History of the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO):

Evolution of the Role of the NCO from 1775 until Present

By:

SGM Kevin S. Robins

Sergeant Major Course, Class # 56

Group Room: L05

Faculty Advisor: SGM Vaneta Vaughn

11 January 2006

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I. Introduction.

A. References:

l. FM 7-22.7, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide

2. Valley Forge: The Making of an Army, by Alfred H. Bill

3. Combat Actions in Korea, by Russell A. Gugeler

4. The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military, by Charles C. Moskos Jr.

5. The Boys in the Barracks: Observations on American Military Life, by Larry H. Ingraham

B. The basis for the research conducted in support of this paper was to define the evolution of the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) from the early beginnings of our Army until the present. Extensive internet searches reinforced the references listed above.

II. Body.

A. The Beginning: The emergence of the NCO in America.

B. Baron von Steuben's impact on the development of the NCO.

C. The Civil War and the emergence of the Color Sergeant.

D. The role of the NCO during World Wars I and II, and the Korean Conflict.

E. Vietnam was the war of the NCO.

F. The modem era of the NCO.

III. Closing

A. Summary. For the past fifteen minutes, I have discussed areas A-F above.

B. Questions.

C. Closing statement.

D. Next speaker introduction.

1970

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Works Cited

Bill, Alfred H. Valley Forge: The Making of an Army. New York: Harper, 1952

Gugeler, Russell A. Combat Actions in Korea. Washington: Government Printing Office,

Ingraham, Larry H. The Boys in the Barracks: Observations on American Military Life. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study ofHuman Issues, 1984

Moskos, Charles C. Jr. The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970

United States. Department of the Army. The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide: FM 7-22.7. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2002

Arms, L.R. "A Short History of the NCO." NCO Museum Staff Article U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, TX 20 November 1989. 1 Oct. 2005 http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/arms/arms.asp

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Evolution of the Role of the Noncommissioned Officer from 1775 until Present

The emergence of the American Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) began

simultaneously with the beginning history of our great country and has continued to

evolve in stature and responsibility. Only recently has the NCO received the recognition

deserving a professional. That recognition was born of the accomplishments,

perseverance, and devotion to upholding standards through over two hundred years of

American's history. To better understand the evolution of the NCO, one must first

understand the origins of the NCO in the American Army and trace their progress to

present-day.

The early settlers in colonial America brought with them the traditions of their

homeland. One of the traditions was that of forming local militias for the protection of

local communities. Each community formed a single company and further divided into

squads, each led by a NCO. Unlike their European counterparts, American NCOs did not

experience the strict structure of an established army and exercised much more initiative

as a result. During the War of Independence, the most noteworthy positions served by

NCOs were as fifer, drummer, and file closer. The fifer and drummer were in charge of

battlefield communications, signaling commands from officers by means of musical

notes. File closers served to maintain the integrity of formations. Squads normally

formed in two ranks of ten files. A Corporal usually served as file closer in the rear of a

formation, while a Sergeant performed the same function on the flank. While the

positions of the NCO on the battlefield were important, they allowed little or no

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independence of action (Arms, 1989). However, the growth in importance of the NCO

was just around the comer.

In 1778, a Prussian General, Baron Frederick William von Steuben, made camp at

Valley Forge and quickly went to work identifying weaknesses in the structure and

training of the Continental Army. The result of Steuben's analysis resulted in the

Regulations for the order and discipline ofthe troops ofthe United States. Possibly the

most significant document ever published regarding the necessity of NCO leadership,

Steuben's Regulations introduced, for the first time, the NCO as instructor and trainer.

NCOs received training in leadership skills and assumed responsibility for the well-being,

discipline, and training of Soldiers. While NCOs retained traditional roles such as file

closer, which now, thanks to advances in weapons technology, placed NCOs in charge of

aimed volley fire rather than the old method of simply pointing fire in the direction of the

enemy, they also established new roles such as the "covering sergeant." The covering

sergeant was responsible for the protection of the unit commanding officer on the

battlefield; similarly, corporals performed those same duties in protection of the junior

officers responsible for the unit colors on the battlefield (Bill, 1952). At the close of the

War of Independence, NCOs were playing an increasingly more vital role in the training

and tactics of the time.

The next significant development in the evolution of the NCO came in 1815 with the

introduction of General (later President) Winfield Scott's Rules and Regulations for the

Field Exercise and Maneuvers ofInfantry. This document provided for more swift

movement of formations. Key to these changes in maneuver was the "color sergeant."

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Traditionally a junior officer role, Scott's doctrine called for the use ofNCOs in

maintaining unit colors and in controlling formation alignment and cadence in movement.

Obvious targets on the battlefield, the demonstrated courage of these Soldiers was

essential in their ability to motivate units. The tradition of the color sergeant carries on

today and serves as a significant reminder of the sacrifice of those who came before us.

The Civil War saw an increased reliance on sergeants, as most NCOs remained loyal

to the Union and nearly one third of all commissioned officers fled to the confederate

states. With the role of the NCO as color sergeant well embedded in military tactics

during the Civil War, the increase in weapons accuracy and volume of fire, due largely to

the advent of rifled barrels and the Gatling gun, created the need to change maneuver

tactics yet again. General Silas Casey introduced his u.s. Army Infantry Tactics for the

Instructions, Exercises, and Maneuvers ofthe Soldier, a Company, a Line ofSkirmishers,

Battalion, Brigade, or Corps D ' Armee in 1862 that directed senior NCOs be trained in

taking command of small units in the event that officers were lost in battle, a

circumstance that occurred increasingly as weapons developments created larger numbers

of casualties during engagements.

Between the years 1866 and 1917 the Army developed several changes in maneuver

tactics, eliminating linear formations in favor of more open formations which created

greater need for command and control of small units and in tum demanded greater

initiative on the part of the NCO. Modernization of weapons and equipment also took

place during this time frame. The stronger and more efficient one-pound knife bayonet

replaced the old rod bayonet, and in 1903 the new magazine-fed Springfield rifle replaced

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the old standard issue rifle, adopted in 1892. Improvements in the machine gun and the

introduction of the internal combustion engine, which produced machines such as the

truck, motorcycle and airplane, also influenced significant change in the tactics and

strategy of the Army; thereby placing increased emphasis on the need of the NCO as

trainer.

World War I brought with it the new tactical phenomenon referred to as trench

warfare. A struggle of attrition, trench warfare had a devastating effect on American

forces by creating huge NCO shortages. To address these shortages, the Army began

training programs in the United States whereby draftees trained for NCO positions.

Lacking the experience of their predecessors, these new NCOs drew constant criticism

from their European counterparts sighting their inability to maintain discipline among the

American troops. In response to obvious shortcomings in NCO training, General John J.

"Blackjack" Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, recommended,

and received approval for, an upgrade in NCO leadership training. NCO performance

improved enough in the closing months of World War I that General Pershing, in

correspondence with Major General G. B. Duncan, Commanding General of the 82nd

Division, wrote the following on the importance of NCO leadership at the small unit

level: "NCOs must love initiative and must hold what ground they gained to the utmost.

It often happens that a sergeant or even a corporal may decide a battle by the boldness

with which he seizes a bit of ground and holds it" (Moskos, 1970). As World War I came

to a close, the weapons and art of warfare continued to evolve. Soon the "war to end all

wars" would pale in the scale of destruction brought about by yet another World War.

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World War II placed enormous stress on the nation as a full 25 percent of the nation's

manpower mobilized in support of the conflict. As the Army grew in size, the number of

NCO positions also grew. The Army was also in need of specialists to accommodate the

technological advances in weaponry and equipment. These specialists were given NCO

status. As a result, units were soon overwhelmed with NCOs and no one to perform daily

tasks and duties. Realizing the mistake of bestowing NCO status on the "techs," in 1943

the Army determined that techs and specialists would share duties with privates and

would wear the letter "T" beneath their chevrons (Ingraham, 1984). NCOs performed

their duties in an exemplary manner throughout World War II. Their ability to adapt

from one environment to another in victory after victory, further demonstrated their value

in leading small units in combat. After World War II, the Army suffered through a

demobilization that reduced enlisted strength by 90 percent. This would haunt the Army

when in 1950 war would breakout in Korea. It would be months before the war hardened

veteran NCO of World War II would reemerge. But reemerge they did, and became once

more recognized as vital to any small unit success (Gugeler, 1970). This tradition carried

on during the Vietnam conflict.

Once again, NCOs would demonstrate their skills as trainers and small unit leaders.

In 1965 the role of the United States in Vietnam changed from advisor to combat

multiplier; the United States joined with other allied forces to provide offensive combat

capability. Because of the limiting factors associated with terrain and infrastructure, the

conflict in Vietnam was not suited for large troop formations. Success would depend

upon small unit actions. More than any other military conflict in American history,

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success in Vietnam would depend on the NCO. NCOs perfonned exceptionally in every

facet of combat operations. However, Army personnel policy - such as the one-year

theatre rotation - and high casualty rates created severe NCO shortages. These shortages

led to faster than nonnal promotion rates to junior and mid-level NCO ranks. The lack of

experience of these NCOs diminished the respect and trust of officers who found

themselves more involved in the routine duties and responsibilities of their Soldiers. In

tum, Senior NCOs became increasingly frustrated with both junior NCOs and officers.

That frustration, naturally reciprocated, resulted in insubordination on a scale that drew

attention from the highest levels of the Army.

With the drawdown of American forces in Vietnam, the draft ended and the decision

made was to build a military from volunteers. The decision to shift from a conscript

military to a volunteer professional anny was based on the realization that defense was

not something that should only be created during times of conflict, just to be destroyed

once the threat was defeated. The Army leadership detennined to build an organization

based on professional business theory. Past lessons emphasized the need to affect change

in middle management, the NCO. Ofparticular concern were the areas of pay, training,

education, NCO management, and treatment. For the first time in the history of the

American Anny, rather than being reminded that their status as professionals meant little

when competing with those of the officers corps, NCOs would be treated with the dignity

and respect they deserved. The years 1971 through 1973 saw the introduction of the

Noncommissioned Officers Education System (NCOES), a system of education that

would prepare NCOs for positions of increased responsibility; 1975 witnessed the

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implementation of the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) which provided

guidance in the management and promotion potential of enlisted personnel; and

implemented in 1980, the Noncommissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP)

provided formal leadership training at all levels of command. These programs provided

the impetus necessary to develop a professional Noncommissioned Officer (Arms, 1989).

The past two decades have further demonstrated and reinforced the need for NCOs

trained to lead small unit actions across the full spectrum of military operations. The

social, authoritative and responsibility lines that once differentiated NCO from officer

have blurred, due largely to higher enlisted education levels and the Army's profound

focus on developing a lighter, more swift and lethal force; all attributes associated with

small unit tactics and the professional NCO. NCOs now find themselves performing in

Joint, Inter-service, and Multinational positions that not so long ago commissioned

officers filled. As a result, leaders at the highest level have recognized the importance of

retaining experienced NCOs in the ranks through progressive pay increases, better

education opportunities, and the perpetual revision ofNCOES to ensure its relevance.

Perhaps the highest recognition is that of appointing a senior NCO to stand with each

Commander from platoon level to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Certainly, the lines of separation between officer and NCO will continue to blur and

evolve, but what will remain unchanged is the charge of the NCO, assigned over the

history of our military, that the NCO is, and will remain, the standard-bearer, the

gatekeeper of institutional knowledge, and the mentor of the timeless qualities of

leadership and courage.