HSB-54/H1890E Sept. 19, 2006

COURSE INTRODUCTION: HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT THE SECOND WORLD WAR?

THE WAR AS VIOLENCE:Some stats.: U.S. losses in Iraq: <3,000 to date; 58,000 in Vietnam, 110,000 in WW I,

>300,000 in WW II. Russia’s losses, perhaps >20,000,000; Germany’s perhaps 4,000,000.WW I: 9-10m dead of which 80% or more were combat deaths. WW II: perhaps 40-

50m dead, of which about 50 percent non-combat deaths. Genocide, famine, aerial bombing take huge roll.

If violent death in the 20th century = approximately 180m, 25% of those died in World War II. See Matthew White’s website: <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstats.htm>

THE WAR IN SPACE: WAR AND EMPIRE: WWI: the culmination of a particular state form: “Empire” (generally authoritarian rule

over different “nations” or ethnically aware groups.) Newer overseas empires (Britain, France, US) vs. old landed empires (Russia, Austria-Hungary), Ottoman Empire (Turkey and mid-East). Breakdown of these latter and rivalry of the former interact (Germany both new and old). Alliance system and crisis mismanagement lead to War.

We think of WWI and Versailles settlement as destroying the old empires (Ottomans, Russians, Habsburgs or Austrian-Hungarian – along with 1911 end of Qing empire) and establishing principle of nationality. But in fact, WWII also an imperial conflict – Britain and Dutch in Pacific vs. Japanese and French, British, vs. Germans; and two new superpowers ready to assume empire-like scale (U.S. and USSR).

THE WAR IN TIME: ONE WAR IN TWO? FOUR WARS IN ONE?One War in Two? Relation of World War II (1937/39-45) to World War I (1914-1918): A Thirty-Year War of the Twentieth Century?? German problem in both wars: Japanese ambition and challenge throughout both wars; rise of the United States and Soviet Union to world power through both wars – both speaking for anti-imperial ideologies.

But: scope and violence of WW I vs. WW II. Extent of fighting and theaters. A war of offensives (WWII) vs. a “defensive” war (WW I); sea power and air power in WW II.

A sense of fatality vs. sense of choice (WWI vs. WW II). Issues of inevitability.

Four Wars in One? WW II best seen in terms of four overlapping wars:(1) WWI resumed: Germany vs. Britain and France for continental hegemony

(September. 1939-June 1940);(2) Ideological Total War (Germany vs. Soviet Union, June 22, 1941-May 9, 1945); the

US. vs. Germany (Dec. 11, 1941-May 8, 1945). Far huger in manpower and resources; Holocaust takes place within this war. Democracy and Communism vs. Nazism/Fascism;

(3) The Pacific War: Japanese-Chinese war, 1931/37-45 and Anglo-American-Japanese War. Who controls China? Who inherits European imperial possessions in Far East?

(4) The War for the German or Japanese Succession, 1943-45: Civil war between the Resistance and Collaborators; or between Communist and Non-Communist Resistance and Collaborators. Outcome crucial for control of Europe and Asia.

HSB-54/H1890E; 9/21/06 Prof. Charles Maier

War and Empires: Old, Aspiring, Reluctant

Return to the turn of the twentieth century and the “state system.”

What was taken for granted? Darwinist premises: states competitive; peoples/races varied in their capacity for statehood and governance; “nation-states” had a claim on their young males – conscription on the continent; alliances had become necessary – From the balance of power with Britain as “swing” to balance of two opposing blocs: end of Britain’s “splendid isolation” and the Central Powers (1879 on) vs. the Entente Cordiale (1904) and Triple Entente (1907).

Changes in the late l9th century: Unification of Germany (was it “satiated” or not?); multi-national empires vulnerable to disintegrative pressures (Ottomans and Austria-Hungary in particular). Two forms of empire: “Old,” agglutinative – Russia, Austria-Hungary, Ottomans, China. Governed continguous territories and relatively authoritarian (bureaucratic and military).“New” overseas empires – could be democratic (strong parliaments) at home though not abroad. “New” overseas empire – French in North Africa and Indochina, Dutch in Indonesia, British as largest, emerging Japanese and Americans, in uncontested Caribbean. Germany as both “new” and “old”: African territories, and influence in Ottoman empire.

Industrial might changing the calculus of power: Germany overtaking Britain; US overtaking all others; Russia and Japan emerging. Technological changes – railroad nets being completed; instantaneous communication; iron and steel ships with improved gunnery; the airplane; machine gun.

Contending Strategic Ideas: Admiral Alfred Mahan (“Influence of Sea Power on History”) and new navalism. Dominance of seas crucial – major impact on Britain and US. But what sort of ships? from cruisers to battleships (and after WWI to aircraft carriers). New role of submarines. Naval rivalries – German decision to build “capital ships” 1898 on. Geopolitics: focus on domination of continental land masses (“the great Eurasian landmass” and control of “the heartland” through armies and industrial development): Halford Mackinder, Friedrich Ratsel, later Albrecht Haushofer. Army increases: Germany 1893, 1913; French 3-year service, 1912-13. German two-front dilemma amswered by so-called “Schlieffen Plan” but fear of Russian railroads. Both sides feel time against them.

Sites of crises: Where new, ambitious empires contend (Morocco, 1905, 1911), and coastal China (Sino-Japanese War 1895; European enclaves 1842 on, 1897 in Shandong), Korea/Manchuria (leading to Russo-Japanese War, 1904). Where old empires subject to disintegrative pressures (Ottomans in Balkans, 1875-78, Austria-Hungary and emerging nationalisms: problem of ambitious Serbia; Bosnian crisis 1908-9; Balkan wars, 1912-13).

Failure to manage the fourth Balkan crisis (and “third” Balkan war) in l9l4. From assassination in Sarajevo, 6/28/14 to declarations of war 6/ World War I as result of intersecting rivalries between old empires and newer empires – mutually connected through alliance systems .

Issue of responsibility or “war guilt.” Serbia because of state-sponsored terrorism? Germany because of strong support for A-H? Austria because of ultimatum 7/25 and then declaration of war on Serbia 7/28? Russia because first power to mobilize, 7/29-30? Germany for declaration of war on Russia 8/1? And on France 8/3? And invasion of Belgium 8/4 which gives Britain excuse to enter war on side of France? France because of failure to restrain Russia? Britain for not clarifying it would enter war and perhaps not deterring Germany in time????

Toward “total war” (Gen. Ludendorff’s phrase) and ideological war.Failure of short-war expectations: trench warfare on the western front. Why repeated

bloody offensives? Logic of two-front warfare. Failure of “end runs” in Greece and Dardanelles and Mesopotamia.

Growth of territorial ambitions: German plans for annexations and their supporters; British-French plans to partition Ottoman empire and to recover Alsace-Lorraine.

Entry of Italy (1915), Russian revolutions (March & November l9l7), United States (April 1917) and transformation into an ideological war. Wilson’s role and Lenin’s. War weariness, and the sudden German collapse – why??

A great victory? German republic; dissolution of Austria-Hungary; … Or a failure to resolve underlying problems?

(Next: Versailles, Riga, Washington Lausanne, Locarno – the postwar treaties and their weakness…)

HSB-54/H1890E, 9/26/06 Prof. Charles Maier

The Shadow of World War I: Postwar Settlements and their Vulnerability

FROM LAST LECTURE: Nineteenth-century developments -- the nation-state system; emergence of bipolar alliance system; mass conscription, railroads and industrialization; social Darwinist premises, imperialism. Navalism and geopolitics; Anglo-British naval rivalry; German-Franco/Russian army buildups. The crises of l905-1914 (Morocco 1905, 1911, the Balkans, 1908-09, 1912, 1913), and their danger.

Sarajevo and the Balkans: A mismanaged crisis: from the” third” Balkan war to World War I. Issue of responsibility (See notes from last time).

Toward “total war.” Battle of the Marne (Sept. 1914); trench stalemate (Somme and Verdun 1916); Russian collapse and Bolshevik Revolution; entry of the United States (1917). Exhaustion of home fronts. German war effort unravels – revolutions in Germany and Austria-Hungary; armistice.

“LESSONS” TO BE DRAWN FOR THE PEACE SETTLEMENTWilson’s Lessons: the “old diplomacy” (balance of power) had failed to keep the peace. Democracies were peaceful; autocracies were militarist. Collective Security (the League of Nations would assure the peace. Therefore reintegrate Germany as a democratic state. But Wilson’s influence a diminishing asset in Europe and disavowed at home.

Clemenceau’s Lessons: Germany was an ambitious state no matter what her regime. She must be unilaterally disarmamed and diminished as a security threat. Would the new German Republic be aggressive? Still preponderant in size. But if the Allies were too tough would communist revolution move west from Russia (Hungary, Bavaria)? Clemenceau not strong enough to hold Rhineland forever; wins temporary occupation and supposed U.S. alliance, which is never ratified.

Lloyd George’s lesson: Make peace quickly and conveniently. Don’t let Britain become committed to enforcing Clemenceau’s treaty. Protect British interests in the Middle East and avoid entanglement in Eastern Europe.

THE TREATY “ORDER” OF THE 1920S AND ITS VULNERABILITYNEGOTIATING THE VERSAILLES TREATY: (spring/summer 1919): (i) disarmament (100,000 army; limited navy; prohibition on air force; demilitarized Rhineland and occupation on west bank of Rhine), supposed commitment to general disarmament; (ii) territorial cessions (Danzig and Polish corridor, implicit in commitment to re-establishing Poland) and plebiscites (esp. Upper Silesia, 1921); (iii) reparations & Art.231, "war guilt clause." The “Diktat” or imposed peace. Reaction on right: feelings of betrayal, stab in the back. Rise of paramilitary politics and fascism (Hungary, Italy, Germany).

Dilemmas of Treaty: Germany neither reconciled, nor decisively weakened; remains the most massive power; Bolshevik Russia as powerful “rogue state”; Treaty thus requires continuing Anglo-French unity on enforcement or rapid revision.

RIGA (1921): Ends the Russo-Polish war of l920-21 and defines boundaries of new Soviet Union excluding much of western Ukraine and White Russia (Belarus); Bolsheviks remain in power, and “white” armies withdrawn.

SEVRES (1920) with Ottoman Sultanate reducing it to non-European Turkish territory and Constantinople; British-Greek protectorate in western Anatolia; nationalist reaction under Kemal Ataturk Treaty of LAUSANNE, 1923 (Greco-Turkish population exchange). Still, Ottoman and German possessions remained partitioned between France and Britain.

WASHINGTON TREATIES 1921-22 (East Asian settlement)DAWES PLAN (1924) diminishes reparations after crises of l921-23 including French

occupation of Ruhr territory and German hyperinflation, and opens way for U.S. private investment in Central Europe;

LOCARNO TREATIES (1925)—British and Italians guarantee German-French-Belgian borders. French, in effect, renounce unilateral intervention across Rhine. But what if Germans “remilitarize” Rhineland?? And what about German-Polish border??

HOPES AND DANGERS:Franco-German reconciliation 1925-30 under Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann;

Germany accepted into League of Nations; growth of pacifist feelings; prosperity of late l920s; reparations issues seems solvable.

Revived colonial systems (as Mandates under League of Nations) play implicit role in stabilizing Europe – what happens if colonial possessions become restive??

But…System hostage to prosperity continued democratic order in Germany. Italy already fascist. Advent of world economic crisis (Stock market crash 1929; growing mass unemployment) and political radicalism. Divergent British and French responses. Death of Stresemann fall 1929 and new nationalist tone in Germany even before Hitler. German authoritarian cabinets l930-32; Nazi electoral successes; Hitler named as Chancellor, Jan. 1933. Does Hitler mean war?

HSB-54/H1890E, 9/26/06 Prof. Charles Maier

The Shadow of World War I: Postwar Settlements and their Vulnerability

FROM LAST LECTURE: Nineteenth-century developments -- the nation-state system; emergence of bipolar alliance system; mass conscription, railroads and industrialization; social Darwinist premises, imperialism. Navalism and geopolitics; Anglo-British naval rivalry; German-Franco/Russian army buildups. The crises of l905-1914 (Morocco 1905, 1911, the Balkans, 1908-09, 1912, 1913), and their danger.

Sarajevo and the Balkans: A mismanaged crisis: from the” third” Balkan war to World War I. Issue of responsibility (See notes from last time).

Toward “total war.” Battle of the Marne (Sept. 1914); trench stalemate (Somme and Verdun 1916); Russian collapse and Bolshevik Revolution; entry of the United States (1917). Exhaustion of home fronts. German war effort unravels – revolutions in Germany and Austria-Hungary; armistice.

“LESSONS” TO BE DRAWN FOR THE PEACE SETTLEMENTWilson’s Lessons: the “old diplomacy” (balance of power) had failed to keep the peace. Democracies were peaceful; autocracies were militarist. Collective Security (the League of Nations would assure the peace. Therefore reintegrate Germany as a democratic state. But Wilson’s influence a diminishing asset in Europe and disavowed at home.

Clemenceau’s Lessons: Germany was an ambitious state no matter what her regime. She must be unilaterally disarmamed and diminished as a security threat. Would the new German Republic be aggressive? Still preponderant in size. But if the Allies were too tough would communist revolution move west from Russia (Hungary, Bavaria)? Clemenceau not strong enough to hold Rhineland forever; wins temporary occupation and supposed U.S. alliance, which is never ratified.

Lloyd George’s lesson: Make peace quickly and conveniently. Don’t let Britain become committed to enforcing Clemenceau’s treaty. Protect British interests in the Middle East and avoid entanglement in Eastern Europe.

THE TREATY “ORDER” OF THE 1920S AND ITS VULNERABILITYNEGOTIATING THE VERSAILLES TREATY: (spring/summer 1919):

(i) disarmament (100,000 army; limited navy; prohibition on air force; demilitarized Rhineland and occupation on west bank of Rhine), supposed commitment to general disarmament; (ii) territorial cessions (Danzig and Polish corridor, implicit in commitment to re-establishing Poland) and plebiscites (esp. Upper Silesia, 1921); (iii) reparations & Art.231, "war guilt clause." The “Diktat” or imposed peace. Reaction on right: feelings of betrayal, stab in the back. Rise of paramilitary politics and fascism (Hungary, Italy, Germany).

Dilemmas of Treaty: Germany neither reconciled, nor decisively weakened; remains the most massive power; Bolshevik Russia as powerful “rogue state”; Treaty thus requires continuing Anglo-French unity on enforcement or rapid revision.

RIGA (1921): Ends the Russo-Polish war of l920-21 and defines boundaries of new Soviet Union excluding much of western Ukraine and White Russia (Belarus); Bolsheviks remain in power, and “white” armies withdrawn.

SEVRES (1920) with Ottoman Sultanate reducing it to non-European Turkish territory and Constantinople; British-Greek protectorate in western Anatolia; nationalist reaction under Kemal Ataturk Treaty of LAUSANNE, 1923 (Greco-Turkish population exchange). Still, Ottoman and German possessions remained partitioned between France and Britain.

WASHINGTON TREATIES 1921-22 (East Asian settlement)DAWES PLAN (1924) diminishes reparations after crises of l921-23 including French

occupation of Ruhr territory and German hyperinflation, and opens way for U.S. private investment in Central Europe;

LOCARNO TREATIES (1925)—British and Italians guarantee German-French-Belgian borders. French, in effect, renounce unilateral intervention across Rhine. But what if Germans “remilitarize” Rhineland?? And what about German-Polish border??

HOPES AND DANGERS:Franco-German reconciliation 1925-30 under Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann;

Germany accepted into League of Nations; growth of pacifist feelings; prosperity of late l920s; reparations issues seems solvable.

Revived colonial systems (as Mandates under League of Nations) play implicit role in stabilizing Europe – what happens if colonial possessions become restive??

But…System hostage to prosperity continued democratic order in Germany. Italy already fascist. Advent of world economic crisis (Stock market crash 1929; growing mass unemployment) and political radicalism. Divergent British and French responses. Death of Stresemann fall 1929 and new nationalist tone in Germany even before Hitler. German authoritarian cabinets l930-32; Nazi electoral successes; Hitler named as Chancellor, Jan. 1933. Does Hitler mean war?

HSB-54/H1890E 10/03/06 Prof. Charles Maier

Adversaries, Phase I: Hitler’s Strategy

I. FROM LAST LECTURE

(1) INTERPRETING HITLER’S EARLY FOREIGN POLICY: end of disarmament talks; Non-aggression pact with Poland. (A.J. P. Taylor’s arguments of 1960). Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935 (Germany accepts 40% UK naval tonnage).

(2) ALLIED CONFUSIONS: Manchuria, 1931. French commitment to defensive military strategy – Maginot Line. Domestic politics as a determinant of security policy. Left and Right exchange foreign policies – the Left calls for rearmament and collective security; the Right afraid of the Soviet Union and domestic communism. Politics of the Third Republic: French turmoil in depression, scandals and the Paris demonstrations of Feb. 6, 1934. The Spanish Republic: victory of conservatives 1934 and revolt of l934. Fear of Fascism. Crackdown on left and formation of Left coalitions, now supported by Communists. VIIth Congress of Communist International: the Soviet Union will support rearmament and the encouragement of “Popular Fronts” (electoral coalitions of 1935-36). Franco-Soviet Pact by Feb.1936; but no real defence planning but undercuts demilitarized status of Rhineland, into which Germans march on 3/7/36. Popular Front coalitions in Spain and France, the growing climate of violence. The French Right calls for appeasement and encouragement of Italian alliance while Italy prepares to invade independent kingdom of Ethiopia (Abyssinia). British Tories under Stanley Baldwin shy from arms expenditures.. Generals’ uprising in Spain July 1936. Léon Blum and the French Popular Front yield to British passivity – “Non-Intervention Agreement.” Abandonment of Spanish Republic. Italian aspirations; German calculations (Hossbach Memorandum 1937 and multiple contingencies: war by 1943/45).

(3) BRINGING GERMANS “HOME TO THE REICH”: The Destruction of Austrian independence: Dolfuss and the Nazi coup attempt of July 1934; Mussolini from l934 via 1935 “Stresa Front” (meeting with French and British after announcement of German conscription) to the Rome-Berlin Axis via Ethiopia; Schussnigg and the effort to appease Hitler; isolation; plebiscite and Anschluss (annexation) March l938.

(4) HITLER AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. From Baldwin to Neville Chamberlain (Anthony Eden out in early l938). Benes agrees not to invoke French alliance. Munich agreement fall 1938: “Peace in our Time.” Arguments for and against Munich, Czecho-Slovakia. Crisis of March 15, 1939: Incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia (the Czecho- half) into the “Great German Reich.” Slovakia as vassalized republic. British extend guarantee to Romania and to Poland.

Meanwhile changes in Eastern Europe: British-French influence ebbs after Rhineland. Dictatorships in Baltic republics, Hungary moves toward Germany; Greek dictatorship under Metaxis; Romania under king and then Marshall Antonescu (vs. Iron Guard).

(5) Poland and the Danzig crisis: What did Hitler want? How did he plan to get it? The Polish “Colonels” (Sanjaca). Col. Beck – the Soviet Union as long-term adversary. Announcement of Non-Aggression Pact; last minute negotiations. “Die for Danzig?”

II. HITLER’S STRATEGY: CONCEPT OF STRATEGY – Strategy vs. Tactics; strategy as enabling concept; strategy as maximization given constraints. (1) What were constraints on Germany. (a) Relative weakness as of l936, l938. French military superiority on land; relative aircraft balance; relative armor situation. Weaknesses of German armor, but better “doctrine” for use. Britain hard to subjugate, but Britain not decisive

on continent and hoarded air power. (b) Sources of opposition at home – Generals as source of resistance?? But Hitler’s growing control over army 1934 (when he becomes “Führer and demobilizes Storm Troopers) to l938 when he installs pliable generals and becomes his own commander-in-chief. Would generals have removed Hitler? (c) Ultimate strategy – self-confidence, knowledge of opponents’ weakness. (2) Long-term economic balance potentially against Germany -- if US supports France and UK. But American isolationist legislation and Soviet neutrality (and access to Soviet raw material). Economic considerations secondary – moral issues first in his mind.

III. THE WAGER OF 1940: (1) “Phoney War,” 1939-40. French and British Right seem as concerned by Finnish

plight against Soviet Union (Finns lose Karelia in Russo-Finnish War). “Bombs for Baku?” Daladier and the effort to govern from the right.

(2) The Scandinavian calculus: Norwegian shipping and Swedish steel. Germans pre-empt British on April 10. Fall of Chamberlain government by May 10. Need for a national coalition with Labour and advent of Churchill.

(3) Invasion in West. Low countries, May 10. French and German battle plans. Did France have to lose?? Theories: (a) “Pertinax” – grave diggers of France. Inner rot leads to surrender. Evidence from after the fact: i.e. formation of Vichy. Or (b) Military catastrophe: French still have more men and tanks available. Weygand’s errors. Military/Intelligence failure. German change of tactics to “Sickle Cut.” (third version of Plan Yellow: tank and air deployments south east of British and French through hilly Ardennes, due West.. As in 1914 French guess wrong and set off in wrong direction – but in 1914 they regrouped for a decisive battle on the Marne. German intentions not understood in time. Compartmentalization of intelligence (cf. reports about 9/11).

(4) Other options in late June: a government of national defense in Bordeaux and Algeria? Instead: Pétain as savior and toward the New Order, summer-fall l940. The impact of Mers-el-Kebir; the left, the Jews, perfidious Brits had pressed a war onto France.

HSB-54/Hist.1890E Oct. 5, 2006

Adversaries, Phase I: Churchill’s Strategies

I. CHURCHILL’S OPTIONS: (1) Resources and dangers:

1) organization of economy (aircraft production up: 315 fighters by May l940, 446 in June, c.485 each in July and August -- exceeded pilot supply: 1450 in l939 + 50/week.) (Germans had l0,000 pilots but producing only 230 fighters/mo.)

2) Geographical advantages/disadvantages. 50 percent of food imported. Shipping crunch to come in l94l and early l942. (Losses = 222 ships or 755,000T in l939, 1059 ships and 4mT in l940, l300 ships and 4.33mT in l941.)

3)Contributions of dominions: NZ, Australia, Canada, S. Africa, India. 4) Hitler's ambivalence toward British Empire; peace offers; partial decision for

invasion: "Sealion." Recognizes that invasion requires air supremacy -- elimination of British bombers (which would hit German naval forces) and therefore of fighters too.

(2) Alternatives: 1) compromise peace – what were arguments (October 38).for accepting it?? 2) indefinite standoff. For survival U.S. economic help required. Destroyer deal (for convoying) and Lend Lease. 3) Victory? Could there be victory without U.S. or Russia? Could Russia survive if attacked? Could FDR bring in the US? Compromise bluff: "Give us the tools and we will finish the job." Difference from Chamberlain in acceptance of American role. Cultivation of Roosevelt.

(3) Long-term objectives and alternatives: preserving "Empire." Japanese threat in East -- but had to be tackled second. Centrality of Mediterranean conception (Egypt-Suez). Concern with Greece and Crete. Counterattacks against Italy from Egypt to Libya (l940), but reversed by Rommel, spring l941. Help with defense of Greece vs. Italy, but lost to Germans April l941; reinforcement of Crete, but surrender of island to Germans in late May. Continuous preoccupation with Mediterranean (N. Africa, Sicily and Italy, Greece) throughout war even at cost of delay in second front.

II. BATTLE OF BRITAIN: "Battle" proper vs. subsequent "blitz." Rough fighter parity: 600 available Hurricanes and Spitfires each day vs. 800 Messerschmidt 109s (limited fuel for escort and combat). Germans had up to 1300 two engine bombers. Radar (developed l935-39 with 50 Chain Home stations installed) and "ultra," vs. Knickbein.

Germans go from anti-RAF to city-bombing strategy: (1)Channel Battle from July l0; (2)full engagements from "Eagle Day" 8/13-23; (3)attack on airfields and factories 8/24-9/6 --the most successful offensive in toll of planes and pilots; (4)attack on London 9/6-30 (continuous daylight raids in effort to smoke out British fighters but with major German defeat on 9/15); night raids to "end" of battle on 10/30. Night blitz thereafter through spring l941 (Coventry). Sealion postponed on Oct. 12 until at least spring l941.

Historical Studies B-54 Oct. 10, 2006

JAPANESE STRATEGY AND CONQUESTS

I. Background: 1. Catching up with West: Meiji "Restoration" l867-8. Modernization and national

independence as goals; govt. sponsored industrialization; limited role for parliament and parties; army and naval chiefs as ministers.

2. Imperialist aspirations: Sino-Japanese War, l894-95, gains Formosa; Anglo-Japanese alliance, l902; rivalry with Russians over Korea and Russo-Japanese War, l904-5. Annexation of Korea l9l0. WWI as opportunity: the "21 demands" of l9l5" vs. China; Japan backs down but retains Tsingtao at Versailles.

3. From "liberalism" and cooperation in the l920's to growing nationalism and authoritarianism in the l930's. Washington Conference l921-22: naval limitation treaty (5-5-3 tonnage ratio). But: role of depression on army; concern with Chiang's reunification of China in late l920's. Young officers' unrest and occupation of Manchuria: made into puppet state of Manchukuo. Kwangtung Army; murder of prime minister 5-15-32. Japan quits League l933; Tokyo army mutiny, Feb. 36; denounces naval limits l936; military consolidate control in late l930's.

II. The Chinese War

(1) Marco Polo Bridge, 7/7/37. Bombing of Shanghai; "rape" of Nanking (Nanjing); Chiang Kai-shek to Chunking. 1.5m men in China by l938. Anti-Comintern pact, Dec. 1938 (Japan joins "Axis"). Clashes with USSR in Mongolia 1938-9; Japanese defeat at Nomonhan. Army ponders "northern way" vs. Russia -- but Russo-German pact (8/23/39) forces caution.

(2) Opportunities of European war: Fall of France leads to Japanese occupation of southern Indochina, July l940. U.S. opposition and demand for withdrawal from Indochina and China: embargo on steel. Prince Konoye installed as pliable PM in July l940: negotiates neutrality pact with Soviets. Tripartite Pact, Sept. l940 (Earlier pacts: “Axis” fall 1936; Anti-Comintern Pact, Dec. ’38; Pact of Steel, 1939) -- envisaged as deterring US. "Co-Prosperity Sphere."

(3) American oil embargo 7/25: US and UK envisage military deterrence in South Pacific. III. The “Rationality” of War with the U.S.

(1) After fall of France,Japan demands bases in southern Indochina; potential springboard for attack on Burma, Singapore, Indies. Navy urges "southern way," take-over of Dutch East Indies for oil supplies. Fears American Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act, l940; window of opportunity to close by l943. German invasion of Russia 6/22/41: Siberia or Indies as goal? But American embargo on oil July 25, l941; cuts off 90% of supply. Two years fuel reserves; navy sees crisis by mid-1944.

(2) Options: Either (i) withdrawal from Indochina, China and humiliation of military regime; or (ii) take-out blow against Britain, Dutch, US requiring simultaneous moves vs. Philippines, Singapore, Hawaii. Konoye wants negotiations; replaced by Tojo govt. Oct. 26.

Japanese Liaison conference envisages war unless US concession. Hull-Nomura talks in Nov. and Kurusu mission 11/25 but decision for war on November 26: Japanese present Plan A (comprehensive settlement with residual presence in China), then B (withdrawal from S. Indochina and pledge vs. further attacks in return for oil.) Hull ready to respond with "Modus Vivendi" (90 day stand-still, Japanese-Chinese talks; withdrawal from S. Indochina; end to embargo) -- but drops it 11/26 for insistence on withdrawal from China and all Indochina. Why? (ABCD talks; China demoralization?) Tokyo confirms war decision 12/1.

(3) Balance Sheet: high-quality surface cruisers and battleships, good training; underestimation by enemy. Advanced torpedos and optics, "Zero" superior in theatre. But no radar, submarines weak, merchant marine, oil tankers for forward supply, shipyard capacity, steel for replacement all insufficient.

IV. Period of Japanese Success: Dec. 41-Spring l942: A. Simultaneous Japanese attacks with a total of ll divisions (51 in army total). To East:

destruction of US battleships but not carriers at Pearl Harbor; capture of Guam and Wake. To South: destruction of U.S. airforce at Luzon on Dec. 8; American resistance on Luzon (Bataan and Corregidor) until April/May l942. British Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Sumatra taken by mid-February, Java by mid-March. To Southwest: Siam (neutral) and Malaya (British) attacked overland from Indochina and from sea. 50k Japanese defeat 90k British in Malaya, take Singapore by 2/15/42. Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk from air. Northern New Guinea occupied. Rangoon and Burma taken in March-April. British and Chinese retreat to India. Shattering of myth of white supremacy.

B. For Japan: strategic brilliance -- but what relation to political concept? Was Japan credible as leader of anti-imperialist coalition? Treatment of populations racist in its own turn.

Uncertainty about next steps: Continue offense (which way?: toward Midway or attacks on Ceylon and India?) or hunker down behind perimeter.

Oil estimates by Japanese Planning Agency (Millions of barrels)

Reserve Production.(incl.Indies) Consumption12/41-12/42 52.9m Bbl. 5.35m (Japan alone) 32.7m 12/42-12/43 25.5m 16.4m (incl.conquest) 31.5m 12/43-12/44 10.4m 33.4m 29.9mDec. l944 13.8 (i.e. more oil to be produced than consumed)

Oil estimates by Navy, as of August 19419/41-942 59.2 5.3 34.0

` 9/42/-9/43 30.2 21.0 34,09/43-9/44 10.4 42.0 34.09/44 25.2

Note: Navy projects greater consumption but also enhanced production. Unaddressed problem: interdiction of transporting Indies oil to home islands.

Actual oil production and consumption:12/41-12/42 52.9m 12.5m 51.9m (30m for

navy) 12/42-12/43 13.5m 20.1m. 41.7m12/43-12/44 -8.1 9.6 29.5Dec.44 -27.9

HSB-54/H1890E October 12, 2006Roosevelt’s Objectives and Strategies

I. Objectives and Constraints:1. What were FDR’s foreign-policy goals? What were limits on action? Problem of

his evasiveness (1940 campaign: pledge to keep U.S. out of foreign wars).2. Was U.S. participation in the war necessary? Desirable? Could we have intervened

earlier? U.S. action with relation to the Holocaust.

II. Contending U.S. Attitudes:1. “Internationalists”: FDR as a Wilsonian, ties to Europe. Domestic sources of support

in East and South. vs. American isolation in the l920s and l930s. German-American constituencies; Progressive party of 1920s (Norris, LaFollette); GOP. Nye Committee and “merchants of death.”

2. Slow changes: Neutrality Act, Aug. 1935 provides compulsory arms embargo. Renewed in winter l936 until 5/1/37 (Compare with Wilson’s policies in 1914-17). “Cash and Carry” bill May 1937 for non-military supplies. Quarantine the Enemy speech of 10/5/37.

Neutrality Act of Nov. 1939 allows cash and carry for military equipment. Charlottesville address, June l940. Defense appropriations up from $2b to $5b in summer l940. Embargo on scrap steel and aviation gasoline, summer/Sept. 1940.Dec. 1940: Lend Lease proposal: US to be “arsenal of democracy.” Passed 3/11/41. Extended to USSR in fall l941.

III. Creeping Military Involvement:1. British-American staff talks winter l941: ABC-1 (3/27/41) and commitment to defeat

Germany first. Convoying to mid-Atlantic; occupation of Greenland inApril; marines on Iceland and convoying to Iceland by July 1. Arcadia Conference at Argentia Bay: Atlantic Charter (No territorial changes w/o consent and self-determination.) Endorsed by Soviets and other governments. –

2. Greer “attack” Sept. 5, leads to “shoot on sight” policy. “Kearny” and Ruben James” attack. Congress authorizes arming of merchant ships and use in war zone, Nov. 7. Hitler’s restraint vs. Adm. Raeder’s demand to unleash German subs.

3. Failure of Nomura-Hull talks.Problems:

1) Can we justify Roosevelt’s evasiveness on involvement in European struggle?2) Did FDR willfully expose the Pacific fleet? Problem of intelligence. 3) Why did Hitler declare war on Dec. 11? If he had not, what would US have done?

HSB-54/H1890E October 17, 2006

BARBAROSSA: STALIN AND THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR

INTRODUCTION: STRENGTHS AND BURDENS OF WAR LEADERSHIP: Churchill’s gifts – archaic resistance; FDR: the sense of democratic consensual leadership – social dimension in the “Four Freedoms.” But evasiveness in 1940-41. Could he have been more forthright? Should we have stayed out of war? Stalin: near collapse in 1941, but the personification of Soviet resistance (in part due to “cult of personality”).

I. STALIN'S DIPLOMACY: 1. From collective security to Hitler-Stalin (Ribbentrop-Molotov) Pact. Buying time?

Relocation of industry; annexation of Eastern Poland. Delivery of oil and materiel. What did Stalin believe about German intentions? What did Hitler believe about Stalin?

2. Grounds for a preemptive German attack?? Russian moves in East Europe. Defense treaties with Baltic states Sept.-Oct.39. Russo-Finnish War 11/30/39-3/12/40. Annexation of Baltic states 7/20/40.

3. Rumanian events as catalyst of German-Soviet rivalry/distrust: (a) Soviet annexation of Bessarabia, then Northern Bukovina (today's Moldova), 6/23-

28/40 ; Rumania asks German support and installs pro-German govt. 7/1-3/40; Hungarians given 2/3 Transylvania 8/30 in Second Vienna Award). (Bulgarians take S. Dobruja)

(b) Antonescu dictatorship 9/6/40, King Carol flees. (Tripartite Pact 9/27. Germans arrive to train military and control oil wells (Oct. 11); Russians threaten borders; Molotov to Berlin 11/12/. Hungary endorses Axis and Tripartite Pact. (11/20/40), then Rumania joins Axis 11/23/40. Suppression of Iron Guard.

Problems over trade; Molotov to Berlin Nov. 40; refuses to endorse anti-British war. Russia continues exports to Germany; Stalin dismisses intelligence reports, moves troops back. (Had Stalin planned a preemptive strike? The Icebreaker charges.)

II. “BARBAROSSA”: THE GERMAN ATTACK. 1. Planned for 5/15; but delays for Balkans. Italians invade Greece from Albania

10/28/40 but reversed and stalemated. Yugoslavia joins Axis 3/25/41 but anti-German coup in Yugoslavia 3/27/41 annnounces neutrality; brings German invasion into Yug.& Greece 4/6/41. Brits defeated in Crete in May.

2. Invasion of USSR 6/22/41: 3.3m German trooops, 2000 airplanes in 3-pronged attack. Soviets had 4000 planes but many destroyed on ground. Initial German success, but problem of distances, winter weather, later swampy terrain. Siege of Leningrad and provisioning across Lake Ladoga. Resistance at Moscow; front threatened; Hitler demands standing firm. German-Rumanian advance on Odessa (annexed by Rumania as Transnistria 10/8).

3. Savagery of War. Commissar decree (shooting of CP members, Jews); Einsatzgruppen active in fall (Riga, Babi Yar, Odessa).

III. CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET PARTICIPATION1. Would Russia hold out? Lend-Lease extended; change of Western opinion. Western

communists now free to enter resistance. Anglo-Soviet pact accepts Soviet annexations in Eastern Europe.

2. Significant land conflict. Stalin seeks “second front.”

Historical Studies B-54 October 19, 2006

“The End of the Beginning”: Standoffs and Turning Points, 1941-1942*

Introduction: Parameters of Global War, late l941: Territorial: Goebbels’ Christmas message: German and Japanese control. Vast spaces vs. combat zones (Burma, New Guinea, N. Africa, Russia, N. Atlantic, the air). Buffer zones and neutrals (Iran, Turkey, Iberia), etc. Manpower: Bureaucracies, military, economic.

I. The Soviet Theater:(1) Three-pronged invasion of 1941 leads to siege of Leningrad, halt before Moscow on

Dec. 6, and expulsion from Rostov on the Don, after its capture on Nov. 21. Offensive resumed toward Caucusus and oil, spring l942. Battle of Stalingrad, July 1942-beginning of Feb. 1943. Zhukov counter-offensive in rear traps German troops, at least 150,000 killed, 90,000 surrender.

(2) Issue of Second Front: FDR & Gen. Marshall vs.Churchill’s caution. What was promised?

II. Africa and the Mediterranean:

(1) Italian offensive in Libya, Sept. 1940, Wavell’s counter-offensive,Dec.40-Feb.41 (British then divert to Greece in April ’41). Rommel reinforces Italians and moves East (April-June); British lose at Tobruk and in Crete. but then recover and move West (Nov-Dec.). Rommel invades Egypt Jan-Oct. 1942; Montgomery attacks at El Alamein,Oct.-Nov.1942. Simultaneous Anglo-American landings in Western Mediterranean: “Torch”. Axis surrenders 300,000 men in Tunisia by April 1943. Churchill’s “End of the Beginning.”

(2) Question of Logistics in N. Africa: no railroads; role of trucks, therefore oil. Rommel needs to capture Egypt to get supplies.

III. Pacific Theater:Japanese conquests through May 1942: Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia,

Philippines (Bataan and Corregidor), Aleutians. Then which way? Indian Ocean scenario – Ceylon and Madagascar; taking Southern New Guinea; or American islands (Midway, Guam, Aleutians). Limited number of carriers imposes choice. Americans bomb Tokyo, April 18, 1942 (Doolittle raid). Americans help Australians/British reinforce Port Darwin. Japanese turn South: Battle of Coral Sea, May 1942; Midway, June1942, Japanese lose 3 carriers and 300 planes. Americans take Guadalcanal, August l942-Feb. 1943 – prepared to contest western Pacific. Island hopping: search for air bases to interdict ocean areas.

IV. Some basic issues: (1) the tyranny of logistics for Germany (Russia and Africa); the carrier constraint for

Japan. Submarines and convoys; radar and Ultra.(2) Running the War: (a) The relationships of civilian power to generals. Hitler as war

leader: brilliant in intuition at first, then convinced he could tactically run the war far from the front. Stalin, in contrast, increasingly defers to generals. Types of generals: Brilliant egotists with sycophants (Montgomery, MacArthur); brilliant tacticians (Rommel, Patton, Slim); political organizers (Eisenhower, Marshall, Zhukov). How does the Commander in Chief relate to his generals? (b) The role of committees (Anglo-American model; German)

(3) Role of inter-service rivalries in choice of mission.(4) The violence of war: “new” history of combat: John Keegan’s “Face of Battle.”

Did soldiers like to kill: problems of the new historiography of combat (Joanna Burke, An Intimate History of Killing). The fate of POWs. Role of military discipline and punishment, training, ideology.

(*This lecture supersedes the announced topic.)

HSB-54/Hist.1890E October 24, 2006

The Search for Decision: U-Boats, Ultra, Bombing

Recap: The War from early to late 1942,

I. U-BOATS VS. BRITAIN (THE BATTLE FOR THE ATLANTIC): A. The balance of shipping: UK started war with 21mT of merchant shipping. Needed yearly imports of 43mT after rationing. (Every ton of shipping sunk = 2T of goods/yr. lost.) 1939 1940 1941 1942 Jan-May 43 Jun-Dec.

Ship Tonnages Sunk:

755kT 4mT 4.33mT 6.7mT 1.6m 700kTons of merchant shipping built in US and UK

320kT 1.2mT 1.8mT 7mT 14.4M (Jan-Dec.43)

B. Tactical balance: (1) German:U-Boats gained French Atlantic bases; "Wolfpack" tactics until forced to disperse in l943. Snorkels developed in l944. (2) Allied: New antisub weapons: destroyers, frigates, corvettes; (asdic/sonar limited), radar limited; intelligence allowed rerouting. Allies gained escort carriers and long-range patrol planes (Liberators).

C. Relative Losses: Germans start with 57 subs. By end l941 strength up to about 300 (allowing for 50 destroyed). (In l941 200 launched, 28 sunk, but 15/15month by l943. Allies lost 2452 merchant ships in Atlantic, c.13mT. and l75 warships. Germans lost 696/830 U-Boats, 26,000/41,000 crewmen killed -- costliest service in war. II. INTELLIGENCE

A.Weaknesses: 1. Intention hard to judge; 2. Problem of chaff or static (Pearl Harbor); 3. Problems of disregarding bad news (Stalin and Barbarossa; British and Norway); 4. Problems of gathering and interpreting (decentralized and rival agencies; belated central processing).

B. Achievements: "Sigint" and decrypting (Bletchley Park). The Enigma machine and "Ultra." "Magic" and Midway. But signals ambiguous and plans change: the Coventry raid, Nov. 16, 1940. Was intelligence decisive?

III. STRATEGIC BOMBING A. "Doctrine":

1. Douhet, Trenchard. l920's debate over bombing of a military target with "collateral risk." Calculations in late l930's: "The bomber will always get through." 700 T.of bombs and 35,000 casualties per day envisaged. British discussions: doctrine of “collateral damage.”

2. Cost of precision bombing by day -- fighters not neutralized until l944 -- leads to area bombing by night; championed by Arthur Harris, vs. Portal, who advocates attack on oil. USAF tries to maintain daylight bombing. Until l944 selective precision bombing not decisive (lessons of Schweinfurth raid)

B. Increase in destruction:Madrid, 11/16-19/36: waves of 10-12 two-engined planes, perhaps l000 killed.Coventry: l00 Acres, 554 dead, 865 seriously wounded; London, 5/10/41, heaviest air raid, 1,436 killed. Total British bomb dead: 51,000.First l000-plane raid on Cologne, l942. Early 2-engine planes carried up to 2T. of explosive ("Mosquitos" in first raids over Berlin, 8/40). By l943-44, B-17, B-24, Lancaster carried 7-10T/plane. Hamburg July 24, 1943: 791 planes, 1500 dead; but July 27, 29, Aug. 2: 750-plane raids: 43-60,000 killed. (Fire storm and asphyxiation). Dresden, Feb. 13-14/45: 35,000 killed; Tokyo, March 10, 1945: up to 125,000 killed. Questioning of purpose after Dresden: Was Churchill fair? Total German dead in raids = 600,000. Hiroshima = 20kT equivalent; 75,000 killed?

C. Effectiveness? Strategic Bombing Survey and subsequent critiques. Economic effects limited until spring l944, then cumulative difficulties. Evaluating morale (of those bombed) and morals (those bombing) Ethical issues. Recent German literature on their own suffering: Joerg Friedrichs, “The Fire.”

HSB-54/H1890E October 26, 2006

RECAP FROM LAST TIME: ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE AIR WAR:(1) Bombing as strategy: Daylight, so-called precision bombing, as advocated initially by

Brits, then by US – targeting RRs, shipyards, oil, dams, ballbearing factories – but with high cost to attackers and not really precise; vs. nighttime “area” bombing, designed for general destruction and demoralization.

(2) Bombing as a morally debatable strategy (Was “collateral damage” an equivocation. Was area bombing “justified”?

(3) Disputed efficacy of bombing? Did morale crack? Did populations get weary or resentful? What was the economic impact?

WARTIME ECONOMICS

I. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES: HOW MUCH DID WW II COST? HOW DOES A SOCIETY PAY FOR A WAR?

1. The real cost of a war = (1) current product and investment allocated for war (but some of this capital can be used later -- Germany/Austria, Japan augmented capital during war despite bombing until 1944); + (2) deferred costs: non-renewed capital, payback of foreign loans, interrupted trading patterns, invalids, demographic losses.

2. Real cost versus financing of war. Financial problem = transfer of purchasing power to state from public or non-nationals. Non-inflationary vs. inflationary transfers of purchasing power.

2a. What war costs can be deferred to a future generation by borrowing? Distinguish (1) between external vs. internal debt; (2) between debt held by public (individuals, corporations, private banks) vs. debt held by central bank; (3) between costs to society as a whole vs. different segments (burden shifting from old to young, taxpayers to bondholders).

3. What mechanisms of finance available? (1) Borrowing or booty from abroad. (2) Taxes. (3) Internal borrowing. Soaks up corporate or household purchasing power to avoid inflation (4) Inflation and money creation -- inflation as tax on current real income and on bank balances. Lessons of WWI learned for more effective price control, and less inflationary finance. American prices during WW II rose 20%; wages + 60%; pre-tax profits + 350%; after tax profits: + 120%

4. Patterns of taxation: UK financed c.25% of WWI by taxation and by 1943 was financing 53% by taxation; Germany extracted almost 20% of German GNP from occupied countries; USSR switched to personal taxes from taxes on industry (disposable income down to 40% of l940); in U.S. taxes (income, excess profits, etc.) covered 26% of budgeted costs in l942, 2/3 in 1944, 4/5 in 1945.

II. COMPARATIVE OUTPUT AND SACRIFICES:Overall patterns: (1) early German lead, then slackening in late 1941-42; reacceleration during later l942-mid 44. Validity of "Blitzkrieg" thesis? (2) US industrial preponderance

(3) Continuing high Soviet effort (4) relative Japanese weakness even though military expenditure reaches 50% GNP.1938 populations and GDP in 1990 prices:UK: 48m and $284bn; France: 42m & $186bn; UK colonies /dominions: 454m & $285bn; US, 130m & 800bn.; USSR 167m & 360bn.

Germany+Austria: 75m & $375bn; Italy 43m & $141bn; Japan, 72m & 169bn; Japanese colonies 60m & 63bn.

Axis total in 1942 after gain of France & occupied territory. 635m & $1552bn.Allied total in l942 after gains of US and Russia, but loss of France, occupied Russia, etc.: 784m & $1,749bn. Allied/Axis GDP ratio = 1.3

Combat Munition production, 1935-44 in $billion/yr. in US l944 pricesand (Volume of Production per Man in $1,000 US dollars/man, 1944 prices) 1935-39 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944US 0.3b/yr 1.5 ($2.8) 4.5 (2.8) 20 (5.4) 38 (4.2) 42 (3.7)UK 0.5 3.5 ($1.5) 6.5 (1.9) 9.0 (2.2) 11 (2.3) 11 (2.2)USSR 1.6 5.0 ($1.2) 8.5 ( ? ) 11.5 (1.1) 14 (1.3) 16 (1.2)Germany 2.4 6.0 ($1.1) 6.0 (0.8 ) 8.5 0.9) 13.5 (1.2) 17 (1.4)Japan 0.4 1 - 2 - 3 - 4.5 - 6 - (US arms production per man approximately 5x Japan's)

Plane production 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 TotalUK (excl.trainers) 15,000 20,100 23,700 26,300 26,500 120,000 Germany 10,000+ 11,800 15,600 25,500 39,800 110,000US 300,000

Comparative military spending and output as %NNP (I=produced domestically; II= from all sources, i.e., + imports for UK and USSR; - Lend Lease exports for US; + occupied areas for Germany). UK imports financed by Lend Lease and assets abroad. III = National income (index=100: for US & Germany= 1939 GNP; UK & USSR: 1938/37 NNP). _____US_____ ____UK____ ___USSR__ ____GER____ I II III I II III I II III I II III1939 2% 1% 100 8% 16% 103 ? ? 107 24% 25% 1001940 3 1 108 31 48 120 20 20 117 36 44 1001941 14 13 125 41 55 127 ? ? 94 44 56 1021942 40 36 137 43 54 128 66 75 66 52 69 1051943 53 47 149 47 57 131 68 76 77 60 76 1161944 54 47 152 47 56 124 52 69 93 ? ? ?

By about 1943 German and USSR importing 16-18% of their NNP from abroad; UK down from l940's 17% to l0%; US exporting 4-6% (=3x Marshall Plan). France contributing about 28% of l938 French GNP to Germany by l943 plus output of about lm workers inside Germany. (Total foreign workers in l944 Third Reich = 7m + (of which 1.9m POWs) = almost 20% of labor force.

Historical Studies B-54 October 31, 2006

MOBILIZING SOCIETIES: WAR AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The Experiences of Wartime: (1) Family losses; evacuation of children; rationing of basic commodities; postponement of purchases. Differentiation of zones: WWI (front vs. home), vs. WWII (urban and rural differences). The discovery of the underclass. War budgets: the discovery of full employment.

Social change in war vs. enduring transformations. What serves as an index of Social Change? War as transformer, as catalyst, or as blip? (Does the war change a trend? Does it accelerate a trend underway on a permanent basis? Does it divert it or accelerate it only temporarily?) Is there an effort to overcome losses? Memory and meaning vs. social change.

A. Demographic/Attitudinal Indices:Births per 1000 inhabitants per year:

1900-14 1914-18 1930 1941-45 1946-49 avg.Germany 36 to 27 14 17.6 20-16 16.5 France 21 to 18 11 18 13 to 16 21 Engl./Wales 28 avg. -- 19.6 17 20

Marriage per 1000 per year:Germany -- 9 17.5 15.5 20France 15.5 7.5 16.4 8.6-11 20Engl/Wales 16 -- 13.3 14 18

Percentage of the U.S. population who were never married: 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 37% 38% 32% 32% 31% 23% 21% 25%The images of the wartime woman vs. the statistics of postwar family formation -- were they compatible? Connection of the emphasis on the nuclear family of the l950's to the war experience. Beer Consumption (100 million liters = 125 million quarts)

1913 1918 1938 1943 1947Germany 69.2 24.8 48.1 43.3 12UK 58.9 21.3 40.1 49 48.8 (1913 = over 100 liters per inhabitant per year!)

Infant Mortality (deaths up to 1 yr. old/1000) 1900 1914 1916 1918 1929 1939 1942 1944 1946 1949France 160 111 117 146 100 68 77 82 78 60 Germany 229 164 140 158 97 72 -- -- 97 60Engl/W. 154 130 166 196 74 51 51 45 43 32Sweden 99 73 78 88 59 40 29 31 27 23

Gender: What happened to Rosie the Riveter after the War? U.S. Female Labor Force Participation Rates

1900 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980Total 20.6 23.7 24.8 25.8 29.5 35.1 41.6 51.1 Married 5.6 9.0 11.7 13.8 21.6 30.6 39.5 50.1 Single* 43.5 46.4 50.5 45.5 50.6 47.5 51.0 61.5 White M. 3.2 6.5 9.8 12.5 20.7 29.8 38.5 49.3Nonwhite M 26.0 32.5 33.2 27.3 31.8 40.5 50.0 59.0

*Single women have averaged 6 years in the labor force.

Cohort Analysis: Increase in Female Employment by Age of Employee:Ages: 14-19 20-24 25-44 45-64 July 1944/1940 2.30 1.14 1.28 1.651950/1940 1.05 0.95 1.27 1.76 Source: Claudia Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap (NY:OUP,1990), 17,153.

II. Which War caused More Change? Political radicalism greater after WWI than WWII in Europe; but post WW II radicalism more marked outside Europe. On the other hand, European powers weaker in colonial areas after WWII. Suffrage extended in US and UK after WWI, in France after WWII. Erosion of liberal values as reaction to WWI, reinforcement in wake of WW II. The 1960's as rupture?

HSB54/Hist1890-E Nov. 7, 2006AMERICA'S WAR

COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCES: Air Raids, rationing, war bonds, deaths; "Gold Star" Mothers (blue vs. gold stars on flags in windows). Use war bonds to sell the war -- Morgenthau. WW II vs. WW I: Less preoccupation about threat at home; no anti-German hysteria. But internment of Japanese on coasts. The sense of seriousness: from Depression on. America buckling down. Self-regimentation: Office of War Information.

Legends: Colin Kelly crashing his plane down the smoke stack of a Japanese Cruiser; the Three Chaplains. Film: "The Fighting Sullivans," five brothers killed when ship sunk.

Prejudice: vs. Jews, Italians, homosexuals, blacks, Jehovan Witnesses. Race: FEPC, Detroit Race Riot 25 blacks, 9 whites killed, July 43. Caricatures and clarity: Bugs Bunny nips the Nips Superman, Wonderwoman, Captain Marvel, Terry and the Pirates. The Movies. Humphrey Bogart: Across the Pacific; Casablanca; Lifeboat, Mrs. Miniver. Clarity: Bill Mauldin's Willy and Joe in Stars & Stripes; Ernie Pyle.

ECONOMY: Rehabilitation of Wall Street and large corporations after rhetoric of New Deal. Dollar a Year Men; suspension of antitrust fervor. (a) Office of Production Management, Jan. 41 (Sidney Hillman, William Knudsen of GM); (b) Jan. 42: War Production Board under Donald Nelson and issue of procurement. Cost-plus pricing; Controlled Materials Plan (Ferdinand Eberstadt) to mediate with War and Navy Dept. (Forrestal as Asst. Secr. of Navy). Who controls? Nelson or War and Navy? James F. Byrnes, Office of War Mobilization.

Budget for War and Navy Depts. from 1.8b (1940) to 6.2 (1941), 23b (43), 76b (44), 80.5 (45). Fear of relapse into depression, but accumulated demand; then Marshall Plan and Korean War.

SOCIETY: (1) Movement: 16,354,000 in armed forces by end of war; 15m civilians had moved to

different counties. 25m/140m Americans moved and did not return home after the war; farm to city, east to west. Plains States and South lose. Numbers large; but also resumption of natural migratory patterns after bottling up in Great Depression.

(2) Family Formation: Was the war fought for the nuclear family? Better Homes &Gardens, Oct. 1944: "Are children necessary? Yes, happiness lies in conforming to the rules of life, and the first of these rules is that we shall lose our lives in the lives of our children. Perhaps there is not much more needed in a recipe for happiness." Marriage rate per 1000 unmarried women over 15: 73.0 in 1939 to 93.0 in 1942, then decline to 83 or so. Birth rate (women 15-44) from 77.6 to 94.3 in l943m {first time since 1921 that births exceeded 3m} to 85.9 (45). Thus peak in marriages and conceptions in l942.

(3) Trends toward Liberalization as well as toward repression: (i) Change in child-rearing: Dr. Spock's training coming on stream; from discipline to

permissiveness. (ii) Progressive education; Educational Policy Commission with Pres. Conant: nurture the whole child; social responsibility and cooperative schools; adjustment for real life. NEA: Children's Morality Code: loyalty to family, school, town, country, humanity.

(4) Farewells: The Death of Roosevelt; the train to Hyde Park. Eisenhower's parade; McArthur back in l950-51: his farewell address.

POSTWAR : working with war criminals to beat the Russians; Arno Mayer and Werner von Braun; "The Best Years of our Lives." From the War to the Cold War and McCarthyism. McCarthyism as a reaction to the Depression and the War: to the breakdown of prewar provincialism and isolation, to the straining of gender lines; or just a displacement of the war effort? The war as dissolution of American certainties; an uprooting from the farm and from localism. The postwar as an effort to reaffirm an America that had come apart in the l920s and l930s, with role of government, new sophistication, need for the government role, new conflicts. The discipline reached high point in the l950s. Being a child in the l940s-50's vs. the l960s-70s. Literary dissent: Norman Mailer, The Naked and the Dead; Joseph Heller, Catch 22; war poetry in WWII vs. WWI.

HSB-54/Hist1890E November 14, 2006

OCCUPATION AND COLLABORATION

I. OCCUPATION REGIMES:1. Outright Annexation to Germany: Austria (Ostmark); Danzig; Wartegau (West

Pomerania). 1a) Annexation to Grossdeutsches Reich: Bohemia-Moravia (the Protectorate), Alsace-Lorraine. 2. Direct rule without intermediaries: General-Gouvernement (Hans Franck) 3. Direct rule with intermediaries: Norway, Netherlands (Arthur Seyss-Inquart), Belgium. 4. Puppet regimes carved out of former countries: Slovakia and Croatia. 5. Nominally independent occupation regimes: Vichy France -- occupied and unoccupied zones; the Italian Social Republic, Sept.1943-April 1945. 6. Controlled allies: Hungary (occupied after 10/25/44), Romania. 7. Military zones: Soviet Union.

Basic conditions: shortages, inflation, black market, breakdown of urban-rural exchange as war goes on. Violence up after end l942. Special situation of the Jews, gypsies.

II. AIMS OF OCCUPATION: Economic exploitation (plunder vs. collaboration); strategic benefits (French empire in N. Africa); racial agenda (SS vs. Reichskommissar in Netherlands, SS vs. Rosenberg in East); exploitation of manpower. Did the “New Order” have any reality?

III. WHY COLLABORATION? OPPORTUNISM-DESPAIR-CONVICTION.1. From conviction: prewar fascists with frustrated ambitions. Jacques Doriot's PPF,

Vidkun Quisling, Adrien Mussert, Szalasi and Arrow Cross. Collaboration as part of European civil war. The collaboration of the intellectuals – the New Order as an anti-bolshevik “moral” rehabilitation. A needed purge of a decadent and tired European liberal capitalism, dominated by Jewish materialism. The lure of European integration. Spiritual values triumph; crass capitalism superseded. (The case of Robert Brasillach.) Germans seemed “vital.”

Paths to prewar fascism: The break with Communism (Doriot); "neo-socialism" (Hendrik De Man) and the temptations of fascism; the commitment to appeasement (Marcel Deat, L'Oeuvre). Rivalry among collaborators: Doriot vs. Deat, Quisling and Lie. Germans wary of these men.

2. Sense of lesser evil and inevitability. 3. Belief that Germany must prevail; liberalism weak and finished.4. Collaboration of the upper crust: Otto Abetz in Paris woos intellectuals and artists. 5. Collaboration of the inexperienced: SS recruitment.6. Economic collaboration: France and Belgium.7. Forced compliance: the Jewish Councils.

Collaboration as a slippery slope; where and how does one stop? (The Milice after 1942.)

IV. COLLABORATIONIST REGIMES IN EUROPE:A. Vichy France: Full powers to General Petain after Armistice; suspension of

legislature and effective end of III Republic. Belief in Petain: punishment for Popular Front. Need to recover conservative values. National Revolution (Catholic conservative ideology: Maurras and Action Francaise), ruralism, corporatism, anti-semitism. The officials at Vichy and the collaborators at Paris.

Phases: (1) Laval premier, fall l940; ousted by Petain. Montoire. (2) Flandin and technocrats and admirals: Belin, Bichelonne; Charter of Labor. Organizing committees. Jewish roundups summer l942 (Vel d'Hiver; Drancy); (3) Fall l942: Rélève and STO; return of Laval. Milice formed. German occupation of the South; civil war 1943-44; Sigmaringen.

B. Italian Social Republic. Mussolini deposed July 25, 1943; Sept. 8: Badoglio armistice; Germans invade, set up Mussolini in North at Salo'. Verona trials (Ciano shot); "socialization" decree. Civil war summer and fall l944.

V. COLLABORATIONIST REGIMES IN ASIA:The Japanese appeal: “Asia for the Asians.” The Japanese New Order: Japan blends

Asian civilization with western science and capacity for ousting Europeans. Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo, Nov. 1943 – reps from Thailand, Burma, Philipines, Manchuria and Wang Chingwei of China. Japan promises independence: Burma declared “independent” on 8/1/43 under Ba Maw and the Thakin Party and Burma National Army. Philippines declared independent on 10/14/43 under Pres. Laurel; Suba Chandra Bose establishes provisional Indian

govt., “Azad Hind” in Singapore in October, INA declares war on Britain and US. Independence planned for Indonesia under Sukarno. …The “fourth” war within the war.

HSB-54/H1890E November 21, 2006A Culture of Death: The Last Year of the War

THE WAR IN 1944-45: The deadliest year: unrelenting bombing of Germany and Japan, Northern Italy and France; starvation (Bengal 1943; Southeast Asia; China; the Netherlands); extermination of Greek and Hungarian Jews until camps abandoned late l944. The toll of civil wars; desperation of collaborationist militias in Italian Social Republic (Salò Republic), in France (the Milice), Hungary (Arrow Cross). Progressive failure of German economy summer l944 on; oil problem. The German Resistance: 20th of July plot: General Beck, Kreisau Circle, von Stauffenberg. Limits and difficulties of Resistance. Suppression. Perhaps 1500 “conspirators” killed; but thousands of ordinary soldiers executed by German military justice. Contrast with World War I.

STRATEGIC CHOICES AND COALITION WARFARE:Casablanca, Jan. 43 and Unconditional Surrender. British American discussion of

where to attack after North Africa: Progress of Sicilian and Italian campaign (Salerno (Sept. 43), Anzio (Han. 44), Monte Cassino (Feb.-May), Rome (June), Tuscany (July), Gothic Line (Pisa-Rimii), August, toward Bologna.

Russian question: Would Russia remain in the war? Harriman as ambassador. Katyn Forest massacre dispute. Teheran Conference Dec. 43 (Mutual commitment; change in Polish frontiers).

Soviets to Danube August 20-24, 1944. Bulgaria defects; Germans abandon Greece, then Yugoslavia, Hungary signs armistice mid-October, 1944; suspends Jewish deportation. Hitler installs Arrow Cross government. Battle for Budapest, Oct. 29-February.

OVERLORD (D-DAY, JUNE 6, 1944) INTO GERMANY: Eisenhower as Supreme Commander; importance of position.. Relatively easy landings except for Omaha) but slowdown between Saint-Lo Cotentin. Battle of Falaise Gap, in August. Landings in southern France. Resistance fight for Paris August 20-25. General LeClerc enters city for Free French. Antwerp taken mid-Sept., but Scheldt mouth held by Germans into November. Aachen taken, but parachute drop in Arnhem (Sept. 17-24) fails (“A bridge too far”) and Netherlands remains occupied through winter of l944-45: approaches starvation. Germans counter attack in the Ardennes (the Bulge), Dec. 6-Jan. 16: “Nuts.” Remagen crossed, March 9. Focus on Ruhr and concern about Alpine Redoubt.

Vistula to the Oder: Operation Bagratian, June 44; Warsaw uprising, July-Sept. 44. East Prussian advance, end l944, then withdrawal. Warsaw captured Jan. 17; regrouping for battle for Berlin, Feb. on. Mass flights of German population (10-12m) from East. Soviets take Vienna April 2. The issue of rape.

Final days:

Bologna to Trieste, Milan, Turin, April 1945. Italian surrender conflict with Ruissians. Battle for Berlin April 16-May 2. Two million Russians in attack. Hitler and Goebbels

commit suicide 4/30; Doenitz as successor. Surrenders May 7-8-9.

WHY DID THE GERMANS FIGHT SO LONG? (1) The leaders’ situation: Hitler’s ‘contempt’ for Germans? His belief in a miracle?

No alternative for leadership. Was unconditional surrender a mistake?(2) Repression of alternatives. Trials of conspirators, massive courts martial.(3) Resilience of population and army; organization of army. Ideology/patriotism.

THE PACIFIC THEATRE: Japanese Resistance; refusals to surrender; Kamikaze. The Air War after November 1944. Tokyo raid. What cities left for the atomic bomb? Chaos in China.

THE END OF CLAUSEWITZIAN WAR? Means-End calculations abandoned. All means had to be used once they became available. The end of civilian immunity.

Historical Studies B-54 Nov. 21, 2006

WAR DEATHS

Deaths/Missing (These are approximate figures and subject to wide discrepancies. I have either provided ranges or plausible estimates.)

Combat Civilian Total est..Proportion killed, 1944-45United States 290-320,000 --- 290-320,000 2/3United Kingdom 264-400,000 60-65,000 325-450,000 1/2 Canada 37,000 --- 37,000Austr.-NZ-S.Afr. 39,000 --- 39,000India 24,000 1.5-3m (Bengal famine) c.1.5m+ France 200,000 200-300,000 (incl. c.500,000 75-90,000 Jews)Netherlands 10,000 200,000 210,000 1/2?Italy 175-300,000 80-175,000 330-410,000 1/2Greece c.80,000 c.160,000 c. 240,000 1/2Yugoslavia 400,000 c.1m (incl..partisans) c. 1.5-2m 1/2Poland 300,000 5-6m (incl. 3m Jews) c. 6m 1/4USSR 6-7m (incl.3m POWs) 7-13m (incl. 2m Jews) c.13-20m <1/4China 0.5-1.5m 1-10m 3-10m 1/2Germany/Aust. 4m (incl. 1m POWs) 3m (incl. 0.6 in air 6-7m 1/2

raids & 2m in expulsions)Japan 1.2-2m. 300-500,000 1.5-2.5m 1/2Hungary 400,000 500,000-1m 1-1.5m 2/3Rumania 300,000 300,000+(incl. gypsies) 600,000-1m 1/3

Totals 14m-17m 19m-34.5m 37m-50m?

Perhaps 6m Jews and 250,000 gypsies included in above. Famine victims included many Chinese civilians, Bengalis, Dutch in winter of 44-45. The proportions killed in l944-45 are rough estimates and in the cases of large Jewish losses, Poland, Holland, reflect the earlier completion of exterminations.

Personnel mobilized: US: 16.4m; USSR: 20m; UK 6.2m; Germany 12.5; Japan 7.5m. Total all armies: c. 100 million.

HSB-54/H1890E November 28-30, 2006

ANOTHER WAR WITHIN THE WAR: MURDERING THE JEWS OF EUROPE

RELATIONSHIP OF MURDER OF THE JEWS (AND 220,000/700,000 GYPSIES) TO THE WAR: Would the "Final Solution" have been possible or undertaken without the war?

Speech of Jan. 1939: A new European war will bring the destruction of the Jewish people. But when and how was physical destruction decreed? Long-term project or improvisation? "Intentionalism" vs. "Functionalism." The decision as a reflection of exuberance, summer 1941, or reflection of stalemate, December 1941? A word on terminology: “Holocaust.”

GEOGRAPHY, SOCIAL PATTERNS, AND DEATH TOLLS. Patterns of Jewish settlement in Europe. Ashkenazim (Germany and Eastern Central

Europe: Poland and Galicia, Lithuania and Latvia, Ukraine (the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), western Russia (the “pale” of settlement), Romania, Hungary), Sephardim ( Middle East and Mediterranean, Spain until 1492, Ottoman empire thence to Salonike, Netherlands, New World).

Social patterns of settlement in Eastern Europe vs. western Europe and Germany and Austrian empire (urban communities, adoption of “Enlightenment”, more intermarriage, ascent in professions—the idea of “assimilation,” adoption of host-nation loyalties in Germany, France, N. America, Italy, etc.). Late l9th century, early 20th century migrations of Russian/Polish Jews to New York, London, Buenos Aires, South Africa, France.

Populations and destruction (in thousands): 165/500; Austria 60/206; France 76/300; Belgium 29/90; Netherlands 102/112; Italy 6.5/ 34 ; Greece 60/70 Yugoslavia 64/80 Hungary 550/(400+325of annexed territory), Czechoslovakia 260/356 (but of these 120/146 lost in territory given to Hungary); Romania 210/600; Poland 2.7-3m; Soviet Union; 2.1/2.9m.

SOURCES OF THE PROJECT:Anti-semitism: religious, racial, “communal”: in Germany, in Eastern Europe and

elsewhere. Earlier antisemitic outbreaks in Europe: l870's, l890's, 1917-22. Role of antisemitism in Germany before Hitler; comparisons elsewhere.

Racial and Colonial violence: Herrero war 1906.Eugenic thinking and euthanasia (“life unworthy of life”).

GERMAN MEASURES BEFORE THE WAR: Pre-Holocaust measures under Nazism: l933: Boycott and dismissals from public

services (including teaching); concentration camps established inside Germany for political

prisoners, "asocials," some Jews, esp. after l938 (Dachau and Oranienberg, Sachsenhausen, Bergen Belsen, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, etc., etc., satellite camps); 1935 Nuremberg laws and racial definitionsof Jewishness; Kristallnacht, Nov. 9, 1938; 1939-40: expulsions of Jews into France, from Warthegau into Gouvernement General. Madagascar project.

GHETTOIZATION AND MURDER SQUADS: SEPTEMBER 1939-JANUARY 1942 Effect of war: Emigration slowed; inability to move refugees. Radicalisation of Hitler's

concept. Euthanasia resumed (70,000 killed). Ghettos established in Warsaw, Lodz, Vilna, etc. (Rations in Warsaw winter l940: Germans: 2300 calories/day, Poles: 930, Jews: 200.)

(5) After Barbarossa (6/22/41) (1) Einsatz-gruppen (2,000 SS troops) sent out for mass shooting: perhaps 1 to 1.5m victims, 1941-42: Riga, Kiev (Babi Yar), Odessa, etc. Police batallions. (2) Gas vans used at Chelmno after Serbia. (3) Participation of other peoples: Ukranians, Romanians, Croatians and question of German “guilt.”

IV. THE FINAL SOLUTION : When was decision taken? Summer to late l941: relation to progress of Russian Campaign. What happened at the Wannsee Conference, Jan. 1942? SS hierarchy: Himmler, Heydrich, Eichmann. Roundups in France summer l942; Netherlands; remaining German Jews (Theresienstadt, Riga, Auschwitz); Belgium, Greece, Serbia, Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia. Hungarian deportations summer l944, then finally resisted. Extermination camps: Chelmno, Belczek, Sobibor, Treblinka, Majdanek, Auschwitz (including Birkenau, Monowitz & I. G. Farben plant). Difference from regular KZ (concentration camps).

V. WHAT COULD OTHER POWERS HAVE DONE? Immigration? German Jews before 1939: 102,000 to U.S., 63k to Argentina, 52k to

UK, 30k to France (which also takes many Polish Jews). 30k to Holland, 12k to Belgium, 9k to Australia, 6k to Canada, Brazil 8k, Bolivia 7k, Palestine 33k. The impediments to

immigration.German desire for cooperation from local authorities. Bulgaria vs. Netherlands;

Denmark and rescue. Romania and Hungary begin with compliance (and massacre in Romanian occupied Soviet territories: Transnistria) then reverse course. Russians arrive

in Romania; Germans occupy Hungary; install Szalasi.Vichy France: Effort to keep distinction of French Jews and foreign Jews.

Preoccupation with preserving autonomous state induces more cooperation. Commissioner for Jewsih affairs. “Vel d’Hiver” and Drancy, August 1942. Germans insist on 40 percent quota of “French Jews; distinction between those naturallized before or after l933 then l927.

Italy: Adoption of racial laws in l938. Jewish deportations in North after German occupation Sept. 1943: “Garden of the Finzi-Contini” Ferrara, the Rice Factory in Trieste. Roman Jews and Ardeatine Cave reprisals. Mitigating role of Italian army in Croatia and Nice.

Role of the Papacy (Pius XII) and the Catholic Church.

TROUBLING QUESTIONS:1. Passivity or Resistance of Jews? Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). Warsaw ghetto uprising April 1943 and other smaller ones.2. Role of Allies? Resistance to knowledge; dislike of diversions to military objectives and refusal to bomb Auschwitz. Why? 3. Role of Poles (“Shoah”) in a country that lost 3 m Jews, and about 3m non-Jews.4. Did Germans know? How much? Recent historiography: Goldhagen, Bankier, Kershaw.

5. How was it possible? Division of labor; role of local helpers. Bureaucratic mentality (RRs): a job to be done. Role of dehumanizing "discourse": gradual definition of non-people -- "life unworthy of life." Progressive segregation as separation from species. “Lessons of the Holocaust”?6. The suicides: Amery, Borowski, Celine, Levi, Bettelheim, Kosinski.

HSB-54/H1890E Dec. 15, 2006 War Crimes Trials and Reprisals

I. BACKGROUND TO NUREMBERG (1945-46)Decision to have a multi-national tribune to try Germans and Japanese. Precedents after World War I and failure of Leipzig trials. Notion of trials and denazification agreed to at Potsdam. II. ALLIED TRIALS Trials of major war criminals. Charges at Nuremberg: planning aggressive war; war crimes; crimes against humanity (a category around since Hague conventions), and Anglo-Saxon notion of “conspiracy” to commit any of the above.. What was not in indictment: domestic repression. Concept of “criminal organizations” –SS, higher echelons of NSDAP – introduced. 13 death sentences including General Jodl, Julius Streicher; 20 years for Albert Speer, life imprisonment for Hess, 10 years for Adm. Doenitz. Papen and Schacht acquitted. Change in attitude toward Nuremberg: originally a concern with “victors’ justice.” Problem of retroactivity. War crimes were violations of Geneva accords, but “crimes against humanity’ and “planning aggressive war?” Today seen as valuable precedent for Hague Tribunal. Could Germans have tried the Nazis?

Other trials: Diplomats’ series (incl. Weizsäcker) and industrialists’ series (incl. Alfried Krupp). Prison sentences imposed. Commutations by l950-51. Also return of many concentration camp leaders or military commanders to country where abuses committed (Hoess; SS generals to Yugoslavia, etc.) Eichmann capture and trial in Jerusalem.

German trials by late 1950s: “Auschwitz trials,” – a new generation of Germans open investigations.

Tokyo Tribunal: Difficulty of emperor’s impunity. Dissent by Indian judge over notion of aggressive war, but guilt for allowing war crimes under one’s command (Yamashita doctrine).

III. DENAZIFICATION IN DIFFERENT ZONES Effort to reconstruct Germany and Japan; remove roots of aggression. Role of emigre social scientists. Different national approaches: Soviets: institute socialism (fascism a disease of capitalism); British: democratization and encouragement of unions and SPD; U.S.: individual de-Nazification and political pluralism, federalism. Economic deconcentration a semi-success. The American “Questionnaire” and special hearings. Grades of participation; penalties could include prison, confiscation of property, suspension from office. Problem of broad participation in party and regime. Unevenness of sentencing..Gradual relaxation; impact of Cold War. Some elites hardly subject to sanctions: judiciary, university professors.

IV. THE PURGES (EPURATION) AND POLITICS

Initial reprisals in France, Italy, etc. Shaming of women. Problem of numbers killed. Up to 10.000 in France; several hundred in Belgium/Netherlands. Resistance coalitions take decision to try collaborators. Who was guilty? Major defendants: Pétain, Laval, Quisling, etc. vs. lesser criminals. “National degradation” (civic disenfranchisement) as penalty (cf. “lustration” after l989). Role of intellectuals: the trial of Brasillach. Problem of economic collaboration (Belgium, Italy ); procedures bog down in courts. Purges as a surrogate for social revolution, but have to be pursued individually and not by class. Left parties press trials in “Resistance coalitions” that last from late 1945 to 1947. Reaction against moralism of Resistance parties by 1946-47. Uomo Qualunque (Everyman) movement in Italy. Gradually abandoned.

V. EXPULSION OF THE GERMANS 12m. flee West. 9-10m from East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia. (new Polish territories –Danzig (Gdansk), Posen (Poznan), Breslau (Wroclaw). 3m. expelled from Sudetenland (“Benes Decrees). 1-2m die. Assimilation into Germany.

HSB54-H1890E December 5, 2006ENDING THE JAPANESE WAR

I. THE THEATERS OF WAR 1. Burma theatre: British retreat into Bengal, April 1942; loss of Burma Road;

unsuccessful British offensives, l942-43. Japanese encourage "Free Asia": Ba Maw in Burma (declared "independent" in in 1943, as are Philippines). Suhas Chandra Bose (Provisional government of Free India in Singapore; Japanese and Bose lay siege to Imphal, Mar.-July 44; then rollback: Mandalay reached overland, March l945, Rangoon by April.

2. China Theatre. Nationalists (Kuomintang=KMT) in Chunking under Chiang Kai-shek; Communists in North; a nominal United Front. Stilwell, Clair Chenault (Flying Tigers). l944 offensives: demoralization, inflation, floods and rural uprooting.

3. Islands: A. General Problems: huge distances; absence of deep water ports in New Guinea; shortage of air bases; shipping crises(but resources in manpower and equipment= Europe before Overlord)

B. Dual strategy (SW Pacific vs. Central Pacific) dictated by division of American command: Gen. MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. Also desire not to lose resources to Europe on part of Adm. King.

1. MacArthur wants to take Rabaul (foremost Japanese base off New Guinea) and advance up New Guinea, thence to Philippines. Guadalcanal (Solomon Islands), August 42-Feb. 43. Rabaul bombed (Dec. 43) but bypassed. MacArthur retakes NE New Guinea, then advances through W. New Guinea (by May l944). Philippines (October 1944): destruction of Japanese battleship fleet at Leyte Gulf (Oct. 44). Luzon taken by Jan. 45. 90% of Japanese merchant marine destroyed by March l945; submarine warfare.

2. Washington favors Nimitz and Central Pacific. Air Force backs Navy on island strategy; envisages use of new B-29. Tarawa on Gilberts (Nov. 20,43): 1000 dead and 2000 wounded to take 5000 Japanese on 3 sq. miles (reefs and low tides). Then attack on Marshall Islands (Eniweitok); Saipan in Marianas (June l944) sought as B-29 base. Battle of Philippine Sea. Resignation of Tojo Cabinet, and prospect of defeat. Tinian, Guam (Marianas) taken; battle for Iwo Jima Feb.-Mar. 45. Okinawa (April-June, 100,000 Japanese dead) and Kamikaze missions.

II. RUSSIA AND DIPLOMACY FOR THE PACIFIC WAR: Need for the Russians presupposed (to pin down 1.5m Japanese troops in Manchuria. U.S. Naval vs. Army estimates on eve of Yalta conference. Soviets promise entry into war three months after V-E day. Plans for landing near Tokyo spring l946 and varying expectations of resistance.

III. THE AIR WAR, NOV. L944-AUG. L945:No defenses for Japan. B-29 raids unopposed. Tokyo incendiary raid, March 9/10,

1945 (100,000 killed?). Stimson asks review. Development of fission bomb: Meitner and Hahn (chain reaction); Stagg Field; Manhattan Project (Groves and Oppenheimer). Search for fissionable material: Oak Ridge for U235, Hanford WA for plutonium: "Thin Man," vs. "Fat Boy." Potsdam ultimatum, July 26, 1945; Baron Suzuki response, July 30. Atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Aug. 6 and 9. Why was the bomb used?

Problem of surrender. Japanese govt divided; fear of coup. Hirohito's intervention. V-J Day, Aug. 14/15, 1945; surrender Sept. 2. From defiance to submission.

HSB-54/H1890E Dec. 19, 2006 War and Memory

WHAT DO WE DO WITH THE PAST when it involves so much suffering and enmity? How do we come to terms with those we fought; those who killed us or our families (cf. the new Daniel Mendelsohn book)? How do we honor the memory of those who fought? Can we legitimately honor those who fought on the other side – a comradeship of arms?

I. THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: TRIALS AND PUNISHMENT… (See preceding outline)

II. THE POLITICS OF MEMORY AND MEMORIALS. “Collective memory” as an object of study. This has changed in significant ways. While Communism prevailed in Russia and Eastern Europe, Communist martyrs

singled out; singularity of Jewish victims obscured. Monuments “to the victims of fascism.

National memory; Jewish memory since the Six Days War; Japanese memory: Hiroshima. Nanjing massacre; the Enola Gay (Smithsonian) controversy. in 1995The preoccupation with “landscapes of memory’ (lieux de memoire), visits to camps or battlefields…Monuments less evocative, less successful than those of World War I

The return of memory (The Vichy syndrome...), and the memoirs of memory (Saul Friedlander, When memory comes...). The last trials: Barbes, Papon.

Why so intense a return of memory?. (a) D-Day. 1994-95: the passing of a generation? And the effort by a new generation to catch their parents at their most heroic or problematic. A “feel-good” war for Americans and Brits? (b) In France and Italy, the freeing up of memory from Left politics (The end of the Cold War and of the official Communist party lines. The Resistance no longer as a battle of good vs. evil, but as civil war. freeing up of ambiguous memory: Civitella controversy over partisans. In the Netherlands, the toll of the Holocaust a problem. In Germany: theme of victimization through l950s, then generation break and little reference to cost of war for Germans – this theme reviving.

III. THE POLITICS OF REPARATION: Adenauer and Israel and Jewish negotiations of early l950s. The slave-labor settlement.

III. MEMORY VS. HISTORY. What is the difference? Can historians endow war or other experience with “significance”? (War as absurdity literature: “Catch 22”; Paul Fussell, “In Wartime.) Explaining vs. interpretation. (Answering the question, “why?” vs. answering the question, “So what?” Possible frameworks of significance for WW II: (a) an era of violence/war, unparalleled since; (b) the end of Empire; (c) the rise of the U.S.; (d) the defeat of Nazism and Fascism. The changing nature of war and violence.

HSB54-H1890E Dec. 7, 2006 (Pearl Harbor + 65)AFTERSHOCKS: THE AXIS DEFEAT AND THE END OF EMPIRE

OVERVIEW: (1) A. Europe reduced and discredited in Asia. Contrast with Mandate system after WWI, when France and Britain had inherited German and Ottoman territories. (2) Resistance and Collaboration confused concepts: Anticolonial resistors pre 1942 become Japanese collaborators in Asia, then divide. Communists vs. Non-Communists. Ethnic divisions (Chinese vs. Malays); Burmese highlanders vs. lowland South; Thakin Party vs. British and then vs. Japanese. Soekarno (Sukarno) vs. Dutch, then vs. Japanese. (3) Decolonization and triumph of national and national-communist movements. (Chinese civil war and victory of Mao by 1949 .) Impact of war and Japanese victories on non-Europeans. FDR's anti-imperial agenda vs. Churchill on India. U.S. out of Philipines (1946). But America to become increasingly distrustful of nationalists as Cold War deepened.

THE PROCESS OF JAPANESE RETREAT: North Burma, 1944: Japanese atrocities grow against highlanders; distrust pro-Communist Thakins. Ba Maw (head of Burmese collaborationist govt.) vs. Aung San, head of Burmese Defense Army. Economic devastation 1942 and 1944; famine conditions. INA (Subha Chandras Bose) decomposes. Japanese retreat from Rangoon and British turn toward Aung San. Independence in l948.

Malaya: Chin Peng (pro Mao) vs. conservative Malays. “Emergency” or antiguerrilla war does suppress largely Chinese communist resistance movement. Malaysia and Singapore established.

BRITISH POSSESSIONS ELSEWHERE: (1) INDIA: Congress vs. Muslim league. 2m Indians

serve in armed forces; but "Quit India" movement, arrest of Congress leaders, and growing conflict. 1942 Cripps Mission (offering later dominion status for end of agitation) fails. Churchill succeeded by Labour Party 1945. Decision to partition and get out, August (1947), (2) MIDDLE EAST:Palestine (partition in l947), Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, later Central Africa. Ethnic wars as British leave (Muslims-Hindus, Muslims-Jews, Greeks-Turks in Cyprus).

THE EAST INDIES (INDONESIA): Dutch resist Sukarno takeover. 1946 direct agreement for a federation and union with Holland under the Queen. Breaks down; agreement brokered by Americans then sabotaged; Sukarno vs. Communists; American pressure leads to capitulation in 1949.

FRENCH POSSESSIONS: Syria and Lebanon lost. In Africa de Gaulle seeks to retain colonial position by offering "integration." and assimilation. Setif Algeria) repression, May 8,

1945; Madagascar repression l947. Indochina (effort to stem Viet Minh, 1945-54): Ho Chi Minh takes Hanoi, Aug. 45; French retake Saigon control in Sept. Agreement with Ho denounced by French; Haiphong shelled while Vietminh negotiating in Paris, Nov. 46. War continues until 1954. French troops acquiescence to Tunisian and Moroccan independence; Algerian war l954-62.

KOREA AND THE SOVIET-AMERICAN DIVISION: Korean Nationalist movement:

Syngman Rhee vs. Kim Il Sung; decision to divide country on 3th parallel. Hardening of regimes l945-50. Stalin consents to Northern invasion after Chinese Communists in power: 6/25/50. The Global Cold War and the Emergence of the new imperial structures…