HiRadMat Safety Register

HiRadMat Safety Register

HiRadMat ReviewCERN, May 26, 2011

Outline Guideline Documents Hazard Inventory Facility Risk Analysis Risk Management Examples Safety File

S. Evrard – EN/MEF

EDMS No: 1146592

Guideline documents

S. Evrard – HiRadMat ReviewMay 26, 2011

2

MARCHE À SUIVRE POUR CONSTITUER UN DOSSIER DE SÉCURITÉ EDMS 785546

MARCHE À SUIVRE POUR LA CONDUITE D’ANALYSES DE RISQUES EDMS 785548

Risk and impact register form EDMS 830219

Hazard inventory


3

Electrical installations and equipment Effluents to site drainage – non-radioactive – water leak

Chemical substances (including dust) Radioactive materials (including sealed sources and wastes)

Electromagnetic fields Storage/Usage – radioactive materialAccelerators or other radiation generating devices Atmospheric emissions – radioactiveConsumption of resources – power Effluents to site drainage – radioactiveHigh pressure, vacuum Ionising stray radiation (external

exposure)Moving parts of machines Waste generation – radioactive Waste generation – banal industrial Soil and wall activationFire Historical site pollutionLifting and carrying loads Internal exposure (contamination)Use of equipment, tools or materials outside of the design specifications or outside of the manufacturer's recommendations OR use of equipment or apparatus designed or built at CERN

UV, IR, laser, and microwave radiation

Explosion

Facility Risk Analysis


4 Code rating explanationEvaluation of significance Evaluation of the degree of control over the risk/impact Priority

Hazard/Aspect Risk/Impact P C1

C2

C3

C4 S Org. measures

in place O Technical meas. in place T D

CFeedback on

accidents F DC P

Electrical installations and equipment

personnel safety, risk of fire

3 2 2 2 1 M

Safety inspections (installation acceptance ) (EDMS xxx)

2Equipment group monitoring

2 M 1 L 2

P Probability of OccurrenceC1 Legal complianceC2 Harm in terms of human

injury or ill healthC3 Geographical dispersionC4 Public image

From a combination of C1, C2, C3 and C4, the severity is assessed (here calculated)

F

Evaluation of feedback on past incidents/accidents

O

Evaluation of organisational measures and their implementation

T

Evaluation of technical measures and their implementation

Significance of risk and impact

Severity

4 M M H H3 S M M H2 n S M M1 n n S M

1 2 3 4Occurrence

Intermediate degree of control

organis.3 L M H2 L M M1 L L L 1 2 3

Technical Measures

Final degree of control

feedback3 L M H2 L M H1 L L L L M H

Intermediate degree of control

Evalutation of priority

Significance

n Not significantS P2 P3 P3M P2 P2 P3H P1 P1 P3

L M HFinal degree of control

5 Beam related hazards


Hazard/Aspect Risk/Impact P C1 C2 C3 C4 S Org. measures in place O Technical meas. in place T DC Feedback on accidents F DC P

Electrical installations and equipment

personnel safety, risk of fire3 2 2 2 1 M


2 Equipment group monitoring 2 M 1 L 2

Chemical substances (including dust)

neutal gaz (N2, He) pipes low pressure - personnel safety 3 2 2 1 1 M Safety inspections + safet

y rule2 2 M 1 L 2

Electromagnetic fields Personnel & equipment safety

3 2 1 2 1 M

IS 36 - Safety Rules for the Use of Static Magnetic Fields at CERN (EDMS 335801)

2

Access fobidden by access interlock (EDMS 1146079 + EDMS 1146094)

3 M Very few accident reported 2 M 2

Accelerators or other radiation generating devices

Beam “lost” to LHC 2 2 1 2 1 S

CCC operation procedures and interlock system

3 TBSE (EDMS 1102536) 3 H Very few accident reported 2 H 3


Beam accidentally sent to LHC instead of HiRadMat (simultaneous failure of equipment and interlock system), while LHC in access mode 3 2 1 2 1 M

Transfer line will be operated in the same way as alll other beam lines: CCC operation procedures, Beam Loss Monitors, interlock system, HiRadMat beam sent only on request and protected by RBAC (Role Based Access Control system)

3

BLM, beam interlock system BIS (EDMS 1146094), RBAC for beam request

3 H

(damage of component due to unexpected beam loss, for example following simultaneous failure of a beamline element and of the interlock system). Consequences would be irradiation of component, down-time for component exchange.

2 H 3


Exit window failure

2 2 1 1 1 S Mechanical analysis (EDMS 1108983) 3

Beam size measurement by BTV using low intensity beam before any high intensity beam is sent + BIS (EDMS 1146094)

3 H

Consequences would be vacuum leak and downtime for window exchange.

2 H 3


TED water cooling failure

3 2 1 1 1 MMechanical and thermal analysis (EDMS 1145914 + EDMS 1145924)

3 BIS (EDMS 1146094) 3 H

Consequences would be downtime to locate fault and repair, possibly on activated equipment

2 H 3

Consumption of resources – power

Power shortage, power cuts3 2 1 3 1 M TIOC meetings 3 Secured network/ Safety

network / UPS 3 H 1 L 2

High pressure, vacuum Contamination of personnel2 2 2 1 1 S


3 Equipment group monitoring 3 H 2 H 3

http://safety-rules.web.cern.ch/safety-rules/documents2/Chemical_Biolo_Cryo.html

http://safety-rules.web.cern.ch/safety-rules/documents2/Chemical_Biolo_Cryo.html



6 Building related hazards


Moving parts of machines Collision with people or

equipment

3 2 2 1 1 M

PR532 risk analysis (EDMS 1114822) + Safety inspections (installation acceptance ) (EDMS 1117007)

3 Remote control operated crane (EDMS 1145625) 2 M 1 L 2

Waste generation – banal industrial

Environment pollution3 2 1 1 1 M Waste management

procedure (EDMS 995498) 3 Recycling area 3 H 1 L 2

Fire Personnel and equipment safety

3 2 3 2 2 M

respect of Safety code E, G and IS23,41,42,47 + recommandations of the Fire prevention officer + Fire brigade emergency procedure (EDMS 1146082)

3

Fire prevention (EDMS 1146217) + Fire detection (EDMS 1146080) + Extinguishing means (RIA, fire extinguishers) + air tightening (RF2H partitions) of TNC and TJ7 (EDMS 1146073)

3 H 2 H 3

Lifting and carrying loads Collision with people or equipment

3 2 2 1 1 M


3 Remote control operated crane (EDMS 1145625) 2 M 1 L 2

Use of equipment, tools or materials outside of the design specifications or outside of the manufacturer's recommendations OR use of equipment or apparatus designed or built at CERN

Collision with people or equipment

3 2 2 1 1 M


3 Remote control operated crane (EDMS 1145625) 3 H 1 L 2

Effluents to site drainage – non-radioactive – water leak

Environment pollution

3 2 1 2 1 Minstallation acceptance (pressure tests) (EDMSxxx)

3

Circuit filling alarm monitoring system available + existing drain network and sump

3 H 2 H 3

Facility Risk Analysis7 Radiation related hazards


Radioactive materials (including sealed sources and wastes)

Irradiation and/or contamination of personnel 3 2 2 1 1 M

Safety Code F Rev. + ALARA + RP habilitation + dedicated training (EDMS 1079566)

3HFM + IPE + dosimeters + area sectorization (EDMS 1146079)

3 H 2 H 3

Storage/Usage – radioactive material

Irradiation and/or contamination of personnel

3 2 2 1 1 M

Safety Code F Rev. + ALARA + RP habilitation + dedicated training (EDMS 1079566) + TNC future waste inventory (EDMS 1146086)

3 Reuse of existing radioactive equipment 3 H 2 H 3

Atmospheric emissions – radioactive


2 2 1 3 3 M Safety Code F Rev. 3

Ramses (EDMS 1070443) + ventilation flush (EDMS 1134872) + area sectorization (EDMS 1146079)

3 H 2 H 3

Effluents to site drainage – radioactive


2 2 1 3 3 M installation acceptance (pressure tests) (EDMS xxx) 3

Circuit filling alarm monitoring system available + existing drain network and sump + Ramses (EDMS 1070443)

2 H 2 H 3

Ionising stray radiation (external exposure)

Irradiation of personnel

4 2 2 2 2 M

Safety Code F Rev. + ALARA + RP habilitation + dedicated training (EDMS 1079566) + impact on design stage of the facility

3

HFM + IPE + dosimeters + source term removal + Ramses (EDMS 1070443) + area sectorization (EDMS 1146079)

3 H 1 L 2

Waste generation – radioactive

Irradiation and/or contamination of personnel, environment pollution 3 2 2 1 1 M

Waste management procedures (EDMS 995498 + 1146265) + safety code F Rev. + TNC future waste inventory (EDMS 1146086)

3 Reuse of existing radioactive equipment 3 H 1 L 2

Soil and wall activationIrradiation and/or contamination of personnel 3 2 2 2 1 M Radiation survey follow-up

(EDMS 1145544) 3 TNC wall and floor painting 3 H 2 H 3

Historical site pollution

Irradiation and/or contamination of personnel

3 2 2 2 2 M

Radioactive material inventory (EDMS 1146086) + Radiation survey follow-up (EDMS 1145544)

3HFM + IPE + dosimeters + area sectorization (EDMS 1146079)

3 H 2 H 3

Internal exposure (contamination)

Contamination of personnel

2 2 2 2 1 S

Safety Code F Rev. + ALARA + RP habilitation + dedicated training (EDMS 1079566) + impact on design stage of the facility

3

HFM + IPE + dosimeters + TNC wall and floor painting + area sectorization (EDMS 1146079)

3 H 2 H 3



8

No priority 1 risk

1. Ionizing stray radiation (external exposure)2. Electrical installations3. Consumption of resources4. Moving parts of machines5. Waste generation - radioactive

Priority of risks: TOP 5

Risk Management Examples


9 Ionising stray radiation (external exposure) Design stage:

Fluka simulations CV and Ramses design Dedicated handling means (lifting jig and eyes) Prefabricated structure (easily removable) Reduced maintenance in TNC (no patrol box, long life TL’s) Waste management plan

Operational procedures Frequent radiation survey of TNC tunnel Dedicated RP training ALARA, JOLI & DIMR preparation with all stakeholders On-site close RP monitoring Remote controlled PR532 crane

Technical measures Access and RP sectorization Ventilation system Ramses monitoring system

Risk Management Examples


10

A lot of stuff will be reused and is not considered as waste

Experimental waste = Experiment responsibility Owner to dispose waste if fully authorized CERN would take in charge if owner is not authorized

Infrastructure waste

TNC future waste inventory (EDMS 1146086)

Waste generation - radioactive

Débit de dose à 10 cm

< 10 µSv.h-1 De 10 µSv.h-1 à 2 mSv.h-1

> 2 mSv.h-1

Traitement Travail normal (>95% des cas)

Traitement spécifique, ALARA, balisage.

Zone blindée ISR 6, manipulation à

distanceProcédure Pas de procédure

spécifiqueEDMS 995498 EDMS 995498

Safety file


11 Content

Inventory document Descriptive part Demonstrative part Operation part Feedback part

Safety file


12 Additional support & expertise

Marion Picard will join the team as from June, 1st, for 6 months. Ingénieur INSA maîtrise des risques industriels et impacts sur

l’environnement. First experience @ CERN (Risk analysis Isolde) Mission:

Propose procedures to minimize risk of accidents, prepare emergency plans and finalize the safety file to document the work

Define specifications for the operation of the facility and the safety issues involved. This will include remote handling operations and handling of the radioactive waste as a results of the tests

Analyze, determine and specify the procedures and safety documentation that will be required for each experiment prior their approval for beam time in the facility

Coordinate the operational safety aspects of the facility including the defining of intervention protocols and reporting on operations in terms of safety.

Act as safety linkman and collaborate with the various safety groups at CERN

Spare – 3D view


13

Spare - HiRadMat sectorization


14

Sectorization PA7 TA7 TCC6 TJ7 TNC Pit 846

Access Sector 1 Sector 1 Sector 3 Sector 1 Sector 6 Sector 7

RP Controlled Radiation Area – Limited stay Controlled Radiation Area - High Radiation

Ventilation 1+2 SPS loop 1+2+3 4+5

Id Air Handling unit Function Air flow (m3/h)

Location

1 UACV1-00249 inlet 16.000 BA72 UUW1-00137 outlet 16.000 BA73 UUW1-00138 outlet 2000 BA74 UACV1-00253 inlet 3600 B8465 UACV1-00254 inlet 3600 B846