Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa

David R. Smock

UNITED STATESINSTITUTE OF PEACE

Summary v

Foreword vii

1 Introduction 1

2 The Problem: Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict 2

3 The Complicating and Compromising Context 4

4 What Should Be Done? 6

5 Discussion of Three Cases 11

6 Critical Issues Requiring Attention 13

Symposium Participants 16

About the Author 17

About the Institute 18

CONTENTS

Humanitarian assistance provided in recentyears by nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) in Africa has saved hundreds of

thousands of lives. While the value of these effortsis increasingly recognized and appreciated, someanalysts have begun to assert that this kind of as-sistance on occasion exacerbates conflict ratherthan contributing to peace. The urgency of this is-sue led the United States Institute of Peace to orga-nize a day-long symposium in October 1995.

The most direct negative impact occurs whenwarring forces gain control of supplies intendedfor civilians, either through imposing levies orthrough theft. More indirectly, when internationalNGOs meet the needs of civilian populations, thegovernment and rebels are freed to use their re-sources for war-making. Humanitarian assistancemay also unintentionally convey negative ethicalmessages.

NGO representatives at the symposium pointedout the complicated and sometimes compromis-ing context in which their organizations must op-erate. NGOs largely function as implementingagents for donor governments and the United Na-tions. Since these donors are often not well in-formed about field conditions, they may imposeunrealistic restrictions and inappropriate mandateson NGOs with whom they contract. Moreover,

emergency situations usually do not permit timefor the requisite planning to avoid all negative con-sequences. In any case, the positive outcomes fromproviding humanitarian assistance almost alwaysoutweigh the negative outcomes.

Symposium participants identified eight majorsteps NGOs can take to minimize or eliminate thenegative impact of humanitarian aid: (1) improveplanning; (2) assess need more accurately; (3) ana-lyze the consequences of agreements negotiated togain access to needy populations and obtain secu-rity for NGO personnel; (4) provide aid that willhave the longest term benefit to particular targetedgroups; (5) contract for independent monitoringand evaluation of assistance programs to reducemismanagement and the diversion of supplies; (6)make the empowerment of local institutions a highpriority; (7) coordinate closely with other assis-tance organizations operating in a particular crisissituation; and (8) deploy human rights monitorsto help protect local populations from exploitationand repression by the fighting factions.

While political neutrality is a time-honoredprinciple, most faithfully observed by the Interna-tional Committee of the Red Cross, several sympo-sium participants asserted that some conflicts inAfrica require political involvement by NGOs.Some also argued that NGOs should provide hu-manitarian assistance only when local populationsand factions agree to conditions that will ensurethe most effective use of relief supplies.

Many agreed that the provision of humanitarianassistance could be an endless and futile processunless accompanied by efforts, probably spear-headed by other bodies, to build peace. The sym-posium ended with a shared conviction that de-spite the travail that Africans have recentlysuffered, African people are generally resilient andhopeful. Africans will continue to grapple withtheir issues and make progress in promotingpeace. International NGOs should remain en-gaged with Africans on this journey.

v

SUMMARY

vii

The good work of nongovernmental organiza-tions (NGOs) in recent conflicts in suchcountries as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia is

well known—providing food, shelter, medicine,and a host of other materials and services underextremely difficult conditions. But does humani-tarian assistance in some cases actually exacerbateconflict? And if so, what can NGOs and the inter-national community do to eliminate or mitigatesuch effects?

At the request of several concerned NGOs, theUnited States Institute of Peace organized a sym-posium on this issue, “Humanitarian Assistanceand Conflict in Africa,” in October 1995. This re-port summarizes the discussions and conclusionsof the symposium.

That meeting in fact represents the intersectionof two program streams for the Institute. The firstis the Institute’s growing involvement with non-governmental organizations. We focused on theburgeoning role of NGOs in international conflictat the “Managing Chaos” conference, which waspart of our tenth anniversary celebration in De-cember 1995. Since then, we have formallylaunched an initiative that I have been pleased todirect with the assistance of Pamela Aall, programofficer in the Institute’s Education and TrainingProgram. This effort aims to provide a clearing-house for Institute programs involving or impacting

on NGOs, coordinate activities among programsand initiatives, and identify projects in which theInstitute can make a unique contribution to NGOactivities in conflict management. Much of thiswork is done through an interprogram workinggroup on NGOs, chaired by Aall, that brings to-gether Institute staff having significant experiencewith NGOs to share information and plan furtherefforts.

Through informal consultations with NGO rep-resentatives and meetings such as the symposiumreported here, we are identifying new ways to re-spond to the needs of these organizations as theirpivotal role in international conflict resolutionevolves. For example, the Education and TrainingProgram is developing conflict resolution trainingseminars geared specifically to the needs of theNGO community, in addition to its current prac-tice of including representatives from major inter-national NGOs in the International Conflict Reso-lution Training (ICREST) programs.

Throughout the history of the Institute’s GrantProgram we have made a number of grants toNGOs. Among these, grants to the Catholic ReliefServices and the World Peace Foundation seek toclarify the roles NGOs are playing, and might play,in early warning of emerging international con-flicts. A grant to CARE-Canada will help that orga-nization, along with some academic partners,

FOREWORD

think through more systematically the role ofNGOs in situations of international conflict.

The second major program stream comprisesthe set of activities the Institute initiated relating toAfrica. David R. Smock, coordinator of our Africanactivities and director of our Grant Program, orga-nizes these efforts. Under his leadership, the Insti-tute engaged in Track II diplomacy involving So-mali leaders and, more recently, Sudanese.Institute conferences have also focused on conflictresolution in South Africa and ways to promote im-plementation of the peace accords in Mozam-bique. A conference a year ago on the U.S. role inpeacemaking in Africa generated a book co-editedby Smock and Africa specialist Chester A. Crocker

entitled African Conflict Resolution: The U.S.Role in Peacemaking, published recently by theUnited States Institute of Peace Press.

In deciding to organize the symposium on “Hu-manitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa,” we carefullyconsidered the advice of Julia Taft and her col-leagues at InterAction—a coalition of 150 Americanhumanitarian relief, development, and refugee or-ganizations working internationally—and otherNGO representatives. We thank them for theirhelp and encouragement.

HARRIET HENTGES

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

viii

In recent years humanitarian assistance pro-vided in situations of war and disaster by donorgovernments, international organizations like

the United Nations (UN), and, particularly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in situationsof war and disaster has saved hundreds of thou-sands, perhaps even millions, of lives. The provi-sion of food and medical supplies to refugees, dis-placed persons, and those near the battlefields inSomalia, Rwanda, Zaire, Mozambique, Angola,Liberia, Sudan, and elsewhere constitutes one ofthe most heroic and life-preserving activities of ourtime. Major NGOs like CARE, Save the Children,Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and manyless well known organizations have been on thefront lines relieving desperate human suffering inAfrica.

While the international community increasinglyrecognizes and appreciates the value of these ef-forts, some analysts have begun to assert that hu-manitarian assistance on occasion exacerbatesconflict rather than contributing to peace. No onequestions that the value of this assistance far out-weighs its occasional negative consequences, butmembers of the assistance community find it nec-essary nevertheless to address the issues these ana-lysts have raised. They want to assess the extent ofthe damage and consider how to eliminate or mini-mize these negative consequences.

The urgency of this issue led the United StatesInstitute of Peace to organize a daylong sympo-sium in October 1995 attended by forty expertsfrom NGOs, the State Department/U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID), the UN, uni-versities, and think-tanks. Participants discussedand debated assistance issues, with the principaldialogue occurring among representatives of sev-enteen NGOs. In some respects the conversationwas painful, because no one likes to concede thatthe highly acclaimed humanitarian assistance toAfrica has some negative externalities. Neverthe-less, the importance of maintaining the integrity ofsuch endeavors led everyone to engage in an opendialogue. Symposium organizers confined the dis-cussion to Africa both because Africa has featuredso prominently in recent humanitarian assistanceoperations and to focus the conversation.

The format of the discussion consisted of threepresentations followed by several hours of discus-sion. The first presenter, Mary Anderson, presidentof The Collaborative for Development Action, hasbeen the leading analyst of this issue. She exploredparticular ways in which humanitarian assistanceprovided by NGOs in Africa at times contributes toconflict rather than peace. Next, Julia Taft, presi-dent of InterAction, the umbrella organization forAmerican NGOs engaged in international reliefand development, discussed the kinds of prob-lems facing NGOs that make these negative exter-nalities so difficult to redress. Finally, John Pren-dergast of the Center of Concern recommendedcreative ways to address these problems.

1

1INTRODUCTION

Anderson asserted that although NGOs donot generate conflicts, they sometimes con-tribute to and reinforce violent conflicts

pre-existing in the societies where they work. Thenegative impacts of humanitarian assistance com-prise two basic types: the first results from thetransfer of resources, and the second involves “theethical message conveyed by the provision of assistance.”

In the case of resource transfer, the most directimpact occurs when warring forces and armiesgain control of supplies provided for humanitarianassistance, either by imposing levies on humanitar-ian assistance operations or by stealing supplies. Amore indirect impact occurs when NGOs meet theneeds of civilian populations, which frees the war-ring factions to use their resources for war-making.“Resources under the control of one or anotherwarring faction help buttress the power and con-tinuing legitimacy of that warring faction,” Ander-son said. Intergroup tensions are also reinforcedwhen NGOs provide external resources to somegroups and not to others. For instance, NGOs hirepeople from certain groups and not others. WhenNGOs have more funds than local governments,that creates an imbalance between external re-sources and domestic resources, making it difficultfor local institutions to build for peace. Also,

NGOs hire away much of the best talent from do-mestic agencies.

Illustrating some of these issues in relation toSudan, Prendergast wrote recently:

In the context of Sudan, questions about the useof aid to underwrite Khartoum’s war efforts re-main unanswered. To what extent is the interna-tional community assuming the public welfare re-sponsibilities of the Sudanese government,thereby freeing resources for the war? Are aidflights from Khartoum to the south supplying sol-diers in the government garrisons rather thancivilians in need? Is money spent in the pursuit ofaid projects providing the government with asource of hard currency used to prosecute thewar, and are donated food stocks in the north free-ing Sudan production for export (reports say upto a million tons of northern Sudanese sorghummay be exported [in 1995] alone)? [John Prender-gast, “Tie Humanitarian Assistance to SubstantiveReform,” Washington Report on Middle East Af-fairs, July/August 1995, p. 42.]

Anderson next discussed the second type ofnegative impact humanitarian aid can have, whichinvolves the ethical messages NGOs sometimesconvey. “When we negotiate with the parties whoare at war with each other in order to gain access tothe civilians behind the lines they control, whenwe hire armed guards to protect our staff and ourdelivery of goods in order to be able to operate in ahighly volatile and dangerous situation, when weuse the stories of war atrocities to educate andfund raise back home, we become part of the con-flict and we convey an implicit message that it is le-gitimate for arms to decide who gets access to hu-manitarian assistance,” Anderson said. NGOs alsosometimes express solidarity with groups engagedin armed struggle against repressive regimes,thereby indirectly reinforcing the conflict. More-over, the moral legitimacy that accrues to a factionbecause of support received from internationalNGOs sometimes makes that faction less willing toengage in peace negotiations.

NGOs send complicated and compromised eth-ical messages, Anderson argued, insofar as theiroperations are now increasingly intertwined withthose of official agencies. Donor governments andUN agencies increasingly rely on NGOs as theirfield agents. Moreover, NGOs now collaborate

2THE PROBLEM

Humanitarian

Assistance

and Conflict

2

3

with military forces in the delivery of humanitariansupplies. This raises questions about the non-governmental and pacific character of NGOs andalso suggests they may be adopting some elementsof military operating style. Moreover, the militarypreoccupation with logistics and delivery systems

may replace and in turn undermine local capaci-ties to carry out locally initiated developmental ac-tivities. The predominant military presence canalso undermine civilian control, which in turnslows peacebuilding.

Julia Taft, while noting that tens of millions ofpeople are alive today because NGOs deliv-ered resources to them and advocated for

peace, justice, and human rights protection, ac-knowledged the seriousness of the problems An-derson identified. However, Taft urged that theseproblems be considered in context, since NGOsare not free agents. NGOs largely function as im-plementing agents for the UN and donor govern-ments, and this imposes severe constraints ontheir independence. In the case of the UN, memberstates govern that body, which limits the freedomof its agencies and in turn of NGOs under contractto those agencies. For example, when atrocitieswere occurring in Rwanda in the spring of 1994,the government of Rwanda, which was complicitwith these atrocities, was sitting as a member of theSecurity Council, which was considering actions tohalt the genocide.

As for donor governments, they are compro-mised because they engage in arms sales and havecomplicated trade linkages. Donors continue to fa-vor relief aid at the expense of longer term devel-opment, which is where the real answers lie.Donor priorities in turn largely dictate NGO pro-grams. Moreover, donor governments often preferthat NGOs distribute relief aid in the form of foodexported from donor countries, which thereby

benefits donor country farmers, even though localeconomies would more likely benefit from pur-chases of local food.

Emergency situations usually do not permittime for the requisite planning. To avoid many ofthe problems Anderson identified, Taft continued,NGOs must preplan extensively. They must in-volve local officials in planning, train local reliefworkers in-country, and pre-position stocks towhich relief agencies have access. But these stepsare usually not feasible in an emergency. Moreover,the existence of Hutu militias in the camps inGoma, Zaire, the teenage bandits in Liberia and So-malia, and warlords in many countries create con-fusing and unfamiliar environments in whichNGOs must function. NGOs must continually re-mind themselves that the situation they confront isnot their situation. It belongs to the local people,and NGOs must ask local people how to deal withit. This means developing local partnerships andinvesting resources in training.

Other participants offered additional insightsregarding the complicating context in which inter-national NGOs must operate in Africa. To avoid ex-acerbating conflict, it is essential to support mod-erates and work with local groups that are workingfor peace. But how can NGO staff consistently dif-ferentiate the good guys from the bad guys, partic-ularly in the chaotic conditions that often sur-round emergencies? It is not always possible tointervene without fueling local rivalries. Moreover,some NGOs, like Church World Service, are notoperational, in that they provide money to localpartners who direct the relief projects. When anNGO is not directly operational, it may have evenless control over whether its resources exacerbateconflict.

Focusing attention exclusively on the negativeimpact of humanitarian assistance neglects thepositive effects, which also have to be considered.Peter Shiras of InterAction stated, “To simply pre-sent the negative side of either ‘taxation’ or theft bythe belligerents is an incomplete recitation of whatis obviously a much more complex reality.” Sometypes of negative effects may be a cost of doingbusiness in such difficult circumstances. “We needto distinguish between those factors we can influ-ence and those we cannot, and then look at waysin which we can really minimize the factors we can

3THE COMPLICATING

AND COMPROMISING

CONTEXT

4

5

affect, like theft and taxation,” Shiras said. ButNGOs cannot agonize over factors they cannotcontrol or affect, such as relief assistance freeingup local resources for war-making.

Donor governments and the UN frequently arenot well informed about field conditions, and, inturn, they often impose unrealistic restrictions andinappropriate mandates on NGOs with whomthey contract. Michael Bryans of CARE-Canadanoted that new conditions also make standard op-erating procedures inapplicable. NGOs are “find-ing themselves in perverse situations, like CARE-Canada running a Rwandese refugee camp inZaire, five percent of whose residents are almostcertainly genocidal killers.”

Susanne Riveles of Lutheran World Reliefpointed out that NGOs’ humanitarian imperativerequires immediate responses to save people fromstarvation. This pressure does not permit the care-ful analysis and preplanning required to avoidsome of the negative by-products of humanitarianassistance.

Political chaos, transition, or authoritarianismencountered in countries like Liberia, Somalia,Rwanda, and Sudan pose major contextual diffi-culties for NGOs. In some cases, like Somalia, thegovernment has disappeared and the state has col-lapsed, noted Hussein Adam of the College of theHoly Cross. Conventional approaches no longerwork when NGOs have to confront factions andfighting, as in Liberia and Somalia. In those coun-tries factions and alliances shifted constantly andwar maneuvers were difficult to track.

Russ Kerr of World Vision International empha-sized how confusing these situations are forNGOs. NGOs must do better at sharing informa-tion so they can understand the political agendasof various factional leaders and warlords, the terri-tory they control, and the level of their popularsupport. As an example Kerr cited the difficultyNGOs had in comprehending and interacting withthe Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)during the Mozambique civil war. Ultimately, hu-manitarian relief can succeed only when it islinked to initiatives aimed at resolving political dif-ferences among the factions in conflict. NGOsthemselves need not be involved in peace negotia-tions, but their long-term goal must be the genera-tion of peace.

Understanding and addressing the oftenchaotic political dynamics undergirding these con-flicts is critical to successful interventions. AngelaRaven Roberts of UNICEF said members of the agegroup from six to twenty-six are becoming “thefodder for conflicts of the future: They have beenmarginalized, disenfranchised, thrown out of his-tory, thrown out of culture, and thrown out of eco-nomics. [It is these people] who are going to be theperpetuators of new conflicts in the future.” Fran-cis Deng of the Brookings Institution stressed thatthe international community needs to hold Africangovernments, like the Sudanese government, ac-countable when they fail to shoulder responsibilityfor their citizens, since that failure is what precipi-tates humanitarian crises.

Planning

The first requirement to reduce the negative exter-nalities of humanitarian assistance is improvedplanning, John Prendergast said. NGOs and agen-cies must assemble capable and well-preparedteams that are ready for deployment. A good exam-ple of such a team is the rapid response teamUNICEF is currently organizing for deployment inany new emergency. CARE and other NGOs are ex-ploring how they might pre-position experiencedpersonnel in situations deemed likely to explode.To facilitate this, they can employ experts on thecountry in crisis on a short-term basis to providetraining and advice on how to minimize the nega-tive consequence of humanitarian assistance. Hav-ing ethnological and sociological expertise withinan agency can help that agency develop appropri-ate population profiles before an emergencyerupts. Risk mapping in advance can make emer-gency responses much more efficient and reducethe mistakes that sustain or exacerbate conflict.The development of an effective information sys-tem is also critical. Careful preplanning can mini-mize dislocations of populations, which is impor-tant because military factions can usuallymanipulate aid to displaced populations more eas-ily than aid to those who remain in their homes.

Prendergast said that donors should require op-erating agencies to demonstrate short- and

medium-term plans of action as a condition for re-ceiving support. “Many agencies responding to themass exodus of Rwandans into Zaire and Tanzaniawere not fully aware of the political and militarystructures that were quickly being reconstituted inthe camps, and, in turn they were not prepared tocope with them,” he said. Much of the difficultyNGOs have encountered in these camps resultedfrom this lack of early preparedness, he asserted.

Accurate Assessments of Need

Factional authorities typically inflate populationfigures and exaggerate food requirements becausethis creates a surplus that is easy to divert, Prender-gast pointed out. As a result, unofficial markets forthe trade of stolen commodities emerge as a factorNGOs need to be on the lookout for. For example,where do the commodities go? Who sells them?Who gets the money? Who else benefits?

Agencies need to ascertain the factors that cre-ate vulnerability: What causes the food system tobreak down or people’s health to deteriorate?Those undertaking assessments often interviewthe wrong people. NGOs frequently acceptskewed and biased reports given by local infor-mants. An important corrective would be to inter-view women, who are typically excluded fromthese assessments but who know more abouthousehold needs.

Accurate surveys sometimes lead to unantici-pated conclusions. In Somaliland an assessmentfollowing the resumption of conflict in 1994 dis-covered that most of the displaced people wereable to fend for themselves. A major relief effortmight have only added fuel to the conflict. “Limit-ing involvement to active monitoring may be themost helpful response in some situations,” Pren-dergast said.

Access and Security

In the process of negotiating humanitarian access,NGOs and agencies often give weight to politicalbalance and expediency rather than objective andindependent assessment, according to Prender-gast. “This is further complicated when humanitar-ian diplomats capitulate to the invocation of sover-eignty by host governments,” he said. For example,

4WHAT SHOULD BE

DONE?

6

7

governments like Sudan’s often insist that aidagencies meet their alleged food requirements asthe price for access to rebel-held areas. Belligerentsare most likely to offer access routes because of theadvantages their armies can gain from the arrange-ment. “Warring parties often use negotiated accessagreements to build credibility in international cir-cles and deflect criticism about their war tactics.”

Commercial channels offer one innovative wayto gain access to food deficit areas in conflict situa-tions. The World Food Program sells commoditiesto Somali merchants in Mombasa, Kenya, and con-tracts with them to transport the goods to desig-nated sites in Somalia. The merchants are respon-sible for gaining access, which alongwith security is largely assuredthrough clan protection. Another ef-fective approach is to bring suppliesacross a variety of entry points frombases in neighboring countries. “Using various cross-border chan-nels and small ports, and even beachlandings like those employed in So-malia in 1992, lessens agency depen-dence on large-scale distribution networks that are vulnerable to ex-tortion,” Prendergast said.

Humanitarian agencies have anunderstandable preoccupation withsecurity, which, however, generates several prob-lems. In Somalia in 1992 the UN and NGOs focused too much attention on agency securityrather than on finding alternative distributionstrategies that could have reduced security require-ments. The military protection currently beingprovided in the Rwandan refugee camps by twobattalions of Zairian soldiers hired by the UN oncontract has not addressed fundamental prob-lems. Law and order have improved, Prendergastsaid, but the underlying source of regional insecu-rity (mixing civilian refugees with militia who areguilty of genocide) has not been addressed successfully.

Selection and Targeting of Aid

Donors need to select types of aid carefully, Pren-dergast said. It is more tempting to steal and divertcertain kinds of inputs than others. For instance,rice is a high-value food item in Somalia, and at the

peak of the crisis it was attractive to looters, whileother types of grains were just as nutritious but didnot have the same resale value. Similarly, medi-cines can be stolen and then usually resold forcash. Other problematic aid strategies involvethose that respond only to symptoms and pro-mote dependency, as opposed to those that en-courage self-reliance. Also, in some cases strongreasons may exist for giving aid to armies or rebelgroups so they do not divert aid away from localpopulations.

Prendergast noted that donors still generallyprefer to finance relief assistance while other kindsof aid could more effectively prevent conflict.

Sustainability ought to be the overriding principle,he said. “External responses to emergenciesshould be driven by what already works at the local level: the structures already in place and sup-ported by the community, and the indigenous so-cial welfare mechanisms and kinship exchangeprocesses already functioning.”

Thomas Alcedo of CARE reaffirmed the need toshift the balance from relief to development. Al-though it is more difficult to obtain grants and con-tracts for development projects and they attractless media attention, such projects address rootproblems and are less likely to contribute to conflict than the simple provision of relief sup-plies, he said.

Another key component of successful targetingis to direct aid to those most adversely affected bythe conflict. Navigating along critical fault lines ofgender, class, and ethnic/clan identity “is a criticalingredient in minimizing the offtake of aid by thewarring factions,” Prendergast said. Local leaderscannot always be relied on to target those most in

Donors need to select types of aid

carefully. . . . For instance, rice is a high-

value food item in Somalia, and at the peak of

the crisis it was attractive to looters, while other

types of grains were just as nutritious but did

not have the same resale value.

need, because their decisions are likely to be influ-enced by “relations of entitlement based on a com-bination of political and ethnic considerations, aswell as social debts that villagers are thought toowe leaders and various elites in the community.”Experience in places like Ethiopia during the l980sconvinced many donors that NGOs should delivercommodities directly to famine-affected popula-tions rather than relying on host governmentswhen those governments are parties to the con-flict. In many crisis situations, local authoritieshave proven to be more predatory than helpful indistributing assistance.

The use of family ration cards is one importantremedial step. Moreover, women generally shouldreceive food aid and be heavily involved in theplanning process, according to Prendergast, be-cause they are usually the custodians of family wel-fare. In some places alternative planning and dis-tribution structures have been adopted. Forinstance, in southern Sudan the World Food Pro-gramme has instituted local relief committees,which are popularly elected bodies responsible formuch of the planning and distribution of aid. Inthe Rwandan camps in Zaire, attempts have beenmade to promote women’s groups as well as tech-nical committees to oversee health and water is-sues, in order to bypass the military structures.

These measures help empower the community,which should be a key objective of humanitarianassistance. In so far as these measures increase lo-cal control and local accountability, they help re-duce diversion of aid. Factional leaders may stillapproach local relief committees and negotiate fora certain share of the food, but at least this kind ofdiversion is negotiated and open.

Cost Standardization

In addition to diversion of supplies, the excessiveamounts of money paid to local authorities andfactions for supplies and equipment often fuel con-flicts. Prendergast said the UN and NGOs need tocooperate closely to keep payments at reasonablelevels. All agencies operating in Baidoa, Somalia,collaborated to reduce the amounts paid to rentvehicles. In Rwanda, Save the Children-UK orga-nized NGOs to set price controls on housing,transport, and local salaries. In Sudan, NGOs anddonors cooperated to undermine that government’s

efforts to manipulate foreign exchange rates to itsadvantage.

Independent Monitoring

The deployment of field monitors helped dramati-cally reduce the amount of diversion in bothRwanda and Angola, Prendergast said. He quotedone NGO representative as saying that monitoringis monotonous and boring, but critical in cuttingdown mismanagement and diversion. The moresophisticated warring parties become in manipu-lating aid to serve their war-making purposes, themore essential it is that agencies regularly evaluatethe effects of their interventions. Monitoring andevaluation can help NGOs gauge the proper levelsof aid and the appropriate groups to target.

Empowerment of Local Institutions andCapacity Building

Several participants identified empowerment andcapacity building as the most important remedialstrategies. Prendergast noted that according to theGeneva conventions, the responsibility for the wel-fare of civilian populations rests with local authori-ties. NGOs can encourage these authorities to liveup to their responsibilities. If they fail to do so, re-lief and development agencies need to challengethem. In addition, NGOs can help local authoritiesbuild their capacities. He cited several examples ofcapacity building, including the development ofdistrict councils in Somalia, the strengthening ofthe humanitarian branches of the rebel move-ments in southern Sudan, and assistance to gov-ernment ministries in post-genocide Rwanda.

Joel Charney of Oxfam America said interna-tional actors, including American NGOs, too fre-quently think foreigners must parachute in to savelocal people in places like Somalia. Most relief,UN, and military officials in Somalia assumed thatall Somalis were out to cheat them and that noworthy Somali partners could be found. In con-trast, the Oxfam philosophy is to give highest pri-ority to finding local NGOs with whom Oxfam andother international NGOs can work, and withsome effort they did find effective Somali organiza-tions. International intervention in Somalia resem-bled a military logistical exercise more than an

8

9

attempt to empower Somalis to cope with their crisis, Charney said.

Engagement requires coordination and con-stant vigilance. Prendergast said NGOs and otheragencies must consistently challenge checkpoints,shakedowns, searches, and other abuses by any ofthe warring parties. One long-time observer of Su-dan concluded that whatever reforms the SudanPeople’s Liberation Army (SPLA) has made to ad-here to human rights and humanitarian principleshave resulted from pres-sure exerted by NGOs anddonors.

The building of local ca-pacity requires sustainedengagement and trainingby NGOs. The Swedish Lifeand Peace Institute hastraining centers in Garowe,Jowhar, and Baidoa whereit pairs international train-ers with Somali counter-parts to help create districtcouncils. In Ethiopia theUnited Nations Develop-ment Programme (UNDP) is helping build localcapacity of woreda councils to manage food secu-rity, natural resource protection, and disaster prevention.

Strong local NGOs can provide some of thegreatest insurance against the local manipulationof relief supplies by military factions. To play thisrole, local NGOs need encouragement and sup-port from international NGOs, Adam said.Granted, some local NGOs, like some in Somalia,have profit-making agendas or may even behavemore like pirates than like servants to those inneed. Hence, international NGOs have to be care-ful in selecting their local partners. But many in-digenous NGOs in Somalia are run by profession-als whose motives are as altruistic as those ofAmerican NGOs. Since Somalia has little govern-mental structure, local NGOs may begin to fillmuch of the void. Adam pointed to the Eritrean Re-lief Association (ERA) as a model of what a localNGO can do to provide relief and stimulate devel-opment during wartime. The SPLA could usefullymodel itself on ERA’s operations, he suggested.

African governments often inhibit and stifle lo-cal NGOs because they regard them as threats to

governmental authority and control. Taft indicatedthat international NGOs, through their relation-ship with local NGOs, offer them legitimacy andprotection, which helps shield them against con-trols imposed by their own governments.

While donors and NGOs consistently give lipservice to capacity building, Alcedo pointed out,they do not generally give it high priority in theirfield operations. Capacity building should be di-rected at both local NGOs and local governmental

structures to en-able them tosolve their ownproblems. Thedevelopment oflocal capacities isthe only alterna-tive to whatseems like an un-ending processof foreignersparachuting in toeach new crisisspot. Anotherspeaker added

that local institutions may also cope more success-fully with factional leaders and troops that are mis-using relief supplies.

Human Rights Monitoring

While it may be controversial for NGOs to monitorhuman rights and engage in human rights issues,Prendergast said, human rights monitoring, hu-man rights advocacy, and human rights capacitybuilding should be critical components in the in-ternational response to African conflicts and emer-gencies. “The mandates of most operational agen-cies prevent them from speaking out aggressivelyand publicly on human rights issues, but many ofthese agencies provide valuable information to hu-man rights groups privately,” he said. In the future,NGOs need to coordinate more closely amongthemselves on human rights issues. For instance,when Medecins Sans Frontiers withdrew fromEthiopia in 1984 and again from the Rwandanrefugee camps in Zaire in 1994 to protest humanrights abuses, other agencies remained. Such dif-fering responses can create confusion both

Strong local NGOs can provide some

of the greatest insurance against

the local manipulation of relief supplies

by military factions. To play this role,

local NGOs need encouragement and

support from international NGOs.

10

internationally and locally. Quietly coordinatingwho stays and who goes and blows the whistlecould significantly advance the cause of humanrights, Prendergast said.

Coordination

At the outset of a major emergency that drawsdozens of agencies to the scene, coordination anda rational division of responsibility are critical, inpart to avoid manipulation by warring factions,Prendergast said. The UN’s Department of Hu-manitarian Affairs (DHA) should take the lead incoordinating operational agencies and developingan appropriate division of labor. If the major agen-cies can agree on a coordination mechanism, theirleadership by example can influence others. Lionel Rosenblatt of Refugees International, quot-ing the late Fred Cuny, said this kind of coordina-tion requires a single strong leader, similar to therole played by the UN in the person of Sir RobertJackson in Cambodia.

But coordination is far from easy. As Kevin Mc-Cort of CARE-Canada noted, NGOs disagree overmajor issues, such as the degree of risk to whichthey will subject their staff. Donors and operatingagencies may convey conflicting messages to the

international public about the nature of a particu-lar crisis and the most suitable response. Donorgovernments often respond to domestic politicalagendas both in interpreting and in responding tocrises, which may put them at odds with DHA andthe operating agencies.

Anderson pointed out that it is usually easier tocoordinate the external actors among themselvesthan to coordinate them with local authorities andlocal NGOs. The full empowerment of local insti-tutions may not be compatible with strong leader-ship from DHA or any other external actor.

The interests and agendas of NGOs are not al-ways consistent with those of donors and localAfrican governments. David Shinn of the U.S. De-partment of State reported growing nervousnessover the increasing and, some would say, excessivepower of NGOs in humanitarian emergencies. Onthe other side, Roberts observed, NGOs mustsometimes collaborate closely among themselvesto stand up to donors and the local governmenton issues about which they feel strongly.

InterAction, as the umbrella organization forAmerican NGOs operating internationally, is help-ing these NGOs develop strategies for field coordi-nation, Taft reported. Hopefully, internationalNGOs based in Europe will be included in theprocess later on.

11

Recent emergencies in Sudan, Somalia, and SierraLeone illustrate many of the issues discussed.

Sudan

In Sudan, according to Prendergast, there havebeen massive diversions of relief supplies; civilianshave been used as shields by the various armedfactions; favoritism exhibited by certain NGOs inthe distribution of relief supplies has intensifiedthe conflict; and the warring factions have consis-tently violated humanitarian principles. To combatthese problems, the agencies operating in Sudannow engage the factions almost daily, urging andpressuring them to behave more responsibly. Re-cent progress is evident in persuading the south-ern rebels to adopt and begin to adhere to theGeneva conventions and other humanitarian prin-ciples, including the Convention on the Rights ofthe Child. The coordinating body, Operation Life-line Sudan (OLS), has also achieved very impres-sive progress in introducing a new system to as-sess local food requirements. In the past, poorassessments enabled the military factions to divertor steal large quantities of relief supplies. The cur-rent assessments do not merely measure food re-quirements, but also consider food within the totaleconomic context.

OLS has made some progress in strengtheninglocal authority structures as part of the relief opera-tions. Women-led distribution planning structuresare now functioning in some localities. This em-phasis on female leadership sometimes conflictswith local tradition, but it is consistent with wom-en’s predominant roles in household and foodeconomies. Limited progress has also been madein strengthening the civilian relief wings of the twosouthern rebel organizations. Human rights moni-toring has also been introduced. Although the suc-cess of these measures will have to be evaluatedover time, they do represent dramatic progressover five years ago. At that time UN and NGO reliefcampaigns disastrously undermined local produc-tion, and relief supplies were regularly stolen or diverted.

Will Thach, formerly of the International Com-mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), affirmed some ofthe progress that has been made. The new foodeconomy surveys in southern Sudan are a dra-matic improvement over past practice. Local reliefcommittees effectively involve local Sudanese indecisions regarding both food distribution and theprocess of distribution. Coordination among agen-cies, in sharp contrast to what happens in Rwanda,is impressive. On the other hand, Thach said hehas been disappointed by his experience with therelief wings of the southern rebel organizations.They were too closely linked and controlled by themilitary factions, with military needs usually givenparamount consideration. The most depressingfactor is that, despite the efficiency of relief opera-tions, humanitarian assistance has not broughtpeace, Thach said. Relief agencies struggle to pro-mote local food security and then military opera-tions undermine the progress made. Based on hisfrustrations in both southern Sudan and Rwanda,Thach said, “Speaking as a person who has spenttime in the field, there was hardly a day that I orone of my colleagues didn’t think or make thecomment that we should pull out altogether, thatwhat we were doing was a mistake.”

Deng underscored the culpability of the govern-ment in Khartoum. He said that the government inKhartoum manipulates the differences among therebel factions and strives to undermine the reliefeffort, in the belief that humanitarian aid to thesouth only augments the fighting strength of thesouthern rebels.

5DISCUSSION OF

THREE CASES

Somalia

The most notable feature of the relief operation inSomalia in late 1995 was the degree to which theSomali Aid Coordination Body succeeded in pro-moting collaboration among the operating agen-cies. This coordinating body developed a code ofconduct that guides humanitarian operations inSomalia. Consistent with this code, developmentactivities in the post-emergency phase will be pro-vided only on condition that safety can be assuredfor agency personnel and supplies. Many donorsand NGOs have with-drawn from Somalia be-cause they have becomefrustrated and questionthe effectiveness of theirassistance. As alreadymentioned, much relief isnow efficiently deliveredthrough commercialchannels, using indigenous networks. This experi-ment needs to be evaluated to draw lessons forother relief operations. UNDP, the designated leadagency in Somalia, concentrates on gathering andsharing information and closely monitoring developments.

Stephen Tomlin of the International MedicalCorps emphasized the value of the Somali Aid Co-ordination Body, which has given the UN, donors,international NGOs, and Somali NGOs an oppor-tunity to share information and be heard. Prior toDecember 1994, when it was moved from Nairobito Europe, this body was an effective clearing-house for field operations.

Sierra Leone

Symposium participants hope that lessons learnedfrom Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda can be appliedin Sierra Leone, site of the most recent humanitar-ian crisis in Africa. Roberts urged DHA and collab-orating NGOs to grasp the nature of the conflictand the warring parties more successfully than

they did in other African crises. NGO staff mustproduce accurate background information and in-corporate it in their plans. “Let’s find which ofthese relief strategies could work for Sierra Leoneand which we, as the responsible and caring com-munity, are willing to try out in Sierra Leone,”Roberts said.

Will Lynch, until recently Catholic Relief Ser-vices’ (CRS) manager of relief services in SierraLeone, lamented the failure of international plan-ning commissions on Sierra Leone to consult withthose with field experience and operational re-

sponsibility in thecountry. Thesecommissionshave also failed toengage localNGOs in eitherplanning or oper-ations. Assess-ment missions

typically fail to visit the areas of greatest need be-cause those places are dangerous. It is encourag-ing, however, that international NGOs have beenincorporated in the DHA-sponsored assessmentmission for Sierra Leone, Taft said. One role theseNGOs can play is to insist that the assessment mis-sion fully comprehend the political dynamics un-derlying the conflict, and not merely plan the logis-tics of a relief operation. William DeMars of theUniversity of Notre Dame recommends that as-sessment teams make direct contact with the rebelgroup, not just with the government in Freetown.

Unfortunately, not all NGOs operating in SierraLeone have been willing to sign the code for hu-manitarian operations drafted by CRS, ICRC, andothers. This generates inconsistency, Lynch noted.On the other hand, NGOs collaborated success-fully in eliminating the original distortions and in-flation in the list of displaced persons reportedly inFreetown, he said. By hiring local chiefs at the rateof $100 per month to verify the lists, they reducedthe census of displaced persons from 750,000 to287,000. This helped substantially reduce the di-version and theft of relief supplies.

12

Assessment missions typically fail

to visit the areas of greatest need

because those places are dangerous.

13

Political Neutrality

One of the time-honored and cardinal principles ofhumanitarian assistance, best exemplified andpracticed by the ICRC, is political neutrality. But,Roberts asserted, NGOs and donors can no longeravoid the political issues by claiming neutrality.The fact that several current wars are wiping outwhole populations and ways of life makes it essen-tial that NGOs confront the political dimension. AsDeng noted, NGOs have to recognize that theirwork is linked to the challenge of peace, becausethe most important humanitarian objective is toend wars. And yet, although many wars seemsenseless, others are waged in pursuit of just ends.When a war is fought to challenge the severe op-pression of a minority group, can NGOs merelyclaim neutrality and confine their attention to humanitarian assistance?

Prendergast argued that the humanitarian com-munity has to be fully aware of the politicization ofits activities. Although rarely intended, the actionsof NGOs often influence both the military and po-litical dimensions of conflicts. DeMars noted thatneutrality might work for organizations like theICRC in cases of traditional interstate conflict, andalso in civil wars where the warring parties looklike little states. However, in the case of failedstates, like Somalia and Liberia, where the multiplefactions each lack the internal coherence of a state,

it is an open question how the ICRC model of neu-trality can be adapted to fit. DeMars continued, “A generic problem for aid operations in failedstates is that the boundary between the politicaland humanitarian erodes. CARE-Canada has geno-cidal killers in its refugee camp in Zaire, and what-ever CARE does affects the fate of the killers andtheir hostages, and has a dramatic effect on thepolitics. So CARE is stuck in a situation where itloses its ability to maintain its humanitarian char-acter by keeping politics at bay and having some-one else handle politics.”

Underscoring the inevitability of political in-volvement, DeMars argued that successful peace-making requires the international community tocombine humanitarian relief and political involve-ment, but ideally different sets of actors wouldhandle the two dimensions. “Successful humani-tarian operations require that somebody else, notthe agencies providing relief assistance, is doingthe heavy lifting politically,” DeMars said. “Whenno one else is doing that, the NGOs get stuck in sit-uations where their humanitarian personnel be-come targets of the warring parties. That is onething that happens when the distinction betweenhumanitarian and political erodes; it is always ambiguous.”

Conditionality

It is a well-established practice that donors placeconditions on development and security assis-tance. But, Prendergast said, “humanitarian assis-tance to areas of the world not thought to be of vital strategic importance has largely been exemptfrom such overt conditions.” Agencies on theground, however, continuously experiment withconditionalities, often outside standard operatingframeworks. Humanitarian assistance is the majoroutside resource for many war-torn areas, and inturn the suspension of humanitarian assistancecan serve as a significant lever on the warring fac-tions. Before NGOs impose conditions or threatento suspend aid, however, they must elicit the viewsof the local populations, Prendergast said. Theyshould canvass local civilians about the magnitudeof abuses committed by factions and whether toimpose conditions or terminate assistance. NGOscould ask local populations whether to go publicabout the abuses, recognizing that this might

6CRITICAL ISSUES

REQUIRING ATTENTION

require their organizations to withdraw or run therisk of being expelled. Or should the agencies con-tinue their aid and remain silent?

Thach argued in favor of putting conditions onthe provision of humanitarian assistance. When afactional leader abuses local civilians or obstructsand diverts the delivery of supplies, NGOs have aresponsibility to object and not be complicit.NGOs have to be faithful to their own mandatesand principles.

Consultation with factional leaders might gen-erate agreement on a code of conduct to be ob-served by both military and civilian leaders as acondition for continuing assistance. The UN andrebel leaders in southern Sudan have reached suchan agreement whereby assistance could be re-duced or suspended if humanitarian assistance ismisused on a significant scale or if other abuses areobserved.

On the other hand, NGOs are not lone opera-tors, Kerr pointed out. They depend on donationsfrom home populations and contracts from donorgovernments and international organizations. Ifthese contributors do not support conditionalityand threats of withdrawal, then NGOs cannot takeindependent action. Many NGOs depend com-pletely on continued donor support.

The imposition of conditions and threats ofwithdrawal are pointless unless all the NGOs oper-ating in a particu-lar locale areunited. But Taftdescribed the dif-ficulty NGOs havehad in developinga common frontin terms ofwhether to con-tinue their opera-tions in Somaliaand in the Rwan-dan camps inZaire. In the case of the camp in Goma, twelveagencies threatened to withdraw, but representa-tives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) reminded them that if they departed,other NGOs were waiting to replace them so thattheir withdrawal would have no material impact.

While conditionality may sound appealing tothose at NGO headquarters, one participant

pointed out, NGOs cannot in good conscience ter-minate food shipments to women and children atrisk of starvation. Compassion dictates againstconditionality. NGOs have to accept some diver-sion of supplies as the price for getting life-supporting supplies to those at great risk. Condi-tions, the participant continued, usually hurt mostthose the NGOs most want to help.

Professionalism and Training

The lack of professionalism among more marginalNGOs adds to the negative impact of humanitar-ian assistance. Some NGOs are more interested inconvincing their donors that they are productivelyengaged with an emergency than they are in assur-ing them that their work is productive and con-ducted responsibly.

Roberts emphasized that all NGOs need to trainfield staff more effectively as a means of ensuringeffectiveness and responsible action. Field staff areplaced in increasingly demanding positions andthey need training not only in logistics but in micro-economics, anthropology, and micro-politics. Inaddition, new research needs to be widely dissemi-nated among NGO staff to ensure that they baseoperations on the most current knowledge and in-sights. NGOs need to acquaint themselves, for

example, with a recent Oxfam-UK publication en-titled Organizational Re-sponse to Conflict as astep toward professional-izing their staff and opera-tions, Roberts said. An-other participant urgeddissemination of recent re-search in what might betermed the anthropologyof war. Furthermore, fieldstaff whose capabilities are

limited to the movement and delivery of suppliescannot handle the ethical dilemmas and politicalcomplications of operating in a camp in Goma orin Somalia, she said.

As satellite communication to remote areas im-proves, staff can access Internet and receive ongo-ing training while in the field. Kerr recommended

14

When a factional leader abuses

local civilians or obstructs

and diverts the delivery of supplies,

NGOs have a responsibility to object

and not be complicit.

that NGOs develop a set of papers considered essential reading before staff engage in any dia-logue or negotiations with the local populace, gov-ernment, or factions. Providing field staff with cur-rent information on the political and militarydynamics of a conflict situation will help themavoid blunders and miscalculations that couldjeopardize the mission.

Public Information

One reason NGO staff do not discuss the negativeexternalities of humanitarian assistance moreopenly is their concern that donors and the pressmight misunderstand or exaggerate the serious-ness of the problem and cast doubt on the wholeenterprise of humanitarian assistance. McCort in-dicated that the Canadian public is increasinglyaware of the negative side of humanitarian assis-tance, but remains supportive. NGOs need tomake a commitment to engage the public and thepress, he added. The positive stories need to betold without denying the failures. The media needto be shown the problems and dilemmas NGOsand others confront in the field. Another partici-pant suggested that a forum similar to this one beorganized to permit dialogue between NGOs andthe press about the successes and shortcomings ofhumanitarian assistance, making it clear that onbalance the outcome is overwhelmingly positive.

Peacebuilding

Some NGOs involved in humanitarian assistancewant to play expanded roles in promoting peace.As stated earlier, humanitarian assistance must besupplemented by peacemaking, whether by gov-ernments or international organizations. But theremay be new peacemaking roles for NGOs as well.Kerr urged that NGOs share information on thestate of the conflict. They could develop a commonvocabulary and taxonomy to help them communi-

cate about “changes in the conflict or a famine oran economic collapse or a state of violence.” Suchcommunication would prepare them for new situa-tions they are about to face and enable them to bemore effective actors in relation to peacemaking.

Prendergast expressed confidence that NGOscan play new peacemaking roles well beyond thesharing of early warning information. BecauseNGOs are engaged at the grass roots, they can ef-fectively promote participatory dialogue as a firststep toward local and regional conflict resolutionand peacemaking. NGOs can help build thebridges among communities that are so critical topeacebuilding and to post-conflict reconciliation.

The longer-term process of peacebuilding isaided through the strengthening of civil society.Rudy von Bernuth of Save the Children said build-ing local institutions that can support participa-tory democratic processes and pluralism is thebest way to ensure a lasting peace. NGOs con-tribute to this process when they establish effectivepartnerships with local institutions, including local NGOs.

The goal for local institutions and their interna-tional NGO partners must be to establish the ruleof law and responsible governance in troubledAfrican states. Once these strategies are in place,African societies can handle their crises withoutcollapse or violent upheaval.

The symposium ended with a shared convictionthat, despite the travail Africans have recently suf-fered, African people are generally resilient andhopeful. They will continue to grapple with theirissues and in time peace will be more the rule thanthe exception. International NGOs must remainengaged with Africa through this journey. DeMarssaid, “Religious NGOs can talk about faithfulness;secular NGOs can talk about a new kind of solidar-ity, the solidarity of staying with these communi-ties as they sort their way into the future. A futurewill emerge, and we want to be with them to dis-cover that.” Africans have not lost hope, and theywill continue to experiment with new approaches.International NGOs need to remain their partners.

15

Pamela Aall, United States Institute of Peace

Hussein Adam, College of the Holy Cross

Thomas Alcedo, CARE

Mary Anderson, Collaborative for DevelopmentAction

James Bishop, InterAction

Katherine Blakeslee, USAID

Michael Bryans, CARE-Canada

Polly Byers, USAID

Joel Charney, Oxfam America

William DeMars, University of Notre Dame

Francis Deng, Brookings Institution

Jennifer Douglas, USAID

Jeanne Downen, CARE

Karen Elshazly, American Refugee Committee

Dina Esposita, Save the Children

Harriet Hentges, United States Institute of Peace

Russ Kerr, World Vision International

Lauren Landis-Guzman, Save the Children

David Loudon, World Relief Corporation

Will Lynch, Catholic Relief Services

Kevin McCort, CARE-Canada

Gwendolyn Mikell, United States Institute ofPeace

Cheryl Morden, Church World Service/LutheranWorld Relief

Rosemary O’Neill, U.S. Department of State

John Prendergast, Center of Concern

Susanne Riveles, Lutheran World Relief

Angela Raven Roberts, UNICEF

Lionel Rosenblatt, Refugees International

Andrea Scharf, Catholic Relief Services

David Shinn, U.S. Department of State

Peter Shiras, InterAction

David Shorr, Search for Common Ground

David Smock, United States Institute of Peace

Julia Taft, InterAction

Will Thach, formerly International Committee ofthe Red Cross

Stephen Tomlin, International Medical Corps

Rudy von Bernuth, Save the Children

SYMPOSIUM

PARTICIPANTS

16

17

David R. Smock is director ofthe Grant Program and coordi-nator of the Institute’s activitieson Africa. Smock was a staffmember of the Ford Founda-tion in 1964–80, serving inNigeria, Ghana, Kenya, andLebanon, as well as in New

York. He served as director of the South AfricanEducation Program, a scholarship program thatbrings black South African students to U.S. univer-sities, in 1975–80. During that time he was alsovice president for program development and re-search for the Institute of International Educationin New York. In 1986–89, he was executive associ-ate to the president of the United Church of Christ,after which he became executive director of Inter-national Voluntary Services, supervising develop-ment projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.Smock edited Making War and Waging Peace:Foreign Intervention in Africa and co-edited withChester A. Crocker African Conflict Resolution:The U.S. Role in Peacemaking, both of whichwere published by the United States Institute ofPeace Press. He is author or editor of six otherbooks, most of which are on African topics.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created byCongress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, includingresearch grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services,publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the Presi-dent of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. CrockerVice Chairman: Max M. KampelmanPresident: Richard H. SolomonExecutive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

18

Peaceworks No. 6. First published February 1996.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author or conference participants alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NW, Suite 700Washington, DC 20005-1708

Phone: 202-457-1700E-mail: usip_requests@usip.orgInternet: gopher.usip.org

UNITED STATESINSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NWWashington, DC 20005 Peaceworks No. 6