Document

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TOOLS FOR CIVIL

SOCIETY ACTION

TO REDUCE FOREST

CORRUPTION

Drawing Lessons from

Transparency International

By Kenneth L. Rosenbaum

Forest Integrity Network Advisor

January 2005

The World BankWashington, D.C.

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Material in this book can be copied and quoted freely provided acknowledgement is given to the authors.

Published by:PROFOR at the World Bank1818 H Street NWWashington DC 20433United StatesE-mail: [email protected]: http://www.profor.info

Published February 2005. PROFOR book number 4.Printed on 80% post consumer fiber paper.Cover credits: Transparency International: Source Book 2000, The Elements of Confronting Corruption:Integrity System, page 35.

ii

Acknowledgements v

Introduction and Overview vii

Transparency International, National Integrity Systems,and Forest Corruption 1

What is corruption? 1

Corruption in the forest sector 3

Transparency International and Combating Corruption 4

National Integrity Systems:An Overview 7

What kinds of actions can civil society take to enhance national integrity? 10

Applying TI’s Tools to the Forest Sector 13

Tools Proposed for Use in FIN’s Program 13Create a knowledge center 13Establish and implement model forest integrity pacts 13Draft business principles for the forest sector 14Create a forest sector corruption perception index 14

Tools for Use at the National Level 15Create an anti-corruption forest comic book 15Create anti-forest-corruption advertisements 15

Contentsiii

Form an anti-corruption theater troupe 16Create a traveling anti-forest-corruption exhibit or booth 16Draw attention to lost revenue 16Educate journalists 17Put together a concession manual and workshop 17Set up a concession website 17Compile a forest law reference 17Put together a landowner permit manual and workshop 18Encourage forest certification 18Document government performance on forest-related tasks 19Collect statistics on forest law enforcement 19Train enforcers in forest-related skills 19Document forest agency staffing and structure 20Produce a biographic directory of senior forest officials 20Hold a series of agency/citizen workshops on corruption 20Create a program to encourage forest whistleblowers 21Create an outlet for citizen complaints 21Create a public stakeholder panel 21Hold a conference on professional responsibility 22Encourage officials to sign an ethics pledge 22Recognize outstanding public service 22Create a forest corruption risk map 22Produce a forest sector citizens report card (CRC) 22

Tools for Use on the International Level 23Convene to exchange best practices 23Create a model professional ethics code for foresters 23

Key Questions 25

Can reformers address corruption on a sector-specific basis? 25Case Study: Addressing Corruption in the United States’ Forest Sector in the 19th and 20th Centuries 26

Can reformers develop generic forest-sector anti-corruption tools? 28

How do the efforts of a civil society group fit with the efforts of other reformers? 28

Concluding Observations 31

Literature cited 33

TOOLS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ACTION TO REDUCE FOREST CORRUPTION

iv

This publication was made possible through funding from PROFOR donors: theDepartment for International Development

(DFID) of the United Kingdom, the FinnishDepartment for International DevelopmentCooperation, the Japanese International ForestryCooperation Office, and Swiss DevelopmentCooperation(SDC).

Special thanks are due to Dr. Ute Siebert (FINSecretariat) for coordinating the Forest IntegrityNetwork, Nalin Kishor (World Bank Forests Team)for his coordination and oversight of the work lead-ing to this publication and to Laura Ivers (PROFORCommunications Officer) for managing the pro-duction of the publication. Acknowledgement isalso due to the many reviewers who provided valu-able input into this report.

Acknowledgementsv

The forest sector badly needs functioningintegrity systems. Corruption promotes ille-gal logging and trade, and illegal logging is a

multi-billion-dollars-per-year problem for theworld. Beyond the lost revenues, illegal logging isalmost never sustainable. No one has ever quanti-fied the environmental and social harm it causesworldwide.

Transparency International (TI) is the world’sleading organization in the fight against corruption.The Forest Integrity Network (FIN) is a TI initiativethat aims to address corruption issues in the forestsector. This report, prepared by FIN with PROFORfunding, examines the approach of TI to fightingcorruption and considers how it could be applied inthe forest sector.

The first chapter explains the underpinning ofTI’s approach, the theory that corruption is achronic threat in all societies and is only controlledthrough national integrity systems. These are builton a foundation of social values and public aware-ness, and they rely on the various pillars of societyproviding mutual accountability for corrupt behav-ior. The pillars include non-governmental actorssuch as the media and civil society, and governmen-tal actors such as the legislature, ombudsmen, andwatchdog agencies.

The second chapter takes its inspiration from thecorruption-fighting projects of TI throughout theworld and asks how civil society groups might applythese examples to the forest sector. It details more

than two dozen tools that groups might apply. Mostare based on TI efforts at the national level asreported in TI’s Corruption Fighters’ Toolkit.

The third chapter considers some key questionsabout applying these tools:

■ Can reformers address corruption on a sector-specific basis? The answer is a qualified “yes.”The TI National Integrity System approachteaches that corruption is a systemic problem.However, sometimes incremental solutions arethe only ones available, and efforts within theforest sector may help to advance anti-corrup-tion efforts throughout the society.

■ Are TI’s anti-corruption tools generic and uni-versal? The basic causes of corruption are wide-spread throughout the world, and generic toolscan offer basic guides, but groups using the toolsmust adapt them to particular local conditions.

■ Can civil society efforts work alongside govern-mental and other anti-corruption reforms? Yes,these efforts can be synergistic. Civil society canhelp advance the work of the other pillars ofnational integrity, and the other pillars can helpenhance the work of civil society.

The report concludes with a few overarchingobservations, including an endorsement of TIsapproach to tackling corruption as a constructiveand perhaps necessary addition to the fight againstillegal logging.

Introduction and Overviewvii

WHAT IS CORRUPTION?

Corruption is “the misuse of entrustedpower for private gain.”1 This broad defini-tion encompasses both private and public

authority.There is no broadly accepted way to categorize

all the many forms of corruption, and TI’s SourceBook notes different ways to do so. One simple wayis by actor, as illustrated in Figure 1. Corruptionoften involves several people: the instigator is notalways the person who ends up abusing the entrust-ed power, and is usually distinct from the victims ofthe corrupt act. But by focusing on the abuser ofpower, some simple dichotomies emerge. The abus-er can either be wielding public authority or privateauthority. In general, it is abuse of public authoritythat carries the greater potential for social harm.Within the public sector, there is abuse of politicalpower and abuse of administrative power — that is,abuse by politicians and abuse by civil servants.2

Corruption is usually illegal in itself, but is notalways coupled with another unlawful act. This pro-vides another classification dichotomy, illustratedin Figure 2. Corruption may be “according-to-rule”and “against-the-rule.”3 In according-to-rule cor-ruption, the corrupt actor provides benefits (such asservices or contracts) ordinarily required by law, butextracts a payment by threatening to withhold or

delay them, or by threatening to break the law. Inagainst-the-rule corruption, the corrupt actor pro-vides an unlawful benefit.

Corruption also varies by scale and motive.Corruption at its worst completely overwhelms law-ful controls over forest use. This overarching cor-ruption can twist the national laws so they nolonger conserve forest resources, or it can capturethe forest bureaucracy and stop it from guarding theresource.

The TI Source Book distinguishes betweengrand corruption and small-scale corruption.4 Thelatter is also called petty corruption. A distinctioncan also be drawn between corruption out of greedand corruption out of need, which applies mostly inthe case of petty corruption. Figure 3 offers aschematic of all these distinctions. Actually, no firmline separates the small act from the large.Corruption occurs along a spectrum that stretchesfrom controlling a nation’s entire forest resource to“fixing” a minor violation.

Although the word corruption often bringsbribery to mind, the TI Source Book notes corrup-tion has other forms. These include cronyism(including nepotism), quid pro quo payments topolitical campaigns, kickbacks (including subcon-tracting consultancies), and fraud in all its forms.5

Figures 4 through 7 show some of the variationwithin and among different forms of corruption.

Transparency International,National Integrity Systems,and Forest Corruption

CHAPTER ONE

1


2

Figure 4, on bribes, follows the TI Source Book’sdivision of bribes into four categories, which differin their causes and impacts.6 Category 1 bribes arepaid to access a scarce benefit or to avoid a commoncost. An example would be a bribe to secure a con-tract or concession. In these cases, one person’s gainis another’s loss, and the bribers may be competingto secure the benefit or avoid the loss. Category 2bribes are paid to receive a benefit that is not itselfscarce but is controlled through exercise of discre-tion. An example would be a bribe to avoid prose-cution or to secure a business license. Category 3bribes are paid for incidental benefits such asspeedy service or inside information. Category 4bribes are paid to entice the official to withhold abenefit or impose a cost on someone else.

An act of bribery usually involves two separatecrimes: the giving of the bribe and the soliciting or

acceptance of the bribe. Soliciting bribes can be aform of extortion. Extortion does not have a sepa-rate figure here, but its forms parallel those ofbribery. An official can extort money to grant ascarce benefit, to use discretionary powers favor-ably, to give incidental service, or to impose a coston others.

Favoritism and patronage illustrate that it doesnot always take two to commit a corrupt act. AsFigure 5 illustrates, a person can abuse power togrant benefits to himself. He can also grant benefitsto family (nepotism) or as a reward for loyalty(cronyism).

Kickbacks, illustrated in Figure 6, are not alwaysdistinct from bribes. However, the kickback is usual-ly tied to the granting of a scarce good or favor thatgenerates income for the beneficiary, who returns aportion of that income directly or indirectly.

FIGURE 1Categorizing corruption by who is abusing authority.

Corruption

Involving Use of Public Authority

By Politician, for example...

Forest Minister diverts concession income into campaign treasury

By Bureaucrat, for example...

Forest officer demands bribe to issue timber transit permit

Involving Use of Private Authority,for example...

Forest company awards subcontracts for kickbacks

Fraud, illustrated in Figure 7, is a crime that goesfar beyond corruption. Broadly, fraud is lying forprofit. When a person lies in an official capacity forhis private enrichment, or when that person delib-erately accepts someone else’s lie for his privategain, that becomes corruption.

CORRUPTION IN THE FOREST SECTOR

Forest sector corruption and the resulting lawlessforest use have many painful impacts. Forests,including protected areas, are destroyed. Local peo-ple lose access to forest resources that they haveused for many years. Rural societies go throughtemporary economic booms as forests are strippedfollowed by inevitable busts that leave the societiesshattered. Government revenues that ought to go

towards sustainable forest management and ruraleconomic development go into the pockets of offi-cials and their cronies.

By its nature, forest corruption is clandestine,and assessing its dimensions is difficult. The WorldBank has estimated that the amount of revenue lostto illegal logging each year is on the order of five bil-lion US dollars.

This estimate does not necessarily reflect thescope of corruption. Corrupt logging and illegallogging often overlap, but not always. Some acts ofcorruption, such as kickbacks for promotions with-in the bureaucracy, are not tied to particular acts ofillegal harvest or trade. Some forms of illegal log-ging, such as when local people continue tradition-al forest uses despite new laws, have nothing to dowith corruption. However, corruption probably fos-ters many of the largest illegal operations.

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS, AND FOREST CORRUPTION

3

FIGURE 2Categorizing corruption by the legality of associated actions.

The action taken for corrupt motive is...

Basically According to Rule,for example...

A forest officer is bribed todrop a false charge

A customs official is bribed toallow a legal shipment out of port

Against the Rule, for example...

A forest officer is bribed tomark extra trees for harvest

A customs official is bribed toallow import of protected species

Corruption can also foster apparently legal log-ging. This can happen on small or large scales. Asmall-scale actor might bribe a clerk to speed process-ing of a permit request.A large-scale actor might bribelawmakers to reshape forest laws and institutions tofavor private gain over good forest management.

Given all this, it seems safe to estimate that theimpacts of corrupt logging are at least as large as theimpacts of illegal logging. Corruption is probablyassociated with a large volume of the world’s illegaltimber, and estimates of illegal harvest and trade doprobably not adequately reflect corruption’s fullmonetary scope.

On top of this revenue loss, no one has everplaced a value on the damage suffered by ecosys-tems and rural societies. The toll is enormous. Inmany countries with significant forest resources,there is little hope of sustainable forest managementwithout honest government oversight.

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ANDCOMBATING CORRUPTION

Transparency International (TI) is the only interna-tional organization devoted exclusively to fightingcorruption. TI’s corruption-fighting efforts arebased on a set of premises:

■ That corruption is a pervasive threat.■ That corruption is inimical to good governance.■ That many factors promote corruption.■ That a multi-faceted National Integrity System is

a country’s best defense against corruption.

That corruption is a pervasive threat means thatsome degree of corruption occurs or threatens tooccur in every society. The effort to suppress cor-ruption must be ongoing in every society.


4

BOX 1

Corruption in the forest sector reflects the rangeof corruption seen throughout society. There ispetty corruption and grand, administrative andpolitical, and bribery in many forms. The follow-ing are typical reported and alleged incidents:

■ Forest officials extort payments fromlandowners for forestry services that thestate ought to supply at a nominal fee.

■ To avoid delays in issuance of a timber tran-sit permit, landowners bribe not only thelocal forester, but also local tax and land offi-cials.

■ Enforcement officials stop perfectly legal logshipments on the road and threaten tocharge the drivers with illegal transportunless the drivers pay a bribe.

■ To win the right to cut trees on a govern-ment forest, a bidder makes cash paymentsto a forest officer.

■ Officials award timber concessions to theirrelatives.

■ Forest officers, police officers, or prosecutorstake bribes to ignore violations of forestlaws, including laws forbidding harvest in

parks and laws protecting endangeredspecies.

■ In a forest-related court case, bribes fly tothe court clerks, the judges, and even toopposing counsel to secure a favorable andprompt verdict.

■ Officials take bribes to allow export of ille-gally harvested timber.

■ Customs agents take bribes to allow timberto enter the country without paying dutiesor in violation of endangered species protec-tions.

■ A forest officer demands that his subordi-nates pay him kickbacks for salary increasesand promotions.

■ A forest officer places friends and relativeson the agency payroll, though they are“ghosts” who do no actual work.

■ Ministers, legislators, or other high officialsaccept bribes to shape forest laws, institu-tions, and procedures to favor the bribers.

■ Ministers use timber receipts to fund politi-cal campaigns.

■ Ministers siphon money off of donor-spon-sored project for personal enrichment.

Reported and Alleged Incidents of Forest Sector Corruption


That corruption is inimical to good governancemeans that fighting corruption is essential toimproving governance. TI rejects the view that cor-ruption is no worse than an extra tax. If unchecked,even petty corruption tends to escalate and becomeinstitutionalized. Once in place, it distorts both themarket and the government. In forest situations, afew buyers who know how to grease the corruptwheels often step in and control the timber market,offering landowners artificially low prices. Forestagencies skew their budgets to favor projects that

offer opportunity to divert funds. Decisions on for-est management turn on short-term enrichmentrather than sustainability.

That many factors promote corruption meansthat there are multiple routes to attack corruption.For example, corruption feeds on both opportuni-ty to bribe (or solicit bribes) and inclination to doso. In the case of petty forest corruption, we canfight opportunity through institutional changes, byeliminating or restricting the authority of pettyofficials over forest use, or by providing equivalent

5

FIGURE 3Categorizing corruption by size and motive.

The scope of corruption is...

Overarching, for example...

A corporation bribes parliament to reshapeforest laws to the corporation’s advantage

Grand, for example...

Petty, and the motive is...

Greed, for example...

Need, for example...

An elite group“captures” the forest bureaucracythrough an organized system of bribery and cronyism

A head of state awards a major concession to his brother’s firm

A forest officer accepts an overseas junket from a concession bidder

A guard on meager salary extracts bribes to keep his family fed

government services through more than one officeor agency. We can fight inclination by increasinggovernment salaries and increasing the likelihoodof corruption coming to light, turning it into a low-profit, high-risk activity.

That a multi-faceted national integrity system is acountry’s best defense means that in the long run, a

country’s best hope to resist corruption depends onmaintenance of a constellation of institutions andprocesses, all reflecting social values and kept work-ing by public awareness, leadership, and politicalwill. TI has developed a theoretical framework forfighting corruption based on strengthening nation-al integrity systems.


6

FIGURE 4Forms of bribery, by objective, with forest-sector examples.

Get awardof forest concession

Bribes

To get ascarce benefit

To get adiscretionary favor

To get anincidental benefit

To impose acost on others

Avoid prosecutionfor forest offense

Get license tooperate sawmill

Get faster issuanceof transit permit

Get public forest guard to keepwatch over private loggiing equipment

Delay competitor’sharvest permit

Schedule inspectionof competitor’s mill

NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS:AN OVERVIEW

TI pioneered the concept of national integrity sys-tems (NIS). It presents the concept in detail in itsSource Book.

The NIS approach argues that a society becomesresistant to corruption when a whole set of institu-tions are present and functioning well. These insti-tutions include an elected legislature, a transparentexecutive committed to the rule of law, and an inde-pendent judiciary. In Figure 8, these institutions arerepresented as the pillars of national integrity.


7

FIGURE 5Forms of favoritism and patronage, with forest-sector examples.

Favoritism and Patronage

Self-Dealing

Award harvest concessionto own firm

Buy vehicles for ForestDepartment from own firm

Hire own firm to preparegovernment forest plans

Hire untrained family memberto be forest official

Award forest boundary surveycontract to a relative

Hire forest officer based on personal loyalty, not ability

Grant harvest concession as a reward for loyalty

Nepotism

Cronyism

Figure 8: The Foundations and Pillars ofNational Integrity, and some of the social goals thathonest governance supports. Diagram from Pope(2000).

The institutional pillars rest on a dual founda-tion. At the very base are society’s values. These

include fairness, integrity, accountability, and hon-est dealing. TI has found these to be universal. Itrejects the view that some cultures embrace briberyor accept abuse of power as a social norm. In everycountry where TI has worked, it has found thatmost people resent corruption.


8

FIGURE 6Forms of kickbacks, with forest-sector examples.

Kickbacks

Direct paymentsto officials

Excessive gifts and hospitality

Payments from subordinates

Percentage of concession income

“Rebate” on purchaseof supplies or services

Forest company pays officialsto attend overseas meeting

Concession holder gets foreignscholarship for official’s child

Forest official’s brother gets job with bidder

Chief requires forest officersto pay to get promotion

Minister demands percentageof forest officers’ bribes

The institutions also sit on a foundation of pub-lic awareness. Public awareness allows verticalaccountability. If the public turns a blind eye to theactions of government, it cannot hold the responsi-ble leaders accountable.

Along with structures, societies need effectiveprocesses to discourage corruption. For example,transparency and free and fair elections enhance theeffectiveness of vertical accountability.

Vertical accountability alone is usually notenough to deter corruption. Society also needsprocesses that create or enhance horizontalaccountability, where one pillar becomes a watch-dog of another. Thus, through legislation and over-sight, the legislature can check and balance thepower of the executive. Through judicial review, the

courts also act as a check on the executive.Institutionalized overseers such as auditors generalor ombudsmen look for waste, fraud, and abusethroughout government. An ethic of public serviceencourages government employees to foster trans-parency, enhancing accountability generally.Watchdog agencies keep an eye on abuses in the pri-vate sector or in public enterprises. The media, civilsociety, private sector, and international actors allcontribute to public awareness and hold the gov-ernment accountable for its actions.

As the illustration suggests, national integrity isnot an ultimate goal, but rather the means of sup-porting the achievement of other goals attainedthrough good governance. These include improvedquality of life and sustainable development.


9

FIGURE 7Forms of fraud combined with corruption, with forest-sector examples.

Fraud, accompanied bypersonal gain for official

Person defrauds othersin name of employer

Overcharges for services or stumpage,with excess diverted to self

For a price, falsifies documents toallow sale of wood from protected species

Person defrauds employerin aid of self or others

For a price, accepts misrepresentation ofspecies, volume, or grade of timber

Hires “ghost” timber guards who do nowork and kick back part of salary

Claims experience for fieldworkor travel not actually done

WHAT KINDS OF ACTIONS CAN CIVIL SOCIETY TAKE TO ENHANCENATIONAL INTEGRITY?

TI has developed and put into practice a number oftools to fight corruption. However, TI has chosennot to investigate and expose individual cases ofcorruption. It views its role not as a watchdog of thegovernment, but more as a facilitator of theNational Integrity System. TI works to makeNational Integrity Systems stronger and more effec-tive.

TI has identified seven categories of tools that itand its national chapters use. The categories are:

I. Awareness RaisingII. ProcurementIII. Election CampaignsIV. Access to Information

V. Public InstitutionsVI. Business EthicsVII. Diagnostics

TI publishes a Toolkit8 that documents hownational chapters have used tools in each of thesecategories to fight corruption.

Awareness raising tools bring the issue of corrup-tion to the public’s attention. They remind the pub-lic that corruption is a problem and inform thepublic about actions that individuals can take tofight corruption. TI chapters have carried outawareness raising campaigns through publications,advertisements, and classes. TI’s Toolkit is itself anawareness tool, informing people of other’s success-es in fighting corruption.

Procurement tools address commercial transac-tions between the government and the private sec-tor. Through training and dissemination of infor-mation, local chapters have found ways to make


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FIGURE 8The Foundations and Pillars of National Integrity, and some of the social goals that honest government supports.Transparency International: Source Book 2000,The Elements ofConfronting Corruption: Integrity System, page 35.

Sustainabledevelopment

Rule of lawQualityof Life

S O C I E T Y ’ S V A L U E SP U B L I C A W A R E N E S S

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procurement more open and honest. TI’s IntegrityPact tool is a powerful example. For a particularcompetitive procurement, all participants, privateand public, agree to abide by a set of rules for hon-est behavior as set out in an integrity pact. An inde-pendent third party monitors their behavior andhas the power to punish violations of the rules. TI isnow implementing integrity pact projects in severalcountries.

Free and fair election campaigns are fundamentalto vertical accountability. TI chapters have devel-oped tools that monitor media coverage and politi-cal spending and encourage accountability amongthe political parties.

Access-to-information tools take many forms. Forthe ordinary citizen, TI chapters have producededucational materials on what to expect of govern-ment and how to get government services. Thechapters have encouraged adoption of strongertransparency laws, and they have encouraged andprotected whistleblowers. The “Publish What YouPay” campaign, begun by Global Witness, TI, andother NGOs, advocates that corporations disclosewhat they pay for the right to exploit publicresources, such as forests. This information is astarting point for citizens who want to track whathappens to that income.

Public institutions tools focus on particular armsof government. TI chapters have set up watchdogprojects to provide the public with information onthe activities of legislatures, courts, and municipalgovernments. They have done studies comparingthe activities of bureaucracies such as customsagencies with similar agencies in nearby countries.They have produced citizen manuals for monitor-ing social programs.

Business ethics tools aim at the private sector andthe professions. One of the most promising of thesetools is TI’s Business Principles for CounteringBribery, developed with Social AccountabilityInternational and a group of other interested busi-nesses and civil society organizations. As more andmore enterprises are putting corporate socialresponsibility management systems in place, thesestand out as one of the few sets of managementprinciples that directly address corruption andabuse of power.

Diagnostics include two of TI’s best-knowntools: the Corruption Perception Index and theBribe Payers Index. The first documents the reputa-tion of governments for honest practice, and thesecond documents the reputation of private enter-prises from particular countries for willingness topay bribes. TI produces international versions ofthese surveys. TI chapters have used surveys to doc-ument corruption on the national and local level.

NOTES

1. TI web page, http://www.transparency.org/faqs/faq-cor-

ruption.html. See also Pope (2000) [hereinafter “TI Source

Book”], p.2.

2. TI Source Book, pp.2–3.

3. TI Source Book, p.3.



6. TI Source Book, pp. 16–17.

7. See, e.g., Curran et al. (2004) documenting illegal logging’s

toll on protected areas in Indonesian Borneo.

8. Transparency International (2003) [hereinafter “Toolkit”]

was used as the basis for this paper.


11

13

This chapter offers nearly thirty ideas forcivil-society anti-corruption projects in theforest sector. Most of the ideas are adapta-

tions of tools from the TI Corruption Fighters’Toolkit. Some are based on other TI projects. A few are inspired by actions outside TI. The firstsection of this chapter lists four tools that FINhopes to make part of its core program. The second section of this chapter lists over twentytools that a TI national chapter might considerimplementing. The third section of the chapterlists a few tools that would be implementedregionally or globally.

TOOLS PROPOSED FOR USE IN FIN’S PROGRAM

Create a knowledge center

Activity Type: Access to Information.

Description: Create an Internet-based analyticalclearinghouse for identifying best practices in thefight against forest corruption and illegal logging.The clearinghouse would provide at least threeservices: 1) documentation and tracking of effortsto combat forest corruption, providing where possi-ble information on each effort’s success and poten-

tial for dissemination; 2) a library of links to docu-ments, articles, news reports, and other publicationsrelevant to forest corruption; and facilitation ofongoing discussions among practitioners on forestcorruption issues.

Similar Programs: The TI website and the TIToolkit document efforts to fight corruption, butwithout focus on any particular sector. The RoyalInstitute of International Affairs maintains a webindex of materials on illegal logging, but withoutfocus on corruption. The World Bank has hostedinternational electronic conferences, including oneon forest law enforcement and governance, but itdoes not offer regular venues for anti-corruptionactivists to exchange opinions and information.

Rationale: This will give individual corruptionfighters access to key information tools. In this con-text, the premise is that information leads to action.

Establish and implement model forestintegrity pacts

Activity Type: Public Institutions, Business Ethics.

Description: Develop a model Integrity Pact for theforest sector and apply it in pilot projects in selectedcountries.

Applying TI’s Tools to the Forest Sector

CHAPTER TWO

An Integrity Pact (IP) is a tool to discourage cor-ruption in public contracting. It entails an agree-ment between a government agency or departmentand all the private sector bidders for one or severalpublic contracts. All parties agree that bidders willnot offer bribes and that public officials will notdemand bribes. The IP is enforced by ensuring max-imum transparency at every stage of the process, acareful monitoring of the process by independentobservers such as local NGOs, and the application ofsevere sanctions when violations occur. Civil societyorganizations such as TI National Chapters andother nationally based NGOs play a key role in mon-itoring and overseeing such a pact.

Similar Programs: TI has implemented IPs in morethan 14 countries, in various sectors.

Rationale: A forest sector IP could:a) increase accountability and transparency by

enhancing publicity and access to information onlogging concession awarding processes;

b) create equity and efficiency in such processes;c) reduce the high costs of corruption to both gov-

ernments and bidders, and counter distortion ofthe concession and timber market;

d) provide a basis for further monitoring whether acompany abides to the concession granted;

e) facilitate and enhance sustainable timber harvestand sustainable forest management by strengthen-ing environmentally responsible companies; and

f) help the government to curb the evasion of con-cession and royalty payments that can be used forforest conservation, improving the quality of for-est resources and development projects.

Draft business principles for the forest sector

Activity Type: Business Ethics.

Description: Convene a committee of stakeholdersto draft a set of model anti-corruption principlesfor businesses in the forest sector. The principleswould cover all aspects of corruption, includingsuch things as facilitation payments to governmentofficials and kickbacks to private suppliers.Publicize the principles and assist businesses thatwish to adopt them.

Similar Programs: TI has worked with businessesand NGOs to produce a generic set of BusinessPrinciples to Counter Bribery (BPCB). This FINproject would build on that TI program, focusing onthe forest sector.

Rationale: Applied to the forest sector, a good set ofbusiness principles can:a) decrease acts of bribery within forest sector

enterprises;b) increase accountability, transparency, and social

and environmental responsibility of forest sectorenterprises;

c) enhance awareness of corruption in the forestsector and its adverse environmental and socialeffects and help to develop preventive strategies;

d) increase the reputation of forest sector enterpris-es and lower the risk of corruption scandals thatgive negative signals to sensitized consumers;

e) reduce corruption-related distortion of marketsby reducing the cost of doing business;

f) decrease corruption-related distortion of opencompetition;

g) discourage non-participants of the BPCB pro-gram from seeking bribes and kickbacks fromparticipating companies;

h) lower the risk of disruption of a company’s orga-nizational structure; and

i) facilitate and enhance sustainable timber harvestand sustainable forest management by strength-ening environmentally and socially responsiblecompanies.

Create a forest sector corruption perception index

Activity Type: Diagnostics.

Description: Use public surveys to detect and publi-cize the presence of corruption in the forest sector.In a large country, the survey could compare per-ceived corruption levels in different regions or sub-divisions of the country. In a large forest bureaucra-cy, the survey could compare perceived levels ofcorruption in different arms of the agency (forexample, social forestry versus traditional produc-tion forestry) or at different levels of the agency (for-est guards versus junior forest officers versus seniorforest officers).


14

Similar Programs: The grandfather of these sortsof programs is TI’s international corruption per-ception index, which compares governmentagainst government.9 TI also has a bribe payersindex, which measures the propensity of business-es from particular nations to pay bribes.10

The TI Toolkit offers examples of TI nationalchapters adapting this kind of diagnostic tool to localproblems. For example, Transparency InternationalKenya produced an urban bribery index.11 TheLithuanian national TI chapter conducted a set ofsurveys of corruption within the country.12

Transparency International-Initiative Madagascar(TI-IM) with the help of the International Secretariatof TI conducted a pair of opinion surveys of corrup-tion in Madagascar.13 Transparencia Mexicana pro-duced a national survey of public experiences withcorruption in the supply of government services ineach of Mexico’s states.14 TI-India has conducted anational survey of corruption in ten sectors, but notincluding forests.15

Rationale: Corruption is often an open secret,taboo to mention publicly. Such surveys break thetaboo and bring the problem into the realm of pub-lic discussion. The surveys also show that not allpeople and agencies are corrupt. This removes theexcuse that corruption is inevitable. A survey cancreate public pressure for the government toimprove and it can encourage competition amongbureaucrats to improve their bureau’s standing.

TOOLS FOR USE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The list below generally follows the TI Toolkit’sorganization: Awareness Raising projects comefirst, followed by Procurement, Access toInformation, Public Institutions, and Diagnostics.Some of the proposed tools involve more than a single category. Some tools appear out of strictcategory order because they are related to othertools or because they address similar aspects ofcorruption.

Create an anti-corruption forest comic book.

Activity Type: Awareness Raising

Description: Create anti-corruption forest comicbooks. The books will carry the messages “Don’tpay bribes to police or foresters” and “Don’t let peo-ple steal our trees!”

Similar programs: The comic book idea is men-tioned in passing in the TI Source Book.16 There aresome examples of general anti-corruption comics athttp://www.worldcomics.fi/anticorruption.html.These include single-panel editorial style cartoons aswell as extended stories.

Rationale: The comic book format is engaging andfun to read. Both children and adults will readthem. They are effective even if there is not a tradi-tion of reading. Children especially will take thesemessages to heart and urge their parents to follow.

Create anti-forest-corruption advertisements.

Activity Type: Awareness Raising

Description: Using a variety of means, put out themessage that forest corruption hurts everyone. Thisactivity is in the same vein as the comic book, butpotentially addressed to a broader audience. Themeans could include roadside signs, bumper stick-ers, posters, radio spots, or even television.

Similar programs: In a fire-prone country, you haveonly to look at how the forest agency reminds localpeople of the importance of preventing forest fires.The means may be as simple as slogans spelled outwith painted stones on a cleared hillside.

TI national chapters have produced radio andtelevision campaigns. Transparência Brasil pro-duced a series of general anti-corruption radiospots aimed at upper-middle-class listeners in SãoPaulo.17 Association Nigérienne de Lutte contra laCorruption produced a series of three-minute tel-evision spots. TI Nepal also has produced televi-sion spots.19

APPLYING TI ’S TO THE FOREST SECTOR

15

In a slightly more ambitious use of media,Transparency Thailand has produced a live, two-hour radio talk show on corruption, which featuresexperts in the Bangkok studio and calls from listen-ers. It also has produced a 15-minute taped pro-gram for the nation’s military radio stations, whichis aired on ten stations throughout the country.20

As part of an anti-corruption week, TI Ugandahas used a broad range of publicity tools, includinglive phone-in radio and TV programs.21

TI Slovakia has put together an ambitious set ofawareness tools that include television programs oncorruption.22

Rationale: Advertising can convey information andsway public opinion. Even simple messages canstrengthen public values, which are the foundationof national integrity.

Form an anti-corruption theater troupe

Activity Type: Awareness Raising.

Description: Produce a series of short plays or skitsthat illustrate the problems of corruption. The exactformat would depend on the local culture. For exam-ple, in some countries a puppet theater would beeffective, and in others a single storyteller could playall roles. In some countries the appropriate tonewould be clownish and satirical, and in others seriousor melodramatic. The troupe would tour forestedareas spreading an anti-corruption message.

Similar Programs: TI Bangladesh has created aPeople’s Theater.23 Staffed largely by volunteers, ithas three separate troupes that have put on per-formances in schools and public venues such as busstations. Thousands of people have seen the plays,and many more have heard of them through presscoverage. The project has involved youth in the pro-ductions and reached an audience that includeslow-income people with minimal access to services.The message has been a general anti-corruptionmessage, not specific to any sector.

In central and east Africa, the International Anti-Corruption Theatrical Movement sponsors anti-corruption theater. It has worked with TI Uganda toraise awareness.24

Rationale: Spreading messages through perform-ance is a tradition in many cultures. In rural areas,the theater format allows the message to reachwhole communities at once and does not dependon literacy. Using humor or fantasy, a theater pro-duction can raise issues that would be dangerous orimpossible to raise directly in the press.

Create a traveling anti-forest-corruptionexhibit or booth


Description: Make an anti-corruption exhibit for apublic fair or market. A small information boothcould offer landowners information on both goodforestry and their legal rights. It could also offerthe general public information to raise awarenessof corrupt practices in the forest. A more sophisti-cated booth at a trade fair can promote businessprinciples, integrity pacts, and other anti-corrup-tion tools for the corporation.

Similar Programs: TI South Korea organized anentire fair around corruption fighting.25

Rationale: A fair or market exhibit can reach thevictims of forest corruption. An exhibit next to thefirewood sellers could explain how corruptionincreases the cost of wood and threatens the relia-bility of the supply. An exhibit at the trade fair canoffer buyers and sellers ideas to limit bribery andkickbacks.

Draw attention to lost revenue


Description: Estimate and publicize lost revenues.Commission a study to estimate the amount ofpublic money lost due to illegal logging and relatedcorruption, and the rate at which losses occur.Include loss of stumpage fees and tax revenues, andalso loss of future income due to lack of forest man-agement. Create a way to dramatize the amount,such as a clock-driven sign or web page that gives aninstantaneous updated estimate, so that people canwatch the money fly away.


16

Similar Programs: None in Toolkit.

Rationale: People underestimate the importance offorests and the harm brought by corruption. Thistool will make the point that corruption is hurtingeveryone.

Educate journalists


Description: Hold educate-the-press sessions.Invite journalists to briefings on forest corruption.The briefings could be done as a workshop, or per-haps better, as a series of breakfast or lunch meet-ings over several weeks or months. The speakersshould include activists, experts, and reform-mind-ed officials. The briefings would be done “off-the-record” — with the journalists promising not tocover the briefing as a news event or to quote thespeaker — to encourage more candid discussion.

Similar Programs: The Public Awareness Campaignin Slovakia included seminars for journalists.26

Anti-Corruption Week in Uganda included pressconferences.27

Rationale: These briefings will achieve severalends. Reporters will get basic information and con-tacts in the area, so that when something newswor-thy happens, they will understand the context andknow where to go for more information. Speakerswill get enhanced standing in the eyes of the press.Also, the reporters will see other reporters at thebriefing, which tells them that there is interest inthe subject. It will make them more likely to coverthis kind of news.

Put together a concession manual and workshop

Activity Type: Procurement; Access to Information.

Description: Produce a forest concession bidder’smanual and offer concessions workshops. Thesewould guide enterprises large and small seeking tocompete for concessions and would clarify the pri-vate parties’ rights. The materials would describe the

laws that apply to the process, the agencies thatimplement the laws, the fees involved, and the dead-lines or typical time necessary for the agency toprocess requests. The workshops should includeagency officials.

Similar Programs: The Lebanese TransparencyOrganization has prepared a permit manual forobtaining construction permits. TransparenciaParaguay has run public procurement workshopsfor officials.29

Rationale: The project would make concession bid-ders aware of their rights and of normal procedures,and would make them better able to protest if offi-cials tried to deviate from the law. Having the offi-cials participate would both educate them and makeit hard for them to change procedures arbitrarily.

Set up a concession website

Activity Type: Procurement; Access to Information.

Description: Create a country-specific website withinformation on advertised and active forest conces-sions. Such a website should include informationuseful to potential bidders, so that more maypar\ticipate, and information that will allow thepublic to judge whether particular concessions havebeen awarded fairly and whether the terms of theconcession are being followed.

The project could build on the concession man-ual project. The entire concession manual could beavailable online. Besides this generic information,though, the website should provide current infor-mation on specific concessions.

Similar Programs: Corporación Latinoameri-cana para el Desarrollo, the TransparencyInternational national chapter in Ecuador, has cre-ated a website dedicated to public procurement.30

The site collects information on procurement pub-lished in newspapers around the country and pres-ents them in a searchable database.

Some countries have government-sponsoredwebsites that perform a similar function.


17

Rationale: This project aids both the potential bid-der, who learns more about opportunities for bids,and the interested citizen, who can watch theprogress of the concession process in a singleinstance or overall.

Compile a forest law reference


Description: Compile a forest law reference — anauthoritative source book of forest-related laws inforce — and keep it up-to-date. Make it available onpaper and on the web. Translate it into local lan-guages. Where laws are not published, or are out-of-date, point this out.

Similar Programs: As part of an effort to fight cor-ruption in customs administration, Center forRegional Development/Transparency Inter-national Armenia compiled the customs laws andregulations in force in Armenia, Georgia, andAzerbaijan.31 The other parts of the project includ-ed surveys of experience of businesses with customsand production of simplified educational materialson customs laws and procedures for businesses andcustoms officials.

Rationale: In some countries, no one has ever com-piled all the statutes, rules, and official policies thatapply to forest into a single source. In fact, in somecountries the rules and policies are not publiclyavailable at all. Worse, they may not exist in writtenform. Creating a source book can pressure the gov-ernment to put its rules and policies in writing andto follow them consistently. Making the laws easilyavailable can help educate people about their rights.(People may be paying “fees” that they believe arerequired by law but that are actually required by thepresiding official and remain in his pocket.)

Put together a landowner permit manual and workshop


Description: Produce a permit manual and offerworkshops for landowners on how to market theirwood. The materials would describe the laws thatapply to the process, the agencies that implement thelaws, the fees involved, and the deadlines or typical

time necessary for the agency to process requests.The workshops should include the officials from theagencies as well as the landowners.

Similar Programs: The Lebanese TransparencyOrganization has prepared a permit manual forobtaining construction permits.32 The Armeniancustoms project, described elsewhere in this paper,included production of a booklet on customsrequirements and procedures.33

Rationale: This would be useful in areas where for-est officers extort bribes from landowners. Themanual or workshop would make landownersaware that they did not have to pay bribes and howto act if bribes were sought. It would also educateofficials, who themselves may not be aware of all therules. By having an open, public discussion of theproper procedures, the officials will find it more dif-ficult to deviate from them later.

Encourage forest certification

Activity type: Access to Information, Business Ethics

Description: Forest certification programs set stan-dards for production of forest products and thencertify whether products or producers meet thosestandards. By doing that, the programs assure con-sumers that forest managers followed good prac-tices in producing forest products. The most promi-nent programs today focus on followingenvironmental standards, but programs may alsoinclude social standards, such as worker safety orcompliance with laws. Some programs are self-policed, while others rely on independent audits.Some programs certify the forest management pro-gram, while others include chain-of-custody track-ing and certify the products produced. Some pro-grams include transparency provisions, which allowinterested citizens and groups access to informationon past or planned forest management activities.

Similar programs: TI has not been involved in for-est certification, however other NGOs and industryassociations have. The Forest Stewardship Councilhas created a system favored by many environmen-tal NGOs. It employs independent auditing andchain-of-custody tracking. Though it focuses onsustainable management, it includes some socialprinciples. The Pan European Forest Certification


18

(PEFC) is another widely subscribed to scheme.There are also a number of national level initiativessuch as that by the Ecolabelling Institute inIndonesia.34

Rationale: Many analysts of the forest sector seecertification systems as an effective tool to fightlarge-scale illegal logging. In particular, systemswith chain-of-custody tracking, transparencyrequirements for harvest planning, and independ-ent auditing can help trace the origin of wood andmake it difficult to hide theft. If information oncertification follows the wood through the streamof commerce, informed consumers can have a pos-itive influence on behavior in the forest. Also, whena company agrees to be certified, it embraces a codeof conduct, which is similar in effect to adopting acorporate ethics pledge (see discussion of that tool,below in this paper).

Although these are desirable effects, existing cer-tification systems are not necessarily cures for cor-ruption problems. First, many systems are silent oncorruption — they simply do not include an anti-corruption standard. Second, corruption is far moredifficult for an auditor to detect than, say, unsus-tainable forest management or theft of timber.Third, the certification system may be vulnerable tocorruption itself, through bribery of auditors. Allthis means that certification cannot absolutelyguarantee that a product is untainted by corruptpractices.

On balance, however, including anti-corruptionstandards in certification systems should be worth-while. Honest businesses should embrace the addi-tion of anti-corruption standards to certificationsystems. And even without specific anti-corruptionstandards, the transparency provisions in some cer-tification programs will make corrupt practicesharder to hide.

Document government performance on forest-related tasks

Activity Type: Public Institutions, Diagnostics.

Description: Gather, analyze, and publish data ongovernment approval of routine forest-relatedactivities. The activities would include land-relatedapprovals, such as permission to harvest and trans-port logs, and trade-related approvals, such as per-mission to export or import forest products. The

data would include numbers of approvals or appli-cations handled by each office of the responsibleagency and average time for processing. Businesssurveys could collect information on how oftenbribes were solicited or paid. Ideally, the datawould allow comparison of similar processes indifferent offices and jurisdictions, or for similarkinds of approvals outside the forest sector. Repeatannually to seek trends.

Similar Programs: The Armenian customs projectmentioned above included a survey that gathereddata on people’s experiences with customs inArmenia and Georgia, including the length of timeit took to clear customs, the and the kinds andamounts of bribes paid.35 The national TI chapter inBangladesh documented how long it takes thenational Anti-Corruption Bureau to complete rou-tine tasks.36

Rationale: If the data shows a consistent pattern of corruption, or contrasts between tasks or agen-cies, they will help build the case for reform. Ifthe data show long delays or large variation in thetime it takes to process seemingly simple tasks, itwould point to possible efforts to obtain facilitationpayments.

Collect statistics on forest law enforcement

Activity Type: Public Institutions; Diagnostics.

Description: Create a scorecard for forest lawenforcement, compiling information on the num-bers of arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and sen-tencing. Compare jurisdictions or point out pat-terns of failure to prosecute cases fully.

Similar Programs: A study of forest law enforce-ment in the Atlantic coastal forests of Brazil byConservation International showed that the gov-ernment was putting much emphasis on detectingillegal acts but not enough on prosecuting, and thatfew arrested people drew significant punishments.

Rationale: This project could bring public attentionto the efforts of law enforcement to detect and sup-press corruption and associated forest crimes. A pat-tern of failure to suppress crime could suggest under-lying corruption of the enforcement apparatus.


19

Train enforcers in forest-related skills

Activity Type: Public Institutions

Description: Offer training for law enforcementofficials on technical issues related to forest corrup-tion. For example, customs agents could be trainedin recognizing species of wood to help detect misla-beled shipments. Finding a pattern of such ship-ments could suggest illegality and perhaps corrup-tion in the harvest of the wood. Police could betrained in investigating accounts to detect signs offraud or abuse of power. Prosecutors could betrained in gathering and presenting evidence of cor-ruption. Judges could be trained to understand thescientific issues that may arise in these cases (forexample, the importance of protection of naturalareas) to help them both decide the case and arriveat appropriate punishments for the guilty.

Similar Programs: The Whistleblower Protectionprogram in South Africa includes training on appli-cation of the whistleblower law.37

Rationale: Sometimes corruption goes undetected,unpunished, or under-punished for lack of knowl-edge. For example, the NGO Pacific Environmentalhas alleged that customs inspectors in Russia cannotprevent export of illegally cut Korean pine becausethey cannot recognize the wood when they see it.Judges have been know to give minor sentences forforest-related illegality, not understanding thedegree of environmental harm that the illegal acts,facilitated by corruption, have caused.

Document forest agency staffing and structure

Activity Type: Public Institutions.

Description: Create and publish a completeorganogram or roster of forest agency personnel,with contact information for senior officials. Theorganogram would illustrate the organization of theagency, explaining the roles of the various branches.It would also reveal exactly how many peopleworked in each branch, and at what rank. Revise theroster regularly to keep it accurate.

Similar Programs: None found in the Toolkit, how-ever “mapping” an agency is a common part ofinformation gathering in preparation for institu-tional reform.

Rationale: This would serve two purposes. It wouldexpose and discourage “ghosts” on the payroll. Theorganogram would illustrate excess staff levels andallow follow-up verification that all posts were actu-ally filled by real employees. The product would alsobecome a tool for reporters or citizen activists whowish to deal with the agency. It would help steerinterested people to the proper official at the agencyand help identify an official’s superior if a matterneeded to be elevated within the agency.

Produce a biographic directory of senior forest officials


Description: Maintain and publish career biogra-phies of past and present senior forest officials.Include information about training and past posi-tions. If possible, also include information aboutfamily members who have connections to govern-ment or the forest sector.

Similar Programs: None in the Toolkit.

Rationale: The directory would serve several pur-poses. First, it would be useful to citizens trying toapproach their government. For example, by beingable to identify which forest officers speak a partic-ular local language or which have had training insocial forestry, a citizen might be able to locate thoseofficials most likely to be interested in particularregions or projects. Second, it would help citizensidentify whether the best trained and qualified peo-ple tended to advance in the government. If thiswere not happening, it might suggest that other fac-tors, including nepotism and cronyism, were influ-encing advancement. Third, it would help docu-ment revolving-door activity between governmentand the private sector.


20

Hold a series of agency/citizen workshopson corruption


Description: Hold a series of forest-agency/citizenworkshops on corruption. The workshops woulddiscuss the extent of corruption in the forest sectorand explore ways to combat it. People would meetwith the understanding that the workshops wouldbe forward-looking, not finger-pointing. Theywould seek solutions rather than cast blame.

Similar Programs: Transparencia Mexicana’s citi-zen’s manual for monitoring social programs grewout of workshops involving agency members, ben-eficiaries of agency programs, representatives ofcivil society, and others.38

Rationale: Properly designed, the workshops wouldoffer a safe atmosphere to discuss a delicate subject.They would encourage contact and build trustbetween citizens and forest officials, and they couldlead to further joint efforts to combat corruption.

Create a program to encourage forest whistleblowers

Activity Type: Access to Information; PublicInstitutions.

Description: Provide a program to support whistle-blowers in the forest agency or other agencies thatregulate forest commerce. If the country has awhistleblower protection law, the program couldmonitor its implementation and encourage the gov-ernment to honor it. The program could offer con-fidential counseling to potential or actual whistle-blowers. In cases where the government offers noprotection to whistleblowers, it may be appropriateto offer to take anonymous complaints and have amechanism for objective and discreet screening ofthese complaints to identify serious concerns.

Similar Programs: The Open Democracy AdviceCentre of South Africa has a WhistleblowerProtection program.39 A central feature of this pro-gram is a whistleblower hotline, with advice offeredto callers.

Rationale: Whistleblowers can effectively bringinternal agency problems to light, but often at ahigh personal cost in terms of their future withinthe agency. A whistleblower support programwould make agency employees feel safer aboutbringing problems to light.

Create an outlet for citizen complaints

Activity Type: Public Institutions; Diagnostics.

Description: Provide a safe channel for taking andcompiling complaints from citizens about forest-sector corruption. Assist citizens in pursuing theircomplaints using existing governmental channels.Besides helping with specific complaints, give outgeneral information on how to discourage corruptactivity and how to participate in other TI projects.Produce a periodic public report on the complaintsreceived, analyzing their nature and frequency.Compare the rate of complaint in various parts ofthe agency.

Similar Programs: TI Polska, in Poland, has a pro-gram that helps citizens pursue complaints withinthe government.40

Rationale: Citizens may avoid making complaintsdirectly to the government because they fear reprisal,they expect complaints will be ignored, or they donot know how to register a complaint. A third-partyprogram to handle complaints can overcome theseobstacles. The program could gather aggregate datawhile assisting in individual complaints. The datawould not have the statistical validity of a survey, andit would be subject to manipulation. However, itwould produce some rough idea of the nature of cit-izen concerns. The program would also allow moti-vated citizens to vent their frustrations and make aconnection to the local TI chapter.

Create a public stakeholder panel


Description: Set up local stakeholder committees,made up of representatives of landowners, residents,small businesses, larger enterprises, NGOs, etc. tomeet once a month, take citizen input on forest con-cerns, and report to the public on the functioning of


21

the forest agency. The Bolivian municipal monitor-ing committees may serve as a model.

Similar Programs: Bolivia set up municipal moni-toring programs by law.41 In the Bolivian system,various civil society organizations elect a represen-tative to sit on a stakeholder committee to overseemunicipal government. The law gives the commit-tee specific oversight powers and duties. A similarmechanism could exist informally, organized bycivil society.

Rationale: This program would institutionalizepublic participation. Even a transparent bureaucra-cy can get away with criminal acts if the public isnot carefully watching the government. Watchingthe government takes time, interest, and expertise.This program ensures that a group of interested,capable people will maintain watch.

Hold a conference on professional responsibility

Activity Type: Business Ethics.

Description: Hold a national or regional conferenceor workshop on professional responsibility andethics for foresters.

Similar Programs: TI has been holding workshopson its Business Principles for Countering Bribery.42

Rationale: If TI or FIN drafts a model code offorester ethics (see project in the last section of thispaper), conferences would be an effective way to dis-seminate the code and encourage its adoption.

Encourage officials to sign an ethics pledge


Description: Start a take-the-pledge campaign. Asksenior forest-sector civil servants and ministers tosign a pledge that (1) they are acting in compliancewith all civil service laws and regulations and (2)that they will follow a voluntary honor or ethicscode. Design the campaign with the help of a fewhigh-ranking, reform-minded officials, who will behappy to sign, and then use peer pressure to spreadparticipation.

Similar Programs: This idea is related to TI’sIntegrity Pact tool. The integrity pact focuses onpublic contracting, involves both sides of the trans-action, and is third-party verified. The ethics pledgewould be both broader — applying to the full rangeof official activities — and less elaborate — withoutthird-party verification.

Rationale: This program provides a means for sen-ior officials to communicate to staff the importanceof honest administration and it provides a way toinform staff about proper and honorable behavior. Italso may help to create an esprit de corps that willmake the senior civil service more resistant to cor-ruption.

Recognize outstanding public service

Activity Type: Public Institutions, Awareness Raising.

Description: Award a “Medal of Merit.” Give annualprivate awards to public employees, governmentoffices, or citizens who helped reduce corruption oreliminate waste, fraud, or abuse of authority in theforest sector. A public nominating process couldraise the profile of the project. Creating a panel ofprominent citizens to judge the nominees and selectthe winners would also give weight to the effort.

Similar Programs: None in the Toolkit.

Rationale: An awards program can be a relativelyinexpensive way to raise the visibility of anti-corrup-tion efforts. Few if any people will intentionally setout to win such an award. However, simply by exist-ing, the award will send a message that the societyvalues honesty. Also, an employee or group that winsthe award will have a reputation to live up to.

Create a forest corruption risk map

Activity Type: Awareness Raising, Diagnostics.

Description: Identify, measure, and grade the risksof corruption in the forest sector in particular partsof the country. Take the preliminary analysis andreview it in workshops with government, business,and civil society participants. Produce a final reportwith maps or tables showing, for example, the levelof pressure for corrupt activities, the local resistance


22

or openness to corruption, and the potential for eco-logical damage from corrupt activities.

Similar Programs: TI Costa Rica has implemented amapping program for public procurement in roadsand infrastructure and is now doing the same for theforest and land use sector.

Rationale: This tool directs public attention to vari-ations in the level of corruption in the country,inviting discussion of the causes and cures of theproblem. The process of reviewing the preliminarydata in workshops serves to raise awareness whileimproving the quality and credibility of the risk map.

Produce a forest sector citizens report card (CRC)

Activity Type: Awareness Raising, Diagnostics

Description: Survey citizens about the honesty, effi-ciency, and quality of government forest manage-ment services. The survey may also cover other gov-ernment services to forested populations, such ashealth care or water supply, to allow comparison ofthe forest bureaucracy with sister agencies, and itmay draw geographical distinctions to allow com-parison of services among forest districts. The sur-vey can also collect information on how citizens usegovernment services, what services citizens valuemost, and what new services citizens want. Publishthe results in a report card format.

Similar Programs: NGOs around the world haveused CRCs to bring government successes andshortcomings to light.43 For example, with WorldBank funding the Public Affairs Foundation ofBangalore recently prepared a pilot citizen reportcard of forest, health, drinking water, education, andrural credit services in the state of Jharkhand, India.These kinds of efforts generally have not focusedexclusively on corruption, but have looked at it inthe broader context of evaluating its effects on thequality of public services delivery.44

Rationale: The report card can raise awareness ofgovernment shortcomings and point to models ofsuccess. By covering more than one service sector ordistrict, it invites comparisons and creates a compet-itive atmosphere for improvement. By collectingdata through random and confidential surveys, it

protects the identity of informants and encouragescandid reporting of patterns of corruption.

TOOLS FOR USE ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Convene to exchange best practices


Description: Hold a multi-national anti-corrup-tion-practices-in-the-forest-sector conference.Bring together TI national chapters, public officials,business leaders, and others to discuss best prac-tices. (This may be more appropriate in a few years,after some of the other ideas have been tested.)

Similar Programs: The regional Forest Law Enforce-ment and Governance conferences in Southeast Asiaand Africa have done this for illegal logging generally,and the forest-sector workshop at the last fewInternational Anti-Corruption Conferences has donethis globally for forest-sector corruption, but no oneyet is doing this regionally with a focus on corruptionin the forest sector.

Rationale: This will help to propagate ideas, gener-ate enthusiasm, forge alliances, and promote action.Though the FIN knowledge center will provide someof these services, periodic face-to-face meetings willcreate social bonds and rededicate people to theeffort in ways that Internet tools cannot.

Create a model professional ethics code for foresters

Activity Type: Business Ethics; Awareness Raising.

Description: Working with an organization such asthe International Society of Tropical Foresters, draft amodel code of professional behavior for foresters indeveloping countries. The model code could eitherfocus on corruption or it could be broader, dealingwith other areas of social responsibility, such as envi-ronmental stewardship.

Similar Programs: Corporación Transparencia porColombia has developed a program to promote busi-ness ethics in small to medium sized enterprises.45 TISecretariat has developed a set of Business Principles


23

for Countering Corruption.46 The Society ofAmerican Foresters and the Association ofConsulting Foresters47 of America48 are examples ofprofessional forestry associations that require theirmembers to follow an ethical code.

Rationale: Having a model code would encouragelocal foresters’ organizations to adopt their owncodes. The process of adopting a code makes themembers of an organization more aware of theimportance of honorable behavior within the pro-fession. Future enforcement of the code can helpmaintain this awareness.

NOTES

9. The current version is Lambsdorff (2002).

10. The current version is Galtung (2002).

11. Toolkit, pp. VII-14 to VII-23.




15. The report is available online at http://www.ti-

bangladesh.org/ti-india/documents/corrInd.htm.

16. TI Source Book 2000, p. 42.

17. Toolkit, pp. I-1 to I-6.


19. Toolkit, pp.I-67 to I-70.


21. Toolkit, p. I-52.







28. Toolkit, pp. IV-1 to IV-6.

29. Toolkit, pp. II-12 to II-19.

30. Toolkit, pp. II-1 to II-11.

31. Toolkit, pp. V-51 to V-69.


33. Toolkit, p. V-51.

34. Atyi and Simula (2002).

35. Toolkit, p. V-60.







42. See the web page at http://www.transparency.org/build-

ing_coalitions/private_sector/business_principles.html#ws

43. http://www.pacindia.org/

44. Paul et al. (2004)

45. Toolkit, pp. VI-1 to VI-13.

46. http://www.transparency.org/building_coalitions/pri-

vate_sector/business_principles.html

47. http://www.safnet.org/who/codeofethics.cfm

48. http://www.acf-foresters.com/acfcoe.cfm


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In the course of advancing the efforts of theForest Integrity Network, and the effort againstforest corruption generally, supporters have

raised some critical questions:

■ Can we address corruption on a sector-specificbasis?

■ Can we develop generic tools, or must we shapethem to fit specific social and political contexts?

■ Can we find synergies in our work, where theefforts of a civil society group such as TI mightcomplement the efforts of government reform-ers, international donors, and others?

This chapter addresses these questions.

CAN REFORMERS ADDRESS CORRUPTIONON A SECTOR-SPECIFIC BASIS?

The National Integrity System approach suggeststhat fighting corruption is a broad battle that wemust fight on several fronts. Most of the key pillarsof national integrity are not sector-specific. Caneffective reforms even occur within a single sector?

The answer is a qualified “yes.” TI occasionallytakes sector-specific approaches. The biennialInternational Anti-Corruption Conference, whichTI initiated and continues to sponsor, has included

sector specific workshops. In fact, the last twoInternational Anti-Corruption Conferences, towhich TI functions as a secretariat, have includedforest sector workshops.

TI has published or co-published conferencereports on corruption in health services49 and officialarms trade.50 It has put out several sector-specificworking papers51 including ones on the environ-ment52 and tropical forest resources.53 However,being able to discuss problems within a sector differsfrom being able to solve problems within a sector.

Inherently, sector-specific reforms have limits. Aforest sector project cannot fix enforcement prob-lems if the courts are thoroughly corrupt. It cannotweed all corruption out of the legislature or magi-cally turn a captive press corps into effective inde-pendent watchdogs. These are system-wide prob-lems that need broad remedies.

However, even in a society with system-wideproblems, incremental improvement and sector-specific reforms can happen. For example, TI’s envi-ronment working paper discusses how environ-mental management systems applied to localgovernment can help suppress corruption in publicenvironmental services programs.54

In fact, incremental reforms are a practical long-term strategy for corruption reform. In the literatureof TI or elsewhere, there are few examples of dra-matic changes in the level of corruption in a society

Key Questions

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unless accompanied by general revolutionary socialor political change. In fact, the pace of change can bemeasured in years or even generations.

A case in point in the forest sector is that of theUnited States from the early nineteenth century tothe early twentieth. In the last forty years of thattime, the country went from a thoroughly corruptpublic forest administration system to one that wasreasonably honest.

Case Study:Addressing Corruption in the United States’ Forest Sector in the19th and 20th Centuries

In the early nineteenth century, the administrationof public resources was deplorable, with systemicflaws that prevented the government from policingitself. In the words of one scholar:

[A]dministration was weak, incompetent, andcorrupt. Major scandals featured land frauds,frequently involving bribery of state legisla-tors and theft of Native American lands. Morethan 90 cases involving land fraud reached theU.S. Supreme Court. The Court’s reaction wasconsistently to refuse to order an examinationof official wrongdoing no matter how com-pelling the evidence. In Fletcher v. Peck [a casedecided in 1810], Chief Justice Marshall said itwould be improper for the Court to inquireinto bribery of the legislature; that it mustassume the incorruptibility of every depart-ment of the government.55

In the mid-nineteenth century, the governmentadopted a policy to encourage settlement and devel-opment of lands in the western United States.Historians have called the resulting exploitation“the Great Barbeque.”

[T]imber was effectively open for the taking,much as was the case with federal mineralsand rangeland. …

In addition to outright theft of timber, therewas rampant abuse under the homesteadinglaws. The fraudulent schemes were so variedand colorful, no summary can do them justice ….54

Scandal helped propel the turnabout. Railroadowners took a shell corporation called CreditMobilier of America and awarded it lucrative con-tracts to construct new tracks. The owners allowedthe construction company to overcharge the rail-road, making fabulous profits, and passed stock inCredit Mobilier to members of Congress and theVice President to assure the railroad favorable treat-ment, including western land grants contingent onconstruction of more tracks.

The scandal became public during the adminis-tration of President Ulysses S. Grant. WhenRutherford Hayes succeeded Grant in 1877, heappointed a reform-minded man named CarlSchurz as Secretary of the Interior with responsibil-ities for the public lands.

Schurz supported not only better conservationpractices but also civil service reform. Still, hefought an uphill battle. When Hayes declined to runfor a second term as president after four years,Schurz wrote to the new president:

The Interior Department is the most danger-ous branch of the public service. It is moreexposed to corrupt influences and more sub-ject to untoward accidents than any other.57

Out of office, Schurz continued to crusade forcivil service reform. In 1883, a new civil service lawreduced the number of political appointments andbegan a trend towards applying standards of meritin the hiring and promotion of federal civil servants.

In 1884, the Republican Party nominated JamesBlaine for president, a man tainted by the CreditMobilier scandal years before. Schurz, himself aRepublican, revolted and split the party, allowingthe Democrat Grover Cleveland to win the election.Cleveland, who served from 1885 to 1889 and againfrom 1893 to 1897, was instrumental in reformingpublic land laws and creating forest reserves.

The cleaning up of the administration of thepublic forests took a great leap during the presiden-cy of Theodore Roosevelt, from 1901 to 1909.Roosevelt had first made his political reputationfighting corruption as police commissioner of NewYork City. He went on to become governor of NewYork State, Vice President, and President.

Besides having a reputation as a corruptionfighter, he was known as an outdoorsman, and one


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KEY QUESTIONS

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of his close advisors was Gifford Pinchot, a foresterin the federal Department of Agriculture. Pinchothad a low opinion of the Interior Department, writ-ing in his autobiography:

The Administration of the public-land lawsby the General Land Office of the InteriorDepartment is one of the great scandals ofAmerican history. At a time when, in theWest, the penalty for stealing a horse wasdeath—death without benefit of law—steal-ing the public land in open defiance of lawwas generally regarded with tolerance or evenwith open approval. …

When I was appointed to the Division ofForestry [in the Agriculture Department] in1898, the Forest Reserves … were still in theDepartment of the Interior. To get charge ofthem [became] my chief object in life.58

In 1905, after a great deal of political spadework,with Roosevelt’s help and the Congress’s approval,Pinchot succeeded. He then set about creating anew, corruption-resistant bureaucracy to managethe lands. He had been thinking about the problemfor some time. In the early 1890s, Pinchot had cor-responded with the respected German foresterDietrich Brandis. How to keep forest officers free ofcorruption?

This problem required special handling,Brandis offered, due to the dispersed natureof a forest service, spread out and isolatedover a vast terrain. It required creation of “aStaff of Officers, animated by strong and del-icate feelings of honor, [and] impelled androused by enthusiastic zeal for the publicgood.”59

Pinchot recruited idealistic young men to serve asforesters. He imbued them with an esprit de corpsand a sense of duty that persisted in the US ForestService long after political winds forced Pinchot outof the federal bureaucracy. The result was a markedchange in the administration of the federal forestreserves.

This story of reform is too simple in a sense.First, Roosevelt and Pinchot did not clean up pub-

lic land administration completely or for all time.There would be scandals yet to come, including theTeapot Dome scandal over oil, which rockedPresident Harding’s administration in theearly1920s. There would be further reforms andcrusaders.

Second, there were far more players behindreform than the politicians and the bureaucrats.There were investigative reporters and editors, sci-entists and academics. Editorial cartoonists have anhonored history of rousing public opinion againstcorruption in America. Ding Darling, a cartoonistin the first half of the twentieth century, was soeffective in skewering the abuse and mismanage-ment of natural resources that a federal wildlifereserve is now named in his honor. Civic organiza-tions such as the American Association for theAdvancement of Science, the American ForestryAssociation, the Sierra Club, and the Society ofAmerican Foresters all played roles. Reform-mind-ed legislators help change laws and institutions. Inshort, many other pillars of the National IntegritySystem were involved.

But the story has some valid lessons to teach.Sector reforms advance as a sum of general and spe-cial efforts. General civil service reforms, for exam-ple, fight cronyism and patronage across all of gov-ernment, aiding forests as well. Special efforts in thearea of forests, though, can score gains for foreststhat become models for other sectors. Local successdemonstrates that corruption is not inevitable. Itbuilds political will for wider reforms, and it sharp-ens the tools needed to carry out that reform.

Also, anti-corruption efforts do not have tofocus purely on fighting corruption. Pinchot andRoosevelt sought to improve forest management ingeneral. They found that they had to address cor-ruption as part of the problem. Anti-corruptiongroups can find allies among those fighting for bet-ter use of natural resources or greater justice for for-est-dependent communities.

Sector-specific efforts do have a place in whatwill be a long battle against the corrupt use of forestresources. And in any case, there is no profit in wait-ing for system-wide reforms. Forests and forest-dependent communities are suffering injuries todaythat may never heal and losses that are impossible tocompensate. Any incremental gains that localefforts win are worth the effort.

CAN REFORMERS DEVELOP GENERICFOREST-SECTOR ANTI-CORRUPTIONTOOLS?

Can reformers develop generic tools, or must weshape them to fit specific social and political con-texts? International development workers who tryto import reforms based on successes in other soci-eties often hear the refrain, “Yes, but you mustunderstand the local context.” What works in onecountry may not work in another, depending onlocal knowledge, practices, values, and culture ingeneral.

Nonetheless, the TI National Integrity Systemapproach is based on some universal precepts,including that no society broadly approves of cor-ruption and that transparency and accountabilitytend to discourage corruption. Many of the tools inthe TI Toolkit grow out of these simple ideas.

The tools themselves are not universal approaches.The TI Toolkit describes each tool as it has beenadopted in a particular situation in a particular coun-try. No one advocates taking any tool and replicatingit exactly in another context. Each tool serves as amodel to be adopted as needed to local conditions.

So, the answer is yes, reformers can developgeneric forest-sector anti-corruption tools. The toolsmust be based on widely applicable principles andmust be adapted to local use. Not every tool willserve in every situation, but with a variety of tools tochoose from, reformers should benefit from well-described generic options.

This report offers a first set of generic forest-sector anti-corruption tools for civil society groups.As reformers test the tools in varied contexts, therewill be improved understanding about the relativemerits of each and the best ways to adapt them. Newtools will be identified, and perhaps some on the listwill be discarded as impractical or ineffective. Thepackage of tools offered here, like the tools in TI’s Toolkit, can evolve into a practical set of bestpractices for civil society to fight forest sector corruption.

HOW DO THE EFFORTS OF A CIVIL SOCIETY GROUP FIT WITH THE EFFORTS OF OTHER REFORMERS?

The National Integrity System model suggests thateffective reform efforts will involve improving manypillars of the system, as well as strengthening itsfoundations. Can the efforts of a civil society groupbe effective without direct help from other pillars? Ifcivil society is to play a constructive role, how mightthe efforts of other pillars boost those of civil socie-ty?

First, many of the general tools offered in the TIToolkit and in specific form in this paper aim toincrease public awareness. In the National IntegritySystem model (recall Figure 8), strengthening publicawareness strengthens all the pillars of nationalintegrity. In that sense, many of these tools indirect-ly advance any other efforts taking place in pillarssuch as the legislature, the watchdog agencies, andthe media.

Second, some of the tools are aimed at directlystrengthening other pillars. For example, the “edu-cate journalists” tool strengthens the media, and the“train enforcers” tool can strengthen executive andwatchdog agencies.

Third, some of the tools increase the accounta-bility of the other pillars. For example, document-ing forest agency staffing and structure both checksabuses in staffing and makes the agency more trans-parent to the public. Implementation of integritypacts strengthens accountability of the private sec-tor.

Fourth, some of the tools provide substitutes forweak or missing pillars. For example, collecting sta-tistics on forest law enforcement or documentinggovernment performance on forest-related tasks areefforts that an auditor general might take on, butthat a civil society organization can attempt if theauditor general is unwilling, uninterested, or absententirely. Creating an outlet for public complaints is atask normally handled by an ombudsman, but a civilsociety group can help air complaints even if noombudsman is present.

On the question of integrating the efforts ofother pillars with those of civil society, there aremany opportunities for synergy:

■ The Legislature, through legal reform, oversight,and appropriations of funding, can:


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KEY QUESTIONS

29

• Increase the transparency of the forest-sectorbureaucracy, making it easier for civil societygroups to shed light on agency actions. Toolssuch as documenting government perform-ance are easier to implement if the agency istransparent.

• Establish forest auditors and ombudsmen, ifthey do not already exist. This will give civilsociety efforts additional avenues for influ-encing government behavior.

• Fully fund anti-corruption efforts within theforest bureaucracy and allow governmentworkers to take advantage of such things ascivil society training and conferences.

• Allocate funds directly to civil society groupsto promote their participation in forest anti-corruption efforts.

• Through legislative hearings, provide a forumto inform the public about civil society efforts.

■ The Executive can:• Release discretionary drafts of forest regula-

tions and plans and invite civil society andthe public in general to participate in rule-making and planning.

• Open government forestry budgets andrecords to media, civil society, and the publicin general.

• Cooperate with civil society groups in dis-seminating information about forest con-tracts and concessions.

• Take advantage of training and capacitybuilding offered by civil society groups andothers.

■ The Judiciary can:• Apply the laws concerning transparency and

corruption firmly, evenhandedly, and fairlywithin the forest sector.

• Protect the rights of forest whistleblowers andother reformers.

• Take advantage of training and capacitybuilding in forest-related areas.

■ Auditors General, Ombudsmen, and WatchdogAgencies can:

• Follow up on forest sector complaintsbrought by civil society groups.

• Participate in civil society workshops andtraining.

• Be transparent themselves, so that civil socie-ty groups can fairly report on the effective-ness of their oversight.

■ Public Service personnel can:• Cooperate with civil society in adopting codes

of ethics and professional responsibility forgovernment foresters.

• Take advantage of training and capacitybuilding.

■ Media can:• Help increase the success of civil society pub-

lic awareness campaigns by reporting onthem.

• Find common cause with civil society inpushing for greater transparency in publicforest activities.

• Use civil society resources to learn moreabout forest corruption, its impacts, and howto fight it.

■ The Private Sector can:• Participate with civil society in implementing

forest integrity pacts.• Urge government to establish fair and open

forest concession and contracting systems.• Take advantage of civil society information

on forest concessions and contracting tomake the process more competitive andopen.

• Use market power to reward good actors inthe forest sector.

■ International Actors can:• Help fund civil society anti-corruption work

in the forest sector.• Help with training and capacity building.• Make sure trade laws and treaties promote

transparency and integrity in the forest sector.

NOTES

49. Inter-American Development Bank (2002).

50. Transparency International (2001).

51. See list and links at http://www.transparency.org/work-

ing_papers/index.html.

52. Lippe (1999).

53. Hafner (1998).

54. Lippe (1999).

55. Futrell (1993), pp. 11–12.

56. Wilkinson (1992), pp. 120–21.

57. Futrell (1993), p. 20.

58. Pinchot (1947), pp. 243–244.

59. Miller (2001), p. 279.


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Forest sector corruption is a chronic problemthat invites action from many actors on manylevels. Civil society groups have the potential

to play a highly constructive role. More than mostother groups, they can raise public awareness andinspire other corruption fighters to take action.

Transparency International’s dedication andapproach to corruption fighting is unique. Theefforts of TI chapters around the world, as reportedin the TI Toolkit, offer project blueprints that civilsociety groups can readily adapt to the fight againstforest corruption.

An unusually broad coalition of stakeholdershas emerged in recent years to fight illegal logging.

In this effort, forest corruption is often given toolittle emphasis. The common tools available tofight timber theft and illegal trade, includingincreased enforcements, certification, and chain ofcustody tracking, cannot put an end to bribery,fraud, and the other forms of forest corruption. Infact, those tools are in constant danger of fallingvictim to corruption.

The TI approach is a constructive and perhapsnecessary addition to the fight against illegal log-ging. In this fight, programs like the Forest IntegrityNetwork have a role to play and deserve the forestcommunity’s support.

Concluding Observations 31

Atyi, Richard Eba’a and Markku Simula. 2002. For-est Certification: Pending Challenges for Trop-ical Timber. Background paper prepared forthe ITTO International Workshop on Compa-rability and Equivalence of Forest CertificationSchemes, Kuala Lumpur, 3-4 April, 2002.

Curran, L.M. et al. 2004. Lowland Forest Loss inProtected Areas of Indonesian Borneo. ScienceVol. 303, pp. 1000–03 (13 Feb. 2004).

Futrell, William. 1993. The History of Environmen-tal Law, pp 3–91 of Sustainable EnvironmentalLaw: Integrating Natural Resource and Pollu-tion Abatement Law from Resources to Recov-ery (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al., eds.). WestPublishing Co. 1529 pp.

Galtung, Fredrik. 2002. Bribe Payers Index, pp.266–68 in TI, Global Corruption Report(2003). (available on the Internet at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/).

Hafner, Othmar. 1998. Working paper: The role ofcorruption in the misappropriation of tropicalforest resources and in tropical forest destruc-tion. (available on the Internet at http://www.transparency.org/working_papers/hafner/ohafner.html).

Inter-American Development Bank. 2002. Corrup-tion in Health Services: Papers presented at the10th International Anti-Corruption Confer-

ence Workshop “Corruption and Health,”Prague, Czech Republic, October 2001. 50pp.

Lambsdorff, Johann. 2002. Corruption PerceptionsIndex, pp. 262–65 in TI, Global CorruptionReport (2003). (available on the Internet athttp://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/).

Lippe, Michael. 1999. Working paper: Corruptionand Environment at the Local Level. (availableon the Internet at http://www.transparency.org/working_papers/lippe/lippe.html).

Miller, Char. 2001. Gifford Pinchot and the Makingof Modern Environmentalism. Island Press.458 pp.

Paul, Samuel, Suresh Balakrishnan, K Gopakumar,Sita Sekhar and M Vivekananda. 2004. State ofIndia’s Public Services: Benchmark for theStates. Economic and Political Weekly Feb. 28,2004, pp. 920-933.

Pinchot, Gifford. 1947. Breaking New Ground.Reprinted by Island Press. 522 pp.

Pope, J. 2000. Confronting Corruption: The Ele-ments of a National Integrity System [The TISource Book 2000]. 364 pp. (available on theInternet at http://www.transparency.org/sourcebook/index.html).

TI Source Book 2000: See Pope (2000) above.Toolkit: See Transparency International (2003)

below.

Literature Cited 33

Transparency International. 2001. Report on theConference: Corruption in the Official ArmsTrade, Cambridge, April 5–7, 2001. Gillian Delland Susanna Krueger, eds. 113 pp.

Transparency International. 2003. CorruptionFighters’ Toolkit: Civil society experiences and

emerging strategies. (for the most recent ver-sion available on the Internet; see http://www.transparency.org/toolkits/index.html).

Wilkinson, Charles, 1992. Crossing the Next Merid-ian: Land, Water, and the Future of the West.Island Press. 376 pp.


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