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HUMAN SMUGGLING TRENDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Executive Summary The United National Office Drugs and Crimes (UNODC, 2018) estimates that, at a minimum, 2.5 million

people were smuggled across international borders in 2016, generating a revenue of between 5.5 and 7

billion USD. As the number of migrants reaches record highs globally, there are increasing economic,

social and cultural reasons for people to migrate by either formal or informal means. Increasing demand

for movement generates more business for migrant smuggling networks.

Migrant smuggling is defined as “the procurement, in order to obtain, either directly or indirectly, a

financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person

is not a national or permanent resident.” (Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 2000)

Smuggling is a complex phenomenon with criminal, economic, social and historical components.

Smugglers offer a variety of services, ranging from pre-departure provision of information and support

to services along the route, including: accommodation, transport, provision of counterfeit documents

and escorting, and support after arrival, including accommodation.

Smuggling routes encompass land, sea and air options. They are volatile and shift on a regular basis,

often on account of changes in border security measures. The fluidity of smuggling routes is

demonstrated by the effects of border wall construction – data indicates that although border walls

reduce crossings at their targeted points, they are often accompanied by increases in crossings at other

points. Routes are not only geographically malleable, but they are temporally flexible as well. Migrants

can choose to remain at one point on a route for a relatively long period of time, either to make more

money to proceed onward or for other reasons. Although routes are flexible, cities where logistical and

transport arrangements for smuggling are made – known as ‘hubs’ - remain constant.

Smuggling networks take a variety of different forms, from structured hierarchies to extremely informal

networks. Migrant smugglers are not systematically linked to other organised criminal networks such as

arms and drugs, although there are links along some routes. Smugglers often have strong ethnic and

linguistic links with the communities with which they work. Many migrant smugglers are either migrants

themselves, were formerly migrants, or are low level smugglers – that is, they undertake smuggling as a

part time occupation to improve household income. As such, informal smuggling networks may be

weakened if low-level smugglers were offered alternative economic opportunities.

Migrants are subject to a range of protection violations at all stages of the smuggling process – these

include death, physical assault and violation, extortion and transfer into human trafficking networks.

According to some studies, 76% of migrants have been subject to violations - most of which have been

perpetrated by smugglers or local law enforcement officials. Migrants rely on narrow sources of

information before departure, and are therefore not likely to be fully informed about the nature of the

risks they are likely to encounter on the road or after arrival.

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The current policy approach toward migration focuses on criminalisation of smuggling and enforcement

measures are taken to apprehend and prosecute smugglers. This policy approach is reflected in the UN

Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and is reinforced in the Bali Process and the Global

Compact on Migration. It also echoes the EU and US policies of ‘externalising’ border management1,

including by construction of walls. This is similar to the approach taken to legally address human

trafficking – but due to distinct differences between smuggling and trafficking, the current approach to

addressing smuggling has some key gaps, the most significant of which is that smuggling involves the

voluntary participation of the migrant. In addition to the voluntary agreement between the smuggler

and the migrant, this practice is typically supported by local social mores and economic needs. The

identification and prosecution of criminals in a context where most actors are complicit is challenging.

Adoption of a more market oriented approach to smuggling, aiming to reduce demand and to target

supply hubs rather than routes, may be a more effective method of addressing human smuggling. This

paper proposes five recommendations for policymakers and practitioners to address this gap.

Focus on migration hubs. Available research indicates that although migration routes vary significantly

and can shift, hubs remain constant. These hubs represent bases for smugglers and opportunities for

migrants to gain information, but due to the heavy concentration of smugglers, they also heighten the

risk that migrants will be subject to human rights violations. Initiatives that target hubs – for example,

provision of legal migration alternatives at hub locations– may generate longer-lasting changes in

migration and smuggling decisions.

Moving away from criminalisation and toward ‘market regulation’. International actors have adopted a

law enforcement approach to migration, in which smugglers are criminals and those who are smuggled

are victims not liable for prosecution. This does not reflect the consensual nature of smuggling as a

crime. International actors should adopt a more market-oriented approach. This involves identifying the

factors that generate and promote supply and demand, and working to influence these factors. An

example of such an approach could be provision of alternative income generation options to low level

smugglers located at hubs; this would reduce smuggling ‘supply’.

Holistic approaches to smuggling and migration. Smuggling has been defined as a criminal activity, but

it has strong economic, social and cultural ties and motivations. Research and policy approaches need to

address social and economic components in order to be successful.

Targeting populations of potential migrants. Potential migrants are often young, literate, unemployed

or underemployed, and from urban areas. A holistic approach to migration would focus on increasing

access to dignified employment in urban areas in countries of origin; it would target not the most

vulnerable, but those that have enough money and education to attempt to move.

In-depth research into smuggling networks. There is little data available on human smuggling networks

and research into these networks is limited. Investment at the global or regional level into qualitative

and quantitative data collection and the development of a comprehensive picture of smuggling

networks could generate more effective policies at the regional and national levels.

1 Externalization is the reproduction of a country’s migration policy at the external level, which entails (1) burden sharing with

regard to border policing with bordering countries and (2) the setting up of migration management policies in the countries of transit and origin

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Migrant Smuggling: Definitions and Concepts The most commonly accepted definition of migrant smuggling has been laid out in the Protocol against

the Smuggling of Migrants by Air, Land and Sea (2000), defined as “the procurement, in order to obtain,

either directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a

State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident.”

The International Legal Framework Around Smuggling. The predominant definition of smuggling was

developed as a part of the international framework governing migration, smuggling and trafficking. The

UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime governs the international approach to smuggling

and trafficking. Both the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2000) and the

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (2000) fall under the Convention. These

documents form the basis of the approach taken to human smuggling in the Global Compact for

Migration - notably in Objective 9 of the Compact, which attempts to strengthen the transnational

response to migrant smuggling.

To ensure continuous policy dialogue and information sharing on smuggling, trafficking and other forms

of transnational crime, the Bali Process was established. The Process is a non binding international

forum that exists for policy dialogue, information sharing and exchange to aid each participating state to

address challenges associated with smuggling, trafficking and transnational crime. The Process, including

45 member states, is steered by Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand and Thailand (2002).

Distinction between migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The key differentiation between

smuggling and trafficking lies in coercion – those who are smuggled are generally voluntary participants,

whereas those who are trafficked are coerced and exploited by those who arrange their movement2.

This differentiation is clearly delineated in the definitions of migrant smuggling, laid out in the Protocol,

and human trafficking, defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. In

practice however, the distinction between smuggling and trafficking can be blurred – individuals may

embark on a route voluntarily, but may be coerced into an exploitative situation by smugglers along the

journey, for instance (Carling, Gallagher and Horwood, 2015). In some situations, smugglers also recruit

migrants into their smuggling networks; while such recruitment may be voluntary, it may also be linked

to some degree of financial coercion (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Mohammadi and Nimkar,

forthcoming). Although the primary distinction between smuggling and trafficking is coercion of the

smuggled individual, under existing international legal frameworks, migrants who are voluntarily

smuggled and complicit in the process are safeguarded from legal consequences – including prosecution

(Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 2000).

Exclusion of ‘humanitarian’ smuggling. The definition of migrant smuggling clarifies that a smuggler

must receive a financial or other material benefit. As such, there is a loophole for ‘humanitarian’

smuggling. This constitutes a recognition that extremely vulnerable populations may need to rely on

informal actors or family connections to facilitate movement. The loophole is confirmed in the travaux

2 Specifically, 5 factors differentiate smuggling and trafficking: (1) Consent – typically smuggling is voluntary whereas for

trafficking, consent is irrelevant if ‘means’ are in place, (2) Purpose – smuggling is undertaken for material benefit whereas trafficking involves exploitation of the victim, (3) Transnationality – smuggling is always transnational, whereas trafficking can also take place within a country, (4) Source of criminal profits – smuggling derives its profit from facilitation of illegal entry or stay, whereas trafficking derives profit from exploitation, and (5) Who is affected by the crime – smuggling is a crime against the state, whereas trafficking is a crime against a person.

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preparatoires of the Protocol, which states that “the intention was to include the activities of organised

criminal groups acting for profit but to exclude … those who provided support … for humanitarian

reasons or on the basis of close family ties” (United Nations General Assembly, 2000). This legal

provision has, to date, rarely been used in practice (UNODC 2018). In practice, this loophole may

generate a lack of clarity, given that many smugglers have mixed motives. For example, people choose

smuggling networks in Afghanistan and Somalia on the basis of family ties, but then engage in a profit

relation. Another example consists of smugglers who may transfer a cargo of migrants who paid, but

may, along the route, pick up other extremely vulnerable migrants for humanitarian reasons.

Due to the definitional shortfalls outlined above, academics have complemented the formal definition

with wider and more comprehensive conceptualisations of smuggling. Some of the key

conceptualisations are:

Smuggling as a business. The prevalent academic definition asserts that smuggling is a business that

delivers a service for people who are looking to move in return for a profit in an open informal market.

In this conceptualisation, smugglers may “exploit … legal as well as illegal methods and channels of

entry.” (Salt and Stein, 1997). As such, smuggling may take place even if no national or international

laws are violated. The most common services provided by smugglers are (1) transportation, guiding and

escorting, (2) accommodation, (3) planning and contacts, (4) information and corruption of local law

enforcement authorities, and (5) provision of travel documents (UNODC, 2018). This conceptualisation

implies that policy measures to reduce smuggling and/or reduce risks associated with smuggling must

consider smuggling networks as market system, implying an understanding of demand, supply,

intermediaries, infrastructure and drivers of price.

Smuggling as part of a multi-level social dynamic. Understanding of smuggling as a social phenomenon

is relatively new. In 2018 (Majidi, 2018), academics proposed a model of smuggling using ecosystems

theory; smuggling networks are developed, and ingrained, at microsystem (family and friend network),

mesosystem (community level), exosystem (government actor, private sector, business and larger

networks) and macrosystem (wider social and cultural factor) levels. This model generally suggests that,

in order for smuggling networks to be successful, they need to be widely integrated and accepted at all

levels of society. Efforts to either reduce smuggling or mitigate risks, therefore, must account for the

factors that generated social acceptance and/or support for smugglers at all levels.

Smuggling within a historical and cultural context. Smuggling networks often have cultural and historic

roots. For example, in Afghanistan smuggling networks evolved from a group of people who originally

guided pilgrims to religious sites and who have passed on the profession of smuggling through

generations (Mohammadi and Nimkar, 2019). Similarly, in Ecuador, smugglers, known as coyotes, exist

within a historical and cultural framework that has generated widespread social acceptance and trust

(Stone-Cadena and Velasco, 2018). Due to the ways in which smuggling networks have evolved over

time, each network is likely to be influenced by different factors. As a result, generalised policy

approaches to smuggling are unlikely to be effective, and successful approaches will require tailoring to

the particular cultural roots of an individual smuggling network.

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Smuggling Today: An Overview

The Numbers Data on human smuggling is extremely limited and unreliable; it tends to reflect information gathered

from people apprehended for smuggling offences and some states are reluctant to share information on

these matters. Data from non-official sources, including academia, international agencies and think

tanks, is often not comparable and studies are unlikely to be longitudinal, making trend analysis

problematic. However, it is possible to develop some estimates regarding the minimum size of global

smuggling operations in terms of number of migrants smuggled and revenues.

In 2016, UNODC estimated that a minimum of 2.5 million migrants were smuggled across borders. This

estimate is conservative, given that it excludes smuggling into and within South America and Asia. This

number represents approximately 10% of the total global stock of migrants and about one-third of the

annual flow of migrants (estimated at 7.13 million) into OECD countries (IOM, 2018). Even rough figures

indicate that smuggling networks play a key role in facilitating movement for a substantial proportion of

the world’s migrants.

Smuggling networks also generate significant revenue flows. UNODC estimated that the minimum

annual income for smuggling networks globally was between 5.5 billion and 7 billion USD; other

estimates put the value of migrant smuggling at 10 billion USD per year (Ferrier and Kaminsky, 2017).

Paid services take place in the grey or black market and payment is often made through informal

mechanisms such as hawalas, which can be difficult to trace and is therefore likely to be

underestimated.

Routes and Flows Smuggling routes can be established over land, sea and air. Land routes often offer the simplest crossing

options with some areas only requiring transport and small bribes to border officials, while others

require counterfeit documents. Crossings by sea are possible along American, European and

Asian/Australian routes. Sea crossings are significantly more complex as they require the procurement

and management of a vessel large enough to accommodate many people. However, sea crossings can

help to avoid issues associated with strong security at land border crossing points. Air crossings can be

the safest routes for the migrants themselves as they are unlikely to be exposed to environmental

threats and harassment but are the most expensive and require high-quality counterfeit documents.

Often a combination of methods is used by migrants and by smugglers in order to reach their

destination and depend on the capacities of the smuggler (UNODC, 2018).

Logistical arrangements are often determined out of migration hubs. Hubs are often located close to

border crossing points, but exact location is often determined by security and geographical factors.

Given that smugglers are often organised by ethnic groups, hubs are often located where a particular

ethnic group feels secure and has territorial control (EU, 2015; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012).

Smugglers may also hold migrants in a hub for a period of time while organising the next stage of a

journey; sometimes this may involve choosing between different routes. Routes may also shift in

response to different border management policies and protection regimes.

Many of the most significant smuggling routes are well known: the three routes across the

Mediterranean into Europe, the Mexico - United States routes, and the sea routes into Australia. These

routes have received significant amounts of publicity over the years, as well as attention from border

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management agencies. There are a variety of shifting and changing routes within Africa and Asia that are

less well understood. Again, due to lack of concrete data, it is very difficult to estimate route traffic or

costs, although the location of hubs are well known. The table below provides data on some major

smuggling routes analysed in UNODC’s 2018 report on migrant smuggling. Although this data is not

representative or complete, it provides a rough picture of the size and scale of various routes.

Figure 1: UNODC, Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018

Available data indicates that the most significant migration routes in terms of volume and revenue run

from Latin America into the US. The routes to Europe are broken up into several stages; one of the

largest and most profitable flows takes place from within Sub-Saharan Africa to Libya, with additional

networks, costs and risks to make the final crossing into Europe. The route to Australia was significant in

earlier years (UNODC 2018), but has reduced substantially following a crackdown by the Australian

authorities. However, significant flows remain within Asia, leading primarily to Indonesia with the

objective of onward resettlement in Western countries (Mixed Migration Centre, 2017).

Characteristics and Trends The demand is increasing. Despite the relatively poor availability of data on smuggling, there is broad

consensus that migration, and thus smuggling, is growing The number of migrants globally is growing,

and has already reached record highs; similarly, the number of forcibly displaced and asylum seekers is

on the rise. As a result, there is more demand for the services of smugglers. The growth of this business

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has also been suggested in some of the very limited primary research conducted directly with smuggling

networks (IOM, 2018; UNODC 2018; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012).

Routes are volatile. The precise routes taken by smugglers shift. The factors affecting smuggling routes

include, but are not limited to, (1) formal border security measures designed to deter entry, (2) attitudes

of border guards (openness to bribery, the use harsh or illegal enforcement measures), (3) seasonal

environmental conditions, and (4) destination demand among migrants (Salt and Stein 1997; UNODC

2018; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). The volatile nature of migration routes poses a challenge for

border management officials. It can be challenging for a state to ensure equal levels of enforcement

across a border, but it is easy for smugglers to shift to areas with low enforcement. This indicates that it

is necessary for states to adopt multi-faceted approaches to smuggling and border management.

Means of travel can shift. Means of travel often run in parallel and smugglers can choose between

various land routes, sea routes and air routes depending on demand, the context and their network

capacities, as well as external factors, as above. Smugglers choose between these routes both on the

basis of ‘internal’ factors, including their own networks, logistical capabilities and management

capabilities, and on the basis of ‘external’ factors such as the degree of enforcement in place along any

particular route (MacAuliffe and Laczko, 2016).

Journeys are interrupted. People on the move do not necessarily travel smoothly across a migration

route. Routes can be interrupted for a variety of reasons including but not limited to: (1) smugglers’

needs to adjust routes, (2) inability of the migrant to pay for the full route at a single time, and (3) need

to change between different nodes in a smuggling network at hubs (UNODC 2018; MacAuliffe and

Laczko 2016; Mixed Migration Centre 2017). The fact that journeys are interrupted offers policymakers

and practitioners several options to interrupt migration routes, either by disrupting smuggling networks

at the point of interruption, or by offering alternatives to migration at the points of interruption.

Hubs remain stable. While smuggling routes are volatile, hubs remain relatively constant. Hubs

represent points where supply and demand meet and are often under the territorial control of a

smuggling network or of an ethnic group from which a network originates – increasing their stability

(UNODC 2018). Hubs often provide a variety of services for both smugglers and migrants, and as such

they are economic centres. The stability of hubs represents an opportunity for both policymakers and

practitioners.

Smugglers and their Networks Services Provided by Smugglers Migrant smugglers provide a relatively wide array of services, depending on the precise route and the

obstacles to movement on the route. Their involvement in migration often starts before the decision to

migrate is made and continues past arrival in the destination country.

Marketing and Recruitment. Before departure, smugglers are often involved in the provision of

information to potential migrants, including the restriction of other sources of information to potential

migrants (Mixed Migration Centre, 2018). This can include providing inaccurate or incomplete

information to potential migrants, often minimising the risks along the route or providing an inflated

view of success upon arrival in the destination country. In recent years, smugglers have begun to rely

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more on social media platforms for recruitment and marketing; this includes Facebook as well as more

direct and personalised communication such as WhatsApp and Vibr (RMMS Briefing Paper, 2016).

Services Provided by Smugglers. Along the route, smugglers can provide a variety of services. This

includes: (1) guiding and escorting across border checkpoints, (2) accommodation both along route and

upon arriving at the destination, (3) transport, (4) counterfeit travel documents, (5) facilitation of bribes.

The precise range of services provided by the smuggling network depends both on the financial capacity

of the migrant and capacity of the smuggling network. Smugglers generally cannot guarantee a

successful border crossing and migrants generally pay for a number of attempts. Depending on the

route and the strength of the smuggling network, some smugglers offer ‘guaranteed delivery’. (UNODC

2018; MMC 2017).

Packaging of Services. Smugglers offer different ‘packages’ of services to migrants, including: (1)

Comprehensive service from the origin country to the destination country, (2) Service to the next hub

where migrants can then investigate a variety of smugglers and services that best meets their needs for

onward travel and make additional money should it be required. (3) Facilitation through a geographic

monopoly. In some cases, certain smuggling networks or ethnicities have geographic access over an

area; for example, the Baluch ethnicity has monopoly over a part of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In

this case, migrants can contract smugglers to provide an interface with the monopolistic service

provider. (4) Travel agencies. Some travel agencies offer smuggling services, that is, arrangement of

irregular visas and air voyages, as well as formal and legal travel services. Such businesses, which are a

blend of formal and informal networks, are common in cities such as Mogadishu and Kabul.

(Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; UNODC 2018; Majidi and Danziger, 2017)

Payment for Services. Fees are generally levied per service accessed by migrants and often heavily

negotiated based on a number of factors, including family ties and non-financial favours. The price of

any particular service is likely to vary based on factors affecting route volatility. Factors such as

negotiation ability, ethnicity, gender and citizenship of the migrant may also affect the price. Migrants

often pay for the services of smugglers as phases of the desired ‘package’ of services are complete. The

phased payment mechanism serves several purposes, notably: (1) it reduces the vulnerability of the

migrant, as a one-off payment at the beginning of the route risks exploitation, (2) it provides the

possibility for migrants and their families to raise money as the migrant travels, (3) it offers the

possibility to change smuggling networks along the route (Mixed Migration Centre 2017; UNODC 2018).

As mentioned previously, payment generally takes place informally through hawala money transfer or a

network of friends and family.

Linkages with Other Networks and Organised Crime. There is a common perception that migrant

smuggling is closely associated with other forms of organised crime, in particular drug and arms trade;

however, the relationship is more complex. While certain prominent smuggling networks are closely

linked to the drug and arms trade (notably the routes from Central America to the US and the routes

from Afghanistan), there is no systematic link between migrant smuggling and other criminal networks

(UNODC 2018). There are also indications that organised criminal networks and small scale migrant

smuggling networks can operate along parallel paths, such as the paths from Afghanistan to Europe

(Mixed Migration Centre 2017). In other locations, it appears that migrant smuggling networks have

systematic contact with, but are not the same as, organised crime networks; in some cases, the

systematic contact involves payment of a ‘tax’ for smuggling migrants (UNODC 2018).

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Smuggling Network Organisation and Smuggler Profiles Just as migrant smuggling networks differ dramatically in size, scale and form, smugglers themselves

have a range of profiles, although data is very limited.

Individual Smuggler Profiles. Smugglers are predominantly male, though women may be involved in

recruitment, provision of food and shelter to migrants and support functions such as caring for children.

Although women are not prominent in smuggling network hierarchy, they are not absent either – one of

the most significant Chinese human smuggling networks was led by a woman (Keefe 2014). In general,

smugglers are adults but relatively young adults (30 – 35 years old). There is a trend of smugglers being

recruited from among those who have previously migrated; this has been noted along the Sahel

smuggling route, along the Afghanistan – Europe route and the routes toward southern Africa (EU 2016;

Mohammadi and Nimkar 2019; Khosravi 2010). Smugglers who work in organising roles tend to share

ethnic or linguistic ties with migrants and smugglers who work to facilitate border crossings are of the

same nationality and/or ethnic group as border guards (Monsutti 2018; Monsutti 2012; RVI 2016).

Ethnic and Cultural Ties. In order for migrant smuggling to be effective, trust is required along the

market chain: between migrants and smugglers, and between smugglers and their networks. As such,

migrants and smugglers tend to rely on ethnic ties in selecting and providing services . The importance

of ethnic and linguistic ties has been noted across various smuggling routes (Stone-Cadena and Velasco,

2018; Monsutti, 2012; Khosravi, 2010; UNODC 2018). On a similar note, smugglers often have a

longstanding role in society, including a place in both local history and culture; migration has a

longstanding place in many cultures as a livelihoods strategy or a coping mechanism and smugglers

therefore form a part of the historical and cultural fabric of certain communities (Stone-Cadena and

Velasco, 2018; Monsutti, 2012).

Varying Organisational Models. Migrant smuggling networks take a variety of forms, ranging from

hierarchical, structured models to very loosely organised informal networks. An example of the

hierarchical model of migrant smuggling is the Chinese migrant smuggling network. Actors in this

network have very clearly defined roles and places within the hierarchy – for example, ‘little

snakeheads’ are responsible for recruitment and marketing (that is, finding people to be smuggled)

whereas ‘big snakeheads’ are responsible for investment and funding (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis,

2012; Chin, 2011). However, many smuggling networks are quite informal and offer services through an

open marketplace (Mixed Migration Centre 2017; MacAuliffe and Laczko 2018). Smuggling networks

“should… be seen as multicephalous and polycentric networks of criminals located in different

countries.” (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012). The multiplicity of actors organised, not around

hierarchical structures, but around use of logistical infrastructure, implies that smuggling networks

function more as open marketplaces than they do as the stereotypical criminal organisation.

Lower Level Smugglers – Both Victims and Perpetrators. Those who engage with potential migrants,

including marketing, recruitment, and small-scale transportation activities are often engaged in other

livelihood activities such as shopkeeping, hotel operation, and farm work (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis,

2012; Mohammadi and Nimkar, 2019). Part-time engagement in smuggling is often used as a means to

meet household expenses. Low level smugglers can be recruited from amongst migrants, both those

who moved successfully as well as those who returned. It is possible for people to act both as smugglers

and as migrants at the same time (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Triandafyllidou, 2018) out of

economic need.

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The Relationship Between Smugglers and People on the Move

Profiles of Smuggled Migrants The majority of smuggled migrants come from fragile or conflict-affected countries. Although data on

migrants themselves is relatively scarce, it is possible to identify some common migrant characteristics.

The factors that drive people to migrate inform the demand for services provided by smugglers.

Youth. Migrants are often young (below 35 years of age) are single and do not have children. In general,

the youth are unemployed or involved in precarious employment such as daily labour. There is some

qualitative data indicating that, in some countries of origin, families select a member to migrate as an

investment on behalf of the entire family. The individual is often young for several reasons: 1) there is a

perception that sending youth may increase chances of gaining asylum (Mixed Migration Centre 2018),

2) they will remain at working age for a longer period – increasing remittances over time, 3) youth may

be able to pursue family reunification.

Predominantly male. Approximately 70% of migrants are men who are generally single and childless.

Men are more likely to undertake migration as they are perceived to be better able to manage the

physical hardships associated with migration, to have more earning potential upon arrival, and higher

levels of social pressures to migrate in cultures where it is linked to manhood (Rift Valley Institute,

2016). Women travelling along migration routes are more likely to be divorced or widowed.

Urban. Migrants are primarily from urban areas. Along some migration routes, such as Afghanistan, over

70% of those who migrate are from urban areas (Mixed Migratin Centre, 2018). Although migrants are

from urban areas, they are often not fully employed – many migrants, across different migration routes,

are either unemployed or underemployed, often in precarious daily labour or in the service industry.

Literate and Educated. On average, migrants have higher levels of education when compared to their

countries of origin. Most migrants are literate and data from the Mixed Migration Centre indicates that

over 50% of migrants have at least enrolled in secondary education. Literacy helps migrants gain

information about migration routes and to access technology (e.g., WhatsApp, Vibr) that facilitate

migration journeys.

Elements that Influence Demand Potential migrants represent the demand side of the smuggling business. A significant amount of

research has been conducted on push and pull factors for migrants (Migration Policy Institute, 2018;

IOM, 2018; EU 2016).

Political and security conditions. Poor political and security conditions in country of origin are a

significant driver of migration. Security conditions can affect the decision to migrate through both direct

security threats or through the deterioration in the country as a whole that prompts fear for the future.

A proportion of migrants come from relatively stable areas in conflict-affected countries (e.g.,

Somaliland in Somalia or Bamyan in Afghanistan), but depart due to a perception that the situation will

deteriorate.

Economic Opportunity. Lack of economic opportunity is a significant push factor and perceptions of

economic opportunity elsewhere is a significant pull factor. Although many migrants are literate and

have basic education, most of them do not have secure employment. Across various migration routes, it

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can be seen that a high proportion of migrants are either unemployed or reliant on precarious

employment sources. There is a strong perception among migrants that economic opportunity is better

in the destination country. The perception of better economic opportunities elsewhere is strengthened,

in some cases, by the fact that several migrant-producing countries have a history of migration. In both

Afghanistan and Somalia, for example, migration is a part of traditional culture and is often used as a

livelihoods coping mechanisms (Monsutti 2012; FAO 2016).

Educational Opportunity. Most migrants have a base level of education and wish to continue their

education. According to DRC data regarding migrant aspirations, 24% of people migrating irregularly to

Europe are seeking improved educational opportunities.

Cultural Factors. Cultural norms play a significant role in migration decisions. In some cultures, such as

Somalia, migration is a part of the traditional ‘coming of age’ process for boys. While previously

migration routes would have been circumscribed to neighbouring provinces/countries, improvements in

transportation have made it possible to include international migration. In other countries, migration

has become synonymous with safety; in Afghanistan, for instance, migration guaranteed safety during

the Soviet invasion of 1979, reinforcing a belief among communities that migration will ensure physical

safety now.

Misinformation. Those who migrate are not always fully informed before or during the move. Migrants

often rely on a limited network for information before departure including family, friends, and the

smugglers themselves (Mixed Migration Centre 2018; Regional Mixed Migration Centre Briefing Paper

2016). Technology has allowed those who have arrived in the West to send home photos with

exaggerated impressions of their success home, either to relieve worry on the part of their families or to

engage in bragging. The limited information sources and positive personal testimony increases demand

for services provided by smugglers.

Mobility and Administrative Restrictions. The decision to migrate irregularly is often driven by the lack

of sufficient regular movement opportunities and the lack of information about these opportunities

where they do exist. Procedures to obtain formal visas are often very complex and opaque. They involve

significant cost in application fees and travel to embassies as well as an understanding of bureaucratic

processes. Both the administrative complexity associated with getting visas and the perception of lack of

transparency heighten demand for smuggling and informal migration routes.

Risks and Protection Concerns Those who are smuggled face substantial protection risks along the route. According to one study, 76%

of migrants arriving in Europe through the Mediterranean route directly experienced violence (MEDMIG

2018). Smugglers, in some cases, contribute to perpetration of violations by others.

Death. Available data suggests that the death rate along irregular migration routes is high (IOM 2018;

UNODC 2018; Mixed Migration Centre 2018). Some sources of data indicate that smugglers are directly

responsible for 50% of such violations (Mixed Migration Centre 2018); the second most prevalent type

of perpetrator is local authorities and border guards. Smugglers may cause death directly, through

beatings and physical assault, but they may also cause death indirectly – for example, smugglers who

arrange crossings on unsafe ships cause death by drowning, and those who engage in unsafe driving

cause accidents when crossing borders. Smugglers may also cause physical harm because they do not

12

provide adequate physical conditions for migrants – this includes lack of sufficient food and water as

well as lack of sufficient accommodation, particularly in harsh weather conditions.

Physical Assault and Crime. Violence and robbery are the two most common forms of crime to which

migrants may be subjected. According to one study, 65% of Somalis reported physical violence or

robbery on the route to Europe; Afghans report similar rates of criminality (IOM 2009). Extortion is one

form of violence that is often perpetrated by smugglers; smugglers hold migrants hostage and demand a

ransom from family members and friends (Nimkar and Frouws, 2018). There are indications that this

type of crime may target, not only families in the country of origin, but also members of the diaspora

(Split Loyalties). Such extortion may take place when migrants are transferred from one smuggling

network to another; some smuggling networks sell migrants to organised crime groups or armed groups

who then engage in extortion (UNODC 2018). Sexual violence is also common for women who take part

in migration routes. According to one study, 44% of women on migration routes experienced protection

concerns, and of this, 52% were subject to repeated violations. Lack of information contributes to this

issue – more than half of the women who experienced violations were not fully aware of the risks of

migrating (Mixed Migration Centre 2018).

Human Trafficking. Extortion through hostage taking on the part of smugglers may occur when migrants

are transferred from one smuggling network to another (Split Loyalties). Migrants may also be sold to

organised criminal groups who then engage in extortion (UNODC 2018). The irregular status that

smuggled migrants often have in both transit and destination countries leaves them vulnerable to

becoming victims of trafficking.

Policy Developments and Smuggling Policy toward migration is undergoing rapid change, particularly following the irregular migration crisis

in Europe in 2015. The precise nature of policy is dependent on the country and region, but the general

policy trends toward migration and asylum share some characteristics.

Criminalisation of Smuggling. International approaches toward irregular migration have been

developed relatively recently. The predominant definition of smuggling, outlined in the Protocol Against

the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea is a criminal definition, attempting to eradicate the

smuggling industry. The Bali Process also focuses on ensuring that anti-smuggling legislation and law

enforcement measures are in place in destination and transit countries. The Global Compact on

Migration also explicitly attempts to “prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise the smuggling of

migrants” (Objective 9). The fact that smuggling is perceived as a criminal enterprise at the international

level indicates that policy is likely to focus on elimination of smuggling and on enforcement measures.

Externalisation. The European Commission and the US have placed increasing focus on common

integrated border management. The EU adopted the Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy and

subsequent action plan in 2003 and 2006, respectively; this way forward establishes a single, non-military

border security authority according to EU Schengen Borders Code. One of the key elements of EU border

management has been externalization. Externalization is the reproduction of EU’s migration policy at the

external level, which “entails burden sharing in the policing of European borders with bordering countries

and the setting up of migration management policies in the countries of transit and origin…” (Doukoure

and Oger, 2007) Externalization can be defined as the overall aim of the EU to prevent unwanted migration

from reaching the EU territory (Lavenex 2004; Sirkesci and Pusch 2016). As a clear demonstration of

13

border security prioritization, 2018 will mark the first year that the EU’s annual investment in border

security will outweigh its investment in development in Africa (EURACTIV 2018). The US has adopted

externalisation measures since the Reagan administration and has been applied to Haiti, Cuba and other

Latin American countries in successive administrations. Some of the key facets of the externalisation

policy have included the interdiction and detention of irregular migrants, the increasing funding of border

management including coast guards and equipment and joint governmental policy initiatives (Human

Rights Watch 2016).

Border Walls. One of the more visible developments in border management is the relatively new policy

of putting walls up between states. At the end of World War II there were fewer than five border walls in

the world and only 15 by 1990. There are 70 walls either constructed or under construction today (Vallet

2014). Several of the recently-constructed walls have been successful in lowering the number of irregular

migrants through the targeted migration route. For instance, in 2014, approximately 19,000 people

attempted to cross the Mediterranean into Spain but, following the construction of the wall, the number

diminished to 3,700 people in 2015 (Harvard International Review 2017). Walls represent a significant

financial and human resource investment as they are considered to be most effective when they cover

short lengths and are heavily armed and, due to the flexibility of migration routes, often divert migration

to other more risky routes (Migration Policy Institute, 2016). Finally, walls do not address some major

forms of irregular migration, including overstaying of visas and crossing via sea (Heritage Institute, 2018).3

Addressing Root Causes. There is a clear understanding among policymakers that migration is linked to

economic opportunity. Many policy responses to the migration crisis have aimed to spur economic

growth, including in rural areas4. However, the relationship between migration and development is

complex; initial increases in household income may generate more migration in the short term (Migration

Policy Institute, 2018). In addition, programs to address root causes are generally diffuse and require

additional focus on addressing employment and long-term opportunities for urban youth.

Conclusion and Recommendations Policymakers and practitioners who aim to reduce the prevalence of smuggling networks and mitigate

the risks associated with human smuggling can alter and refine their approaches in order to better

target both potential migrants and smuggling networks.

In-depth research into smuggling networks. There is little data available on human smuggling networks,

and the research into factors driving smugglers is extremely limited. The lack of data around smuggling

reflects reliance on official statistics, differences in definitions of human smuggling, and reluctance to

share data on the part of law enforcement agencies. In order to gain a more comprehensive picture of

smuggling networks, their modes of operation, and to identify factors which may disrupt the networks,

it is necessary to have more complete information. Investment at the global or regional level into

qualitative and quantitative data collection, and into the development of a comprehensive picture of

smuggling networks and their modes of operation, could help to generate more targeted and effective

policies at the regional and national levels.

4 Examples of such programs include the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UK Department for International

Development’s programming developments in Afghanistan in 2016, following the ‘crisis’ of 2015, as well as similar programming in Somalia and the Sahel.

14

Focusing on migration hubs. Available research indicates that migration routes shift to avoid changes in

border management practices but hubs remain constant. Many of these hubs are well known, for

instance Agadez in Niger, Nimroz in Afghanistan and Sabratha in Libya. Since hubs serve as bases for

smugglers and information gathering and service selection locations for migrants, a focus on hubs may

generate longer-lasting changes in migration and smuggling decisions and mitigate human rights

violations. Examples of potential policy interventions could include: 1) identification of smuggling

‘leaders’ and disruption of smuggling networks at hubs, 2) implementation of programs to offer

migrants alternative legal migration or mechanisms for free or low-cost safe return at hubs, 3)

implementation of programs to offer economic alternatives to lower level smugglers, and 4)

implementation of awareness raising campaigns to reduce and mitigate the risks of rights violations.

Moving away from criminalisation and toward ‘market regulation’. Currently, international actors have

adopted an approach to migration that focuses on prosecuting smugglers. Migrants are complicit in

human smuggling as smuggling takes place consensually. In addition, an economy has developed around

smuggling networks. Other actors in the smuggling economy (e.g., hotel owners, providers of

communication infrastructure) have no incentive to cooperate with authorities regarding measures to

reduce smuggling networks. International actors could adopt a more market-oriented approach to

smuggling. This would involve identifying the factors that generate supply and demand, and working to

influence these factors. Potential policy interventions could include: 1) development of non-smuggling

related economic alternatives for low-level smugglers at migration hubs and 2) information campaigns

among potential migrants regarding physical safety measures (eg ensuring they are aware of minimum

standards for boats, ensuing awareness of minimum vehicle safety measures); such campaigns would

influence migrants to put pressure on smugglers to adopt measures to improve safety.

Holistic approaches to smuggling and migration. Smuggling has been defined as a criminal activity, but

it has strong economic, social and cultural ties. Smuggling networks arise from strong social systems;

many migrants rely on friends and family to identify a smuggler, and then rely on the smuggler as the

predominant source of information about potential migration routes and risks upon these migration

routes. The fact that smuggling is so closely linked with ethnicity indicates that successful migrant

smuggling policies are likely to include explicit social components that engage with the ethnic groups

that are more heavily involved in smuggling networks. Reducing migration requires addressing cultural

and historical factors that promote migration, including linkages of migration with coming-of-age and

newer cultural developments such as tendencies to ‘brag’ among people who have reached the West.

Policy approaches need to include explicit social and economic components in order to be successful.

Targeting populations of potential migrants. Although data on irregular migrants and smuggling

networks is relatively limited, there is enough data to draw some conclusions. Potential migrants are

often young and are literate; many of them are unemployed or underemployed and from urban areas. A

holistic approach to migration would therefore be likely to concentrate not only on hubs, but also on

employment in urban areas in countries of origin. Employment opportunities would focus, not on the

poorest of the poor, but instead on those who are not the most vulnerable, but have enough money and

education to attempt to move.

15

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