How China Will Change the Way We Think: The Case of the State

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p a p e r s e r i e s

HOW CHINA WILL CHANGE

THE WAY WE THINK:

THE CASE OF THE STATE

Martin Jacques Bosch Public Policy Fellow, Transatlantic Academy



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How China Will Change the Way We Think:The Case of the State

Transatlantic Academy Paper Series

February 2011

M Jq*Bosch Public Policy Fellow, Transatlantic Academy

*M Jq B P P F T A Nv F . H B When China Rules the World . H v LS E, IDEAS, , , v LSE’ A R C. H v T Uv, Bj.






1

T he relationship

between the

state and society

in China is very

different from th

in the West. And

the consequence

are profound.

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Transatlantic Academy2

It is clear that

the legitimacy

of the Chinese

state could hardly

be more deeply-

rooted. It is at

least 2,000 years

old, in some

respects older.

And its role, as far

as the Chinese are

concerned, could

not conceivably be

more important.

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1 F xp, Dv Sbu (), T M CS (Cb: Ru, 2000), pp. 2, 182.




3

It would be

extremely short-

sighted if we trie

to understand

the contemporar

Chinese state

and its likely pat

of development

through a

Western prism.

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3 G Xu, “S- p C: H b ?”,EAP/ B, W B, p 19 Ju 2010.

4 G D R MG, “C’ Cp: W S Op N L Pv D H,” FT, 16 M 2008.




It is important

to emphasize

that the Chinese

state itself is a

highly dynamic

institution, which

is subject to a

constant process

of reform and

restructuring.

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5 Dv Sbu (), T M C S, pp. 167,174-81.

6 B Nu, “C’ Dv S: b ?”, Ju Cp C (2010), 19(65),Ju, pp. 452-57.

7 Ib, pp. 445, 447-8.




5

There has been

considerable

discussion in

the last few

years about the

notion of a so-

called “Beijing

Consensus,” an

idea, it should be

noted, that the

Chinese have no

themselves ever

used or shown

much interest in.

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The combination

of the hobbled

and debilitated

Western state and

China’s success

will lead to a

growing debate

about what we

might learn from

the Chinese state.

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7

The difficulty with

the concept of

hard and soft

power is that it

treats power as

fragmented and

disconnected

rather than

recognizing

its organic

and ultimately

unified nature.

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The world now

increasingly

looks to China

when it comes

to imagining its

infrastructural

future.

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9

Without any doub

in time China wil

come to exercise

huge soft power,

not least in areas

that are basic to

the future of our

own societies

in the West.

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How China Will Change the Way We Think: The Case of the State