Humanitarian Programming and Monitoring In Inaccessible Conflict

Settings Review: Preliminary Findings

Prepared by: Simran Chaudhri, MPH Columbia University (working with UNICEF) GHC Partner Meeting, 23-24 June 2016, Maison de la Paix, Geneva

Why perform this review?

Increasing number, length and complexity of conflicts accessibility growing issue

Lack of guidance on programming and monitoring in inaccessible settings • Current practices largely trial and error and rarely evidence based

Demand from humanitarian sector/GHC

“…an operational response to insecurity, [involving the withdrawal or drastic reduction of] international and sometimes national personnel from the field, transferring greater program responsibility to local staff or local partner organizations, and overseeing activities from a different location.”

(Norman 2012, Tearfund)

Remote Management

1. Systematic literature review of published peer-reviewed papers • 6 databases searched

• Consensus methodology (CDC + UNICEF)

2. Grey-literature review • Google and organizational website search

• Resources provided via key contacts

• Consensus methodology (CDC + UNICEF)

Review Methods

Systematic Review of Published Peer-reviewed Literature

Systematic Review Results I

Systematic Review Results II 4 strategies identified to increase access

1. Task shifting to indigenous providers

• Local health care providers trained by expats prior (MSF Somalia) • Local health care providers crossed Myanmar-Thai boarder to

receive training (Backpack Health Worker Team)

2. Adapting/simplifying protocols to context

• Simplifying TB monitoring protocols for non-TB clinicians (MSF, DRC)

• Adapting program messaging to make sure it is culturally sensitive with local language and clearly dissociating it from government programs (so impartial) (Global Fund, Afghanistan). Community acceptance and uptake.

3. Technological support • Telemedicine with videoconferencing support from

specialists in other countries (MSF Somalia) • Measuring displaced populations remotely using

mobile phone and satellite data (Côte d’Ivoire)

4. Gaining buy-in from local communities,

authorities, armed-groups • Networking and relationship building to facilitate

access (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia)

Systematic Review Results III

Grey Literature Review

• Key contacts identified first through working group and then via snowball sampling • Asked to provide documents from their organization

or elsewhere pertaining to programming and monitoring in inaccessible conflict affected settings

• 65+ documents included

• case studies, guidelines, reports, evaluations, etc.

• New documents being continuously added

Grey Literature Review I

• Types of Remote Management

• Need to maintain humanitarian principles

• Partnerships/Capacity building

• Coordination

Grey Literature Review Themes

• Risk management • Advocacy • Acceptability • Accountability

• Remote Management

Trap

Remote Control • All/nearly all decisions by relocated international managers • Reactive, Unsustainable, inflexible, limited monitoring, vulnerable to staff turnover

Remote Management • Partial delegation of authority/responsibility to national staff • Moderate investment in skill transfer/capacity building of national staff • Option for those with some experience in context, vulnerable to staff turnover

Remote Support • Proactive developmental strategy • Full investment in mentoring, skill transfer/capacity building with plans of eventual handover • Assumes high level of experience in context; less vulnerable to shocks

Remote Partnership • Equal partnership and near complete handover of responsibility to local actors • Remote partner supports resource mobilization, advocacy, administration • Operational partner focuses on context and operationally • Can be difficult to ensure equitable status

Types of Remote Programming

(Hansen, 2008)

Reasons for Remote Management

(Norman, 2011 – Tearfund)

Need to ensure local staff are trained in humanitarian principles to guide programming decisions and ensure program is implemented as intended

Impartiality issue, more pressure on local staff that can lead to more risks

Should humanitarian imperative be given priority over independence/neutrality?

Maintenance of Humanitarian Principles

Partner selection • Weed out disreputable partners with alternative agendas, ties into impartiality • Prioritize partners with capacity and history in context: selected by well know

history • Partners with contacts and coming to meeting, not necessarily the right ones.

Capacity building is essential • Training on implementation, reporting, and security PRIOR to program found to

improve program quality and better meet outputs, for national actors • Training can happen blindly without looking at national capacity already, training

in areas that they don’t need: can lead to mistrust • Sharing of information and experiences between local NGOs

• Ex: NCCI Field Focal Point Network in Iraq

• Communication and trust building: proper communication protocols

Partnership & Capacity Building

Difficulty in coordinating multiple levels of operation with perspectives that vary by proximity to field

Difficulty coordinating with multiple INGOs and agencies with own protocols and agendas

Coordination

• Solutions: - Clearly defined internal

communication protocol - Culture and context specific

strategies • Ex: Afghanistan Shura

System

• Risk transfer: international national and local staff - Faulty assumption that national staff are at lower risk, ethics. - National staff can still be a foreigner if from a different part of the country,

risks of pressure from the community, etc. - Often not capacity building, communications and supplies taken back by

international staff, need contingency plan. - With a certain level of resources and decision making, that increased risk

closer to international. Lack of planning or agreed upon way of management. • Others….

• Solutions: - Better risk assessment for national staff taking their unique risks into

consideration - Capacity building for implementation and security - Equal resources to support security - Early definition of contingency plan and agreement with donors on how best

to support nationals

Risk & Risk Management

By local staff - Mistrust between local implementers and remote managers

decreased acceptance • Increasing distance • heavily guarded visits • reduced communication

- Solutions • Maximize face-to-face contact • Favor Remote Support over Remote Control where possible

By beneficiaries: lack of contact with staff - Mistrust of organizations and fear of connections to combatants - Solutions:

- Community participation in program planning, implementation, and monitoring, face-to-face interaction

- Some visibility to ensure community knows who is providing services

Acceptability

Upwards accountability towards donors • Focus of much M&E • Disconnect between donor requirements and what is feasible in the

setting • National staff putting themselves at risk for unrealistic donor

requirements

Downwards accountability toward beneficiaries • Important to ensure program goals and address implementation issues

during process • Methods:

• Transparency over and monitoring of entitlements • Community complaint mechanisms with thorough follow-up • Ex: Beneficiary Reference Groups Afghanistan

Accountability / M&E I

General Methods: • Direct Monitoring in field by staff • 3rd party monitoring (independent consultant): impartial and objective, but

expensive. Not many firms, so repetitive and reduces objectivity, so try others below or combined monitoring for all international programs.

• Cross-program monitoring • Peer-monitoring • Triangulation: Approach community members, NGOs in the field, get opinion on

how things are done, but not totally reliable. • Simulated field visit: technology • Information and communications technologies

• Mobile data collection • Photo/video evidence with date/time/GIS encryption • Data management, organization, and analysis software • Ex: Qlik Dashboard used in Syria Program

Accountability / M&E II

Example of Monitoring Strategy In Kandahar

(Souness, 2011)

Challenges: • Lack of good baseline data for performance indicators, collecting at

the end of the program

• Rapid aid influxes prohibit M&E to be build in from onset

• Limited presence, not on the ground to collect data and ensure quality

• Convincing local staff resources should be spent on M&E over life-saving aid - need to share findings and explain why important.

• Hard to ensure accuracy

Accountability / M&E III

Local NGOs do not carry the same weight and influence in advocacy efforts as international counterparts

Legitimacy of advocacy is directly related to on the ground presence reduced in remote management

Advocacy

Stuck in remote management and unable to revert back to regular programming

• Causes

- Outdated or skewed perception of insecurity - Protection oriented security culture - Must follow protective stance of other organizations as to not become a

target, makes more dependent and stay in remote - Reduced acceptance because internationals not seen

• Solutions: - Clearly defined exit strategy - Continuous communication with field/maximize visits - Triangulate sources to get better picture of context on ground

Remote Management Trap

• Need for clear evidence-based guidance on remote programming and monitoring methods

• Contingency planning incorporated into program framework from onset

• Incorporation of clear exit strategy

• Need for forum to share best practices without compromising program security

Need for Planning and Guidance

Way Forward

How can the findings be strengthened? More interviews and case studies, much is lessons learned.

How can the findings be used to have an impact

What is the final product people would like to see? Are a few guidelines on principles of remote management

and good practices, but not specific methodology

Guidance that walks programmers through when to initiate RM (with appropriate tick box indicators), training of national staff (with core themes and maybe even lesson plans), monitoring (with a minimum set of core indicators, how to initiate and implement specific methods)

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Thank You.