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Holding a Mirror to the New Lok Sabha Author(s): Samuel Paul and M. Vivekananda Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 45 (Nov. 6-12, 2004), pp. 4927-4934Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4415773Accessed: 04-09-2015 06:11 UTC

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Holding a Mirror to the New Lok Sabha

Following a Supreme Court directive, the 2004 parliamentary elections saw the submission

of affidavits by contesting candidates for the first time, providing information on their education, assets, criminal cases, borrowings from public financial institutions and dues to the government. This paper presents the findings obtained by an analysis of affidavits submitted by

elected candidates. While they point to the increasing number of younger (age group 36-55) and educated (graduates) MPs, other instances also confirm the correlation between money power and criminal cases. The clear dominance of the better-off in the electoral arena calls for a reform of electoral laws. Not only is greater transparency and accountability required,

but also a debate on whether elections need to be publicly financed, so as to enable the creation of a level playing field for all aspiring candidates.

SAMUEL PAUL, M VIVEKANANDA

Landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of India in May 2002 has made it mandatory for all those who contest in the elections to the Lok Sabha and the state legislatures

to furnish information on their antecedents to the Election Com- mission of India and state election commissioners.1 The court further ordered that such information should be placed in the public domain well before voting take place. The court ruled that citizens have a right to know the backgrounds and antecedents of the candidates and that this is part of the people's fundamental rights. In compliance with this order, the Election Commission of India then announced that all candidates contesting in parlia- mentary and state elections were required to furnish certain categories of information about themselves in a prescribed affidavit. In the parliamentary elections of 2004, for the first time, affidavits along these lines were ordered to be collected from all those who contested in the national elections in all states and union territories of the country.

In India, as in many other countries, voters have very little knowledge of the backgrounds and personal antecedents of those whom they elect to their legislatures. Election campaigns may exaggerate the credentials or achievements of candidates to suit the occasion. Anything negative may be kept under wraps. It is difficult for voters to check the veracity of these claims. Neither the candidates nor the election authorities are required to vouch for their validity. As a result, voters are left with a one-sided glimpse of the candidates, a far cry from the balanced assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the persons who will constitute the august body that enacts the country's laws and policies. Voters then will certainly not have any means to judge whether the capabilities, backgrounds and past conduct of the representatives will be an aid or hindrance in the effective discharge of their duties. It is this gap or imbalance in information that is being sought to be rectified by the Supreme Court's judgment.

The affidavits mandated by the Election Commission, how- ever, can fill this gap only in part. First of all, the information on antecedents sought from the candidates is of a limited nature. The only categories of information required of them are on education, assets, criminal cases, borrowings from public finan- cial institutions, and dues owed to the government. Equally important matters like the candidate's profession, sources of income or income tax status are not included in the affidavit. Secondly, many observers have doubts about the veracity of the

data provided by the candidates as there is no official verification of the reported data. The valuation of assets, for example, is complex and may well be underreported by many. Education attainments could be exaggerated. But the hope is that putting the information in the public domain itself will act as a deterrent to large-scale falsification of data. Thirdly, the election authori- ties do not always ensure that candidates complete the affidavits in full. This is evident from the affidavits assembled in the 2004 elections. Despite these reservations, the merit of the affidavits is that the information declared is available for all or most of the candidates. It is for the first time that such data has been

displayed publicly in websites, and the Election Commission of India deserves our thanks for its timely actions.

The Supreme Court's intent was to make this information accessible to the public enabling the latter to make more informed choices in elections. In retrospect, however, it is doubtful that this objective has been achieved satisfactorily in the elections of 2004. The affidavits may have been displayed in the offices of the returning officers. But no attempt was made by the authorities to publicise the affidavits or to make them more accessible to the people. Information on websites was accessible only to a highly select segment of voters. The media and civil society groups also would have found it difficult to disseminate this voluminous information.2

Though the primary purpose of this exercise in public exposure may not have been adequately met, we can have the consolation that the information in the affidavits can also be used to generate new knowledge about the totality of India's elected represen- tatives. This can be done by aggregating and analysing the data on all the elected candidates, in terms of certain common criteria or attributes. In the process, we may gain a better understanding of our representatives and the choices we make.

In this paper, we present the findings of a systematic analysis of the data taken from the affidavits of 541 MPs3 elected in 2004 to the Lok Sabha (The total number of seats is 543). The affidavits were taken from websites of state election commissions. Their processing did take some time as the information had to be translated from different languages. Some data gaps exist in the affidavits as all members have not disclosed all the facts required of them. The returning officers are supposed to ensure completion of all affidavits. We now know that not all of them have been diligent in their duty! Despite the incomplete answers in some

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of the affidavits, interesting patterns of MP backgrounds emerge from the analysis. Disaggregation by political parties, states and other criteria yields rich insights into the strong and weak spots of newly elected MPs in the Lok Sabha, India's supreme gov- ernance institution. Benchmarks based on these findings can be used to measure changes in the profile and attributes of MPs over time as new elections are held.

The paper is divided into five sections. The first section presents the demographic profile of the new Lok Sabha. The second section dissects the information on the assets held by the MPs. The analysis of their criminal cases is summarised in Section III. Their borrowings from public financial institutions and dues owed to government departments are analysed in Section IV. The conclusions of the study and policy implications are presented in the final section.

Demographic Features It is useful to start with an overview of some of the basic demo-

graphic attributes of the new Lok Sabha that can be gleaned from the affidavits. The analysis presented in this section deals with the distribution of MPs by age, education, caste and gender. Further disaggregation of these distributions by state, political party, etc, has been done, and the major findings are summarised below.

The age distribution of the members shows that nearly 55 per cent of the members are in the age group of 36-55. Elderly members (more than 65 years) account for 14 per cent and the youngsters (less than 35 years) constitute 6.5 per cent of all members. The age distribution of the members has not changed significantly from one Lok Sabha to the other except for the 1 1th Lok Sabha which had a higher proportion of youngsters (19 per cent). In the present Lok Sabha (14th), members above 60 years of age are more in Communist Party of India (20 per cent), Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (18.8 per cent) and Communist Party of India (Marxist) (18.6 per cent). The Indian National Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party have about 16 per cent of elderly members. Higher percentages of youngsters are repre- sented by Bahujan Samaj Party (26.3 per cent), Shiv Sena (16.7 per cent) and Rashtriya Janata Dal (13 per cent). The younger MPs constitute 4.8 per cent in the Indian National Congress and 5.8 per cent in Bharatiya Janata Party.

Nearly 28 per cent of the MPs are less than 45 years old. Regional analysis shows that a higher percentage (34.3 per cent) of members elected from the northern states are below 45 years (Appendix Table A for details), followed by western states (24.2 per cent), southern states (23.3 per cent) and eastern states (22.7 per cent).4 The states with more than 20 per cent seniors among their MPs are Assam, Karnataka, Punjab, West Bengal and Uttaranchal. The highest proportions of young MPs (below 35 years) are found in Haryana (20 per cent), Jammu and Kashmir (16.7 per cent) and UP (15 per cent).

The education level of elected representatives is impressive though it is hazardous to make a comparison of declared quali- fications across the states. Over 73 per cent are graduates and 41.7 per cent of them are postgraduates. Law is the dominant professional qualification of the members (21.5 per cent). Only 5.9 per cent of members were unable to go beyond high school education. The 12th Lok Sabha also had about 77 per cent graduates. There is thus a small decline in the overall education level.

Among the political parties, nearly 80 per cent of the MPs of Biju Janata Dal, Communist Party of India, and Rashtriya Janata Dal are graduates. Nearly 71 per cent of the MPs of the Indian National Congress and 74 per cent of the MPs of Bharatiya Janata Party are graduates. Relatively low education levels are reported by Bahujan Samaj Party members (15.8 per cent under high school level).

Himachal Pradesh leads in the education level of its MPs (100 per cent graduates). Assam (86 per cent), Kerala (84.3 per cent), and Tamil Nadu (84.2 per cent) are next. MPs below high school level are the highest in Haryana and Uttaranchal (20 per cent each). A higher percentage of members (81.3 per cent) from southern states are graduates and a relatively lower percentage of members (64.3 per cent) from western states are graduates.

The scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (SC and ST) category accounts for 24.6 per cent of all MPs. This group constitutes 26.8 per cent in Bharatiya Janata Party and 22.1 per cent in the Indian National Congress. The highest percentage of SC and ST members (27.3 per cent) are in Biju Janata Dal. In terms of age composition, a larger proportion of SC and ST members are in the lower age group. Over 35 per cent of SC and ST members are less than 45 years as against 25.2 per cent in the general category.

The education level of SC and ST candidates is comparable to the level of general category. Nearly 20 per cent of the SC and ST MPs have had education up to high school as against 14.6 per cent for general category. Graduates comprise 70 per cent of SC and ST members as against 74.4 per cent in the general category. The percentage of postgraduates in SC and ST category is higher (33.1 per cent) than in the general category (29.8 per cent).

Women constitute only 8.3 per cent of all MPs. Female rep- resentation is slightly higher in the SC and ST category (9 per cent). Among political parties, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (18.8 per cent) and Shiv Sena (16.7 per cent) have comparatively better representation for women. Communist Party of India has no women MPs and Rashtriya Janata Dal has only 4.3 per cent women MPs.

Women MPs are much younger than their male counterparts. Over 44 per cent of female members are less than 45 years while only 26 per cent males are less than 45 years. There are no female members above the age of 66 years, whereas 15.3 per cent of male members are above 66 years. The education levels of female members are also higher compared to the male members. Eighty two per cent of women members are graduates as against 72.5 per cent among males. Furthermore, 37.8 per cent of female members are postgraduates as against 30 per cent among males.

II Asset Holdings: The Power Base

Detailed information on assets was provided by 535 members. The different categories of assets reported are given in Table 1. Most of the members have not given the value of motor vehicles owned by them. Hence, in the computation of movable assets the valuation of the vehicles is not included. The value of the movable and immovable assets of 35 members add up to Rs 78.3 crore. On an average, an MP has total assets worth Rs 1.64 crore (the assets per MP varied from Rs 11,000 to Rs 66.6 crore). The average assets reported by the SC and ST members are less than one-third of the assets reported by the rest. When the non-SC

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and ST MPs alone are considered, the asset value per person rises to nearly Rs 2 crore.

The share of jewellery in the total assets is a mere 3.5 per cent of the total. The movable and immovable assets constitute 46.2 percent and immovable assets 53.9 percentrespectively. Buildings appear to be the dominant asset form, accounting for over one- third of the total assets. Three out of four MPs (74.6 per cent) own agricultural land. But one out of five MPs have agricultural assets that account for over 50 per cent of their total immovable assets. Thus only a small proportion of them have strong agri- cultural ties.

The largest proportion of MPs with substantial agricultural assets are found in the Rashtriya Janata Dal (43.5 per cent) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (35.3 per cent). This proportion is much lower for the Congress MPs (18.6 per cent) and for the Bharatiya Janata Party (24.1 per cent). No agricultural land is owned by 70 per cent of the Communist Party of India MPs, 57 per cent of the MPs in Communist Party of India (Marxist), and one-third of the Shiv-Sena MPs.

The average value of assets owned by an SC and ST MP is Rs 58 lakh much lower than the average asset value of other MPs (Rs. 1.98 crore). One out of 12 SC and ST MPs is a crorepathi while one out of three among other MPs is a crorepathi. One out of five SC and ST MPs has assets below Rs 10 lakhs while only one out of 16 among other MPs fall into this low asset category. Though SC and ST members reported a lower level of assets compared to other members, the immovable assets constitute a higher percentage (62.6 per cent) compared to general members (53 per cent). Correspondingly the share of movable

Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Assets

Items SC and ST General All Members

Jewellery 3.70 3.48 3.50 Movable assets excluding gold 33.49 43.51 42.65 Agricultural land 15.60 11.18 11.55 Non-agricultural land 9.31 5.66 5.97 Buildings, etc 37.90 36.17 36.32 Total assets 100.00 100.00 100.00

assets is on the lower side for SC and ST members. This shows that the assets of SC and ST are less in the formal sector and more in the traditional areas like land.

The distribution of total assets of all members by political parties shows that the share of the Indian National Congress members is 52 per cent though they constitute about 27 per cent of total members. The share of BJP is 15 per cent as against their membership share of about 25.5 per cent. The share of Samajwadi Party is 6 per cent, 2 per cent each for Shiv Sena, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Bahujan Samaj Party and 1 per cent each for Biju Janata Dal, Rashtriya Janata Dal and Communist Party of India (Marxist) and a negligible share for the Communist Party of India.

The distribution of total assets by major political parties also shows that Indian National Congress leads the list with Rs 3.1 crore per MP, followed by Samajwadi party and Shiv Sena with 1.5 crore each. The other major political parties with more than Rs 1 crore assets per member are Bahujan Samaj Party and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. The total assets per member of the Bharatiya Janata Party is slightly below one crore of rupees. The members of the two communist parties reported lower assets. The average assets reported by members of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Communist Party of India (CPI) are Rs 23 lakh and Rs 25 lakh respectively. The average assets reported by the members of other smaller parties (Rs 1.77 crore) are on the higher side and are next only to the average assets reported by members of the Indian National Congress. The average assets of an SC and ST member works out to Rs 58 lakh. It is not only the elected members who have a large asset base; even the runners-up (those who polled the next highest votes) in this election were also high asset persons (based on the analysis of two states).

The total assets per member is highest in the south (Rs 2.47 crore) followed by the north (Rs 1.72 crore), the west (Rs 1.48 crore) and lowest in the east (Rs 0.61 crore).

The asset distribution for members of major political parties presented in Table 2 shows that over 50 per cent of MPs have assets per person of Rs 50 lakh or more. Over 27 per cent are

Table 2: Distribution of Members by Asset Class, Major Parties and Other Categories

Major Parties Total Assets per Member Less than Rs 10 to Rs 50 Lakh Rs 1 Crore Total (Rs in lakh) Rs 10 Lakh 50 Lakh to 1 Crore and Above

Indian National Congress (INC) 310.76 5(3.4) 39(26.9) 35(24.1) 66(45.3) 145(100) Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 96.91 11(8.0) 54(39.4) 40(29.2) 32(23.4) 137(100) Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) 22.95 13(31.0) 24(57.1) 5(11.9) 0(0.0) 42(100) Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 119.83 4(23.5) 8(47.1) 1(5.9) 4(23.5) 17(100) Communist Party of India (CPI) 25.40 2(20.0) 6(60.0) 2(20.0) 0(0.0) 10(100) Samajwadi Party (SJP) 153.78 3(8.3) 13(36.1) 8(22.2) 12(33.3) 36(100) Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 56.19 1(4.3) 11(47.8) 10(43.5) 1(4.3) 23(100) Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) 105.06 0(0.0) 5(33.3) 5(33.3) 5(333) 15(100) Shiv Sena (SHS) 151.29 0(0.0) 6(50.0) 3(25.0) 3(25.0) 12(100) Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 53.51 3(27.3) 4(36.4) 1(9.1) 3(27.3) 11(100) Other smaller parties 177.39 10(11.5) 33(37.9) 25(28.7) 19(21.9) 87100 Total 164.18 52(9.7) 203(37.9) 135(25.2) 145(27.1) 535100 Caste Category SC and ST 57.97 27(20.6) 59(45.0) 29(22.1) 16(12.3) 131(100) General 198.27 25(6.2) 144(35.6) 106(26.2) 129(31.9) 404(100) Total 164.18 52(9.7) 203(37.9) 135(25.2) 145(27.1) 535(100) Education level Undergraduates 193.18 9(6.9) 49(37.4) 33(25.2) 40(30.5) 131(100) Graduates and above 137.07 43(10.9) 148(37.6) 101(25.6) 102(25.9) 394(100) Notes: (1) Major parties are those with 10 or more elected members.

(2) Figures in brackets are percentages. (3) One lakh= 100,000; one crore= 10 million.

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'crorepatis'. Only one in 10 has reported assets below Rs 10 lakh. Among the political parties, Indian National Congress has the highest percentage of elected members (45.5 per cent) with assets worth more than a crore of rupees. One in 10 of the Congress MPs is worth Rs 10 crore or more. One-third of members in Samajwadi Party and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam reported assets worth more than a crore of rupees. Over 23 per cent members of Bharatiya Janata Party reported assets worth more than a crore of rupees.

Neither the Communist Party of India (Marxist) nor the Communist Party of India (CPI) has any crorepati MP. Of the MPs with assets below Rs 10 lakh, CPI (M) leads with 31 per cent, followed by Biju Janata Dal (27.3 per cent), Bahujan Samaj Party (23.5 per cent) and CPI (20 per cent).

Among the states, the highest concentration ofcrorepatis among MPs are in the Punjab (69.3 per cent), Andhra Pradesh (47.6 per cent), and Maharashtra (41.7 per cent). West Bengal (28.6 per cent), Orissa (28.6 per cent), and Kerala (26.3 per cent) have the most MPs with less than Rs 10 lakh assets per person (See Table A2 for details).

According to conventional wisdom, the less educated are the least likely to become rich. But that is not how it is in the world of MPs! There is clear evidence that a larger proportion of our less educated MPs are richer than the better educated. A compari- son of their assets with education levels shows that it is the less educated MPs who are richer in terms of asset values. The per capita assets of those with undergraduate education or less amount to Rs 1.93 crore while graduates and post-graduates have average assets of only Rs 1.37 crore.

Ill Criminal Cases: The Interconnections

The nexus between politics and criminality has been a major public concern in the country in recent years. A special committee was appointed by the government of India to investigate this matter in detail and to recommend remedial actions.5 But the committee had to rely on anecdotal evidence for the most part. We are now on much firmer grounds with regard to data, given the information provided by the affidavits. It is possible, for example, to analyse the cases by their degree of severity and track parties and regions in terms of these criteria. Needless to add, registration of criminal cases against a person does not imply that s/he is a criminal. But it does raise the possibility of criminal conduct by the person.

According to the affidavits, nearly a quarter (23.2 per cent) of the MPs have either criminal cases registered against them or pending in courts. One out of 12 among them have cases that could attract penalties amounting to imprisonment for one year or less. One out of two of the MPs with criminal cases (over 50 per cent), on the other hand, have cases that could attract penalties of imprisonment of five or more years. For the purpose of this analysis the cases that could attract penalty of five or more years of imprisonment are classified as major criminal cases.

Further analysis of the age distribution of MPs and their criminal cases shows that members in the age group of 36 to 45 have a higher percentage of criminal cases (30.4 per cent) compared to the other age groups. Besides, this age group has a higher percentage of major cases (18.3 per cent) compared to minor cases (12.1 per cent). Over 25 per cent of members in the age group 46 to 55 and 19.3 per cent of members in the age

Figure 1: Distribution of Total Assets of Members by Parties

BJD Others 1 per cent 18 per cent

SHS V 2percent DMK

2percent^\. - ; ^^J 62 i:eINC

0 per cent ,~ 1 per cent ...........

. . ..........

PI ..... ..

BSP r 2percent e t PoM , .BJP

1 per c ent

group 55 to 65 have criminal cases that are evenly distributed between minor and major cases. Similarly, 20.3 per cent of younger MPs (35 years and less) and 14.7 per cent of elders (66 and above) have criminal cases, but a large proportion of their cases are minor in nature.

The criminal cases of members by party affiliation show that there are no criminal cases registered against 83 per cent of the Congress MPs and 80 per cent of the BJP MPs (Table 3 for details). RJD leads in the proportion of criminal cases (43.5 per cent). Biju Janta Dal has the smallest proportion of MPs with criminal cases. In respect of criminal cases with severe penalties (5 or more years' imprisonment), RJD leads with 34.8 per cent of MPs, BSP with 27.8 per cent and Samajwadi Party with 19.4 per cent. The proportion of Congress MPs who fall into this category account for 7.6 per cent of their total and BJP MPs account for 10.9 per cent.Though the Shiv Sena has the highest percentage of members with criminal cases, no member has a case liable for the highest penalty.

Statewise analysis shows that there are no criminal charges against the elected members from the states of Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and Uttaranchal (Appendix Table A3). A lower percentage of criminal charges are found among the elected members in Andhra Pradesh (7.1 per cent). A higher percentage of members (31.3 per cent) from the western states reported criminal cases, followed by the northern states (28.2 per cent). The lowest percentage of criminal cases (11.4 per cent) is reported from members from the eastern states. Nearly 20 per cent of MPs from the southern states reported criminal cases. Though a higher percentage of members from western states reported criminal cases, the more serious criminal cases were reported against a larger percentage of members from the northern states.

That money and muscle power dominate Indian elections has been suspected by many observers. But we can now go beyond this generalisation and demonstrate that a convergence of factors seems to be at work. Of 132 MPs who are undergraduates and below, over 30 per cent have criminal cases against them com- pared to 21 per cent for the rest. Their average value of assets is close to Rs 2 crore each compared to less than Rs 1.4 crore for the more educated. The convergence here is between crimi- nality (cases against MPs), money power (asset base) and low education. This is not to say that all MPs with low education levels are rich or prone to crime. But more among them are richer and have more criminal cases than those with higher educational

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attainments. The question to ask is whether the less educated among the MPs get elected because they are richer and command criminal links than the rest of the members. Do political parties attract them because they compensate for their low education through their asset power and criminal prowess?

Four states, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand account for over 50 per cent of all MPs with criminal cases that could attract severe penalties (five years' imprisonment or more). The category of criminal cases and the asset base of the MPs in these four states have been analysed to see whether there is a similar convergence between criminality and money power. Out of the 162 elected members from these states, about one-fourth are undergraduates and about 30 per cent have criminal cases against them. Among the undergraduates, about 38 per cent and among graduates about 28 per cent reported criminal cases. This pattern is similar to the overall pattern where undergraduates have a higher percentage of criminal cases compared to graduates. Of the total criminal cases reported by the members in the four states, two-thirds are major criminal cases. Only 4 per cent of cases that attract a penalty of one year or less in jail, are minor. It is significant that there is a positive association between the cat- egories of criminal cases (by the severity of punishment) and the asset classes of the members (Table 4). Members with minor criminal cases have a lower asset base compared to the members with major criminal cases. The average assets per member with criminal cases ranged between Rs 2.6 lakh for MPs with minor criminal cases to Rs 1.1 crore for MPs with major criminal cases. It is almost as if with larger assets one can graduate to a higher

Table 3: Distribution of Members by Criminal Cases (Classified by Penalties) and Major Parties

Major Parties No Case One Year Two to Five Years Total and Less Three Years and above

Indian National Congress 120(82.8) 2(1.4) 12(8.3) 11(7.6) 145(100)

Bharatiya Janata Party 110(79.7) 3(2.2) 10(7.2) 15(10.9) 138(100) Communist Party of India (Marxist) 35(83.3) 1(2.4) 3(7.1) 3(7.1) 42(100)

Bahujan Samaj Party 11(61.1) 1(5.6) 1(5.6) 5(27.8) 18(100) Communist Party of India (CPI) 8(80.0) 0(0.0) 1(10.0) 1(10.0) 10(100)

Samajwadi Party 25(69.4) 0(0.0) 4(11.1) 7(19.4) 36(100) Rashtriya Janata Dal 13(56.5) 0(0.0) 2(8.7) 8(34.8) 23(100) Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 10(66.7) 1(6.7) 3(20.0) 1(6.7) 15(100)

Shiv Sena 5(41.7) 0(0.0) 7(58.3) 0(0.0) 12(100) Biju Janata Dal 10(90.9) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 1(9.1) 11(100) Other Smaller Parties 66(75.0) 2(2.3) 9(10.2) 11(12.5) 88(100) All Parties 413(76.8) 10(1.9) 52(9.7) 63(11.7) 538(100)

Notes: (1) Criminal cases attract varying degrees of penalties based on the nature of the offence. The penalties presented in the columns are the maximum penalties the cases can attract as per the Indian Penal Code sections.

(2) Figures in brackets are percentages.

Table 4: Assets per Member by Level of Education and Criminal Cases in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh

and Jharkhand (Rs in Lakh)

Liability of Punishment Number of Percentage Assets per Members of Members Member

One year and less 2 4.2 2.60 Two to three years 14 29.2 79.67 Five years and above 32 66.6 112.19 Total 48 100.0 98.14

level on the crime ladder. Or is it the other way around? This evidence lends strong support to the symbiotic relationship between criminality and money power in the electoral arena.

Further analysis of the data shows that four regional parties (BSP, SP, RJD, JMM6 ) in the four states account for a substantial proportion of the MPs with major criminal cases. By contrast, the Indian National Congress has the lowest proportion of such MPs. BJP has a larger proportion of such MPs than the Congress, but the proportion is much smaller than that of the regional parties. The prominent presence of MPs with criminal cases in regional parties deserves to be noted.

Disaggregation of criminal cases by caste groups shows that the percentage of MPs with criminal cases is more in the general category (25.2 per cent) than in the SC and ST category (17.3 per cent). For the SC and ST category, the percentage of minor cases is higher (9.8 per cent) compared to major cases (7.5 per cent). For the general category, the percentages of minor cases and major cases are evenly distributed.

An analysis of criminal cases by gender shows that the per- centage of MPs with criminal cases is higher for men than for women. 15.6 per cent of female members have criminal cases compared to 23.7 per cent for men. Furthermore, women MPs have a larger proportion of minor cases than male members.

IV What the MPs Owe: Debts and Dues

Nearly half of all MPs have reported outstanding debts to public financial institutions. Outstanding debts in excess of Rs 10 lakhs were reported by 13.6 per cent while debts below Rs one lakh were reported by only 5.4 per cent. The total outstanding debt of these MPs amounts to Rs 41.3 crore.

Of total outstanding loans from public financial institutions, 45 per cent is accounted for by Congress MPs though they comprise less than 30 per cent of all MPs. BJP is next with 23 per cent of the total. Larger debts (in excess of Rs 10 lakh) have been incurred by Shiv Sena MPs (41.7 per cent), followed by DMK (20 per cent), Congress (17.9 per cent), and BJP (12.5 per cent). Substantial proportions of CPI MPs (80 per cent), CPI (M) MPs (66.7 per cent) and BSP MPs (66.6 per cent) reported no outstanding debt.

Outstanding debts of over Rs 10 lakh are owed by over 30 per cent of the MPs from Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Karataka and Punjab. Over 70 per cent of the MPs from Haryana, West Bengal, Delhi, and Uttaranchal have no outstanding debt.

Dues to government departments (for telephone charges, taxes, rent, electricity, etc) were reported by 13.8 per cent of the members. Dues are in excess of Rs one lakh for 8.4 per cent of the MPs. Their total government dues amount to Rs 7.3 crore.

RJD MPs (52.2 per cent) lead the pack in terms of unpaid government dues. These MPs account for 69 per cent of the total government dues. RJD also leads in the proportion of MPs that owe dues in excess of Rs one lakh (34.8 per cent), followed by Congress MPs (13.8 per cent), and BJP MPs (6.6 per cent). No government dues are reported by CPI (M) and CPI MPs.

Government dues in excess of Rs one lakh remain outstanding from one-third of the MPs from Bihar, and Jammu and Kashmir. But MPs from Delhi top the list with 43 per cent in default. No dues have been reported by MPs from Kerala, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and Chhattisgarh.

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In terms of outstanding debts and government dues, SC and ST MPs are more or less similar to the rest of the MPs (about 52 per cent). The major difference is that the amounts involved are smaller.

V Conclusions and Policy Implications

The analysis of affidavits presented in this paper provides substantial support to the view that the convergence between money power and criminality is widely prevalent in the Indian electoral arena. Nearly one-fourth of all MPs have criminal cases registered against them. Some of the ways in which criminality, wealth and education are linked also emerge from our analysis. For example, it is revealing that a larger proportion of our less educated MPs are richer than the better educated MPs and are also ahead of the latter on the criminal front. Of the 132 MPs who are undergraduates and below, over 30 per cent have criminal cases against them compared to 21 per cent for the rest. Their average value of assets is close to Rs 2 crore each compared to less than Rs 1.4 crore for the more educated. This is not to say that all MPs with low education levels are rich or are prone to crime. But the convergence of low education, large assets and criminal cases perhaps reflects a functional mix that suits the needs of some of the political parties.

A positive finding is that an impressive majority of MPs are graduates and postgraduates. But women MPs who possess higher education levels than men, account for only eight per cent of the total. Younger MPs have higher education levels than the rest, but constitute only a minority. MPs who belong to scheduled castes and tribes (SC and ST) are as educated as the rest, but possess fewer assets. Perhaps, most of them would not have been elected in the absence of reservation of seats.

Four states, Bihar, UttarPradesh, MadhyaPradesh and Jharkhand account for over 50 per cent of all MPs with criminal cases that could attract severe penalties (five years imprisonment or more). MPs from Himachal Pradesh, Assam, Uttaranchal and Jammu and Kashmir have no such criminal cases against them. There is thus a concentration of criminally charged MPs in a few states. The regional parties in these states account for a substantial

Table 5: Debt and Dues per Member by Major Parties and Categories

(Rs in Lakh)

Major Parties Debt Dues

Indian National Congress 12.66 0.90 Bharatiya Janata Party 6.80 0.21 Communist Party of India (Marxist) 1.06 0.00 Bahujan Samaj Party 0.87 1.00 Communist Party of India 0.30 0.00 Samajwadi Party 4.92 0.15 Rashtriya Janata Dal 1.79 21.87 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 4.72 0.03 Shiv Sena 21.77 1.85 Biju Janata Dal 4.83 0.09 Other smaller parties 7.78 0.28 Total 7.72 1.37 Caste Category SC and ST 3.50 0.62 General 9.08 1.61 Total 7.72 1.37

Education level Undergraduates 10.66 0.39 Graduates and above 6.44 1.73

Figure 2: Distribution of Dues (Government Departments) of Members by Parties

BJD Others INC 0 per cent 3 per cent 18 per cent

SHS BJP 3 per cent 4 per centCP

2 per cent

CPi

mon people have an asset base that puts them in a class, way above their fellow citizens. Over 50 per cent of the MPs have assets of over Rs 50 lakh. The Indian National Congress has the largest proportion of crorepati MPs (45 per cent). The Congress Party MPs account for more than 50 per cent of the assets of all MPs. Even the runners-up (those who polled the next highest votes) are high asset persons. Money power truly constitutes the entry barrier in the political game. Only the two communist parties have the largest proportion of MPs with assets less than Rs 10 lakh. The average assets of an MP are valued at Rs 1.64 crore. Having a large asset base is not a disqualification, however, the concern is whether electoral politics is dominated by those with money power at the cost of other essential qualities such as leadership and integrity.

SC and ST MPs compare favourably with the rest of the MPs in terms of education. But their asset base is much smaller and could have been a handicap in the competitive nature of election politics. It is unlikely that many of them would have been elected but for the reservation policy. Women MPs are a small minority in the Lok Sabha, but have a much larger proportion of educated persons than among the men.

The two communist parties and DMK have the largest pro- portion of MPs aged 66 years and above. Younger members are a small minority in all parties CPI has no women MPs. Assam and Uttaranchal are the only states that have returned no women MPs.

The findings presented above give us a more comprehensive picture of the new Lok Sahba that cannot be derived from statements about individual MPs or about one or the other attributes such as criminality. Some of the findings are counter- intuitive and offer us insights into the patterns of strengths and weaknesses of the collectivity constituting our elected represen- tatives. At the very least, the findings should make us sit up and think about their policy implications.

Key Policy Implications

(1) A striking finding is the dominance of the richer classes in the electoral arena. That only six per cent of non-SC and ST members have assets below Rs 10 lakh signals the power of the

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money barrier. The only other group that has won seats despite lower assets are SC and ST MPs, only because they contest from reserved constituencies. That elections cannot be fought without substantial funds is widely known and understood. But the evidence presented in this analysis raises two important ques- tions. First, if large funds are deployed, does it not call for a higher degree of transparency and accountability by persons and parties that collect and use the funds? Second, should not a significant role be assigned to public financing, if large sums are required for election campaigns and transparency is difficult to enforce under the prevailing system? If election financing is not reformed, the role of private money power will only increase, making it even more difficult for qualified persons without a large asset base to enter politics. If a level playing field is created, those with greater leadership qualities and integrity may be encouraged to enter the political arena even if their personal wealth is modest.

(2) In respect of transparency and accountability, the existing laws have only been partially effective. Formal rules for accounting and monitoring election expenses exist. But how well they are being enforced and whether action is taken where abuses occur is not at all clear. Most political parties do not publish timely and complete accounts and reports. Given the large-scale cash transactions, it is not easy to verify their revenues and expenses. Even the income tax departments have not been able to examine and act on their findings. It is difficult to see how political parties who are non-transparent and undemocratic in their internal affairs can lead and strengthen the country in democratic and accountable ways. A more democratic, accountable and transparent internal system of management of the political parties has to be the starting point.

(3) There are similar problems with respect to election fin- ancing. Given the issues highlighted in this paper, the only way to go forward is by assigning a larger role for public financing in elections.7 But when parties are dominated by people with money power, a serious incentive problem emerges. Public financing may dilute their power and influence for obvious reasons. Their lukewarm response to the public financing idea is therefore not surprising. The argument that several other countries have adopted such reforms also does not impress many political leaders. The most frequently heard argument against this idea is that governments do not have adequate funds to finance election expenditures of candidates in a signi- ficant way. On the face of it, it seems reasonable to say that large amounts diverted for financing election expenses will impoverish the government. But much depends on what society considers to be its priorities in public spending. To take just one example, in the name of the MP local area development scheme (MPLADS), an amount of Rs 2 crore per member per annum that adds up to nearly Rs 1600 crore is being allocated by the government.8 Over a five-year period, this will amount to Rs 8,000 crore. Even if a crore of rupees is to be given to each candidate for specified expenses and there are five candidates per constituency, a third of this sum will be adequate to finance a good proportion of their election expenses. The real question is, what is higher priority in the larger public interest. Parliament has decided that MPLADS is more important than election financing. Many observers have questioned the relevance, sustainability and productivity of this scheme. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India has raised serious concerns about

the working of this scheme and its utilisation of funds. It is time to initiate a debate on this subject. Funds for election financing could be found simply by reallocating funds from lower priority to higher priority uses.

(4) To those who object to the very concept of public financing of elections, it needs to be pointed out that an opaque and costly form of public financing of election campaigns already exists! Though it is hard to prove with precise numbers, it is widely believed that most political parties and elected representatives have non-transparent ways of mobilising funds at public cost that are later used for election financing. Some of these funds may come from their corporate or business allies. But a major source is said to be through the award of contracts or other favours to interested parties, including for appointments and transfers of civil servants, who in turn give kickbacks to their patrons through corrupt means. Is this not a blatant diversion of public funds? The pervasive non-transparency in the accounting and finances of political parties and the predominance of cash transactions in the election arena reinforce this belief. Let us accept and recognise that public financing of elections of an illegal and inequitable kind does operate in the country, with serious con- sequences for the stability and health of our democratic system. The challenge is to scrap this system and replace it with a transparent, fair and functional framework for the proper use of public funds in elections. This reform may well save some public funds as many observers believe that huge amounts are being sucked out of the public exchequer through the corrupt practices referred to above. Our objective here is not to offer a formula for the public financing of elections, but rather to confront this issue as the only way forward to create a more just level playing field for those who contest elections.

(5) Our findings challenge the view that criminality can be banished from politics simply through more legislation and penalties. If money power is closely linked to crime and crime- prone leaders, the answer lies much more in solving the problem of campaign financing as explained above. If know- ledge and understanding are important for MPs whose primary role is to deal with complex policy-making and legislation, we need first of all to make it easier for political parties to attract more suitable persons to enter the electoral arena. It is in this context that the apparent links between low education levels,

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Appendix Table A1: Distribution of Members by Key Attributes and Regions

(Per cent)

Regions Age Graduates Criminal Major Average Below Cases Criminal Cases Assets

45 years (Rs in lakhs)

North 34.3 73.4 27.7 17.5 171.94 East 22.7 77.9 11.4 9.1 60.8 South 23.3 81.3 19.7 8.7 247.0 West 24.2 64.3 31.3 7.1 147.7 Total 27.8 73.3 23.2 11.7 164.2

Notes: North - Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and Delhi. East - Assam, Orissa, Chhattisgarh and West Bengal. South - Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. West - Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan.

Table A2: Distribution of Members by Asset Class and States

Major States Less than Rs 10 to Rs 50 lakh to Rs One Rs 10 Lakh 50 Lakh One Crore Crore to Total

10 Crore

Andhra Pradesh 2(4.8) 11(26.2) 9(21.4) 20(47.6) 42(100) Assam 2(14.3) 7(50.0) 3(21.4) 2(14.2) 14(100) Bihar 2(5.1) 17(43.6) 16(41.0) 4(10.3) 39(100) Gujarat 1(3.8) 11(42.3) 7(26.9) 7(26.9) 26(100) Haryana 0(0.0) 2(20.0) 5(50.0) 3(30.0) 10(100) Himachal Pradesh 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 3(75.0) 1(25.0) 4(100) Jammu and Kashmir 1(16.7) 0(0.0) 4(66.7) 1(16.7) 6(100) Karnataka 2(7.1) 8(28.6) 9(32.1) 9(32.1) 28(100) Kerala 5(26.3) 10(52.6) 3(15.8) 1(5.3) 19(100) Madhya Pradesh 2(6.9) 12(41.4) 9(31.0) 6(20.7) 29(100) Maharashtra 2(4.2) 15(31.3) 11(22.9) 20(41.7) 48(100) Orissa 6(28.6) 8(38.1) 3(14.3) 4(19.0) 21(100) Punjab 0(0.0) 1(7.7) 3(23.1) 9(69.3) 13(100) Rajasthan 0(0.0) 13(52.0) 5(20.0) 7(28.0) 25(100) Tamil Nadu 2(5.4) 13(35.1) 9(24.3) 13(35.1) 37(100) Uttar Pradesh 9(11.5) 24(30.8) 20(25.6) 25(32.1) 78(100) West Bengal 12(28.6) 22(52.4) 6(14.3) 2(4.8) 42(100) Chhattisgarh 1(10) 7(70.0) 2(20.0) 0(0.0) 10(100) Jharkhand 2(14.3) 8(57.1) 1(7.1) 3(21.4) 14(100) Uttaranchal 0(0.0) 4(80.0) 0(0.0) 1(20.0) 5(100) Delhi 0(0.0) 2(28.6) 2(28.6) 3(42.9) 7(100) All states 52(9.7) 203(37.9) 135(25.2) 35(27.1) 535(100)

Note: Figures in parenthesis are percentages.

Table A3: Distribution of Members by the Class of Criminal Cases and States

Major Parties No Case One Year Two to Five Years Total and Less Three Years and above

Andhra Pradesh 39(92.9) 0(0.0) 1(2.4) 2(4.8) 42(100) Assam 14(100) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 14(100) Bihar 26(66.7) 0(0.0) 2(5.1) 11(28.2) 39(100) Gujarat 19(73.1) 0(0.0) 3(11.5) 4(15.4) 26(100) Haryana 8(80.0) 0(0.0) 1(10.0) 1(10.0) 10(100) Himachal Pradesh 4(100) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 4(100) Jammu and Kashmir 6(100) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 6(100) Karnataka 22(78.6) 0(0.0) 1(3.6) 5(17.9) 28(100) Kerala 11(57.9) 2(10.5) 4(21.1) 2(10.5) 19(100) Madhya Pradesh 22(75.9) 0(0.0) 2(6.9) 5(17.2) 29(100) Maharashtra 28(58.3) 3(6.3) 16(33.3) 1(2.1) 48(100) Orissa 18(85.7) 0(0.0) 1(4.8) 2(9.5) 21(100) Punjab 9(69.2) (0.0)0.0 1(7.7) 3(23.1) 13(100) Rajasthan 21(84.0) 2(8.0) 0(0.0) 2(8.0) 25(100) Tamil Nadu 30(78.9) 1(2.6) 5(13.2) 2(5.3) 38(100) Uttar Pradesh 57(72.2) 2(2.5) 7(8.9) 13(16.5) 79(100) West Bengal 37(88.1) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 5(11.9) 42(100) Chhattisgarh 9(81.8) 0(0.0) 1(9.1) 1(9.1) 11(100) Jharkhand 7(50.0) 0(0.0) 4(28.6) 3(21.4) 14(100) Uttaranchal 5(100) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 5(100) Delhi 5(71.4) 0(0.0) 2(28.6) 0(0.0) 7(100) All states 413(76.8) 10(1.9) 52(9.7) 63(11.7) 538(100)

Note: Figures in parenthesis are percentages.

money and criminality among our elected representatives are worrisome. That this phenomenon is concentrated in a few states and some regional parties is tragic considering the eco- nomic and social backwardness of these states. The brighter side is that tackling this problem in a limited geographical region may be easier than fighting it all across the country. Parties need to reflect on the implications of the patterns revealed by our find- ings. Informed public exposures and debates on this subject are perhaps the only way to sensitise our political parties to these public concerns.

(6) At the outset of this paper, it was mentioned that the affidavits have not been made easily accessible to the voters who have the 'right to know'. The Supreme Court's primary concern was to inform the public about the candidates. The kind of post mortem analysis presented here would have been seen by the Court as incidental! But getting back to the basics is important. Both the Election Commission, government and civil society groups need to be more proactive to achieve this objective. Copies of the affidavits relevant to a locality should be displayed in other public offices in that area, and not merely in the election office; post offices, village offices, etc, are some examples. Civic groups could make summaries on the candidates and display them in towns and villages. The media could publicise where and how citizens can access this information.

(7) Women MPs at 8 per cent of the total is an abysmally appalling record, especially when they compare favourably with their male counterparts on several desirable attributes. They are, for example, more educated and younger in terms of average age than the men in MPs. Whether reservation is the only way to correct the gender imbalance is another important issue for reflection. m

Address for correspondence: pacindia@vsnl.com

Notes [The views expressed in this paper are of the authors and not of the Public Affairs Centre. The authors are grateful to A Ravindra, Suresh Balakrishnan, K Gopakumar and several other colleagues for their helpful comments and suggestions.]

1 The judgment is an example of the success of civil society activism and public interest litigation in India. The initiative for filing the case initially in the Delhi High Court was taken by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR). Several other groups also joined in at the appeal stage.

2 Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore, disseminated information from the affidavits in many districts of Karataka along with other citizen groups. Voters are concerned only about the candidates in their constituencies. The information campaign has therefore to be customised to meet varying needs, making it highly labour intensive.

3 Based on the data available on the state web sites at the time of the analysis.

4 The definition of the four regions is given in Table Al at the end. 5 See the Vohra Committeee Report, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government

of India, Delhi, 1995. 6 JMM is a regional party in Jharkhand. It has only four MPs and hence

has been aggregated under 'other smaller parties' in the tables. 7 The different options for public financing of elections will not be discussed

here. See Guhan, S and Paul, S, (eds), Corruption in India: Agenda for Action, Vision Books, Delhi, 1997, for details.

8 There are nearly 800 members in the two houses of parliament. At Rs 2 crore per member, this scheme has to be provided an annual budget of Rs 1,600 crore.

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