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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USEOF NUCLEAR WEAPONSADVISORY OPINIO N OF JULY 996

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICERECUEIL DES ARRTS,AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

LICIT DE LA MENACE OU DE L EMPLOID ARMES NUCLAIRESAVIS CONSULTA TIF D U JUILLET 996


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Officia1 citationLegali ty of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,Advisory Opinion, 1 C.J. Reports 1996, p 226

Mode officiel de citation:Licit de la menace ou de l emploi d armes nuclaires,avis consultatif, C.I.J . Recueil 1996, p 226

ISSN 0074 4441ISBN 92 1 070743 5

Sales numberNo de vente 79


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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE9968 JulyGeneral ListNo 95

YEAR 996uly 996

LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USEOF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Jurisdiction of the Court to give the advisory opinion requested rticle 65paragraph 1, of the Sta tut e ody authorized to request an opinionArticle 96, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Charter ctivities of the GeneralAssem bly Leg al question olitical aspects of the question posedMotives said to have inspired the request and political implications that theopinion might have.Discretion of the Court as to whether or not it will give an opinionArticle 65, paragraph 1 of the Sta tut e ompelling reasons ague andabstract question urposes for which the opinion is sought ossible eff ec tsof the opinion on current negotiations uty of the Cour t not to legislate.Formulation of the question posed nglish and French tex ts Clearobjective urden of proof:Applicable law nternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rig htsArbitrary deprivation of life onvention on the Prevention and Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide ntent against a group as such xisting norm srelating to the safeguarding and protection of the environment nvironmen-ta1 considerations a s an elem ent to be take n into account in the implernentationof the law applicable in armed conflict pplication of mo st direc tly relevantlaw: law of the Charter and law applicable in armed conflict.

Unique characteristics of nuclear weapons.Provisions o f the Charter relating to the threat ou use of force rticle 2,paragraph 4 he Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use ofan y specijc weapon rticle 51 onditions of necessity andpro portionalityhe notions of threat and use of force stand together ossession ofnuclear weapons, deterrence and threat.Speczjc rules regulating the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the recourse tonuclear weapon s as such bsence of specijc prescription authorizing thethreat or use o f nuclear weapon s nlawfulness per se: treaty law nstru-me nts prohibifing the use of poisoned weapons nstrum ents expressly pro-hibiting the use of certain weapon s of ma ss destruction rea ties concludedin order to limit the acquisition, manufacture a nd possession of nuclear weapons,the deploym ent and testing of nuclear weapons rea ty of TlatelolcoTreaty of Rarotonga eclarations mad e by nuclear-weapon States on the


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COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

juillet 996

LICIT DE LA MENACE OU DE L EMPLOID ARMES NUCLAIRES

Com pten ce de la Cour pour donner l'avis consultatif demand rticle 65,paragraphe 1 du St at ut rgane autoris solliciter un avis rticle 96,paragraphes 1 et 2, de la Cha rte ctivits de l'Assem ble gnraleQuestion juridique )) spects politiques de la question pose obiles quiauraient inspir la requte et implications politiques que pourrait avoir l'avis.Pouvoir discrtionnaire de la Cour de dcider si elle doit donner un avisArticle 65 paragraphe 1 du St at ut aisons dcisives uestion floue etabstraite ins auxq uelles l'avis est demand ffe ts possibles de l'avis surdes ngoc iations en cours evoir de la Cour de ne pas lgifrer.Libell de la question pose ersio ns ranaise et anglaise bjec tif clairharge de la preuve.Droit applicable act e international relatif a u x droits civils et politiquesrivation arbitraire de la vie onven tion pour la prven tion et la rpres-sion du crime de gnocide ntentionnalit envers un groupe com me telNo rm es en vigueur en matire de sauvegarde et de protection de l'environnementonsidrations cologiques en tant qu'lm ent prendre en com pte dans la

mise en uvre du droit applicable dans les conflits arm s pplication du droitle plus directement pertin en t; droit de la C harte et droit applicable dan s lesconflits arms.Caractristiques propres a u x arm es nuclaires.Dispositions de la Cha rte ay an t trait la men ace ou l'emp loi de la forceArticle 2, paragraphe 4 a Charte n'interdit ni ne permet expressmentl'emploi d'aucune arm e particulire rticle 51 ondition s de ncessit etde proportionnalit es notions de ((m en ac e)) t d'e mp loi de la force vontde pair ossession d'ar me s nuclaires, dissuasion et menace.Rgles spcijques rgissant la licit ou l'illicit du recours aux armesnuclaires en tan t que telles bsence de prescription spci que autorisant lamen ace ou l'emplo i d'armes nuclaires llicit per se: droit conventionnelInstrum ents interdisant l'emploi d'arm es empoisonnes nstrum ents prohi-bant expre ssme nt l'emploi de certaines arm es de destruction massive raitsconclus en vue de limiter Iacquisition, la fabricatio n et la possession d'arm esnuclaires, le dploiement d'arm es nuclaires et les essais nuclaires raitde Tlatelolc o rait de Raro tonga clarations faites par les Eta ts dots

9968 juill tRle g nralo 95


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occasion of the extension of the Non-Proliferation Trea ty bsence of compre-hensive and universal conventional prohibition of the use or the threat of use ofnuclear weapons as such nlawfulness per se: custornary law onsisten tpractice of non-utilization of nuclear weapons olicy of deterrence en-eral Assemb ly resolutions a fj r~ n in g he illegality of nuclear weapons on-tinuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris and the still strong adherenceto the practice of deterrence.Principles and rules of international humanitarian law rohibition ofme thod s and means of warfare precluding any distinction between civilian andm ilit ar j targets or resulting in unnecessary suffering to comb atants artensClause rinciple of neutrality pplicability of thesepvincip les and rules tonuclear weapons onclusions.Right of a St at e to survival and right to resort to self-defence olicy ofdeterreizce eservations to und ertak ings given by certain nuclear-weaponStates not to resort to such weapons.Current state of international law and elem ents of fact available to the Courtse of nuclear weapons in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in whichthe very survival of a State is at stake.Article V I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty bligation to negotiate in goodfaith and to achieve nuclear disavmament in al1 its aspects.

ADVISORY OPINIONPresent President BEDJAOUI Vice-President SCHWEBELJudges ODA,GUILLAUME,HAHABUDDEEN,EERAMANTRY,ANJEVA, ERCZEGH,SHI, FLEISCHHAUER,OROMA,VERESHCHETIN,ERRARIBRAVO,HIGGINSRegistrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

On the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,

composed as above,gives the following Advisory Op inion :1. The question upon which the advisory opinion of the Court has beenrequested is set forth in resolution 49/75 K adopted by the General Assembly ofthe United Nations (hereinafter called the General Assembly ) on 15 Decem-ber 1994. By a letter dated 19 December 1994, received in the Registry byfacsimile on 20 December 1994 and filed in the original on 6 January 1995,the Secretary-General of the United Nations officially communicated to theRegistrar the decision taken by the General Assembly to submit the questionto the Court for an advisory opinion. Resolution 49/75K the English text ofwhich was enclosed with the letter, reads as follows:

Th e General Assembly,Conscious that the continuing existence and development of nuclearweapons pose serious risks to humanity,Mindful that States have an obligation under the Charter of the United


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d arm es nuclaires l occasion de la prorogation du trait de non-prolifrationbsence d interdiction conventionnelle complte et universelle d emplo i ou demen ace d emp loi des arme s nuclaires en tant que telles llicit per se: droitcoutum ier ratique constan te de non-utilisation des armes nuclaires oli-tique de dissuasion solution s de l Assem ble gnrale affirma nt l illicitdes arm es nuclaires ensions subsistant entre une opinio juris naissante etune adhsion encore forte la pratique d e la dissuasion.Principes et rgles du droit international hum anitaire nterdiction desmthodes et moyens de guerre ne permettant pas de distinguer entre ciblesciviles et cibles militaires ou aya nt pour effe t de causer a u x co mb attants dessouffrances inutiles lause de M art ens rincipe de neutralit pplica-bilit de ces principes et rgles a ux arm es nuclaires onsquences.Droit d un Et at la survie et droit de recourir a la lgitime dfense oli-tique de dissuasion serves des enga gem ents pris par certains Et at s dotsd arm es nuclaires de ne pas recourir ces armes.Eta t actuel du droit international et lments de fait la disposition de laCour mp loi d arm es nuclaires dans une circonstance ex trm e de lgitimedfense da ns laquelle la survie m m e d un Et at serait e n cause.Article V I du trait de non-prolifration bligation de ngocier de bonnefoi et de parvenir au dsarm em ent nuclaire dans tous ses aspects.

AVIS CONSULTATIFPrsents M . BEDJAOUI,rsident M SCHWEBEL,ice-Prsident MM ODA,GUILLAUME,HAHABUDDEEN,EERAMANTRY,ANJEVA, ERCZEGH,SHI, FLEISCHHAUER,OROMA,VERESHCHETIN,ERRARIBRAVO,MmeHIGGINS,uges; M. VALENCIA-OSPINA,reffier.

Sur la licit de la menace ou de l emploi d armes nuclaires,

ainsi compose,donne l avis consultatif suiv an t.1. La question sur laquelle un avis consultatif est demand la Cour estnonce dans la rsolution 49175 K que l Assemble gnrale des Nations Unies(ci-aprs dnomme l Assemble gnrale))) a adopte le 15 dcembre 1994.Par une lettre en date du 19 dcembre 1994, reue au Greffe par tlcopie le20 dcembre 1994 et dont l original a t enregistr le 6 janvier 1995, le Secr-taire gnral de l organisation des Nations Unies a officiellement communiquau Greffier la dcision prise par l Assemble gnrale de soumettre cette ques-tion la Cour pour avis consultatif. La rsolution 49/75K dont le texte anglais

tait joint cette lettre, se lit comme suit:( (L Assemblegnrale,Considrant que l existence des armes nuclaires et la poursuite de leurmise au point font courir de graves dangers l humanit,Sachant que les Etats ont en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies l obli-


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Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorialintegrity or political independence of any State,Recalling its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 351152D of 12 Decem-ber 1980, 36192 of 9 December 1981, 45/59 B of December 1990 and46/37D of 6 December 1991, in which it declared that the use of nuclearweapons would be a violation of the Charter and a crime againsthumanity,

Welcoming the progress made on the prohibition and elimination ofweapons of mass destruction, including the Convention on the Prohibitionof the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Conven-tion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling andUse of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction2,

Convinced that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the onlyguarantee against the threat of nuclear war,Noting the concerns expressed in the Fourth Review Conference of theParties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons thatinsufficient progress had been made towards the complete elimination ofnuclear weapons at the earliest possible time,Recalling that, convinced of the need to strengthen the rule of law ininternational relations, it has declared the period 1990-1999 the UnitedNations Decade of International Law 3Noting that Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter empowers theGeneral Assembly to request the International Court of Justice to give anadvisory opinion on any legal question,Recalling the recommendation of the Secretary-General, made in hisreport entitled An Agenda for P e a ~ e ~ ,hat United Nations organs thatare authorized to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Inter-national Court of Justice turn to the Court more frequently for suchopinions,Welcoming resolution 46/40 of 14 May 1993 of the Assembly of the

World Health Organization, in which the organization requested the Inter-national Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on whether the use ofnuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict would be abreach of its obligations under international law, including the Constitu-tion of the World Health Organization,Decides pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of theUnited Nations, to request the International Court of Justice urgently torender its advisory opinion on the following question: 1s the threat or useof nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under internationallaw?

Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.See Official Records of the General Assembly Forty-seventh Session Supple-ment No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix 1.Resolution 44123.N471277-Sl24111.


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gation de s abstenir de recourir la menace ou l emploi de la force contrel intgrit territoriale ou l indpendance politique de tout Etat,Rappelant ses rsolutions 1653 (XVI) du 24 novembre 1961, 33/71 B du14 dcembre 1978, 34183 G du 11 dcembre 1979, 351152 D du 12 d-cembre 1980, 36192 1 du 9 dcembre 1981, 45159 B du 4 dcembre 1990 et46/37 D du 6 dcembre 1991, dans lesquelles elle a dclar que l emploid armes nuclaires constituerait une violation de la Charte et un crimecontre l humanit,Se flicitant des progrs accomplis en ce qui concerne I interdiction etl limination des armes de destruction massive, notamment la conclusionde la convention sur I interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication etdu stockage des armes bactriologiques (biologiques) ou toxines et surleur destruction et de la convention sur I interdiction de la mise au point,

de la fabrication, du stockage et de l utilisation d armes chimiques et surleur destruction2,Convaincue que l limination complte des armes nuclaires est la seulegarantie contre la menace d une guerre nuclaire,Notant l inquitude exprime lors de la quatrime confrence des partiescharge de l examen du trait sur la non-prolifration des armes nuclairesdevant le peu de progrs accomplis vers l limination complte des armesnuclaires dans les meilleurs dlais,Rappelant que, convaincue qu il faut renforcer la primaut du droitdans les relations internationales, elle a dclar la priode 1990-1999

Dcennie des Nations Unies pour le droit international3,Notant qu elle peut, en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l article 96 de laCharte, demander la Cour internationale de Justice un avis consultatifsur toute question juridique,Rappelant que, dans son rapport intitul Un agenda pour la paix4, leSecrtaire gnral a recommand aux organes des Nations Unies qui sontautoriss demander des avis consultatifs la Cour internationale de Jus-tice de s adresser plus souvent la Cour pour obtenir d elle de tels avis,Se flicitant de la rsolution 46140 de l Assemble de l organisationmondiale de la Sant, en date du 14 mai 1993, dans laquelle l organisationdemande la Cour internationale de Justice de donner un avis consultatifsur la question de savoir si l utilisation d armes nuclaires par un Etat aucours d une guerre ou d un autre conflit arm constituerait une violationde ses obligations au regard du droit international, y compris la Constitu-tion de l organisation mondiale de la Sant,Dcide, conformment au paragraphe 1 de l article 96 de la Charte desNations Unies, de demander la Cour internationale de Justice de rendredans les meilleurs dlais un avis consultatif sur la question suivante:Est-il permis en droit international de recourir la menace ou l emploid armes nuclaires en toute circonstance?

Rsolution 2826 XXVI), annexe.Voir Documents officiels de l'Assemble gnrale, quarante-septime session,supplment n 7 A/47/27), append ice 1Rsolution 44123.A1471277-Sl24111.


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2. Pursuant to Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations communicated to the Court a dossier of documentslikely to throw light upon the question.3. By letters dated 21 December 1994, the Registrar, pursuant to Article 66,paragraph 1, of the Statute, gave notice of the request for an advisory opinionto al1 States entitled to appear before the Court.4 By an Order dated 1 February 1995 the Court decided that the Statesentitled to appear before it and the United Nations were likely to be able to fur-nish information on the question, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, ofthe Statute. By the same Order, the Court fixed, respectively, 20 June 1995 asthe time-limit within which written statements might be submitted to it on thequestion, and 20 September 1995 as the time-limit within which States and

organizations having presented written statements might submit written com-ments on the other written statements in accordance with Article 66, para-graph 4, of the Statute. In the aforesaid Order, it was stated in particular thatthe General Assembly had requested that the advisory opinion of the Court berendered urgently ; reference was also made to the procedural time-limitsalready fixed for the request for an advisory opinion previously submitted tothe Court by the World Health Organization on the question of the Legality ofthe Use by State of Nuclear Weapons in Avrned ConflictOn 8 February 1995, the Registrar addressed to the States entitled to appearbefore the Court and to the United Nations the special and direct communica-

tion provided for in Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute.5. Written statements were filed by the following States: Bosnia and Herze-govina, Burundi, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt,Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy,Japan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Nauru, Netherlands,New Zealand, Qatar, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, SolomonIslands, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, andUnited States of America. In addition, written comments on those writtenstatements were submitted by the following States: Egypt, Nauru and SolomonIslands. Upon receipt of those statements and comments, the Registrar com-municated the text to al1 States having taken part in the written proceedings.6. The Court decided to hold public sittings, opening on 30 October 1995, atwhich oral statements might be submitted to the Court by any State or organi-zation which had been considered likely to be able to furnish information onthe question before the Court. By letters dated 23 June 1995, the Registrarrequested the States entitled to appear before the Court and the UnitedNations to inform him whether they intended to take part in the oral proceed-ings; it was indicated, in those letters, that the Court had decided to hear,during the same public sittings, oral statements relating to the request for anadvisory opinion from the General Assembly as well as oral statements con-cerning the above-mentioned request for an advisory opinion laid before theCourt by the World Health Organization, on the understanding that the UnitedNations would be entitled to speak only in regard to the request submitted bythe General Assembly, and it was further specified therein that the participantsin the oral proceedings which had not taken part in the written proceedingswould receive the text of the statements and comments produced in the courseof the latter.7 By a letter dated 20 October 1995, the Republic of Nauru requested theCourt's permission to withdraw the written comments submitted on its behalf


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MENACE OU EMPLOI D'ARMES NUCLAIRES AVIS CONSULTATIF)2. Conformment l'article 65, paragraphe 2, du Statut , le Secrtaire gn-ral de l organisation des Nations Unies a communiqu la Cour un dossier

contenant des documents pouvant servir lucider la question.3. Par des lettres en date du 21 dcembre 1994, le Greffier a notifi la requtepo ur avis consultatif a tous les Etats admis a ester devant la C our, conform-ment a l'article 66, paragraphe 1, du Statut.4. Par une ordonnance en date du 1 ' fvrier 1995, la Coura dcid que lesEtats admis a ester devant elle et l 'organisation des Nations Unies taient sus-ceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur la question, conformment a l ar-ticle 66, paragraphe 2, d u Statut . Par la mme ordonnance, la Cour a fix,respectivement, au 20 juin 1995 la date d expiration du dlai dans lequel desexposs crits pourraient lui tre prsents sur cette question et au 20 septembre1995 la date d expiration du dlai dans lequel tes Etats ou organisations ayantprsent un expos crit pourraient prsenter des observations crites sur lesautres exposs crits conformment a l'article 66, paragraphe 4, du Statut.Dans ladite ordonnance, il tait notamment fait tat de ce que l'Assemblegnrale avait demand que l avis consultatif de la Cour soit rendu a d a n s lesmeilleurs dlais; il y tait par ailleurs fait rfrence aux dlais de procduredj fixs aux fins de la demande d avis consultatif antrieurement soumise laCour par l organisation mondiale de la Sant sur la question de la Licit deZ'lrtilisntion des rmes nuclaires par un Etat dans un conflit armLe 8 fvrier 1995, le Greffier a adress aux Etats admis ester devant la Cou ret I Organisation des Nations Unies la communication spciale et directe pr-vue a l article 66, paragraphe 2, du Statut.

5 Des exposs crits ont t dposs par les Etats suivants: Allemagne, Bos-nie-Herzgovine, Burundi, Egypte, Equateur, Etats-Unis d Amrique, Fdra-tion de Russie, Finlande, France, Iles Marshall, Iles Salomon, Inde, Rpu-blique islamique d'Iran, Irlande, Italie, Japon, Lesotho, Malaisie, Mexique,Nauru, Nouvelle-Zlande, Pays-Bas, Qatar, Rpublique populaire dmocratiquede Core Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d Irlande du Nord, Saint-Marin,Samoa e t Sude. Par ailleurs des observations crites sur ces exposs crits ontt prsentes p r les Etats suivants Egypte, Iles Salomon et Nauru. Ds rcep-tion de ces exposs et de ces observations le Greffier en a transmis le texte tous les Etats ayant pris part a la procdure crite.6. La Cour a dcid de tenir compter du 30 octobre 1995, des audiencespubliques au cours desquelles des exposs oraux pourraient tre faits devantelle par tout Etat et toute organisation ayant t jugs susceptibles de fournirdes renseignements sur la question elle soumise. Par des lettres en date du23 juin 1995, le Greffier a prie les Etats admis a ester devant la Cour et l'Orga-nisation des Nations Unies de lui faire savoir s'ils avaient l'intention de parti-ciper la procdure orale; il tait indiqu, dans ces lettres, que la Cour avaitdcid d'entendre au cours d une seule srie d'audiences publiques les expossoraux relatifs la demande d'avis consultatif de l'Assemble gnrale et ceuxconcernant la demande d avis consultatif susmentionne dont la Cour avait tsaisie par l 'organisation mondiale de la Sant, tant entendu que l Organisa-tion des Nations Unies ne serait habilite prendre la parole qu propos de lademande soumise par l'Assemble gnrale et il y tait par ailleurs prcis queles participants la procdure orale n'ayant pas pris part la procdure critese verraient communiquer le texte des exposs et observations produits dans lecadre de cette dernire procdure.7. Par une lettre en date du 2 octobre 1995, la Rpublique de Nauru ademand a la Cour l autorisation de retirer les observations crites qui avaient


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in a document entitled Response to submissions of other States . The Courtgranted the request and, by letters dated 30 October 1995, the Deputy-Regis-trar notified the States to which the document had been communicated, speci-fying that the document consequently did not form part of the record beforethe Court.

8 Pursuant to Article 106 of the Rules of Court, the Court decided to makethe written statements and comments submitted to the Court accessible to thepublic, with effect from the opening of the oral proceedings.9. In the course of public sittings held from 30 October 1995 to 15 Novem-ber 1995, the Court heard oral statements in the following order by:

for the Commonwealth Mr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitor-General ofof Australia Australia, Counsel,The Honourable Gareth Evans, Q.C., Senator,Minister for Foreign Affairs, Counsel;for the Arab R epublic Mr. George Abi-Saab, Professor of International

of E ~ Y P ~ Law, Graduate Institute of International Stud-ies, Geneva, Member of the Institute of Interna-tional Law;for the French Repu blic Mr. Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Director of LegalAffairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor of International Law,University of Paris X and Institute of PoliticalStudies, Parisfor the Federal Repub lic Mr. Hartmut Hillgenberg, Director-General ofof Germany Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;for Indonesia H.E. Mr. Johannes Berchmans SoedarmantoKadarisman, Ambassador of Indonesia to theNetherlandsf o r Mex ico H.E. Mr. Sergio Gonzalez Galvez, Ambassador,Under-Secretary of Foreign Relations;for the Islamic H.E. Mr. Mohammad J Zarif, Deputy Minister,Republic of Iran Legal and International Affairs, Ministry ofForeign Affairsfor Ztaly Mr. Umberto Leanza, Professor of InternationalLaw at the Faculty of Law at the University ofRome Tor Vergata , Head of the DiplomatieLegal Service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;for Japan H.E. Mr. Takekazu Kawamura, Ambassador,Director General for Arms Control and Scien-tific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Takashi Hiraoka, Mayor of Hiroshima,Mr. Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki;


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t prsentes en son nom dans un document intitul Rponse aux conclu-sions des autres Etats)). La Cour a accd cette demande et, par des lettres endate du 30 octobre 1995, le Greffier adjoint en a inform les Etats qui avaientreu communication de ce document, en prcisant que ledit document ne faisaiten consquence pas partie du dossier dont la Cour tait saisie.8 Conformment l article 106 du Rglement, la Cour a dcid de rendreaccessible au public le texte des exposs crits et des observations crites ladate d ouverture de la procdure orale.9. Au cours d audiences publiques tenues du 30 octobre 1995 au 15 no-vembre 1995, la Cour a entendu en leurs exposs oraux et dans l ordre sui-vant

pour le Commonwealth M . Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitor-Generald Australie d Australie, conseil,l honorable Gareth Evans, Q.C., snateur, mi-nistre des affaires trangres, conseil;pour la Rpublique arabe M Georges Abi-Saab, professeur de droit inter-d Egypte national l Institut universitaire de hautestudes internationales de Genve, membre del Institut de droit international;pour la Rpublique franaise: M. Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, directeur desaffaires juridiques au ministre des affairestrangres,

M Alain Pellet, professeur de droit internatio-nal l universit de Paris X et l Institutd tudes politiques de Paris;pour la Rpublique fdrale M Hartmut Hillgenberg, directeur gnral desd Allemagne affaires juridiques du ministre des affairestrangres ;pour l Indonsie S Exc. M Johannes Berchmans SoedarmantoKadarisman, ambassadeur d Indonsie auxPays-Bas ;pour le Mexique: S. Exc. M Sergio Gonzalez Galvez, ambas-

sadeur, ministre adjoint des affaires tran-gres;pour la Rpublique islamique S. Exc. M. Mohamrnad J. Zarif, ministre adjointd Iran aux affaires juridiques et internationales, mi-nistre des affaires trangres;pour l Italie

pour le Japon:

M Umberto Leanza, professeur de droit inter-national la facult de droit de l universitde Rome Tor Vergata)), chef du service ducontentieux diplomatique du ministre desaffaires trangres ;S. Exc. M Takekazu Kawamura, ambassadeur,directeur gnral au contrle des armementset aux affaires scientifiques, ministre desaffaires trangres,M Takashi Hiraoka, maire d Hiroshima,M Iccho Itoh, maire de Nagasaki;


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for Malaysia H.E. Mr. Tan Sri Razali Ismail, Ambassador, Per-manent Representative of Malaysia to the UnitedNations,Dato Mohtar Abdullah, Attorney-General;

for New Zealand The Honourable Paul East, Q.C., Attorney-Generalof New Zealand,Mr. Allan Bracegirdle, Deputy Director of LegalDivision of the New Zealand Ministry for For-eign Affairs and Trade;for the Philippines H.E. Mr. Rodolfo S. Sanchez, Ambassador of thePhilippines to the Netherlands,Professor Merlin N. Magallona, Dean, College ofLaw, University of the Philippinesfor Qatar H.E. Mr. Najeeb ibn Mohammed Al-Nauimi,Minister of Justice;for the Russian Mr. A. G. Khodakov, Director, Legal Department,Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs;for San Marino Mrs. Federica Bigi, Embassy Counsellor, Officia1in Charge of Political Directorate, Departmentof Foreign Affairs;for Samoa H.E. Mr. Neroni Slade, Ambassador and Perma-nent Representative of Samoa to the UnitedNations,Miss Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, AssistantProfessor, Graduate Institute of InternationalStudies, Geneva,Mr. Roger S. Clark, Distinguished Professor of Law,Rutgers University School of Law, Camden, NewJersey;for the Marshall Islands The Honourable Theodore G. Kronmiller, LegalCounsel, Embassy of the Marshall Islands to the

United States of America,Mrs. Lijon Eknilang, Council Member, RongelapAtoll Local Government;for Solomon Islands The Honourable Victor Ngele, Minister of Policeand National Security,Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor of Law, Universitlibre de Bruxelles,Mr. Eric David, Professor of Law, Universit librede Bruxelles,Mr. Philippe Sands, Lecturer in Law, School ofOriental and African Studies, London Univer-sity, and Legal Director, Foundation for Inter-national Environmental Law and Development,

Mr. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of Inter-national Law, University of Cambridge;


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pour les Philippines:

pour Qatar:pour la Fdrationde Russie:pour Saint Marin

pour le Samoa

pour les Zles Marshall:

pour les Zles Salomon:

pour la Malaisie: S. Exc. M. Tan Sri Razali Ismail, ambassadeur,reprsentant permanent de la Malaisie auprsde l'organisation des Nations Unies,Dato' Mohtar Abdullah, Attorney General;pour la Nouvelle Zlande: l'honorable Paul East, Q.C., Attorney Generalde Nouvelle-Zlande,M. Allan Bracegirdle, directeur adjoint de ladivision juridique du ministre des affairestrangres et du commerce extrieur de Nou-velle-Zlande

S. Exc. M Rodolfo S. Sanchez, ambassadeurdes Philippines aux Pays-Bas,M. Merlin M. Magallona, professeur, doyen de lafacult de droit de l'universit des Philippines;S. Exc. M. Najeeb ibn Mohammed Al-Nauimi,ministre de la justice;M. A. G. Khodakov, directeur du service juri-dique du ministre des affaires trangres;Mme Federica Bigi, conseiller d'ambassade,fonctionnaire en charge de la direction poli-tique au ministre des affaires trangres;S. Exc. M. Neroni Slade, ambassadeur, repr-

sentant permanent du Samoa auprs del'organisation des Nations Unies,Ml1 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, charged'enseignement a l'Institut universitaire dehautes tudes internationales de Genve,M. Roger S. Clark, professeur la facult dedroit de l'universit Rutgers, Camden, NewJersey;l'honorable Theodore G. Kronmiller, conseillerjuridique de l'ambassade des Iles Marshallaux Etats-Unis d'Amrique,Mme Lijon Eknilang, membre du conseil, gou-vernement local de l'atoll de Rongelap;S. Exc. l'honorable Victor Ngele, ministre de lapolice et de la scurit nationale,M. Jean Salmon, professeur de droit l'univer-sit libre de Bruxelles,M. Eric David, professeur de droit l'univer-sit libre de Bruxelles,M. Philippe Sands, charg de cours a la Schoolof Oriental and African Studies de 1'Univer-

sit de Londres et directeur juridique de laFoundation for International EnvironmentalLaw and Development,M. James Crawford, professeur de droit inter-national, titulaire de la chaire Whewell al'universit de Cambridge;


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for Costa Rica : Mr. Carlos Vargas-Pizarro, Legal Counsel andSpecial Envoy of the Government of Costa Rica;

for the United Kingdomof Great Britain and The Rt. Honourable Sir Nicholas Lyell, Q.C., M.P.,Nortlzern Ireland: Her Majesty's Attorney-General;for the United Sta tes Mr. Conrad K Harper, Legal Adviser, Unitedof America: States Department of State,Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy LegalAdviser, United States Department of State,Mr. John H. McNeill, Senior Deputy GeneralCounsel, United States Department of Defense;for Zimbabwe: Mr. Jonathan Wutawunashe, Charg d'affaires ai .,Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe in theNetherlands.

Questions were put by Members of the Court to particular participants in theoral proceedings, who replied in writing, as requested, within the prescribedtime-limits; the Court having decided that the other participants could alsoreply to those questions on the same terms, several of them did so. Other ques-tions put by Mernbers of the Court were addressed, more generally, to any par-ticipant in the oral proceedings; several of them replied in writing, as requested,within the prescribed time-limits.

10. The Court must first consider whether it has the jurisdiction togive a reply to the request of the General Assembly for an advisoryopinion and whether, should the answer be in the affirmative, there is anyreason it should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction.The Court draws its competence in respect of advisory opinions fromArticle 65 paragraph 1 of its Statute. Under this Article, the Court

may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the requestof whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with theCharter of the United Nations to make such a request .11. For the Court to be competent to give an advisory opinion, it isthus necessary at the outset for the body requesting the opinion to beauthorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations

to make such a request . The Charter provides in Article 96 para-graph 1 that : The General Assembly or the Security Council mayrequest the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion onany legal question.Some States which oppose the giving of an opinion by the Courtargued that the General Assembly and Security Council are not entitled


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MENACE OU EMPLOI D ARMES NUCLAIRES (AVIS ONSULTATIF) 232pour le Costa Rica: M. Carlos Vargas-Pizarro, conseiller juridiqueet envoy spcial du Gouvernement du Costa

Ricapour le Royaum e- Uni deGrande-Bretagne et le trs honorable sir Nicholas Lyell, Q.C., M.P.,d Irlande du No rd: Attorney-General;pour les Etats-Unis M. Conrad K. Harper, conseiller juridique dud Amrique: dpartement d Etat,M. Michael J Matheson, conseiller juridiqueadjoint principal du dpartement d Etat,M . JohnH McNeill, conseiller juridique adjointprincipal du dpartement de la dfense;pour le Zimbabwe: M Jonathan Wutawunashe, charg d affairesai. de l ambassade du Zimbabwe aux Pays-Bas.Des membres de la Cour ont pos des questions certains participantsla procdure orale et ceux-ci y ont rpondu par crit, ainsi qu ils en avaientt pris, dans les dlais prvus cet effet; la Cour ayant dcid que les autresparticipants pourraient galement rpondre ces questions dans les mmesconditions, plusieurs d entre eux l ont fait. D autres questions poses par desmembres de la Cour ont t adresses, plus gnralement, tout participantla procdure orale; plusieurs d entre eux y ont rpondu par crit, ainsi qu ilsen avaient t pris, dans les dlais prvus cet effet.

10. La Cour examinera en premier lieu la question de savoir si elle acomptence pour donner une rponse la demande d avis consultatifdont l a saisie l Assemble gnrale et, dans l affirmative, s il existeraitdes raisons pour elle de refuser d exercer une telle comptence.La Cour tire sa comptence pour donner des avis consultatifs de l ar-ticle 65, paragraphe 1, de son Statut. Aux termes de cette disposition, laCour((peut donner un avis consultatif sur toute question juridique, lademande de tout organe ou institution qui aura t autoris par laCharte des Nations Unies ou conformment ses dispositionsdemander cet avis

11. Pour que la Cour ait comptence aux fins de donner un avisconsultatif, il faut donc tout d abord que l organe qui sollicite l avis soit((autoris par la Charte des Nations Unies ou conformment ses dispo-sitions demander cet avis. La Charte, l article 96, paragraphe 1, dis-pose: L Assemble gnrale ou le Conseil de scurit peut demanderla Cour internationale de Justice un avis consultatif sur toute questionjuridique. Certains Etats qui se sont opposs ce que la Cour rende un avis enl espce ont soutenu que l Assemble gnrale et le Conseil de scurit ne


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to ask for opinions on matters totally unrelated to their work. Theysuggested that, as in the case of organs and agencies acting underArticle 96, paragr aph 2, of the Charter, and notwithstanding the differencein wording between th at provision and par agr aph 1 of the sam e Article,the General Assembly and Security Council may ask for an advisoryopinion on a legal question only within the scope of their activities.

In the view of the Court, it matters little whether this interpretation ofArticle 96, para grap h 1, is or is no t corr ect; in the present case, the G en-eral Assembly has competence in aily event to seise the Court. Indeed,Article 10 of the Charter has conferred upon the General Assembly acom petence relating to any questions or any matters within the scopeof the Ch arter. A rticle 11 has specifically provided it with a co mp etenceto consider the general principles in the maintenan ce of intern ation alpeace and security, including the principles governing disarmament andthe regulation of armaments . Lastly, according to Article 13, the Gen-eral Assemblv shall initiate studies an d m ake recomm endations for thepurpo se o f . encouraging the progressive development of internationallaw an d its codification .12. The question put to the Court has a relevance to many aspects ofthe activities an d concerns of the G eneral Assembly including those relat-ing to the threat or use of force in international relations, the disarma-ment process, and the progressive development of international law. TheGeneral Assembly has a long-standing interest in these matters and intheir relation t o nuclear weap ons. This interest has been manifested in theannu al First Com mittee debates, and the Assembly resolutions o n nuclearweapons; in the holding of three special sessions on disarmament (1978,1982 and 1988) by the G eneral Assembly, an d the an nu al meetings of theDisarm ame nt Com mission since 1978; and also in the comm issioning ofstudies on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, itdoes not matter that important recent and current activities relating tonuclear disarmament are being pursued in other fora.

Finally, Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter cannot be read aslimiting the ability of the Assembly to request an opinion only in thosecircumstances in which it can take binding decisions. The fact that theAssembly's activities in the above-mentioned field have led it only to thema king of recommendations thu s has n o bearing on the issue of whetherit had the competence to put to the Court the question of which it isseised.13. The C ou rt mu st furtherm ore satisfy itself that the advisory opinionrequested does indeed relate to a legal question within the mean ing ofits Statute and the United Nations Charter.The Court has already had occasion to indicate that questionsframed in terms of law and rais[ing] problems of international laware by their very nature susceptible of a reply based on law


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son t pas habilits dem ander des avis sur des questions sans rap po rtaucun avec leurs travaux. Ils ont donn entendre que, comm e dans lecas d organes ou d institutions agissant en v ertu de l article 96, para -graphe 2, de la Charte, et nonobstant les diffrences de rdaction entrecette disposition et le para grap he 1 du mme article, l Assemble gnraleet le Conseil de scurit ne peuven t dem ander d avis consultatif su r unequestion juridique que si celle-ci se pose dans le cadre de leur activit.D e l avis de la Co ur, peu imp orte que cette interprtation de l ar-ticle 96, paragrap he 1, soit ou no n correcte; en l espce, l Assemble g-nrale a comptence en tout tat de cause pour saisir la Cour. En effet,l article 10 de la Cha rte a confr l Assemble gnrale une comp tencerelative ((toutes questions ou affaires)) entrant dans le cadre de laCh arte. L article 11 lui a expressment attribu co mp tence aux finsd tud ier les principes gn raux po ur le maintien de la paix et de la scu-rit internationales, y com pris les principes rgissant le dsarmem ent e t larglemen tation des arm em ents) ). Enfin, selon l article 13, l Assemblegnrale ((p rov oq ue des tudes et fait des recomm andations en vue[d ]encourager le dvelopp emen t progressif d u d roit in terna tiona l et sacodification12. La question pose la Co ur est pertinente au regard de maintsaspects des activits et proccupations de l Assemble gnrale, notam me nten ce qui concerne la m enace ou l emploi de la force dans les relationsinternationales, le processus de dsarmement et le dveloppement progres-sif du dro it international. L Assemble gnrale porte de longue d ate unintrt ces matires et leur relation avec les armes nucla ires. Cet intrta trouv son expression dans les dbats annuels de la Premire Commis-sion et les rsolutions de l Assem ble gnrale sur les armes nuclaires;dans la tenue par l Assemble gnrale de trois sessions extrao rdina ires surle dsarm ement (1978, 1982 et 1988) et, depuis 1978, de ru nions annuellesde la commission du dsarmement; ainsi que dans la commande d tudessur les effets de l emploi d armes nuclaires. Dans ce contexte , il importepeu que des activits importantes relatives au dsarmement nuclaire,rcentes ou en cours, aient t ou soient menes dans d autres enceintes.L article 96, para grap he 1, de la C ha rte ne sau rait enfin tre interprtcom me limitant la facult qu a l Assemble gnrale de demander un avisaux seules circonstances d an s lesquelles elle peut pren dre des dcisionscarac tre excutoire. Que les activits de l Assem ble dans les matiressusmentionnes ne la conduisen t formuler qu e des recom man dationsest ds lors indiffrent aux fins d apprcier si elle avait comp tence pou rposer la Co ur la question don t elle l a saisie.13. La Co ur d oit par ailleurs s assurer que l avis consultatif dem andporte bien sur une ((question juridique)) au sens de son S tatut et de laCharte des Nations Unies.L a C ou r a dj eu l occasion d indiquer que les questions

libelles en termes juridiques et soul[evant] des problm es de d ro itintern ation al sont, pa r leur na tu re mme, susceptibles de recevoir


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[and] appear . . . to be questions of a legal character WesternSahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 18, para. 15).

The question put to the Court by the General Assembly is indeed alegal one, since the Court is asked to rule on the compatibility of thethreat or use of nuclear weapons with the relevant principles and rules ofinternational law. To do this, the Court must identify the existing prin-ciples and rules, interpret them and apply them to the threat or use ofnuclear weapons, thus offering a reply to the question posed based onlaw.The fact that this question also has political aspects, as, in the natureof things, is the case with so many questions which arise in internationallife, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a legal question andto deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by itsStatute Ap plication for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the U nitedNations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1 C.J. Reports 1973,p. 172, para. 14). Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuseto admit the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge anessentially judicial task, namely, an assessment of the legality of the pos-sible conduct of States with regard to the obligations imposed upon themby international law (cf. Conditions of Admission of a State to Member-ship in the United Nations Artic le 4 of Cha rter), Advisory Opinion,1948, I.C.J . Reports 1947-1948, pp. 61-62; Competence of the GeneralAssembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, AdvisoryOpinion, I. C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 6-7; Certain Expenses of the UnitedNations Artic le 17, paragraph 2 , of the Char ter), Advisory Opinion,I. C.J. Reports 1962, p. 155).Furthermore, as the Court said in the Opinion it gave in 1980 concern-ing the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 Ma rch 1951 between theW H O an d Eg y p t:

Indeed, in situations in which political considerations are promi-nent it may be particularly necessary for an international organiza-tion to obtain an advisory opinion from the Court as to the legalprinciples applicable with respect to the matter under debate . .I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 87, para. 33.)The Court moreover considers that the political nature of the motiveswhich may be said to have inspired the request and the political implica-tions that the opinion given might have are of no relevance in the estab-lishment of its jurisdiction to give such an opinion.

14. Article 65 paragraph 1 of the Statute provides: The Court maygive an advisory opinion . . . (Emphasis added.) This is more than anenabling provision. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, the Statute


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une rponse fonde en droit [et] ont en principe un caractre juri-dique (Sa har a occidental, avis consultut C. . J. Recueil 1975,p. 18, par. 15).

La question que l Assemble gnrale a pose la Cour constitue effec-tivement une question juridique, car la Cour est prie de se prononcer surle point de savoir si la menace ou l emploi d armes nuclaires est compa-tible avec les principes et rgles pertinents du droit international. Pour cefaire, la Cour doit dterminer les principes et rgles existants, les inter-prter et les appliquer la menace ou l emploi d armes nuclaires,apportant ainsi la question pose une rponse fonde en droit.Que cette question revte par ailleurs des aspects politiques, commec est, par la nature des choses, le cas de bon nombre de questions quiviennent se poser dans la vie internationale, ne suffit pas la priver deson caractre de ((question juridique)) et ((enlever la Cour une com-ptence qui lui est expressment confre par son Statut)) (Deman de derformation du jugement no 158 du Tribunal adm inistratif des NationsUnies, avis consultat C.I .J. Recueil 1973, p. 172, par. 14). Quels quesoient les aspects politiques de la question pose, la Cour ne saurait refu-ser un caractre juridique une question qui l invite s acquitter d unetche essentiellement judiciaire, savoir l apprciation de la licit de laconduite ventuelle d Etats au regard des obligations que le droit inter-national leur impose (voir Cond itions de l'udmission d'un Etat com meMem bre des Nations Unies (artic le 4 de la Ch ar te) , avis consultat 1948,C. . J. Recueil 1947-1948, p. 61 -62; Comptence de l'Assemble gnralepour l'udmission d'un Eta t au x Nations Unies, avis consultut C.I .J.Recueil 1950, p. 6-7; Certaines dpenses des Nations Unies (article 17,paragraphe 2, de la Ch ar te) , avis consultat C.I .J. Recueil 1962 , p. 155).Au demeurant, comme la Cour l a dit dans l avis qu elle a donn en1980 au sujet de l'Interprtation de l'uccord du 25 mars 1951 entre l' O M Set I'Egypte:

En fait, lorsque des considrations politiques jouent un rle mar-quant il peut tre particulirement ncessaire une organisationinternationale d obtenir un avis consultatif de la Cour sur les prin-cipes juridiques applicables la matire en discussion (C.I .J .Recueil 1980, p. 87, par. 33.)

La Cour considre en outre que la nature politique des mobiles quiauraient inspir la requte et les implications politiques que pourraitavoir l avis donn sont sans pertinence au regard de l tablissement de sacomptence pour donner un tel avis.

14. L article 65, paragraphe 1, du Statut dispose : ((La Courpeut donnerun avis consultatif (Les italiques sont de la Cour.) Il ne s agit pas lseulement d une disposition prsentant le caractre d une habilitation.


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leaves a discretion as to whether or not it will give an advisory opinionth at ha s been requested of it, once it has established its competence t o d oso. In this context, the Co urt h as previously noted as follows:

The C ourt 's Opinion is given no t to the States, but to the o rganwhich is entitled to request it ; the reply of the C ou rt, itself an 'organof the United Na tions', represents its participa tion in the activities ofthe Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused. Inter-pretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950 , p. 71 see alsoReservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crim e of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1. C.J. Reports 1951,p. 19; Judgments o f the Administrative Tribunal of the I L 0 uponCom plaints M ad e against Unesco, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports1956, p . 8 6 ; Certain Expense s of the United Nations Artic le 17, para-graph 2, of the C har ter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Repo rts 1962,p . 155; and Applicability of Article V I, Section 22, of the Conventionon the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, AdvisoryOpinion, I. C.J. Reports 1989, p. 189.)Th e Cou rt has constantly been mindful of its responsibilities as the

principal judicial orga n of the Un ited Nations (Ch arter, A rt. 92). W henconsidering each request, it is mindful that it should not, in principle,refuse to give an advisory opinion. In accordance with the consistentjurisprudence of the Co urt, only compelling reasons could lead it tosuch a refusa1 Judg men ts of the Administrative Tribunal of the I L 0upon Cornplaints M ad e aga inst Unesco, Advisory Opinion, I. C.J. Reports1956, p. 8 6 ; Certain Expen ses of the United Nations Artic le 17, para-graph 2 of the Cha rter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 19 62, p. 155;Legal Consequences for Sta tes of the Continued Presence o f So uth Africain Namibia So ut h W est Afric a) notwithstanding Security Council Reso-lution 276 19 7 0) , Advisory Opinion, I. C.J. Reports 1971, p. 2 7 ; Applica-tion for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Adm inistra-tive Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 183; WesternSahara , Advisory Opinion, I. C.J . Reports 1975, p. 21 an d Applicabilityof Article V I, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Imm u-nities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I. C.J. Reports 1989,p 191). The re has been no refusal, based on the discretio nary power ofthe Co urt, to a ct upon a request for advisory opinion in the history of thepresent Court; in the case concerning the Legality of the Use by a Stateof Nuclear We apo ns in Arrned Conflict, the refusa1 to give the WorldHe alth O rganiz ation the advisory op inion requested by it was justified bythe Court's lack of jurisdiction in that case. The Permanent Court ofIntern ation al Justice too k the view o n only one occasion th at it could n otreply to a question put to it , having regard to the very particular circum-stances of the case, among which were that the question directly con-cerned a n already existing dispute, one of the States parties to which was


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Comme la Co ur l a soulign maintes reprises, son Sta tut lui laisse aussi lepouvoir discrtionnaire de dcider si elle doi t ou no n donn er l avis consul-tatif qui lui a t dem and, une fois qu elle a tabli sa comptence pour cefaire. Da ns ce contexte, la Co ur a dj eu l occasion de note r ce qui su it:

((L avis est donn par la Cou r non aux Etats, mais l organehabilit pour le lui dem ande r; la rponse constitue une partic ipationde la Cou r, elle-mme ((or ga ne des Na tions U nies)), l action del org an isat ion et, en principe, elle ne devrait pas tre refuse.))(Interprtation des traits de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hon-grie et la Ro um anie , premire phase, avis consultut C.I.J . Recueil1950, p. 71 voir aussi Rserves la convention pour la prvention etla rpression du crime de gnocide, avis consultat C.I.J . Recueil1951, p. 19; Jugements du Tribunal administratif de l'OIT sur re-qutes contre l'Unesco, avis consultatg C.I.J. Recueil 1956, p. 86;Certaines dpenses des Nations Unies (article 17 , paragraphe 2 , dela Ch ar te) , avis consultut C.I.J . Recueil 1962, p. 155, et Applicabi-lit de la section 22 de l'article V I de la convention sur les privilgeset imm units des Nations Unies, avis consultut C.I. J. Recueil 1989,p. 189.)

La C ou r a toujou rs t consciente de ses responsabilits en tan t q u o r-gane judiciaire principal des Nations Unies)) (Charte, art. 92). Lors del examen de chaque demande, elle ga rde l esprit qu elle ne devrait pas,en principe, refuser de donn er un avis consultatif. Conformm ent sajurispruden ce constan te, seules des ((rai son s dcisives)) pou rraie nt l yinciter (Ju gem ents du Tribunal administratif de l' O IT sur requtes contrel'Unesco, avis consultut C.I .J. Recueil 1956, p. 86; Certaines dpensesdes Na tions Unies (article 17 , paragraphe 2, de la C ha rte ), avis consul-t a t g C. . J . Recueil 1962, p. 155; Consquences juridiques pour les Et atsde la prsence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Su d-O ues t afri-cain) nonobstant la rsolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de scurit, avisconsultut C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 2 7 ; Dem ande de rformation du juge-me nt no 158 du T ribunal adm inistratif des Natio ns Unies, avis consultutC.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 183; Sahara occidental, avis consultut C.I.J .Recueil 1975, p. 21 et Applicabilit de la section de l'article V I de laconvention sur les privilges et imm unit s des Nation s Unies, C. . J.Recueil 1989, p. 191). Aucun refus, fond sur le pouvoir discrtionnairede la Cou r, de donner suite une dem ande d avis consultatif n a t enre-gistr d an s l histoire de la prsente C o u r; da ns l affaire de la Licit del'utilisation des armes nuclaires par un Eta t d ans un conflit arm , le refusde don ner l Organisation mondiale de la San t l avis consultatif sollicitpa r elle a t justifi p ar le dfaut de com ptence de la Co ur en l espce.La Cour permanente de Justice internationale a une seule fois estimqu elle ne pouvait rpon dre la question qui lui avait t pose, eu gardaux circonstances toutes particulires de l espce, savoir, notam m ent,que cette question concernait directement un diffrend dj n auqueltait partie un Eta t qui n avait pas adhr au Statu t de la Cou r perma-


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neither a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a Member ofthe League of Nations, objected to the proceedings, and refused to takepart in any way St at us of Eastern Carelia, P. C.I.J., Series B N o . 5 ) .15. Most of the reasons adduced in these proceedings in order to per-suade the Court that in the exercise of its discretionary power it shoulddecline to render the opinion requested by General Assembly resolu-tion 49175K were summarized in the following statement made by oneState in the written proceedings :

The question presented is vague and abstract, addressing complexissues which are the subject of consideration among interested Statesand within other bodies of the United Nations which have an expressmandate to address these matters. An opinion by the Court in regardto the question presented would provide no practical assistance tothe General Assembly in carrying out its functions under the Char-ter. Such an opinion has the potential of undermining progressalready made or being made on this sensitive subject and, therefore,is contrary to the interests of the United Nations Organization.(United States of America, Written Statement, pp. 1-2; cf. pp. 3-7, II.See also United Kingdom, Written Statement, pp. 9-20, paras. 2.23-2.45; France, Written Statement, pp. 13-20, paras. 5 9; Finland,Written Statement, pp. 1 2; Netherlands, Written Statement, pp. 3-4,paras. 6-13 Germany, Written Statement, pp. 3-6, para. 2 b )In contending that the question put to the Court is vague and abstract,some States appeared to mean by this that there exists no specific disputeon the subject-matter of the question. In order to respond to this argu-ment, it is necessary to distinguish between requirements governing con-tentious procedure and those applicable to advisory opinions. The pur-pose of the advisory function is not to settle t least directlydisputes between States, but to offer legal advice to the organs and insti-tutions requesting the opinion (cf. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with

Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I. C.J.Reports 1950, p. 71). The fact that the question put to the Court does notrelate to a specific dispute should consequently not lead the Court todecline to give the opinion requested.Moreover, it is the clear position of the Court that to contend that itshould not deal with a question couched in abstract terms is a mereaffirmation devoid of any justification , and that the Court may give anadvisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise Condi-tions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United NationsAr ticl e 4 of Ch ar ter ), Advisory Opinion, 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948,p. 61; see also Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the UnitedNatio ns Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I. C.J. Reports 1954,p. 5 1 ; and Leg al Consequences for Sta tes o f the Continued Presence ofSouth Africa in Narnibia So uth W es t Afric a) notwithstanding SecurityCouncil Resolution 276 19 70 ), Advisory Opinion, I. C.J. Reports 1971,p. 27, para. 40).


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nente, n tait pas membre de la Socit des Nations, s opposait la pro-cdure et refusait d y prendre part de quelque manire que ce soit (S ta tu tde la Carlie or ientale, C.P.J.I. srie no 5 ) .15. La plupart des motifs invoqus en l espce pour convaincre laCour qu elle devrait, dans l exercice de son pouvoir discrtionnaire, refu-ser de donner l avis demand par 1 Asemble gnrale dans sa rsolu-tion 49/75 K ont t rsums dans la dclaration suivante faite par un Etatdans la procdure crite:

La question pose est floue et abstraite et soulve des problmescomplexes qui sont l examen entre les Etats intresss et au seind autres organes ou institutions des Nations Unies ayant mandatexprs de les traiter. En donnant un avis sur la question pose, laCour n apporterait aucune aide concrte l Assemble gnralepour accomplir les fonctions qui lui ont t confres par la Charte.Un tel avis serait susceptible de compromettre les progrs dj ra-liss ou en cours sur ce sujet dlicat et serait en consquence contraireaux intrts de l organisation des Nations Unies.)) (Etats-Unisd Amrique, expos crit, p. 1-2; voir aussi p. 3-7, II. Voir galementRoyaume-Uni, expos crit, p. 9-20, par. 2.23-2.45; France, exposcrit, p. 13-20, par. 5-9; Finlande, expos crit, p. 1-2; Pays-Bas,expos crit, p. 3-4, par. 6-13; et Allemagne, expos crit, p. 3-6,par. 2 b )En soutenant que la question pose la Cour serait floue et abstraite,certains Etats ont sembl entendre au il n existerait aucun diffrendprcis portant sur l objet de la question. En vue de rpondre cet argu-ment, il convient d oprer une distinction entre les conditions qui rgis-sent la procdure contentieuse et celles qui s appliquent aux avis consul-tatifs. La finalit de la fonction consultative n est pas de rgler umoins pas directement es diffrends entre Etats, mais de donner desconseils d ordre juridique aux organes et institutions qui en font lademande (voir Interprtation des traits de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie,

la Hongrie et la Rou ma nie, premire phase, C.I.J. Recueil 1 950, p. 71).Le fait que la question pose la Cour n ait pas trait a un diffrend prcisne saurait par suite amener la Cour refuser de donner l avis sollicit.Par ailleurs, la Cour a clairement affirm que l allgation selon laquelleelle ne pourrait connatre d une question pose en termes abstraits n estqu une pure affirmation dnue de toute justification)), et qu elle peutdonner un avis consultatif sur toute question juridique, abstraite ou non(Conditions de l'admission d'un Etat comme M embre des Nations Unies(article 4 de la Charte), avis consultatif; 1948, C.I.J. Recueil 1947-1948,p. 61 voir aussi Ef fet de jugements du T ribunal administratif des Natio nsUnies accordant indemnit, avis consultatif; C .I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 51,et Consquences juridiques pour les Eta ts de la prsence continue del'Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud -Ou est africain) nonobstant la rsolu-tion 276 (1 97 0) du Conseil de scurit, avis consultut C.I.J. Recueil 1971,p. 27, par. 40).


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Certain States have however expressed the fear that the abstract natureof the question might lead the Court to make hypothetical or speculativedeclarations outside the scope of its judicial function. The Court does notconsider that, in giving an advisory opinion in the present case, it wouldnecessarily have to write scenarios , to study various types of nuclearweapons and to evaluate highly complex and controversial technological,strategic and scientific information. The Court will simply address theissues arising in al1 their aspects by applying the legal rules relevant to thesituation.

16. Certain States have observed that the General Assembly has notexplained to the Court for what precise purposes it seeks the advisoryopinion. Nevertheless, it is not for the Court itself to purport to decidewhether or not an advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly for the per-formance of its functions. The General Assembly has the right to decidefor itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs.Equally, once the Assembly has asked, by adopting a resolution, for anadvisory opinion on a legal question, the Court, in determining whetherthere are any compelling reasons for it to refuse to give such an opinion,will not have regard to the origins or to the political history of therequest, or to the distribution of votes in respect of the adopted resolution.

17 It has also been submitted that a reply from the Court in this casemight adversely affect disarmament negotiations and would, therefore,be contrary to the interest of the United Nations. The Court is awarethat, no matter what might be its conclusions in any opinion it mightgive, they would have relevance for the continuing debate on the matterin the General Assembly and would present an additional element in thenegotiations on the matter. Beyond that, the effect of the opinion is amatter of appreciation. The Court has heard contrary positions advancedand there are no evident criteria by which it can prefer one assessment toanother. That being so, the Court cannot regard this factor as a compel-ling reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.

18 Finally, it has been contended by some States that in answering thequestion posed, the Court would be going beyond its judicial role andwould be taking upon itself a law-making capacity. It is clear that theCourt cannot legislate, and, in the circumstances of the present case, it isnot called upon to do so. Rather its task is to engage in its normal judi-cial function of ascertaining the existence or otherwise of legal principlesand rules applicable to the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The conten-tion that the giving of an answer to the question posed would require theCourt to legislate is based on a supposition that the present orpus juris isdevoid of relevant rules in this matter. The Court could not accede to thisargument; it states the existing law and does not legislate. This is so evenif, in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify itsscope and sometimes note its general trend.


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MENACE OU EMPLOI D ARMES NUCL IRES (AVIS ONSU LTAT IF) 37Certains Etats on t cependan t exprim la crainte que le caractre abs-trait de la question ne puisse condu ire la Co ur se prononcer sur des hypo-

thses ou entrer dans des conjectures sortant du cadre de sa fonctionjudiciaire. L a C ou r ne considre pas qu en renda nt u n avis consultatifen l espce elle serait ncessairement amene crire des sc na rios ,tudier divers types d arm es nuclaires et valuer des info rm ation stechnologiques, stratgiques et scientifiques extrmement complexes etcontroverses. La Co ur exam inera simplement les questions qui se posent,sous tous leurs aspects, en appliquant les rgles de droit appropriesen la circonstance.16. Certains Eta ts on t observ que l Assemble gnrale n a pasexpliqu la C our quelles fins prcises elle sollicitait l avis con sultatif .Toutefois, il n appa rtient p as la Cou r de prtendre dcider si I Assem-ble a ou non besoin d un avis consultatif po ur s acquitter de ses fonc-tions . L Assem ble gn rale est habilite dcider elle-mme de l utilitd un avis au regard de ses besoins pro pres.De m me, ds lors qu e l Assemble a demand u n avis consultatif sur unequestion juridique par la voie d une rsolution qu elle a ado pte, la C ou rne pren dra pas en considration , pour dterminer s il existe des raisonsdcisives de refuser de d onner cet avis, les origines ou l histoire politique dela demande, ou la rp artition des voix lors de l adop tion de la rsolution.17. Il a aussi t soutenu qu une rponse d e la Co ur en l espce pou r-rait tre prjudiciable aux ngociations sur le dsarmement et serait, enconsquence, contraire l intrt de l organ isation des Natio ns Unies.L a C ou r sait que, quelles qu e soient les conclusio ns auxquelles elle po ur-rait parven ir dan s l avis qu elle do nn erai t, ces conclusion s seraient perti-nentes au regard du dbat qui se pou rsuit l Assemble gnrale, etapporteraient dans les ngociations sur la question un lment suppl-m entaire. M ais, au-del de cette con statati on , l effet qu aurait cet avis estune q uestion d apprciation. Des o pinion s contraires o nt t exposesdevan t la Cou r et il n est pas de critre vident qu i perm ettra it celle-cide don ner la prfrence une position plutt qu une autre. Dan s cesconditions. la Cour ne saurait considrer ce facteur comme une raisondcisive de refuser d exercer sa com ptence.18. Enfin, certains Eta ts on t fait valoir qu en rp ond ant la questionpose la C ou r dpasserait sa fonction judiciaire po ur s arroger une fonc-tion lgislative. La Cour ne saurait certes lgifrer, et, dans les circons-tances de l espce, elle n est nu llemen t appele le faire. Il lui appa rtien tseulement d e s acquitter de sa fonctio n judiciaire norm ale en s assurantde l existence o u de la non-existence de principes et d e rgles juridiquesapplicables la m enace ou l emploi d arme s nuclaires. L argum entselon lequel la Co ur, po ur rpon dre la question pose, serait oblige delgifrer, se fonde sur la supposition que le corpus juris existant ne com-porterait pas de rgle pertinente en la matire. La Cour ne saurait sous-crire cet arg um ent; elle dit le dr oit existant et ne lgifre po int. Cela estvrai mme si la Cour, en disant et en appliquant le droit, doit ncessai-rem ent en prciser la po rte et, parfois, en co nsta ter l volution.


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19. In view of what is stated above, the Court concludes that it has theauthority to deliver an opinion on the question posed by the GeneralAssembly, and that there exist no compelling reasons which would leadthe Court to exercise its discretion not to do so.

An entirely different question is whether the Court, under the con-straints placed upon it as a judicial organ, will be able to give a completeanswer to the question asked of it. However, that is a different matterfrom a refusa1 to answer at all.

20 The Court must next address certain matters arising in relation tothe formulation of the question put to it by the General Assembly. TheEnglish text asks: 1s the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circum-stance permitted under international law? The French text of the ques-tion reads as follows Est-il permis en droit international de recourir lamenace ou l'emploi d'armes nuclaires en toute circonstance? It wassuggested that the Court was being asked by the General Assemblywhether it was permitted to have recourse to nuclear weapons in everycircumstance, and it was contended that such a question would inevitablyinvite a simple negative answer.

The Court finds it unnecessary to pronounce on the possible diver-gences between the English and French texts of the question posed. Itsreal objective is clear: to determine the legality or illegality of the threator use of nuclear weapons.21. The use of the word permitted in the question put by the Gen-eral Assembly was criticized before the Court by certain States on theground that this implied that the threat or the use of nuclear weaponswould only be permissible if authorization could be found in a treaty pro-vision or in customary international law. Such a starting point, thoseStates submitted, was incompatible with the very basis of internationallaw, which rests upon the principles of sovereignty and consent; accord-ingly, and contrary to what was implied by use of the word permitted ,States are free to threaten or use nuclear weapons unless it can be shownthat they are bound not to do so by reference to a prohibition in eithertreaty law or customary international law. Support for this contentionwas found in dicta of the Permanent Court of International Justice in theLotus case that restrictions upon the independence of States cannotbe presumed and that international law leaves to States a widemeasure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitiverules (P.C.I.J., Series A No. IO pp. 18 and 19). Reliance was alsoplaced on the dictum of the present Court in the case concerning Militaryand Pavamilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. United States of America) that:

in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as maybe accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby


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19. A la lumire de ce qui prcde, la Cour conclut qu elle a comp-tence pour donner un avis sur la question qui lui a t pose par I Assem-ble gnrale et qu il n existe aucune ((raison dcisive))pour qu elle use deson pouvoir discrtionnaire de ne pas donner cet avis.Un tout autre point est celui de savoir si la Cour, compte tenu des exi-gences qui psent sur elle en tant qu organe judiciaire, sera en mesure dedonner une rponse complte la question qui lui a t pose; ce qui, entout tat de cause, est diffrent d un refus de rpondre.

20 La Cour doit aborder prsent certains problmes soulevs par lelibell de la question qui lui a t pose par l Assemble gnrale. Enanglais, ce libell est le suivant: ((1s the threat or use of nuclear weaponsin any circumstance permitted under international law? Le texte franaisde la question pose se lit comme suit: Est-il permis en droit internatio-nal de recourir la menace ou l emploi d armes nuclaires en toute cir-constance?)) Il a t suggr que l Assemble gnrale demanderait ainsi la Cour si l emploi d armes nuclaires est permis en droit internationaldans toutes les circonstances et il a t expos qu une telle question appel-lerait invitablement une simple rponse ngative.La Cour n estime pas ncessaire de se prononcer sur les divergencespossibles entre versions franaise et anglaise de la question pose. Celle-cil a t avec un objectif clair: dterminer ce qu il en est de la licit ou del illicit de la menace ou de l emploi d armes nuclaires.

21 L utilisation du mot permis dans la question pose par 1 Assem-ble gnrale a fait l objet, devant la Cour, de critiques de certains Etatsau motif que cette utilisation supposait que la menace ou l emploi d armesnuclaires ne seraient permis que s ils taient autoriss par une disposi-tion conventionnelle ou par le droit international coutumier. Selon cesEtats. une telle rm misse serait incom~atible vec les fondements mmesdu droit international, qui repose sur les principes de souverainet et deconsentement des Etats; par voie de consquence, et contrairement ceque sous-entend l emploi du mot les Etats seraient libres demenacer d employer ou d employer effectivement des armes nuclairesmoins qu il ne soit dmontr qu ils doivent s en abstenir en vertu d uneinterdiction contenue dans le droit international conventionnel ou coutu-mier. A l appui de cette thse ont t invoqus des dicta de la Cour per-manente de Justice internationale dans l affaire du Lotus, selon lesquelsd une part les limitations de l indpendance des Etats ne se prsumentpas et d autre part le droit international laisse aux Etats une largelibert, qui n est limite que dans quelques cas par des rgles prohibi-tives (C.P.J I srie A no 10 p. 18 et 19), ainsi qu un dictum de la Couractuelle dans l affaire des Activits militaires et paramilitaires au Nicava-gua et contre celui-ci (Nicarag ua c. Etats-U nis d Am r iqu e), selon lequel

il n existe pas en droit international de rgles, autres que celles que1 Etat intress peut accepter, par trait ou autrement, imposant la


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the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited 1. JReports 1986 p. 135, para. 269).For other States, the invocation of these dicta in the Lotus case wasinapposite; their status in contemporary international law and applica-bility in the very different circumstances of the present case were chal-lenged. It was also contended that the above-mentioned dictum ofthe present Court was directed to the possession of armam ents and wasirrelevant to the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, it was suggested that, were the Court to answer the questionpu t by the Assembly, the word perm itted sho uld be replaced by pro -hibited .22. The C ou rt notes that the nuclear-weapon States appearing beforeit either accepted, or did not dispute, that their independence to act wasindeed restricted by the principles and rules of international law, moreparticularly hum anita rian law (see below, par agr aph 86), as did the o therStates which took part in the proceedings.Hence, the argument concerning the legal conclusions to be drawnfrom the use of the wo rd permitted , an d the questions of burden ofproof to which it was said t o give rise, are w ithout particular significancefor the disposition of the issues before the Court.

23 In seeking to answer the question put to it by the GeneralAssembly, the Court must decide, after consideration of the greatcorpus of international law norms available to it, what might be therelevant applicable law.

24. Some of the proponents of the illegality of the use of nuclearweapons h ave argue d th at such use would violate the right t o life as guar-anteed in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, as well as in certain regional instruments for the protection ofhuman rights. Article 6, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant pro-vides as follows: Every hu m an being has the inherent right to life. Thisright shall be protected by law. N o o ne shall be arbitrarily deprived of hislife.In reply, others contended that the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights made no mention of war or weapons, and it hadnever been envisaged that the legality of nuclear weapons was regulatedby that instrument. It was suggested that the Covenant was directed tothe protection of human rights in peacetime, but that questions relatingto unlawful loss of life in hostilities were governed by the law applicablein armed conflict.


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limitation du niveau d armement d un Etat souverain)) (C.I.J.Recueil 1986, p. 135, par. 269).D autres Etats ont jug hors de propos ce renvoi aux dicta tirs del affaire du otus et ont mis en cause leur porte dans le droit interna-tional contemporain ainsi que leur applicabilit aux circonstances, fortdiffrentes, de l espce. Il a en outre t soutenu que le dictum susmen-tionn de la prsente Cour se rapporte la possession d armements, etn est pas pertinent du point de vue de la menace ou de l emploi d armesnuclaires.Il a enfin t avanc que si la Cour devait rpondre la question posepar l Assemble gnrale, il y aurait lieu de remplacer le mot permispar ((interdit22. La Cour prend note du fait que les Etats dots d armes nuclairesqui se sont prsents devant elle soit ont reconnu soit n ont pas ni queleur libert d agir tait effectivement restreinte par les principes et rglesdu droit international et plus particulirement du droit humanitaire (voirparagraphe 86 ci-aprs). Il en a t de mme des autres Etats prsentsdevant la Cour.Ds lors, ni l argument visant les conclusions juridiques tirer del emploi du mot permis ni les questions de charge de la preuve qui endcouleraient ne prsentent d importance particulire aux fins de trancherles problmes dont la Cour est saisie.

23. Pour rpondre la question que lui a pose l Assemble gnrale,la Cour doit dterminer, aprs examen du large ensemble de normes dedroit international qui s offre elle, quel pourrait tre le droit pertinentapplicable.

24. Plusieurs tenants de l illicit de l emploi d armes nuclaires ontallgu qu un tel emploi violerait le droit la vie tel que le garantissentl article 6 du pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques ainsique certains instruments de protection des droits de l homme de caractrergional. L article 6, paragraphe 1 du pacte international relatif auxdroits civils et politiques dispose ce qui suit: Le droit la vie est inh-rent la personne humaine. Ce droit doit tre protg par la loi. Nul nepeut tre arbitrairement priv de la vie.))A cela, d autres Etats ont rpondu que le pacte international relatif auxdroits civils et politiques ne mentionne ni la guerre ni les armes et quel on n a jamais envisag que cet instrument rgisse la question de la licitdes armes nuclaires. Selon eux, le pacte vise la protection des droits del homme en temps de paix, alors que les questions relatives la privationillicite de la vie au cours d hostilits sont rgies par le droit internationalapplicable dans les conflits arms.


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25. The Court observes that the protection of the International Cov-enant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, exceptby operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisionsmay be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for theright to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right notarbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The testof what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be deter-mined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable inarmed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certainweapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of lifecontrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference tothe law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms ofthe Covenant itself.

26. Some States also contended that the prohibition against genocide,contained in the Convention of 9 December 1948 on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide, is a relevant rule of customaryinternational law which the Court must apply. The Court recalls that inArticle II of the Convention genocide is defined asany of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, inwhole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, assucha ) Killing members of the group;b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of thegroupc) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculatedto bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;e ) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.It was maintained before the Court that the number of deaths occasionedby the use of nuclear weapons would be enormous; that the victims could,in certain cases, include persons of a particular national, ethnic, racial orreligious group; and that the intention to destroy such groups could beinferred from the fact that the user of the nuclear weapon would haveomitted to take account of the well-known effects of the use of such weapons.The Court would point out in that regard that the prohibition of geno-cide would be pertinent in this case if the recourse to nuclear weapons didindeed entai1 the element of intent, towards a group as such, required bythe provision quoted above. In the view of the Court, it would only bepossible to arrive at such a conclusion after having taken due account ofthe circumstances specific to each case.


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25. La Cour observe que la protection offerte par le pacte internatio-nal relatif aux droits civils et politiques ne cesse pas en temps de guerre,si ce n est par l effet de l article 4 du pacte, qui prvoit qu il peut tredrog, en cas de danger public, certaines des obligations qu impose cetinstrument. Le respect du droit la vie ne constitue cependant pas uneprescription laquelle il peut tre drog. En principe, le droit de ne pastre arbitrairement priv de la vie vaut aussi pendant des hostilits. C esttoutefois, en pareil cas, la l x specialis applicable, savoir le droitapplicable dans les conflits arms, conu pour rgir la conduite des hos-tilits, qu il appartient de dterminer ce qui constitue une privation arbi-traire de la vie. Ainsi, c est uniquement au regard du droit applicabledans les conflits arms, et non au regard des dispositions du pacte lui-mme, que l on pourra dire si tel cas de dcs provoqu par l emploi d uncertain type d armes au cours d un conflit arm doit tre considrcomme une privation arbitraire de la vie contraire l article 6 du pacte.26. Certains Etats ont aussi avanc l argument selon lequel l interdic-tion du nnocide. formule dans la convention du 9 dcembre 1948 Dourla prvention et la rpression du crime de gnocide, serait une rgle per-tinente du droit international coutumier que la Cour devrait appliquer enl espce. La Cour rappellera que le gnocide est dfini l article II de laconvention comme

((l un quelconque des actes ci-aprs, commis dans l intention dedtruire, en tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racialou religieux, comme tel:a meurtre de membres du groupe;b atteinte grave l intgrit physique ou mentale de membres dugroupe;c soumission intentionnelle du groupe des conditions d existencedevant entraner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle;d mesures visant entraver les naissances au sein du groupe;e transfert forc d enfants du groupe un autre groupe)).

Il a t soutenu devant la Cour que le nombre de morts que causeraitl emploi d armes nuclaires serait norme; que l on pourrait, dans certainscas, compter parmi les victimes des membres d un groupe national, eth-nique, racial ou religieux particulier; et que l intention de dtruire de telsgroupes pourrait tre infre du fait que l utilisateur de l arme nuclaireaurait omis de tenir compte des effets bien connus de l emploi de ces armes.La Cour relvera cet gard que l interdiction du gnocide serait unergle pertinente en l occurrence s il tait tabli que le recours aux armesnuclaires comporte effectivement l lment d intentionnalit, dirigcontre un groupe comme tel, que requiert la disposition sus-cite. Or, del avis de la Cour, il ne serait possible de parvenir une telle conclusionqu aprs avoir pris dment en considration les circonstances propreschaque cas d espce.


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27. In both their written and oral statements, some States furthermoreargued that any use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful by referenceto existing norms relating to the safeguarding and protection of the envi-ronment, in view of their essential importance.Specific references were made to various existing international treatiesand instruments. These included Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 to theGeneva Conventions of 1949, Article 35 paragraph 3, of which prohibitsthe employment of methods or means of warfare which are intended, ormay be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage tothe natural environment ; and the Convention of 18 May 1977 on theProhibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of EnvironmentalModification Techniques, which prohibits the use of weapons which havewidespread, long-lasting or severe effects on the environment (Art. 1).Also cited were Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 andPrinciple 2 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 which express the commonconviction of the States concerned that they have a duty

to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do notcause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyondthe limits of national jurisdiction .

These instruments and other provisions relating to the protection andsafeguarding of the environment were said to apply at al1 times, in war aswell as in peace, and it was contended that they would be violated by theuse of nuclear weapons whose consequences would be widespread andwould have transboundary effects.28. Other States questioned the binding legal quality of these preceptsof environmental law; or, in the context of the Convention on the Pro-hibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modi-fication Techniques, denied that it was concerned at al1 with the use ofnuclear weapons in hostilities; or, in the case of Additional Protocol 1,denied that they were generally bound by its terms, or recalled that theyhad reserved their position in respect of Article 35 paragraph 3, thereof.

It was also argued by some States that the principal purpose of envi-ronmental treaties and norms was the protection of the environment intime of peace. It was said that those treaties made no mention of nuclearweapons. It was also pointed out that warfare in general, and nuclearwarfare in particular, were not mentioned in their texts and that it wouldbe destabilizing to the rule of law and to confidence in internationalnegotiations if those treaties were now interpreted in such a way as toprohibit the use of nuclear weapons.29. The Court recognizes that the environment is under daily threatand that the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe forthe environment. The Court also recognizes that the environment is notan abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life andthe very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The


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MENACE OU EMPLOI D ARMES NUCL IRES (AVIS ONSULTATIF) 24127. Dans leurs exposs crits et oraux, certains Etats ont en outresoute nu q ue t ou t em ploi d armes nuclaires serait illicite au regard desnormes en vigueur en matire de sauvegarde et de protection de l environ-nement, compte tenu d e leur importance fondam entale.Divers traits et instruments interna tionau x en vigueur on t t expres-sment cits, dont le protocole additiotlnel 1 de 1977 aux conventions deGenve de 1949 ui, son article 35, parag raph e 3, interdit l emploi de((mthodes ou moyens de guerre qui sont conus pour cau