How to Build a Nuclear Bomb Nation Books [2004] Barnaby

Frank Barnaby is a nuclear physicist by training. He worked at theAtomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston andUniversity College, London. He was Director of the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) from 1971 to 1981and Guest Professor at the Free University, Amsterdam. Hecurrently works for the Oxford Research Group on research intomilitary technology, civil and military nuclear issues, and theterrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

How to Build aNuclear Bomb

and other weapons ofmass destruction

FRANK BARNABY

For Wendy, Sophie, and Ben

How To BUILD A NUCLEAR BOMB and Other Weapons ofMass Destruction

Copyright 2004 by Frank Barnaby

Published byNation Books

An Imprint of Avalon Publishing Group Incorporated245 West 17th St., 11th Floor

New York, NY 10011

Nation Books is a co-publishing venture of the Nation Instituteand Avalon Publishing Group Incorporated.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be repro-duced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic ormechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any informationstorage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, with-out permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewerwho wishes to quote brief passages in connection with a review

written for inclusion in a magazine, newspaper, or broadcast.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.

ISBN 1-56025-603-6

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of AmericaDistributed by Publishers Group West

Contents

Preface to US edition (2004) ix

Preface xix

Introduction - the state we're in 1Nuclear weapons are here to stay 2Why countries "go nuclear" 4Weapons of mass destruction: the next terrorist threat? 5International terrorism and democracy 6Reacting or overreacting to terrorism? 8Fear of biological and chemical terrorism 10

Part I Weapons of mass destruction: What they areand what they do 13

1 Nuclear weapons 15Nuclear history 15How a nuclear bomb works 16The nuclear powers 21What a nuclear explosion does 23The Reality of Nuclear AttackEyewitness Accounts 31Nuclear terrorism 36Effects of a radiological weapon 38

2 Biological weapons 41What is a biological weapon? 41

vi Contents

What are biological-warfare agents? 42The making of biological weapons 48How biological-warfare agents are spread 51What biological-warfare agents do 52Biological terrorism 52

3 Chemical weapons 55What is a chemical weapon? 55How chemical-warfare agents are spread 57What chemical-warfare agents do 58The Reality of Chemical Attack: Eyewitness Accounts 60Chemical terrorism 63

Part II Weapons of mass destruction and the state 65

4 What does it take to make a WMD? 67What is a nuclear-weapon program? 68What do you need to make a nuclear weapon? 70The making of chemical weapons 84Biological and chemical munitions 84

5 Case Studies: Iraq and North Korea 85Iraq's nuclear capability 85Iraq's biological capability 90Iraq's chemical capability 91North Korea 92

6 What is the international impact of a WMDprogram? 95Nuclear proliferation 96Nuclear export controls 99Biological proliferation 100Chemical proliferation 101Assessing the impact 103

Part III Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism 105

7 Terrorism with weapons of mass destruction 107Nuclear terrorism 110Biological and chemical terrorism 117

Contents vii

8 Which groups are capable of making and usinga WMD? 121The nuclear terrorist 121The bioterrorist 123The chemical terrorist 124The prime suspects 125The increased threat 131

9 What can counterterrorism do? 137Protecting key materials 138Regional and international agreements 144The urgent need for effective intelligence 147

10 What does the future hold? 151Nuclear terrorism 153Genetic engineering 163Biowar against ethnic groups 164Cyberterrorism 166

Appendix 169Countries with military expenditure over 5,000

million U.S. dollars p.a. (2001) 169

Further reading 170

Websites on weapons of mass destruction and

terrorism 171

Source notes 172

Index 176

PREFACE to the USedition (2004)

Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is out of action, havingbeen captured on December 14, 2003, by American forces at Ad-Dawr, about eleven miles from his hometown of Tikrit. Yetweapons of mass destruction (WMDs) remain a, if not the, maincause of concern in the international community, especiallyamong leading Western powers, fearful of nuclear proliferation inthe Middle East, a fear enhanced by evidence of nuclear-weaponsprograms in North Korea, Iran, and Libya, and anxious about thenuclear standoff between India and Pakistan. However that con-cern has been complicated in the aftermath of theAnglo-American invasion of Iraq.

When they went to war against Iraq on March 20, 2003, bothUS President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister TonyBlair invoked the scenario of Saddam Hussein deployingchemical and biological weapons. Saddam, an irresponsible andunpredictable leader, could not, they argued, be trusted withWMDs. Disarming Iraq of its WMDs and ballistic missiles wasgiven as the primary reason for going to war. Yet as of writing noWMDs have been found, while a political firestorm has eruptedin Britain about the alleged "sexing up" of intelligence reports onIraqi's WMDs to sell the war to a skeptical British and American

x Preface to the US edition (2004)

public. One casualty of the scandal was the suicide of Dr. DavidChristopher Kelly.

The Kelly tragedy made much more acute the deep division inBritish society about participating in the Iraq war. Fifty-nine-year-old David Kelly was a leading international expert in biologicalweapons and warfare. As a United Nations weapons inspector inIraq, between 1991 and 1998, he made thirty-seven visits to thecountry, investigating Iraq's former biological-weapons program.He also led all the inspections at Russia's biological-warfare facil-ities from 1991 to 1994 under the 1992 US, UK, and Russianagreement.

A microbiologist educated at the universities of Leeds,Birmingham, and Oxford he worked at the British Ministry ofDefence's chemical-weapons research center at Porton Down,Wiltshire, becoming the head of microbiology before joining theMinistry of Defence and the Foreign Office as a consultant on armscontrol. Part of his job was to brief journalists on defense issues.

A quiet man who normally shunned the limelight, Dr. Kellywas thrust into the media spotlight in July 2003 after he was iden-tified in the press as the man the Blair government believed leakedinformation about Iraq's WMD program to BBC reporter AndrewGillingham. Kelly soon became embroiled in the furious rowbetween the government and the BBC over claims that the Britishgovernment's dossier on Iraq's illegal WMD capabilities, pub-lished on September 24, 2002 to mobilise public support for thecoming invasion of Iraq, was "sexed up."

On July 15, 2003, Kelly was called to give evidence at the Houseof Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee. He told theCommittee that he was not the source of the "sexed up" claim. OnJuly 17, Kelly's family contacted the police after he failed to returnto his home in Oxfordshire. On July 18, his body was found in thecountryside a few miles from his home. He had bled to death froma wound in his left wrist, in an apparent suicide. On July 20, theBBC confirmed that Kelly was indeed the source of theGillingham's report about the "sexed up" dossier.

Preface to the US edition (2004) xi

Dr. Kelly's death caused considerable public disquiet and criti-cism of Tony Blair and his government. The dignified way hiswife Janice and three daughters handled the tragedy increasedpublic concern. Kelly was clearly upset about his treatment andthe hostile interrogation at the parliamentary committee, and wor-ried that the affair may have consequences for his pension. Butmany believed that David Kelly was made a scapegoat to divertpublic attention from the government's role in the affair. The cir-cumstances of his death and the fact that David Kelly had, for anumber of years, been a committed member of the Baha'i faith thatcondemns suicide added to the disquiet. Tony Blair bowed topublic pressure and set up an inquiry, headed by Lord Hutton, toinvestigate the circumstances of Dr. Kelly's death. The events sur-rounding his death and the public sentiment against the Iraq warhave severely dented Tony Blair's popularity. Only time will tellwhether his premiership can survive.

In the United States, ambassador Joseph Wilson's accusationthat the Bush Administration manipulated intelligence aboutSaddam Hussein's weapons programs to justify an invasion ofIraq, along with the growth of American casualties there, has pro-duced a certain cynicism about the war that even the capture ofSaddam has only partially allayed.

Bush and Blair's problems have been compounded by the factthat despite the great efforts made since June 2003 to find them,WMDs have yet to be found in Iraq. David Kay, the head of the1,200-strong Iraq Survey Group, the coalition's team dispatched tofind WMDs in Iraq, has said that he plans to leave before the ISG'swork is completed. The ISG's interim report, published in October,said that the team was unable to find WMDs or any active pro-gram to develop or produce them.

In May 1991, after the first Gulf war, the United Nations SpecialCommission and the International Atomic Energy Agencythetwo international organizations responsible for finding anddestroying Iraq's chemical-, biological-, and nuclear-weapons pro-grams, its WMD arsenals and its stocks of chemical and biologicalagentsbegan their work. In December 1998, the UN withdrew its

xii Preface to the US edition (2004)

inspectors because Iraq failed to cooperate fully with them, thuspaving the way for President Clinton to bomb Iraq.

It now seems reasonable to assume that the inspectors suc-ceeded in their task, at least as far as finding and destroyingIraq's militarily significant chemical and biological munitions isconcerned, and that Iraq did not fabricate more WMDs after1998. Whether the Iraqis were able to squirrel away significantstocks of chemical or biological agents is not clear.

Saddam Hussein undoubtedly spent large sums on WMD pro-grams until the 1991 Gulf war but after his defeat his mainobjective may well have been survival in power. He may havedecided that deploying WMDs threatened rather than helped hissurvival. If this is true, the Iraqis had no WMDs when the 2003Iraq war began. They may have had small stocks of biologicalwarfare agents but no munitions.

However, the ISG has found evidence that Iraq intended tomaintain its capability to develop WMDs in the future, includingthe preservation of biological research capabilities and strains ofbacteria to be used in the future production of biologicalweapons. There was also evidence of contacts with North Koreaabout possible future development of long-range ballistic mis-siles. In other words, there was evidence of Iraqi intention ratherthan Iraqi capability.

In an interview on December 16, 2003, President Bush wasasked why he had stated that Saddam Hussein had suchweapons when it appears that they only had the intention toacquire them. He replied: "So what's the difference? If he were toacquire weapons, he would be the danger." Many believe thatthere is a difference; a country that has actually deployed aneffective WMD force is clearly a greater threat to potential adver-saries than one that just has the intention to develop WMDs atsome future date.

In fact Bush's rather blase attitude may actually hinder inter-national cooperation and diplomatic attempts to control andeventually seek to abolish WMDs. What is more, the Anglo-American exaggeration about Saddam's WMD potentiality could

Preface to the US edition (2004) xiii

also cloud the real issues about the danger of WMDs. Ironically,Saddam could turn out to be the least of our problems.

During a visit to Iraq's nuclear establishment at Tuwaitha in 1979I met a number of the nuclear scientists working there. Some wereof very high quality, educated at top universities in the UnitedStates, England and other countries, and at the internationalnuclear center at CERN, in Geneva, Switzerland. They were obvi-ously capable of designing nuclear weapons.

It is a sobering thought that a country needs only a very smallgroup of top nuclear scientists to design and develop nuclearweapons. The United Nations inspectors discovered that Iraq haddeveloped a design for an effective nuclear weapon and had puttogether and tested its nonnuclear components. In fact, in a raremoment of self-reflection, Saddam Hussein has regretted that hedidn't develop a nuclear missile system before he invaded Kuwaitin 1991. He must have been thinking of the North Korean example,where a crisis over WMDs was handled very differently.

In a speech on December 16, 2003, at the Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies, William Perry, US Defense Secretary in theClinton Administration, warned that North Korea was a greaternuclear threat than Iraq. He also stated that in the next decade, anuclear terrorist device could be exploded in an American city.This is likely unless the United States "develops more effectivesafeguards against the spread of the fearsome weapons."

"No one would doubt that Al-Qaeda would execute that night-mare scenario if they could get their hands on nuclear weapons,"he said. Preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weaponsshould be the "acid test" of America's security policy. It is a test,Perry said, that the country is failing.

Diplomacy, in his opinion, is the only way to prevent NorthKorea from developing nuclear weapons. As Defense Secretary,Perry handled the 1994 nuclear crisis that brought the Koreanpeninsula to the brink of war. Although as it was reported, "he hada plan on his desk to bomb North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facil-ity, the Americans negotiated a regional agreement for North

xiv Preface to the US edition (2004)

Korea to cease its nuclear weapons program in exchange for twonuclear reactors that could not be used to develop nuclearweapons." Unfortunately, the agreement was never fully imple-mented and North Korea resumed its nuclear-weapons programafter President Clinton left office.

Another country with ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons isIran. It is generally believed that Iran has two previously secretnuclear facilities that may be part of a nuclear-weapons program.The Iranian government has acknowledged the existence of thefacilities but claims they are part of its civil nuclear program andthat it does not have a military nuclear programme.

It is well-known that Iran has a civilian nuclear-power reactorunder construction. The 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor is beingbuilt at Bushehr by the Russians. It will use low-grade enriched ura-nium as fuel. Under the contract Iran has with Russia, Russia willprovide the fuel for the lifetime of the reactor and will take the spentfuel back to Russia for storage and possibly reprocessing. This powerreactor is, according to Iran, the first of a series of power reactorsplanned to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity.

Iran operates four research reactors, three at the EstahanNuclear Technology Center and one at the Nuclear ResearchCenter in Teheran. Two, at Estahan, are subcritical assemblies usedfor training nuclear physicists and technicians; they have bothbeen operating since 1992. The third at Estahan is a 30-kilowatt-thermal research reactor used for research purposes; it has beenoperating since 1994. The fourth is a 5-megawatt thermal reactoralso used for research; it has been operating since 1967, an indica-tion of the length of time during which Iran has been interested innuclear technology.

The two facilities suspected of being part of a nuclear-weaponsprogram are a plant to produce heavy water, located near the townof Arak, about 250 kilometers from Teheran; and a gas centrifugeplant for enriching uranium, under construction at Natanz, fortykilometers from Kashan. Very few details of this plant are publiclyknown.

Heavy water (water in which the hydrogen is the deuterium

Preface to the US edition (2004) xv

isotope) is a very good moderator and coolant for a reactor fueledwith natural uranium. Such a reactor is excellent for the produc-tion of plutonium of a grade suitable for use in very effectivenuclear weapons (so-called weapons-grade plutonium). TheDimona reactor used by Israel to produce plutonium for itsnuclear weapons is a heavy water-natural uranium reactor, as isthe Cirus reactor used by India produce plutonium for its nuclearweapons.

Heavy water and enriched uranium can be used both in civiland military nuclear programs; they are dual-use materials. Forexample, the Candu-type civil nuclear-power reactor developedand used by Canada uses heavy water and a gas-centrifuge plant,which can produce the low-enriched uranium needed to fuel civilnuclear-power reactors.

The production of heavy water on a reasonable scale is a mucheasier task than using a gas centrifuge to produce significantamounts of highly-enriched uranium of the type needed fornuclear weapons. An Iranian facility containing, say, 3,000 gas cen-trifuges could produce about forty kilograms of highly enricheduranium per year. It would take this facility at least five years toproduce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear force of sixnuclear weapons. For comparison, it is believed that Israel hasbetween 200 and 400 nuclear weapons.

Assuming that about 60 percent of the centrifuges have to berejected as substandard (a reasonable assumption), Iran wouldneed to produce about 5,000 centrifuges for the facility. Moreover,gas centrifuges break down frequently because of the mechanicalstresses they endure. A steady supply of replacement machinesmust therefore be produced.

A facility operating a cascade of 3,000 centrifuges would use asmuch electricity as a largish city. It would, therefore, be impossi-ble to operate such a facility clandestinely. Building andeffectively operating a gas-centrifuge facility of a useful size is nota trivial taskit is an industrial undertaking. It would probablytake Iran at least four or five years to build such a facility andbegin producing significant amounts of highly enriched uranium.

xvi Preface to the US edition (2004)

Iraq, North Korea, and Iran have shown that if it takes politicalwill to do so, a developing country is able indigenously to con-struct and operate the complex and sophisticated facilitiesrequired to produce the fissile materials (highly enriched uraniumand plutonium), needed to fabricate nuclear weapons. They can, ifthey decide to do so, also produce the agents needed to producechemical and biological weapons, and to design and produce bal-listic missiles to deliver WMDs.

Preventing terrorist groups is considerably more difficult thanpreventing their spread to countries that do not now have them. Itis hard to be optimistic that democracies can succeed in preventingterrorist groups from attacking them with WMDs, includingnuclear weapons. History shows that effective counterterrorism isan exceedingly difficult activity.

The ability of the intelligence community to identify and predictthreats of terrorist attacks is crucial if such attacks are to be pre-vented. Monitoring the communications of terrorist groupstheactivity known as signal intelligence (SIGINT)has in the pastbeen used effectively in counterterrorism activities. But today'sterrorists can protect their communication systems by the use of,for example, encryption. Human intelligenceHUMINTis,therefore, the mainstay of counter-terrorism. Experience shows,however, that infiltrating fundamental terrorist groups is, to saythe least, extremely difficult.

Rivalries between intelligence agencies within countries andlack of cooperation in intelligence matters among countries seri-ously reduce the effectiveness of intelligence. One person withadequate access to the political leadership should lead intelligenceagencies within countries. International cooperation amongnational intelligence agencies is essential, as is the integration ofnational data banks. And so is an effective flow of information toregional and international authorities. International cooperationand flexibility are the keys to good counterterrorism intelligence.

The monitoring and control of the trade, within and amongstates, in the materials needed by terrorists to fabricate chemical,biological, and nuclear weapons is crucial, and should be consid-

Preface to the US edition (2004) xvii

erably improved. Some materials, such as plutonium, shouldsimply not be used and activities, like the reprocessing of spentnuclear-power-reactor fuel, should be stopped.

Perhaps the best we can do is implement as best we can coun-terterrorist measures and, at the same time, put into place the mosteffective emergency services we can afford in order to cope with aterrorist attack if it occurs. The post-9/11 establishment in theUnited States of the Department of Homeland Security is a wel-come step in the right direction.

Preface

The twentieth century saw an unprecedented increase indestruction caused by warfare, mainly brought about by the ever-increasing lethality of weapons. The terrorist attacks on New Yorkand Washington on September 11, 2001, and the responses to them,suggest that in the twenty-first century we shall continue to wit-ness large-scale violence by both states and sub-state groups. Thedestructiveness of warfare and of international terrorism is likelyto increase dramatically in the coming years, mainly because of thespread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to countries andinternational terrorist groups which do not currently have them.

One of the ways the world changed forever on September 11,was that a shocked public realized that international terrorists areprepared to attack even the most powerful and heavily armedcountry in the world, killing large numbers of people in suicideattacks. And if this was possible, thennew attacks may come at any time andanywhere. It is hardly surprising thatthe nightmare of international terroristsusing WMDs has become so disturbing.

When societies are vulnerable, it isessential that there be informed public debate about the risks andthe measures needed to address them. Currently, the debate is farfrom informed, mainly because of the large amount of inaccurateinformation and misinformation in circulation. These have created

new attacks maycome at any timeand anywhere

xx Preface

public fear, which in turn has been exacerbated by Western govern-ments' badly thought out and hastily implemented counterterroristpolicies. These not only reduce the effectiveness of counterterrorismbut actually play into the terrorists' hands, weakening democracyby instituting unnecessary repressive measures such as some ofthose brought in by the 2001 British Anti-terrorism, Crime andSecurity Bill.

The purpose of this book, then, is to contribute to informeddebate by providing factual information on the characteristics ofWMDsbiological, chemical, nuclear, and radiologicaland theeffects of their use. In Part 1 of the book, I describe the currentglobal arsenals of WMDs, who has these, what they have, and themunitions used to deliver the weapons to their targets. The per-sonnel, facilities and materials needed by a state to fabricateWMDs are explained and I analyze the roles of politicians, scien-tists, industry, the defence bureaucracy, and the military in WMDprograms. In Chapter 5, I present two case studies which discussIraq's and North Korea's likely involvement with WMDs. Chapter6 looks at the international impact following the discovery that astate has a WMD program.

Chapter 7 deals in detail with the potential terrorist use ofWMDs, and the following chapter attempts to identify the terror-ist groups capable of making and using them. The means andlikely success of counterterrorism form the subject of Chapter 9;and finally in Chapter 10, I offer some thoughts on what the futuremight hold.

Introductionthestate we're in

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have been one of the mostprominent topics in the news since the terrorist attacks on NewYork and Washington on September 11, 2001. Not a day passeswithout a great deal being said about them in the media, by politi-cians and other commentators. Much of what politicians say ismisinformation, often put about for propaganda purposes, andmany reporters misunderstand the issues.

The world's leaders continually warn us of the dangers ofWMDs. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan,called the terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical

weapons "the gravest threat the world faces." And Tony Blair andGeorge W. Bush have frequently told us that international terror-ists and the states that support themparticularly Iran, Iraq, andNorth Koreaare today's greatest threats to national and globalsecurity. They claim that "rogue states" are likely to make WMDsavailable to terrorists who will act as proxies, using the weaponsto attack the states' enemies. War is necessary and justified toremove these threats. Unless the regimes in the accused countriesare changed, WMDs may be used with devastating effects. Shouldwe believe these prophecies of doom or are they exaggeratednightmares?

It is impossible to judge the threat of WMDs unless we know

2 Introduction - the state we're in

the answers to some key questions which this book will attemptto address. How do biological, chemical, and nuclear weaponsdiffer? What are the effects of the use of these weapons? Whichterrorist groups are capable of making and using these weapons?What facilities and capabilities do countries need to fabricateand deliver them? Can democracies deal with the threat of bio-logical, chemical, and nuclear terrorism? What are the mosteffective counterterrorism measures? What does the future holdin the way of terrorism with WMDs? Is cyberspace under threatof terrorist attack? Which new countries will develop and deployWMDs?

When the Cold War ended in 1991 there were high hopes thatthe importance given by political and military leaders to weaponsof mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, would dra-matically decrease. There would then be rapid progress indisarmament leading to the total abolition of these weapons, or soit was believed. But this was not to be: more countries now deployWMDs than ever before.

As East-West relations deteriorated after the Second World War,concern about a global nuclear war, which could have destroyedthe Northern Hemisphere, was widespread. Few people nowworry about a global nuclear holocaust, but the possibility of aregional nuclear war remains a real one. The hope that future gen-erations will be saved from the scourge of nuclear conflict has yetto be realized; the vision of mushroom clouds rising over ourheads has not gone away.

Nuclear weapons are here to stay

Unfortunately, far-reaching nuclear disarmament has not yet beennegotiated and there is no reason to believe that it will be in theforeseeable future. On the contrary, nuclear weapons are now backon the agenda more firmly than at any time since the height of theCold War. For example, the US National Strategy to CombatWeapons of Mass Destruction, completed at the end of 2002,

Introduction - the state we're in 3

describes a role for nuclear weapons wellinto the future, not as part of a nucleardeterrent policy but as part of America'swar-fighting strategy. Apparently, thePentagon has prepared contingencyplans to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively against targets in seven ormore countriesincluding China, Iran,Iraq, Libya, Russia, and Syria.

According to the National Strategy:

Weapons of mass destructionnuclear, biological, and chemicalin the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent oneof the greatest security challenges facing the United States. Wemust pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat inall of its dimensions.

An effective strategy for countering WMD, including theiruse and further proliferation, is an integral component of theNational Security Strategy of the United States of America. Aswith the war on terrorism, our strategy for homeland security,and our new concept of deterrence, the US approach to combatWMD represents a fundamental change from the past. To suc-ceed, we must take full advantage of today's opportunities,including the application of new technologies, increased empha-sis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening ofalliance relationships, and the establishment of new partner-ships with former adversaries.

In March 2002, the British Minister of Defence announced, for thefirst time ever, that British nuclear weapons could be used in a firststrike and against countries that used biological or chemicalweapons against British forces or targets in the UK. Both theAmerican and British governments have now reneged on theirsecurity assurance guarantees not to use nuclear weapons againstcountries that do not have them and which are not allied to anuclear-weapon power. The constraints on the use of nuclearweapons are weakening as nuclear deterrence gives way to pre-emption.

the Pentagon hasprepared contingencyplans to use nuclearweapons pre-emptively againsttargets in seven ormore countries


These new policies have been adopted in spite of the"unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination" oftheir nuclear weapons entered into by the USA and the UK alongwith the other established nuclear-weapon states (China, Franceand Russia at the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT). One hundred and eighty-seven countries have rati-fied the NPT, making it the world's most comprehensivemultilateral nuclear arms control treaty.

While the established nuclear-weapon powers claim to beopposed to the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particu-larly nuclear ones, to other countries, they will not get rid oftheir own nuclear weapons and reneging on such a universaltreaty is likely only to encourage other countries to acquire theirown WMDs. American political leaders are even prepared to goto war to prevent such proliferation or to disarm some countriesthat have acquired WMDs. However, the policy is confused,confusing, and hypocritical: there is no suggestion that actionwill be taken against India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea,which have nuclear weapons, or Iran, which is suspected ofdeveloping them.

The established nuclear-weapon powers are continuallyimproving the quality of their nuclear weapons and developingtechnologies to support them. By this behavior they show thatthey believe that their nuclear weapons have considerable politicaland military value. How then can they be surprised when othercountries want these weapons themselves?

Why countries "go nuclear"

There are a number of reasons which might prompt a state toacquire nuclear weapons. Some countries want them to solve realor perceived security needs. Israel, for example, feared, with somereason, that various Arab countries wanted to destroy it when thecountry was born in 1948 and for a little time afterwards. Israelwas, therefore, intent on developing nuclear weapons, as a


deterrent or as a weapon of last resort, and began to do so in the1950s, finally deploying some in the 1973 war.

Prestige is another reason. The fact that all permanent membersof the United Nations Security Council are nuclear-weaponpowers is not lost on non-nuclear states. Nuclear weapons cangive a state a dominant position in itsregion. Conversely, the risk of loss ofprestige is a reason why countries withnuclear weapons, such as France andthe United Kingdom, will not give themup. Political leaders may also wantnuclear weapons for internal politicalreasonsto boost their domestic power or to distract their peoplefrom social or economic problems. India may have acquirednuclear weapons partly for this last reason, partly to impressPakistan, and partly to improve its security against China.

There may also be a "domino effect" in some regions; if onecountry acquires nuclear weapons, neighboring countries may feelobliged to follow suit. Pakistan, for example, felt itself to be undergreat pressure to get nuclear weapons when India did so.

Weapons of mass destruction: the nextterrorist threat?

Even before Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by atomicbombs, prophetic observers foresaw that WMDs might one dayfall into the hands of terrorist groups as well as states. In April1945, for example, US Secretary of War Henry Stimson warnedHarry Truman that: "the future may see a time when such aweapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly andeffectively with devastating power by a wilful nation or groupagainst an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size andmaterial power." The weapon to which Stimson referred was onethat could destroy a whole citya WMD.

Stimson could not have foreseen the rise of fundamentalist

Nuclear weaponscan give a state adominant position inits region


terrorism and the ways in which it would threaten advanced soci-eties. Many of the most crucial assets of industrialized societieslikelarge power stations, fuel dumps, liquid gas storage sites, computernetworks, major telecommunication centers, major transportcenterswithout which the society cannot operate effectively, arehighly centralized and, therefore, particularly vulnerable to attack orsabotage by terrorist groups.

All the signs are that during the next decade or two fundamen-talist terrorism will increase in frequency and the terrorists will beprepared to use WMDs in their attacks. The risk of attacks oncrucial targets will increase; attacks on computer networks (cyber-terrorism) and attacks on large nuclear-power stations areparticularly likely, and alarming, prospects in the future.

International terrorism and democracy

People, particularly those who live in major cities, fear interna-tional terrorism. This fear is fed by the intense media interest in thesubject, which reached a peak after the terrorist attacks onSeptember 11, 2001. The first attack from outside in modern timeson America's homeland deeply shocked the world and showedwith dramatic clarity that the most powerful and most heavilyarmed country in the world was vulnerable.

The Americans responded vigorously by declaring a wide-ranging"war on terror." The "war" has mainly been fought by Americanforces but involves the military forces of a number of allies and theactive support of security and intelligence agencies from a largernumber of other countries. So far, major military action, using airpower and special forces, has been the destruction of the Talibanregime and attacks carried out on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.Another is the war on Iraq, ostensibly to destroy any biologicaland chemical weapons that Iraq may have retained after theUnited Nations inspectors left in 1998; another stated aim was"regime change" to topple Saddam Hussein.

Lower profile activities in the war on terrorism include, in the


words of Paul Rogers and Scilla Elworthy, "support for anti-insurgency and counterterrorism operations in a number ofcountries, especially the Philippines, the development of significantUS bases in a number of Central Asian countries, and continuingsupport for the Sharon government in Israel in its actions againstPalestinian militants and the Palestinian population of the occupiedterritories."

The feeling that there is little that can be done to counterinternational terrorism enhances fear of it. This feeling of helpless-ness is particularly strong in democracies, which are certainly morevulnerable to terrorism than are authori-tarian regimes. (Research by William LeeEubank and Leonard Weinberg hasshown that the likelihood of finding aterrorist group in a democracy is 3.5times greater than the likelihood offinding one in a country with an authori-tarian regime.) A typical authoritarianregime is prepared to use any means,however brutal, to eliminate terrorists,irrespective of whether these ultra-repressive actions are as illegal as thoseused by the terrorists themselves.

Peter Chalk, an expert in responses to terrorism, puts the case:

the likelihood offinding a terroristgroup in ademocracy is 3.5times greater thanthe likelihood offinding one in acountry with anauthoritarian regime

Any liberal response to terrorism has to rest on one over-ridingmaxim: a commitment to uphold and maintain the rule of law. Itis quite obvious that the threat of terrorism can be minimized, ifnot entirely eliminated, by any state that is prepared to use totheir fullest extent the entire range of coercive powers at its dis-posal. However, to do so would merely be to transplantinsurgent terrorism from below with institutionalized andbureaucratized terror from above, destroying in the process anymoral or legal claim to legitimacy that the state may have.

The aim of a typical terrorist group is to disrupt and destabilizesociety, as Paul Wilkinson explains: "Political terrorism may be


briefly defined as coercive intimidation. It is the systematic use ofmurder and destruction, and the threat of murder and destructionin order to terrorize individuals, groups, communities or govern-ments." A democratic government has a basic duty to ensure thatits citizens can go about their legitimate business with the mini-mum of hindrance, which is only possible in the absence of coercionand violence. The terrorist's purpose is, by the use of coercive vio-lence, to prevent the citizen from going about his or her legitimatebusiness. The politics of the terrorist are absolute; those of ademocracy are based on compromise. The two are inevitably inconflict.

Reacting or overreacting to terrorism?

The main problem for a democracy faced with terrorism is that itmust act against terrorists in ways that are legal and constitu-tional. A democracy must, therefore, evolve counterterrorismmeasures that are both effective and publicly acceptable. PeterChalk has described two characterizations of counterterrorism:

First there is the criminal-justice model which views terrorismas a crime where the onus of response is placed squarelywithin the bounds of the state's criminal legal system. Secondthere is the war model which views terrorism as an act ofrevolutionary/ guerrilla warfare and where the onus ofresponse is placed on the military and the use of, for instance,special forces, retaliatory strikes, campaigns of retribution andtroop deployment. The typical approach adopted by liberaldemocracies in Europe and North America is to treat terrorismas a crime where prosecution and punishment take placewithin the rule of law. In other words, the response conformsto the criminal-justice model.

To adopt the "war model" would be to acknowledge the politicalrole of the terrorist and legitimate his actions. This the democracieshave, up to now, been generally unwilling to do. Consequently, themilitary have been brought in only as a last resort, to be deployed in


an emergency, such as the use of the British Army in NorthernIreland. The new "war" against international terrorism adopts thewar model and is a significant move away from the previouspolicy.

If a democracy overreacts to terrorism by making significantdepartures from normal legal and law-enforcement proceduresthe response will be neither effective nor acceptable to the public.Illegality by the state is seen to match the illegality of the terror-ist act, and thereby plays into the hands of the terrorist.Departures from the due process of law (such as the failure toobtain search warrants, extracting confessions by torture, intern-ment without trial, the denial of timely access to lawyers, andillegal detention) are deemed excessively repressive and unac-ceptable in a democracy and, therefore, likely to prove ultimatelyineffective because they undermine the democracy they purportto defend.

There are good reasons for believingthat the current American adminis-tration is overreacting to terrorism.President Bush, elected by an arguablemajority in Florida, a minority of theelectorate, and a partisan majority in theSupreme Court, has used his popularityafter September 11, 2001 to suppressboth criticism and civil liberties. Thetreatment of prisoners at the US internment camp in GuantanamoBay, Cuba, and the refusal to bring them to trial, tell them whatthey are charged with, allow them access to lawyers, or releasethem are obvious threats to the strength of American democracy.

The refusal by the state to take decisive legal action against terroristsis equally ineffective. Appeasement is likely to encourage terrorists tofurther violence and enhance public feelings of insecurity. PaulWilkinson warns: "If a democratic government caves in to extremistmovements and allows them to subvert and openly defy the lawsand to set themselves up as virtual rival governments within thestate, the liberal democracy will dissolve into an anarchy of

the end result of toomuch repression is apolice state; the endresult of theappeasement ofterrorists is anarchy


competing factions and enclaves." In other words, the end result oftoo much repression is a police state; the end result of the appease-ment of terrorists is anarchy.

There is always a tendency for governments, even in liberaldemocracies, to adopt extreme measures when terrorists resort togreat violence. Even if these measures are permitted constitution-ally, they will not be publicly acceptable and effective if theyappear to go beyond reasonable limits. For example, in 1971, theBritish government introduced internment without trial inNorthern Ireland. It was severely criticized both domestically andinternationally, even though terrorist activity in Northern Irelandhad reached unprecedented levels.

If democracies are going to deal effectively with the terroristthreat in ways that do not threaten the democratic way of life oftheir citizens, all of the counterterrorist measures they adopt mustbe firmly under the control of civil authorities that are accountableto the people through Parliament. In the words of Peter Chalk:

The invocation, use and continuance of all counterterrorist meas-ures need to be made subject to constant parliamentarysupervision and independent judicial oversight. In order to strikea balanced response that does not unduly restrict or abuse indi-vidual rights and freedoms, it is absolutely essential that the stateis held accountable for its actions and that mechanisms exist forthe redress of grievances. Antiterrorist measures should there-fore be formulated according to clear and precise rules so that allconcerned are able to make an adequate assessment of their ownpowers, obligations and duties.

Fear of biological and chemical terrorism

A biological or chemical attack is probably more likely than anuclear one and public concern about the former type of terroristattacks has been high since 11 September. (Though if it werewidely believed that a nuclear attack was likely, it would probablybe more feared than any other type of attack.)


In turn, biological weapons are more feared than chemical onesbecause populations feel themselves to be particularly vulnerableto them; it is extremely difficult to protect populations, rather thanmilitary forces, against biological attack. In addition, we have anatavistic fear of disease, perhaps dating back to past epidemics,such as the Black Death, which between 1346 and 1350 killed one-third of Europe's population, significantly reducing the inhabitantsof 200,000 towns and villages. The psychological impact of thechaos and despair that swept the land may be deep in our psyche.For this reason, and given their exposure and vulnerability, it islikely that populations would panic if involved in a biologicalattack.

A terrorist group, or even an individ-ual with relatively small financial andpersonnel resources, could construct aneffective biological weapon and releaseit. An advantage of biological weaponsfor terrorists is that only a small amountof biological agent is required, becausemicroorganisms can be reproduced relatively easily. Chemicalweapons, including highly lethal nerve agents, are also relativelyeasy to prepare from readily available chemicals and chemicalapparatus.

Public fear is increased by well-publicized statements,particularly by American and British political leaders, linking Iraq,Iran, and North Korea, the "rogue states" forming Bush's "axis ofevil," with international terrorist groups. These three countriesare portrayed as possessing biological and chemical weapons andlikely to make some available to terrorists.

Fear of becoming involved in a biological or chemical attack ispervasive. The publication of plans to protect populations frombiological and chemical attacksby, for example, stockpiling vac-cines or vaccinating whole populations or groups at particularriskdoes not reassure but simply adds to people's anxiety.

An awesome future possibility is the use of genetic engineeringby military scientists and terrorists to produce new and more

Public fear isincreased by well-publicizedstatements


deadly biological warfare agents. This even raises the prospect ofbiological warfare against a specific ethnic group using "genetic-homing" weapons that could target, for example, a geneticstructure shared by particular ethnic groups.

The best way to overcome fear of WMDs is to grapple with thenature of the threat. The first step is to understand the character-istics of the weapons and the effects of their use.

PART I

Weapons of massdestruction: What theyare and what they do

Weapons of mass destruction take biological, chemical, nuclear or radi-ological form. The use of the term is recent; it is also controversial. DanPlesch, of London's Royal United Services Institute, for example, pointsout that NATO still uses the "nuclear, biological, chemical" description, aseach type of weapon has very different effects. The creation of the blan-ket acronym WMD blurs these distinctions; I will, however, use theacronym in this book for convenience, while recognizing the differences.

Crudely put, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons are designed to killand injure a large number of people. Nuclear weapons have the additional pur-pose of destroying much of the enemy's propertyparticularly his cities andindustryor his own strategic nuclear forces. Radiological weapons areintended to contaminate with radioactivity an area of a city, which will then haveto be evacuated and decontaminateda highly disruptive and expensive pro-cedure. (Radiological weapons are, therefore, strictly speaking "weapons ofmass disruption" rather than weapons of mass destruction.)

The awesome lethality of a single WMD puts them into a specialcategory. Political leaders believe that some WMDs are so destructive

14 Weapons of mass destruction: What they are

that they are deterrent weapons, preventing an enemy from making asurprise, preemptive attack. That lethality also makes some of themattractive to fundamentalist religious and political terrorist groups, whowant to kill as many people as possible in terrorist attacks in order toseize the headlines. A nuclear explosion, in particular, would fit in withapocalyptic visions of Armageddon.

1 Nuclear weapons

Nuclear history

Soon after nuclear fission was discovered by German physicistOtto Hahn in 1938, it was realized that the energy from fissioncould be used to produce a nuclear explosion. The fear thatGermany and/or Japan might succeed in developing nuclearweapons stimulated the Americans to make a massive effort,known as the Manhattan Project, to develop them first. The effortled to the first nuclear explosiona test carried out in the NewMexico desert in 1945.

Nuclear weapons have been used only twice in anger:Hiroshima was destroyed by a nuclear weapon on August 6, 1945and Nagasaki was destroyed three days later. Together the twoexplosions killed a total of about 250,000 people. Many othernuclear weapons have been exploded in tests and to help design-ers develop new types, from the first nuclear test on July 16, 1945in the desert near Alamogordo, New Mexico, to the most recentconducted in Pakistan on May 28, 1998.

Seven nuclear-weapon powersChina, France, India, Pakistan,Russia /the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStateshave tested nuclear weapons. These countries are knownto have carried out a total of at least 2,052 nuclear tests. Israel, theeighth known nuclear-weapon power, has not, so far as is publiclyknown, tested a nuclear weapon.


How a nuclear bomb works

A nuclear weapon produces a powerful explosion by releasing avery large amount of energy in a very short time. It works on thesame principle as nuclear reactors which produce electricity; ineach case, atoms of uranium or plutonium are split (undergo fis-sion) in a chain reaction. The fission chain reaction in a nuclearreactor is controlled; in a nuclear weapon it is not.

Nuclear fission occurs in different forms of a heavy elementinpractice, uranium or plutoniumwhen a neutron enters thenucleus of an atom of one of these isotopes. When fission occursthe original nucleus is split (fissioned) into two nuclei, called fis-sion products. Two or three neutrons are released with the fissionproducts. If at least one of these neu-trons produces fission in a neighboringuranium or plutonium nucleus, a self-sustaining fission chain reaction can beproduced. This process is best achievedif the isotopes uranium-235 or plutonium-239 are used. These two isotopes arethe key materials in any nuclear-weapon program. Each fission eventproduces energy. A fission chain reac-tion, involving a very large number of fission events, can thereforerelease a very large amount of energy. A significant nuclear explo-sion will only occur if there is a sufficient amount of uranium-235or plutonium-239 present to support a self-sustaining fission chainreaction. The minimum amount of the material required for thispurpose is called the critical mass.

An amount somewhat larger than the critical mass, called asupercritical mass, is required to produce a fission chain reactionfor a nuclear explosion. The larger the quantity of uranium-235 orplutonium-239 that is fissioned, the greater the explosive yield ofthe nuclear explosion. The nuclear-weapon designer's aim is tocreate a weapon that will not be blown apart until it has producedthe size of explosion he requires. In other words, the aim is to

A nuclear weaponproduces a powerfulexplosion byreleasing a verylarge amount ofenergy in a veryshort time

1st Generation

2nd Generation

3rd Generation

4th Generation

Neutron

Uranium-235 atom

Fission fragmenteg: Kr, Cs, Rb, Ba, Xe or Sr.

A fission chain reaction


keep the fission process going long enough to produce therequired amount of energy. The most remarkable thing aboutnuclear weapons is the small amount of uranium-235 or plutonium-239 needed to produce a huge explosion: the critical mass of asphere of plutonium-239 is about 11 kilograms; the radius of thesphere is only about 5 centimeters.

The plutonium sphere can be surrounded by a shell of a mate-rial like beryllium, the only function of which is to reflect back intothe plutonium some of the neutrons that would otherwise havebeen lost to the fission chain reaction, increasing the number of fis-sions that take place. This trick reduces the critical massconsiderablytypically, from 11 kilograms to about 4 kilograms, asphere of a radius of approximately 3.6 centimeters, about the sizeof a small orange.

A fission nuclear weapon using just 4 kilograms of plutonium-239 would typically explode with a power of 20 kT, equivalent tothat of the explosion of about 20,000 tons of TNT, the power of the

Ordinary nuclear fission weaponConfiguration of components of a fission bomb. A - initiator (neutron source orgenerator), B - fissile core (plutonium and U-235), C - tamper core reflector (uraniumplus beryllium), D - high explosive lens (shaped plastic charge), E - detonator.

E

D

C

,A

Nuclear weapons 19

nuclear weapon that destroyed Nagasaki in August 1945. Such anuclear weapon would therefore be about 5,000 times more effec-tive, weight for weight, than a conventional bomb. The maximumexplosive power of a militarily usable nuclear weapon usingnuclear fission is about 50 kT because to obtain a bigger explosiona technique known as boosting is used. In a boosted weapon, somefusion material is injected into the centre of the plutonium mass asit is exploding with the result that the power of the explosion isboosted, typically tenfold.

Nuclear fusion occurs when nuclei of atoms of hydrogen iso-topes fuse together to form nuclei of helium. Whereas fissioninvolves the splitting of the nuclei of heavy isotopes like pluto-nium, fusion involves the joining together of light nuclei likehydrogen. Nuclear fusion takes place when the hydrogen nucleiare subject to very high temperatures and pressures, similar tothose that occur in the sun, and exploding plutonium producesthese conditions.

During fusion, neutrons are produced and energy is released. Ina boosted weapon, these fusion neutrons are used to produce morefission in the plutonium-239. Boosted weapons are, therefore,sophisticated fission weapons. Tritium and deuterium, isotopesof hydrogen, are used as the fusion material in boosted weapons.

Heat

Pressure Pressure

How nuclear fusion works

Helium

H2H2

EnergyHigh-energyneutrons


How a boosted weapon worksConfiguration of components of a boosted fission bomb. A - initiator (neutron source orgenerator), B - fissile core (plutonium and U-235), C - tamper core reflector (uraniumplus beryllium), D - high explosive lens (shaped plastic charge), E - detonator, F - tritiumcontainer, G - tritium feed into core of bomb.

Boosted weapons are very efficient, typically between five orten times more than ordinary fission weapons. Much higher explo-sive powers can be obtained from a given amount of plutonium-239. Typically, explosive powers of up to 500 kT can be obtainedfrom boosted fission weapons, ten times greater than the explo-sive powers that can be obtained from fission nuclear weaponsthat are not boosted. An explosion of this size would totallydestroy a large city.

If even greater explosive powers than 500 kT are required, alarge fraction of the energy must be obtained from nuclear fusion.Nuclear weapons that rely for their explosive power mainly onfusion are called thermonuclear weapons or H-bombs. In a thermo-nuclear weapon, a nuclear fission weapon acts as a trigger,providing the high temperature and pressure required for fusion.Typically, a cylinder of fusion material, in the form of lithiumdeuteride, is placed beneath the trigger. When the fission triggerexplodes it generates fusion in the fusion stage.

FE

GD

C

A

Nuclear weapons 21

There is no critical mass for the fusion process, and so in theorythere is no limit to the explosive power that can be obtained from athermonuclear weapon. In 1962, the former Soviet Union explodeda thermonuclear weapon at its Arctic test-site at Novaya Zemlyawith an explosive yield equivalent to that of the explosion of nearly60 million tons of TNT, or about 3,000 Nagasaki weapons. This isvery much more explosive power than would be required todestroy totally the largest city on earth.

The nuclear powers

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty attempts to prevent the spreadof nuclear weapons to countries other than China, France, Russia, theUK, and the USA (the five permanent members of the SecurityCouncil of the UN). The development, production, stockpiling, anduse of both biological and chemical weapons are prohibited underinternational treaties. But these treaties have not prevented the pro-liferation of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are the WMDs of choice of the five majorpowers mentioned above, and of three regional powersIndia, Israel,and Pakistan. Iran and Iraq are strongly suspected of developingnuclear weapons and North Korea probably already has one or two.

There are about 30,000 nuclear weapons in today's world.Some are deployed in operational weapons; some are kept inreserve for possible future deployment; and some are waiting tobe dismantled. The majority are American or Russian; theUnited States and Russia each deploy about 9,000 nuclearweapons. The other countries with nuclear weaponsChina,France, the UK, India, Israel, and Pakistanhave a total of about1,200 in their operational nuclear arse-nals. China has deployed about 400nuclear weapons, France about 350,and the UK about 200. Israel is esti-mated to have about 200, India about60, and Pakistan about 35.

There are about30,000 nuclearweapons in today'sorld

Schematic cross-section of a thermonuclear weapon

polystyrenefoam jacket

uranium-238casing

solid lithium-6deuteride

uranium-235orplutonium-239spark plug

honeycombshield

uranium-235

plutonium-239

tritium-deuteriumgas

uranium-238

beryllium

chemicalexplosives

detonators

timingdevices forchemicalexplosion

neutrongenerator

Nuclear weapons 23

Nuclear weapons are far more destructive than conventionalbombs. During the Second World War it took a number of raids,each involving 1,000 or more bombers, to destroy, for example, theGerman city of Dresden with high explosive and incendiarybombs, killing at least 50,000 people. Several times more peoplewere killed in 1945 in each of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima andNagasaki using a single nuclear weapon.

There are many types of nuclear weaponsaircraft bombs,artillery shells, depth charges, torpedoes, land mines, cruise mis-siles, and a variety of ballistic and other missiles. They may bedeployed for tactical or strategic use. Tactical ones generally havea lower explosive yield and shorter range than strategic ones.The effect of the explosion of a nuclear weapon depends mainlyon the explosive yield of the weapon and the altitude at which itexplodes.

The explosive yields of the nuclear weapons currentlydeployed by the nuclear-weapon powers vary considerably. Someartillery shells, aircraft bombs, and land mines have low yields,some of less than 1 kT; strategic intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles have the highest yields. Some Chinesestrategic nuclear weapons have yields as high as 5 megatons. Allother deployed strategic nuclear weapons have yields of less than750 kT.

What a nuclear explosion does

The author was present when British nuclear weapons weretested at Maralinga, in the South Australian desert, in 1953.Seeing a nuclear explosion is an awesome experience: theobserver at first stands with his back to the explosion to avoidbeing blinded by the initial flash of light and ultraviolet radia-tion. After the flash, he can turn towards the nuclear explosion towatch the fireball grow.

The initial flash of light is followed by a weird, very shortperiod of silence. Any exposed skin then feels a wave of heat. Just

World map showing civil nuclear powers, date of first civil nuclear power reactor and major nuclear test sites worldwide

Argentina 1974 Lithuania 1985Armenia 1979 Mexico 1990Belgium 1962 Netherlands 1969Brazil 1985 Pakistan 1972Bulgaria 1974 Romania 1996Canada 1971 Russia 1954China 1994 Slovakia 1973Czeck Republic 1985 Slovenia 1983Finland 1977 South Africa 1984France 1964 Spain 1971Germany 1966 Sweden 1972Hungary 1983 Switzerland 1969India 1969 Taiwan 1978Italy 1964 UK 1956Japan 1965 Ukraine 1978Kazakhstan 1973 USA 1957South Korea 1978Italy and Kazakhstan no longer have nuclear-power reactors.

Country year of operation of firstnuclear-power reactor

Country year of operation of firstnuclear-power reactor

1. USA Nevada test site (u and a)2. USA Amchitca, Alaska (u)3. France French Polynesia at Mororoa Atoll and Fangatuafa

(u and a)4. France Reggan, Sahara desert (a)5. France Sahara desert (u)6. China Lop Nor, Sinkiang Province (u and a)7. India Thar desert, Jaisalmer district (u)8. Pakistan Chagai Hills (u)9. UK Pacific at Johnston Atoll (a)

Year when countries commissioned their first nuclear-power reactors

10. UK Pacific at Christmas Island (a)11. UK Monte Bello Islands (a)12. UK Emu Field, South Australia (a)13. UK Maralinga, South Australia (a)14. USSR Novaya Zemlya, South Site (u and a)15. USSR Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan (u and a)16. USSR Novaya Zemlya, North Site (u and a)17. USA Pacific tests at Johnston Atoll, Enewetak, Bikini,

Christmas Island (a)u = nuclear tests performed undergrounda = nuclear tests performed in the atmosphere


10000900080007000600050004000300020001000

0

Number of nuclear weapons9000 9000

400 350 200 200 60 35

US Russia China France UK Israel India Pakistan

Nuclear arsenals by country

as one gets over the surprise of the heat wave, one is shaken by theblast wave, accompanied by a loud noise. The body is shakenagain by a wind travelling away from the explosion, raising acloud of dust. A short time later, one is shaken yet again byanother wind blowing in the opposite direction.

Experiencing the heat, blast, noise, and the winds, seeing thebrilliantly colored fireball growing to a tremendous size, andwatching the mushroom cloud rise to a high altitude, combine togive a sense of the immense power of a single nuclear explosion.It is an experience that one does notforget. The most awesome thing is thatthis huge explosion, powerful enoughto destroy a city, is produced by apiece of plutonium about the size of atennis ball.

Nuclear weapons are quantitativelyand qualitatively different from conven-tional weapons. Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat, in his book NuclearRadiation in Warfare, explains:

The initial flash oflight is followed by aweird, very shortperiod of silence

A single nuclear bomb can have an explosive yield greater thanthat of the total of all the explosives ever used in wars sincegunpowder was invented. The qualitative difference whichmakes nuclear weapons unique is that, in addition to causing

Nuclear weapons 27

Nuclear weapon exploding

loss of life by mechanical blast, or by burns from the heat of thefireball, nuclear weapons have a third killerradiationMoreover, and unlike the other two agents of death, the lethalaction of radiation can stretch well beyond the war theatre andcontinue long after the war has ended, into future generations.

At the instant of the detonation of a typical nuclear weapon,the temperature shoots up to tens of millions of degrees andpressure to millions of atmospheres. As the fireball, a luminousmass of air, starts to expand, conditions are like those in the sun.The energy of the explosion is carried off by heat, blast and radi-ation. When a typical nuclear-fission weapon explodes, roughlyhalf of the energy goes in blast, about a third in heat and the restin radiation.

With a bomb of the size of the Hiroshima one, heat will killpeople over a larger area than either blast or radiation. The lethalareas for blast and radiation are about the same; each is about halfof the lethal area for heat. For weapons with much larger explosiveyields, heat is by far the biggest killer, several times more lethalthan either blast or radiation.


Heat, blast and radiation

In the first few thousandths of a second after the explosion beginsthere is a burst of ultraviolet radiation from the fireball as it risesin the atmosphere. This is followed by a second burst of radia-tionthermal radiationlasting for a few seconds. After aminute or so, the temperature of the fireball has fallen sufficientlyfor it to stop emitting visible light. The second burst of thermalradiation is responsible for the heat effects of the weapon.Exposed people will be killed or severely burned and fires will bestarted over a large area. The area affected will depend on theexplosive yield of the weapon and the weather. If the weather isfine, the heat wave can kill and injure people at much greater dis-tances than can blast and radiation.

About half of the people caught by the heat wave at a distanceof 2 kilometers from the explosion of a nuclear weapon with ayield of 12 kT (similar to the atomic bomb that destroyedHiroshima) at low altitude in fine weather will suffer third-degreeburns. For a nuclear explosion of 300 kT, the distance would beabout 7.5 kilometers. People will also be killed and injured by firesset alight by the thermal radiation.

If a nuclear weapon is exploded over a town or city, most imme-diate death and injury will be caused by blast. Blast will also be themain cause of damage to buildings. In fact, most blast deaths occurfrom indirect effectsfalling buildings and debris, being hurledinto objects by the blast wave, and so on. For a 12 kT bombexploded at a height of 300 meters, the lethal blast area is about 5square kilometers.

During the first minute following a nuclear explosion, ionizingradiation, called initial radiation, is given off. Ionizing radiationemitted after a minute is called residual radiation, most of whichcomes from the fallout of radioactive fission products. Much of theradioactivity in the fallout will be in the mushroom cloud pro-duced by the explosion.

As the cloud is blown downwind, radioactive particles willfall to the ground. People in the contaminated area may then beexposed to the radiation given off by the radioactive particles.

Nuclear weapons 29

They can be irradiated by radiation given off by radioactivefallout; they can also inhale or swallow radioactivity fromfallout and then be irradiated by the radioactivity in theirbodies.

Radiation causes atoms to becomeelectrically charged, a process called ion-ization. Cells in the body consist ofatoms, and if one of the atoms in a cell isionized it can be dangerous. When aperson is exposed to low levels of radia-tion, cells will be damaged but the bodycan repair this damage, but when thebody is exposed to higher doses of radi-ation so many cells are damaged thatthe body's repair mechanisms cannotcope.

Some cells are more easily damaged by radiation than others.The most sensitive cells are those that line the intestines, white

when the body isexposed to higherdoses of radiationso many cells aredamaged that thebody's repairmechanismscannot cope

Lethal areafor blast:1026 km2

Lethal areafor radiation:

89 km2

Lethal areafor heat:3240 km2

Lethal area of a 60mT bomb

("Lethal area" is defined as the area in which the number of survivors equals thenumber of fatalities outside the area)

32 km

Map of central London showing effect of 1 kT explosionWithin Circle 1 (200 meters), almost 100 percent fatality in those directly exposed to thermal radiation; within Circle 2 (800metres), almost 100 percent fatality in those directly exposed to blast; within Circle 3 (one kilometer), almost 100 percentfatality in those directly exposed to prompt nuclear radiation; within Circle 4 (two kilometers), almost all directly exposed sufferimmediate injuries from burns and blast. (Map by Antony Smith with additional graphics by Richard Prime.)

EustonStation

Regent'sPark

St. PancrasStation

King's Cross

BTTower

BritishMuseum

Lord'sN

PaddingtonStation

Hyde ParkKensington

Palace

Royal AlbertHall

ScienceMuseum V i c t o r i a

and AlbertNatural

HistoryMuseum

1 km VauxhallBridge

VictoriaStation

TateGallery,

LamtbethBridge

WestminsterCathedral

Imperial WarMuseum

LambethPalace

Houses ofParliament

WesfminsterBuckingham'

Palace

St. J a m e ' sPalace

Bridge .Waterloo

Globe

TheatreHMS

BlackfriarsBridge

SouthwarkBridge

WaterlooBridge .

NationalGallery

1234

St Paul'sCathedral

Nuclear weapons 31

blood cells that combat infection, and cells that produce red andwhite blood cells. The effects of radiation on these types of cellslead to the first symptoms of radiation sickness, including nausea,diarrhea, vomiting and fatigue. These symptoms may be followedby, among others, headache, hair loss, dehydration, breathless-ness, hemorhage, anemia, permanent darkening of the skin, loss ofweight, fever, fatigue and sweating. All of these symptoms occuronly at high doses of radiation; with lower doses only some ofthem may occur.

Very high doses of ionizing radiation can produce symptomswithin minutes. Death may occur from short-term (acute) effectswithin about two months. Death from long-term effects,particularly leukemia, may occur several years later and othercancers may occur after very long times, of thirty or more years.

The reality of nuclear attackeyewitness accounts

8:15 a.m.atomic bomb released43 seconds later, a flashshock wave, craft careenshuge atomic cloud

9:00 a.m.cloud in sightaltitude more than 12,000 meters

Part of the flight log of the Enola Gay, the American B-29 bomberthat atom-bombed Hiroshima, August 6,1945.

The pilot's story

The Enola Gay dropped the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima froman altitude of about 7,900 meters; the bomb exploded at an altitudeof 570 meters. Paul Tibbets, the pilot of the Enola Gay, explainedthat he told his air crew that he would say, as the Enola Gayapproached Hiroshima,

"One minute out," "Thirty seconds out," "Twenty seconds,"and "Ten" and then I'd count, "Nine, eight, seven, six, five,


four seconds," which would give them time to drop theircargo (the atomic bomb). They knew what was going onbecause they knew where we were. And that's exactly theway it worked, it was absolutely perfect. We get to that pointwhere I say "one second" and by the time I'd got that secondout of my mouth the airplane had lurched, because 10,000l.b.s. (the weight of the bomb) had come out of the front. I'min this turn now, tight as I can get it, that helps me hold myaltitude and helps me hold my airspeed and everything elseall the way round. When I level out, the nose is a little bithigh and as I look up there the whole sky is lit up in the pret-tiest blues and pinks I've ever seen inmy life. It was just great.

I tell people I tasted it. "Well," theysay, "what do you mean?" When Iwas a child, if you had a cavity inyour tooth the dentist put some mix-ture of some cotton or whatever itwas and lead into your teeth andpounded them in with a hammer. Ilearned that if I had a spoon of ice-cream and touched one of those teeth I got this electrolysisand I got the taste of lead out of it. And I knew right awaywhat it was. OK, we're all going. We had been briefed to stayoff the radios: "Don't say a damn word, what we do is wemake this turn, we're going to get out of here as fast as wecan." I want to get out over the sea of Japan because I knowthey can't find me over there. With that done we're home free.

The shockwave was coming up at us after we turned. Andthe tailgunner said, "Here it comes." About the time he saidthat, we got this kick in the ass. I had accelerometers installed inall airplanes to record the magnitude of the bomb. Next day,when we got figures from the scientists on what they hadlearned from all the things, they said, "When that bombexploded, your airplane was ten and a half miles away from it."

You see all kinds of mushroom clouds, but they were madewith different types of bombs. The Hiroshima bomb did notmake a mushroom. It was what I call a stringer. It just came up.It was black as hell, and it had light and colors and white in itand grey color in it and the top was like a folded-up Christmastree.

the whole sky is lit upin the prettiest bluesand pinks I've everseen in my life

Nuclear weapons 33

A survivor's storyScientific descriptions of the effects of the explosion of a nuclearweapon over a city cannot convey the awesome power of a nuclearexplosion nearly as well as eyewitness accounts. The difference isdramatically brought home by the eloquence of the accounts ofsurvivors of the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Kataoka Osamu was a teenage schoolboy in Hiroshima whenthe bomb exploded. His moving account of his experience is instark contrast to the detached, matter-of-fact account of the pilot.

"I looked out of the window at the branch of a willow tree," heremembers.

Just at the moment I turned my eyes back into the old and darkclassroom, there was a flash. It was as if a monstrous piece ofcelluloid had flared up all at once. Even as my eyes were beingpierced by the sharp vermilion flash, the school building wasalready crumbling. I felt plaster and roof tiles and lumber comecrashing down on my head, shoulders and back. The dustysmell of the plaster and other strange smells mixed up with itpenetrated my nostrils.

I wondered how much time had passed. It had graduallybecome harder and harder for me to breathe. The smell hadbecome intense. It was the smell that made it so hard to breathe.

I was trapped under the wreckage of the school building . . .I finally managed to get out from under the wreckage andstepped out into the schoolyard. It was just as dark outside as ithad been under the wreckage and the sharp odor was every-where. I took my handkerchief, wet it, and covered my mouthwith it.

Four of my classmates came crawling out from beneath thewreckage just as I had done. In a daze we gathered around thewillow tree, which was now leaning over. Then we begansinging the school song. Our voices were low and rasping, witha tone of deep sadness. But our singing was drowned out by theroar of the swirling smoke and dust and the sound of the crum-bling buildings.

We went to the swimming pool, helping a classmate whoseleg had been injured and who had lost his eyesight. You cannotimagine what I saw there. One of our classmates had fallen intothe pool; he was already dead, his entire body burned and


Hiroshima bomb damage

tattered. Another was trying to extin-guish the flames rising from hisfriend's clothes with the blood whichspurted out of his own wounds. Somejumped into the swimming pool toextinguish their burning clothes, onlyto drown because their terribly burnedlimbs were useless. There were otherswith burns all over their bodies whosefaces were swollen to two or threetimes their normal size so they were nolonger recognizable. I cannot forget thesight of those who could not move at all, who simply looked upat the sky, saying over and over, "Damn you! Damn you!"

I cannot forget thesight of those whocould not move at all,who simply lookedup at the sky, sayingover and over, "Damnyou! Damn you!"

Nuclear weapons 35

Hiroshima victims


Nuclear terrorism

Terrorists would have to obtain suitable uranium or plutonium tofabricate a crude nuclear explosive. They are more likely toacquire plutonium than uranium because it is becoming increas-ingly available (see Chapter 7). Civil plutonium is separatedfrom spent civil nuclear-power reactor fuel in reprocessingplants, such as those operated at Sellafield, England; La Hague,France; and Chelyabinsk, Russia. Another is being constructed atRokkashomura, Japan.

A group of two or three people with appropriate skills coulddesign and fabricate a crude nuclear explosive. It is a soberingfact that the fabrication of a primitive nuclear explosive usingplutonium or suitable uranium would require no greater skillthan that required for the production and use of the nerve agentproduced by the AUM group and released in the Tokyo under-ground.

A crude nuclear explosive designed and built by terrorists couldwell explode with a power equivalent to that of 100 tons of TNT.For comparison, the largest conventional bombs used in warfareso far had explosive powers equivalent to about 10 tons of TNT.The terrorist bomb set off at the World Trade Center in 1993 had anexplosive power equivalent to that of about a ton of TNT, the onethat destroyed the Murrah building in Oklahoma in 1995 that ofabout 2 tons of TNT, and the one that destroyed the Al KhobarTowers building near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996 that of about4 tons of TNT. The size of the Dhahran bomb surprised andshocked American security officials.

A nuclear explosion equivalent to that of 100 tons of TNT in anurban area would be a catastrophic event, with which the emer-gency services would be unable to cope effectively. Exploded on ornear the ground, it would produce a crater, in dry soil or dry softrock, about 30 meters across. The area of lethal damage from theblast would be roughly 0.4 square kilometers; the lethal area forheat would be about 0.1 square kilometers.

Nuclear weapons 37

The direct effects of radiation, blast or heat would very prob-ably kill people in the open within 600 meters of the explosion.Many other deaths would occur, particularly from indirect blasteffects such as the collapse of buildings.

Heat and blast will cause fires, from broken gas pipes, gasolinein cars, and so on. The area and extent of damage from fires maywell exceed those from the direct effects of heat.

The area significantly contaminated with radioactive falloutwill be uninhabitable until decontaminated. It may be manysquare kilometers and it is likely to take a long time to decontam-inate it to a level sufficiently free of radioactivity to be acceptableto the public.

An explosion of this size, involving many hundreds of deathsand injuries, would paralyze the emergency services. They wouldfind it difficult even to deal effectively with the dead. Many, if notmost, of the seriously injured would die from lack of medical care.In the UK, for example, there are only a few hundred burn beds inthe whole country.

There would be considerable delays in releasing injuredpeople trapped in buildings. And, even for those not trapped, itwould take a significant time to get ambulances through to themand then to transport them to the hospital. A high proportion ofthe seriously injured would not get medical attention in time tosave them. This scenario of a nuclearterrorist attack would put a far greaterstrain on the emergency services thandid the attack on New York onSeptember 11,2001.

The simplest and most primitiveterrorist nuclear device would be a radi-ological weapon or radiological dispersaldevice, commonly called a "dirtybomb". It is not strictly speaking anuclear weapon, as it does not involve anuclear explosion. A dirty bomb would

There are literallymillions of radioactivesources usedworldwide inmedicine, industryand agriculture;many of them couldbe used to fabricatea dirty bomb


consist of a conventional high explosivefor example, Semtex,dynamite or TNTand a quantity of a radioactive material.Incendiary material, such as thermite, is likely to be put into a dirtybomb to produce a fierce fire when the bomb is set off. The radioac-tivity would be taken up into the atmosphere by the fireball andwould then be blown downwind.

There are literally millions of radioactive sources used world-wide in medicine, industry, and agriculture; few of them are keptsecurely and many of them could be used to fabricate a dirtybomb. The most likely to be used are those that are relatively easilyavailable, have a relatively long half-life, of several months oryears, and emit energetic gamma radiation; suitable candidatesinclude caesium-137, cobalt-60, and strontium-90.

Clearly, the lack of security on radioactive materials around theworld is a major cause for concern; even in the United States andEurope, where security is comparatively strong, there are thou-sands of instances of radioactive sources that have been lost orstolen over the years. Their present whereabouts are unknown.

Effects of a radiological weapon

The detonation of a dirty bomb is unlikely to cause a large numberof casualties. Generally, any immediate deaths or serious injurieswould most likely be caused by the detonation of the conventionalexplosive. The radioactive material in the bomb would be dis-persed into the air but would soon be diluted to relatively lowconcentrations.

If the bomb were exploded in a city, as it almost certainly wouldbe, some people would probably be exposed to a dose of radiation.But in most cases the dose would probably be relatively small. Alow-level exposure to radiation would slightly increase the long-term risk of cancer.

The main potential impact of a dirty bomb is psychologicalitwould cause considerable fear, panic, and social disruption,

Nuclear weapons 39

exactly the effects terrorists wish to achieve. The public fear ofradiation is very great indeed, some say irrationally or dispropor-tionately so.

The radioactive area would have to be evacuated as quickly aspossible, to prevent people becoming contaminated, and wouldthen have to be decontaminated. The degree of contaminationwould depend on the amounts of high explosive and incendiarymaterial used, the amount and type of radioisotope in the bomb,whether it was exploded inside a building or outside, and theweather conditions. Decontamination is likely to be very costly(costing millions of dollars) and take weeks or, most likely, manymonths to complete. Radioactive contamination is the most threat-ening aspect of a dirty bomb.

2 Biological weapons

What is a biological weapon?

Biological weapons spread disease deliberately in human popula-tions, when people are exposed to infectious microorganisms or tothe toxins they produce. They may also affect animals and plants.Biological weapons can be much more lethal than chemicalweapons but are less so than the most powerful nuclear weapons.

According to an official American study, about 30 kilogramsof anthrax spores could kill more people than the nuclearweapon that destroyed Hiroshima (equivalent to 12,500 tons ofTNT). An estimate of the number of fatalities from the nuclearweapon would be between 23,000 and 80,000 people, whereasthe anthrax could kill between 30,000 and 100,000.

Biological weapons are by no means new. The use of human oranimal corpses to befoul wells is the most ancient use of biologicalwarfare, instances of which are recorded in early Persian, Greek,and Roman literature. Examples of the use of corpses to contami-nate drinking water occur up to the twentieth century in Europeanwars, the American Civil War, and the South African Boer War.

In 1346, the town of Feodosia, in the Crimea, a Genoese tradingoutpost, was withstanding a siege by a Tartar army. When thebesieging Tartars were struck by a plague epidemic they cata-pulted their plague victims into the town where the diseaserapidly spread. The survivors were forced to flee back to Italy by


sea, taking the plague with them. In 1710, in the battle againstSwedish troops in Reval, the Russian besiegers threw bodies ofplague victims over the city walls, causing an epidemic, and in1763, the British killed North American Indians by making thempresents of hospital blankets taken from smallpox patients. Twohostile Indian tribes were given two blankets and a handkerchieftaken from the smallpox hospital. The stratagem worked only toowell. Within a few months, smallpox was prevalent among thevarious Indian tribes in the Ohio region and these peoples weredecimated. But the ruse backfired: the Americans also used small-pox against the British during the Revolutionary War.

Despite these historical precedents, biological weapons have notbeen used to any significant extent in modern times. The Britishactively considered using anthrax against Germany in the SecondWorld War, but both then and since, fear of retaliation has pre-vented countries from engaging in biological warfare.

What are biological-warfare agents?

There are four types of biological-warfare agents, all disease-carryingsubstances (toxins) or else microorganismsbacteria, viruses, rick-ettsiae, and fungi. Bacteria, single-cell microorganisms, cause suchdiseases as anthrax, cholera, pneumonic plague, and typhoid. Theyproduce illnesses by invading tissues and/or by producing poison-ous toxins including botulinum, ricin, tetanus, and diphtheria.

Viruses, the simplest form of organisms, cause diseases such asEbola, AIDS, flu, polio, and smallpox. They cannot live independ-ently and must, therefore, invade living cells to reproduce andgrow.

Rickettsiae are microorganisms, intermediate between bacteriaand viruses, found in the tissues of lice, ticks, and fleas, and cancause diseases such as typhus, Q-fever, and Rocky Mountain spot-ted fever when transmitted to humans. Fungi, more complexorganisms than bacteria, reproduce by forming spores and causediseases like coccidiomycosis.

Biological weapons 43

Microorganisms such as those produced by Clostridium botu-linum, which causes botulism, produce toxins. Whereas bacteriaand viruses can spread disease through a population by contactbetween humans, toxins cannot.

There are a bewildering number of possible biological-warfareagents. The ones most likely to be deployed are: anthrax, outlinetoxin, smallpox, and ricin. Iraq, for example, had produced by1991 significant quantities of anthrax and of botulinum toxin. AnyIraqi biological weapons found by UNSCOM, the United Nationsteams of inspectors, were destroyed. The inspectors left Iraq inDecember 1998 and returned in 2002.

Anthrax

Inhalation anthrax, the type of the disease most likely to be used inbiological warfare, occurs when bacteria Bacillus anthracis arebreathed into the lungs. The disease isusually not diagnosed in time for treat-ment and the mortality rate is typicallyabout 95 percent. The first symptoms ofinhalation anthrax are nonspecific,including fever, malaise, and fatigue,sometimes with a dry hacking cough.After these symptoms occur, treatmentcannot help. After about three days,severe respiratory distress occurs anddeath usually follows within thirty-sixhours.

Anthrax is a preferred biological-warfare agent of states suchas Iraq because it is highly lethal, it is easily produced in largequantities at low cost, it is very stable and can be stored for avery long period as a dry powder, and it is relatively easy to dis-perse as an aerosol with crude sprayers. For the same reasons,anthrax is also likely to be the preferred biological agent forterrorists.

Anthrax is apreferred biological-warfare agentbecause it is highlylethal, it is very stableand it is relativelyeasy to disperse


Botulinum toxin

Botulinum toxin is extremely toxic. Symptoms of inhalation botu-lism may begin within thirty-six hours after exposure or they maybe delayed for several days. The first symptoms include generalweakness, dizziness, extreme dryness of the mouth and throat,the retention of urine, blurred vision and sensitivity to light.Respiratory failure caused by paralysis of respiratory muscles isgenerally the cause of death. Fatalities may be limited to no morethan 5 percent with effective treatment but intensive and pro-longed nursing car

Documents

How to Build a Nuclear Bomb Nation Books [2004] Barnaby