Hume and Absolute Necessity Mind

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expressivist theories of absolute modality. Such at least I hope to show

in this paper, in which my main quarry is a consistent and plausibly

Humean reading of the absolute necessity texts. I focus on the Treatise,

since that is where the absolute necessity texts are concentrated. But Iwill also touch on some supporting evidence from the later works, allof which are at least consistent with the mind-dependent, anti-realist

approach suggested in the Treatise.Stroud (1977, p. 241) first broke ground for the mind-dependent

interpretation, proposing that Hume might be treating absolute ne-cessity as a fiction [that] we inevitably project onto what we think

about only because something happens in our minds on certain

occasions. Subsequent commentators have failed to develop thisinsight, however, and Stroud himself merely raised it as a speculativeproposal in the context of one isolated passage. Indeed he positivelydenies that any other passage in Humes writings supports the mind-

dependent interpretation.1 That may be true if we are looking for

direct and explicit avowals of a mind-dependent account of absolute

necessity. But if we expand our search to take in wider textual andsystematic considerations, there is evidence that, while circumstantial,

is cumulatively quite powerful. My aim in this paper is then to mar-shal the full evidence for the mind-dependent interpretation, taking

account of all the various absolute necessity texts along with the

wider systematic and contextual evidence. The interpretation is atleast consistent with what Hume says, and I will argue that it

also helps to motivate and explain a number of otherwise puzzling

passages.2

1 Strouds discussion focuses exclusively on T 1.3.14.23, which is the first text I examine

below.

2 There has been little in the way of sustained discussion of Humes account of the meta-

physics of absolute necessity since Stroud 1977. The following commentators have all taken

Hume to be endorsing some sort of mind-dependent account of the nature of absolute

necessity but these are all very brief treatments, and touch on the question of the nature

of absolute necessity only in passing: Garrett (2008, p. 204), Imlay (1975, p. 42), Millgram

(1997, pp. 2601, n. 45), and Waxman (2005, pp. 5003, 1994, pp. 798). Other commentators

have rejected the mind-dependent interpretation, suggesting instead that Hume is some sort of

realist about absolute necessity. See, for instance, Passmore (1952, p. 19) and Kail (2007, p. 39).

Again, these are only brief and rather indirect treatments. The paucity of secondary literaturein this area is perhaps partly a consequence of the fact that Hume provides so little in the way

of explicit discussion of the interrelated topics of demonstration and absolute necessity a

fact that is stressed by Stroud (1977, p. 240), Kemp Smith (1941, p. 349), and Loeb (2002

pp. 2489).

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2. The interpretative proposal: an expressivistaccount of absolute necessity

Humes most striking pronouncement on the metaphysics of absolutenecessity occurs in Of the idea of necessary connexion (T 1.3.14), thewell-known section of theTreatisein which he advances his account ofcausal necessity. Here, in the course of noting an analogy between histreatment of the necessity of causes on the one hand and his under-standing of absolute necessity on the other, Hume shows us somethingof his hand, providing us with his most direct and explicit remark onthe nature of absolute necessity and a remark, moreover, that hascaused a good deal of consternation among his various commentators.

The passage, with enough surrounding context to make it intelligible,runs as follows:

Upon the whole, [causal] necessity is something that exists in the mind,not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea ofit, considered as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, ornecessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass fromcauses to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experiencedunion.

Thus as the necessity, which makes two times two equal to four, or three

angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the act of theunderstanding, by which we consider and compare these ideas; in like mannerthe necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in thedetermination of the mind to pass from the one to the other. (T1.3.14.223,my emphasis)

Here Hume asserts that the necessity of causes and the absolutenecessity attending demonstrable propositions each depend uponthe workings of the mind. Facts about causal necessities and facts

about absolute necessities both implicate psychological facts, andeach sort of modality can be explained (at least in part) in termsof our own mental activity. Thus, on the one hand, causalnecessityinvolves a certain determination of the mind to connect particularevent-types together in our thought, thereby rendering us unable toavoid believing that the one sort of event will always accompany theother. On the other hand, absolute necessity equally lies in [an]act of the understanding in this case some sort of mental oper-ation by which, Hume offers rather cryptically, we consider and

compare [the relevant] ideas. Of course, if we focus on the case ofcausal necessity at least, it is important to remember that the mind-independent world also plays an essential role alongside the oper-ations of the understanding. Causation is not simplya matter of the


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minds disposition to associate event-types together in a certain way.

It is also a matter of objective regularities obtaining in the world.

Thus in Humes familiar account, a suitably regular experienced

union of two event-types is required to instil the relevant habitsof association in the mind: the world must first contribute a con-stant conjunction of event-types in order for a causal relationship to

obtain, even if the mind must equally contribute its own responsive,

habit-induced expectation.3 Given that Hume is drawing an analogy

between causal necessity on the one hand and absolute necessity onthe other, we should then bear in mind the possibility that the mind-independent world also makes some corresponding contribution in

the latter case. Perhaps mind-independent facts play some role in theproduction of absolute necessity, or in controlling our talk and

thought about absolute necessity, even if that necessity itself liesonly in the act of the understanding.

Humes driving aim in T 1.3.14.23 is to clarify his novel account of

the nature of causal necessity, while the theory of absolute necessity

appears merely as an expository device. Indeed, one peculiarity of thispassage is that Hume seems to expect that his readers will find his view

of absolute necessity less controversial and counterintuitive than hisview of the necessity of causes. He invokes the former to help shed

light on the latter, and presents this sort of mind-dependent theory of

absolute necessity as if it were a relatively familiar and unexception-able commonplace that might help his readers comprehend the basic

strategy of his extraordinary and paradox[ical] new theory of causal

necessity (T 1.3.14.24). But here Hume seems to have misjudged his

audience. Commentators on this passage, at least, have generally

3 The two sides of this account are captured in Humes famous two definitions of cause,

the first of which (an object, followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first,

are followed by objects similar to the second) lays emphasis on objective regularities, and the

second of which (an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the

thought to that other) stresses an association of ideas in our minds (EHU 7.29; see also

T 1.3.14.35). These so-called definitions are notoriously non-coextensive, and best understood

not as definitions proper, but as summaries of the two essential factors that explain our

practice of making causal judgements: (i) the existence of objective regularities in the world,and (ii) the consequent functional shift in our minds. Thus [i] when one particular species of

event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, [ii] we make no longer any

scruple of foretelling the one upon the appearance of the other We then call the one object

Cause, the other, Effect (EHU 7.27).


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found the account of absolute necessity sketched here at least as hard

to swallow as the corresponding account of causal necessity, if not

significantly harder and most of them have reacted with some com-

bination of dismay, annoyance, and embarrassment on Humesbehalf. So here is one puzzle about this passage (a puzzle to which Iwill return): Why did Hume treat the mind-dependent theory of ab-

solute necessity as if it were familiar and reassuring, rather than alien

and unsettling?But what is the core objection to the mind-dependent account of

absolute necessity sketched in T 1.3.14.23, the concern that drives

the commentators negative reactions? The charge is that Humes

proposal seems absurdly psychologistic that is, this sort of mind-dependent account appears to reduce mathematical relationships(and any other relationships characterized by absolute necessity) topsychological relationships, making mathematics (and the subject-

matter of any other sciences characterized by absolute necessity) ab-

surdly dependent on human mental activity. And this looks like a

serious mistake. After all, mathematical relationships are eternal, im-mutable, and a priori, whereas psychological relationships are perish-

ing, mutable, and knowable only through experience. Mostimportantly, mathematical relationships are necessary, while psycho-

logical facts about the workings of the human mind are plainly con-tingent, and so there is no prospect of grounding the former on thelatter. This case against psychologism in the theory of absolute mo-

dality is very well entrenched in our own post-Fregean age (Frege1884/

1953, pp. vx). But the point itself is plain enough, and was certainly

available in Humes own day. Consider, for instance, James Beattiesnear-apoplectic reaction to T 1.3.14.23 in An Essay on the Nature and

Immutability of Truth (1770), his point-by-point reply to HumesTreatise:

What! is it my understanding that makes two and two equal to four! Was itnot so before I was born, and would it not be so though all intelligencewere to cease throughout the universe! But it is idle to spend time inconfuting what every child who had learned the very first elements ofscience, knows to be absurd. (Beattie 1770, p. 315)

Similar charges have also been levelled against T 1.3.14.23 in the more

recent literature (Imlay 1975, p. 42). Moreover, apparently moved bythe desire to avoid charging Hume with such psychologistic absurd-ities, some of his more sympathetic interpreters have tried to save him

from himself, either by denying that he meant what he said in



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T 1.3.14.23,4 or at least by asserting that this is an anomalous text that

he does not really stand by. Thus Kemp Smith declares that it is dif-ficult to account for this passage under any hypothesis, but hazards

the view that it may indicate that Hume hoped for a time to accountfor literally all aspects of human thought through associative psycho-logical mechanisms, before eventually abandoning such a quixoticendeavour (Kemp Smith 1941, pp. 253n, 252). Meanwhile Passmoreasserts that T 1.3.14.23 is simply deviant, and that, by contrast, thegeneral tenor of Humes argument is the more serious view thatdemonstrated propositions have an objective necessity, which can becontrasted with the merely subjective, or internal, necessity of causal

relations (Passmore 1952, p. 19). But this is wishful thinking. KempSmith provides no evidence that Hume subsequently retracted themind-dependent theory of T 1.3.14.23, explicitly or implicitly. Andwhile Hume does of course contrast the necessity of demonstrabletruths with the necessity of causes, he never does so in Passmoresterms: the comparison is never made out in the language of subjectiveversus objective relationships, or internal versus external relation-ships or, for that matter, in terms of mind-dependent versusmind-independent relationships. Passmore provides no textual evi-dence for his claim about the general tenor of Humes modal meta-physics, nor is any to be had.

But can Hume really have embraced the mind-dependent theoryapparently hazarded in T1.3.14.23? And if so, how might he handle thecharge of psychologistic absurdity? (Would he not have anticipatedthis challenge and Beatties rather obvious line of objection?) In sec-tions 3, 4, and 5 below, I present the textual case for thinking thatHume did sincerely intend a mind-dependent account of absolute

necessity, and that he conforms to it throughout his work. I thenconsider the charge of psychologism in more detail, and advance aninterpretation of the act of the understanding in which Hume mostlikely takes absolute necessity to rest. My proposal is that absolute

necessity lies in an act of the understanding in that our talk andthought about absolute necessity is a systematic manifestation ofour sense of what, as a causal-psychological matter, the human

4 For instance, Hausman accepts that this passage is very disconcerting and, if taken

literally, so much nonsense. However, [t]he point, if there is one, of Humes comparisonof intuition with the determination of the mind to move from cause to effect is, on my view,

merely to show that in each case the mind relates ideas, that relation being the ground of the

certainty we feel about each. To say the least, then, I do not take Humes own words literally

(Hausman 1975, pp. 58, 62).


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mind can and cannot conceive. When we assert that a given propos-ition is absolutely necessary, we are expressing an attitude that isprompted and controlled by our sense that we could never successfully

formulate the contrary combination of ideas, and that we are in thisway forced to regard the original proposition as psychologically inex-orable. (This inexorability makes itself felt when we consider andcompare the relevant ideas, and find, for instance, that, as a causal-psychological matter, we just cannot form an idea of two pairs ofobjects that is not also an idea of four objects.) Similarly, when weassert that a proposition is absolutely possible we are expressing anattitude that is prompted by our sense that that proposition is in fact

conceivable by the human mind. Notice that none of this means thatwe need to saddle Hume with the intolerably implausible view thatour claims about absolute necessity and possibility just are attempts toreportor describethe limits of human imagination, any more than weneed to saddle Hume with the implausible view that our claims aboutcausal necessity just are attempts to report or describe our habit-induced expectations regarding what sort of events will follow oneanother. Instead, I will argue that we can more plausibly interpretHume as advancing an expressivist account of absolute necessity an account, that is, that regards our talk about absolute necessity asgiving voice to certain non-representational attitudes that we taketoward certain propositions, its superficially representational appear-ance notwithstanding. When we call a given proposition absolutelynecessary it is not that we are describing it; nor are we are describingthe limits of our own imaginations. Rather, we are expressing a certainnon-representational attitude most likely, the attitude ofprescribingthat that proposition be treated as a non-negotiable element in our

systems of belief, not up for revision in the light of empirical evidence,and in this sense obligatory or required. We might take this sort ofprescriptive attitude toward a proposition as a result of the fact thatwe regard the contrary combination of ideas as inconceivable, but weneed not be thereby reporting or describing any such psychologicalfacts.

3. Evidence from Humes theory of beliefTo begin, consider two passages from Humes discussion of the natureof belief. Humes driving interest in this area is to determine thespecific nature of our beliefs concerning matters of fact and



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existence a new question, he says, unthought of by philosophers(A 17). However, on the way to his main topic Hume does register auseful contrast between this factual sort of belief and the type of belief

that results from reflection on the relations among our ideas that is,the aprioristic conceptual inquiry that takes philosophical rela-tions which [depend] solely on the ideas or the proportions ofideas, considered as such as its subject matter (T 1.3.1.5, 2.3.10.2).This latter domain of inquiry covers propositions that are discover-able by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what isany where existent in the universe. It comprehends the sciences ofGeometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation,

which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain (EHU 4.1;compare also T 1.3.1.25).5 And it is also, of course, the sphere ofabsolutely necessary propositions, of conceptual truths and entail-ments that are independent of empirical fact and immune to empiricaldisconfirmation.

Just before advancing his new theory of the nature of belief inmatters of fact and existence, Hume offers the following aside onthe class of beliefs that are generated by reflection on the relationsamong ideas, a cognitive operation that might proceed by way of

either intuition (the immediate apprehension of self-evident concep-tual relations) or demonstration (the working through of a proofthat is constituted by a series of individually intuitive steps)(T 1.3.1.23, EHU 4.1, 12.27).6

[W]herein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving anyproposition? The answer is easy with regard to propositions, that areprovd by intuition or demonstration. In that case, the person who assentsnot only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily

determind to conceive them in that particular manner, either immedi-ately, or by the interposition of other ideas. Whatever is absurd isunintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive any thingcontrary to a demonstration. [By contrast] in reasonings from causation,and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place,

5 There is one substantive change between the Treatiseand the first Enquiryhere, in that

the latter includes geometry alongside algebra and arithmetic as among the sciences based on

relations of ideas. This marks a change from the official taxonomy of the Treatise, where the

equivalent class of philosophical relations which depending solely upon ideas, can be the

objects of knowledge and certainty (T 1.3.1.2) comprehends the subject-matters of algebra andarithmetic (T 1.3.1.5), but not geometry, which is treated instead as an inexact science drawn

from the general appearance of the objects (T 1.3.1.2, see also T 1.3.1.67).

6 For a useful treatment of Hume on intuition and demonstration, see Owen 1999,

pp. 83112.


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and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question.(T 1.3.7.3)

The same basic account reappears (in much the same context) in theAbstract:

When a demonstration convinces me of any proposition, it not only makesme conceive the proposition, but also makes me sensible, that tisimpossible to conceive any thing contrary. What is demonstratively falseimplies a contradiction; and what implies a contradiction cannot beconceived. (A 18)

These two passages do not present us with a metaphysical account ofthe nature of absolute necessity itself, at least not directly. Rather, they

sketch a doxastic account addressing the nature of a certain sort ofbelief. However, if we shift our immediate focus from the metaphys-

ical question of the nature of absolute necessity to the more tractable

anthropological-psychological question of what human thought aboutabsolute necessity actually amounts to, these texts prove quite illumi-

nating. My suggestion is that we can read these passages for whatHuwPrice (2008)has called a genealogy of modals: an account of what it

is that humans are actually doing when they adopt modal idioms and

think modal thoughts, of why we employ such vocabularies, and ofwhat factors control our modal pronouncements. Approaching thetopic of absolute modality through the science of human nature,

such a genealogical account would provide an explanation of our

talk and thought about absolute necessity in terms of the practicalrole such talk and thought plays in our lives. It might even help to

demystify absolute necessity itself, at least if it managed to explain thefunction of our modal vocabulary in a way that undercut any reason

to believe that we are somehow detecting and tracking a mind-

independent system of absolute necessities.Such a genealogical approach to absolute necessity would at least be

in keeping with a familiar Humean strategy in metaphysics. Consider

Humes treatment of causal necessity. When attempting to get a

handle on the nature of the mysterious necessary connexion relatingcause and effect, Hume finds himself at an early impasse (T 1.3.2.1213,

EHU7.26). Unable to make headway in a frontal assault on this meta-physical question, he recommends that we leave the direct survey of

the problem (T 1.3.2.13; see also T 1.3.6.3), and shifts instead to asecond-order naturalistic investigation of the conditions underwhich creatures like us make causal judgements and inferences

(T 1.3.2.1415; see also EHU 7.27). His hope is that this second-order



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investigation will demystify our first-order causal intuitions. Indeed,[p]erhaps twill appear in the end, that the necessary connexion de-pends on the inference [from cause to effect], instead of the infer-

ences depending on the necessary connexion (T 1.3.6.3) and this isof course the conclusion that Hume eventually reaches with hisaccount of causal necessity as an expression, at least in part, of ourhabit-induced inferential dispositions. A similar genealogical methodunderlies Humes approach to the metaphysics of morals, in which thetraditional programme of attempting to locate moral facts in themind-independent world is replaced by an anthropological accountof the sentimental attitudes that give rise to our actual moral pro-

nouncements. So the parallel suggestion here is that Humes theory ofbelief might point to a similarly naturalistic, second-order accountof what humans are actually doing when they think and talk interms of absolute necessity and absolute possibility.

But how exactly do our two doxastic passages relate to the topic ofabsolute modality? The key point is that the account sketched in thesepassages covers the nature of those beliefs that are prompted by first-person demonstration (or intuition, which I will henceforth take to beincluded under demonstration), and this is a particularly important

way in which we can come to believe that a particular proposition isabsolutely necessary. Of course, it is not the only way. There is also thecase where we accept that a proposition is absolutely necessary with-out having worked through the demonstration for ourselves as, forinstance, when we accept an expert mathematicians claim that a cer-tain theorem can indeed be proved (T 2.3.10.6). However, beliefs gen-erated by first-person demonstration are at least typically the only sortof case in which our assent to what we take to be an absolutely ne-

cessary proposition is accompanied by the sense that we have actuallygrasped its inexorable character. We do not merely believe that theproposition is absolutely necessary, but also believe that we have seenthis for ourselves. In following out the conceptual entailments amongour ideas and working through the proof in this first-person fashion,we take ourselves to have understood the propositions inescapability:to have seen for ourselves that it could not have been otherwise. Wehave, or so we believe, an understanding ofits absolute necessity.7

7 There is also a second reason why first-person demonstration is of particular interest foran understanding of our thought about absolutely necessity. For Hume, any proposition that is

absolutely necessary is ipso facto demonstrable, at least in principle. All absolutely necessary

truths concern relations of ideas (T 2.3.10.2, 3.1.1.9), and any relation among ideas can be

demonstrated through conceptual reflection by a sufficiently accurate thinker possessed of the


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comes the same thing for Hume, the imagination, the faculty of form-ing image-like ideas as a guide.9

First, Hume holds that if some state of affairs can be clearly and

distinctly conceived, then it is absolutely possible. [N]othing of whichwe can form a clear and distinct idea is absurd and impossible, hedeclares; and whatever weconceiveis possible, at least in a metaphys-ical sense (T 1.1.7.6, A 11; see also T 1.2.2.8, 1.2.4.11, EHU 4.25).10 Thisconceivability principleis set to work in many of Humes most familiararguments including, for instance, his argument that we can haveno a priori assurance that the future will resemble the past (T 1.3.6.5),his argument against the claim that anything that begins to exist must

have a cause (T 1.3.3.1), and his argument that we have no idea ofcausal power as a mind-independent feature of objects (T 1.3.14.13).Hume employs this principle with great conviction, telling us boththat it is a necessary truth and that it is impossible seriously to denyit.11 Second, Hume also holds that if a certain state of affairs cannot beclearly and distinctly conceived by the human mind, then that state ofaffairs is absolutely impossible and hence, presumably, the contrarystate of affairs is absolutely necessary. Although he employs this in-conceivability principle less often in actual argumentation, his express

commitment to it seems clear, and he apparently regards the twoprinciples as on the same robust epistemic footing. (The key texthere is T 1.2.2.8, which I will examine in a moment.) As I will argue

9 For Hume all mental representation is a matter of producing mental imagery. Being

ultimately derived from experience, all of our ideas are imagistic in character imagistic,

that is, in a broad sense, covering the various ideas furnished by outer sense (including

auditory, gustatory, olfactory, tactile, and visual images) and inner reflection (including

images of the passions and other internal sentiments), plus the ideas that we can construct

by separating or combining the ideas from this original empirically given stock. So Humes

empiricist model of mind handles all cognitive representation in terms of mental imagerytraceable ultimately to experience, and he rejects the sort of refind and spiritual non-

imagistic ideas posited by Descartes and other rationalist philosophers (T 1.3.1.7). It follows

that the understanding is just a part of the imagination or faculty of producing mental images

(T 1.4.7.7, T 1.3.9.19 note). Likewise, to form an idea, to conceive, and to imagine are all one

and the same thing (see, for instance, T 1.2.2.8). For a useful discussion of Hume on ideas,

imagery, and mental representation, see Garrett 1997, pp. 1140.

10 Hume never defines clarity and distinctness himself, but he is obviously drawing on the

familiar Cartesian terminology, in which to be clear is to be present and open to the attentive

mind, and to be distinct is to be free from any hidden detail or confusion (Descartes 1644/

1991, pp. 2078).11 Whatever can be conceivd by a clear and distinct idea necessarilyimplies the possibility

of existence (T 1.2.4.11, my emphasis). We can at least conceive a change in the course of

nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change is not absolutely impossible. To form a

clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its possibility (T 1.3.6.5, my emphasis).


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in section 7 below, the kind of conceivability and inconceivability atwork in these principles is not a matter of the imaginative powers ofthis or that actualhuman mind, since the imagination of any given

actual mind may be limited by its narrow experience and hence in-complete stock of simple ideas. Our concern is not with such local anderadicable imaginative limitations, but rather with the imaginativelimitations that are part of the permanent structure and constitutionof our shared human nature: the limitations that even a mind pos-sessed of the relevant simple ideas would encounter.

Given the traditional realist understanding of absolute modality as amind-independent matter, Humes faith in these two principles would

be quite puzzling. He offers no account of how this imagination-driven detection of modal facts is supposed to work, nor is it easyto see how premisses about what we can and cannot conceive could

justify conclusions about a supersensible and mind-independentdomain of absolute necessities and possibilities. Of course, the chal-lenge of explaining our ability to detect the absolute modal status ofpropositions would not just be Humes problem. There is a familiarpuzzle here for any realist account of absolute necessity and possibil-ity, for once such a realist picture is in place the human capacity to

detect modal facts can seem quite baffling. (There seems little prospectof a causal explanation of our ability to detect a mind-independentorder of necessity and possibility along the lines of the causal explan-ation of perception, and it is difficult to see what alternative sort ofaccount might serve.) However, while modal realism raises a quitegeneral puzzle for modal epistemology, the difficulty here would beparticularly pressing for Hume.

First, consider the strength of his conceivability and inconceivability

principles. According to these principles, clear and distinct conceiv-ability and inconceivability are not merelyreliably correlatedwith pos-sibility and impossibility. These principles do not support merely afallibilistic and defeasible evidential link between our clear and distinctconceivings on the one hand and conclusions about absolute modalityon the other. Rather, clear and distinct conceivabilityentailspossibil-ity, while inconceivabilityentailsimpossibility. These are strong meta-physical claims: strong enough to underwrite the infallibilityof clearand distinct conceivability as an indicator of absolute modality.12

12 Of course, one might have doubts about whether a certain state of affairs is in fact clearly

and distinctly conceivable: there is still room for error at this initial stage of the appeal to

conceivability as a guide to possibility. But the fact remains that, if Hume were indeed a modal

realist, he would be making very ambitious claims about the connection between conceivability



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Second, there is the degree of confidence that Hume places in these

principles. He appears to have an implicit and total faith in them,

notwithstanding his various sceptical doubts about the other oper-

ations of the understanding.13 It is worth pausing to emphasize justhow surprising this confidence is, for Hume is not usually so sanguineabout the capacity of the human understanding to discern the funda-

mental metaphysical structure of the mind-independent world. The

philosophy of the Treatise tends rather to give us a notion of the

imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding (A 27) and most of the time, at least, Hume is intent on checking rather thanpromoting our pretensions to metaphysical insight through pure ra-

tional reflection.14

So what has happened to Humes usual scepticaldiffidence when he declares that conceivability provides us with an

infallible guide to the facts about absolute modality?The puzzle evaporates in the light of the mind-dependent reading. If

absolute possibility and necessity are just a reflection of what humans

can and cannot conceive, then epistemological concerns about the gap

between psychological premisses and modal conclusions are mis-placed. Thereisno gap. Other features of Humes modal epistemology

also fall into place. Clear and distinct conceivability entails possibility;inconceivability entails impossibility: this is because the modal prop-

erties are constituted by the limits of human imagination. Again, if

our modal notions are just the shadow of our imaginative blocks, thenwe can understand both why Hume would assert that clear and

on the one hand and the mind-independent order of absolute necessity and possibility on the

other.

13 In particular, notice that the sceptical challenge to demonstrative reason in T 1.4.1 (Of

Scepticism with Regard to Reason) calls neither the conceivability principle nor the incon-ceivability principle into question. Although Hume argues in T 1.4.1 that all demonstrative

knowledge degenerates into probability since we must take our track-record of errors with

this sort of reasoning into account, and need to iteratively check and re-check our proofs for

possible mistakes, none of this means that Hume has any doubts about the conceivability

principle and the inconceivability principle themselves. In fact, in all demonstrative sciences,

the rules are certain and infallible; it is just that when we apply [those rules], our fallible and

uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error (T 1.4.1.1).

14 It is also worth stressing that sceptical doubts about the reliability of conceivability as a

guide to possibility were quite familiar in Humes day. Descartess First Meditation culminates

with the threat of such scepticism, and doubts about the reliability of our clear and distinct

conceptions had been revivified (and explicitly tied to the traditional problem of the criterion)in Bayles scandalous article on Pyrrho. (Descartes 1641/1991a, pp. 1415; compare also his 1641/

1991b, p. 107. Bayle 16957/1991, pp. 199203.) For Humes familiarity with Descartess

Meditations and Bayles Dictionary, see his letter to Michael Ramsey of 31 August 1737,

which is reproduced in Popkin 1980, pp. 2902.


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distinct conceivability provides an undeniable argument for possi-

bility (T1.3.6.5), and why he would regard the conceivability principle

as a necessary truth (T 1.2.4.11). At the same time, none of this com-

mits Hume to the absurd view that we cannot go wrong in our judge-ments of absolute necessity and possibility. Given the mind-dependentapproach sketched so far, a judgement about the modal status of a

proposition is some sort of expression of ones sense of the conceiv-

ability or inconceivability of that proposition by the human under-

standing, and so beneath our pronouncements about absolutenecessity and possibility will ultimately lie convictions about theimaginative limitations that are part and parcel of human nature.

But clearly we can err in our judgements about these imaginativelimitations.

For a specific example of the mind-dependent interpretations abil-ity to explain otherwise puzzling features of Humes modal epistem-

ology, we might consider T1.2.2.8, a somewhat notorious piece of text.

This is Humes most expansive passage on the conceivability principle,

and it seems to include (in the third sentence) an endorsement of theinconceivability principle as well.

Tis an establishd maxim in metaphysics, that whatever the mind clearlyconceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, thatnothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of agolden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain mayactually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, andtherefore regard it as impossible. (T 1.2.2.8)

The first striking feature of this passage is the fact that the opening

sentence provides not one but two formulations of the establishd

maxim. Since Hume connects the two (italicized) formulations ofthis maxim with the expression in other words, it seems that he

holds that they are at bottom statements of one and the same prin-ciple. However, there is at the very least a shift in emphasis between

the two. The first formulation, after all, announces a thesis about theidea of possible existence, whereas the second speaks not of theideaofpossible existence, but rather of absolute impossibility and, by impli-

cation, absolute possibility itself. To many readers, the first formula-tion has seemed to affirm a relationship between our clear conceptions

or imaginings and a species ofapparentorseemingpossibility, whereasthe second plainly affirms a relationship between our clear concep-tions or imaginings and genuinepossibility. In fact, since the equivo-

cation here can seem so obvious, this text has often served as Exhibit A



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for those who would charge Hume with sliding recklessly from pre-misses about apparent possibility on the one hand to conclusionsabout genuine possibility on the other (Yablo 1993, pp. 45). On

this reading, the shift between the two formulations would besimply an oversight on Humes part. It is as if he simply fails tonotice the difference between the two, perhaps thereby demonstratinga nave and uncritical faith in the power of the human imagination todisclose facts about absolute modality. But the mind-dependent inter-pretation avoids charging Hume with such an apparently obviousblunder. On this interpretation, to be absolutely possible is, atbottom, to be clearly and distinctly conceivable or, more cautiously

and precisely, when one says that a certain proposition is absolutelypossible, one is expressing an attitude (perhaps a non-representationalattitude) that is prompted by ones sense that that proposition isclearly and distinctly conceivable. So with the mind-dependent inter-pretation we can see why Hume regards the two formulations of theestablishd maxim as interchangeable, and we can take T 1.2.2.8at itsliteral word when it announces their effective equivalence.

There is also a second puzzle about this passage, which has not tomy knowledge been taken up in the literature. In the opening sentence

Hume announces the conceivability principle or establishd maximin its general form (providing his two formulations), and then goes onin the following sentences to cite, first, the example of the (conceivableand therefore possible) golden mountain and, second, the example ofthe (inconceivable and therefore impossible) mountain without avalley. These examples are clearly intended to illustrate and confirmthe establishd maxim announced at the start of the paragraph.However, the second example the case of the mountain without a

valley seems in fact to be an instance of the inconceivability prin-ciple at work, not an instance of the conceivability principle. Hume isapparently conflating the two principles, and on any traditional viewthis is an egregious logical blunder. Given the traditional realist under-standing of absolute modality as a mind-independent matter, theclaim that conceivability entails possibility is one thing, and theclaim that inconceivability entails impossibility is quite another.After all, even if every state of affairs that we can conceive of is pos-sible, it would not follow that we can conceive of every possible state

of affairs: there is no reason to think that the conceivability principleentails the inconceivability principle (or vice versa). Humes fallacy,on this interpretation, would be quite an embarrassment. Butof course, if possibility were at bottom the same thing as


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conceivability as per the mind-dependent theory then the two

principles would be interchangeable after all. Once again, the mind-

dependent interpretation clears up the difficulty, and Humes appar-

ent misstep is no misstep at all.15

There is even a third feature of T 1.2.2.8 that gives additional suc-

cour to the mind-dependent interpretation. This paragraph provides

an excellent example of the way in which Hume slips so readily intothe genealogical or anthropological mode (which I discussed in Sect. 3

above), giving us a second-order description of the sorts of occasionsin which creatures like us make modal pronouncements where an-

other philosopher might rather simply have affirmed first-order modal

intuitions in his own voice. Thus in order to illustrate and confirm theestablishd maxim set out in the opening sentence, Hume directs usto anthropological, second-order claims about the sort of factors thatprompt human talk and thought about possibility and impossibility.

We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence con-

clude that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea of

a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible.Depending on whether or not we can form a certain sort of idea, we

declare the state of affairs represented by that idea to be either possibleor impossible.Thatis what humans are doing when they make modal

claims, and that helps to show us what modal talk is in fact talk about.

Thus we can admit the general move from conceivability to possibilityset out in the opening sentence.

15 Lightner (1997)argues Hume does not in fact endorse the inconceivability principle, andsuggests that T 1.2.2.8 only commits him to the principle that if any idea of a thing would be

contradictory, then that thing is absolutely impossible which contradiction principle

Lightner regards as weaker than the inconceivability principle (Lightner 1997, p. 116). But

this is unpersuasive. The text of T 1.2.2.8 speaks of our inability to form an idea of a mountain

without a valley, and says nothing about the contradictory nature of such an idea. Lightner

adds that If Hume did accept the Inconceivability Principle, one would think that in the

twenty-four or more instances of his stating or using the Conceivability Principle, he would

have made it clear that the inference goes both ways (p. 115). But, first, Hume did make this

clear in T 1.2.2.8, his most expansive discussion of the conceivability principle. Second, there

are good reasons why Hume would only use the inconceivability principle in a case (such as

T 1.2.2.8) where there is a manifest contradiction in the idea we are trying to form, since onlythen is the premiss that the idea is inconceivable likely to be uncontroversial. Third, if Hume

holds that the conceivability principle and the inconceivability principle are equivalent (as the

mind-dependent interpretation would have it, and as T 1.2.2.8 suggests), then there would be

no need to repeatedly state both principles, since they are really one and the same.



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5. Evidence from Humes interweaving of logic andpsychology

There are other texts that slip back and forth between claims aboutwhat is absolutely possible and claims about what we can conceive in away that suggests that the one notion may simply be the reflection ofthe other. Consider part 9.6 of the Dialogues Concerning NaturalReligion in which the movement between modal claims and psycho-logical claims is particularly striking.16 Here in DNR part 9, Hume ismobilizing his thesis that the contrary of any matter of fact is con-ceivable in order to press the following objection against the trad-itional view that the Deity exists necessarily. (This is Cleanthes

speaking, but Philo is apparently content to stand by and letCleanthes press these points for the both of them.17)

It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and thisnecessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that ifwe knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be asimpossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it isevident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at

present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie

under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in thesame manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two tobe four. The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or,which is the same thing, none that is consistent. (DNR9.6, first emphasismine)

Humes conclusion in this passage is that necessary existence is aninconsistent and hence meaningless expression. We can therefore ruleout any proposal that the existence of the Deity (or any other being)

is absolutely necessary, and so the traditional argument a priori(DNR9.1) for the necessary existence of a first cause of all is derailedfrom the start. To get to this conclusion, Hume manifestly appeals topsychological claims about the operation of the human understand-ing. He draws a modal conclusion (rejecting the claim that the

16 For other examples of Hume moving insouciantly back and forth between modal claims

and psychological claims, see EHU 4.2 and EHU 12.28.

17 Cleanthes prefaces his attack on Demeas case for a necessary being with the comment

that I shall not leave it to Philo, (though I know that the starting objections is his chiefdelight), to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning (DNR 9.4). And Philo

apparently approves of Cleanthess objections, for once Cleanthes has completed his critique,

Philo announces that the reasonings, which you have urged, Cleanthes, may well excuse

me from starting any further difficulties (DNR 9.10).


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existence of any being is absolutely necessary) from what are appar-ently contingent psychological premisses (this can never happen,while our faculties remain the same as at present).

Here it is instructive to follow the details of Humes dialectic.Apologists for the argument a priori pretend that the Deity is anecessarily existent being, though apparently they are also preparedto admit that we might not be able to perceive this recondite form ofnecessity for ourselves. Their attempted but ultimately unsuccessfulexplanation of the Deity s necessary existence turns on the claim thatif our minds were improved in a certain sort of way, then we wouldcome to perceive it to be as impossible for [the Deity] not to exist, as

for twice two not to be four. In effect, such apologists are makinginconceivabilityby this sort of enhanced mindthe standard of absoluteimpossibility (and hence of absolute necessity). But Hume himselfresists this. The standard of absolute impossibility (and hence ofabsolute necessity) is rather inconceivability by minds like ours.Moreover, the fact is that while our faculties remain the same as atpresent that is, given the fundamental operations of the under-standing that are a part of human nature we can never lie undera necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in the

same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twicetwo to be four. That is just how our minds are wired, and that forHume is enough to secure his strong modal conclusion. The function-ing of other sorts of minds, by contrast, is dismissed as irrelevant tothe point. Since our human faculties are structured in a certain sort ofway, then certain sorts of states of affairs are absolutely possible, andtheres an end ont.18 Once again, the mind-dependent interpretation

18 Kail has argued, contrary to my own reading, that Cleanthes is leaving open the possi-

bility that an enhanced mind might in fact be able to grasp that God exists necessarily.According to Kail, the reasoning provided by Cleanthes merely tells us that we can have

no knowledge of [this] necessity as we are presently constituted; not that there is, or can

be, no such feature. Cleanthess opponent would have to envisage a change in human

cognitive faculties before [an a priori proof of Gods existence] is forthcoming; as we actually

are, there can be no such proof. This reading is quite enough to undermine the a priori

argument for the existence of God and give Hume what he wants ( Kail 2007, pp. 1001; for a

similar interpretation, seeWright 1983, pp. 1478). This would indeed be enough to undermine

the a priori argument for the existence of God, but it is not the argument that Cleanthes

actually gives in DNR 9.6. Cleanthess argument aims at the stronger conclusion that [t]he

words necessary existencehave no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consist-

ent. It is not that we can have no knowledge of this necessary existence (while other minds yetmight); it is that talk of necessary existence is empty nonsense. Cleanthes is, moreover, quite

disparaging about the theological apologists attempted gloss of necessary existence by way of

the appeal to an enhanced mind, characterizing it as simply a pretended explication of ne-

cessity (DNR9.6, 9.7). He shows no sign of taking it seriously, and his and Philos subsequent



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explains why Hume frames his riposte to the argument a priori in thisway, and why he so plainly privileges minds like ours as the arbiters ofmodal facts. Our imaginative abilities are what they are, and that is

whyno proposition affirming the existence of an object is absolutelynecessary.

Finally, consider a passage from the introduction to the Treatiseinwhich Hume explicitly declares his intention to annex the traditionaltopics of logic which would presumably include the nature of ab-solute necessity and possibility, and the structure and interrelation-ships of modal truths to a form of anthropology. The context hereis Humes opening manifesto for a science of man and his insistence

on the authority of this science over all other fields of human inquiry.There is no question of importance, whose decision is not comprizdin the science of man, he writes, and there is none, which can bedecided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with thatscience (T Introduction6). Hume gives two reasons. The first is thatall the various sciences are pursued by means of our own humanfaculties, and so the conduct of all sciences even those whose ownpeculiar subject matter lies wide of human nature is subject to cor-rection and control by a proper view of the operation and limits ofhuman understanding. The second is that the subject matter of manyparticular sciences among which Hume prominently includeslogic is inextricably bound up with the nature of the humanunderstanding:

If the sciences of mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion,have such a dependence on the knowledge of man [since they lie under thecognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties(T Introduction 4)], what may be expected in the other sciences, whose

connexion with human nature is more close and intimate?The sole end oflogic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and

the nature of our ideas: Morals and criticism regard our tastes andsentiments: And politics consider men as united in society, and dependenton each other. (T Introduction 5, emphasis mine)

In the sentence that I have italicized (and which is repeated in theAbstract(A 3)), Hume states that the exclusive purpose of logic is toexplain the workings of a certain part of human psychology, namely

references to necessary existence when raising further objections to the argument a prioriarepace Kail (2007, p. 100) entirely ad hominem: he and Philo are showing that, even

if we suspend the point that necessary existence is unintelligible jargon, there are other fatal

problems for the theologians argument a priori. For an interpretation of DNR 9.6 more in

tune with my own, see Winkler, 1991, pp. 812.


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the nature of our ideas and the workings of our reasoning fac-ulty that is, the faculty (which Hume also calls the understand-ing) that is responsible for both our probable and our demonstrative

inferences. Logic, on such a view, is a subfield of the science of humannature: the subfield focusing on our representational and inferentialfaculties. It is a self-reflexive form of inquiry in which the humanmind utilizes its own cognitive principles and operations in order toexamine its own cognitive principles and operations. We might nowcall it cognitive psychology, and in so far as it focuses on the workingsof the understanding (or reasoning faculty) we might perhaps class itas a species of naturalized epistemology. So if Hume is thinking of the

theory of absolute necessity and possibility as a part of logic, then he isannouncing a psychological treatment of such matters from the start.At least, this would help to explain why Hume seems (in T 1.3.14.23) toexpect that his readers will be relatively unperturbed by a mind-de-pendent account of absolute necessity in comparison with his para-doxical new proposal for a mind-dependent treatment of the necessityof causes (T 1.3.14.24), since both in the Introduction and in many ofthe intervening parts of Book1, Hume has been steadily advocating for

just this sort of reorientation of the traditional topics of logic toward

the science of human nature.19

6. The charge of psychologism

With the evidence now in hand, we have a strong case for takingHume at his word when he locates absolute necessity in an act ofthe understanding at T 1.3.14.23. Humes doxastic texts addressing thepeculiar nature of belief in demonstrated propositions; the broad

structure and detailed expression of his modal epistemology; the inter-weaving of psychology and logic in theDialoguesand the introductionto theTreatise: these various factors all point toward a mind-depend-ent theory of absolute necessity one that would interpret our talkand thought about absolute necessity as some sort of systematic mani-festation of our sense of what can and cannot be clearly and distinctlyconceived. No one passage is decisive, but the evidence has significantcumulative power. And since the rival realist interpretation both lacksany explicit or implicit textual support (at least that I am aware of ),

19 For a useful survey of the convergence of logic and cognitive psychology in various early

modern philosophers including Arnauld, Locke, Hume, and the pre-critical Kant, see George

1997.



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and generates several infelicities in Humes reasoning and expression,

we can be fairly confident in attributing to him some sort of mind-

dependent account of absolute necessity.

What then of the charge of psychologism? Does Humes treatmentof absolute necessity invite disaster, making arithmetic, algebra, and

the other demonstrative sciences absurdly dependent on human ways

of thought? To deal with this concern, we must first distinguish thequestion of whether non-modalized demonstrable truths depend on

facts about human psychology from the question of whether moda-

lizeddemonstrable truths depend on facts about human psychology.

Consider the non-modal proposition

(NM) Two times two equals four

and the modal proposition

(M) It is absolute necessary that two times two equals four

When Hume writes that the necessity, which makes two times twoequal to four lies only in [an] act of the understanding (T1.3.14.23),

he is clearly treating the truth of (M) as some sort of consequence of

the operations of the human mind. But it is not so clear that he is also

committed to treating the truth of (NM) as a consequence of suchoperations. Although (NM) is one of those truths that depend only onrelations among ideas (T 2.3.10.2, 3.1.1.9, EHU 4.1), and ideas are psy-

chological items, this need not make (NM) itself a consequence of

human psychology: the relations here might be non-psychological

even if the relata are psychological. Perhaps the relations obtainsimply in virtue of the intrinsic representational or semantic content

of those ideas what Descartes would call their objective reality

regardless of the role those ideas play in the mechanisms of the humanmind. So there might be non-psychological reasons why, for example,

any idea that we can form of two pairs of objects is also an idea of fourobjects, whether or not we are aware of this commonality, and

whether or not the mind does anything with it, consciously or other-

wise. One wishes that Hume had expressed himself more clearly onthis point, but I see nothing in T 1.3.14.23 (or any other text) that

forces us to read him as offering a mind-dependent, anti-realist ap-proach to non-modal demonstrable truths. So perhaps he would have

said that (NM) obtains in virtue of mind-independent relations alone,while (M) brings in the notion of absolute necessity and so requireshis mind-dependent treatment if it is to be fully explained. Humes

handling of absolute necessity would then be quite parallel to his


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handling of the necessity of causes, in which he grants that the mind-

independent world contributes objective relations that condition our

judgements of causal necessity, even if the notion of necessity at work

in those causal judgements can itself only be understood with refer-ence to the human mind.20

The charge of psychologism still stands against Humes treatment of

demonstrable propositions in their modalized form. As I have beenarguing, Humedoesembrace a mind-dependent account of the nature

of absolute necessity, and hence must regard the truth of a modalizedproposition such as (M) as some sort of consequence of psychological

facts. So, to renew the objection, is thisresult not itself an unpalatable

absurdity? Is (M) not an eternal and immutable truth beyond thevagaries of anthropology and psychology? (Was it not so beforeI was born, and would it not be so though all intelligence were tocease throughout the universe!)

It will help to distinguish three possible complaints here, each of

which might fall under the general charge of an untenable psycholo-gism. First, it can just seem intuitively evident that modal facts aremind-independent realities, not some sort of consequence of human

attitudes or habits of mind. Second, a semantic point: in making a

claim about the modal status of a proposition, we neither sayanything

about human psychology, nor do we implyanything about it; it fol-lows that modal facts cannot be reduced to facts about the workings of

the human mind. Third, if the modal status of propositions were somesort of systematic reflection of facts about human psychology then the

modal status of propositions would be mutable, subject to change

whenever there are changes in the relevant aspects of human psych-ology. Since this result is absurd, it follows that the modal status

of propositions cannot be a systematic reflection of psychologicalfacts.

The first objection emphasizes the apparent intuitive obviousness ofmodal realism. But we have excellent grounds to think that Hume, at

least, would have been quite unmoved by an appeal to realist intu-

itions in the current context. That is because he explicitly addresses an

20 As to what may be said, that the operations of nature are independent of our thought

and reasoning, I allow it; and accordingly have observd, that objects bear to each other the

relations of contiguity and succession; that like objects may be observd in several instances tohave like relations; and that all this is independent of, and antecedent to the operations of the

understanding. But if we go any farther, and ascribe a power or necessary connexion to these

objects; that is what we can never observe in them, but must draw the idea of it from what we

feel internally in contemplating them (T 1.3.14.28).



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analogous challenge to his mind-dependent account of the necessity of

causes, and his response to that objection would readily carry over,point-by-point, to a parallel defence of his mind-dependent account

of absolute necessity. In T 1.3.14, following his initial statement of hismind-dependent account of causal necessitation, Hume predicts thatmy sentiments [regarding the necessity of causes] will be treated as

extravagant and ridiculous, since they jar with well-entrenched realistintuitions affirming the mind-independence of causal power. He con-

jures up an imaginary objector who gives voice to this complaint in

the following terms:

What! the efficacy of causes lie in the determination of the mind! As if

causes did not operate entirely independently of the mind, and woud notcontinue their operation, even tho there was no mind existent tocont

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