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How to Secure Infrastructure Clouds with Trusted Computing Technologies
Nicolae Paladi
Swedish Institute of Computer Science
Contents
1. Infrastructure-as-a-Service
2. Security challenges of IaaS
3. Trusted Computing and TPM
4. Trusted VM launch
5. InfraCloud
6. Future work
2
Infrastructure-as-a-Service
• A 'cloud computing' service model (NIST:2011):
Provision processing, storage, networks.
Deploy and run arbitrary software.
No control over underlying cloud infrastructure.
Control over OS, storage, deployed applications.
Limited control of select networking components.
3
Infrastructure-as-a-Service architectural overview
4
OpenStack architectural overview
https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/ArchitecturalOverview
Infrastructure-as-a-Service security issues
5
OpenStack architectural overview
https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/ArchitecturalOverview
2011: Vulnerabilities in the AWS management console (XSS and XML wrapping attacks)
Infrastructure-as-a-Service security issues
6
OpenStack architectural overview
https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/ArchitecturalOverview
2011: Vulnerabilities in the AWS management console (XSS and XML wrapping attacks)
2012: Cross-VM Side Channels can be used to extract private keys.
Infrastructure-as-a-Service security issues
7
OpenStack architectural overview
https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/ArchitecturalOverview
2011: Vulnerabilities in the AWS management console (XSS and XML wrapping attacks)
2012: Cross-VM Side Channels can be used to extract private keys
2012: Rackspace’s
“dirty disks”
Can we help it?
8
Introducing the TPM
Trusted platform module v1.2 as specified by TCG.
v2.0 is currently under review.
Tamper-evident.
16+ PCRs for volatile storage.
Four operations: Signing / Binding / Sealing / Sealed-sign.
9
Introducing the TPM: output
• Produces integrity measurements of the firmware at boot time.
Can produce integrity measurements of the loaded kernel modules (sample below).
10
Introducing the TPM: usage
• Microsoft BitLocker
• Google Chromium OS
• Citrix XenServer
• Oracle’s X- and T-Series Systems
• HP ProtectTools
• Others
11
Securing IaaS environments with trusted computing
• Virtualization security.
• Storage protection in IaaS environments.
• Computing security in IaaS environments.
• Remote host software integrity attestation.
• Runtime host software integrity attestation.
• Encryption key management in IaaS environments.
12
Computing security in IaaS environments: Problem Setting
• “Consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications.”
Client can launch VMs for sensitive computations.
Trusted VM launch – the correct VM is launched in a IaaS platform on a host with a known software stack verified to not have been modified by malicious actors.
IaaS security with trusted computing.
How do we ensure a trusted VM launch in an untrusted
IaaS environment?
13
Attack scenario 1
Hardware
Client (C)
Scheduler
(S)
Trusted
Compute
Host
(CH)
Compute
Host
(CH)
Hardware Hardware
Remote attacker
(Ar)
14
Ar could schedule
the VM instance to
be launched on a
compromised host
Attack scenario 2
Trusted
Compute
Host
(CH)
Hardware
Scheduler
(S)
Client (C)
Compute
Host
(CH)
Hardware Hardware
Compute
Host
(CH)
15
Ar could
compromise
the VM image
prior to
launch
Remote attacker
(Ar)
Trusted VM launch protocol
• Ensure VM image launched on a trusted host.
• Ensure communication with VM launched on a trusted
CH rather than a random VM.
• Compute host to verify the integrity VM image to be
launched.
• Minimum implementation footprint on the IaaS
codebase.
• Transparent view of the secure launch procedures.
16
Protocol: birds-eye view
(S)
CH
HW Client (C)
CH CH
HW HW
+
TPM
1.
2.
3.
4. 5.
6.
Prototype implementation
• OpenStack cluster deployed on 3 nodes (TPM-equipped)
• Code extensions:
• Changes OpenStack launch procedure.
• Implementation of an OpenStack–TPM communication “glue”.
• Implementation of a TTP (interpretation of attestation info)
• Implementation of client-side functionality (token generation, trusted launch verification).
18
• Ongoing project in collaboration between
Region Skåne, Ericsson Research and SICS.
• Aim: proof of concept design and deployment
of one of the region’s medical journaling
systems in a hardened and trustworthy
IaaS environment.
• Prototype implementation based on earlier
research, as well as solutions to newly
identified challenges.
19
Securing IaaS with InfraCloud: The project
Numerous new research challenges have been identified already in the early stages of the project:
• Storage protection in untrusted IaaS environments.
• Verification and protection of a deployment’s network
configuration.
• Runtime VM instance protection (prevent memory dumping,
cloning).
• Secure key handling mechanisms in untrusted IaaS
deployments.
• Update and patch deployment on guest VM instances.
• Interpretation of TPM attestation data.
20
Securing IaaS with InfraCloud: The challenges
Conclusion
• Out-of-the-box public IaaS probably not acceptable
for most organizations handling sensitive data.
• A comprehensive solution for data protection in public
IaaS environments has not been found yet.
• SICS Secure Systems lab works with various aspects
of guest protection in untrusted IaaS.
• Trusted Computing Technologies allow to address
some of the issues with IaaS security.
• Participation in the InfraCloud project and practical
application of protocols reveal multiple new research
challenges.
21