How is the Rise of Suicide Terrorism in Contemporary

World Politics Best Accounted for?

By David Reichert

Post Cold War World Order

Fall 2010

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Introduction

On the cool, crisp morning of September 11, 2001, 19 men boarded 4 passenger planes

on the east coast of the United States. After they took off, two planes were flown into the twin

towers of the World Trade Center in New York, one crashed into the Pentagon in Washington

D.C., and one was crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania. The terrorist organization headed by

Osama Bin Laden known as Al-Qaeda (the base) had in a single stroke brought the threat of

terrorism to the doorstep of the most powerful nation-state in the world. It had a profound effect.

America’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons, its physical distance from major conflicts, and

protection by oceans, no longer provided it with sufficient national security. It was

incomprehensible that in a matter of hours a few men with resolute will could turn civilian

aircraft into the largest suicide bombs to date. They had invented human smart bombs. This act

caused millions of Americans to finally experience on a large scale the phenomenon that the

inhabitants of the historically blood soaked sands of the Middle East and other cultures have

endured throughout history— suicide terrorism. Americans immediately began to wonder what

causes people to do this and why us? Does it matter that these men who hijacked planes on 9-11

were Muslims? Or is this behavior a rational tactical response to strong state powers?

Indeed, the most prominent threat facing international society following the end of the

Cold War is transnational terrorism. Policymakers, military experts, and intelligence agencies all

continue to struggle for solutions to the complex security problems terrorist threats pose to states.

This paper will explore the primary reasons for the rise in suicide terrorism. First, a working

definition of terrorism must be established. The lack of consensus on a working definition of

terrorism to a large degree makes it difficult to provide objective analyses and policy

prescriptions to address it. Two main arguments will be explored. First, it is necessary to

consider the degree to which culture and religious motivations have contributed to the rise in

terrorism. I draw on Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis to examine this point of

view. Second, I look at the argument that supports suicide terrorism being a rational strategy

persisting throughout history as a means for waging warfare against stronger, more powerful

enemies. Robert Pape’s research is an instructive framework to argue in favor of this position.

Evidence is strong on both sides of this debate. While recent increases in suicide terrorist attacks

appear to be caused by groups that embody elements of extreme religious doctrines and

differences in cultural values, particularly Islamic terrorism, I will conclude that suicide terrorism

and similar acts have been conducted throughout history and are rational strategies and effective

tactics when facing states with overwhelming military power.

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Defining Terrorism

It is quite fascinating that each of the 16 intelligence agencies in the U.S. has its own

definition of terrorism. The United Nations, foreign intelligence agencies such as Mossad and

MI-5, and other foreign governments have different definitions of terrorism. It may be that

different values are in play. After all, the old axiom ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s

freedom fighter’ may be more accurate today than ever. It is true that in different parts of the

world acts of aggression are viewed by states, cultures, and other actors differently. But for the

purposes of this paper, and to have any hope of determining root causes of terrorism, a working

definition is paramount.

Instead of trying to pick among the various agencies’ and nations’ definitions of

terrorism, the following is an all-encompassing and useful definition. Terrorism is:

• ineluctably political in aims and motives;

• violent – or; equally important, threatens violence;

• designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;

• conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell

structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small

collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or

example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and

• perpetuated by a substantial group or non-state entity.

Bruce Hoffman’s definition1

Suicide terrorism adds a critical dimension to this definition. It draws on fear and the

psychological aspects noted above, thus establishing the key element of credibility. The act

demonstrates that the bombers are willing to cross a line that most individuals are not, in order to

send their message. Suicide bombers come from all walks of life and are not rooted only in

poverty as some assume. In many cases they are well educated and well financed, a point I will

return to later. Secular-nationalist groups primarily conducted acts of terrorism in the 1970’s and

80’s, but since the end of the Cold War it has been used predominantly by religious

fundamentalist groups, primarily those rooted in Islam. I now turn to the main focus of this

report— how best to account for the rise in suicide terrorism internationally?

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Religious Fundamentalism and Cultural Values

Contemporary terrorism is typically characterized as Islamic suicide terrorism. By

studying suicide bombings from a narrow scope during the period 2001 - 2005, these forms of

attacks have accounted for 78 percent of all terrorist incidents since 1968.2 Of the 35 terrorist

organizations, 86% (or 31 of these groups) were Islamic. This poses the question: are cultural

and religious values the cause of these attacks? Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’

thesis poses a strong case that these values are indeed a significant factor. I will explore the

historical transition of these values and how current suicide terrorists hold deeply embedded

beliefs that might cause their seemingly irrational behavior.

Huntington, writing this thesis in 1993, was prophetic. He hypothesizes that in the future

“The great divisions of humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” 3 He

believed that cultural conflict would prevail in world politics in the future rather than territorial

power and material strength. His view of the future was a world marked by cultural

fragmentation. He divided the world into discreet blocs and noted that religion is the key definer.

Most importantly, people will self-identify with a religion. Proponents of this argument cite that

this is why suicide bombers make tapes of themselves. Huntington further contends that future

conflicts will be primarily between Confucian civilizations (Asia) versus the West, and Islam

versus the West. It is clear there is growing tension with Asian states and the West. The

oppressive North Korea regime is overtly defying the U.S. and their allies’ wishes by moving to

obtain nuclear weapons to balance against them. While China and the U.S. have growing

tensions between them, thus far they remain willing to conduct their interactions through

diplomatic statecraft, largely due to active trade and mutual economic reliance. Worries about

trade-related issues such as disputes over currency valuations persist. As Asian conflicts have yet

to result in notable aggressive acts, I will focus primarily on conflict between Islam and the West,

insofar as conflicts between these two cultures have already proven to be violent.

When there is a lack of order in a state, a power vacuum exists that needs to be filled. In

many cases, radical, religious fundamentalist groups fill these vacuums. These groups meet many

societal and social needs, including the provision of medical and hospital services, kindergarten

and schools, care for the elderly, prompt relief after natural and other catastrophes, and welfare

and social support during periods of economic deprivation.4 Nowhere is this more noticeable

today than in several Islamic states throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa.

Huntington suggests that while Asian countries will seek the path of economic growth to

balance against the west, Muslims will have an “Islamic Resurgence”. They will turn towards

religion as a source of power, development, and legitimacy. This resurgence is the notion of

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willingness to accept modernization, but to reject Western culture. Throughout the political

resurgence of Islam its people are major participants in the products and processes of

modernization. There are several key groups that are involved. The core elements consisted of

students and intellectuals beginning in the 1970s in Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, mainly at

technical universities, who were increasingly exposed to Islamist influence. They shared five

characteristics: they were 20-30 year olds, 80 percent university students or graduates, over 50

percent came from elite universities, over 70 percent came from the lower middle-class, and were

the first generation in their families to receive higher education. This group filled the militant

portion of fundamentalist groups. In fundamentalist groups the bulk of active membership

included doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, teachers, and civil servants.5

Is there an inherently violent component to Islam? According to Huntington there are six

possible causes of Muslim conflict propensity. Three explain conflict between Muslim and non-

Muslims and three causes contribute to both intra- and extra-Muslim conflicts. First, the Muslim

religion is steeped in a tradition of dungeon, fire, and sword. Throughout the Koran, military

virtues are glorified (martyrdom here is key), there is a deep tradition of warring nomadic tribes,

and the Muslim prophet Muhammad was himself a great military commander. Second, the

spread of Islam from Arabia to North Africa, the Middle East, central Asia and Balkans brought

this religion in close proximity, by which force of conquest contributed to conversions. These

historic conflicts resurface today as evidenced in Kosovo by Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. A

third source of extra-Muslim conflict is the exclusivity of Islam; Muslim majorities have

problems with non-Muslim minorities. It is an absolutist faith combining politics and religion.

Islam draws a sharp line between countries where Muslims can practice their religion freely and

those where Islamic law is not in force. The fourth cause (extra-Muslim conflict) is the notion of

victim status— the idea that Muslims have been subjugated by Western imperialism and viewed

as militarily and economically weak. Fifth, Islam lacks a centralized core state, which results in

political instability within Muslim states. Finally, there has been a demographic explosion in

Muslim societies, which contributes to a large number of unemployed males between the ages of

15 and 30, which has emerged as a source of violence and instability.

Table 10.4 Possible Causes of Muslim Conflict Propensity______________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ Extra-Muslim conflict Intra- and Extra-Muslim conflict_________ Historical and contemporary conflict Proximity Militarism Indigestibility

Contemporary conflict Victim Status Demographic bulge

________________________________________________________________________Core state absence_____________________

Huntington6

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The above causes are evidenced in the growth of conflicts along the major fault lines between

Muslims and others at the micro level, taking place along the border looping across Eurasia and

Africa that separates Muslims and non-Muslims. Huntington appears to be right to some degree

that “Islam has bloody borders.” 7

A brief history of extreme Islamic doctrine is instructive. It is within the Sunni tradition

that the al-Sauds who eventually conquered the area known today as Saudi Arabia merged with

an 18th century martial desert preacher, Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. Abdul Aziz embraced

Wahhabi doctrine during his rule 1765-1803. He banned alcohol, tobacco, embroidered silk,

gambling, fortune telling, and magic. Aziz sponsored a new, fierce, semi-independent vanguard

of Ikhwan, or Brothers, war-fighting believers who dressed in distinctive white turbans and

trimmed their beards and mustaches to express Islamic solidarity.8 These fighters ensured this

doctrine was followed by forcing it upon many subjects under Aziz’s rule. Furthermore, the

doctrine embodies a strict Islamic code and denounces idol worshiping, music, art, and imposes a

strict code of conduct on women’s dress and behavior in public. The doctrine promotes severe

punishments for these offenses, such as stoning and hanging. This extremist Islam became the

dominant doctrine of Saudi Arabia after the oil boom in the 1970s.9

The first major event that truly propelled the Islamic resurgence was the overthrowing of

the Shah in Iran in 1979. The Saudi’s intelligence agency (GID) and the U.S. Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) feared the Saudi royal family would be next, following a plot to seize Mecca. The

revolt in Iran would signal a spread of the revolution to Saudi Arabia as it is home to some of

Islam’s holiest sites including Mecca, Medina, and Jedda. When the Soviets invaded

Afghanistan, Prince Turki, head of the GID, coordinated with Pakistan’s President Zia. Turki and

the CIA agreed to match funding to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in 1980. More of a mystery

was the massive number of Saudis flocking to join the Afghan Jihad (struggle) against the

Soviets. One of these young Mujahedeen warriors was Osama Bin Laden.

The second major driving force inspiring Islamic resurgence was the U.S. and their allies’

presence in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War in 1991. One of the main reasons Bin Laden left

Saudi Arabia was the Royal family’s continued relationship with the West. Bin Laden and his

followers were outraged at this because of the religious significance of Saudi Arabia and its holy

sites. They view the Western presence as deeply offensive. He and his followers returned to

Afghanistan and were accepted by another Islamic fundamental regime, the Taliban (‘students’),

who shared his outrage towards Western states’ proximity to their sacred lands. With his wealth

Bin Laden has helped the spread of his militant beliefs by building Madrassas (Islamic theology

schools) to educate young students, primarily in the strict Wahhabi doctrine. These schools draw

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on deep traditional beliefs embedded in history and legend, including violent acts against

Muslims by Christians during the Crusades. Through this spread of Islamic beliefs Bin Laden

helped build a seemingly unending army of militant warriors who believed, through these

teachings, that by martyring themselves in the name of their religion they would compel the

Western infidels (non-believers) to leave heir lands.

Andrew McCarthy of the National Review Institute argues that this extreme doctrine of

Islam is not new. He explains several parts of the Koran that are interpreted by Wahhabism to

promote self-sacrifice, martyrdom, and extreme violence are acceptable and rewarded in

spreading the Islamic faith. Many of these violent adaptations of the Koran have deep roots and

are fourteen centuries old. He posits that there is a sizable minority that holds these beliefs. In a

Muslim world with over 1.4 billion in population, even if that number is 20 percent (McCarthy

estimates this as low), it represents over 250 million people.10 If true, this presents a notable

threat and a strong case that culture and more specifically religion is a significant cause of the

violence and beliefs that suicide bombers hold. Furthermore, they have self-determined this.

Currently, the largest suicide attack remains the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center

and the Pentagon. The U.S. is the sole military super-power in the world, making it the biggest

and most likely target. So far, attacks upon other Western states such as the U.K. and Spain

remain limited. Should they be attacked with the same severity as the U.S. it would likely prove

Huntington’s arguments even more convincing.

The Effectiveness of the Strategy

Causes the Rise in Suicide Terrorism

One must wonder if culture, specifically religion, is the main cause of the rise in suicide

terrorism. Robert Pape says no. A common suicide bomber profile may not exist. By

broadening the scope of incidents, his framework and research provides the central argument that

counters Huntington. Pape argues that just as air power and economic sanctions are tools for

coercion by states, suicide terrorism is a rational and calculated strategy for terrorist actors.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and eventual defeat by the U.S. and their allies in 1991 proved that in

the post-cold war era challenging major western powers by conventional means is not a winning

strategy. Terrorism throughout history has been a successful tactic by the weaker side. Suicide

attacks have one strategic goal in common: to compel democracies to withdraw military forces

from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.11 Religion is a factor, but it is

ultimately a recruiting tool for terrorists. Pape’s evidence included a study of 315 suicide attacks

from 1980-2003 (Table 1). The leading terrorist group was the Tamil Tigers based in Sri Lanka,

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who are a Marxist-Leninist group. Even though their founders are Hindu based, they are very

opposed to religion. They committed 76 of these incidents. This surpasses both Hamas and

Islamic Jihad. 301 of these were part of an organized political or military campaign.

Democracies are uniquely vulnerable to these attacks. All 18 groups in the study had one

overarching aim— seeking to establish or maintain political self-determination. Pape notes that

the suicide terrorism rate has increased from 31 in the 1980s, to 104 in the 1990s, and 53 in 2000-

2001. During this time the total number of terrorist attacks has fallen from 666 in 1987 to 274 in

1998, with 348 in 2001 (The figures are from the Department of State, 2001).

Table 1. Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980-2003

Completed Campaigns

Date Terrorist Group Terrorist Goal Attacked/Killed Target Behavior

1 Apr-Dec 1983 Hezbollah US/France Out of Lebanon 5 / 393 Total Withdrawal

2 Nov 82-Apr 82 Hezbollah Israel Out, Lebanon 11 / 197 Partial Withdrawal

3 Jun 85-Jun 86 Hezbollah Israel Out, Leb sec. zone 20 / 156 No Change

4 Jul 90-Nov 94 LTTE (Tamil

Tigers) Sri Lanka accept Tamil State 14 /164 Negotiations

5 Apr 95-Oct 00 LTTE Sri Lanka accept Tamil State 54 / 629 No Change

6 Apr-94 Hamas Israel Out, Palestine 2/15 Partial Withdrawal, Gaza

7 Oct 94-Aug 95 Hamas Retaliation, Israel Assassination 11 / 65 Partial Withdrawal, West Bank

8 Feb-Mar 96 Hamas Israel Out, Palestine 4 / 58 No Change

9 Mar-Sept 97 Hamas Israel Out, Palestine 3 / 24 Top leader released

10 Jun-Oct 96 PKK Turkey Accept Kurd autonomy 3 / 16 No Change

11 Mar-Aug 99 PKK Turkey free leader 11 / 6 No Change

12 2001 LTTE Sri Lanka accept Tamil State 6 / 51 Granted Autonomy

Ongoing Campaigns

13 1996- Al-Qaeda US out, Arabian Peninsula 21 / 3661 TBD

14 2000- Chechens Russia out, Chechnya 19 / 362 TBD

15 2000- Kashmir Rebels India out, Kashmir 5 / 61 TBD

16 2000- Several Israel Out, Palestine 92 / 515 TBD

17 2003- Iraqi Rebels US out, Iraq 20 / 262 TBD

Total Incidents = 315 # in campaigns = 301 # isolated = 14

Source Pape, Blowing Up an Assumption, NY Times, from his research at University of Chicago

There are five main principles in examining the strategic logic of suicide terrorism. First,

as mentioned above, is strategic. The attacks are generally part of a larger campaign and usually

stop once the objectives are reached. Second, they are designed to coerce democracies to make

concessions to national self-determination. This is why al-Qaeda wants the U.S. to leave the

Middle East. Third, terrorists have discovered that suicide attacks have paid off. They forced

American forces from Lebanon in 1983 and Israeli forces in 1985. Fourth, even though moderate

attacks lead to some concessions, it does not change a nation’s willingness to trade high interests

for high costs due to its relatively limited scope of punishment. America retaliated aggressively

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against al-Qaeda in the wake of the 9-11 attacks. Finally, reducing terrorists’ confidence is the

most effective way to contain these attacks. Investing significant resources in border defenses

and homeland security is the best policy prescription.12

The coercive logic of suicide terrorism is that the strategy aims to compel a target

government to change policies by inflicting enough pain and punishment to that society to either

force the government to change the policies or induce their population to revolt against that

government. The coercive nature of suicide terrorism as a strategy of a weak actor relies on

leveraging the future expectation of damage. A suicide bomber’s willingness to die amplifies the

effect of this punishment and generally inflicts more damage than other types of terrorist attack.

Such attacks are a very convincing way to signal the future likelihood of attack. Terrorist groups

that rely on these tactics are better positioned than other terrorist groups to increase the

expectations about escalating future costs because they intentionally violate the norms in the use

of violence by crossing thresholds of damage, pushing the envelope on what is considered a

legitimate target, and it helps broaden recruitment.

Bruce Hoffman has argued that the September 11th attacks are instructive in

understanding why suicide terrorism is a logical strategy. First, the 19 hijackers were all prepared

to martyr themselves. Rather than a cause for a rise in terrorism, it demonstrates the usefulness of

religion as being a key recruiting tool for terrorism groups like al-Qaeda. The plan itself was well

designed and highly technical in having the hijackers turn passenger airliners into missiles they

could control as potent suicide weapons. Third, these attacks are relatively inexpensive for

terrorist groups and have arguably contributed to America’s economic woes. It is estimated that

al-Qaeda spent $400,000 - $500,000 on the attacks. At the same time, the U.S. budget deficit has

skyrocketed since 2001, largely driven by defense spending linked to the global war on terror.

Fourth, this attack was extremely destructive. Fifth, the 9-11 attacks had a powerful

psychological impact on the American populace. It did what terrorism strategies are meant to

do— inspire fear. Finally, the media coverage that followed could not have been better for al-

Qaeda. It only helped to spread the impact and message of the disaster worldwide.

There are 8 key factors explaining the utility of suicide terrorism.13

1. Suicide attacks are more lethal than their conventional counterparts

2. They are highly effective in gaining the spotlight and international attention.

3. In enabling social circumstances, suicide attacks build solidarity with one’s political base.

4. They can deflect or reduce the possibility of backlash over civilian casualties.

5. Suicide attacks can be “auto-propaganda” motivating a group’s internal membership.

6. Can be used to gain competitive advantage over other rival terrorist groups.

7. As noted above, suicide operations are cheap.

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8. It is sometimes rational to appear irrational.

Joseph Nye has also argued that terrorism is not new. He points out that its roots date

back throughout history. Terror (Great Fear) was an instrument used historically by several

governments. The first French Republic (1792-1804) and Stalin’s Soviet Union used it to control

their populations. It has been used by revolutionaries in the 19th century and killed half a dozen

heads of state. Nye argues that a chief causal aspect of the rise of terrorism is that technology has

made the complex systems of modern societies more vulnerable. Islamic terrorists use the

Internet to spread their message. A key point Nye raises is that this advancement in technology is

making physical borders less relevant in protecting state security today. The technology of

miniaturization of explosives, vulnerability of modern systems such as air travel, and increasing

ease of communication via the Internet enable non-state actors to do great harm across borders.

Nye adds that terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s was largely driven by nationalism. The groups

were either left-wing, right-wing, nationalist-separatists, and had some compunctions about

killing innocent people— which appears less prevalent among terrorists today. This lack of

distinction between civilians and combatants makes today’s terrorists capable of more destructive

power.14

Conclusion

It is true that some of the suicide terrorists groups operating today are characterized by

their Islamic fundamentalism. Islam vs. the West and Asia vs. the West have been seen as the

major tensions and conflicts in the post Cold War era. Islamic fundamentalists attempt to control

key strategic locations in the Middle East and Central Asia. This is significant as they fill power

vacuums left by weak centralized governments and regimes. Massive corruption and tribal

disagreements have endured throughout the history of these civilizations. They have resurfaced

on a sizeable scale. The explosion of Muslim populations and their ties to historically violent

settlement of disagreements have created great political instability, authoritarian rule, and large-

scale poverty throughout these lands. Many of these countries and their governments have rich

supplies of oil; and since they control this vital commodity and are compensated handsomely by

other nations, they have no need to develop resources and institutions for these societies. As a

result, extremist Muslim groups fill a societal need. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other groups step

in to fill these needs. Furthermore, the West has become entrenched in these areas due to several

conflicts over the years and has close ties with Saudi Arabia and their rich oil suppliers. They

have also remained allied and heavily fund the states of Israel and Turkey. The deeply embedded

beliefs and traditions have mobilized and contributed to the rise in Muslim conflict propensity

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both among their own peoples and with non-Muslims. However, religious beliefs are not a root

cause of increases in suicide terrorism.

While it is true that religious fundamentalism impels many of today’s terrorist actors,

specifically groups using suicide tactics, this has been the dominant, rational strategy of weak

actors against powerful states. Assassins were probably the closest thing to suicide bombers

historically as they were willing to die (and often did) to carry out their missions. Ismali

Assassins killed for political purposes during the medieval Crusades. It is worth noting that even

though they were Muslims, they sold their services just as often to the Christian armies as to

Muslims. In fact, they tried to kill Saladin, the Muslim military leader at the time. Throughout

history, similar groups operated in feudal Japan, China, medieval Europe, Rome, and ancient

Greece.

Robert Pape’s evidence and logic of suicide terrorism is convincing. Recent trends

demonstrate that 76 of 315 of suicide attacks have been carried out by the Marxist-Leninist Tamil

Tigers. Other secular and non-Muslim based terror groups carried out over one third of the

attacks. Suicide attacks inflict punishment and establish credibility, signaling further attacks to

come. Moreover, it pays. Low cost and high rewards are among its defining attributes. It aims

to achieve moderate concessions from larger, more powerful adversaries. Furthermore, the U.S.

has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. Its overwhelming, conventional military power in 2003

during the invasion of Iraq clearly demonstrates that the reality on the ground makes challenging

them, even at the state level, irrational. They spend nearly $700 billion on defense annually. The

next closest nation is China, with $98 billion (Figures from Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute). Fighting powerful military states head on is unlikely to be successful for

these groups. Moreover, retaliation against suicide terrorists is problematic. One cannot launch a

nuclear weapon at al-Qaeda and risk harming millions of innocent people. As long as diplomatic

policies and conventional and clandestine military strategies fail to eliminate these threats, suicide

terrorism will continue to be used by a wide spectrum of terrorist organizations and not just those

with extreme religious beliefs. In sum, suicide terrorism is a viable strategy to combat the might

of the U.S. and other Western military powers. The strategy's effectiveness supported by

technological advances has caused the rise suicide terrorism in the post Cold War era, and not

cultural and religious beliefs per se. If history is any indication, long-term solutions to combat

suicide terrorism and similar acts will remain elusive.

Notes

1. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 40. 2. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 131. 3. Huntington, S. “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, p.22 4. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 98 5. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 112-114 6. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 263 7. Huntington, S. “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, p.35 8. Coll, S., Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the

Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, p.76 9. Rashid, Taliban, p. 85 10. Gottlieb, S., Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Andrew McCarthy’s essay ‘Islam

has a Unique Impact on Modern Terrorism, p115 11. Pape, R., Blowing Up an Assumption, p. 1 12. Pape, R., The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, p. 344 13. Gottlieb, S., Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: ‘Suicide Terrorism is a Pragmatic

Choice’, pp. 139-143 14. Nye, J., Understanding International Conflicts, pp. 247-249.

Bibliography

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