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Honeypot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook Nasri Messarra, Anne Mione Université de Montpellier 1 – MRM International Network for Social Network Analysis (INSNA) Conference, Sunbelt XXXIV, Tampa, Florida, USA, 2014

Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

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Page 1: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Honeypot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Nasri Messarra, Anne MioneUniversité de Montpellier 1 – MRM

International Network for Social Network Analysis (INSNA) Conference, Sunbelt XXXIV, Tampa, Florida, USA, 2014

Page 2: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Background Most SN studies in general & OSN studies in particular work

on already existing networks to find influencers (Trusov, Bodapati & Bucklin), hubs, bridges, etc., and restructure them (Valente)

Social bots and fake profiles have one objective: maximizing the number of friends and then, eventually studying the resulting network (Boshmaf, Muslukhov). They are in majority based on sexual attraction (Barracuda statistics) and are used as carriers of information – not an influencers (empiric)

Recent studies show that size does not matter (Scarpi) and that one of the keys to success is the initial seeding population (Liu-Thompkins)

We believe that Facebook is not really a non-directed network (in & out degrees matter)

Page 3: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

How activists attack on Facebook1- Post directly on the brand page

2- Post on their own social networks and Facebook communities and wait for the viral effect to reach the brand

Reported cases & littérature about Nestlé, Pampers, DKNY, Marie-Claire, Capri Sun, Cooks Source, Bershka…

Page 4: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Weaknesses of both methods1- Post directly on the brand page

2- Post on their own social networks and Facebook communities and wait for the viral effect to reach the brand

Exposure of consumer posts on the page was reduced since FB has

chosen to put all customer comments in a small

discrete area

The user gets banned,Communication is closed

Creating viral content is demanding and complex.

Information may never break through

Page 5: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Brand communityOn Facebook(Brand page) Engaged

fans

Efficient schema for a blitz unstoppable attack

Personal timeline

What if a person can become friend on his own timeline/profile with engaged fans of a brand?

Diffusion will only need to be organic, not viral (no need for WOM for diffusion)

The brand will not have direct control to ban the user

Engaged fans

Page 6: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Honeypot profiles Can we attract engaged fans of a brand Around a high-prestige profile (in degree > out

degree) with common interests and call for reciprocity (the illusion of social proof)

In order to create an efficient initial seeding population

That can be reached directly through organic communication?

Page 7: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Attraction by common interest

The cover experiment Infiltration of a politician network: Obama, Hariri…, Infiltration of a

movement: Syrian revolution, Infiltration of a star: Ronaldo, Infiltration of a company’s group – using a profile with a cover photo that reflect a common interest and without any other content

Sending requests to 100 engaged users - 40% responded positively

Page 8: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Attraction through the value of friends

Creating network value by choosing popular friends

The Spartacus experiment (male, very small set of photos, standard mid-age person with kids, etc.) - Different from social bots: unattractive male, weird name (cannot be confused with someone else),

Started with 5 real friends & only chooses the most popular mutual friends

After 4 months from the beginning of the experiment we started receiving friend requests on a regular basis (Prestige = 10% after 2 years)

Currently has more than 500 friends

Page 9: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Attraction by impersonation

Impersonating a public figure Zero friend request sent The impersonator just likes comments on Facebook talking about him and his

actions 2 experiments, 5000 friends reached exponentially in a matter of weeks

Page 10: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

The strategic power of honeypot profiles Build their network Which is an optimized seeding population Of engaged fans of an adversary or friend.

Honeypot profiles Cannot be banned from a page Reach fans organically Can have a very high prestige rate depending on the method used Have the illusion of social proof, liking and reciprocity.

Page 11: Honey-pot profiles and malevolent e-reputation attacks on Facebook

Discussion

We are aware that our experiments on honeypot profiles and malevolent influence in online social networks raise ethical questions. Yet, we hope that our work will make brands and consumer more aware of the manipulation they can face on online social network and help them find ways to immune themselves again such malevolent attacks.

We’re only seeing the tip of the OSN iceberg. Brands and consumers should be ready for future and smarter evolutions.

The same experiments can be reproduced with real Facebook accounts and the findings can be used as well to create engaged communities and improve a company’s reputation or promote brands in an ethical way.