Holy alliances: public subsidies, Islamic high schools, and female schooling in Bangladesh

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Holy alliances: public subsidies, Islamichigh schools, and female schooling inBangladeshMohammad Niaz Asadullah a b c & Nazmul Chaudhury da Department of Economics , University of Reading BusinessSchool , HUMSS Building, Whiteknights, Reading, RG6 6AA, UKb ESRC Centre on Skills, Knowledge and OrganizationPerformance , Oxford University , UKc Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) , Bonn, Germanyd The World Bank , Washington, DC, USAPublished online: 19 Aug 2009.

To cite this article: Mohammad Niaz Asadullah & Nazmul Chaudhury (2009) Holy alliances: publicsubsidies, Islamic high schools, and female schooling in Bangladesh, Education Economics, 17:3,377-394, DOI: 10.1080/09645290903142593

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Education EconomicsVol. 17, No. 3, September 2009, 377–394

ISSN 0964-5292 print/ISSN 1469-5782 online© 2009 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/09645290903142593http://www.informaworld.com

Holy alliances: public subsidies, Islamic high schools, and female schooling in Bangladesh

Mohammad Niaz Asadullaha,b,c* and Nazmul Chaudhuryd

aDepartment of Economics, University of Reading Business School, HUMSS Building, Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AA, UK; bESRC Centre on Skills, Knowledge and Organization Performance, Oxford University, UK; cInstitute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn, Germany;

dThe World Bank, Washington, DC, USATaylor and FrancisCEDE_A_414432.sgm10.1080/09645290903142593Education Economics0964-5292 (print)/1469-5782 (online)Original Article2009Taylor & Francis173000000September 2009Dr Mohammad [email protected]

This paper documents the experience of incentive-based reforms in the secondaryIslamic/madrasa education sector in Bangladesh within the context of the broaderdebate over modernization of religious school systems in South Asia. Key featuresof the reform are changes of the curriculum and policy regarding admission offemale students. In return to formal registration and curriculum modernization,madrasas receive financial aid from the government towards teacher salary. Usinga cross-sectional census data-set (containing current and retrospective information)on formal secondary schools and madrasas, we first point out that a significantfraction of the existing post-primary registered madrasas today comprises of‘converts’; that is, formerly all-male, unregistered religious schools that previouslyoffered traditional, religious education. Furthermore, these madrasas haveembraced female students in recent years following the introduction of yet anotherincentive scheme, namely a conditional cash transfer scheme for secondary girls.Drawing upon school enrolment data aggregated at the region level, we showthat regions that had more (modernized) madrasas were more likely to achievegender parity in secondary enrolment during 1999–2003, holding the number ofsecular secondary schools constant. This finding highlights the previouslyundocumented role played by religious schools in removing gender disparity inrural Bangladesh.

Keywords: female education; educational subsidy; madrasa reform; religiouseducation; South Asia

1. Introduction

Madrasa (Islamic faith schools) is the fastest growing education sector in Bangladesh.In terms of absolute and relative measures, Bangladesh hosts the largest number ofregistered religious seminaries in the South Asian subcontinent. However, it is allegedthat religious schools in South Asia are churning out thousands of students not worthyof employment outside the religious sector and unequipped to function in a marketeconomy. Driven by such concerns, the Government of Bangladesh has endeavored to‘reform’ or ‘modernize’ madrasa education systems. A reform scheme was imple-mented by the government in the early 1980s. To induce modernization, cash incen-tives were offered to madrasas as long as they registered and introduced additionalclasses on subjects such as science, mathematics, and English. Nonetheless, the exact

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

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378 M.N. Asadullah and N. Chaudhury

supply-side response of these religious schools to market incentives is unknown.Critiques of market-based reforms point out that Islamic schools are non-market enti-ties that shun formal/market sources of finance and rely on charity for sustenance.Hence any conditional subsidy reform initiative is destined to fail. More importantly,these schools have for many centuries almost exclusively educated boys so that theopportunity cost to publicly finance madrasa education is significant – funds could bediverted instead to secular, co-educational/girls’ private schools to promote femaleeducation and close existing gender gaps in enrolment.

In the years following the introduction of the market-oriented curriculum reformscheme, Bangladesh saw an emergence of a large number of modern, registeredmadrasas that also embraced female students. However, it is alleged that these are allnew madrasas that have been set up to exploit the availability of public funds underthe curriculum modernization and female stipend schemes. To be precise, we do notknow to what extent the reform succeeded in converting pre-existing traditionalmadrasas into modern religious schools. Likewise, the introduction of yet anotherincentive scheme, namely a conditional cash transfer scheme for secondary girls, hasboosted female enrolment in secondary school. But little is known about the way inwhich the program has influenced sex orientation of madrasas. The role played byconverted madrasas in promoting female education also remains unknown.

In the absence of pre-reform data on traditional madrasas, it is not possible toascertain the causal impact of the reform program. We do not know how many of thetraditional madrasa institutions closed down or what percentage of the pre-reformtraditional madrasas adopted modern curriculum in order to register with the govern-ment. Similarly, feminization of the previously all-male registered madrasa systemcould be due to the Female Secondary Stipend program, which covered all of ruralBangladesh so that assessing the causal effect of the program on female enrolment inmadrasas is not possible using cross-sectional data.

In this paper, therefore, we do not assess the impact of the curriculum reformscheme on traditional madrasas. Neither do we study the causal effect of the stipendprogram on gender orientation of traditional madrasas. Rather, we draw upon datafrom a recent census of secondary educational institutes in Bangladesh and describethe profile of madrasas that have chosen to modernize in response to monetaryincentives. The results of our descriptive analysis provide new insights into thepotential influence of the incentive schemes on secondary madrasas. First, given thenon-availability of data on pre-reform traditional madrasas, the number of traditionalmadrasas that ‘converted’ on account of the reforms is derived on the basis of whencurrently registered madrasas were established. We show that the conversion ofpreviously traditional madrasas to reformed madrasas was a significant phenomenon.Second, we highlight the hitherto unnoticed ‘feminization’ of the madrasa sector thathas ensued following the introduction of another incentive scheme in the 1990s,namely the Female Secondary School stipend program. It is shown that ‘converted’madrasas are more likely to be co-educational compared with newly set-up regis-tered madrasas. Lastly, regression analysis shows that Bangladeshi regions with alarger stock of registered madrasas were more likely to achieve gender parity insecondary enrolment. This was also true for regions that had a larger endowment of‘converted’ madrasas. These findings suggest that, with adequate incentives, reli-gious educational institutions can play an important role in achieving developmenttargets such as removing educational gender gaps in countries with large Muslimpopulations.

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Education Economics 379

The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of madrasa educa-tion system in South Asia. Section 3 details the madrasa education reform initiativesin Bangladesh. This section also presents regression evidence on the relationshipbetween modernized madrasas and gender parity in enrolment secondary educationsector. Section 4 concludes by discussing the policy implications of our findings andproviding direction of future research.

2. Background: madrasa reform in South Asia

The schooling system in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh runs in two parallel streams:the private/public secular schools and the religious seminaries. In parallel to main-stream formal education, students can choose to study at madrasas, which offerIslamic religious education at primary, secondary and higher levels. Anecdotalevidence suggests that the majority of madrasas are allegedly run on the Deobandiline.1 Historically, these madrasas have relied on own assets and charities to financeday-to-day activities. This is because financial autonomy concerns five of the eightfundamental principles laid down by Maulana Muhammad Qasim at the founding ofDeoband in 1867 (Ladbury 2004):

As long as the madrassah has no fixed source of income, it will, God willing, operate asdesired. And if it gain any fixed source of income, like jagir holdings, factories, tradinginterests or pledges from nobles, then the madrassah will lose the fear and the hopewhich inspire submission to God and will lose His hidden help. Disputes will beginamong the workers. In matters of income and buildings … let there be a sort of depriva-tion. (Quoted in Metcalf 1978, 113)

Madrasas in the subcontinent, therefore, are alleged to exclusively rely on externalfinance and private donations made for religious purposes. A majority of these madra-sas also house and educate orphans and children from poor families. But it is notknown exactly how they differ in their interpretations of religious doctrine. No singlecurriculum applies to these madrasas and significant divisions prevail in terms ofcourse contents. These madrasas primarily focus on reciting the Koran and learningthe duties of the Maulvi in order to prepare students for running the mosques’ day-to-day operations. In Bangladesh, these madrasas are known as Quomi madrasas.

The overwhelming majority of recognized secondary schools in Bangladesh aregovernment-aided private schools. All registered and recognized secondary schools,both secular and religious institutions, are eligible for government subsidies. In theearly 1980s, the government introduced programs to modernize the madrasa educa-tion system via curriculum reform. The single most important motivation for madrasareform has been the importance of life skill acquisition. In the pre-modernization era,students in all (Quomi) madrasas in the country were taught Urdu (instead ofBengali), Persian and Arabic as the madrasa curricula continued to follow theDeoband-style. Their registered counterparts, albeit few in numbers, followed thestate-approved Dars-i-Nizami-type curriculum.2 Consequently, for students graduat-ing in or before 1980, the mosques and the madrasas were their main sources offormal employment. The ‘religious sector’ of the economy continued to remain as theprimary destination of madrasa graduates in the post-1980 period.3 This has arguablychanged in post-modernization years. The modernization scheme of 1980 introducedsecular subjects such as English, Bengali, Science and Mathematics alongside reli-gion-related subjects and languages.4 Madrasas that accepted this change in the

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curriculum received government recognition and subsequently qualified for publicsubsidies to finance the salary of all teachers similar to secular-aided schools.5 Thesereligious seminaries are known as ‘Aliyah madrasas’, which are registered with agovernment board (Sattar 2004).6

In the Aliyah system, secondary education is provided by Dakhil institutions andhigher secondary education by Alim level institutions (two years of study) institutions.There is also a two-year Fazil (degree)-level education and two-year Kamil(master’s)-level education. The government madrasa board is responsible for thedesign of a national curriculum for all recognized madrasas in the country. The boardalso conducts public examination at the end of Dakhil/Fazil/Kamil education. Quomimadrasas are also characterized by a hierarchy similar to the Aliyah madrasa system(e.g. hafizia, qiratia, and nizamia, all under the kharizia system).

It should be noted that a reform scheme similar to that in Bangladesh was attemptedin India in 1986 when the Indian Government proposed to introduce subjects likescience, mathematics, English, and Hindi in the madrasa curriculum. Modernizedmadrasas were eligible to apply for government financial aid. The government alsopromised to arrange for recognition of certain madrasas by certain state-funded univer-sities.7 However, the success of this initiative has, so far, been limited. The nature ofincentive is insignificant. Only one teacher is provided by the government to teachmodern subjects (Khan, Saqib, and Anjum 2003). The financial incentive to modernizeremains considerably weak. The Indian state only promises to provide financial assis-tance to madrasas to teach secular subjects, whereas in Bangladesh all teachers of arecognized madrasa qualify for salary payments from the state exchequer. Partlybecause of these reasons, most of India’s 30,000 madrasas8 have refused to participatein the scheme (Fahimuddin 2004). Consequently, most madrasas in India today aretraditional and independent of the state for funds.9

A more successful and comparable modernization reform experience is that ofIndonesia.10 The share of the madrasa sector, in terms of total number and studentenrolments, is large in Indonesia and Bangladesh. In both countries, the majority ofmadrasas are privately run. Similar to Bangladesh, the Indonesian Government in2003 recognized and brought madrasas and other traditional Islamic educationalinstitutions into mainstream national education.11 The madrasas are recognized on apar with ‘secular’ public schools, in the sense that they now follow the nationalcurricula 1994 issued by the Ministry of Education. However, the Indonesian reformexperience has been less successful when compared with Bangladesh. Firstly,government agencies have not been able to exercise full control on madrasas; thelegal framework to enforce national curriculum remains weak. Unlike Bangladeshirecognized madrasas, those in Indonesia do not receive large-scale financial supportfrom the government so that incentives to adhere to state-mandated curriculumremain absent. As a consequence, teacher pay and quality in private madrasas remainlow (Azra 2004).12

3. Madrasa reform scheme in Bangladesh: is it significant?

According to government census records for the year 2005, there were 9214 madrasasat post-Ebtedayee (i.e. post-primary) level against 18,500 secondary schools.13

Recognized madrasas therefore constitute approximately 33% of all secondaryeducational institutions. Madrasa enrolment accounts for 15% of total Post-PrimaryEducation (PPE) enrolment (1.5 million out of a total of 10.6 million).14 The majority

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of these are, however, Dakhil (i.e. secondary only) madrasas (see Table 1). Mostmadrasa education takes place in rural locations; rural madrasas account for 92.49%of all madrasas in the country, compared with around 86% of the secular schoolsbeing located in the rural area (see Appendix 1, Table A1).

The religious education sector in Bangladesh is large, both in terms of number ofeducational institutions and students enrolled. Today, 32% of all secondary levelstudents are from (recognized) madrasas. Similarly, madrasas account for 30% of totalfemale secondary school enrolment (see Table 2). Public aid constitutes 90% ofteacher salaries in registered private aided schools and Aliyah madrasas inBangladesh. More recently, the government has further raised the incentive for Aliyahmadrasas in two ways. First, graduates of recognized madrasas are eligible to seekadmission in secular universities as well as employment in public offices. Second,since 1994, female students enrolled in secondary-level Aliyah madrasas (along withregistered secular schools) have been made eligible for receiving stipend under theFemale Secondary Stipend scheme.

Two features of Aliyah madrasas stand out from Tables 1 and 2 and Table A1(Appendix 1). First, almost one-half of the students enrolled are girls. Second, 7% ofthe teachers are also female. Most importantly, this is equally true for rural and urbanareas. These statistics point out the hitherto overlooked role played by these madrasasin spreading female education in the country.

The Bangladeshi reform program gives rise to two basic questions. First, to whatextent did the scheme reduce the number of existing traditional religious schools?

Table 1. Profile of recognized post-primary madrasas in Bangladesh.

Number of madrasas (%)

Fraction of female-only madrasas

Fraction of female teachers

Fraction of female students

Dakhil 73 0.15 0.10 0.52Alim 14 0.07 0.07 0.46Fazil 11 0.02 0.06 0.37Kamil 2 0.04 0.04 0.20Total 100 (n = 9214) 0.12 0.09 0.48

Source: BANBEIS 2005 census, Ministry of Education, Government of Bangladesh.

Table 2. Relative size of the registered madrasa education sector in Bangladesh.

Madrasas as a fraction of total number of secondary

schools

Fraction of secondary teachers in madrasas

Fraction of madrasas in secondary enrolment

Fraction of female

secondary teachers in madrasas

Fraction of madrasas in

female secondary enrolment

Rural 0.35 0.42 0.34 0.27 0.33Urban 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.15Metropolitan cities 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.09Dhaka city 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.07All area 0.33 0.39 0.32 0.22 0.30

Source: Authors’ calculation based on BANBEIS 2005 census (http://www.banbeis.gov.bd/). Data onmadrasas correspond to all post-primary registered madrasas.

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Second, do modernized madrasas embrace reforms regarding admission of femalestudents? We consider these issues below.

3.1 Did traditional madrasas modernize?

Do the existing Aliyah madrasas in Bangladesh largely comprise of new madrasas,which have emerged to take advantage of generous government grants, or do they alsorepresent ‘converts’ from old madrasas that previously imparted traditional and exclu-sively religious education? A priori, one would not expect massive conversions oftraditional madrasas following the introduction of the reform measures. Financialautonomy is one of the fundamental principles of Deoband madrasas (Ladbury 2004).The popular perception has been that the so-called modernized madrasas are alto-gether new religious schools that have mushroomed taking advantage of governmentsubsidies. Nonetheless, the incentive offered by the Bangladeshi Government tomodernize was substantial. Given that teacher pay accounts for most of the recurrentbudget of schools in rural Bangladesh, the incentive to convert is significant: recog-nized madrasas receive regular financial aid from the government on a monthly basisto essentially cover its wage bill.

In the absence of pre-reform data on all (recognized and unrecognized) madrasasin the country, it is not known what fraction of the traditional madrasas actuallyembraced reform. A lower bound on the number of ‘converts’ can be obtained byworking out the total number of Aliyah madrasas that were established prior to 1980and operated as traditional madrasas in the pre-reform period. This can be ascertainedby using data on the year in which a madrasa was established. Such data are availablefrom census records on all registered secondary schools and madrasas in the country.

Figure 1 plots the number of existing Aliyah madrasas (schools) by year of estab-lishment, expressed as a percentage of the total number of Aliyah madrasas (schools)

Figure 1. Number of educational establishments as a percentage of existing educationalestablishments (by year of establishment and type).Source: Authors’ own calculation based on 2003 census of secondary schools, BANBEIS,Ministry of Education.

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in 2003. Most remarkable to note is that 52% (n = 4393) of all Aliyah madrasas in thecountry were established on or before 1980; that is, the year when the reform wasintroduced.15 To be precise, all of these Aliyah madrasas constitute ‘converts’. Theseconverted madrasas accounted for 31.5% of all secondary educational institutions inthe country in the year 1980. However, the impact of the reform, measured in termsof ratio or converts to non-converts, is unknown as no reliable historical estimate onthe total number of traditional madrasas is available.Figure 1. Number of educational establishments as a percentage of existing educational establishments (by year of establishment and type).Source: Authors’ own calculation based on 2003 census of secondary schools, BANBEIS, Ministry of Education.The significance of the reform is also evident if we jointly analyze data on year ofestablishment and year in which government recognition was received.16 Table 3provides cross-tabulation of these two variables, categorizing years in three periods:pre-1980 reform era, post-1993 female stipend scheme era, and the period in between(i.e. 1980–1992). It is reassuring to see that 97% of the Aliyah madrasas that wereset-up prior to the modernization reform indeed received government recognition(following adoption of a modern curriculum) on or after 1980.17 The second impor-tant insight obtained from Table 3 is that a large number of pre-existing madrasas(which are likely to have followed Quomi curricula) have opted for governmentrecognition in the post-1992 period when the female stipend scheme was introduced.As a matter of fact, 75% all Aliyah madrasas that received government recognitionduring this period were pre-existing madrasas. This period also saw the conversion of444 madrasas that were established even before the introduction of the modernizationscheme.

3.2 Did modernized madrasas embrace further reforms?

As pointed out earlier, a hallmark of Aliyah madrasas in Bangladesh is that of femi-nization of students and teachers. At the beginning of the reform program in 1980,1% of madrasa teachers were female. Today, this stands at 6.9%. We argue that the

Table 3. Distribution of Aliyah madrasas by year of establishment and recognition.

Year of recognition

Year of establishment Pre-1980Between 1980

and 1992Between 1993

and 2003 Total

Pre-1980 120 3384 444 3948(3.04) (85.71) (11.25) (100)[100] [73.9] [17.51] [54.57]

Between 1980 and 1992 1195 1477 2672(44.72) (55.28) (100)[26.1] [58.24] [36.93]

Between 1993 and 2003 615 615(100) (100)

[24.25] [8.5]Total 120 4,79 2536 7235

(1.66) (63.29) (35.05) (100)[100] [100] [100] [100]

Note: Row percentages in round brackets; column percentages in squared brackets.Source: Authors’ own calculation based on 2003 census of secondary schools, BANBEIS, Ministry of Education.

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feminization of Aliyah madrasas equally applies to madrasas established before andafter the 1980 reform and is driven by incentives.

The first proposition is easily verified if we compare the sex ratio and genderorientation of ‘converted’ (pre-1980 reform) vis-à-vis new (post-1980 reform) madra-sas. In the pre-reform years, Aliyah madrasas educated mostly boys. Therefore, wewould expect this to be true even today if these ‘converted’ (i.e. those establishedbefore introduction of the modernization scheme in 1980) religious seminariescontinue to shun female education. Figure 2 plots data on the sex orientation of post-reform and pre-reform Aliyah madrasas. As a comparison group, data on schools arealso plotted. Clearly, amongst the converted madrasas, the majority is co-educational.This is also supported by the fact that only 5.39% of the pre-reform madrasas aresingle-sex (of which only 2.4% are boys only) compared with 21.2% post-reformmadrasas (of which only 0.65% are boys only).Figure 2. Sex orientation of post-reform and pre-reform Aliyah madrasas, 2003.Source: Authors’ own calculation based on 2003 census of secondary schools, BANBEIS, Ministry of Education.The fact that the overwhelming majority of Aliyah madrasas in Bangladesh todayadmits and educates girls is also echoed in enrolment statistics. Per 100 boys, there are96 girls enrolled in Aliyah madrasas in the country. Once again, ‘converted’ madrasas,which historically educated boys, today have 85 girls enrolled against 100 boys (seeTable 4). Altogether, these findings are suggestive of the possibility that ‘converted’madrasas have embraced further reform by altering the admission policy and educat-ing girls alongside boys.

Our second proposition is that the change in sex composition of teachers andstudents in the Aliyah madrasas is rather a recent phenomenon and largely a conse-quence of cash incentive programs. At the time of the reform in 1980, only 4.9% ofmadrasa students were female. Today, it stands at 47% (see Figure 3).18 It could beargued that this merely captures the effect of overall economic development. Over

Figure 2. Sex orientation of post-reform and pre-reform Aliyah madrasas, 2003.Source: Authors’ own calculation based on 2003 census of secondary schools, BANBEIS,Ministry of Education.

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time, there has been a gradual increase in female school participation that has equallyaffected secular and religious schools. However, it is clear that over the period 1980–1990 there had only been a small (3%) increase in the share of females in totalmadrasa enrolment. In contrast, during 1990 and 2003 this increased by 39 percentagepoints, implying that female enrolment in madrasas grew by 209% (see Figure 3).Figure 3. Sex composition of students and teachers in post-primary schools and madrasas in Bangladesh, 1970–2003.Note: Post-primary madrasas range from Dakhil to Kamil.Source: Data from BANBEIS, Ministry of Education.The supply-side explanation for the rise of recognized madrasas in the country,namely the apathy of government policy for educational development, is untenable foran additional reason. Aliyah madrasas, like private aided schools, are fee-charging. Asseen in Table 2, a majority of them educate girls even in the rural areas who arewaived of all tuition payments and additionally qualify for regular stipend from thegovernment. Whilst gross enrolment (ratio of ‘total enrolment in Grades 6–10’ to‘total secondary age population’) in secondary Aliyah madrasas increased from 7.54%to 9.26% (between 1999 and 2003), this has been largely due to the greater enrolmentof female students, which rose from 6.63% to 9.7% during the same period.19

3.3 Modernized madrasas and gender parity in secondary enrolment

Our analysis so far has relied on purely descriptive bi-variate treatment of adminis-trative data. However, additional insights can be gleaned by analyzing determinants

Table 4. Sex ratio (number of girls/number of boys) in secondary schools/madrasas, 2003.

School Madrasa

Pre-reform 0.90 0.85Post-reform 1.01 1.10Average 0.94 0.96

Source: Authors’ own calculation based on 2003 census of secondary schools, BANBEIS, Ministry ofEducation.

Figure 3. Sex composition of students and teachers in post-primary schools and madrasas inBangladesh, 1970–2003.Note: Post-primary madrasas range from Dakhil to Kamil.Source: Data from BANBEIS, Ministry of Education.

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of gender parity in regional enrolment in a simple cross-section regression frame-work. While madrasa-level panel data on enrolment rates is unavailable forBangladesh, the existing census (cross-sectional) data-set on schools and madrasascontains annual enrolment figures spanning the period 1999–2003. As mentionedearlier, we have access to this data-set that has been collected by the Ministry ofEducation. The data-set includes information on all secondary educational institu-tions (25,795 in total) in the 64 districts of Bangladesh for the year 2003.20 For eachregistered secondary school and madrasa, the census data-set provides informationon enrolment by gender and grade for the period 1999–2003. The period 1999–2003has seen exceptional growth in total female enrolment in secondary schools. At theunion level, the average growth rate is 21%. But looking at enrolment in Grade 10,this figure is as high as 31%.21 As such, it is possible to ascertain whether a regionhas achieved gender parity in enrolment in secondary grades over the period 1999–2003. To this end, we run regressions using a dummy ‘whether the region achievedgender parity in 2003’ as the outcome variable. To capture the convergence effect,we allow gender parity in 2003 to depend on enrolment at the beginning of theperiod. Since we also want to know school type effects, our gender parity equationincludes the level of school availability by type in 1999 and changes therein by 2003.This yields the following reduced form model of gender parity at the region (i.e.union) level:

where Pti = 1 if the union has achieved gender parity in enrolment in 2003, and zerootherwise, Xt − 4 is the mean characteristics of educational institutions of the union in1999, ∆Xti is the change in number of schools and madrasas between 1999 and 2003,Wti are the other attributes of the union (e.g. whether an urban region; average age ofschool/madrasa in the region; presence of a government school in the region), ϖj is thesubdistrict (upazila) fixed effects (where j is the index of subdistricts), υit is therandom error, t is the time index and i is the union index.

A common problem in Equation (1) is that of endogeneity of the number of madra-sas admitting females. Presence/emergence of co-educational or girls-only madrasascould be driven by cultural factors: regions where there are less cultural restrictionson female mobility are more likely to see emergence/presence of ‘liberal’ religiousschools that also encourage education of girls. We partially address the concern overidentification of religious school effect using regional fixed-effects. This requiressufficient regional variation in norms and/or a data-set with a large number of regions.In the year 2003 there were 486 subdistricts (upazilas) in Bangladesh, and our data-set contained all secondary schools in the country. Within the context of Bangladesh,socio-economic differences are usually across regions and districts – therefore, we canstudy gender parity in enrolment at the union level controlling for unobservables in afixed-effect framework.

Table 5 uses three regression specifications. Specification (1) controls for districtfixed effects. Specification (2) controls for subdistrict (upazila) level fixed effects.Specification (3) replaces the variables – total number of schools in 1999 and totalnumber of madrasas in 1999 – by gender-disaggregated versions (e.g. coeducation,boys only, girls only). Two results are of particular interest. First, between 1999 and2003 regions with more madrasas had a higher probability of achieving gender parityin secondary enrolment. Second, increase in the mean age of schools in the region has

P X X Wti t i it ti t ti= + + + + +−β β β β ϖ υ0 1 4 3 4 1, ( )∆

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Tabl

e 5.

Det

erm

inan

ts o

f ge

nder

par

ity

in s

econ

dary

sch

ool

enro

lmen

t (2

003)

: li

near

pro

babi

lity

mod

el e

stim

ates

.

Dep

ende

nt v

aria

ble:

ach

ieve

d ge

nder

pa

rity

in

tota

l en

rolm

ent

in G

rade

6

by 2

003?

(ye

s =

1, n

o =

0)

Dep

ende

nt v

aria

ble:

ach

ieve

d ge

nder

pa

rity

in to

tal e

nrol

men

t in

Gra

de 1

0 by

200

3? (

yes

= 1

, no

= 0

)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Fem

ale

enro

lmen

t in

199

9 in

the

reg

ion,

Gra

de 6

(in

log

s)−0

.104

−0.1

00−0

.103

(10.

41)*

*(9

.20)

**(9

.41)

**F

emal

e en

rolm

ent

in 1

999

in t

he r

egio

n, G

rade

10

(in

logs

)−0

.075

−0.0

88−0

.091

(6.9

4)**

(7.6

5)**

(7.8

3)**

Num

ber

of m

adra

sas

in t

he r

egio

n, 1

999

0.01

00.

012

0.00

30.

011

(2.4

4)*

(2.4

7)*

(0.5

4)(1

.75)

†

Num

ber

of s

choo

ls i

n th

e re

gion

, 199

90.

015

0.01

60.

020

0.02

7(4

.14)

**(4

.17)

**(4

.64)

**(5

.73)

**N

umbe

r of

new

mad

rasa

s se

t up

dur

ing

1999

–200

30.

010

−0.0

06−0

.007

−0.0

160.

003

0.00

1(0

.33)

(0.1

9)(0

.22)

(0.4

3)(0

.07)

(0.0

4)N

umbe

r of

new

sch

ools

set

up

duri

ng 1

999–

2003

0.03

00.

018

0.02

0−0

.023

−0.0

20−0

.018

(1.7

3)†

(0.9

6)(1

.06)

(1.0

6)(0

.86)

(0.7

6)M

ean

age

of s

choo

ls0.

000

0.00

00.

000

0.00

10.

001

0.00

1(0

.39)

(0.2

0)(0

.29)

(1.2

6)(1

.26)

(1.3

9)F

ract

ion

of m

adra

sas

in t

he r

egio

n be

ing

‘con

vert

s’ (

esta

blis

hed

pre-

1980

)0.

040

0.04

10.

045

0.04

60.

031

0.03

1(3

.08)

**(3

.00)

**(3

.20)

**(2

.75)

**(1

.76)

†(1

.75)

†N

umbe

r of

co-

educ

atio

nal

mad

rasa

s in

the

reg

ion,

199

90.

011

0.01

1(1

.91)

†(1

.61)

Num

ber

of g

irls

-onl

y m

adra

sas

in t

he r

egio

n, 1

999

0.02

70.

014

(2.2

5)*

(0.9

1)N

umbe

r of

boy

s-on

ly m

adra

sas

in t

he r

egio

n, 1

999

−0.0

59−0

.021

(1.8

4)†

(0.5

1)

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Tabl

e 5.

(Con

tinu

ed).

Dep

ende

nt v

aria

ble:

ach

ieve

d ge

nder

pa

rity

in

tota

l en

rolm

ent

in G

rade

6

by 2

003?

(ye

s =

1, n

o =

0)

Dep

ende

nt v

aria

ble:

ach

ieve

d ge

nder

pa

rity

in to

tal e

nrol

men

t in

Gra

de 1

0 by

200

3? (

yes

= 1

, no

= 0

)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Num

ber

of c

o-ed

ucat

iona

l sc

hool

s in

the

reg

ion,

199

90.

015

0.02

3(3

.26)

**(4

.30)

**N

umbe

r of

gir

ls-o

nly

scho

ol i

n th

e re

gion

, 199

90.

027

0.04

3(3

.38)

**(4

.41)

**N

umbe

r of

boy

s-on

ly s

choo

ls i

n th

e re

gion

, 199

90.

005

0.00

1(0

.29)

(0.0

6)U

rban

−0.0

38−0

.002

−0.0

03−0

.092

−0.0

49−0

.049

(1.9

9)*

(0.0

8)(0

.14)

(3.7

4)**

(1.6

3)(1

.58)

Gov

ernm

ent

(= 1

if

a go

vern

men

t se

cond

ary

scho

ol p

rese

nt)

−0.0

26−0

.042

−0.0

42−0

.011

−0.0

05−0

.000

(1.0

3)(1

.58)

(1.5

1)(0

.34)

(0.1

3)(0

.00)

Con

stan

t0.

604

0.57

10.

586

0.50

70.

527

0.53

8(1

3.65

)**

(11.

96)*

*(1

2.12

)**

(12.

58)*

*(1

2.24

)**

(12.

22)*

*n

4747

4747

4747

4627

4627

4627

R2

0.03

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.02

0.02

Fix

ed e

ffec

tsD

istr

ict

Tha

naT

hana

Dis

tric

tT

hana

Tha

na

Not

e: U

nit

of a

naly

sis

is r

egio

n (u

nion

). A

bsol

ute

valu

e of

t s

tati

stic

s in

par

enth

eses

.† S

igni

fica

nt a

t 10

%;

*Sig

nific

ant

at 5

%. *

*Sig

nific

ant

at 1

%.

Sum

mar

y st

atis

tics

of

regr

essi

on v

aria

bles

are

rep

orte

d in

App

endi

x 1,

Tab

le A

1.

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no significant effect whilst the coefficient on the variable ‘fraction of madrasas in theregion that are converts (i.e. set up before the reform of 1980)’ is positive and signif-icant. This finding suggests that traditional madrasas that chose to convert intomodern religious schools went beyond curriculum reform by withdrawing restrictionson admission of female students. These findings are robust to control for than fixedeffects.

One concern over the estimates reported in Table 5 relates to the problem ofreverse causality: many madrasas were newly set up primarily as a response to thestipend scheme immediately after 1994. As a matter of fact, between 1995 and 2003a total of 3798 secondary educational institutions were set up throughout Bangladesh,of which 23.88% (or 907) were madrasas. If there is a correlation between femaleenrolment and madrasas that existed before introduction of the stipend reform, thiscan be taken as a cleaner test of the potential impact of madrasas on female enrolmentand hence on gender parity. To this end, we restricted data to schools/madrasas estab-lished before 1994 and repeated our analysis. However, even for this subsample, therewas a robust relationship between the number of madrasas in the region and genderparity in enrolment.22

4. Conclusion and policy implications

This paper has described religious education in madrasas in Bangladesh and tworeform policies to modernize the Islamic education sector that introduced some marketincentives in the faith education sector. The first reform provided public finance tomadrasas conditional upon introduction of a more market-oriented curriculum. Thesecond reform provided financial incentives to females for attending a secondaryschool or madrasa. In the absence of pre-reform data, it was not possible to evaluatethe effect of the curriculum modernization and female stipend schemes on traditionalmadrasas – we could not causally test whether madrasas responded to these ‘incen-tives’ (public money), and changed their core subjects and gender orientation. None-theless, our descriptive analysis yields important insights into the possible ways inwhich madrasas may have responded to these schemes.

First, the introduction of market-based curriculum reform initiated in the early1980s appears to have succeeded in converting a significant number of traditionalmadrasas that previously operated with own funds and eschewed teaching of modernsubjects. These converted madrasas are registered with the government, strictlyfollow state-mandated course outlines and textbooks, and have become fiscallydependent upon the state. Our findings indicate that approximately 34% of themodernized madrasa system in Bangladesh today is likely to comprise of formerly‘traditional’ religious schools. Second, registered secondary madrasas embracedfemale students and today educate a large number of females. Nearly one-half of thestudent population in these religious seminaries today is female. This feminizationof modernized madrasas in Bangladesh was driven allegedly by transformingformerly all-boys madrasas into centers for co-education, which we conjecture is aby-product of a conditional cash-transfer scheme that gave financial incentives tofemales for attending a religious school. Lastly, regression analysis of region-leveldata on student enrolment shows that presence of modernized madrasas and thestock of converted madrasas in the region are both positively associated with theprobability of achieving gender parity in secondary enrolment in rural Bangladesh.These correlations hold even for the sample of older, pre-existing religious schools,

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and hence corroborate the hypothesis that madrasas may have encouraged greaterfemale participation in secondary education rather than selectively emerging inregions where households have responded to the stipend scheme by sending daugh-ters to schools.

These features of the religious education system in Bangladesh provide importantpolicy leverage in harmonizing schooling outcomes among students from diverseeducational backgrounds. Our results suggest that ‘reformed’ madrasas in Bangladeshhave gone beyond adopting modern curriculum by altering age-old practice of educat-ing predominantly male students and embracing girls. This scenario is in stark contrastwith other countries in South Asia with large Muslim populations (and elsewhere),where most religious seminaries are of traditional types, predominantly single sex, andstill untouched by any significant changes in curriculum. Therefore, Bangladesh offersan excellent case study for other countries that hope to embark on a modernizationscheme to bridge the gap between religious and secular schools.23

There is no question that secondary school madrasas in Bangladesh are playinga critical role as far as enrolment and gender parity is concerned (two importantMillennium Development Goals). However, researchers and critiques should insteadfocus on what is being taught and actually learnt in these educational institutions interms of literacy and numeracy skills. It is expected that the inclusion of modernsubjects will not only give the students of madrasa the requisite skills highly valuedin a market-based economy, but will also change their attitude towards worldlyaffairs and members of different religions and ethnicities. To what extent curricu-lum reform has contributed to these objectives is not yet clear. Existing survey datado not contain information on labor market outcomes of post-reform graduates.Nonetheless, research using test scores data on registered secondary schools andmadrasas in rural Bangladesh find no significant difference in test scores by schooltype conditioned upon school choice and differences in socio-economic back-grounds (see Asadullah, Chaudhury, and Dar 2007).24 Interestingly, the only otherrigorous study of madrasa quality find that there is little difference betweenmadrasa and secular private schools in Indonesia (Newhouse and Beegle 2006).This highlights the fact that quality of education, particularly in poor rural areas ofmany developing countries, is low, regardless of type of provider. However, almostnothing is known about the quality of un-aided Quomi madrasas, which may indeedbe very different (and mostly likely to be lower) and will require specific surveys toaddress.

In conclusion, our study suggests that fiscal incentives can be used to modernizemadrasa curriculum and pry them further open to female admission. On an optimisticnote, the very fact that this was possible in Bangladesh, which has the world’s secondlargest secondary madrasa system, should be encouraging for other countries with alarge Muslim population currently grappling with similar issues of curriculum reformand gender equity. Once madrasas are brought into the mainstream, it is imperativethat we systematically measure how good these schools are in imparting literacy andnumeracy skills to its pupils. This type of rigorous quality assessment should be donefor schools across the spectrum – public or private, secular or religious – otherwise, itis difficult to compare across service providers. Furthermore, systematic research bya wide array of social scientists on the impact of madrasa education on ‘socialization’,political participation, and labor market decisions, is essential towards assembling aholistic picture of the overall implications of incorporating religious institutions asservice providers.25

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AcknowledgementsThe findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of theauthors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated orga-nizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they repre-sent. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 2007 Royal Economic SocietyConference (Warwick University), at the World Bank–Department for Foreign and Interna-tional Development (DFID) South Asia Regional Conference on Education, October 2007(New Delhi), at the Bangladesh Development Initiative Conference, June 2008 (HarvardUniversity), and at seminars at the Independent University of Bangladesh, the University ofReading and the Oxford University. The authors are also thankful to Sayed Rashid Al-Zayedfor help with data preparation.

Notes1. The Deoband (Darul Ulum) system, introduced in 1866 in Northern India, is considered by

many as a reaction to the Anglo-Oriental education in colonial India. The Deobandis shunmodern scientific and technical education and follow the ‘Dars-i-Nizamia’ – a syllabuscomprising of authoritative texts that dates back to the eleventh century. The nature of otherlearning materials used therein remains unknown. Being unrecognized, they do not followgovernment-approved curriculum and, hence, are open to exploitation by extremist quarters.

2. The origin of registered madrasas in Bangladesh can be traced to 1780 when, under theBritish initiative, the first ever madrasa in the public sector was established in the subcon-tinent, namely Calcutta Aliyah madrasa. The madrasa went through a major reorganizationin 1850 when it was divided into two separate divisions, the Arabic and the Anglo-Persian.However, only the purely religious side of the Calcutta madrasa moved to Dhaka in 1947.The handful of registered madrasas in Bangladesh between 1971 and 1980 are all inspiredby the Calcutta madrasa, and hence are popularly known as Aliyah madrasas (Zaman 1999).

3. Those few who succeed in securing wage employment perform relatively poorly in the labormarket. Studies comparing wage earnings of graduates of madrasa and secular schoolssuggest lower returns to religious education (see, for example, Asadullah 2006, 2009).

4. All madrasas in Bangladesh are privately owned and managed. There are just three state-run Islamic seminaries in the country.

5. Recently, humanities, science and business education have been introduced at secondarystage.

6. In recent years, most of the Quomi madrasas have also replaced Urdu by Bangla as themedium of instruction. Amongst other notable changes, some Quomi madrasas have volun-tarily introduced modern subjects into their curriculum. In other words, apart from the usualIslamic education, students are also taught English, mathematics and social science (Ahmad2004). However, such changes are allegedly limited to those that are member of a regionalconfederation of Quomi madrasa. In the absence of a single central association, the extentand nature of curriculum modernization within the Quomi sector is said to differ signifi-cantly across various regional associations. We are not aware of any study that documentsthe extent of curriculum reform in the Quomi sector. These sporadic and uncoordinatedcurriculum changes aside, there have been little changes in other areas such as attitudestowards females. For instance, no Quomi madrasa in the country approves co-education.

7. In contrast, Aliyah madrasa degrees are recognized by all universities in Bangladesh.8. This figure is from Kennedy (2004).9. At present, only seven Indian states (Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan,

Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) have government-sponsored madrasa education boards, towhich a number of madrasas are affiliated.

10. Outside South and South-East Asia, Egypt and Turkey are two countries with considerableexperience in madrasa reform.

11. This followed amendment of the Indonesian Educational Act No. 2/1989.12. Another noticeable difference between the two countries is that recognized madrasas in

Bangladesh are supervised by Ministry of Education, whereas in Indonesia they remainunder the control of Ministry of Religious Affairs.

13. Given that Quomi madrasas are overwhelmingly unregistered, information about themfrom administrative sources is essentially non-existent. Therefore, we do not know the

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exact size of the Quomi education sector in Bangladesh. However, the authors are currentlyin the process of conducting a specialized survey to specially look at Quomi madrasas.

14. In contrast, Madrasas in Pakistan account for less than 1% of total school enrolment(Andrabi et al. 2006).

15. According to Sattar (2004), however, at the time of independence, there were 1371 regis-tered madrasas in Bangladesh. However, no basis could be found for this figure; the authorused past newspapers clippings as a data source. If one takes this estimate as authentic, thefraction of converts as a percentage of total registered secondary madrasas becomes 34%.

16. The ‘recognition year’ corresponds to the year in which a madrasa first received grantsfrom the government. For 14% of the madrasas in the census data-set, however, this infor-mation is missing.

17. The remaining 3% constitute pre-existing registered madrasas that were inspired by theArabic branch of Calcutta Aliyah madrasa and specialized primarily in medieval Arabic/Islamic texts.

18. Indonesia is another Muslim country that has achieved similar gender parity in madrasaenrolment.

19. See online (Table 7): http://www.banbeis.gov.bd/db_bb/madrasah_education_2.htm.20. Administratively the nation is divided into divisions, districts, subdistricts (upazilas),

unions, cluster of household (mouzas). As many as 24% (n = 1179) of the unions in Bang-ladesh do not have a secondary madrasa.

21. A similar pattern is observed from gross enrolment statistics. According to BangladeshBureau of Educational Information and Statistics (BANBEIS), gross female enrolment rateat secondary level in school (total number of females enrolled in secondary school/totalnumber of 11–15 year olds in the population) has increased from 42.5% to 48.4% between1999 and 2003.

22. In a companion paper, we also investigate the correlation between female enrolment andthe number of madrasas in the union using a similar regression specification (see Asadullahand Chaudhury 2008). Once again, we find that Bangladeshi regions with higher numberof madrasas experience higher growth in female enrolment.

23. Our position is not about relative advantage but about expanding the option of serviceproviders in rural areas. There are essentially no government schools in rural Bangladesh.Besides secular aided-schools, the government strategy is to expand supply of schools bygiving incentives to religious schools to register, to modernize their curriculum, and toadmit female students.

24. This, however, simply demonstrates that quality of education remains very low in the ruralarea so that private secular schools do not have an advantage over Aliyah madrasas inattracting prospective students.

25. Asadullah and Chaudhury (2006) present an attempt in this direction. However, the authorsonly focus on a sample of females to study the relationship between religious school atten-dance and social attitude of graduates.

ReferencesAhmad, Mumtaz. 2004. Madrassa education in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Religious radicalism

and security in South Asia, ed. Satu Limaye, Robert Wirsing and Mohan Malik. Honolulu,HI: Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Andrabi, T., J. Das, A. Khwaja, and T. Zajonc. 2006. Religious school enrolment in Pakistan:A look at the data. Comparative Education Review 50, no. 3: 446–77.

Asadullah, M. Niaz. 2006. Returns to education in Bangladesh. Education Economics 14:457–712.

Asadullah, M. Niaz. 2009. Returns to private and public education in Bangladesh and Pakistan:A comparative analysis. Journal of Asian Economics 20, no. 1: 77–86.

Asadullah, M. Niaz, and N. Chaudhury. 2006. Religious schools, social values and economicattitudes: Evidence from Bangladesh. QEH Working Paper No. 139, University ofOxford, UK. (Forthcoming in World Development)

Asadullah, M. Niaz, and N. Chaudhury. 2008. Madrasas and NGOs: Complements or Substi-tutes? Non-state providers and growth in female education in Bangladesh. World BankPolicy Research Working Paper No. 4511, World Bank, Washington, DC.

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Asadullah, M. Niaz, N. Chaudhury, and A. Dar. 2007. Student achievement conditioned uponschool selection: Religious and secular secondary school quality in Bangladesh. Econom-ics of Education Review 26, no. 6: 648–59.

Azra, Azyumardi. 2004. Mainstreaming islamic education. Paper presented at the USINDO10th Anniversary Lecture Series, March 31, in Washington, DC.

Fahimuddin. 2004. Modernization of Muslim education in India. Delhi: Adhyayan.http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2004/04/04/rumors_of_jihad/.Kennedy, Miranda. 2004. Rumors of jihad. Boston Globe, 4 April. http://www.boston.com/

news/globe/ideas/articles/2004/04/04/rumors_of_jihad/.Khan, Amirullah, Mohammad Saqib, and Zafar Anjum. 2003. To kill the mockingbird.

Mimeo. World Bank, Washington DC.Ladbury, Sarah. 2004. Madrassahs and Islamic education in South Asia: What the donor

community needs to know. Report prepared for the World Bank, South Asia Department,Washington, DC.

Metcalf, Barbara. 1978. The madrasa at Deoband: A model for religious education in modernIndia. Modern Asian Studies 12, no. 1: 111–34.

Newhouse, D., and C. Beegle. 2006. The effect of school type on academic achievement:evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Human Resources 41, no. 3: 529–57.

Sattar, A. 2004. Bangladesh madrasa shikhkha o samaj jibone tar provab [Madrasa educa-tion in Bangladesh and indications in social life]. Dhaka: Islamic Foundation.

Zaman, M. 1999. Religious education and the rhetoric of reform: The madrasa in British Indiaand Pakistan. Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 2: 294–323.

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Appendix 1

Table A1. Profile of recognized secondary schools and post-primary madrasas in Bangladeshby location.

Madrasa School

Area/locationNumber of

madrasas (%)

% of teachers

being female

% of students

being female

Number of schools (%)

% of teachers

being female

% of students

being female

Rural 92 8.30 48.50 86 16.7 52.3Urban 8 12.60 40.60 14 34.5 52.3Metropolitan cities 2 14.50 32.00 4 42.5 51.5Dhaka city 1 14.80 35.30 2 44.5 51.7All area 100 (N = 9214) 8.70 47.70 100 (N = 18,500) 20.3 52.3

Source: BANBEIS, Ministry of Education, Government of Bangladesh. Data reported are for the year2005.

Table A2. Descriptive statistics.

Variable Additional description MeanStd. dev.

Total female enrolment in Grade 6 in 1999 in the region

In natural logs 5.27 0.76

Total female enrolment in Grade 10 in 1999 in the region

In natural logs 4.53 0.83

Total number of madrasas in 1999 in the region 1.71 1.65Total number of schools in 1999 in the region 3.51 2.71# of co-educational madrasas in the region, 1999 1.73 1.66Number of girls-only madrasas in the region, 1999 3.54 2.17Number of boys-only madrasas in the region, 1999 1.50 1.40Number of co-educational schools in the region,

19990.19 0.49

Number of girls-only school in the region, 1999 0.03 0.17Number of boys-only schools in the region, 1999 2.74 1.70Number of new madrasas set up during 1999–2003 0.02 0.17Number of new schools set up during 1999–2003 0.07 0.30Mean age of schools 0.03 0.17Mean age of madrasas 0.08 0.31Fraction of madrasas in the region (in 1999) who are

convertsConverts are madrasas established before 1980

0.39 0.41

Urban Fraction of urban schools 0.13 0.31Govt Whether any government

school in the region0.05 0.22

N 4784

Note: Region refers to ‘union’, an administrative unit that is smaller than subdistrict (upazila) but biggerthan village (usually comprising of 10–15 villages).

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Documents

Holy alliances: public subsidies, Islamic high schools, and female schooling in Bangladesh