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In Response to the Queensland Government’s Housing Discussion Paper: ‘Working Together for Better Housing and Sustainable Communities’
By The Gabba Ward Housing Policy Collective June 2016
Housing for All A housing strategy for the needs of people, rather than the demands of
profit
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Table of Contents
Housing for All .................................................................................................................................................... 0
i. The Gabba Ward Housing Collective .............................................................................................................. 3
ii. Our Guiding Principles .................................................................................................................................... 3
1. Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Making renting safe, sustainable and secure ................................................................................................ 5
Our Plan ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
How will this work? .................................................................................................................................... 5
Ideas to explore further ............................................................................................................................. 5
How will it work? All public housing developments will be allocated via our proposed 50/50 model ... 6
Redefining Public & Social Housing ............................................................................................................... 6
Our Plan ..................................................................................................................................................... 6
How is it paid for? ...................................................................................................................................... 6
2. Redefining Public & Social Housing ............................................................................................................... 7
The Failing System and Market ...................................................................................................................... 8
Details and Costings ..................................................................................................................................... 10
Eligibility Framework................................................................................................................................ 10
Rent Calculations ..................................................................................................................................... 10
Financing .................................................................................................................................................. 11
Inclusionary Zoning .................................................................................................................................. 12
3. Making renting safe, sustainable and secure .............................................................................................. 14
Brief background notes ................................................................................................................................ 14
The Need for a Less Bureaucratic Rental System .................................................................................... 14
Sharehousing ........................................................................................................................................... 15
Reforming Rental Legislation ....................................................................................................................... 15
Long-Term Security of Tenure is a Necessary Precondition for Ensuring Other Renters’ Rights ............ 15
The Cost of Moving .................................................................................................................................. 17
Understanding the Power Imbalance Between Landlords and Tenants ................................................. 17
Limiting the Frequency of Rent Increases to Reduce Exploitation and Improve Stability ...................... 18
Ideas to explore further ............................................................................................................................... 20
Rent controls and caps - do they work, and should they be implemented? ........................................... 20
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Scrapping Proof of Income Requirements ............................................................................................... 22
Large Share-households Should Not Be Illegal ........................................................................................ 23
No Eviction Into Homelessness from Public Housing .............................................................................. 24
No Eviction Into Homelessness from Private Rentals .............................................................................. 25
4. Broad Recommendations and Topics for Further Investigation .................................................................. 26
Housing for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples .......................................................................... 26
Homelessness .............................................................................................................................................. 27
5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 28
Appendix A- Costings ....................................................................................................................................... 29
Public Housing Strategy - Projected rental revenue for the first year .................................................... 29
Affordable Housing Scheme - Projected revenue for first year of the .................................................... 30
Projected 15 year revenue from Public housing proposal ...................................................................... 32
Appendix B- Diagram ....................................................................................................................................... 33
Diagram of proposed distribution of new housing stock ............................................................................ 33
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i. The Gabba Ward Housing Collective
We are a collective of people who either reside or work around the Gabba Ward, a local council electorate which
includes the suburbs of West End, Highgate Hill, Kangaroo Point, South Brisbane, Woolloongabba, Dutton Park and
East Brisbane. Our diverse group includes housing sector workers, academics and researchers, and passionate local
residents, many of whom are renters, public housing tenants, or have direct experiences of homelessness. Our
collective is supported by Councillor Jonathan Sri and his office staff, and is formed around the guiding principles
outlined below.
ii. Our Guiding Principles
We believe housing should be a right for all – one derived from our inhabitation of the city, rather than our ability to pay. Our understanding of housing extends beyond the physical structure of a dwelling, and encompasses the physical and social infrastructure essential for habitation. We assert that housing which is affordable, safe, sustainable, secure, and fit for purpose is an essential attribute of a just society. Safe and sustainable housing should be structurally sound, well-maintained, accessible and healthy. It should be located within neighbourhoods that foster a sense of community and belonging, and that facilitate relationships between neighbours. For housing to be safe in the long term, it must also be environmentally sound and connected to infrastructure that supports sustainability, in order to ensure safety for future, as well as current, generations. For us, secure housing is understood as security of tenure and inhabitation, where renters and homeowners can establish roots in a place without fear of eviction, or being forced to move because they can no longer afford to remain. We are referring to housing that liberates inhabitants from the emotional, psychological, and physical burdens of precarity and insecurity, and that instead provides a foundation that enables full and free participation in the civil and social life of our cities and communities. When we refer to houses being ‘fit for purpose’, we are referring to the availability of housing that reflects diverse household structures, varied cultural practices of home and of housing, different needs in terms of accessibility and flexibility of spaces and structures, and different life stages. Housing that is fit for purpose also offers reasonable and affordable access to essential infrastructure and services, including schools, employment, greenspace, healthcare, and public transport – reflecting that what is ‘reasonable’ and ‘affordable’ is subject to a range of individual factors. Our understanding of ‘affordable’ is not derived from a percentage of the market rate for housing. Rather, it is grounded in what individuals and households can afford to pay, and we assert that any discussion of affordability needs to be grounded in what people can afford to pay, rather than what the market will bear. The primary purpose of housing should be to meet the needs of people, rather than the demands of profit. It is a collective, universal right; not only do we all deserve access to housing, but this grounding in housing should also facilitate our capacity to shape our urban environments. As long as housing is positioned as a commodity within the market, it is subject to the same boom and bust cycles that all commodities are
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subject to, and encourages complicity in unjust and unequal processes of urban governance and property economics by keeping many of us vulnerable, and by offering some the hope of wealth at the expense of the security and wellbeing of others. Our position is that everyone, regardless of their ability to pay, deserves housing security. Our response to this paper is underpinned by the belief that for housing to be equitable and accessible to all, it must be progressively de-commodified, and that there is a large scale shift towards the provision of housing by the State Government rather than through the private market.
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1. Executive Summary
Making renting safe, sustainable and secure
Our Plan
For residential properties, rents should not increase more frequently than once every two years,
regardless of changes in tenants or property owners
For rooming accommodation, rents should not increase more frequently than once every eight
weeks, and no more than twice in a six month period, regardless of changes in tenants or property
owners
No eviction into homelessness for residents of public housing
Replace the statutory limits against houses containing more than five unrelated residents with a
limit based on the number of residents per bedroom or per square metre of floor space
Prohibit real estate agents and landlords from demanding proof of income as part of tenancy
applications
How will this work?
Through simple, cost-neutral legislative and regulatory changes:
Amend section 93 of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008
Amend section 105(3)(b) of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008
Amend section 216 of the Building Act 1975
Ideas to explore further
Issues which urgently require further research and policy development:
Rent controls
No eviction into homelessness for residents of private rental accommodation
Safeguards against discrimination for marginalised prospective tenants
Queensland has an acute shortage of affordable housing. In inner-city Brisbane, affordable housing is being
demolished to make room for private apartment developments that do not facilitate diverse, connected
communities, are generally unsuitable for families with children, and are unaffordable for residents who
have the greatest need to live in close to the CBD. Communities are fracturing and lower-income residents
are being priced out to areas of locational disadvantage on the city outskirts.
By redefining public housing as serving a broader range of demographics, and not being exclusively for those
on very high needs, we can transform public housing into an asset that generates revenue for the state
through rental income from wealthier middleclass tenants. Rent from comparatively wealthier public
housing tenants will cross-subsidise maintenance costs for high-needs housing and fund the construction or
acquisition of more stock.
In the short-term, we must recognise that tens of thousands of Queenslanders are long-term renters with no
realistic prospect of entering the private housing market. Rental properties are long-term homes. We must
urgently address the power imbalance between landlords and tenants so that renters are better able to
assert their existing rights.
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Redefining Public & Social Housing
How will it work?
All public housing developments will be
allocated via our proposed 50/50 model
50/50 Model
First 50% - Public Housing Strategy
Cat. 1A - Of the first 50%, 50% is for the unemployed and people on the social/public housing waiting list. Cat. 1B - The other 50% is for individuals earning equal to or less than $48,527 or couples whose combined income is equal to or less than $67,091. This income threshold rises when dependents and/or other adults are residing in the property.
Second 50% - Affordable Housing Scheme
Cat. 2A - The second 50% will be open to any applicants. Rents determined at 25% of net household income, fixed at the beginning of the tenure. Rents can be recalculated at 25% of income in the event that household income drops. Cat. 2B - Residents will have the
option to buy with cost
determined by cost of
construction + 15%
Property can only be sold back to
the government or relevant
housing association - not onto the
private market.
Our Plan
Redefine social/public housing as a universal option for all Queenslanders
Build or acquire 225, 000 dwellings, over 15 years at a total cost of $69 billion dollars
Progressive construction of 15,000 dwellings per year over a 15 year time period with an annual expense of $4.6 billion
Inclusionary zoning: 30% of any new inner city, multi-dwelling development to be delivered as affordable housing stock. To be phased in over 10 years, beginning at 15% and increasing by 7.5% increments every 5 years
This is achieved through a combination of inclusionary zoning, acquisition of empty properties, public construction and public/private ventures
Design and architecture determined by purpose, comfort and sustainability both in terms of fostering cohesive communities and positive environmental outcomes
Prioritise medium/high density development in inner-city Brisbane
How is it paid for?
100% of total cost covered by increased revenue 71% ($49 billion) of total cost over 15 years paid for
through increased State Government revenue via two major sources: 1) $27 billion over 15 years from rent revenue and property sales as new housing stock comes online 2) $22 billion over 15 years through a broad-based, progressive land tax introduced at a State Government level
Yearly Federal Government contribution of $1.3 billion for 15 years paid through reforms to negative gearing and capital gains (raises $127 billion over 10 years)
State tax on vacant investment properties Initial capital outlay will be debt-funded, taking advantage
of record low interest rates Debt-funded component will be phased out over 8 years
as rental and property sale revenue increases
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2. Redefining Public & Social Housing The current housing model in Australia has failed on multiple fronts, particularly in Queensland. The degree to which creative regulatory manoeuvres, private incentives and repurposing of existing public and social housing stock can alleviate the myriad social and economic problems associated with housing in Queensland is ultimately restricted by two primary factors: the limited funds allocated to public and social housing and the reliance on a speculative and unstable private market as the principal provider of housing. References to improved housing outcomes are fraught without first acknowledging that successful European housing models, for instance, are founded on tens of billions of dollars worth of investment in public and social housing – something which has never occurred in the Australian context. Queensland and Australia more broadly must embrace a complete redefinition of public and social housing. It should service a broad spectrum of the population from the most vulnerable to the burgeoning middle class, rather than existing as a last-resort safety net. In broad terms, we believe that by expanding the scope of public and social housing to include the majority of people living in Australia we can address the issue of residualisation, which not only leads to serious social problems but also contributes to the resource-intensive nature of public and social housing management, and the ballooning cost of maintenance and repair. By following best practice design and architecture principles it is entirely possible to position public and social housing as desirable to a much broader cross-section of society. While this will require major public investment, the long-term benefits are considerable. We are aware that our position contradicts decades of mainstream public policy consensus, underpinned as it is by a faith in the market provision of housing for the majority of people in Australia. This consensus is often framed as one of financial and economic necessity, with public expenditure more often the target of cutbacks rather than significant expansion. We believe this consensus is the result of hitherto dominant ideological conceptions that view the market and non-government sector as more efficient and effective. These assumptions, we believe, do not stand up under any sort of meaningful scrutiny when measured against the social, economic or even market outcomes. Below is a brief analysis of the current housing market, which illustrates the need for substantial reform of the housing system in Queensland. Following this is a detailed explanation of our public and social housing recommendations including costings, which illustrate the feasibility and advantages of our recommendations.
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The Failing System and Market
The social, economic and cultural benefits that come with inner-city living are being denied to an increasing section of the population as rising rents and house prices, combined with stagnating wages and rising unemployment, lock many people out of Brisbane’s housing market. Rising rates of housing stress (both rental and mortgage) are significantly reducing disposable household income while also leaving hundreds of thousands of people at risk of homelessness. As of 30 June 2015, there were 12,565 applicants on the waiting list for public housing in Queensland, 3,430 applicants for state owned and managed Indigenous housing (SOMIH) and 16,636 applicants for community housing. In 2011 QCOSS found that there were 26,782 homeless people across Queensland. Anglicare Australia’s 2016 Rental Affordability Snapshot of metropolitan Brisbane found that in 11 out of the 14 different household types, 0% of housing available in Brisbane was affordable. For single people on the minimum wage as well as a couple with two children on the minimum wage, one percent of the available housing in Brisbane was affordable and appropriate. We argue that the private market is an unstable, ineffective, inefficient and unequal mechanism for the provision of housing. Against numerous social, economic and market measures, the private market has categorically failed to meet what must be its primary goal: the provision of safe, secure, liveable housing. We are aware that the history of housing in Australia is defined by a public and social housing sector more often sidelined. The result has been under-investment, residualisation and high waiting lists. To quote Jacobs, Atkinson et al
“The effect of these historical forces—of a socially residualised public sector, a laissez-faire attitude to private renting, and a continued commitment to owner occupation— have combined to set a particular contemporary context within which responses to housing stress, affordability and demographic change are arguably more challenging to deal with.”1
Government interventions in housing provision have focussed primarily on encouraging homeownership, beginning in the early 20th century with state banks and war service home-loans. Progressive government policies, including sales of public housing stock and homebuyer grants have heavily contributed to the cultural importance of home ownership. In this context, our proposal represents a significant break from the historic shift towards a housing market dominated by the private market. However, unprecedented changes in the global and domestic economy and society necessitate an equally bold shift in the way governments approach the supply of housing. Numerous studies by national, state and local community organisations, universities, government departments and other NGOs all of which have indicated growing rates of homelessness, lengthening public and social housing waiting lists, rising housing stress2 (both rental and mortgage), growing housing prices,3 and general increases in housing un-affordability.4 This in the context of above-mentioned
1 Jacobs, Atkinson et al, ‘What future for public housing? A critical analysis,’ Australian Housing and Research Institute (2010)
2 45% of low-income households in Queensland – up from 36.8% in 2007/8 (QCOSS p.10 2014)
3 4.1% in Brisbane. Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Residential Property Price Indexes: Eight Capital Cities, Mar 2016’
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nationally stagnating wages5 and growing household debt.6 While these indicators continue to worsen, several major cities, including Brisbane, are starting to show signs of apartment oversupply and rising vacancy rates. Nonetheless, housing prices continue to grow, including in Brisbane. Increasing prices in the context of a growing oversupply is of course a contradiction in traditionally accepted market logic. Anglicare’s 2016 Snapshot seems to confirm this, noting that despite the marked growth in rental property advertisements, rental affordability for low income earners did not improve in Brisbane in 2016.7 While an economic crisis or depression in the near future is not inevitable, current conditions should elicit a higher level of concern. High rates of housing stress, and growing household debt as a percentage of income (180%) suggest that the Australian population is currently extremely vulnerable to any sudden downward shifts in the housing market – especially highly indebted mortgage owners. Queensland is in a particularly vulnerable position because we have the highest levels of housing stress out of any state or territory.In 2013–14, according to the ABS, the proportion of Queensland households spending more than 30 % of their gross household income on housing costs was 20.5 per cent, the highest out of any state/territory. This is equal to approximately 361,800 households. Research by QCOSS has found that 45% of low-income households in Queensland (up from 36.8% in 2007/8) are currently experiencing housing stress, it is clear that the Queensland private housing sector is under significant strain. Relying on an increasingly volatile and unpredictable private market to provide the majority of housing represents an irresponsible public policy choice with potentially disastrous social and economic outcomes.
4 Of eleven out of the fourteen different household types, zero percent of housing available in Brisbane was affordable. For
single people on the minimum wage as well as a couple with two children on the minimum wage, one percent of the available housing in Brisbane was affordable and appropriate - Anglicare Rental Affordability Snapshot 2016 5 2% nationally - Reserve Bank of Australia (2016)
6 180% of annual household income Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013)
7 Anglicare (2016)
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Details and Costings
Eligibility Framework
Public Housing Strategy (First 50 %)
Category 1A
A person will be eligible for Category 1A if they are currently receiving government payments through
Centrelink as the household’s sole source of income. Within this category a range of households will be
given priority. These households include: people who are currently experiencing homelessness, those on
the waitlist for public housing prior to the implementation of the strategy, and those where a member of
the household is experiencing a chronic mental health issue or has a disability.
Category 1B
To be eligible for Category 1B, a household’s gross income must be equal to or less than the relevant
income limit for the household’s composition. We propose that these income limits be consistent with
those defined in the National Rental Affordability Scheme.
Affordable Housing Scheme (Second 50%)
Category 2A
Eligibility for Category 2A is broad and open to anyone that lives in Queensland. Rent will be calculated at
25% of net household income. We anticipate that the rent collected from higher income households will
help offset repair and maintenance costs. Within this category a range of households will be given priority,
including those in which a member of the household is employed in a role considered key to a particular
geographical area. We understand the complexities and implicit ideological biases in defining who is a ‘key
worker’. Considering this, we recommend that the Queensland Government develop a comprehensive
framework guided by both spatial knowledge of job markets, community needs, and the needs of workers
in traditionally undervalued sectors.
Category 2B – ‘Right to Buy’
Similar to category 2A, category to 2B is open to anyone who lives in Queensland. Anyone is entitled to
purchase their property, which will be priced at the cost of construction + 15%.
Once bought, anyone approved by the new owner can reside in a category 2B property. However, if the
owner chooses to rent the property, rent must be consistent with the framework outlined in the Housing
for All Strategy.
The property can only be sold back to the State Government or the relevant housing authority and not
onto the private market. This will help avoid the privatisation of public and social housing stock and ensure
that these properties aren’t used to generate a profit for property speculators.
Rent Calculations
Rent is to be calculated at 25% of net income. All rents will be fixed at the rent calculated at the beginning
of the tenure and will not increase as household income increases. This follows European policy initiatives
designed to avoid pushing residents out of public housing as their socio-economic position improves.
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To ensure housing stability for residents, rents can be recalculated at 25% of income in the event that
household income drops. The rent will then increase if income rises again, capped at the amount
calculated at the beginning of the resident’s tenure.
Rents will rise periodically in line with the Consumer Price Index. If federal government welfare payments
fail to rise with the Consumer Price Index, those on government payments will not be subject to these
increases.
Financing
We propose a $4.5 billion investment from the Queensland Government in the first year. This initial outlay
will be partly covered by a debt-funded infrastructure strategy, taking advantage of record low interest
rates and bond yields.
Over the 15-year period of construction, revenue from rents and sales of properties will steadily offset the
cost of further construction, repair and maintenance. The costs of the project will be almost entirely offset
by revenue drawn from our proposed land tax, the predicted reduction in the cost of social services that
come with greater housing stability, and other net economic benefits of such a significant infrastructure
project.
Rental Revenue
The newly constructed public and social housing stock will generate a significant amount of income for the
state. This is because at least 75% of the new public and social housing tenants will be drawn from low-
middle income households. In the first year, conservative projections are that the new housing stock alone
will generate $183 million in rental revenue. This revenue will grow rapidly as more housing stock comes
online over the next years.
These estimates do not include rental revenue currently raised from existing public housing stock. They are
also based on conservative calculations of rent. Rent from ‘low-income’ households is calculated at the flat
rate of 25% of a full time minimum wage. We have assumed that the average household income of those
in the Affordable Housing Scheme (Cat 2A and 2B) will be the median Queensland income (calculated in
2011). Rental revenues are likely to be higher than we have predicted.
Land Tax Reform
We have also proposed that the Queensland Government undertake significant land tax reform. Here we
have relied on the Grattan Institute’s calculations of the revenue generated if Queensland were to
introduce a broad-based, progressive land tax. You can find a more detailed explanation here:
http://grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/826-Property-Taxes.pdf.
State Level Vacancy Tax
We are also proposing a state level tax on vacant investor properties. While this will generate some
revenue, the principal purpose of a vacancy tax is to help curb the rising rates of vacancy in investor-owned
apartment complexes.
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Federal Government Contribution
We propose that the State Government seek a yearly contribution of $1.3 billion from the Federal
Government. This could be paid for through changes to negative gearing and capital gains. The Federal
Greens proposed changes to negative gearing and capital gains would raise $119.5 billion over ten years.8
In any event there is a strong case to fund their contribution out of existing revenue given the significant
social and economic benefits that would arise out of such a project.
Other Economic Benefits
While not calculated here, it is also important to recognise the significant economic benefits that come
with ensuring stable housing for the majority of the population and investment in high quality
infrastructure such as housing.
The review by KPMG of the Federal Government’s 2009 Social Housing Initiative (SHI)9 found that for every
$1.00 of construction activity, around $1.30 in total turnover (or an additional $0.30 in turnover) was
generated in the economy. Employment in the construction industry increased by approximately 9,000 full
time equivalent (FTE) positions during the period of stimulus while there was an overall increase of
approximately 14,000 FTE jobs. It found that the average annual value-added (gross domestic product
(GDP) was $1.1 billion on average over the life of the SHI; or approximately 0.1 % (10 basis points) of
Australian GDP increase during the life of the SHI. These benefits came from an estimated outlay of $1.5
billion per annum on average over the life of the SHI.
Inclusionary Zoning
Mandatory inclusionary zoning has proven to be an effective regulatory mechanism in cities around the
world. It could be equally successful in inner city Brisbane.
In 2004 an independent study, commissioned by the Queensland Government, found that mandatory
inclusionary zoning would provide a substantial net benefit to the community (seven times the net cost).10
A portion of the benefit was found to come from reduced expenditure on health, crime and other support
by accommodating low-income households in high amenity locations.
Following the experience of the Brisbane City Council in 2002 where attempts to implement inclusionary
zoning were overturned by the Qld State Government, we emphasize the need for inclusionary zoning to
be legislated by the state government.11 In addition to this, a range of local requirements need to be
articulated clearly.12
8 http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/ending_capital_gains_tax_discounts_-_australian_greens_2016-06-03_11-30-12_am.htm
9 KPMG. (2012) Housing Ministers’ Advisory Committee: Social Housing Initiative Review. Accessed via
file:///C:/Users/100556/Downloads/social_housing_initiative_review%20(1).pdf 10
Spiller, M., & Anderson-Oliver, M. (2015) Revisiting the economics of inclusionary zoning. SGS Economics and Planning Occasional Paper. Retrieved from: http://www.sgsep.com.au/ 11
Quinn, T (2002). In Queensland Environmental Law Association. Affordable Housing Initiatives. Seminar Proceedings. Retrieved from: https://qela.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/02_05_28afhweb.pdf 12
AHURI. (2016) International practice in planning for affordable housing: lessons for Australia, AHURI Research and Policy Bulletin No. 105, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited, Melbourne, https://www.ahuri.edu.au/research/research-and-policy-bulletins/105.
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A study by the Furman Institute,13 found that when implemented in the appropriate context inclusionary
zoning did not reduce the rate of housing construction. Mandatory inclusionary zoning schemes are an
effective mechanism for increasing affordable housing stock in high value markets characterised by
substantial development activity.14 Brisbane has and continues to be characterised by significant
development activity, rapid population growth and a high-value housing market.15 For these reasons
Brisbane would be a perfect candidate for mandatory inclusionary zoning.
We recommend that developers be required to deliver a percentage of affording housing stock within their
proposed multi-dwelling development in inner city Brisbane in order to receive development approval by
the Brisbane City Council. The properties will be sold to the Queensland Government at cost price. This will
ensure quality affordable housing stock is available in high-amenity areas.
The percentage requirement will begin at 15% and increase by 7.5% every 5 years. These incremental
increases will continue until 2026 when the 30% target for affordable housing stock in new developments
is reached. This incremental approach is drawn from the San Francisco model of inclusionary zoning.16
Under this new regulation we suggest ‘multi-dwelling’ be defined as those that contain 10 or more new
dwellings. We use the Brisbane City Council’s definition of the inner city of Brisbane.17 This includes 14
statistical area level 2s (SA2s) of Brisbane City, Fairfield-Dutton Park, Fortitude Valley, Highgate Hill,
Kangaroo Point, Kelvin Grove-Herston, New Farm, Newstead-Bowen Hills, Paddington-Milton, Red Hill,
South Brisbane, Spring Hill, West End and Woolloongabba. The feasibility of the success of implementing a
similar scheme in other high-growth areas around the state should be investigated.
Other forms of inclusionary zoning allow developers to make financial contributions to the construction of
affordable housing on other sites. But we specifically discourage the Qld Government from adopting this
method. Approaches such as these often lead to ghettoization and other forms of socio-spatial inequality,
because the affordable housing is concentrated in areas of high disadvantage. By contrast, our proposed
model will ensure that the affordable housing is dispersed among high amenity areas.
13
Furman Institute (2008). The Effects of Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets: Lessons from the San Francisco, Washington DC and Suburban Boston Areas. Policy Brief. Retrieved from: http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/IZPolicyBrief.pdf 14
Van den Nouwelant, R., Davison, G., Gurran, N., Pinnegar, S. & Randolph, S. (2015) Delivering affordable housing through the planning system in urban renewal contexts: converging government roles in Queensland, South Australia and New South Wales, Australian Planner, 52:2, 77-89, DOI: 10.1080/07293682.2014.914044 15
Lord Mayor’s Economic Development Steering Committee. (2015). Economic Development Plan Brisbane 2012-2031. BCC. Retrieved from: https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au; Wilson, A. (2015) Domain House Price Report: June Quarter 2015. Domain Group. Retrieved from: http://www.domain.com.au/group/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Domain_House_Price_Report_June2015.pdf 16
Lerman, B. R. (2006). Mandatory inclusionary zoning - the answer to the affordable housing problem. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 33(2), 383. 17
Brisbane City Council., (2014). Invest in Brisbane Inner City. https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au
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3. Making renting safe, sustainable and secure Many individuals and families of all demographics across Australia rely on rental properties not just for
accommodation in the narrow sense, but as long-term homes. For millions of Australians, renting is no
longer a temporary stage on the path to homeownership. It is a long-term living situation. With this in
mind, we believe laws and regulations relating to rental properties and residential tenancies must be
adjusted to ensure renters have access to a similar level of security and long-term stability as owner-
occupiers (if they so desire).
In this section, we make the following key points:
Different tenants have different needs and priorities, and our laws must be flexible enough to
reflect that
Currently in Australia, there is a distinct and significant power imbalance between landlords and
tenants, which reduces the practical effectiveness of existing legal protections
Security of tenure is paramount for many tenants, but our current laws do not offer tenants
meaningful stability
To offer tenants stability, flexibility and the confidence to assert their legal rights, we need limits on
how frequently landlords can increase the rent, and caps on how much they can increase the rent
each time a new lease is negotiated
In this section of our submission, we have refrained from providing detailed statistics regarding the
experiences of Brisbane renters because reliable, accurate data from the past five years either hasn’t been
collected or is not publicly available. Instead, we have relied primarily on conversations with renters and
with service providers (including community legal services, emergency accommodation providers,
homelessness support services, and council and government departments) to understand on-the-ground
realities at the local level, as well as drawing upon our own lived experiences as renters.
Brief background notes
The Need for a Less Bureaucratic Rental System
Some renters like to move around - they don’t have a lot of bulky possessions and might relocate regularly
for work or study. Other renters like stability - they want to stay in the same place for a long time, put
down roots, get to know their neighbours and perhaps plant a veggie patch. Some tenants like to have
direct, personal relationships with their landlords; others would rather only communicate formally via
letters and emails. Some tenants are well-informed of their rights and know how to engage with the legal
and administrative system to ensure they aren’t exploited, but the vast majority do not have this privilege.
The core point is that we should not seek to design a one-size-fits-all system that is too rigid to
accommodate a myriad of different social relationships and housing needs. And perhaps most importantly,
we must not assume that tenants will have the time, energy and knowledge to use formal appeals
processes, tribunals etc. to advocate for their rights.
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Sharehousing
Many inner-city renters live in sharehouses, partly out of choice and partly out of necessity. Sharehousing
is no longer the exclusive domain of university students and transient workers. Many young professionals
in their twenties and thirties continue to live in sharehouses as they can’t afford to buy a house of their
own.
However, our existing tenancy laws and our welfare and taxation systems do not accurately represent or
reflect the complex nature of sharehouse human relationships. This is partly a function of our broader
property law system, which struggles to accommodate collective property rights, and perhaps partly a
result of the fact that most of the people who draft laws and regulations affecting sharehouses don’t
currently live in them.
Co-tenants exercise different rights and responsibilities for different parts of a sharehouse e.g. a
housemate has much more autonomy and control over their own bedroom than over shared spaces like
lounge rooms and kitchens. But this does not mean a sharehouse is analogous to a boarding house or
rooming accommodation. Sharehouses are - to greater and lesser degrees - communal living
arrangements. Personal privately-owned property is used, stored and shared in common spaces. Food and
disposable household items are also often shared to some degree, in contrast to most boarding house
arrangements.
Among other issues, this can give rise to inconsistencies in how partner relationships within sharehouses
are treated. For example, Centrelink might insist that two housemates who have started dating are in fact
a de facto couple because they share food and household costs such as electricity and internet bills. But in
truth, all members of the household are sharing such costs, and the de facto status is an inappropriate
descriptor of the relationship.
The collective nature of sharehouses and how the various housemates relate to and care for the property
means that it doesn’t necessarily make sense to go through the trouble of formally amending a lease or
renegotiating and signing a new lease every time a housemate moves in or out. Current processes for
amending leases are unnecessarily bureaucratic and time-consuming for households with 4 or more
tenants. Many landlords and real estate agents will refuse to allow lease amendments, or will charge a fee
for changing names on the lease (whether they are legally allowed to do so is a question of power
relationships). As a result, many sharehouse tenants aren’t added to a lease when they enter a
sharehouse, so their right to a share of the bond is not accurately recorded.
This can cause further problems down the track when a housemate needs to provide proof of address in
order to access government services, or is seeking to enforce their rights against an exploitative landlord.
Reforming Rental Legislation
Long-Term Security of Tenure is a Necessary Precondition for Ensuring Other Renters’ Rights
Long-term stability and security of tenure is a crucial element for making a dwelling a home.
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It is far easier to survive on a low income when you’re part of a mutually supportive community where
neighbours and friends share tools and household items, childcare responsibilities, etc. Mutually
supportive social relationships take time to form and strengthen. Such communities are undermined not
only when renters are constantly having to move house, but also when renters don’t know whether they
might have to move house soon.
If a tenant moves into a new neighbourhood on a 12-month lease, there is less incentive to get to know the
neighbours, join local community groups or even plant a garden. Even if both tenant and landlord might
desire for the tenant to remain there for several years, the uncertainty about whether the lease will be
renewed acts as a disincentive for the tenant to invest time and energy linking in to the local
geographically-bounded community.
For under-educated renters, and renters for whom English is not their first language, moving to a new
neighbourhood is exponentially more difficult. Everything must be relearned: bus timetables, street
layouts, the route to the local shops and community services. For a family that’s struggling to get by, these
seemingly mundane adjustments can be significant challenges.
The hidden financial costs of shorter lease periods can be significant. Many service providers - including
electricity, phone and internet providers - offer cheaper fees for long-term contracts but higher penalties
to end the contract early. Tenants on six or twelve-month leases are forced to gamble on whether their
lease will be renewed when deciding whether to take out a twelve-month or a twenty-four-month internet
contract. A similar problem exists in relation to long-term membership deals for local clubs, sports teams,
food co-ops and community groups.
Uncertainties about security of tenure also discourage tenants from bulk-buying disposable items and non-
perishable food, and from investing in higher quality white goods, furniture, tools, kitchen utensils etc. that
would allow them to reduce their other living costs. Tenants in insecure housing are often reluctant to
acquire basic household items in order to minimise storage and removalist costs the next time they have to
move house. As a result, costs of living are generally higher and quality of life is diminished when tenants
do not have long-term security of tenure.
Insecure tenure has particularly significant negative impacts upon children and teenagers. Changing school
can be extremely stressful for children, particularly at short notice. Renting parents are thus forced to
choose between longer commutes so their children can stay at the school they were originally enrolled at,
or changing schools every time they move to a new neighbourhood. Children are generally less mobile
than adults, so moving house and school can often mean completely severing friendships and social
networks. Similar problems exist for workers and tertiary students. Moving to a new area might mean
cheaper rent, but can also mean increased travel costs and commuting times.
The negative disruptive impacts of insecure tenure flow throughout society. Landlords can suffer when
tenants on short-term leases aren’t emotionally invested in maintaining and looking after their rental
property like it was their own. Neighbours suffer when so many tenants are constantly moving in and out
of rented homes, creating a sense of disconnectedness and social fragmentation throughout the street and
neighbourhood.
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Improving security of tenure must be a core goal of any reform to Queensland’s residential tenancy laws
and regulations.
The Cost of Moving
Moving house can cost thousands of dollars. In inner-city Brisbane, we frequently hear reports of younger
tenants moving house once a year. Some tenants find themselves moving every six months due to the
demolition and redevelopment of older housing stock and the rapid gentrification of formerly affordable
suburbs.
Moving house is stressful and time-consuming, and has further negative flow-on impacts to the wider
community in terms of lost productivity and social upheaval. Relocating a home involves significant
financial, emotional and physical costs, including removalist/truck hire fees, bond cleaning, utility
connection fees, allocating a day or two (perhaps taking time off work to do so) to move, unpacking,
arranging and setting up furniture. For renters, these costs come on top of bond payments and up-front
rent. Further time-consuming inconveniences include redirecting mail and the need to change addresses
registered with government agencies, private businesses and services providers.
Any evaluation of the relative pros and cons of policies which increase security of tenure for renters must
not discount or ignore the significant costs (both to society and the individual) of moving house.
Crucially, the cost and inconvenience of moving house also means that even when tenants know they’re
getting a raw deal from their current landlord, they may still seek to renew their lease rather than applying
for and moving to a new home. For many renters, saving money to cover the lump sum costs of moving is
extremely difficult. These costs act as a significant obstacle even in circumstances where a tenant does
wish to move house. Any suggestion that renters have the power to shop around and seek a better deal if
they’re feeling exploited by their current landlord must be understood in the context of the significant
costs of moving home.
Understanding the Power Imbalance Between Landlords and Tenants
When it comes to renters’ rights in Queensland, there are stark differences between the law as written and
the law in practice. Many landlords and real estate agents frequently and routinely ignore or violate their
responsibilities under the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 200818 and other
relevant laws and regulations.
In theory, tenants have various legal remedies and channels of appeal for some breaches of their rights. In
practice, at the lower end of the rental market, assertive tenants who insist on being treated fairly by their
landlord or real estate agent are less likely to have their lease renewed.
18
Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (State). Retrieved from: https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/R/ResidTenRAA08.pdf
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When real estate agents have so much power over whether a lease is renewed and whether the rent will
increase, tenants are naturally more reluctant to make complaints or assert their rights. Many renters
we’ve spoken to report that they avoid requesting basic repairs and maintenance from their landlord in the
months leading up to a lease expiry, out of a legitimate fear that the rent will be increased or that the lease
won’t be renewed. Many renters do not make complaints when their real estate agent or landlord
conducts an inspection without notice.
Landlords and real estate agents wield substantial power over renters’ lives. They literally have the power
to decide how long we can remain in our homes. Decisions as to how this power is exercised are driven
primarily by financial considerations. While many landlords (and even some real estate agents) do
genuinely care about their tenants’ welfare, residential lease agreements ultimately function as
commercial relationships, even though for the tenants they mean much more than this.
The contractual basis of Australia’s rental laws masks the fact that the high costs and inconveniences of
moving house and finding a new home create a fundamental inequality of bargaining power between
contracting parties. When negotiating a lease renewal, the average tenant has far more to lose than either
the real estate agent or the landlord if the parties fail to reach agreement. At most, a landlord might have
to forego a few weeks’ worth of lost rent before they can find a new tenant, but the tenant risks having
their life turned upside down. This means tenants are unlikely to haggle or bargain to get a better deal for
themselves. A tenant’s weak bargaining position is further exacerbated by high break lease costs. The risk
of having to pay high penalties for breaking a lease means tenants will feel they must accept a shorter
lease period than they would ideally prefer in order to mitigate against the outside possibility that
unforeseen changes in their work or living circumstances force them to move.
A landlord’s power over a tenant increases as the expiry date of the existing lease draws closer. This means
it is generally in the landlord’s interests to have shorter lease periods. Unless this power imbalance is
rectified, many Queensland tenants will continue to live with the oppressive uncertainty of not knowing
how permanent their home is and whether their lease will be renewed.
Limiting the Frequency of Rent Increases to Reduce Exploitation and Improve Stability
Currently under section 93 of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008, rents can
be increased as often as every six months. This is one of the main reasons many inner-city landlords only
offer six-month leases, even when they intend to rent the property out for much longer. Real estate agents
encourage landlords to offer short leases so that the rent can be increased as often as possible when rents
are rising, secure in the knowledge that even if demand for rental properties weakens substantially, the
uneven bargaining power between individual tenants and owners will act as a natural check against
tenants arguing for a decrease in rent the next time their six-month lease is renewed.
The fear of non-renewal means tenants won’t request repairs to the leaky bathroom tap or the dodgy
window latch. It means they won’t complain when a landlord lets himself into the property unannounced
to conduct a snap inspection. It means real estate agents can charge illegal ‘lease renewal fees’ without
repercussions.
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Uncertainty about potential rent rises is a significant stressor for many low-income renters. When youth
allowance for a nineteen-year-old university student is as low $433 per fortnight, an increase of $50 a
fortnight can be devastating. Anecdotal evidence suggests that rents on free-standing homes in West End
were rising as much as 20% from one lease to the next in recent years. Such sharp increases appear to be
slightly less common in 2016, however in Australia, the ongoing treatment of housing as a commodity
means that another wave of rent hikes is never far away.
To minimise the significant negative impacts of insecure tenure and unaffordable rent increases, landlords
should be prevented from increasing the rent on a property more frequently than once every twenty-four
months. This would help rectify the power imbalance between landlords and tenants, ensuring that
landlords will only offer shorter six-month or twelve-month leases if tenants specifically desire this.
Importantly, this twenty-four month limitation must apply to the property regardless of changes in tenants
(or owners), otherwise landlords will still have an incentive to evict an existing tenant in order to reap
higher rents from new tenants. This could be implemented by requiring landlords to include a two-year
history of previous leases on the property (i.e. how long the lease was for and how much the rent was)
whenever a property is advertised for rent, and as additional information in any new tenancy agreement.
Limiting rent increases to once every two years will have the indirect impact of ensuring tenants are only
forced to leave their home when an owner actually wishes to move into the property themselves, as there
will be no financial incentive to replace one group of tenants with another.
The likely practical impact of this change is that more landlords would be willing to sign eighteen-month
and twenty-four-month contracts, as there would be little practical benefit to them in only offering six and
twelve-month leases. As a result, the law would offer tenants greater stability and security, without
limiting flexibility for those tenants who do wish to have shorter leases and a more transient lifestyle.
A cultural shift towards longer lease periods would likely result in better care for and maintenance of
rental properties, as tenants would have a longer-term interest in looking after the home they are renting.
Most importantly though, it would give renters greater confidence in asking for repairs and basic
maintenance, asserting other rights regarding issues such as frequency of inspection, and appealing to the
tribunal against excessive rent increases.
Similar changes should be introduced regarding notice periods for rent increases in boarding houses and
rooming accommodation. Currently, landlords of rooming accommodation are only required to give four
weeks’ notice of rent increases. This can cause a high level of insecurity and uncertainty for rooming
accommodation tenants, making it extremely difficult for them to budget and maintain control of their
finances. Numerous conversations we’ve conducted with boarding house and rooming accommodation
tenants suggest that they tend to have less secure employment and lower incomes than tenants on longer-
term residential leases. In many cases, tenants will not have cash reserves to allow them to meet sudden
increases in rent. This means that when rent is increased with only four weeks’ notice, tenants who are
unable to pay may well find themselves evicted into homelessness. As such, section 105(3)(b) of the
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Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 should be amended so that the notice period
for rent increases is eight weeks rather than four weeks.
Ideas to explore further
Rent controls and caps - do they work, and should they be implemented?
Limits on how frequently residential rents can increase should, ideally, be accompanied by limits on how
much the rent can increase by. In Queensland, only public housing has rent caps available to tenants;
tenants must regularly report their income, otherwise they can lose their entitlement to discounted rent
and be charged market value. But for low-income earners and families who are not part of the public
housing system, increases in rent that outstrip wage growth are extremely damaging, and can force whole
families into housing stress and homelessness.
Rent control is not a holistic long-term housing affordability solution, however it can help smooth out the
peaks and troughs of the housing market, mitigating the harshest impacts of gentrification and allowing
neighbourhoods to adapt gradually to changing economic conditions rather than disrupting and
fragmenting communities overnight. Rent controls for residential properties should ideally be introduced
in parallel with rent controls for commercial properties.
When a particular suburb with a high proportion of low-income residents becomes trendy, or is the target
of a major new infrastructure upgrade that makes the suburb more liveable (such as a new train station),
property values rise much faster than wages. While some landlords will choose to keep rents low, those
landlords who are motivated primarily by commercial gain will tend to raise their rents as soon as their
leases are up for renewal. Under such circumstances, average rents within a given market can increase
dramatically within only a few years. This is exacerbated when the most affordable rental properties are
demolished and replaced with new apartment stock targeted at wealthier investors.
Earlier cycles of gentrification saw rents creep up gradually over decades. However more recently,
gentrification’s impact upon rental markets in Brisbane appears to have resulted in sharp, sudden rent
hikes over three or four years, followed by a plateau. Whether rents rise gradually over a particular time
period, or rise sharply and then plateau, they may well reach the same end-point, however the latter
scenario is significantly more damaging for those on lower incomes.
The impact of these rent-increase frenzies within localised geographic neighbourhoods must not be
understated. In a short space of time, a large number of renters within a community will respond in one or
more of the following ways:
relocate to a cheaper neighbourhood (usually an area with fewer services and amenities and
greater travel costs and commute times) and lose contact with friends, neighbours and community
support networks
take on more shifts at work, leaving less time for socialising, community activities, domestic labour
and caring for dependents
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spend a significantly higher proportion of their income on rent, and cut spending on other essential
goods and services such as healthcare and healthy food as well as discretionary purchases and
leisure activities which support the local economy
become homeless
If, however, rents in a neighbourhood increase more gradually, renters have time to plan ahead and will
have a greater chance of relocating within their current suburb rather than moving to a completely
different part of the city. More importantly, when rent increases occur gradually over many years,
communities have time to adjust and adapt to the dispersal and fragmentation of their social networks,
rather than everyone suddenly scattering to the suburban fringes in the space of a few years.
In this submission, we are not proposing a specific rent control policy for Queensland, but seek to advance
the argument that rent control policies should be implemented in regions where property speculation is
rapidly driving up house prices, and that further research is needed to identify and design a rent control
model that would help address the housing affordability crisis in cities like Brisbane.
Queensland’s existing legislative protections against excessive rent increases are not sufficiently clear or
objective to act as a satisfactory safeguard against exploitative landlords. Requiring tenants (who in many
cases lack the education, time and resources to assert their rights) to proactively appeal to a tribunal on a
case-by-case basis in order to challenge rent increases does not materially mitigate against the negative
social and economic impacts of rapid gentrification. And of course, if protections against excessive rent
increases only apply to the existing tenants of a property (as is the case with the current Queensland
provision), they can - and do - have the perverse impact of incentivising landlords to evict current tenants
to take in new tenants at a significantly higher rent. It is therefore paramount that the above-mentioned
two-year limit on rent increases is introduced to prevent this.
Berlin, the capital of Germany, implemented rent control legislation introduced by the German
government in early 2015 to ‘put the brakes’ on skyrocketing rental prices, and to keep low-income
earners and students from having to relocate to the city’s outskirts. While living in Berlin isn’t as expensive
as Paris or London, Berlin recognised that low-income earners were being pushed out of the city due to
rent increases of 9% over two years. Berlin’s implementation of the Federal Tenancy Amendment Law Act
has enabled rent control measures to be extended to new tenants as well as existing ones. The new
provisions allow German states to implement rental caps in tight housing markets for both new and
existing tenants. Reiner Wild, managing director of Berlin Tenants’ Association, declared rental controls
“are very important for Berlin, because the price difference between new and existing contracts was so
high. The housing market is so strong right now, we don’t want to see Berlin become like Paris and
London… because the reality is, people on low-incomes have to move to the outskirts of the city.”19
19
Berlin becomes first German city to make rent cap a reality. (2015). the Guardian. Retrieved 21 July 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/rent-cap-legislation-in-force-berlin-germany
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A key feature distinguishing Berlin’s system from rent control policies in many other countries (notably the
USA) is that the Berlin approach contemplates and allows for regular rent increases, but sets limits on how
much the rent can rise rather than prohibiting rent increases altogether. By allowing landlords to increase
rents to keep pace with inflation and cover maintenance costs, Berlin decreases the risk that landlords will
leave properties to deteriorate rather than spending money to repair them. The system also allows Berlin
landlords to significantly increase the rent if they spend money on substantial renovations that genuinely
improve the value and livability of the property, so that owners who restore older neglected homes aren’t
penalised.
We would recommend a similar policy approach for rents in Brisbane. To avoid market distortions within
the same broad geographic region, the same rent control policy should be applied to the entire Greater
Brisbane area. Maximum rent increase percentages could be pegged to increases in minimum wage, CPI,
Youth Allowance, Newstart or the Aged Pension. Landlords could still request increases above the standard
maximums based on criteria similar to the current criteria regarding ‘excessive rent increases’ in section
92(4) of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008. Thus, rent controls would not
operate as a strict cap. Rather, they would offer guidelines as to maximum percentage increases, where
the onus is on the landlord to justify increasing the rent more, rather than placing the onus upon the
tenant to argue that a particular rent increase is excessive.
Crucially, introduction of a rent control system would mean that lower-income residents of a
neighbourhood aren’t penalised by increasing rents when new infrastructure (e.g. a new train station or
bus service) is introduced to make a neighbourhood more liveable.
Rents appear to be stabilising in Brisbane for the time being. From a political perspective, now is the best
time to introduce a rent control system so that it will be established and normalised in time for the next
cycle of rent hikes.
Scrapping Proof of Income Requirements
Many landlords and real estate agents in Queensland force prospective renters to declare and prove their
incomes when applying for a place to live. Some agents demand pay slips, detailed bank statements and
letters from employers. Such requirements are onerous and demeaning, and symptomatic of the power
imbalance between landlords and tenants in Queensland. These requirements increase the amount of
unpaid work that renters must complete when applying for a place to live - this becomes an excessive
burden when renters are applying for multiple properties.
More importantly, when real estate agents claim the role of determining which tenant applicant is best
able to pay the rent, the risk of unfair discrimination against people of colour, First Nations peoples,
students, and casual workers increases substantially.
It is hoped that limits on how frequently rents can be increased will shift this power imbalance, however a
specific ban against real estate agents and landlords requesting bank statements and payslips should also
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be introduced to discourage unjustified discrimination against renters who have casual rather than
permanent jobs, or who rely on welfare payments.
The existing legislation already includes sufficient remedies to allow landlords to take action against
tenants who consistently fail to pay their rent on time. Requiring tenants to provide proof of income
documentation as part of tenancy applications adds an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and is an
unreasonable barrier for renters who might not have a conventional permanent job, but who are perfectly
capable of paying their rent on time.
Large Share-households Should Not Be Illegal
Brisbane City Council’s City Plan 2014 currently includes a prohibition against more than five unrelated
people living in the same share-household. This prohibition is based upon Queensland government
legislation which was introduced to address concerns that overcrowded boarding houses were a fire safety
risk, and sets up an alternative framework for ‘budget accommodation’.
The Brisbane City Council regulations draw an illegal and discriminatory distinction between married and
de facto couples. Married couples are defined as ‘related’ while unmarried couples are treated as
‘unrelated’. This contradiction is unjustifiable from a policy perspective, particularly when Centrelink and
other federal government departments treat de facto couples in the same way as married couples for the
purposes of calculating support payments such as rent assistance.
More importantly, Queensland government laws against sharehouses of more than five ‘unrelated’ people
are poorly adapted to their stated purpose. They ignore the fact that Brisbane includes many large homes
that can comfortably and safely house more than five adults, particularly if some of those adults are de
facto couples.
Encouraging efficient use of housing stock is a crucial step in improving housing affordability in
Queensland. Legislative and regulatory provisions which increase the likelihood of empty bedrooms must
be rigorously scrutinised. Any provision which limits low-income renters’ freedom to choose what kind of
household they live in should be based upon detailed data and research rather than arbitrary numbers and
knee-jerk political responses.
Renters choose to live in large privately rented sharehouses as they lack affordable alternatives, and
because large social households can offer a range of other benefits. If three couples wish to share a three
or four-bedroom home in the inner-city to minimise housing costs, the law should not prohibit this.
The blunt-instrument prohibition against large sharehouses seems to be premised on the assumption that
any household of more than five people functions as a boarding house or rooming accommodation rather
than a sharehouse, and that tenants are necessarily being exploited. This assumption is unsubstantiated
and, based on our experiences and conversations with other young renters, deeply flawed. Many students
and young professionals in Brisbane live in sharehouses of more than five unrelated people. Many Brisbane
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homes have four and five bedrooms, multiple bathrooms and large common spaces, and are well-designed
to accommodate more than five tenants.
To assert that any household of more than five individuals should be treated as a boarding house or
rooming accommodation ignores the practical realities of sharehouses as discussed above. Many
sharehouses function as family homes. Whether they’re related or not, housemates often support each
other like family members. To force such households into a boarding house framework with separate
leases places an unnecessary burden on tenants and landlords. For landlords, the costs of establishing and
maintaining properties that comply with boarding houses regulations are significantly higher than the costs
of conventional residential properties. As a result, many landlords are unwilling to convert homes with five,
six or seven bedrooms to boarding houses, resulting in empty bedrooms and an inefficient use of housing
stock.
We suggest that the rule against more than five unrelated people living in a single residential household
should be amended immediately so that tenants who can’t afford alternative accommodation situations
are able to remain living in sharehouses containing more than five tenants. Over-crowding should be
defined according to the number of residents per bedroom or the number of residents per square metre of
floorspace, rather than the number of residents per house. De facto couples should be treated as related in
the same way as married couples, however ideally, any sharehousehold which provides evidence that its
occupants support and care for each other in a manner analogous to a traditional family household of
blood relatives should be treated in the same way.
Ultimately, it is better for eight people to live together in a five or six-bedroom house than for some of
those people to be evicted and left homeless. The law must reflect this practical reality.
No Eviction Into Homelessness from Public Housing
A common theme which emerged from conversations with housing sector workers, social workers, public
housing residents and homeless Brisbanites was that too frequently, public housing tenants are evicted
into homelessness. Reliable data as to how often this occurs has been particularly difficult to access,
however it seems clear that the problem is not infrequent or uncommon.
We believe that under no circumstances is it appropriate for public housing tenants to be evicted into
homelessness. While some tenants - particularly those with drug addictions that contribute to violent
behaviour - can cause a great deal of disruption to neighbours and can contribute to public housing
complexes feeling unsafe, the appropriate course of action is to relocate such tenants into alternative
public housing arrangements, community housing, rehabilitation centres, assisted living situations or
hospitals.
The Queensland government must not evict public housing residents unless the tenant in question has
safe, stable alternative accommodation to relocate to.
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No Eviction Into Homelessness from Private Rentals
The landlord-tenant relationship is often one of control and domination. It is of a fundamentally different
qualitative nature to other commercial contractual relationships. As discussed above, landlords have
immense power over tenants’ lives, but tend to take little responsibility for the impacts of how that power
is exercised.
We believe that if a tenant who is facing eviction informs their landlord that they have no home to move
to, the landlord should be under a duty to help the tenant identify other properties within their price
range.
The Queensland Government must undertake further research to identify policy solutions which will guard
against eviction into homelessness for renters in the private housing market.
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4. Broad Recommendations and Topics for Further
Investigation
Housing for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples
Both private market-oriented and government-led housing policies have consistently failed Aboriginal
people in both urban and remote areas of Queensland.
Urban planning and social policy is often informed by the false assumption that Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Peoples aren’t connected with or don’t live in urban areas.20 In part, this is because urban areas -
as opposed to rural or remote regions - are less likely to be acknowledged as Aboriginal land.21 However,
80 per cent of Indigenous social housing tenants live in the urban areas of Australia.22
Indeed, for a number of reasons outlined below, First Nations Peoples are far more reliant on public and
social housing than other demographics. It is estimated that First Nations Peoples are five times more likely
to be social or public housing renters.23
The historical disadvantages imposed upon First Nations Peoples by ongoing colonisation and decades of
discriminatory government policies have resulted in lower average incomes and higher rates of
homelessness. These factors contribute to the existing financial barriers preventing First Nations Peoples
from accessing the private housing market. These barriers are amplified by persistent racism and
discrimination experienced by First Nations Peoples in the housing market.24
The lack of cultural sensitivity and adaptability in Queensland’s existing housing and welfare policy often
contributes to poor housing outcomes for those outside the dominant cultural group.25 For First Nations
Peoples these poor outcomes are amplified by the repeated imposition of western cultural values and
expectations on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander housing tenants.26 The Queensland public and social
housing system needs to undergo significant changes to ensure it is responsive to the housing needs of
First Nations Peoples.
The housing system must work towards being both locally adaptable and culturally appropriate. Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander peoples are the rightful owners of all lands across the Australian continent,
including the land on which cities have been built. The opportunity to have continuation of connection to
traditional lands needs to be guaranteed, regardless of whether the housing is remote, rural, regional or
urban. We strongly believe that the best housing outcomes for First Nations Peoples will only be achieved
20
Prout, S., & Biddle, N. (2015). The social geographies of indigenous population and housing in Australia's regional urban centres. Australian Geographer, 46(1), 51. doi:10.1080/00049182.2014.986788 21
James, S. W. (2013). Rights to the diverse city: Challenges to indigenous participation in urban planning and heritage preservation in Sydney, Australia. Space and Culture, 16(3), 274-287. 22
Milligan, V. et al. (2011) Urban social housing for Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders: respecting culture and adapting services, AHURI Final Report No.172. Melbourne: Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute 23
Ibid. 24
Nethercote, M. (2014). Reconciling policy tensions on the frontlines of indigenous housing provision in Australia: Reflexivity, resistance and hybridity. Housing Studies, 29(8), 1045-1072. doi:10.1080/02673037.2014.925098 25
Ibid. 26
Ibid.
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when Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community groups have guaranteed long-term control of the
funding models for their own social and public housing projects.
Homelessness
Rates of homelessness continue to rise in Queensland and while we recognise that there are a myriad of
complex causes, from our perspective the lack of supply of affordable and accessible housing and
persistent poverty are the principal drivers. Similarly, ACCOSS notes that ‘[f]undamentally, each of these
reasons for homelessness results from the people lacking access to safe, securely tenured, affordable and
well-located housing’27.
In the absence of an adequate supply of affordable and appropriate housing options, homelessness
services become, at best, a ‘stop-gap’ service or, at worst, a place for perpetuating the damaging,
individualistic discourse of victim-blaming.
For this reason we advocate a housing first approach to homelessness. This recognises that the often-
complex and intersecting factors (poverty, long-term unemployment, domestic violence, mental health
issues, trauma and substance abuse etc.) that force a person into homelessness are more likely to be
successfully addressed when the person is in secure and stable housing. This approach has been described
as ‘a cost‐effective and sustainable approach to reducing homelessness’28. However, this best practice
approach is persistently obstructed by the significant shortfall of affordable, appropriate and accessible
housing.
Research by Micah Projects has highlighted the failures of the current housing system to adequately help
people with complex needs.29 Micah found that pressures to maximise rent revenue have undermined
efforts to operate under a supportive housing framework. Other issues raised by Micah include lack of
community minded designs, problematic locations, inconsistency of landlords and lack of social mix.
We recommended that the Queensland Government uphold the six principles of supportive housing in all
housing policy: design, permanency and affordability, tenancy mix, safety, support services and social
inclusion.30 In relation to homelessness our proposal suggests practical solutions to ensure the principles of
affordability, tenancy mix, social inclusion and permanency are upheld. Ongoing consultation with both
homelessness services and the homeless population is needed to ensure planning surrounding design,
safety and support services directly meets the needs of the chronically homeless.
27
ACOSS in… ACOSS, Community Housing Federation of Australia, Homelessness Australia, National Association for Tenants’ Organisations and National Shelter. (2015) An affordable housing reform agenda. Goals and recommendations for reform. Retrieved from: http://www.acoss.org.au/ 28
Mason, C. & Grimbeek, P., (2013). A Housing First approach to homelessness in Brisbane: Sustaining tenancies and the cost effectiveness of support services. Final Report to Ian Potter Foundation & Micah Projects Inc. Retrieved from: http://www.micahprojects.org.au/ 29
Micah Projects Inc. (2014). SUPPORTIVE HOUSING – BRINGING AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION TO AUSTRALIA. Retrieved from: http://www.micahprojects.org.au/ 30
Corporation for Supportive Housing. (2014). What is Supportive Housing. Retrieved from: at http://www.csh.org/supportive-housing-facts/introduction-to-supportive-housing/
28 | P a g e
5. Conclusion Housing is a human right. But leaving the provision of housing primarily to the private market results in it
being treated as a commodity. When housing is treated as a means of making profit, homelessness and
housing stress tends to increase, renters are more likely to be exploited, and existing housing stock is used
inefficiently.
Queensland has an acute shortage of affordable housing. In inner-city Brisbane, affordable housing is being
demolished to make room for private apartment developments that do not facilitate diverse, connected
communities, are generally unsuitable for families with children, and are unaffordable for residents who
have the greatest need to live in close proximity to the CBD. Communities are fracturing and lower-income
residents are being priced out to areas of locational disadvantage on the city outskirts.
Queensland urgently needs to ramp up investment in public housing and increase the state’s stock of
public housing by 15 000 dwellings per year. By reconceptualising public housing as serving a broader
range of demographics, and not being exclusively for those on very high needs, we can transform public
housing into an asset that generates revenue for the state through rental income from wealthier
middleclass tenants. Rent from comparatively wealthier public housing tenants will cross-subsidise
maintenance costs for high-needs housing and fund the construction or acquisition of more stock.
In the short-term, we must recognise that tens of thousands of Queenslanders are long-term renters with
no realistic prospect of entering the private housing market. Rental properties are long-term homes. As
such, we must urgently address the power imbalance between landlords and tenants so that renters are
better able to assert their existing rights. To this end, the minimum period after which a landlord can
increase the rent should be increased from six months to two years. The two-year minimum should apply
to a property regardless of changes in owners or tenants. This will contribute to a shift in longer-term
residential tenancy leases, which will provide renters with greater stability and security of tenure, and
reduce the negative impacts of rapid gentrification.
Our current approach to housing in Queensland is failing. The state government must act urgently to
reduce the risk of economic crisis and a property market collapse, and to provide stable, secure housing to
tens of thousands of Queenslanders who are currently experiencing homelessness or housing stress.
We have an amazing opportunity in Queensland to rethink the privatisation of the housing market, and
instead provide housing for all. We must not waste it.
Appendix A- Costings
Public Housing Strategy - Projected rental revenue for the first year
Rental revenue from percentage of new housing allocated to households receiving
government payments
Demographic Lone person Single parent Couple or more
Percentage of tenure31
9.5% 12% 78.5%
New Housing Stock
358 449 2943
Income per fortnight32
$527.60 $570.80 $952.80
Rent per fortnight33
$131.90 $142.70 $238.20
Yearly rental revenue
$1,227,725.20
$1,665,879.80
$18,226,587.60
Rental revenue from percentage of new housing allocated to low income households
31
ABS 2011, Household Composition, State of Queensland. Australian Bureau of Statistics 32
Based on Newstart payments. Department of Human Services. (2016). Newstart Allowance. Retrieved on 5 July 2016 from: https://www.humanservices.gov.au 33
Rent fixed at 25% of income at the time of entering housing 34
ABS 2011, Household Composition, State of Queensland. Australian Bureau of Statistics 35
Based on minimum wage of a 38 hour week after tax (before tax $672.70 per week). Fair Work Ombudsman, 2016, Minimum Wages, Fair Work Ombudsman, Canberra accessed 5 July 2016, http://www.fairwork.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/723/Minimum-wages.pdf.aspx; ATO (2016). Weekly Tax Table 2015-2016. Retrieved 5 July 2016 from: https://www.ato.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Content/MEI/downloads/Weekly-tax-table-2015-16.pdf 36
Rent fixed at 25% after tax income (where applicable) per fortnight
Demographic Single Income Multiple Incomes
Percentage of tenure34
21.5% 78.5%
New housing stock
807 2943
Income per fortnight35
$1,197.40 $2,394.80
Rent per fortnight36
$299.35 $598.70
Affordable Housing Scheme - Projected revenue for first year of the
Rental revenue from estimates37 of new housing
Revenue from estimates of housing sales through the State Affordable Housing Scheme
Average build cost41 $ 304, 826.03
37
Estimates based on very conservative assumption that 1000 will be sold and 6000 rented 38
ABS 2011, Household Composition, State of Queensland. Australian Bureau of Statistics 39
Based on 2010-2011 weekly median income (after tax) in Queensland. Queensland Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011) Wage and Salary Earner Statistics for Small Areas, Time Series, 2005-06 to 2010-11 cat. 5673.0.55.003, viewed 5 July 2016, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/mf/5673.0.55.003; ATO (2016). Weekly Tax Table 2015-2016. Retrieved 5 July 2016 from: https://www.ato.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Content/MEI/downloads/Weekly-tax-table-2015-16.pdf 40
Rent fixed at 25% after tax income (where applicable) per fortnight 41
Based on average build cost in 2012 with added inflation. https://www.ahuri.edu.au/policy-development/increasing-affordable-rental-supply Reserve Bank of Australia. (2016). Inflation calculator. Retrieved on 5 July 2016 from: http://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/annualDecimal.html
Yearly rental revenue
$6,280,961.70 $45,811,326.60
Demographic Single Income Multiple Incomes
Percentage of tenure38
21.5% 78.5%
New housing stock
1291 4709
Income per fortnight39
$1,581.80 $3,163.60
Rent per fortnight40
$395.45 $790.90
Yearly rental revenue
$13,277,631.84 $96,825,125.47
Projected 15 year revenue from Public housing proposal
Projected revenue from changes in land tax
Per capita 43 $310.00
Population of QLD44
$4,691,000.00
Revenue for year $1,454,210,000.00
Over 15 years $21,813,150,000.00
Revenue generated through rent of properties
Year of Strategy Rental Revenue
1 $183,315,238.20
2 $366,630,476.40
3 $549,945,714.60
4 $733,260,952.80
5 $916,576,191.00
6 $1,099,891,429.20
7 $1,283,206,667.40
8 $1,466,521,905.60
9 $1,649,837,143.80
10 $1,833,152,382.00
11 $2,016,467,620.20
12 $2,199,782,858.40
13 $2,383,098,096.60
14 $2,566,413,334.80
15 $2,749,728,573.00
Total $21,997,828,584.00
Revenue from estimates of housing sales through the State Affordable Housing Scheme
Total yearly revenue $350 549 934.50
Revenue over 15 years $5,258,249,017.50
Total combined revenue $49,069,227,601.50
43
Daley, J. and Coates, B. (2015) Property taxes. Grattan Institute ISBN: 978-1-925015-70-6
Appendix B- Diagram
Diagram of proposed distribution of new housing stock
225 000
Additional Government housing stock
112 500
Public Housing Strategy
CAT 1
56 250
Allocated to households receiving government payments
CAT 1a
56 250
Allocated to low income households
CAT 1b
112 500
Affordable Housing Scheme
CAT 2
Rented or sold through guidelines of scheme