HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTDgpcb.gov.in/pdf/HPCL_PALANPUR_EIA_PART_2.pdf · receiving station are proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and existing facilities

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DECEMBER 2011

HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM

CORPORATION LTD

SECON PVT. LTD. Vadodara - 390020

Phone/ Fax No.:91-265-6630700/6630707

E-mail: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Secon Pvt Ltd. highly appreciates the opportunity provided by

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, New Delhi by assigning

the preparation of Rapid Risk Assessment study report for Palanpur

Terminal. We express our sincere gratitude to the officials of HPCL

for the cooperation and support extended to us during this

assignment, but for which this report could not have been

successfully prepared.

The assistance of large number of persons in government

departments and private individuals in data collection are also

thankfully acknowledged.

DISCLAIMER

The information contained in this report is based on the

scientific analysis of data/information/drawings provided by

the sponsor and also collected from other sources / nodal

agencies during the time of the study. Conscious efforts have

been made to ensure the accuracy of information in the report,

however, NEERI shall not own, in any manner, any legal,

financial or consequential responsibility for any event of

occurrence of any accident/hazard or direct or indirect

damage/loss to any third party or to sponsor due to the use

or inability to use the information contained in the report.

The sponsor shall exercise due diligence and make their own

decision to implement the contents of this report. The report

shall not be construed as any guarantee or warranty from

NEERI

ii

T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S

Chapter No.

CCoonntteennttssPage No.

Contents (i-vi)

List of Tables (v)

List of Figures (vi)

Executive Summary (I-XV)

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Preamble 1.1

1.2 Objectives of the Risk Assessment Study 1.2

1.3 Scope of Work 1.2

Chapter 2: Technology Profile

2.1 Project Highlights 2.1

2.2 Pipelines and Stations 2.3

2.2.1 Salient Features of the Main Pipeline 2.3

2.2.2 Pipeline Route Description 2.5

2.2.3 Summary of Pipeline Details 2.6

2.2.4 Geographical Location of Terminal 2.7

2.2.5 Sum Summary of Station Details at Terminal 2.8

2.3 Facilities provided at terminal 2.8

2.3.1 Pumping & Loading Facilities in Terminal 2.8

2.3.2 Schedule Of Facilities Available At Palanpur Terminal 2.9

2.3.3 Tank Truck Loading Facilities 2.10

2.4 Design basis for Product Facilities 2.11

2.4.1 Product Characteristics 2.11

2.4.2 Storage Facilities 2.12

2.4.3 Road Loading/Receipt Facilities 2.12

2.4.4 Applicable Codes & Standards 2.12

2.5 Instrumentation ,Control and Communication System 2.13

iiii

T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S

Chapter No.

CCoonntteennttssPage No.

2.5.1 Instrumentation & Automation 2.13

2.5.2 Shut down Features 2.14

2.5.3 Communication System 2.14

2.6 Fire protection system for Terminal 2.15

2.6.1 System Description 2.15

2.6.2 Fire Protection Facilities 2.15

2.7 Safety ,Health and Environment Policy 2.16

2.8 Utilities 2.17

2.8.1 Power Supply Arrangement 2.17

2.8.2 Make up Water System 2.18

2.8.3 Effluent Treatment Plan (ETP) 2.18

Chapter 3: Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis

3.1 Introduction 3.1

3.1.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis 3.2

3.2 Past accident Data Analysis 3.2

3.3 Hazard Identification 3.4

3.3.1 Fire and Explosion index( FEI) 3.5

3.4 MCA Analysis 3.7

3.4.1 Fire, Explosion and Toxic Scenarios 3.8

3.4.1.1 Jet Fire 3.8

3.4.1.2 Flash Fire 3.8

3.4.1.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion 3.9

3.4.1.4 Pool Fire 3.9

3.4.1.5 Lower and Upper Flammability Limit 3.10

3.4.2 Models for the Calculation of Heat load and Shock Waves 3.12

3.4.3 Model for Pressure Wave 3.12

3.4.4 Vulnerability Models 3.13

3.5 Computation of Damage Distances 3.15

Chapter 4: Risk Mitigation Measures

iiiiii


4.1.1 General Recommendations 4.1

4.1.2 Specific Recommendations 4.2

4.1.2.1 Control Rooms 4.2

4.1.2.2 Electricity Hazard 4.2

4.1.2.3 Pumps 4.3

4.1.3 Fire Fighting System 4.3

4.1.4 Fire Protection System 4.3

4.1.5 Risks to Personnel 4.4

4.1.6 Risk to Environment 4.5

4.1.7 Precautionary Measures for Falling Objects 4.5

4.1.8 Training 4.5

4.1.9 Strategies 4.5

4.1.10 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 4.6

Chapter 5: Disaster Management Plan

5.1 Preamble 5.1


5.2.1 Facilities Provided At Terminal 5.2

5.2.2 Instrumentation, Control & Communication System 5.2

5.2.3 Communication System 5.3

5.2.4 Fire Protection Facilities 5.3

5.3 Need for Disaster Management Plan 5.4

5.4 Objectives of Disaster Management Plan 5.4

5.5 Statutory Requirement 5.5

5.6 Different Phases of Disaster 5.5

5.7 Key Elements 5.6

5.7.1 Basis of the Plan 5.6

5.7.2 Emergency Planning and Response Procedures 5.6

5.7.3 On-site Disaster Management Plan 5.7

5.7.3.1 Emergency Actions For Various Accident Scenarios 5.8

5.7.3.2 Various phases of onsite disaster management plan 5.9

5.7.3.3 Emergency Organization structure 5.12

5.7.3.4 Role and Responsibilities 5.14

iivv

5.7.4 Off-site Disaster Management Plan 5.30

5.7.4.1 Fire 5.30

5.7.4.2 Explosion 5.30

5.7.4.3 Toxic Gas/Vapor Release 5.30

5.7.4.4 Various phases of onsite disaster management plan 5.31

5.8 Mock Drills 5.36

5.9 Evacuation Plan 5.37

5.9.1 Purpose 5.37

5.9.2 Fire Escape Drill Procedure 5.38

5.10 Training 5.39

5.11 Checklist for Capability Assessment 5.39

5.11.1 Welding and Cutting Inspection Checklist 5.40

5.11.2 Flammable Liquid Storage Facilities Checklist 5.41

5.11.3 Services Checklist 5.42

5.11.4 Fire Prevention and Fire Protection Checklist 5.43

5.11.5 Checklist for Compressed and Liquefied Gases 5.44

5.11.6 Checklist for Electrical Hazards 5.44

5.11.7 Checklist for Personal Protection 5.45

5.11.8 Checklist for Handling Chemical Substances 5.45

Annexures

Lay out of the Terminal

vv

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Particulars Page No.

2.1 Salient Features of Palanpur Terminal 2.3

2.2 Salient Features of the Main Pipeline 2.4

2.3 Length of the Pipeline Sections 2.6

2.4 Summary of Pipeline Details 2.6

2.5 Geographical Locations of Terminal 2.7

2.6 Station Details at Terminal 2.8

2.7 Tank Truck Loading Facilities in Terminal 2.10

2.8 Salient Features Of Existing And Proposed Tankages At Palanpur 2.10

2.9 Applicable Codes & Standards 2.12

2.10 Fire Water Tanks & Fire Fighting Pumps at Terminals 2.15

2.11 Emergency Preparedness 2.16

2.12 Power Supply Arrangement 2.18

3.1 Degree of Hazards based on FEI 3.6

3.2 Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) for Process Units 3.6

3.3 Pasquill – Giffard Atmospheric Stability 3.7

3.4 List of Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads 3.12

3.5 Damage Criteria for Pressure Waves 3.13

3.6 Range of Thermal Flux Levels and their Potential Effects 3.14

3.7 Consequence Analysis for Jet Fire Scenario 3.15

3.8 Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario 3.19

3.9 Consequence Analysis for Flash Fire Scenario 3.25

3.10 Consequence Analysis for VCE Scenario 3.29

4.1 Summary of Recommended Personal Protective Equipment According to Hazard

4.7

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No.

Particulars Page No.

3.1 Accidental Release of Chemicals: A Scenario 3.11

3.2 Damage Contour for Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak in MS Tank (Tf-16) at 2F weather condition

3.18

3.3 Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 25 mm leak in HSD Tank (Tf-4) at 2F weather condition

3.23

3.4 Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 25 mm leak in MS Tank (Tf-9,10,11) at 2F weather condition

3.23

3.5 Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 50mm leak in SKO Tank (Tf-12,13) at 2F weather condition

3.24

3.6 Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 50mm leak in Ethanol Tank (Ts-6,7) at 5D weather condition

3.24

3.7 Damage Contour for VCE due to 50mm leak in SKO Tank (Tf-12,13) at 5D weather condition

3.32

5.1 Onsite DMP - Disaster Control / Management System 5.8

5.2 Various Organizations Involved During Emergency 5.36

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Executive Summary for Rapid Risk Assessment and

Disaster Management Plan for Palanpur Terminal

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preamble

To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed a 437

km 18 ’’Dia minimum 6.4 mm thickness pipeline between Rewari to Kanpur.The pipeline

will originate from existing marketing terminal at Rewari in Haryana and terminate at

proposed new terminal of HPCL at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) .

Various grades of Motor Spirit BS IIIMS & BS IV MS, BS III High Speed Diesel (HSD) &

BS IV HSD, Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) are the different Petroleum products proposed

to be pumped through the pipeline. Annual thruput capacity for the pipeline is 3.17

MMTPA in phase I, (Year 2018-19) and 3.86 MMTPA in phase II (Year 2023-24).

Required facilities have been planned along the pipeline route depending on major

consumer centres and other engineering requirements. New storage installation and

receiving station are proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and

existing facilities at Palanpur, Rewari, Bharatpur, and Mathura location will be utilized by

augmenting more facilities for receiving products. The present project, for which this

Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Management Plan are

formulated, involves the details of Palanpur Terminal which is located in the state of

Gujarat.

However, the proposed activity as a part of RKPL pipeline project will be addition

of three tanks within the premises of existing terminal facilities already developed

for MDPL project, and conversion of one tank storage material from HSD IV to HSD

III grade.

In order to carry out Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA), HPCL has retained its consultant

Secon Private Limited in association with National Environmental Engineering Research

Institute (NEERI) to undertake the Rapid Risk Assessment with a view to assess the

risk posed on the surroundings due to Palanpur terminal and its installation.

1.2 Objectives of Risk Assessment Study

¨ Identification of vulnerable units with resources to hazard indices

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¨ Generation of release scenarios for escape of flammable chemicals

¨ Estimation of damage distances for the accidental release based on different

scenarios

¨ Suggestion of risk mitigation measures for the Terminal based on consequence

analysis

¨ Approach to Disaster Management Plan

1.3 Scope of the work:

The scope of the present report is to carry out risk assessment for terminal. Standard

industry practices are considered while carrying out risk assessment study.

The hazard potential and estimation of consequences in case of its accidental release

are the issues of immediate relevance to be considered. It is therefore, imperative to

carry out Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) analysis at the first stage, which identifies

vulnerable areas around the pipeline route and suggests a set of recommendations to

improve safety.

HPCL has retained its consultant Secon Private Limited in association with National

Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) to undertake the Rapid Risk

Assessment with a view to assess the risk posed on the surroundings due to proposed

terminal

The work undertaken consists of the following stages:

Collection of relevant data on project description and proposed activities.

Damage distance computations

Maximum Credible Accident analysis is carried out to arrive at the hazard distance for

the worst case scenario. The consequences of all the scenarios are computed and

hazard distances are worked out and listed for flammable materials and possible

explosion effects. Risk mitigation measures, based on MCA analysis and engineering

judgements are suggested in order to improve overall system safety.

Suggestions for risk mitigation measures and delineation of approach to Disaster

Management Plan (DMP) for minimizing the risks which are of concern and can be

practically implemented are documented. International standard operation practices and

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Indian regulatory requirements are considered while giving suggestions /

recommendations.

2.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

2.1 Project Highlights

To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed a 437 km

18 ’’Dia minimum 6.4 mm thickness pipeline between Rewari to Kanpur. The pipeline will

originate from existing marketing terminal at Rewari in Haryana and terminate at proposed new

terminal of HPCL at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.).

Various grades of Motor Spirit (BS IIIMS & BS IV MS), BS III High Speed Diesel (HSD) & BS IV

HSD, Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) are the different Petroleum products proposed to be pumped

through the pipeline. Annual thruput capacity for the pipeline is 3.17 MMTPA in phase I, (Year

2018-19)and 3.86 MMTPA in phase II (Year 2023-24) . However, the proposed activity as a part

of RKPL pipeline project will be addition of three tanks within the premises of existing terminal

facilities already developed for MDPL project, and conversion of one tank storage material from

HSD IV to HSD III grade. This will have marginal impact on the environment of the area

Required facilities have been planned along the pipeline route depending on major consumer

centres and other engineering requirements. New storage installation and receiving station are

proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and existing facilities at Palanpur,

Rewari, Bharatpur, and Mathura location will be utilized by augmenting more facilities for

receiving products.

The following storage, pumping, receipt and marketing terminals are proposed for receipt

and marketing of the products:

1) Rewari - Receipt and Marketing Terminal ( Existing facilities will be used )

2) Bharatpur- Tap-off & Other associated facilities

3) Mathura - Tap-off & Other associated facilities

4) Palanpur - Additional Tankage facilities

5) Bahadurgarh - Pumping & associated facilities

6) Kanpur- Proposed storage terminal.

The present report addresses the Palanpur terminal. At present, there is a well-developed

complex for the marketing facilities, wherein the additional tankage requirements of

marketing terminal forming part of present project will also be satisfied within the same

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campus and so, in the present report, the discussion will be focussed on the facilities of

existing terminal at Palanpur.

The present project, for which this Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental

Management Plan are formulated, involves the details of Palanpur Terminal which is located in

the state of Gujarat.

2.2 Facilities Provided At Terminal

Product Pump House, Manifold, Fire water Pump House, Two Tank truck Filling Gantrys,

Calibration Facilities, Electric Room/MCC, D G yard, Transformer Yard, Lube Drum Yard and

Grease Drum Shed, Lube Ware House, Marketing Room, Admin. Building, Control Room,

Amenity, Parking, Sealing Platform, Effluent Treatment Plant, Security & Gate House checking

Platform , Watch Tower (4 Nos), Compound wall, Emergency Gate-1 No., Drivers Toilet, Foam

Tank Shed, Blue Dye Dosing System, Turbo jet Dosing System, Power Dosing System, Product

Storage Tanks.

2.3 Instrumentation, Control & Communication System

Instrumentation & Automation

The major activities performed by terminal are the following:

a) Storage facilities for BSIII MS, BS IV MS, BSIII HSD, BS IV HSD, and SKO.

b) Receipt of product through pipeline

c) Road loading facilities

d) Sump & Slop tanks

e) Fire water pumps and make up water system

Full-fledged Terminal Automation System (TAS) is envisaged for these units. These include:

a) Tank Farm Management System (TFM)

b) Terminal data management system

c) Bay Queuing

d) Tank Truck loading

Shut Down Features

Emergency shutdown is provided in the marketing terminal control room to stop all dispatch

operation. ESD shall be implemented in the PLC logic as part of terminal automation.

· Emergency push buttons to stop all road loading operations are provided in the middle

gantry.

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· Emergency push buttons to stop all loading operations in the terminal/depot are provided

in the control room.

Communication System

Telecommunication system (interfaced with the public address system) along with Plant

Communication System (PCS) is envisaged for the terminals.

2.4 Fire Protection Systems for Terminals

System Description

The following fire protection facilities are envisaged at terminals as per the requirements of

OISD-117:

a) Fire Water System – Pressurized at 7.0 Kg/cm2

b) Foam system

c) First Aid Fire Fighting Equipment and safety accessories

d) Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment

Fire Protection Facilities

The facilities provided consist of the following units

1) Fire Water Storage Tanks

2) Fire Water Pumps

3) Fire Water Piping

4) Fire Hydrants

5) Fixed Foam System

6) Water/foam Monitors

7) Fixed Water Spray Systems

8) Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment

9) Portable Extinguishers

2.5 Safety, Health and Environment Policy

Petroleum Industry occupies an important segment of our economy and is a source of large

benefit to the society. In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in volumes handled to

meet the increasing demand. Products such as, Euro III MS, Euro IV MS, Euro III HSD, Euro IV

HSD, SKO and FO are highly flammable, and safety which forms an integral part of the industry,

has always been given paramount importance.

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Several Government authorities, both at the centre and state levels such as Inspectorate of

Factories, Department of Explosives etc. are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring safe

handling and accident prevention measures. In spite of the measures, possibility of accidents

either due to human errors and/or due to equipment/system failure cannot be ruled out. The

lessons learnt from the disasters all over the world, made it essential to draw an Emergency

Preparedness Plan to negotiate such eventuality. The imperative of Emergency Preparedness

to minimize the adverse effects due to an unfortunate accident occurring in manufacture,

storage, import and transport of any hazardous substance is thus well recognized by all

concerns.

An Emergency Preparedness Plan is essential to obviate such an eventuality by providing the

measures to contain the incident and minimize the after effects. To assist the Industry it is

considered essential to provide the guidelines for preparing such plans based on the

interactions within the oil industry.

Over the years the oil industry has developed and refined its own directives in the field of safety,

health and environment which are to be followed stringently by their members. In addition to the

environmental legislation, the OISD (Oil Industry Safety Directorate) makes it mandatory for its

members to implement its directives on these issues. HPCL has thus formulated its own

corporate policy on environment and safety which is followed in all its installations.

2.6 Utilities

Power Supply Arrangement

Power requirement will be fulfilled from the local grid. Provision for DG set is kept as back up

arrangement for emergency power only.

Make Up Water System

The source of water for the make up water system is bore wells. Water from the bore well is

collected in sump. From the sump water will be pumped by self priming pumps installed on top

of the sump and distributed through a network of buried GI pipes to individual HDPE overhead

tanks of Amenities buildings, Admin building, drivers rest room etc. and to the fire water storage

tanks.

Effluent Treatment Plan (ETP)

The Effluent Treatment Plant receives oily water through a separate drain line connecting tank

farms, TT Gantry area, Pump house manifold area etc. The plant includes a Primary separation

unit consisting of a bar screen, Titled Plate Interceptor and Belt type oil skimmer. Subsequently

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Effluent will be pumped to Filtration unit using a multimedia filter and coalescing filter. The slop

oil collected will be pumped to the slop tank. The capacity of the existing ETP is 75KL/hr at

Palanpur terminal.

3.0 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT (MCA) ANALYSIS

3.1 Introduction

Accidental risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of

an event or sequence of events resulting into fire, explosion or toxic hazards to human health

and environment.

Risk Assessment (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular facility poses to

the public. It begins with the identification of probable potential hazardous events at an industry

and categorization as per the predetermined criteria. The consequences of major credible

events are calculated for different combinations of weather conditions to simulate worst possible

scenario. These consequence predictions are combined to provide numerical measures of the

risk for the entire facility.

MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum

damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include

quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice the selection of

accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering judgement and

expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis.

Detailed study helps in plotting the damage contours on the detailed plot plan in order to assess

the magnitude of a particular event. A disastrous situation is the outcome of fire, explosion or

toxic hazards in addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss of life, property and

ecological imbalances.

3.2 Methodology

The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of potential

vulnerability. The data requirements for MCA analysis are:

Operating manual

Flow diagram and P&I diagrams

Detailed design parameters

Physical and chemical properties of all the chemicals

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Detailed plant layout

Detailed area layout

Past accident data

Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis:

Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure cases

Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of the

hazardous material

Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind velocities

and atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and pressure waves

Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the accidental

release of chemicals

3.3 Hazard Identification

Identification of hazards is an important step in Risk Assessment as it leads to the generation of

accidental scenarios. The merits of including the hazard for further investigation are

subsequently determined by its significance, normally using a cut-off or threshold quantity.

Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of the risk it presents to

the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both probability and

consequences should be considered, but there are occasions where it either the probability or

the consequence can shown to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can be made on

just one factor.

During the hazard identification component, the following considerations are taken into account.

Chemical identities

Location of process unit facilities for hazardous materials.

The types and design of process units

The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release and

The nature of the hazard (e.g. airborne toxic vapours or mists, fire, explosion,

large quantities stored or processed handling conditions) most likely to

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accompany hazardous materials spills or releases

3.4 Consequence Analysis

MCA analysis encompasses defined techniques to identify the hazards and compute the

consequent effects in terms of damage distances due to heat radiation, toxic releases, vapour

cloud explosion etc. A list of probable or potential accidents of the major units in the complex

arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish

their credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the

event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the respective damage caused

can be assessed.

Hazardous substance, on release can cause damage on a large scale. The extent of the

damage is dependent upon the nature of the release and the physical state of the material. In

the present report the consequences for flammable hazards are considered and the damages

caused due to such releases are assessed with recourse to MCA analysis.

Flammable substances on release may cause Jet fire and less likely unconfined vapour cloud

explosion causing possible damage to the surrounding area. The extent of damage depends

upon the nature of the release. The release of flammable materials and subsequent ignition

result in heat radiation wave or vapour cloud depending upon the flammability and its physical

state. Damage distances due to release of hazardous materials depend on atmospheric stability

and wind speed. It is important to visualize the consequence of the release of such substances

and the damage caused to the surrounding areas. Computation of damage distances are

carried out at various atmospheric stability conditions for various wind velocities and the result is

tabulated.

3.5 Computation of Damage Distances

Damage distances for the accidental release of hazardous materials have been computed at 2F,

3D and 5D weather conditions. In these conditions, 2, 3 and 5 are wind velocities in m/s and F

and D are atmospheric stability classes. These weather conditions have been selected to

accommodate worst case scenarios to get maximum effective distances. DNV based PHAST

Micro 6.51 software has been used to carry out consequence analysis. Damage distances

computed for fire and explosion scenarios for the various storage tanks in Palanpur Terminal

are described below.

Jet Fire

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This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm in MS tank with

capacity 4700KL at various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability classes

and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 50 mm leak for stability class 2F is 49.81 m at

heat load of 4.0 KW/m².

Pool Fire

This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm in HSD tank of

capacity 2918.8KL for various heat radiation levels under the different atmospheric stability

classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 25 mm leak for stability class 2F is

14.72 m at heat load of 37.5 KW/m² condition.

Flash Fire

This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm and catastrophic

rupture of HSD tank of capacity 313.2KL for LFL concentrations under the different atmospheric

stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distances due to 50 mm leak are 7.15 m, 7.05

m and 7.60 m for stability classes 2F, 3D and 5D conditions respectively.

Vapor Cloud Explosion

This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm, 50 mm and catastrophic

rupture of SKO tank of capacity 1497.7KL at various overpressure waves under the different

atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 50 mm leak at

stability class 5D is 24.29 m for overpressure wave of 0.03 bar.

4.0 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES

The scope of the study covers mitigation measures based on Maximum Credible

Accident (MCA) Analysis. The Fire and Explosion Indices were computed for the identification

and screening of vulnerable sections and consequence analysis was carried out for the

accidental release scenarios of hazardous chemicals at various atmospheric conditions. The

following are general and specific mitigation measures

4.1 General Recommendations

Fire prevention and code enforcement is one of the major areas of responsibility for

the fire service. Following are the general recommendations for the proposed facility

Facility should be equipped with the following fire fighting systems

- Water supply

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- Fire hydrant and monitor nozzle installation

- Foam system

- Water fog and sprinkler system

- Mobile Fire fighting equipment

Surrounding population (includes all strata of society) should be made aware of the safety

precautions to be taken in the event of any mishap within the plant. This can effectively be

done by conducting the safety training programs

Safety escape routes should be provided at strategic locations and should be easily

accessible.

Critical switches and alarm should be always kept in line

A wind direction pointer should also be installed at storage site, so that in an emergency

the wind direction can be directly seen and downwind population cautioned

Shut off and isolation valves should be easily approachable in emergencies

Periodical mock drills should be conducted so as to check the alertness and efficiency of

the DMP and EPP and records should be maintained

Signboard including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type of emergencies should

be installed at various locations.

4.2 Specific Recommendations

Control Rooms

¨ Adequate number of doors shall be provided in the control room for safe exit

¨ Halon / Dry chemical fire extinguishers should be used in control rooms and computer

rooms

¨ Smoke detectors system shall be provided for control rooms at suitable locations

¨ To resist fire spread through ducts, dampers shall be installed in ducts

Electricity Hazard

¨ All electrical equipments shall be provided with proper earthing. Earthed electrode

shall periodically tested and maintained

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¨ Emergency lighting shall be available at all critical locations including the operator’s

room to carry out safe shut down and ready identification of fire fighting facilities such

as fire water pumps and fire alarm stations.

¨ All electrical equipments shall be free from carbon dust, oil deposits, and grease

¨ Approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and boots, tester, fuse

tongs, discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp, wooden or insulated ladder should be

used while carrying out the maintenance of electrical parts

¨ Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit should be prevented by

providing fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection

¨ Carbon dioxide, halon or dry chemical fire extinguishers are to be used for electrical

fires

Pumps

¨ Preventive Maintenance Inspection Schedule for Pumps will be observed as per the

equipment manual of the manufacturer.

Fire Fighting System

¨ The fire protection equipment shall be kept in good operating condition at all times

and fire fighting system should be periodically tested for proper functioning and logged

for record and corrective actions.

Fire Protection System

The typical fire fighting system for the various facilities described is outlined in this section. The

exact details of the fire fighting systems and capabilities to be installed and developed will be

finalised after the completion of detailed engineering in consultation with the concerned process

and equipment vendors and fire. It is also to be understood that not all facilities described below

will be applicable for every installation.

Risks to Personnel

Good safety management, strict adherence to safety management procedures and

competency assurance will reduce the risk. Safety practices are needed to carry out jobs safely

and without causing any injury to self, colleagues and system.

For total safety of any operation, each team member must religiously follow the safety

practices / procedures pertaining to respective operational area. If every team member starts

working with this attitude, zero accident rate is not a distant dream.

Secon Private Limited XIII



Any operation is a team effort and its success depends upon the sincerity, efficiency

and motivation of all team members. Safety in such operations is not a duty of a single person,

but it is everyone's job.

Use of protective fireproof clothing and escape respirators will reduce the risk of being

seriously burnt. In addition, adequate fire fighting facilities and first aid facilities should be

provided, in case of any emergency.

5.0 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

The objective of any terminal should be safe and trouble free operation this is ensured

by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design of plant, equipment/pipeline as per

standard codes, ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes/rules

and instruments for safe operation of the plant. Safety should be ensured afterwards by

operating the plant/pipe line by trained manpower. In spite of all precautions accidents may

happen due to human error or system malfunction. Any accident involving release of hazardous

material may cause loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial

installations are vulnerable to various natural as well as man made disasters. Examples of

natural disasters are flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are like

major fire, explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases and liquids from

pipeline storage terminals, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc.

The damage caused by any disaster is determined by the potential for loss

surrounding the event. It is impossible to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might

strike on undertaking. However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. preplanned

procedure involving proper utilization of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimize

the loss to a minimum and resume the working condition as soon as possible.

5.1 Need for Disaster Management Plan

Following are the general types of Emergency /Disaster which lead to preparation of

disaster management plan:

¨ Fire in tank farm area

¨ Large oil spillage which may escape outside the boundary.

¨ Major fire / explosion in unit area

¨ Toxic gas release

¨ Major Earthquake above 7 Richter Scale

Secon Private Limited XIV



5.2 Objectives of Disaster Management Plan

Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The

plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and post disaster:

The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide organisational

setup and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in any

¨ Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources

¨ Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside.

¨ Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment.

¨ Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties.

¨ Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry

¨ Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions.

The above objectives can be achieved by –

¨ Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard potential

and identification of maximum credible hazard scenario.

¨ Arrange/augment facilities for fire fighting, safety, medical (both equipment and

Manpower)

¨ Evolving proper action plan with proper organisational set-up and communication

facilities as well as warning procedure.

5.3 Statutory Requirement:

Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for all petroleum products

marketing terminals to tackle the emergencies. The plan has been prepared in view of the

following regulations

· Factories Act, 1948 and as amended

· Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989,

notified under Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994.

· Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical

Accidents, 1996.

· Stipulations of OISD-168

Secon Private Limited XV



· Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.

5.4 Key Elements

Following are the key elements of Disaster Management Plan:

· Basis of the plan

· Accident prevention procedures/measures

· Accident/emergency response planning procedures

· On-site Disaster Management Plan

· Off-site Disaster Management Plan

CChhaapptteerr 11

IInnttrroodduuccttiioonn

1.1 Preamble

To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed a

437 km 18 ’’Dia minimum 6.4 mm thickness pipeline between Rewari to Kanpur.The

pipeline will originate from existing marketing terminal at Rewari in Haryana and

terminate at proposed new terminal of HPCL at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) .

Various grades of Motor Spirit BS IIIMS & BS IV MS, BS III High Speed Diesel (HSD)

& BS IV HSD, Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) are the different Petroleum products

proposed to be pumped through the pipeline. Annual thruput capacity for the pipeline

is 3.17 MMTPA in phase I, (Year 2018-19) and 3.86 MMTPA in phase II (Year

2023-24).



receiving station are proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and

existing facilities at Palanpur, Rewari, Bharatpur, and Mathura location will be utilized

by augmenting more facilities for receiving products. The present project, for which

this Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Management Plan are

Rapid Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan

For Palanpur Terminal

Secon Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore NEERI, Nagpur

Page No: 1.2

formulated, involves the details of Palanpur Terminal which is located in the state of

Gujarat.

However, the proposed activity as a part of RKPL pipeline project will be

addition of three tanks within the premises of existing terminal facilities

already developed for MDPL project, and conversion of one tank storage

material from HSD IV to HSD III grade.

In order to carry out Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA), HPCL has retained its consultant

Secon Private Limited in association with National Environmental Engineering

Research Institute (NEERI) to undertake the Rapid Risk Assessment with a view to

assess the risk posed on the surroundings due to Palanpur terminal and its

installation.

1.2 Objectives of the Risk Assessment Study

¨ Identification of vulnerable units with resources to hazard indices

¨ Generation of release scenarios for escape of flammable chemicals

¨ Estimation of damage distances for the accidental release based on different

scenarios

¨ Suggestion of risk mitigation measures for the Terminal based on consequence

analysis

¨ Approach to Disaster Management Plan

1.3 Scope of Work

The scope of the present report is to carry out risk assessment for terminal. Standard

industry practices are considered while carrying out risk assessment study.

The hazard potential and estimation of consequences in case of its accidental

release are the issues of immediate relevance to be considered. It is therefore,

imperative to carry out Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) analysis at the first stage,

which identifies vulnerable areas around the pipeline route and suggests a set of

recommendations to improve safety.

HPCL has retained its consultant Secon Private Limited in association with National

Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) to undertake the Rapid Risk




Page No: 1.3

Assessment with a view to assess the risk posed on the surroundings due to

proposed terminal

The work undertaken consists of the following stages:

¨ Collection of relevant data on project description and proposed activities.

¨ Damage distance computations

Maximum Credible Accident analysis is carried out to arrive at the hazard distance

for the worst case scenario. The consequences of all the scenarios are computed

and hazard distances are worked out and listed for flammable materials and possible

explosion effects. Risk mitigation measures, based on MCA analysis and engineering

judgements are suggested in order to improve overall system safety.

Suggestions for risk mitigation measures and delineation of approach to Disaster

Management Plan (DMP) for minimizing the risks which are of concern and can be

practically implemented are documented. International standard operation practices

and Indian regulatory requirements are considered while giving suggestions /

recommendations.

Disaster Management Plan

¨ Evaluation of organization of disaster management plan for the facilities

¨ Delineation of risk prevention and mitigation measures for the proposed facilities

CChhaapptteerr 22

TTeecchhnnoollooggyy PPrrooffiillee

2.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

2.1 PROJECT HIGHLIGHTS

To meet the requirement of Finished Petroleum Products, HPCL has proposed a 437 km

18 ’’Dia minimum 6.4 mm thickness pipeline between Rewari to Kanpur. The pipeline will

originate from existing marketing terminal at Rewari in Haryana and terminate at proposed

new terminal of HPCL at Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) .

Various grades of Motor Spirit (BS IIIMS & BS IV MS), BS III High Speed Diesel (HSD) &

BS IV HSD, Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) are the different Petroleum products proposed to

be pumped through the pipeline. Annual thruput capacity for the pipeline is 3.17 MMTPA in

phase I, (Year 2018-19)and 3.86 MMTPA in phase II (Year 2023-24) . However, the

proposed activity as a part of RKPL pipeline project will be addition of three tanks within the

premises of existing terminal facilities already developed for MDPL project, and conversion

of one tank storage material from HSD IV to HSD III grade. This will have marginal impact on

the environment of the area



receiving station are proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and existing

facilities at Palanpur, Rewari, Bharatpur, and Mathura location will be utilized by augmenting

more facilities for receiving products. The project components for the proposed Rewari

Kanpur Pipeline are as follows:

Rapid Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan for

Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.2

The following storage, pumping, receipt and marketing terminals are proposed for receipt

and marketing of the products:

1) Rewari - Receipt and Marketing Terminal ( Existing facilities will be used )

2) Bharatpur- Tap-off & Other associated facilities

3) Mathura - Tap-off & Other associated facilities

4) Palanpur - Additional Tankage facilities

5) Bahadurgarh - Pumping & associated facilities

6) Kanpur- Proposed storage terminal.

Sr

No.

Location Pipeline Terminal

1 Cross country Pipeline

including SV & IP

station

Rewari-Bharatpur-

Mathura- Kanpur

-

2 Rewari Pumping station &

associated facilities

Existing installation will be

utilized.

3 Bharatpur Tapoff & Other associated

facilities

Additional Tankage

4 Mathura Tapoff & Other associated

facilities

Additional Tankage

5 Palanpur Additional Tankage

6 Kanpur Receiving and associated

Facility

New Storage and Distribution

Terminal with Road and Rail

loading facilities

7 Bahadurgarh Pumping & associated

facilities for pumping of

Product from Bahadurgarh

to Rewari


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.3

· The present report addresses the Palanpur terminal. At present, there is a well

developed complex for the marketing facilities, wherein the additional tankage

requirements of marketing terminal forming part of present project will also be satisfied

within the same campus and so, in the present report, the discussion will be focussed

on the facilities of existing terminal at Palanpur.

The present project, for which this Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental

Management Plan are formulated, involves the details of PalanpurTerminal which is located

in the state of Gujarat.

The salient features of the terminal have been summarized in Table-2.1 below.

Table-2.1Salient Features of Palanpur Terminal

Existing and Proposed Storage Tanks

HSD

BSIII

HSD BS

IV

MS

BSIII

MS

BSIV SKO SLOP

MS

BSIII

MS

BSIV

HSD

BSIV Receipt

Facilities

Loading

facilities

Palanpur

Existing

Marketing

Terminal 3(E)

3 (E)

2(E) 3(E) 2(E) 2(E) 1(P) 1(P) 1(P) Pipeline

(E )

TT

loading

(E )

TT – Tank Trucks (Road Loadings), E-Existing, P-Proposed

Road loading terminal also have small storage and injection facilities for dosage of Ethanol

and various other additives like Furfural, Blue Dye, Power, Turbojet, Marker etc.

2.2 PIPELINES & STATIONS

2.2.1 SALIENT FEATURES OF THE MAIN PIPELINE

The salient features of the proposed Rewari- Kanpur petroleum product pipeline, which will

be supplying the petroleum products to above terminals, has been summarized in Table-2.2

below.


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.4

Table-2.2 Salient Features of the Main Pipeline

Name Rewari- Kanpur Pipeline

Transport

Material

MS BS III, MS BS I V, HSD BS III, HSD BS IV, and SKO.

Pipeline Length 437 km 18’’Dia, min. 6.4mm thickness, carbon steel pipeline.

Take-off point 1) Existing Rewari Originating Terminal in Haryana (km0.0,253

mt. s AMSL)

Terminal Point Proposed Kanpur Terminal of HPCL in U.P. (km 437 ,128 mt.s

AMSL)

ROU 18 m

Operating Hours 8000Hrs./Annum

Pipeline

Roughness

45 microns

Pipeline

Corrosion

allowance

0.5mm

Pigging Facilities Permanent pigging facilities at Rewari, Mathura, and Kanpur,

suitable for “intelligent Pigging “shall be provided. Intermediate

pigging stations at Saiyyadpur Pran.

Sub soil

temperature

25° C throughout the length of the pipeline.

Surge Control Suitable surge control/surge relief system shall be provided as per

requirement of codes/ standards( ASME B31.4-2009Edition)

Pipeline

corrosion

Internal protection-Suitable corrosion inhibitor injection system will

be provided .Also suitable automated system shall be provided for


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.5

protection

System

automated dosing rate.

External Protection- Suitable coating shall be provided. Cathodic

Protection by impressed current technique for buried portion of

pipeline will be provided.

Corrosion

monitoring

system

Corrosion coupons shall be provided as per requirement including

continuous monitoring of corrosion rate.

Sectionalizing

Valve

Sectionalizing Valve shall be provided as per ASME B 31.4 & OISD

relevant standard.

Design Margin On flow: Nil.

On length: 5%

On elevation difference: 5%

Power supply Power supply shall be taken from SEB.

Battery back up shall be provided at all stations for emergency

loads.

Emergency power by DG sets, UPS supply for instrumentation,

Telecom& SCADA at dispatch and receipt station.

Fire Fighting and

Line

maintenance

Fire Tender and gully suckers will be provided at Bharatpur,

Mathura and Kanpur.

Terminals Rewari, Bharatpur, Mathura and Kanpur with tap off point and

associated facilities.

States en-route Haryana, Rajasthan &U.P.

2.2.2 PIPELINE ROUTE DESCRIPTION

The pipeline takes off at Rewari in Haryana and terminates at Kanpur in U.P .The length of

the pipeline including main route is given in Table-2.3


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.6

Table-2.3 Length of the Pipeline Sections

SN Section Length(km)

1. Main Line (Rewari to Kanpur ) 437

2.2.3 SUMMARY OF PIPELINE DETAILS

Summary of the various pipeline parameters is given in Table-2.4

Table-2.4 Summary of Pipeline Details

Item Details

Length (km) Main line:437 km,

Line size & thickness 18” and 6.4-7.9 mm.

Pipe Material & Grade Carbon steel

ROU (m) 18m

Throughput 3.17 MMTPA in phase I, (Year 2018-19)and 3.86

MMTPA in phase II (Year 2023-24) .

Burial Depth (m) 1.0 m to 1.2 m.

Pipeline Design Basis ASME B 31.4 and OISD -141

Methods for

rail/road/river/canal

crossings

Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD), boring and

conventional methods as required.

Pipeline corrosion

protection measures

Three layers of external PE coating consisting epoxy,

adhesive and Polyethylene having coating thickness

2.2 -3.5mm shall be provided.

To avoid internal corrosion, corrosion inhibitor is

injected at the rate of 6-12 ppm during product

pumping.


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.7

Cathodic Protection by Impressed Current Cathodic

Protection ( ICCP)system

Communication System Optical Fibre Cable(OFC)based telecom system

Leak Detection &

protection system

During construction, the welds will be radio graphed

followed by hydro testing to ensure no leakage from

pipe manufacturing source or construction work.

During operation, SCADA with electronic leak

detection soft ware based on pressure flow will be

provided. This will also have necessary detectors to

give necessary alarms and repeating of alarms at

central control room, SCADA system along with

telecommunication system and instrumentation system

shall be supplied power through uninterrupted power

supply source with 12 hours back up. Besides UPS,

Diesel generators will also be installed in case of power

failure for more than 12 hours.

Inspection & Patrolling

system

Periodical Inspection of ROU by Officers, periodical

inspection of pipeline and coating health and regular

patrolling of ROU by line walkers.

2.2.4 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF TERMINAL

Geographical locations of the Terminal is given in the Table-2.5

Table-2.5 Geographical Locations of the Terminal

Stations RL

(m)

Lat (N) Long(E) Village District State

Palanpur

Terminal

190 24∙12’ 71∙21’ Chandisar Banskantha Gujarat


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.8

2.2.5 SUMMARY OF STATION DETAILS AT TERMINAL

The summary of Pipeline station details at terminal location including type of station, facilities

provided in the station are given in Table-2.6

Table-2.6 Station Details at Terminal

Station Station Type Facilities Provided

Palanpur Pumping station and associated

facilities.

Product Receipt Facilities. Pig

Receiving facilities, Metering,

Sump tank, Slop tanks

2.3 FACILITIES PROVIDED AT TERMINAL

Product Pump House, Manifold, Fire water Pump House, Two Tank truck Filling Gantrys,

Calibration Facilities, Electric Room/MCC, D G yard, Transformer Yard, Lube Drum Yard

and Grease Drum Shed, Lube Ware House, Marketing Room, Admin. Building, Control

Room, Amenity, Parking, Sealing Platform, Effluent Treatment Plant, Security & Gate House

checking Platform , Watch Tower (4 Nos), Compound wall, Emergency Gate-1 No., Drivers

Toilet, Foam Tank Shed, Blue Dye Dosing System, Turbo jet Dosing System, Power Dosing

System, Product Storage Tanks.

2.3.1 PUMPING & LOADING FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT PALANPUR TERMINAL

Product Palanpur

HSD BS III 3 X 4800

HSD BSIV 2 X 2400

MS BSIII 3 X 2400

MSBSIV 2 X 2400

SKO 2 X 2400

Slop 2 X 1200


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.9

U/G & HOR 7 X 300

2.3.2 SCHEDULE OF FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT PALANPUR TERMINAL

Item Description Size (M) Area (SQM)

1 Product Pump House 5.5MX49M 269.5

2 Manifold 10MX49M 560

3 Fire water Pump House 19MX7.5M 142.50

4 Tank truck Filling Gantry 42.32MX14.6M 617.87

4A Tank truck Filling Gantry 21.16MX14.6M 308.94

5 Calibration Facilities 12MX8M 96

6 Electric Room/MCC 30MX8M 240

7 D G yard 10MX10M 100

8 Transformer Yard 10MX10M 100

9 Lube Drum Yard and Grease Drum Shed

30MX15M 450

10 Lube Ware House 30MX15M 450

11 Marketing Room 12MX6M 72

12 Admin. Building, Control Room, Amenity

12MX24M 288

13 Parking 18MX6M 108

14 Sealing Platform 8MX9.6M 76.8

15 Effluent Treatment Plant 35MX25M 875

16 Security & Gate House checking Platform

4MX5M 20

17 Watch Tower (4 Nos) 1.2MX1.2M 1.44

18 Compound wall 3M Ht. with Barbed Wire fencing


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.10

19 Emergency Gate-1 No. 6M Wide

20 Drivers Toilet 4.5MX3.25M 14.625

21 Foam Tank Shed 5.0MX4.0M 20.00

22

23

24

Blue Dye Dosing System

Turbo jet Dosing System

Power Dosing System

4MX8M 32

2.3.3 TANK TRUCK LOADING FACILITIES

The Tank Truck loading Gantry consists of loading bays & loading arms. Product wise

distribution of loading arms envisaged in the Gantry of the Terminal is given in Table-2.7

Table-2.7 TT Loading Facilities in Terminal

Terminal No. of

Loading

Bays

No. of Loading Arms for

HSD BSIII HSD BSIV MS BSIII MS BSIV SKO

Palanpur 12 8 2 4 3 3

Table 2.8 Salient Features of Existing and Proposed Tankages At Palanpur


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.11

2.4 DESIGN BASIS FOR PRODUCTS FACILITIES

2.4.1 PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS

POL Products to be handled/stored are: MS BS III, MS BS I V, HSD BS III, HSD BS IV and

SKO

Sr.

No.

Item

No

Description Dimension Remarks Existing/

Proposed

1 TF-

1,2,3

TF-6

FRVT 3173.2KL EACH

HSDIII CLASS-B

TF-6 CONVERTED

FROM HSD-IV TO III

18MØ×14MHT.

API-650 Existing

2 TF-4,5 TANK FRVT 2918.8KL

EACH HSD IV CLASS-B

18MØ×13MHT API-650 Existing

3 TF-7,8 TANK FRVT 2603.8KL

EACH MS III-CLASS-A


4 TF-

9,10

TF-11

TANK FRVT 3602.4KL

EACH MS IV CLASS A


5 TF-12

TF-13

TANK FRVT 1497.7KL

EACH SKO CLASS -B


6 TF-

14,15

TANK FRVT 509.2KL

EACH SLOP CLASS-A/B


7

U/G SUMP VESSELS (7

No.s) 70 KL EACH

3MØ×11MHT

EACH

As per

IS: 10987-

92

Existing

TS-1 MSIII,CLASS-A

TS-2 MSIV, CLASS-A

TS3,4,5 HSD III,HSD

IV,SKO,CLASS-B

TS-6,7 ETHANOL CLASS-A

8 W-1

W-2

FIRE WATER TANKS(2

Nos)

ORVT-2228.5-each


API-650 Existing

9 W-3 DISPLACEMENT

WATER TANK

27.7MØ×15MH

T

API-650 Existing

10 TF-16 MSIII,CLASS-

A,FRV,4700KL

22MØ×14MHT API-650 Proposed

11 TF-17 MSIV, CLASS-A,1700 KL 15MØ×13MHT API-650 Proposed

12 TF-18 HSD IV,CLASS-B,3450

KL

20MØ×13MHT API-650 Proposed


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.12

2.4.2 STORAGE FACILITIES

The storage facilities are planned to suit the minimum requirement of 1 Batch plus 5 days

off-take at the terminal.

2.4.3 ROAD LOADING/RECEIPT FACILITIES

Product loading in Road tankers is through loading arms. Contingency provision is also

made for unloading of product from road tankers and pumping into respective storage tanks.

2.4.4 APPLICABLE CODES & STANDARDS

· Laws – Codes & Rules as mandatory under the legislation of India, among others,

but not limited to and due attention shall be paid to the following with amendments

thereof :

a.OISD: Oil Safety Directorate

b. PMPA: Petroleum & Mineral pipeline Act, 1962

c. Railways./ Forest/NH/Other pipeline – Terms and conditions applicable.

d. Petroleum Act, 1934 and Rules 2002.

e. MoEF- Ministry of Environment and Forest.

· The set of laws- Codes and Rules that have been agreed between HPCL and the

authorities for the implementation of the high pressure system where applicable.

· AMSE (ANSI) B 31.4 American Code and relating US code applicable for similar

facilities.

· The” Rules of good practice” commonly used world wide OIL industry.

Table-2.9Applicable Codes & Standards

S.N. Code/Standard Applicable for

1. API 650/ IS803 For above ground storage tanks

2. IS 10987 For underground storage tanks

3. API 5L For product pipes


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.13

4. API 1104 For welding of pipelines and related facilities

5. API 1110 Pressure testing of pipelines

6. OISD 117 For fire fighting facilities

7. OISD 118 Layout of Terminal Depots

8. API 600 Gate Valves

9. API 6D Pressure Balanced Plug Valves

10. BS 5351 Ball Valves

11. ASME B16.9 Pipe Fittings

12. ASME B16.5 Pipe Flanges

13. API 610 Products Pumps

2.5 INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL & COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

2.5.1 INSTRUMENTATION & AUTOMATION

The major activities will be performed by terminal are the following:

a) Storage facilities for BSIII MS, BS IV MS, BSIII HSD, BS IV HSD, and SKO.

b) Receipt of product through pipeline

c) Road loading facilities

d) Sump & Slop tanks

e) Fire water pumps and make up water system

Full fledged Terminal Automation System (TAS) is envisaged for these units. These include:

a) Tank Farm Management System (TFM)

b) Terminal data management system

c) Bay Queuing

d) Tank Truck loading

TFM Automation


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.14

Tank Farm Management System (TFMS) is a part of Terminal Automation System. Each

tank is provided with Radar type level transmitter, Multi Element averaging temperature

sensor, Water/Product interface measurement and pressure transmitters for density

measurement is also envisaged for additional facilities created at Palanpur. The indication is

available locally in the tank side display unit and in the TAS in the control room.

Underground tanks are provided with Radar type transmitter. Data of the underground tank

are available on the TAS. Volumetric data of each product are also being available as a part

of tank farm management system.

Fire Water Pump Automation

Fire water pumps are diesel engine driven. Pumps are activated by remote manual call

points located at various points in the terminal/depot. If the pressure developed by one pump

drops less than 7 kg/cm2 second pump starts automatically. Three nos. of firewater pumps

are operating. One pump is on stand by. Fire water pump automation is achieved through

PLC. It is possible to operate the pumps manually too locally and from control room.

Make Up Water Pump

Make up water system may be by means of bore well.

2.5.2 SHUT DOWN FEATURES

Emergency shut down is provided in the marketing terminal control room to stop all dispatch

operation.

· Emergency push buttons to stop all road loading operations are provided in the

middle gantry.

· Emergency push buttons to stop all loading operations in the terminal/depot are

provided in the control room.

2.5.3 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Telecommunication system (interfaced with the public address system) along with Plant

Communication System (PCS) is envisaged for the terminals. The communication system

broadly comprises of the following:

1) Telephone exchange equipment and peripherals (EPABX) and Mobile Phones

2) Main Distribution Frame

3) Explosion proof and industrial type telephone instruments.


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.15

2.6 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR TERMINAL

2.6.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The following fire protection facilities are envisaged at terminals as per the requirements of

OISD-117:

a) Fire Water System – Pressurized at 7.0 Kg/cm2

b) Foam system

c) First Aid Fire Fighting Equipment and safety accessories

d) Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment

2.6.2 FIRE PROTECTION FACILITIES


1) Fire Water Storage Tanks

2) Fire Water Pumps

3) Fire Water Piping

4) Fire Hydrants

5) Fixed Foam System

6) Water/foam Monitors

7) Fixed Water Spray Systems

8) Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment

9) Portable Extinguishers

The design of the fire water system is based on one single largest risk. Table-2.10 presents

the capacity of firewater tanks and pumps at different locations.

Table-2.10 Fire Water Tanks & Fire Fighting Pumps at Terminal

Terminal Fire Water Tank Fire Water Pumps

Capacity Dia(m) x

Ht(m)

No. Capacity

PalanpurTerminal(Existing) 2x2228.5KL 14x15 2W+1S 410m3/hr

*DCP/CO2 extinguishers, water/foam monitors, personnel proactive equipment etc. are

provided as per the prevailing OISD norms.


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.16

2.7 SAFETY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT POLICY

Petroleum Industry occupies an important segment of our economy and is a source of large

benefit to the society. In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in volumes handled to

meet the increasing demand. Products such as, Euro III MS, Euro IV MS, Euro III HSD, Euro

IV HSD, SKO and FO are highly flammable, and safety which forms an integral part of the

industry, has always been given paramount importance.

Several Government authorities, both at the centre and state levels such as Inspectorate of

Factories, Department of Explosives etc. are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring

safe handling and accident prevention measures. In spite of the measures, possibility of

accidents either due to human errors and/or due to equipment/system failure cannot be ruled

out. The lessons learnt from the disasters all over the world, made it essential to draw an

Emergency Preparedness Plan to negotiate such eventuality. The imperative of Emergency

Preparedness to minimize the adverse effects due to an unfortunate accident occurring in

manufacture, storage, import and transport of any hazardous substance is thus well

recognized by all concerns.

An Emergency Preparedness Plan is essential to obviate such an eventuality by providing

the measures to contain the incident and minimize the after effects. To assist the Industry it

is considered essential to provide the guidelines for preparing such plans based on the

interactions within the oil industry.

Over the years the oil industry has developed and refined its own directives in the field of

safety, health and environment which are to be followed stringently by their members. In

addition to the environmental legislation, the OISD (Oil Industry Safety Directorate) makes it

mandatory for its members to implement its directives on these issues. HPCL has thus

formulated its own corporate policy on environment and safety which is followed in all its

installations.

Table-2.11 Emergency Preparedness

Emergency communication facility Three independent modes of

communication viz dedicated OFC line and

Land Line and Mobile Telephone are

adequate for communication during any

emergency.


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.17

Copy of Mutual Aid Agreements Will be provided before commissioning.

Emergency Control

Structure/organization chart of HPCL

Will be provided before commissioning.

Sample control structure/ organization

chart is provided in the Risk Analysis

Report.

List of safety equipment available at

site (e.g. fire proximity suits, SCBAs,

First Aid etc)

Safety equipment like breathing apparatus,

safety helmets, rubber gloves, fire

extinguishers, fire proximity suits, first aid

box will be made available at all control

locations before commissioning as per

OISD guidelines.

Details of emergency control centre

and standby location.

Terminal control station at the respective

location is designated to act as emergency

control centre. First aid facilities with

ambulance services will be provided to

treat the affected people as and when

need arises or to shift the injured to the

nearby hospitals in case of any

emergency.

The same HSE Policy which is practiced presently by HPCL, will be adopted for

transportation, storage and marketing of proposed petroleum products as well.

2.8 UTILITIES

2.8.1 POWER SUPPLY ARRANGEMENT

Power requirement will be fulfilled from the local grid. Provision for DG set is kept as back up

arrangement for emergency power only. The Estimated Power Requirement is given in table

2.12


Palanpur Terminal


Page No: 2.18

Table:2.12 Power Supply Requirement

Station Requirement (KVA) Source Back up DG sets for Emergency

Power (KVA)

Palanpur

(Existing)

420 66 KV (Grid) 525

2.8.2 MAKE UP WATER SYSTEM

The source of water for the make up water system is bore wells. Water from the bore well is

collected in sump. From the sump water will be pumped by self priming pumps installed on

top of the sump and distributed through a network of buried GI pipes to individual HDPE

overhead tanks of Amenities buildings, Admin building, drivers rest room etc. and to the fire

water storage tanks.

2.8.3 EFFLUENT TREATMENT PLAN (ETP)

The Effluent Treatment Plant receives oily water through a separate drain line connecting

tank farms, TT Gantry area, Pump house manifold area etc. The plant includes a Primary

separation unit consisting of a bar screen, Titled Plate Interceptor and Belt type oil skimmer.

Subsequently Effluent will be pumped to Filtration unit using a multimedia filter and

coalescing filter. The slop oil collected will be pumped to the slop tank. The capacity of the

existing ETP is 75KL/hr at Palanpur terminal.

Chapter 3

Maximum Credible

Accident (MCA) Analysis

3.1 Introduction

Accidental risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident

consisting of an event or sequence of events resulting into fire, explosion or toxic hazards to

human health and environment.

Risk Assessment (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular

facility poses to the public. It begins with the identification of probable potential hazardous

events at an industry and categorization as per the predetermined criteria. The

consequences of major credible events are calculated for different combinations of weather

conditions to simulate worst possible scenario. These consequence predictions are

combined to provide numerical measures of the risk for the entire facility.

MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with

maximum damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not

include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice the

selection of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering

judgement and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis.

Detailed study helps in plotting the damage contours on the detailed plot plan in

order to assess the magnitude of a particular event. A disastrous situation is the outcome of

fire, explosion or toxic hazards in addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss

of life, property and ecological imbalances.




Page No: 3.2

3.1.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis

The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of

potential vulnerability. The data requirements for MCA analysis are:

Operating manual

Flow diagram and P&I diagrams

Detailed design parameters

Physical and chemical properties of all the chemicals

Detailed plant layout

Detailed area layout

Past accident data

Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis:

Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure cases

Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of the

hazardous material

Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind velocities

and atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and pressure waves

Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the accidental

release of chemicals

3.2 Past Accident Data Analysis

Analysis of events arising out of the unsafe conditions is one of the basic

requirements for ensuring safety in any facility. The data required for such an analysis has

either to be generated by monitoring and/or collected from the records of the past

occurrences. This data, when analysed, helps in formulation of the steps towards mitigation

of hazards faced commonly. Trends in safety of various activities can be evaluated and

actions can be planned accordingly, to improve the safety.

Data analysis helps in correlating the causal factors and the corrective steps to be

taken for controlling the accidents. It is, therefore, of vital importance to collect the data

methodically, based on potential incidents, sections involved, causes of failure and the

preventive measures taken. This helps to face future eventualities with more preparedness.




Page No: 3.3

A) November 23, 2003, Crude Oil Tank Explosion

A battery of crude oil tanks exploded on a lease near the intersection of Highway

349 and County Road 300 about 32 km south of Midland, TX. Perenco LLC. According to

the field superintendent for Perenco, an electrical spark caused the fire: “We seemed to

have a leak on the ‘lack unit’.” He said that a lack unit measures how much oil moves

through the tanks and checks oil content. He said that when the pumper checking the lease

turned off the lack unit, an electrical spark set the leaking oil on fire. The workers quickly left

the lease to turn off the 18 wells that sent oil to the tank battery. They were about 400m

away from the battery when it exploded 45 minutes later. He said about 640 barrels of oil;

three stock tanks, three water tanks and associated equipment were destroyed

B) December 20, 2003, Flange Failure Causes Tank Fire

An explosion occurred in a tank at an oil plant, causing a fire which burned for

more than an hour near Houston, TX. at Marcus Oil and Chemical. A spokesman for the

Houston Fire Department said: “A flange on the south side of the tank broke or cracked and

let the hot oil out. When in turn hit the atmosphere at 700 degrees, it burst into flames.” The

fire department said the blaze was never a considerable danger. No one was ever

evacuated. There was only one minor injury – a twisted ankle – in the incident. The Houston

Fire Department said this was at least the third time they’ve been called to Marcus Oil and

Chemical in the last five or six years.

C) October 29, 2009, Indian oil corporation Ltd, Jaipur

A massive fire broke out on 29th October at an oil storage depot in the western

state of Rajasthan, killing at least 11 people and injuring 135 others. Two huge explosions

were heard before the fire ignited and spread. The fire broke out around 19:30 local time at

the Jaipur storage depot run by Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) Ltd and was visible from over

25 kilometers away, according to reports. Company officials said the depot covers an area

of several square kilometers and the oil tanks store gasoline, diesel and kerosene fuel for

several state-owned oil companies. Reports said the depot had a 100,000-kilolitre capacity.

Initial estimates indicate that products valued at 1.5 billion rupees have been burnt, and the

petroleum stocks were insured.

D) 11 December 2005, the Buncefield Incident, Hemel Hempstead

On Sunday 11 December 2005, a series of explosions and subsequent fire

destroyed large parts of the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, Hemel Hempstead,

and caused widespread damage to neighbouring properties. The main explosion took place




Page No: 3.4

at 06.01:32 hours and was of massive proportions. It was followed by a large fire that

engulfed 23 large fuel storage tanks over a high proportion of the Buncefield site. The

incident injured 43 people. Fortunately, no one was seriously hurt and there were no

fatalities. Nevertheless, there was significant damage to both commercial and residential

properties near the Buncefield site. About 2000 people had to be evacuated from their

homes and sections of the M1 motorway were closed. The fire burned for five days,

destroying most of the site and emitting a large plume of smoke into the atmosphere that

dispersed over southern England and beyond.

3.3 Hazard Identification

Identification of hazards is an important step in Risk Assessment as it leads to the

generation of accidental scenarios. The merits of including the hazard for further

investigation are subsequently determined by its significance, normally using a cut-off or

threshold quantity.

Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of the

risk it presents to the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both

probability and consequences should be considered, but there are occasions where it either

the probability or the consequence can shown to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high,

decisions can be made on just one factor.

During the hazard identification component, the following considerations are taken

into account.

Chemical identities

Location of process unit facilities for hazardous materials.

The types and design of process units

The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release and

The nature of the hazard (e.g. airborne toxic vapours or mists, fire, explosion,

large quantities stored or processed handling conditions) most likely to

accompany hazardous materials spills or releases




Page No: 3.5

3.3.1 Fire and Explosion Index (FEI)

Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) is useful in identification of areas in which the

potential risk reaches a certain level. It estimates the global risk associated with a process

unit and classifies the units according to their general level of risk. FEI covers aspects

related to the intrinsic hazard of materials, the quantities handled and operating conditions.

This factor gives index value for the area which could be affected by an accident, the

damage to property within the area and the working days lost due to accidents. The method

for evaluation of FEI involves following stages.

Selection of pertinent process unit which can have serious impact on plant safety

Determination of Material Factor (MF): This factor for a given substance in the

process unit gives intrinsic potential to release energy in case of fire or an

explosion. Material Factor can be directly obtained from Dow’s Fire and

Explosion Index Hazard classification Guide of American Institute of Chemical

Engineers, New York. The factor can also be evaluated from NFPA indices of

danger, health, flammability and reactivity.

Determination of Unit Hazard Factor: The Unit Hazard Factor is obtained by

multiplication of General Process Hazard (GPH) factor and Special Process

Hazard (SPH) factor. GPH factor is computed according to presence of

exothermic reactions and loading and unloading operations. The penalties due

to each of these reactions / operations are summed up to compute GPH

factor. Similarly, SPH factor can be evaluated for the operations close to

flammable range or pressures different from atmospheric. Penalties of these

operations for both factors can be obtained from Dow’s EFI index form.

Fire and explosion index is then calculated as the product of Material Factor (MF)

and Unit Hazard Factor. Degree of hazards based on FEI is given in the following Table 3.1.




Page No: 3.6

Table 3.1

Degree of Hazards Based on FEI

FEI Range Degree of Hazard

0 – 60 Light

61-96 Moderate

97 - 127 Intermediate

128 - 158 Heavy

159 and Above Severe

Source: Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide, Seventh

Edition, AIChE Technical Manual (1994)

Preventive and protective control measures are recommended based on degree

of hazard. Therefore, FEI indicates the efforts to be taken to reduce risks for a particular unit.

FEI computed for various process equipments are presented

in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2

Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) for Process Units

Sr. No.

Tank No Unit Name

FEI Category

1 TF-1-3,6 HSD (3173.2KL) 34.23 Light

2 TF-4,5 HSD (2918.8KL) 34.20 Light

3 TF-7, 8 MS (2603.8KL) 60.8 Moderate

4 TF-9,10,11 MS (3602.4KL) 60.8 Moderate

5 TF-12,13 SKO (1497.7KL) 34.20 Light

7 TS-1 MS (70KL) 52.59 Light

9 TS-3,4,5 HSD (70KL) 29.07 Light

11 TS-6,7 ETHANOL (70KL) 52.63 Light

11 TF-16 MS (4700KL) 60.8 Moderate

12 TF-17 MS (1700KL) 60.8 Moderate

13 TF-18 HSD (3450KL) 34.20 Light




Page No: 3.7

3.4 MCA Analysis

MCA analysis encompasses defined techniques to identify the hazards and

compute the consequent effects in terms of damage distances due to heat radiation, toxic

releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A list of probable or potential accidents of the major

units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous materials are

examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes

and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the

respective damage caused can be assessed. Flow chart of accidental release of hazardous

chemicals is presented

in Fig. 3.1.

Hazardous substance, on release can cause damage on a large scale. The extent

of the damage is dependent upon the nature of the release and the physical state of the

material. In the present report the consequences for flammable hazards are considered and

the damages caused due to such releases are assessed with recourse to MCA analysis.

Flammable substances on release may cause Jet fire and less likely unconfined

vapour cloud explosion causing possible damage to the surrounding area. The extent of

damage depends upon the nature of the release. The release of flammable materials and

subsequent ignition result in heat radiation wave or vapour cloud depending upon the

flammability and its physical state. Damage distances due to release of hazardous materials

depend on atmospheric stability and wind speed. It is important to visualize the

consequence of the release of such substances and the damage caused to the surrounding

areas. Computation of damage distances are carried out at various atmospheric stability

conditions for various wind velocities and the result is tabulated. Pasquill-Giffard atmospheric

stability classes with corresponding weather conditions are listed in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3

Pasquill – Giffard Atmospheric Stability

Sr. No.

Stability Class

Weather Conditions

1. A Very unstable – sunny, light wind

2. A/B Unstable - as with A only less sunny or more windy

3. B Unstable - as with A/B only less sunny or more windy

4. B/C Moderately unstable – moderate sunny and moderate wind

5. C Moderately unstable – very windy / sunny or overcast / light wind

6. C/D Moderate unstable – moderate sun and high wind




Page No: 3.8

7. D Neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast / windy night

8. E Moderately stable – less overcast and less windy night thand

9. F Stable – night with moderate clouds and light / moderate wind

10. G Very stable – possibly fog

Source: Hanna , S. R. and Drivas, P. J. (1996) Guidelines for Use of Vapour Cloud

Dispersion Models. AIChE, CCPS, New York

3.4.1 Fire, Explosion and Toxic Scenarios

Combustible materials within their flammable limits may ignite and burn if exposed

to an ignition source of sufficient energy. On process plants, this normally occurs as a result

of a leakage or spillage. Depending on the physical properties of the material and the

operating parameters, the combustion of material in a plant may take on a number of forms

like jet fire, flash fire and pool fire.

3.4.1.1 Jet Fire

Jet fire occurs when flammable material of a high exit velocity ignites. In process

industries this may be due to design (flares) or an accidental. Ejection of flammable material

from a vessel, pipe or pipe flange may give rise to a jet fire and in some instances the jet

flame could have substantial “reach”. Depending on wind speed, the flame may tilt and

impinge on pipeline, equipment or structures. The thermal radiation from these fires may

cause injury to people or damage equipment some distance from the source of the flames.

3.4.1.2 Flash Fire

A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a vapour cloud resulting from a

release of flammable material into the open air, which after mixing with air, ignites. A flash

fire results from the ignition of a released flammable cloud in which there is essentially no

increase in combustion rate. The ignition source could be electric spark, a hot surface, and

friction between moving parts of a machine or an open fire.

Flash fire may occur due to its less vapour temperature than ambient temperature.

Hence, as a result of a spill, they are dispersed initially by the negative buoyancy of cold

vapours and subsequently by the atmospheric turbulence. After the release and dispersion

of the flammable fuel the resulting vapour cloud is ignited and when the fuel vapour is not

mixed with sufficient air prior to ignition, it results in diffusion fire burning. Therefore the rate

at which the fuel vapour and air are mixed together during combustion determines the rate of

burning in the flash fire.




Page No: 3.9

The main dangers of flash fire are radiation and direct flame contact. The size of

the flammable cloud determines the area of possible direct flame contact effects. Radiation

effects on a target depend on several factors including its distance from the flames, flame

height, flame emissive power, local atmospheric transitivity and cloud size. Most of the time,

flash combustion lasts for no more than a few seconds.

3.4.1.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion

The Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) begins with a release of a large quantity of

flammable vaporizing liquid or gas from a storage tank, transport vessel or pipeline

producing a dangerous overpressure. These explosions follow a well-determined pattern.

There are basically four features, which must be present for an effective vapour cloud

explosion to occur with an effective blast. These are:

First, the release material must be flammable and at a suitable condition of

temperature and pressure which depends on the chemical. The materials which come under

this category, range from liquefied gases under pressure (e.g. butane, propane); ordinary

flammable liquids (e.g. cyclohexane, naphtha) to non liquefied flammable gases (e.g.

ethylene, acetylene)

Second, before the ignition, a cloud of sufficient size must have been formed.

Normally ignition delays of few minutes are considered the most probable for generating the

vapour cloud explosions

Third, a sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range of the

material to cause extensive overpressure

Fourth, the flame speed determines the blast effects of the vapour cloud

explosions, which can vary greatly

The flammable content of a gas cloud is calculated by three-dimensional

integration of the concentration profiles, which fall within the flammable limits. If the gas

cloud ignites, two situations can occur, namely non-explosive combustion (flash fire) and

explosive combustion (flash fire + explosion).

3.4.1.4 Pool Fire

Vapors of flammable liquids when spilled outside due to leak in the storage tank or

process unit can give rise to a flammable mixture with air which when ignited is called as

pool fire. Burning of the spilled liquid can affect the other surrounding units. Main hazards of

pool fire are due to the heat radiations generated.




Page No: 3.10

3.4.1.5 Lower and Upper Flammability Limit

In case of any spillage and leakages of hydrocarbons / flammable material,

probability of getting ignited is depending on whether the air borne mixture is in the

flammable region. The Lower flammability limit corresponds to minimum proportion of

combustible vapour in air for combustion. The Upper flammability limit Correspond to

maximum proportion of combustible vapour in air for combustion and the concentration

range lying between the lower and the upper limit is called as flammable range.




Page No: 3.11

Release of

Chemical

InstantaneousContinuous

Bottom Top

Two Phase

OutflowLiquid

Ignition Vapours

Ignition ?

Pool

Formation

Ignition ?Flare

Pool Fire

Evaporation

Dispersion

Vapour Cloud

Formation

Ignition ?

Detonation

Toxicity

Vapour Cloud

Explosion

Pressure

Wave

CONSEQUENCE MODELLING

Heat

Radiation

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

TOXICITY

COMPUTATION

Fig. 3.1: Accidental Release of Chemicals: A Scenario




Page No: 3.12

3.4.2 Models for the Calculation of Heat load and Shock Waves

If a flammable gas or liquid is released, damage resulting from heat radiation or

explosion may occur on ignition. Models used in this study for the effects in the event of

immediate ignition (torch and pool fire) and the ignition of a gas cloud will be discussed in

succession. These models calculate the heat radiation or peak overpressure as a function of

the distance from the torch, the ignited pool or gas cloud. The physical significance of the

various heat loads is depicted in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4

List of Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads

Sr.

No.

Heat loads

(kW/m²)

Type of Damage Intensity

Damage to Equipment Damage to People

1 37.5 Damage to process equipment 100% lethality in 1 min. 1%

lethality in 10 sec

2 25.0 Minimum energy required to ignite

wood

50% Lethality in 1 min.

Significant injury in 10 sec

3 19.0 Maximum thermal radiation

intensity allowed on thermally

unprotected equipment

--

4 12.5 Minimum energy required to melt

plastic tubing

1% lethality in 1 min

5 4.0 -- First degree burns, causes pain

for exposure longer than 10 sec

6 1.6 -- Causes no discomfort on long

exposures

Source: World Bank (1988). Technical Report No. 55: Techniques for Assessing

Industrial Hazards. , Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

3.4.3 Model for Pressure Wave

A pressure wave can be caused by gas cloud explosion. The following damage

criteria are assumed as a result of the peak overpressure of a pressure wave:

0.03 bar over pressure wave is taken as the limit for the occurrence of wounds as

a result of flying fragments of glass




Page No: 3.13

Following assumptions are used to translate an explosion in terms of damage to

the surrounding area:

Within the contour area of the exploding gas cloud, Casualties are due to

burns or asphyxiation. Houses and buildings in this zone will be severely

damaged.

In houses with serious damage, it is assumed that one out of eight persons

present will be killed as a result of the building collapse. Within the zone of

a peak over pressure of 0.3 bar the risk of death in houses is 0.9 x 1/8 =

0.1125, and in the zone with a peak over pressure of 0.1 bar the

probability of death is 0.1 x 1/8 = 0.0125, i.e. one out of eighty people will

be killed.

The significance of the peak over pressure 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar, 0.03 bar and 0.01 bar

are depicted in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5

Damage Criteria for Pressure Waves

Human Injury Structural Damage

Peak Over

Pressure (bar)

Type of

Damage

Peak Over

Pressure (bar)

Type of Damage

5-8 100% lethality 0.3 Heavy (90% damage)

3.5-5 50% lethality 0.1 Repairable (10% damage)

2-3 Threshold

lethality

0.03 Damage of Glass

1.33-2 Severe lung

damage

0.01 Crack of windows

1-1.33 50% Eardrum

rupture

- -

Source: Marshall, V.C. (1977)’ How lethal are explosives and toxic escapes’.

3.4.4 Vulnerability Models

Vulnerability models are used in order to determine how people are injured by

exposure to heat load. Such models are designed on the basis of animal experiments or on

the basis of the analysis of injuries resulting from accidents, which have occurred.




Page No: 3.14

Vulnerability models often make use of a probit function. In this function, a link is made

between the heat load and the percentage of people exposed to a particular type of injury.

It is assumed that everyone inside the area covered or gas cloud will be burnt to

death or will asphyxiate. Human fatality is a function of heat flux and exposure time. The

probit expressions for the prediction of mortality due tot thermal radiation from fire scenarios

are proportional to the product of t and q4/3. The probit equation usually used is that

proposed by Eisenberg and coworkers*

Pr = -14.9 + 2.56 In (10-4 q4/3 t)

In which,

Pr = Probit the measure of the percentage of people exposed to a particular injury

t = exposure time in seconds

q = thermal load in W/m²

For 1% lethality in the exposed persons the corresponding probit value is 2.67.

Table 3.6 gives time is seconds for percentage of fatality at various heat radiations.

Table 3.6

Range of Thermal Flux Levels and their Potential Effects

Heat Flux (kW/m²)

Seconds Exposure For % Fatality

1% 50% 99%

1.6 500 1300 3200

4 150 370 930

12.5 30 80 200

37.5 8 20 50

*Eisenberg, N. A., Lynch C. J. and Breeding, R. J. (1975) Vulnerability Model. A

Simulation System for Assessing Damage Resulting from Marine Spills. National Technology

Information Service Report AD-A015-245, Springfield, MA




Page No: 3.15

3.5 Computation of Damage Distances

Damage distances for the accidental release of hazardous materials have been

computed at 2F, 3D and 5D weather conditions. In these conditions, 2, 3 and 5 are wind

velocities in m/s and F and D are atmospheric stability classes. These weather conditions

have been selected to accommodate worst case scenarios to get maximum effective

distances. DNV based PHAST Micro 6.51 software has been used to carry out

consequence analysis. Damage distances computed for fire and explosion scenarios for the

various storage tanks in Palanpur Terminal are described below.

Jet Fire

This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm in

MS tank with capacity 4700KL at various heat radiation levels under the different

atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 50 mm leak

for stability class 2F is 49.81 m at heat load of 4.0 KW/m² and the corresponding damage

contour is shown in Fig.3.2.

The computed damage distances for other process units for 25 mm and 50 mm

leak sizes at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4.0 kW/m² are given in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7

Consequence Analysis for Jet Fire Scenario

Scenario Considered Leak

Leak Size (mm)

Source Strength (kg/sec)

Weather

Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads

37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

Tank – TF 1,2,3,6 Material - HSD Capacity -3173.2KL

25 4.11 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 16.44 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

Tank – TF4,5 Material - HSD Capacity -2918.8KL

25 3.95 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 15.80 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -




Page No: 3.16


Leak Size (mm)


Weather


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

Tank - tf-7,8 Material - MS Capacity -2603.8KL

25 3.13 2F - 30.08 31.53

3D - 31.03 32.53

5D - 31.92 33.47

50 12.53

2F 44.45 46.22 48.91

3D 47.01 48.83 51.63

5D 49.79 51.72 54.77

Tank - tf-9,10,11 Material - MS Capacity -3602.4KL

25 3.13 2F - 30.08 31.53

3D - 31.03 32.53

5D - 31.92 33.47

50 12.53 2F 44.45 46.22 48.91

3D 47.01 48.83 51.63

5D 49.79 51.72 54.77

Tank - tf-12,13 Material - SKO Capacity -1497.7KL

25 3.20 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 12.83

2F - - 14.14

3D - - 15.35

5D - - 16.62

Tank - ts- 1 Material - MS Capacity -70KL

25 2.86 2F - 28.52 29.87

3D - 29.41 30.80

5D - 30.44 31.89

50 11.44

2F 42.72 44.37 46.78

3D 44.63 46.35 48.91

5D 47.18 48.98 51.76

Tank - tf-3,4,5 Material - HSD Capacity -70KL

25 3.60 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 14.42 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

Tank - tf-6,7 Material - MS Capacity -70KL

25 3.55 2F - - 17.67

3D - - 18.76

5D - - 19.47

50 14.20 2F - - 26.83

3D - 26.90 28.35




Page No: 3.17


Leak Size (mm)


Weather


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

5D - 29.09 30.34

Tank - tf-16 Material - MS Capacity -4700KL

25 3.26 2F - 30.78 32.27

3D - 31.69 33.23

5D - 32.71 34.32

50 13.05 2F 45.15 46.98 49.81

3D 48.25 50.12 53.05

5D 51.05 53.05 56.24


25 3.13 2F - 30.08 31.53

3D - 31.03 32.53

5D - 31.92 33.47

50 12.53 2F 44.45 46.22 48.91

3D 47.01 48.83 51.63

5D 49.79 51.72 54.77

Tank - tf-18 Material - HSD Capacity -3450KL

25 3.95 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 15.80 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

Tank - tf- 3,4,5 Material - SKO Capacity -70KL

25 3.60 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 14.42 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -




Page No: 3.18

Fig. 3.2: Damage Contour for Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak in MS Tank (Tf-16) at 2F weather condition




Page No: 3.19

Pool Fire

This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm in

HSD tank of capacity 2918.8KL for various heat radiation levels under the different

atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to 25 mm leak

for stability class 2F is 14.72 m at heat load of 37.5 KW/m² condition and the corresponding

damage contour is shown in Fig.3.3.

The computed damage distances for other process units for 25 mm and 50 mm

leak sizes at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4.0 kW/m² are given in Table 3.8.

Damage contour for other storage tanks are shown in Fig. 3.4 to Fig. 3.6

Table 3.8

Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Pool Radius (m)

Weather


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²


25 4.11 7..89 2F 15.08 24.66 41.03

3D 15.09 26.67 42.17

5D 15.34 29.49 43.48

50 16.44 15.79

2F - 25.66 53.05

3D - 26.54 55.97

5D - 28.11 59.63

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 22.56 2F - 26.98 60.64

3D - 27.69 64.78

5D - 30.86 71.6


25 3.95 7.74 2F 14.72 24.49 40.56

3D 14.73 26.52 41.66

5D 15.73 30.13 43.77

50 15.80 15.48 2F - 25.15 52.37

3D - 26.16 55.13

5D - 27.56 58.51

Catastrophic

Rupture

-

22.56 2F - 34.07 67.72

3D - 33.49 70.57

5D - 40.00 80.73

Tank - tf-7.8 Material - MS Capacity -

25 3.13 6.31 2F 12.57 22.02 41.72

3D 12.49 24.01 43.32

5D 12.79 27.07 44.91




Page No: 3.20

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Pool Radius (m)

Weather


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

2603.8KL 50 12.53 13.08

2F - 22.84 52.90

3D - 24.05 57.49

5D - 25.35 62.47

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 25.23 2F - 33.16 75.00

3D - 32.76 81.43

5D - 37.67 95.03


25 3.13 6.31 2F 12.57 22.02 41.72

3D 12.49 24.01 43.32

5D 12.79 27.07 44.91

50 12.53

13.08 2F - 22.84 52.90

3D - 24.05 57.49

5D - 25.35 62.47

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 25.23 2F - 34.59 76.42

3D - 33.87 82.54

5D - 39.52 96.88


25 3.04 6.94 2F 12.88 23.84 41.48

3D 12.98 26.19 42.94

5D 12.98 29.14 44.23

50 12.17 13.92

2F - 23.46 51.83

3D - 24.97 55.66

5D - 26.52 59.73

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 22.56

2F - 28.86 65.49

3D - 29.14 70.32

5D - 33.14 79.77


25 2.86 6.05 2F 12.00 21.73 40.75

3D 11.98 23.88 42.27

5D 11.89 26.50 43.30

50 11.44

12.54 2F - 22.08 51.67

3D - 23.02 55.77

5D - 25.23 61.30

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 63.22 2F - 64.90 141.54

3D - 64.25 152.94

5D - 65.30 170.48

Tank - tf-3,4,5 25 3.60 7.39 2F 13.96 24.11 39.56




Page No: 3.21

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Pool Radius (m)

Weather


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

Material - HSD Capacity -70KL

3D 13.96 26.15 40.56

5D 13.95 28.61 41.66

50 14.42 14.79 2F - 24.21 50.54

3D - 25.56 53.62

5D - 26.88 56.66

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 66.98 2F - 68.96 137.42

3D - 68.98 145.82

5D - 70.76 157.09

Tank - ts-6,7 Material - Ethanol Capacity -70KL

25 3.55 6.92 2F 23.84 34.72 52.11

3D 24.84 35.06 51.83

5D 26.12 35.79 51.42

50 14.20 13.99 2F 38.86 58.18 88.71

3D 40.57 58.58 88.46

5D 42.99 60.08 88.11

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 62.85 2F 119.81 186.01 288.46

3D 125.28 188.19 289.46

5D 132.1 191.18 289.55


25 3.26 6.42 2F 12.89 22.22 42.21

3D 12.74 24.14 43.81

5D 12.90 26.91 45.30

50 13.05 13.32 2F - 23.25 53.54

3D - 24.58 58.31

5D - 25.75 63.35

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 34.66 2F - 45.63 96.93

3D - 44.28 104.27

5D - 50.85 121.83


25 3.13 6.31 2F 12.57 22.02 41.72

3D 12.49 24.01 43.32

5D 12.79 27.07 44.91

50 12.53

13.08 2F - 22.84 52.90

3D - 24.05 57.49

5D - 25.35 62.47

Catastrophic

- 34.66 2F - 41.07 92.36

3D - 40.70 100.69




Page No: 3.22

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Pool Radius (m)

Weather


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

Rupture 5D - 44.88 115.87


25 3.95 7.74 2F 14.72 24.49 40.56

3D 14.73 26.52 41.66

5D 15.73 30.13 43.77

50 15.80 15.48

2F - 25.15 52.37

3D - 26.16 55.13

5D - 27.56 58.51

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 34.66 2F - 49.48 93.46

3D - 47.49 96.99

5D - 56.51 111.26


25 3.60 7.12 2F 13.27 23.92 42.03

3D 13.37 26.33 43.55

5D 13.45 29.35 44.91

50 14.42 14.29

2F - 23.77 52.53

3D - 25.17 56.46

5D - 26.63 60.55

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 66.82

2F - 68.61 142.53

3D - 68.66 153.09

5D - 69.98 167.27




Page No: 3.23

Fig. 3.3: Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 25 mm leak in HSD Tank (Tf-4) at 2F weather condition

Fig. 3.4: Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 25 mm leak in MS Tank (Tf-9,10,11) at 2F weather condition




Page No: 3.24

Fig. 3.5: Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 50mm leak in SKO Tank (Tf-12,13) at 2F weather condition

Fig. 3.6: Damage Contour for Pool Fire due to 50mm leak in Ethanol Tank (Ts-6,7) at 5D weather condition




Page No: 3.25

Flash Fire

This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50 mm and

catastrophic rupture of HSD tank of capacity 313.2KL for LFL concentrations under the

different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distances due to 50

mm leak are 7.15 m, 7.05 m and 7.60 m for stability classes 2F, 3D and 5D conditions

respectively. The computed damage distances for other process units at LFL distances are

given in Table 3.9.

Table 3.9

Consequence Analysis for Flash Fire Scenario

Scenario Considered LFL Concentration (ppm)

Leak Size (mm)


Weather

LFL Distance (m)


5000 25 4.11 2F 6.17

3D 6.18

5D 6.37

50 16.44 2F 7.15

3D 7.05

5D 7.60

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 2F 23.99

3D 24.06

5D 26.14


5000 25 3.95 2F 5.96

3D 5.97

5D 6.95

50 15.80 2F 6.94

3D 6.74

5D 7.10

Catastrophic

Rupture

-

2F 47.25

3D 44.25

5D 48.03

Tank - tf-7.8 Material - MS Capacity -2603.8KL

10500 25 3.13 2F 38.42

3D 35.00

5D 26.91

50 12.53 2F 62.21

3D 57.49

5D 46.21

Catastrop - 2F 324.11




Page No: 3.26


Leak Size (mm)


Weather

LFL Distance (m)

hic Rupture

3D 300.87

5D 297.00


10500 25 3.13 2F 38.42

3D 35.00

5D 26.91

50 12.53

2F 62.21

3D 57.49

5D 46.21

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 2F 368.85

3D 343.05

5D 335.28


7000 25 3.04 2F 4.94

3D 5.04

5D 5.05

50 12.17 2F 7.05

3D 7.17

5D 6.74

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 2F 28.21

3D 27.82

5D 30.93


10500 25 2.86 2F 36.33

3D 33.44

5D 26.95

50 11.44

2F 57.83

3D 53.16

5D 44.01

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 2F 126.66

3D 109.15

5D 100.56


5000 25 3.60 2F 5.55

3D 5.56

5D 5.54

50 14.42 2F 6.12

3D 6.37

5D 6.58





Page No: 3.27


Leak Size (mm)


Weather

LFL Distance (m)

hic Rupture

3D 10.83

5D 11.44

Tank - tf-6,7 Material - MS Capacity -70KL

43000 25 3.55 2F 5.64

3D 5.28

5D 5.44

50 14.20 2F 11.49

3D 11.42

5D 11.03

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 2F 14.85

3D 9.63

5D 10.15


10500 25 3.26 2F 39.21

3D 35.52

5D 27.48

50 13.05 2F 64.84

3D 59.21

5D 48.17

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 2F 414.77

3D 384.64

5D 372.92


10500 25 3.13 2F 38.42

3D 35.00

5D 26.91

50 12.53

2F 62.21

3D 57.49

5D 46.21

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 2F 280.60

3D 260.24

5D 254.85


5000 25 3.95 2F 5.96

3D 5.97

5D 6.95

50 15.80 2F 6.94

3D 6.74

5D 7.10





Page No: 3.28


Leak Size (mm)


Weather

LFL Distance (m)

hic Rupture

3D 52.74

5D 60.41


7000 25 3.60 2F 5.55

3D 5.56

5D 5.54

50 14.42 2F 6.12

3D 6.37

5D 6.58

Catastrophic

Rupture

- 2F 11.69

3D 10.83

5D 11.44




Page No: 3.29

Vapor Cloud Explosion

This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm, 50 mm and

catastrophic rupture of SKO tank of capacity 1497.7KL at various overpressure waves under

the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distance due to

50 mm leak at stability class 5D is 24.29 m for overpressure wave of 0.03 bar and damage

contour is shown in Fig. 3.7. The computed damage distances for other Storage Tanks are

given in Table 3.10.

Table 3.10

Consequence Analysis for VCE Scenario

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Weather

Damage Distance (m)

0.03bar

0.1bar 0.3bar

Tank – tf 1,2,3,6 Material - HSD Capacity -3173.2KL

25 4.11 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 16.44 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

Catastrophic Rupture

- 2F 403.97 183.75 101.76

3D 410.50 186.54 103.16

5D 409.06 185.92 102.85

Tank – tf4,5 Material - HSD Capacity -2918.8KL

25 3.95 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 15.80 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -


-

2F 837.92 380.29 209.92

3D 860.04 389.72 214.63

5D 846.59 383.99 211.76

Tank - tf-7,8 Material - MS Capacity -2603.8KL

25 3.13 2F 111.27 76.13 63.04

3D 70.19 52.87 46.42

5D 73.77 54.40 47.19

50 12.53 2F 157.92 110.91 95.43

3D 141.39 100.44 85.20

5D 112.07 82.21 71.09




Page No: 3.30

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Weather

Damage Distance (m)

0.03bar

0.1bar 0.3bar


- 2F 957.91 628.26 513.36

3D 899.52 574.94 468.75

5D 868.72 542.61 447.09


25 3.13 2F 111.27 76.13 63.04

3D 70.19 52.87 46.42

5D 73.77 54.40 47.19

50 12.53

2F 157.92 110.91 95.43

3D 141.39 100.44 85.20

5D 112.07 82.21 71.09


- 2F 1072.8 708.52 581.45

3D 1007.1 649.34 530.73

5D 982.4 610.68 504.14


25 3.04 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 12.17 2F 21.40 14.86 12.42

3D 23.27 15.65 12.82

5D 24.29 16.09 13.04


- 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -


25 2.86 2F 81.42 57.66 48.82

3D 75.37 55.08 47.53

5D 74.97 54.91 47.44

50 11.44

2F 178.78 116.39 93.16

3D 143.97 101.54 85.75

5D 117.68 84.59 72.28


- 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -


25 3.60 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 14.42 2F - - -

3D - - -




Page No: 3.31

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Weather

Damage Distance (m)

0.03bar

0.1bar 0.3bar

5D - - -


- 2F 226.56 102.36 56.11

3D 237.92 107.20 58.53

5D 237.01 106.81 58.34

Tank - ts-6,7 Material - Ethanol Capacity -70KL

25 3.55 2F 21.52 14.91 12.45

3D 22.91 15.50 12.75

5D - - -

50 14.20 2F 46.91 37.21 33.60

3D 36.61 27.08 23.53

5D 37.24 27.35 23.67


- 2F 302.32 134.67 72.25

3D 43.57 24.32 17.15

5D 310.75 138.26 74.04


25 3.26 2F 111.78 76.34 63.15

3D 70.99 53.21 46.59

5D 73.06 54.10 47.04

50 13.05 2F 186.90 125.59 102.76

3D 162.51 115.19 97.57

5D 139.90 99.81 84.88


- 2F 1187.2 790.19 651.66

3D 1112.5 721.51 592.58

5D 1068.3 676.05 560.47


25 3.13 2F 111.27 76.13 63.04

3D 70.19 52.87 46.42

5D 73.77 54.40 47.19

50 12.53

2F 157.92 110.91 95.43

3D 141.39 100.44 85.20

5D 112.07 82.21 71.09


- 2F 838.97 547.96 446.55

3D 779.29 496.99 404.98

5D 760.63 469.29 387.99


25 3.95 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 15.80 2F - - -




Page No: 3.32

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Weather

Damage Distance (m)

0.03bar

0.1bar 0.3bar

3D - - -

5D - - -


- 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

Tank - ts- 3,4,5 Material - SKO Capacity -70KL

25 3.60 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

50 14.42 2F 21.40 14.83 12.42

3D 23.27 15.65 12.82

5D 24.29 16.09 13.04


- 2F - - -

3D - - -

5D - - -

Fig. 3.7: Damage Contour for VCE due to 50mm leak in SKO Tank (Tf-12,13) at 5D weather condition

CChhaapptteerr 44

RRiisskk MMiittiiggaattiioonn MMeeaassuurreess

4.1 Introduction

¨ The scope of the study covers mitigation measures based on Maximum

Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis. The Fire and Explosion Indices were computed for the

identification and screening of vulnerable sections and consequence analysis was carried

out for the accidental release scenarios of hazardous chemicals at various atmospheric

conditions. The following are general and specific mitigation measures

4.1.1 General Recommendations

¨ Fire prevention and code enforcement is one of the major areas of

responsibility for the fire service. Following are the general recommendations for the

proposed facility

¨ Facility should be equipped with the following fire fighting systems

Water supply

Fire hydrant and monitor nozzle installation

Foam system

Water fog and sprinkler system

Mobile Fire fighting equipment

¨ Surrounding population (includes all strata of society) should be made aware of

the safety precautions to be taken in the event of any mishap within the facility.

This can effectively be done by conducting the safety training programs

¨ Safety escape routes should be provided at strategic locations and should be

easily accessible




Page No: 4.2

¨ Critical switches and alarm should be always kept in line

¨ A wind direction pointer should also be installed at the site, so that in an

emergency the wind direction can be directly seen and downwind population

cautioned

¨ Shut off and isolation valves should be easily approachable in emergencies

¨ Periodical mock drills should be conducted so as to check the alertness and

efficiency of the DMP and EPP and records should be maintained

¨ Signboard including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type of emergencies

should be installed at the site

¨ In general, all the safety precautions will be strictly adhered to as per the

guidelines and recommendations of Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) in

addition to other statutory requirements of concerned organizations.

4.1.2 Specific Recommendations

4.1.2.1 Control Rooms

¨ Adequate number of doors shall be provided in the control room for safe exit

¨ Halon / Dry chemical fire extinguishers should be used in control rooms and

computer rooms

¨ Smoke detectors system shall be provided for control rooms at suitable locations

¨ To resist fire spread through ducts, dampers shall be installed in ducts

4.1.2.2 Electricity Hazard

¨ All electrical equipments shall be provided with proper earthing. Earthed electrode

shall periodically tested and maintained

¨ Emergency lighting shall be available at all critical locations including the

operator’s room to carry out safe shut down and ready identification of fire fighting

facilities such as fire water pumps and fire alarm stations.

¨ All electrical equipments shall be free from carbon dust, oil deposits, and grease

¨ Approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and boots, tester, fuse

tongs, discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp, wooden or insulated ladder should

be used while carrying out the maintenance of electrical parts




Page No: 4.3

¨ Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit should be prevented

by providing fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection

¨ Carbon dioxide, halon or dry chemical fire extinguishers are to be used for

electrical fires

4.1.2.3 Pumps

¨ Preventive Maintenance Inspection Schedule for Pumps will be observed as per

the equipment manual of the manufacturer.

4.1.3 Fire Fighting System

¨ The fire protection equipment shall be kept in good operating condition at all

times and fire fighting system should be periodically tested for proper functioning and logged

for record and corrective actions.

4.1.4 Fire Protection System

¨ The typical fire fighting system for the various facilities described is outlined in

this section. The exact details of the fire fighting systems and capabilities to be installed and

developed will be finalised after the completion of detailed engineering in consultation with

the concerned process and equipment vendors and fire. It is also to be understood that not

all facilities described below will be applicable for every installation. The outline of the fire

system proposed is described below:

¨ Fire protection system shall be deigned in accordance with the requirements

of OISD, design requirements and safe engineering practices and will have full capability for

early detection and suppression of fire. The system will primarily consist of:

¨ Hydrant system

¨ Foam protection system

¨ Portable fire extinguisher

¨ Hydrant System: The system will essentially consists of firewater storage,

pumping, system pressurisation and all inter connected pipe work and auxiliary fire fighting

appliances. The water storage and pumping capacity and other features of this system will

be finalised considering OISD recommendations.

¨ Adequate number of engine driven fire water pumps will be provided. The

pumps will be started automatically in the event of drop in header pressure. The actuation




Page No: 4.4

will be through pressure switches, the setting of which will be staggered to achieve

sequential starting of the pumps to meet the system demand.

¨ Foam Protection System: Oil storage tanks and the surrounding dyke areas

will be protected with low expansion foam system. The storage tanks will be provided with

sub-surface foam injection system. The foam protection system will be designed as per the

requirements of OISD. A central foam preparation unit consisting of at least foam storage

tank, proportionating devices etc. shall be provided, to supply foam solution to the foam

protection system. Pressurised water for foam system will be tapped from the outdoor main

hydrant.

¨ Sprinkler System: Sprinkler system will be provided. An array of spray

nozzles will be provided all around the protected area.

¨ Manually initiated water spray system will be provided for exposure protection

of oil storage tanks, so that when one tank is on fire, the other tank can be cooled to guard

against exposure heating. Pressurized water supply to all sprinkler systems will be tapped

from the outdoor hydrant main.

¨ Portable Fire Extinguishers: Besides, fire hydrant arrangement, portable

fire extinguishers of suitable categories will be placed at control rooms, electrical switchgear

room and various utility buildings for immediate use in the event of fire. Three different kinds

of extinguishers i.e. foam, CO2 and DCP will be provided. Each type of extinguisher has its

own characteristic to fight a particular class of fire. The size and type of extinguishers will be

decided as per recommendations of OISD and relevant Indian Standard and will be placed in

convenient accessible locations.

4.1.5 Risks to Personnel

¨ Good safety management, strict adherence to safety management

procedures and competency assurance will reduce the risk. Safety practices are needed to

carry out jobs safely and without causing any injury to self, colleagues and system.

¨ For total safety of any operation, each team member must religiously follow

the safety practices / procedures pertaining to respective operational area. If every team

member starts working with this attitude, zero accident rate is not a distant dream.




Page No: 4.5

¨ Any operation is a team effort and its success depends upon the sincerity,

efficiency and motivation of all team members. Safety in such operations is not a duty of a

single person, but it is everyone's job.

¨ Use of protective fireproof clothing and escape respirators will reduce the risk

of being seriously burnt. In addition, adequate fire fighting facilities and first aid facilities

should be provided, in case of any emergency.

4.1.6 Risk to Environment

¨ In general, the frequency of leaks is low. Ensuring proper safety can still

lower this frequency. Risk reducing measures include proper training for personnel,

presence of well-trained engineers and strict adherence to safety management procedures

to be incorporated in the plan.

4.1.7 Precautionary Measures for Falling Objects

¨ Provide safety helmets to protect workers below against falling objects

¨ Ensure that there are no loose objects & all tools are properly secured

¨ Danger areas should be clearly marked with suitable safety signs indicating that

access is restricted to essential personnel wearing hard hats while the work is in

progress.

4.1.8 Training

¨ On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go a

long way in improving their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the operation of

plant, especially from the safety stand point. In order to combat with emergency situations

arising out of accident release of hazardous chemicals, it is necessary for industries to

prepare an exhaustive offsite and onsite emergency preparedness plan.

4.1.9 Strategies

¨ Act quickly.

¨ Contain and control as near source as possible.

¨ Protect resources in oil pathway.

¨ Prevent oil reaching streams, rivers, or groundwater.

¨ Use the natural features to contain and control flow whenever possible.




Page No: 4.6

Points to Remember

¨ Always pay attention to fire and health hazards.

¨ Start containment operations immediately to prevent oil from reaching a

watercourse, the groundwater, or otherwise sensitive area or object.

¨ Evaluate logistical factors (safety, access, availability, etc.) to assess feasibility

and to ensure effective and efficient implementation.

¨ Consider the type of equipment that can be used, as different equipment has

different operational capabilities. It is necessary to match planned activities with

the available equipment and personnel.

¨ As much as possible, do not allow vehicles to run over oil-saturated areas.

¨ Do not flush the oil down clean drains and other inlets.

¨ Do not use excavators on areas with free oil on the surface.

¨ Containment is easier on land than on open water.

4.1.10 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

¨ Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) provides additional protection to

workers exposed to workplace hazards in conjunction with other facility controls and safety

systems.

¨ PPE is considered to be a last resort that is above and beyond the other

facility controls and provides the worker with an extra level of personal protection. Table 4.1

presents general examples of occupational hazards and types of PPE available for different

purposes. Recommended measures for use of PPE in the workplace include:

¨ Active use of PPE if alternative technologies, work plans or procedures cannot

eliminate, or sufficiently reduce, a hazard or exposure

¨ Identification and provision of appropriate PPE that offers adequate protection to

the worker, co-workers, and occasional visitors, without incurring unnecessary

inconvenience to the individual

¨ Proper maintenance of PPE, including cleaning when dirty and replacement when

damaged or worn out. Proper use of PPE should be part of the recurrent training

programs for Employees




Page No: 4.7

¨ Selection of PPE should be based on the hazard and risk ranking described earlier

in this section, and selected according to criteria on performance and testing

established

Table 4.1

Summary of Recommended Personal Protective Equipment According to Hazard

Objective Workplace Hazards Suggested PPE

Eye and face protection

Flying particles, molten metal, liquid chemicals, gases or vapours, light radiation

Safety glasses with side-shields, protective shades, etc.

Head protection

Falling objects, inadequate height clearance, and overhead power cords

Plastic helmets with top and side impact protection

Hearing protection

Noise, ultra-sound Hearing protectors (ear plugs or ear muffs)

Foot protection

Failing or rolling objects, points objects. Corrosive or hot liquids

Safety shoes and boots for protection against moving and failing objects, liquids and chemicals

Hand protection

Hazardous materials, cuts or lacerations, vibrations, extreme temperatures

Gloves made of rubber or synthetic material (Neoprene), leather, steel, insulation materials, etc.

Respiratory protection

Dust, fogs, fumes, mists, gases, smokes, vapours

Facemasks with appropriate filters for dust removal and air purification (chemical, mists, vapours and gases). Single or multi-gas personal monitors, if available

Oxygen deficiency Portable or supplied air (fixed lines). Onsite rescue equipment

Body / leg protection

Extreme temperatures, hazardous materials, biological agents, cutting and laceration

Insulating clothing, body suits, aprons etc. of appropriate materials

CChhaapptteerr 55

DDiissaasstteerr MMaannaaggeemmeenntt PPllaann

5.1 Preamble

In spite of various preventive and precautionary measures taken in works, the

possibility of a mishap cannot be totally ruled out. Hence the need to prepare emergency plan

for dealing with the incidences which may still occur and are likely to affect life and property in

the residential areas and other places are identified in this plan. Such an emergency could be

the result of malfunction or non-observance of operating instructions. It could, at times, be the

consequences of acts outside the control of residents / employees like severe storm, flooding, or

deliberate acts of arson or sabotage.

Pipeline shall commence from Rewari with a new Dispatch Station, followed by Tap

Off points at existing depots at Bharatpur & Mathura with proposed end Terminal at Kanpur.

(Here in after referred to as “Project”) The Capacity of the proposed Pipeline is 3.17 MMTPA

(Ph-I) and 3.86 MMTPA (Ph-II).

The proposed pipeline length would be approximately 437 km long 18’’ Dia and it

passes through the states of Haryana, Rajasthan, and U.P. Associated facilities along the

pipeline route shall require sectionalized valve stations at every 30 kms approx., as per

conventional practice. They are buried underground (at a minimum depth of 1m), are controlled

by SCADA systems which allow continuous monitoring and rapid closure of valves, etc., and

that they are routed to avoid human settlements and ecologically sensitive areas.

5.2 Introduction

The objective of the terminal should be safe and trouble free operation this is ensured

by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design of equipment/pipeline as per standard

codes, ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes/rules and

instruments for safe operation of the facility. Safety should be ensured afterwards by operating

the facility by trained manpower. In spite of all precautions accidents may happen due to human

error or system malfunction. Any accident involving release of hazardous material may cause

loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial installations are



SECON PVT. LTD, BANGALORE NEERI, NAGPUR

PAGE NO: 5.2

vulnerable to various natural as well as man made disasters. Examples of natural disasters are

flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are like major fire, explosion,

sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases and liquids from pipeline storage

terminals, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc.

The damage caused by any disaster is determined by the potential for loss

surrounding the event. It is impossible to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might

strike on undertaking. However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. preplanned

procedure involving proper utilization of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimize

the loss to a minimum and resume the working condition as soon as possible.

5.2.1 Facilities Provided at Terminal

Various facilities such as Product Pump House, Manifold, Fire water Pump House, Two Tank

truck Filling Gantrys, Calibration Facilities, Electric Room/MCC, D G yard, Transformer Yard,

Lube Drum Yard and Grease Drum Shed, Lube Ware House, Marketing Room, Admin. Building,

Control Room, Amenity, Parking, Sealing Platform, Effluent Treatment Plant, Security & Gate

House checking Platform , Watch Tower (4 Nos), Compound wall, Emergency Gate-1 No.,

Drivers Toilet, Foam Tank Shed, Blue Dye Dosing System, Turbo jet Dosing System, Power

Dosing System, Product Storage Tanks are provided at the terminal.

5.2.2 Instrumentation, Control & Communication System

The major activities at the terminal are:

Storage facilities for BS III MS, BS IV MS, BS III HSD, BS IV HSD and SKO.

Receipt of product through pipeline

Road loading system

Sump & Slop system

Fire water pump system and make up water system

Full fledged Terminal Automation System (TAS) is envisaged for these units. These

include:

Tank Farm Management System (TFM)

Terminal data management system

Bay Queuing




PAGE NO: 5.3

Tank Truck loading

Shut Down Features

Emergency Shut Down (ESD) is provided in the terminal control room to stop all

dispatch operation. ESD is implemented in the PLC logic as part of terminal automation.

Emergency push buttons to stop all road loading operations are provided in the

middle gantry.

Emergency push buttons to stop all loading operations in the terminal are

provided in the control room.

5.2.3 Communication System

A dedicated telecommunication system is implemented to meet the requirements.

This system provides voice, data and video communication. In addition to this, dedicated Optical

Fibre Cable (OFC) for audio communication, direct dialling facility, conferencing facilities, data

communication for SCADA, Facsimile communication, PABX net work is included.

5.2.4 Fire Protection Facilities


Fire Water Storage Tanks

Fire Water Pumps and Jockey Pumps

Fire Water Piping

Fire Hydrants

Fixed Foam System

Water/foam Monitors

Fixed Water Spray Systems

Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment

Portable Extinguishers




PAGE NO: 5.4

5.3 Need for Disaster Management Plan

- Following are the general types of Emergency /Disaster which lead to

preparation of disaster management plan:

Fire in tank farm area

Large oil spillage which may escape outside the boundary.

Major fire / explosion in unit area

Toxic gas release

Major Earthquake above 7 Richter Scale

5.4 Objectives of Disaster Management Plan

- Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation

Plan. The plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and post disaster:

- The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide

organisational setup and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in

any

Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources

Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside.

Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment.

Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties.

Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry

Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions.

- The above objectives can be achieved by –

Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard potential and

identification of maximum credible hazard scenario.

Arrange/augment facilities for fire fighting, safety, medical (both equipment and

Manpower)

Evolving proper action plan with proper organisational set-up and communication

facilities as well as warning procedure.




PAGE NO: 5.5

5.5 Statutory Requirement

- Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for all petroleum

products marketing terminals to tackle the emergencies. The plan has been prepared in view of

the following regulations

Factories Act, 1948 and as amended

Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified under

Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994.

Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical Accidents,

1996.

Stipulations of OISD-168

Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.

5.6 Different Phases of Disaster

Warning Phase (Before disaster)

- Emergencies /disasters are generally preceded by warnings during which

preventive measures may be initiated. For example release of light hydrocarbons, uncontrollable

build-up of pressure in process equipment, pipe line weather forecast give warning about

formation of vapour cloud, cyclones, equipment failure, cyclones respectively.

Period of Impact Phase (During disaster)

- This is the phase when emergency /disaster actually strike and preventive

measures may hardly be taken. However, control measures to minimise the effects may be

taken through a well-planned and ready-to-act disaster management plan. The duration may be

from seconds to days.

Rescue Phase

- This is the phase when impact is almost over and efforts are concentrated on

rescue and relief measures.

Relief Phase (post disaster)

- In this phase, apart from organization and relief measures internally,

depending on severity of the disaster, external help should also be summoned to provide relief

measures (like evacuations to a safe place and providing medical help, food clothing etc.). This

phase will continue till normalcy is restored.




PAGE NO: 5.6

Rehabilitation Phase

- This is the final and longest phase. During which measures required to put the

situation back to normal as far as possible are taken. Checking the systems, estimating the

damages, repair of equipments and putting them again into service are taken up. Help from

revenue/insurance authorities need to be obtained to assess the damage, quantum of

compensation to be paid etc.

5.7 Key Elements

- Following are the key elements of Disaster Management Plan:

Basis of the plan

Accident prevention procedures/measures

Accident/emergency response planning procedures

On-site Disaster Management Plan

Off-site Disaster Management Plan

5.7.1 Basis of the Plan

- Identification and assessment of hazards is crucial for on-site emergency

planning and it is therefore necessary to identify what emergencies could arise in storage of

various products. Hazard analysis or consequence analysis gives the following results.

Hazards from spread of fire or release of flammable and toxic chemicals from

storage and production units.

Hazards due to formation of pressure waves due to vapour cloud explosion of

flammable gases and oil spill hazards.

5.7.2 Emergency Planning and Response Procedures

- Emergency rarely occurs; therefore activities during emergencies require

coordination of higher order than for planned activities carried out according to fixed time

schedule or on a routine day-to-day basis. To effectively coordinate emergency response

activities, an organizational approach to planning is required. The important areas of emergency

planning are Organization and Responsibilities, Procedures, Communication, Transport,

Resource requirements and Control Centre. Offsite emergency requires additional planning over

and above those considered under onsite plans, which should be properly integrated to ensure

better coordination.




PAGE NO: 5.7

- The emergency planning includes anticipatory action for emergency,

maintenance and streamlining of emergency preparedness and ability for sudden mobilization of

all forces to meet any calamity.

5.7.3 On-site Disaster Management Plan

- Onsite Emergency/disaster is an unpleasant event of such magnitude which

may cause extensive damage to life and property due to the emergencies resulting from

deficiencies in Operation, Maintenance, Design and Human error, Natural Calamities like Flood,

Cyclone and Earthquake; and deliberate and other acts of man like Sabotage, Riot and War etc.

An Onsite Disaster may occur all of a sudden or proceeded by a Major Fire. Purpose for the on-

site disaster management plan is

To protect persons and property of the equipments in case of all kinds of

accidents, emergencies and disasters

To inform people and surroundings about emergency if it is likely to adversely

affect them

To inform authorities including helping agencies (doctors, hospitals, fire, police

transport etc.) in advance, and also at the time of actual happening

To identify, assess, foresee and work out various kinds of possible hazards, their

places, potential and damaging capacity and area in case of above

happenings. Review, revise, redesign, replace or reconstruct the process,

facility, vessels and control measures if so assessed.

- In order to handle disaster / emergency situations, an organizational chart

entrusting responsibility to various personnel showing their specific roles should be available as

shown in following Fig. 5.1.




PAGE NO: 5.8

Site

Controller

Plant

Manager

Section

Incharge

Medical

Co-ordinator

Incident

Controller

Emergency

Communication

Co-ordinator

Medical

Representative

Transport

Co-ordinator

Personal /

Administrative

Manager

Communication

Officer

Fire & Security

Officer

Fig. 5.1: Onsite DMP - Disaster Control / Management System

5.7.3.1 EMERGENCY ACTIONS FOR VARIOUS ACCIDENT SCENARIOS

- There are instructions that whoever detects fire will give a fire alarm and rush

to the spot with the Fire Extinguisher and try to extinguish the fire. Fire Hydrant System is

operated & Foam/water is sprayed to keep the exposed tanks, pipelines & pumps cool.

Following are the emergency actions to be taken in case of occurrence of following Incidents

Missile/Air Attack during War

- If bombing on terminal takes place due to war scenarios, it would be

completely destructed leading to loss of millions of rupees. There would be a significant loss of

Product, Property and Human beings. The supply of petroleum product will be affected.

Emergency Action

Terminal personnel should contact district authorities like collector, police

immediately

All pipeline and tank valves should be closed and all the operations inside the

Terminal should be stopped. The intensity of operations should be reduced

once the weather department announces the possibility of storm or cyclone




PAGE NO: 5.9

The Terminal lighting should be stopped during nighttime

Persons inside the Terminal should be evacuated as soon as possible

In case of fire, city fire brigade should be called

Earthquakes

Earthquakes can cause large damage to the Terminal. Earthquakes result in cracks in the

foundation, which in turn result into vessel damage. This may result into release of stored

petroleum products into the surrounding area. There is a danger of pool fire around the tank. If

the earthquake is not severe, it could result into leaks and cracks in the pipeline, storage

vessels, etc. The scene could be as dangerous, if not properly managed might cause vast

destruction to the Terminal.

Emergency Action

Raise the alarm to inform everyone to be alert in the facility

Inform the fire brigade, nearest hospital and police control

Rush to check out cracks and leakages in the facility immediately

Switch off the main switch of electricity supply, so that electricity distribution to the

Terminal will be interrupted

The site controller will give signal when the situation is under control

Sabotage & Bomb Threats

- With increase in terrorist activities and as oil installations having, significant

role in national economy sabotage & bomb threats should also be considered in the disaster

management plan. In any such situation, city police/ administration should be informed

immediately and their help should be sought.

Emergency Action

The persons inside the Terminal should be evacuated as soon as possible

Terminal personnel should contact district authorities like collector, police

immediately

Any new or doubtful thing should not be touched

All pipeline and tank valves should be closed and all the operations inside the

Terminal should be stopped




PAGE NO: 5.10

In case of fire, city fire brigade should be called

5.7.3.2 Various phases of onsite disaster management plan

Before Crisis

Prepare a plan of the storage, handling and pumping stations premises and

surroundings showing therein the areas of various hazards like fire, explosion,

toxic releases and also location of assembly points, fire station or equipments

room, telephone room, medical facilities will be provided by arrangements with

nearby hospitals, emergency control room, main gate, emergency gates,

normal wind direction, outside fire station, hospital and other services. Mention

their distances from proposed activities.

The fire protection equipment shall be kept in good operating condition at all the

time and fire fighting system should be periodically tested for people

functioning logged for record and corrective action.

The fire fighting training shall be provided to all officers, truck drivers and other

employees who are likely to be present in installation

There should be regular mock fire drills once a month record of such drills shall be

maintained

Every employee or authorized person working in the production /storage shall be

familiarized with the fire alarm signal and shall know the location of fire alarm

point nearest to place of work

Assign key personnel and alternate responsible for site safety

Describe risk associated with each operation conducted.

During Crisis

Monitor the behaviour of entrant for any effects that suggests they should be

evacuated

Evacuate the space if any hazard that could danger the entrant is detected

Perform no other duties that may interfere with their primary responsibilities

Notify the attendant if they experience any warning signs or symptoms of

exposures or detect a dangerous condition




PAGE NO: 5.11

Exit the permit space when instructed by attendant

Reporting Procedure

- In the event of fire from accidental release of flammable gas or liquid, a person

seeing the incident will follow the laid down procedure in the facility and report as follows:

Will dial the nearest telephone

Will state his name and exact location of emergency

Will contact affected officers on duty

People reporting the accident will remain near the location to guide emergency

crew arriving at the scene

- In case fire emergency person should activate the nearest available push

button type instrument which will automatically sound an alarm in fire control room indicating the

location of fire.

After Crisis

Report injuries or blood or body fluid exposures to the appropriate supervisor

immediately

Assembly points:

Assembly points shall be set up farthest from the location of likely hazardous

events, where pre-designed persons from the works, contractors and visitors

would assemble in case of emergency. Up-to-date list of pre-designed

employees shift wise must be available at these points so that roll call could be

taken. Pre-designated persons would take charge of these points and mark

presence as the people come into it

Wash wounds and skin sites that have been affected with soap & water

Workers should be seen as soon as possible by a health professional

Provide information to the relevant public authority and community including other

closely located facilities regarding the nature of hazard and emergency

procedure in event of major accident




PAGE NO: 5.12

Record and discuss the lessons learned and the analysis of major accidents and

misses with employees and employee representative

5.7.3.3 Emergency Organization structure

- Following are the key personnel and the units in the terminals which are

responsible to take appropriate actions during emergencies.

Site Main Controller

- Site Shift Manager - (the senior most functionary available at site).

- The Site Shift Manager (SSM) will be designated as the Site Main Controller at

the time of an emergency and report at the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) which will be the

Primary Command Post. He will be the Chief Co-ordinator and take overall command of the

emergency management. He will be assisted by other co-ordinators as designated for various

functions. The Site Main Controller will provide all decisions support and resources support to

the Site Incident Controller at the incident site for initiating appropriate actions for emergency

control. He will also liaise with mutual aid members and all outside agencies including Local

Crisis Management Committee, District Contingency Plan Committee (District Collector), Police,

Civil Defence, Factories Inspectorate, etc. to seek assistance/help and provide necessary

information to them.

- Normally, the SSM is available on round the clock duty at the site to co-

ordinate overall manufacturing activities and management of emergency (if any). In the event of

an emergency, the Site Shift Manager (SSM) will assume the charge of the Site Main Controller

till the Executive or the President arrives.

Site Incident Controller

- Sr. Mgr. / Mgr. - (next lower to the senior most functionary of operation

available at site).

- The next lower to senior most functionary of operation available at site will be

Site Incident Controller. On receiving information about the emergency, he will report at the

incident site and take over from the Deputy Incident Controller (shift-in-charge). He will take

overall command of the emergency control operation as the Site Incident Controller and will take

decisions in co-ordinations with Site Main Controller for controlling emergency situation. He will

co-ordinate with all the key personnel, fire fighting and rescue team leaders and other support

services and provide necessary information and advice to them for effectively managing control

measures / actions.




PAGE NO: 5.13

Deputy Incident Controller

The shift-in-charge is available on round the clock duty in terminals. He is competent for

the operation and responsible for all activities related to storage / maintenance including

prevention / control of incidents and handling emergencies (if any) in the terminal. He will be

designated as the Deputy Incident Controller. In the event of an emergency in the terminal, he

will immediately assume the charge of the site Incident Controller and take decisions in

consultation with the Site Main Controller. To initiate immediate actions for controlling/mitigating

emergency situation at the incident site till the Site Incident Controller (next senior personnel in

production) arrives.

Co-ordinators

- (The senior most functionaries available in the respective services)

- The senior most functionaries available at site in the respective services will

be the co-ordinators at the time of an emergency. They will report at the Emergency Control

Centre (ECC), known as the Primary Command Post, unless and otherwise instructed by the

Chief Co-ordinator (The Site Main Controller). They will assist and advise the Site Main

Controller in all matters for effectively managing control measures and mitigating operations.

Emergency Control Centre (ECC) (The Primary Command Post)

- In the event of an emergency, SSM Office will be designated as the

Emergency Control Centre, which will be known as the Primary command Post. If, the SSM

office is likely to be affected due to unfavourable wind direction or any other reasons, the

Emergency Control Centre will be shifted to the Construction Conference Room which will be

having necessary facilities to connect communication links as provided in the SSM Office.

Field Command Post (Incident Site)

- An emergency requires co-ordination of numerous activities beyond spill

containment and countermeasure efforts from a safe location at the incident scene. The Field

Command Post will be established in the "Cold Zone" for staging deployed apparatus, resources

and equipment with means of communications and manning to effectively co-ordinate control

efforts.

Assembly Points

Two alternate locations for safe assembly points have been earmarked at all the

operating terminals. These locations are designated for assembling non-




PAGE NO: 5.14

essential workers, visitors, and other persons who are not required at the site

at the time of emergency but they are to be moved to safe places. These

locations have been provided with sign boards displaying "Assembly Points"

for easy identification

The persons required to be assembled at the assembly point should choose safer

assembly point out of the two, considering the wind direction at that time. The

control room will also announce the same on the PA system, if possible

The person assembled at the assembly point shall follow the instruction for

evacuation of the terminal area and move to safe locations as directed. They

should move in the cross wind direction or up-wind direction, whichever is

more safer

5.7.3.4 Role and Responsibilities

Site Main Controller

- The Site Main Controller will be the chief co-ordinator and shall be assisted by

other co-ordinators (senior most functionaries in the respective disciplines). He will take overall

command of the emergency management and his duties and the responsibilities are as below:

- He will:

Report at the Emergency Control Centre as soon as he gets information about the

emergency at site and will assume overall responsibility if taking decisions and

directing actions as necessary for mitigating the situation and managing the

emergency effectively with due consideration and priorities for personnel

safety, safety to the company's property and the environment

Assess the magnitude of the situation in co-ordination with the Incident Controller /

Dy. Incident Controller and decide whether major emergency exists or is likely

to develop, requiring external assistance. Accordingly, he will decide to inform

Local/District emergency Chief and other emergency control groups for help

and the nature of help required including assistance from mutual aid members

and declare on-site emergency

Decide the safe route of entry for external assistance/help to reach at site of the

incident considering wind direction and the place of the incident and also the




PAGE NO: 5.15

place of reporting such assistance. He will also direct the security to guide

them properly

Ensure that the Key Personnel and Co-ordinators are called in

Ensure that all non-essential workers, visitors, contractors are safely moved to

assembly points and direct for search and rescue operation within the affected

areas, if necessary

Be in constant communication with the Site Incident Controller to continuously

review and assess the situation and possible developments

Direct actions for safe shut down of terminal or section of the terminal and

evacuation of terminal personnel and other necessary action is in consultation

with the other co-ordinators

Exercise direct operational control over areas in the complex other than those

affected in consultation with other co-ordinators

To liaise with the local meteorological office to receive early notification of

changes in wind direction and weather conditions

Liaise with the senior officials of Police, Fire Brigade, Medical and Factories

Inspectorate and pass on information on possible effects to the surrounding

areas outside the factory premises and necessity of evacuating the area and

moving the people to safe places

Liaise with various co-ordinators to ensure that various team are functioning well,

casualties are receiving attention and traffic movement within the works is well

regulated

Arrange for a log of the emergency to be maintained in the Primary Command

Post

Release authorized information to press through the media co-ordinator

Control rehabilitation of the affected persons and the affected areas after

cessation of the emergency

Site Incident Controller




PAGE NO: 5.16

- The Site Incident Controller is the Key Personnel for operations function

reporting at the incident site and will take the overall command of actions for emergency control

operation on his arrival at the incident site. He will be supported by other key personnel

representing various emergency services and initiate emergency control actions under the

direction of the Site Main Controller (Primary Command Post). The duties and the

responsibilities of the Site Incident Controller include the following:

- He will:

Report at the incident site immediately after getting information about an

emergency. Upon his arrival at the site, he will assess the scale of emergency

in consultation with the Deputy Incident Controller and evaluate, if a major

emergency exists or is likely to develop and inform Emergency Control Centre

(primary Command Post) accordingly asking for assistance and indicating kind

of support needed

Take overall control of handling the emergency at site and take action for isolation

of source of containment loss to the extent feasible. Simultaneously, in case

of fire organize appropriate fire response in co-ordination with Key personnel

(Fire & Safety) to get the situation under control and to prevent it's escalation

Set up communication point (Field Command Post) and establish contact with Site

Main Controller (Primary Command Post) and keep him informed about the

development

Keep on assessing the emergency situation at the site and communicate to the

Site Main Controller (Primary Command Post) and keep him informed about

the development

Co-ordinate the activities of other key personnel reporting at the Field Command

Post, under his overall command

Direct all operation with the affected areas giving due priorities for safety of

personnel and to minimize damage to environment, the facility and property

Provide advice and information to Fire fighting and rescue personnel, external fire

services and other emergency services/teams as and when they arrive at the

incident site and co-ordinate with them for effective control actions




PAGE NO: 5.17

Ensure that all non-essential workers and staff within the affected area are

evacuated to appropriate assembly points and that areas are searched for

casualties

Organize rescue teams for search of casualties in the affected areas (if any) and

send them to safe areas / medical centre for first aid and medical relief

Seek additional support and resources as may be needed through Primary

Command Post

Send decision support from the Primary Command Post for decision such as

precautionary shut down of neighbouring facilities, precautionary evacuation of

people in the neighbouring facilities, activating mutual aid plan, etc.

Be in constant liaison with the Site Main Controller and keep him informed about

the situation at the incident site

Preserve all evidences so as to facilitate any inquiry into the cause and

circumstances, which caused or escalated the emergency (to arrange

photographs, video, etc.)

Arrange for head count after the emergency is over with respect to the personnel

on duty in the affected areas

Deputy Incident Controller

- Normally, the Shift-in-charge of a terminal being always available at the

terminal site and well aware of the terminal operating conditions at all times will be designated

as the Deputy Incident Controller and assume the charge of the Site Incident Controller at the

time of an emergency till the Site Incident Controller arrives at the incident site, he will assist the

Site Incident Controller on his arrival and work under his direction in emergency control

operation.

- The responsibilities and duties of the Deputy Incident Controller will be as

defined for the Site Incident Controller. In addition he will ensure the following:

- He will:

In the event of an emergency, caused due to any incident in the terminal, he will

immediately actuate terminal level emergency siren (hooter) to warn the field

personnel, contractors' employees, etc. and also arrange for announcement




PAGE NO: 5.18

about the emergency and necessary instruction for them for assembling at the

safe assembly point or evacuation, etc.

Ensure that the SSM and senior terminal personnel have been informed about the

emergency Fire Services Personnel

- Main role of Fire Services personnel is fire fighting and rescue operations,

helping in operations like, prevention of loss of containment of hydrocarbon, spill/leak

containment, etc. Their main responsibilities and duties are described specifically as below:

Chief of Fire (or next senior most fire personnel available)

He will be the Key Personnel for the Fire and Safety Services at the incident

scene and co-ordinating and commanding all the related operations in

consultation with the Site Incident Controller

He will report at the Field command Post (Incident Site) immediately after

receiving the information about an emergency at site, contact the Site Incident

Controller and the first turn out leader for necessary information/advice to

decide control strategies

He will take overall command of fire fighting/rescue operations and other

measures as necessary to control and mitigate the situation and lead the fire

fighting crew including outside / mutual aid fire fighting teams

He will assess the severity/magnitude of the situation and decide the level of the

emergency in consultation with the Site Incident Controller and inform the Site

Main Controller (Primary Command Post) at ECC. He will also advise him for

declaring on-site emergency (if necessary)

He will call for additional resources/help from other Depts. (AFS personnel),

mutual aid members, etc. through Primary Command Post as necessary and

deploy them appropriately for fire fighting and rescue operation at the incident

scene. He will also co-ordinate with other key personnel

He will ensure that sufficient personnel protective equipment, masks, Breathing

Air sets, Spare Breathing Air, Cylinders etc. are available at the field

Command Post for use by the crew members and ensure that no one access

the "Hot Zone" without adequate personnel protection. He will call for logistic




PAGE NO: 5.19

support (mobilising additional supplies through Primary Command Post (Site

Main Controller/HSE&F Co-ordinator)

He will keep constant contact with Primary Command Post and seek decision

support from the Site Main Controller in critical matters/operations and also

inform him, if other terminals in the complex or surrounding population are

likely to be affected

He will co-ordinate with Security Key Personnel for access control and barricading

the affected area in order to prevent vehicular movement

He will assist in rescue and first aid operations

Shift Fire Officer (Riding Officers)

Upon receiving emergency call/alarm, he will quickly prepare for the fire turn out

and mount the leading fire tender along with the crew members and rush to

the incident site taking a safe route of entry considering the wind direction

Report to the Dy. Incident Controller/the Incident Controller and Position the Fire

Tender strategically at a location in consultation with the Dy. Incident

Controller/the Incident Controller

He will decide the line of action for fire fighting and/or other control actions at the

scene in consultation with the Dy. Incident Controller/Incident Controller and

take appropriate actions for fire fighting and control measures

He will guide and lead the fire fighting crew in fire fighting and rescue operation till

the arrival of F&S Key person (the Chief of Fire or next senior most person)

He will ensure the safety of the crew members and that crew members are fully

equipped with necessary personnel protection prior to enter "Hot Zone"

He will assess the severity of the situation and may call for second

turnout/additional help through the Dy. Incident Controller/Incident Controller

(Field Command Post)

He will keep constant contact with the key personnel (F&S) at the Field Command

Post and inform about the situation and probable developments

Firemen on Duty at the Fire Control Room




PAGE NO: 5.20

The fireman on duty at the Fire Control Room will acknowledge the emergency

alarm received on the panel and promptly note the facility area/where the

incident occurred

He will note down the information, if emergency call is received through

telephone, hot line or messenger

He will sound the fire bell to inform the fire crew to get ready and take their

positions, simultaneously brief the Shift Fire Officer about the emergency

message

He will intimate the Site Shift Manager and the Security Dept. about the

emergency giving short description about the occurrence (if known)

He will actuate emergency siren after receiving instruction from Primary

Command Post (Site Main Controller/HSE&F Co-ordinator)

He will ask telephone operator to pass on to the communication about the

emergency to the Auxiliary Fire Squad of the terminal on receiving the

instruction from HSE&F Co-ordinator/Site Main Controller

He will always be ready and alert for receiving any message / instructions from

Primary Command Post/Field Command Post

Auxiliary Fire Squad Members

- AFS Members shall be ready on hearing emergency siren and will report to

site incident controller at site (Field Command Post) on receiving message from ECC

They will do the fire fighting under the instruction of Shift Officer. Help to bring fire

fighting equipment from nearby terminals

AFS Members of the terminal under emergency will immediately go to the

emergency site and will start first aid fire fighting

As per the emergency situation they will use the fixed fire fighting equipment to

protect terminal equipment from heat exposure

They will guide non-essential personnel in case of evacuation

They will do monitoring/closing of storm water drains if required




PAGE NO: 5.21

They will help key personnel for taking action on site. Help to Security Personnel

for traffic Control

Non-essential Personnel

- Employees, contractors' employees, visitors, etc., (other than emergency

response personnel) present at the incident site that is not required to be present at the incident

site during the emergency at the site. In the event of declaration of an emergency in the

terminal/area, these persons shall quickly assemble at the safe assembly point of the

terminal/area and shall respond as instructed by the Site Incident Controller.

Instruction to the Non-essential Personnel

Do not panic. Ensure that persons in your immediate vicinity are warned

Remain alert for announcement from the Control Room, such "Proceed to Safe

Assembly Point" and act accordingly

Do not rush to the scene to be a spectator

Await instructions at the Assembly Point, report your presence to the superiors/ or

the Site Incident controller, inform his whereabouts of your colleagues if they

have not arrived

Do not engage telephone/talk back system and other communication channels,

unnecessarily

Do not approach Control Centres without urgent/or important reasons

If you are not assigned any specific role, move away as directed

Do not offer non-authentic information/unconfirmed facts/fact/or conjecture

Telephone Operator

- At the time of emergency, communications both inwards as well as outward

are very essential and telephone operator's swift action becomes very important. He plays very

important part in communicating information/messages to the concerned personnel/outside

agencies/mutual aid members/staff members etc. and also receiving a large numbers of outside

calls. His main responsibilities and duties are as below:

He will keep the board free to the extent possible for incoming calls




PAGE NO: 5.22

He will immediately convey message to the "Key Personnel" and the "Co-

ordinator" about the emergency as per the instruction of the Site main

controller. The designated personnel list is given in the On-site Emergency

Plan (Flip Chart)

The telephone operator will follow instructions from the Site Main Controller/or

Media Co-ordinator only, for passing on any information to outside agency

about the emergency or direct all such queries to the media co-ordinator for

appropriate reply

As far as possible he should not entertain unknown/unimportant outside

calls/inquiries during initial few hours of the emergency

External Communication:

- Telephone Numbers of internal/External authorities shall be provided as

separate attachments.

- Sr. - Authority - Phone Numbers

- Fire Brigade

- 1 - Fire Brigade(Terminal)

-

- police

- 2 - Police Control Room (Rural)

-

- 3 - Terminal Gramin Police

-

- 4 - Police Station -

- District Authorities

- 5 - District Collectorate Office

-

- Ambulance

- 6 - Ambulance -

- Doctor

- 7 - Doctor -

- - -

- Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited

- 8 - Terminal Office -




PAGE NO: 5.23

- 9 - Sr. Terminal Manager

-

- 10 - Manager Operations

-

- Others

- 11 - Other nearby installations

-

HSE & Fire Co-ordinators

He will report at the Emergency Control Centre (Primary Command Post)

immediately after receiving information about the emergency. He will assist

the Site Main Controller for taking critical decisions and provide necessary

advice and information

He will co-ordinate with Key Person (Fire & Safety) and will assist the Site Main

Controller for providing decision support and resources support to the Key

Persons (F&S), as may be necessary

He will arrange for mobilizing off-duty fire personnel from their residence; and call

other members of the staff for assistance

He will ensure that the AFS members have been called for assistance and liaise

with mutual aid members / Surat Fire Brigade for mobilization of additional

resources

He will co-ordinate with the materials/stores co-ordinator and mobilize additional

resources, viz., spillage containment equipment/fire fighting

equipment/material, personal protective equipment, spare breathing air

cylinders, etc., as may be required at the incident site for control measures

He will liaise with Factory Inspectorate / Pollution Control authorities in

consultation with the Site Main Controller and provide necessary information.

He will also ask for the help, if necessary to evacuate neighbouring area

outside the complex as advised by the Site Main Controller

He will organize relieving groups for fire fighting

He will also initiate necessary actions to minimise impact on Environment

Medical Co-ordinators




PAGE NO: 5.24

- The Chief Medical Officer (or the next in command available at site) will be the

Medical Co-ordinator and perform the following duties:

He will contact the Site Main Controller immediately after receiving the information

about the emergency

He will report immediately at the Emergency Control Centre (Primary Command

Post) or OHC as instructed by the Site Main Controller and contact the Key

personnel (Medical) and take stock of the situation

He will assist and advise the Site Main Controller in all critical decisions in the

area of health/medical services to the affected persons and keep constant

liaisons with him

Organize rescue and first aid arrangements for the affected persons at the site in

the "cold Zone", as may be necessary with essential staff/equipment and post

additional ambulance for transporting seriously injured persons

Ensure that adequate paramedical staff, equipment and medicines are available

at the OHC. He will mobilize additional resources from neighbouring

industries, if necessary

To liaise with the Local Medical Authorities and City Hospitals, if the causalities

are more and situation demands treatment at additional medical centres

To co-ordinate with the Transport Co-ordinator for transporting victims to various

hospitals

To arrange for additional ambulances from other hospitals/ Municipal Corporation

The Medical Co-ordinator should ensure the upkeep of agreed medical supplies,

antidotes and equipment that should always be kept in stock for treating

victims of burns and hazardous chemicals. The medical authorities should be

aware of the type of treatment to be administered

He will liaise with the media co-ordinator for release of news to the press

Security Co-ordinators

- The Chief of Security or the next in command available at site shall be the

Security Co-ordinator. He will have the following duties / responsibilities:




PAGE NO: 5.25

He will instruct and deploy the security personnel to ensure that the law and order

is maintained ; and unnecessary gathering of the personnel at the scene of

emergency is prevented and ensure control of traffic movement in and out of

the factory areas

He will instruct the security personnel / Security Gates to direct and guide external

emergency vehicles (Fire tenders/ambulances etc.) called for assistance/help

from neighbouring industries/Local administration, to the scene of incident

He will instruct security personnel who could be spared to assist Site Incident

Controller/Key Personnel (fire and Safety) in fire fighting and evacuation of

personnel, at the Incident Site

He will take action to regulate traffic movement and prevention of traffic jams

inside the works as well as outside the factory gates for proper and speedy

movement of the emergency vehicles, ambulances, other vehicles carrying

outside resources, etc.

He will mobilize additional security force for help, as necessary

He will liaise with the police and other local authorities for external help, as

necessary for evacuation of the neighbouring areas outside the factory

premises in consultation with the Site Main Controller

If necessary, he will arrange for announcement through the mobile P.A. system for

alerting and instructing the population in the surrounding areas as directed by

the Site Main Controller

Engineering Co-ordinators

He will report to the Site Main Controller at the Emergency Control Centre

(Primary Command Post) immediately after receiving information about On-

site emergency

He will take stock of the situation and assist/advise the Site Main Controller in

deciding control strategies

He will mobilize the team from the Maintenance Dept. to assist the Site Incident

Controller in control operation at the Field Command Post




PAGE NO: 5.26

Arrange isolation of electrical lines from distribution point/substations as required

by the Site Incident Controller by calling the Electrical Engineer / Electricians

Provide all other engineering support, as may be required

Liaise with Key Personnel (Eng./Maintenance) and co-ordinate with other groups

Communication Co-ordinators

- Communication Co-ordinator plays very important part at the time of an

emergency particularly when extensive disruption of services takes place. He has the following

duties and responsibilities:

To ensure all available communications links remain functional

To quickly establish communication links between the Field command Post and (if

this happens to be in remote off site area) and the Primary Command Post

To arrange for announcement on the public address system and maintain

contacts with congregation points like canteen, main gate, control rooms etc.

To ensure that previously agreed inventory of various types of communication

equipment is maintained in working condition and frequent checks are carried

out and records maintained

To maintain voice record of significant communications with timings

received/passed from the Primary Command Post

To provide additional/alternate communication facilities as required at the site

P&A Co-ordinators

- He will report at the Primary Command Post (ECC) immediately after getting

information about an emergency at the site and assist/advise the Site Main Controller in taking

important decisions in the matters related to welfare/necessities/of emergency personnel at site,

care/needs of the affected persons. His duties and responsibilities include the following:

He will ensure that a record of affected personnel is prepared with their

local/permanent addresses and telephone numbers

He will ensure that the relatives of the affected personnel have been informed

Assign officials at the hospitals to look after the needs of the affected personnel

under medical treatment




PAGE NO: 5.27

Co-ordinate with the Finance Co-ordinator for necessary funds required to cater

the needs of affected personnel, emergency purchases and for other

requirements

To arrange for refreshments, snacks, food, and other needs as may be required

for the emergency personnel from time to time

Co-ordinate with the Purchase Co-ordinator for necessary emergency

procurement of necessary items

Ensure that staff personnel as necessary for assistance and help are

informed/called from their residences

he will co-ordinate with the instruct Key Personnel transport/welfare & canteen for

mobilizing additional resources, as may be required

To co-ordinate with the neighbouring industries for additional vehicles/ambulances

and other resources as may be required

To liaise with the Local Administration for additional assistance/help as may be

needed

Transport Co-ordinators

- The Transport Co-ordinator shall perform the following duties

Mobilize all available company's vehicles for emergency use along with the drivers

Arrange for transport of victims to hospitals/dispensaries

Arrange for duty rotation of the drivers to meet the emergency situation

To direct refuelling of the vehicles

To co-ordinate with the neighbouring industries for additional vehicles /

ambulances as may be required

To mobilize buses of the RECCS, if necessary

To co-ordinate with the neighbouring industries for additional vehicles /

ambulances as may be required

To arrange for vehicles from outside local transport agencies, if required




PAGE NO: 5.28

To keep in contact with the Site Main Controller for evacuation of personnel and

transportation of victims

The Welfare / Canteen Co-ordinators

- The Welfare Co-ordinator will have the following responsibilities:

Ensure that casualties receive adequate attention and arrange additional help (ex-

gratia payment etc.), if required with consultation with the Chief Co-ordinator

Inform the relatives of the victims

When emergency is prolonged, he will arrange for relieving personnel and

organize refreshment / catering facilities and arrangements for their rest

(bedding, and other necessities)

He will arrange to procure and keep stocks of necessary food items and other

necessary supplies as may be required for the personnel working round-the-

clock

He will arrange for hot drinks / snacks and food and other necessary items for

emergency response personnel, as required

Media Co-ordinators

- The Media Co-ordinator will co-ordinate the following under the direction of the

Site Main Controller (The Chief Co-ordinator):

He will liaise with various media and release written statements to the press

through prior concurrence of the Chief Co-ordinate

He will handle media interview with various media groups make arrangements for

televising the information about the incident, the number of casualties, etc

He will inform State and Central Government and the statutory bodies of the

nature and magnitude of the incident, the number of casualties, etc.

He will locate himself such that media persons/third parties do not need to go past

the complex security gates and that adequate communication links exists

Media personnel often insist on visiting incident scene. He will escort media

team(s) If such visits are approved by the Chief Co-ordinator




PAGE NO: 5.29

He will be in constant contact with the Medical Co-ordinator, and other co-

ordinators to be aware of latest development and closely liaise with the Chief

Co-ordinator

Finance Co-ordinators

He will report at the Emergency Control Centre immediately after getting

information about the emergency at site

He will release finance (cash / cheques, etc) as directed by the Site Main

Controller (Chief Co-ordinator)

He will assist the Purchase Co-ordiantor for emergency procurement

He will liaise with Insurance Company personnel as directed by the Site Main

Controller

Purchase Co-ordinators

The Purchase Co-ordinator will report at the Emergency Control Centre as soon

as he is informed about an emergency at site

He will assist the Site Main Controller and arrange for emergency purchase of

necessary items as maybe required during the emergency

He will co-ordinate with the Materials Co-ordinator and other co-ordinator for

necessary emergency items to be procured

He will mobilize necessary manpower as may be required, etc.

Materials Co-ordinators

- The Materials Co-ordinator will ensure:

Availability of the materials required by the Site Incident Controller

Arrange issues of materials from the General Stores round-the-clock during an

emergency

Arrange emergency procurements form local dealers / vendors or from

neighbouring industries

Arrange transportation of materials from General Store to the Incident Site in co-

ordination with the Transport Co-ordinator




PAGE NO: 5.30

5.7.4 Off-site Disaster Management Plan

- Emergency is a sudden unexpected event, which can cause serious damage

to personnel life, property and environment outside the boundary wall of the refinery as a whole,

which necessitate evolving Off-site Emergency Plan to combat any such eventuality. In Offsite

disaster management plan, many agencies like Revenue, Public Health, Fire Services, Police,

Civil Defence, Home Guards, Medical Services and other Voluntary organization are involved.

Thus, handling of such emergencies requires an organized multidisciplinary approach.

- In case of a leak from the pipeline and storage tanks, the control system may

not be sophisticated enough to detect the same. Hence the leak has to be notified by the

eyewitness to the owner who would immediately shut down the pumping operation. This may

not necessarily result in declaration of the disaster. In absence of an eyewitness, the leak may

go undetected in the incipient stages and may result in a major disaster requiring activation of

District Disaster Management Plan.

- Evacuation of people required, if leak from the pipeline and storage tank, can

be done in orderly way. The different agencies involved in evacuation of people are Civil

Administration (both state and central), non Govt. organizations, factory Inspectorate and Police

authorities.

5.7.4.1 Fire

- Effects of fire on population will be mainly due to thermal radiation. In such

cases, houses situated to the proximity of disaster need to be evacuated, although a severe

smoke hazard due to fire is to be reviewed periodically.

5.7.4.2 Explosion

- An explosion will give a very little time to warn population and areas affected

may be much longer than that in case of fire. The effects of explosion on population will be

mainly due to shock waves, flying splinters, collapse of structures and exposure to thermal

radiation.

5.7.4.3 Toxic Gas/Vapor Release

- A toxic gas release will generally threat much larger area and population,

exposed to the drifting cloud of toxic gases and vapours. The time available for warning

population will depend on the point of release, wind direction and velocity.

- Procedures for dealing with outside Reported Gas/ Vapour Escapes




PAGE NO: 5.31

¨ The setting up of a continuously manned Emergency Control Centre for the

receipt of telephone calls related to emergencies and gas/ vapour escapes and/or

from which, the employees are directed by telephone and/or radio

¨ The provision of adequate management, co-ordination and supervision of all

administration and operations necessary to maintain disciplined progress and

clearance of emergency work

¨ The organisation of adequate staff and other resources in order to progress

reported gas/vapour escapes within the specified times

¨ The organisation of facilities for the monitoring of the receipt, issue, attendance at

and clearance of emergency work so as to ensure that none are overlooked or

unduly delayed

- The purpose of the off-site disaster management plan is:

To save lives and injuries and to prevent or reduce property losses

To provide for quick resumption of normal situation or operation

To make explicit the inter related be suggested if necessary

To make explicit inter related set of actions to be undertaken in the event of an

industrial accident posing hazards to the community

To inform people and surrounding about emergency and disaster if it is likely to

adversely affect machinery will be established for this purpose to guide the

people in proper way

To plan for rescue and recuperation of casualties and injuries. To plan for relief

and rehabilitation

To plan for prevention of harms, total loss and recurrence of disaster. It will be

ensured that absolute safety and security is achieved within the shortest time

5.7.4.4 Various phases of onsite disaster management plan

Before Crisis

- This will include the safety procedure to be followed during an emergency

through posters, talks and mass media in different languages including local language. Leaflets

containing dos/ don’ts before and during emergency should be circulated to educate the people

in vicinity




PAGE NO: 5.32

People in vicinity of hazardous installation, and others who are potentially affected

in the event of an accident, should be aware of the risks of accidents, know

where to obtain information concerning the installation, and understand what

to do in the event of an accident

Non-governmental Organizations (NGO’s) (Such as environmental, humanitarian

and consumer group) should motivate their constituents and others, to be

involved in risk reduction and accident prevention efforts. They should help to

identify specific concerns and priorities regarding risk reduction and

prevention, preparedness and response activities

NGO’s should facilitate efforts to inform the public and should provide technical

assistance to help the public analyze and understand information that is made

available

Public authorities (at all levels) and management of hazardous installation should

established emergency planning activities/ program’s for accidents involving

the hazardous substance

All parties who will be involved in emergency planning process. In this respect

public health authorities, including experts from information centers should be

involved in relevant aspects of offsite emergency planning

Emergency warning alert system should be in place to warn the potentially

affected public, or there is an imminent threat of an accident

The system chosen should be effective and provide timely warning. Suitable

warning system could include or a combination of for e.g.: sirens, automatic

telephone message, and mobile public address system

During Crisis

Central Control Committee: As the off-site plan is to be prepared by the

government a central control committee shall be formed under the

chairmanship of area head. Other officers from police, fire, factory, medical,

engineering, social welfare, publicity, railway, transport and requisite

departments shall be incorporated as members. Some experts will also be

included for guidance. The functions of committee should be:




PAGE NO: 5.33

To work as main co-coordinating body constituted of necessary district heads and

other authorities with overall command, coordination, guidance, supervision,

policy and doing all necessary things to control disaster in shortest times

To prepare, review, alter or cancel this plan and to keep it a complete document

with all details

To take advice and assistance from experts in fields to make plan more

successful

To set in motion all machineries to this plan in event of disaster causing or likely to

cause severe damage to public, property or environment

The incident control committee, traffic control committee and press publicity

committee will first be informed, as they are needed first

Medical Help, Ambulance and Hospital Committee: This committee consisted of

doctors for medical help to the injured persons because of disaster. Injuries

may be of many types. As such doctors are rarely available we have to

mobilize and utilize all available doctors in the area. Functions and duties of

the committee include:

To give medical help to all injured as early as possible

Civil surgeon is the secretary who will organize his team

On receiving information to rush to spot he will immediately inform his team and

will proceed with all necessary equipments

First aid and possible treatment shall be provided at the spot or at some

convenient place and patients may be requested to shift to hospitals for further

treatment

All efforts shall be made on war basis to save maximum lives and to treat

maximum injuries

Continuity of the treatment shall be maintained till the disaster is controlled

Traffic Control, Law and Order: The committee is headed by District

Superintendent of Police. Functions and duties of this committee should be:

To control traffic towards and near disaster , to maintain law and order




PAGE NO: 5.34

To evacuate the places badly affected or likely to be affected

To shift the evacuated people to safe assembly points

To rehabilitate them after disaster is over.

Necessary vehicles, wireless sets and instruments for quick communications shall

be maintained and used as per need

After Crisis

At the time of disaster, many people may badly be affected. Injured people shall

be treated by medical help, ambulance and hospital committee, but those not

injured but displaced kept at assembly points, whose relative or property is

lost, houses collapsed and in need of any kind of help shall be treated by this

welfare and restoration committee. Functions and duties of this committee are:

To find out persons in need of human help owing to disastrous effect. They may

give first aid if medical team is not available

They will serve the evacuated people kept at assembly points. They will arrange

for their food, water, shelter, clothing, sanitation, and guidelines to reach any

needful places

They will look for removal and disposal of dead bodies, for help of sick, weak,

children and needy persons for their essential requirements

The team will also work for restoration of detached people, lost articles, essential

commodities etc.

The team will also look after the restoration of government articles

The team will also ensure that the original activities, services and systems are

resumed again as they were functioning before the disaster

Police Department

The police should assist in controlling of the accident site, organizing evacuation

and removing of any seriously injured people to hospitals.

Co-ordination with the transport authorities, civil defence and home guards

Co-ordination with army, navy, air force and state fire services




PAGE NO: 5.35

Arrange for post mortem of dead bodies

Establish communication center

Fire Brigade

The fire brigade shall organize to put out fires and provide assistance as required.

Hospitals and Doctors

Hospitals and doctors must be ready to treat any injuries.

Co-ordinate the activities of Primary Health Centers and Municipal Dispensaries to

ensure required quantities of drugs and equipments

Securing assistance of medical and paramedical personnel from nearby

hospitals/institutions

Temporary mortuary and identification of dead bodies

Media

The media should have ready and continuous access to designated officials with

relevant information, as well as to other sources in order to provide essential

and accurate information to public throughout the emergency and to help

avoid confusion

Efforts should be made to check the clarity and reliability of information as it

becomes available, and before it is communicated to public

Public health authorities should be consulted when issuing statements to the

media concerning health aspects of chemical accidents

Members of the media should facilitate response efforts by providing means for

informing the public with credible information about accidents involving

hazardous substances

Non-governmental organizations (NGO)

NGO’s could provide a valuable source of expertise and information to support

emergency response efforts. Members of NGOs could assist response

personnel by performing specified tasks, as planned during the emergency

planning process. Such tasks could include providing humanitarian,




PAGE NO: 5.36

psychological & social assistance to members of community and response

personnel.

- Duties of NGO are listed below:

Evacuation of personnel from the affected area

Arrangements at rallying posts and parking yards

Rehabilitation of evacuated persons

Co-ordination with other agencies such as police, medical, animal husbandry,

agriculture, electricity board, fire services, home guards and civil defence.

Establishing shelters for rescue, medical, fire fighting personnel.

- Various organizations involved during emergencies are shown in Fig. 5.2.

EMERGENCY

Medical

Aid

Medi

Environmental Health

and Safety Department

District Level

Emergency

Committee

Plant Level

Emergency

Committee

Plant

Security

Fire

Department

Emergency Control Center

Chief Co-Ordinator

Police

Department

Public

Education

Fig. 5.2: Various Organizations Involved During Emergency

5.8 Mock Drills

- As per the Industrial Major Accident Hazard Rules,

- (a) The occupier shall ensure that a mock drill of the on-site emergency plan is

conducted every six months.




PAGE NO: 5.37

- (b) A detail report of the mock drill conducted under sub-rule (4) shall be made

immediately available to the concerned authority.

- Accordingly,

- Onsite Disaster Mock Drills are conducted once in six months.

- Also, Major Fire and Minor Fire mock drills are conducted once in three

months and one month respectively.

Lessons Learned System for Mock Drills

- Performances during the mock drills are reviewed by CEC, Co-ordinators and

other involved persons including Observers. Observations / shortcomings are reviewed and

recommendations are made for improvements which are followed by F&S for compliance. The

action points from the mock drill observations should be circulated to all concerned for

liquidation. The critical points shall be presented to management in Apex Loss control meeting

bimonthly.

All Clear / Re-entry Procedures

- Chief Emergency Controller (CEC) will declare “All Clear” after control of the

Incident and arrange measures required for post Disaster control period and ask Fire Station to

Blow 2 minutes straight run siren.

- After incident normalization, CEC would ask Unit in-charge to visit and check

the incident site along with representatives of Inspection and F&S and also Maintenance

(Electrical / Mechanical / Civil/ Instrumentation/ Rotary) as needed. Standard Checks particular

to a unit will be provided by respective Area Managers.

- Based on feedback of the team, CEC would allow re-entry / resumption of

operations at the incident site.

5.9 Evacuation Plan

5.9.1 Purpose

- To establish method of systematic, safe and orderly evacuation of all the

occupants in case of fire or any emergency, in the least possible time, to a safe assembly point

through nearest safe means of escape. Additionally to use available fire appliances provided for

controlling or extinguishing fire and safeguarding of human life.




PAGE NO: 5.38

5.9.2 Fire Escape Drill Procedure

In the event of fire condition or on hearing the fire alarm all the occupants of the

building shall immediately leave the work area and proceed towards nearest

safe escape route. A care should be taken before leaving the workplace so

that the escape route shall not be blocked due to chairs or other similar object.

Security In-charge will ensure the access control system is defeated for safe

evacuation of all the occupants from the affected building.

The occupants will have to leave the affected area / block / building in a speedy

and orderly manner.

Before leaving the workplace occupants will switch off electrical gadgets such as

AC, Computers, Water heaters, etc. The area owner of the building will ensure

electric supply cut off to the affected building.

The emergency exit / normal exit if not affected due to fire and / or smoke shall be

used for speedy evacuation.

All occupants will follow in a row while escaping from the block / building.

Unnecessary haste and crowding shall be avoided on the escape route. Panic

actions of the occupants will definitely delay the evacuation.

The occupants having visitors shall ensure the safe evacuation of the visitor along

with them to the safe assembly point.

Efforts shall be made to control or extinguish the fire with the help of available fire

extinguishers in that area.

Building / block in-charge shall ensure the safe escape and orderly evacuation of

all the occupants.

All occupants after being evacuated shall assemble at designate safe assembly

point. Block / building in-charge will arrange for head count to ensure that all

the occupants have been safely evacuated.

Security in-charge shall ensure that all the visitors have been evacuated as per

visitor entry register / gate pass register. The visitors shall evacuate from the

building / block along with the occupants and report to security in-charge.




PAGE NO: 5.39

The missing / suspected trapped occupants will be searched and rescued by the

fire crew.

Upon All-Clear signal from the incident controller, occupants can go back to their

work place.

5.10 Training

On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go a long way

in improving their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the operation of

terminal, especially from the safety stand point. In order to combat with emergency

situations arising out of accident release of hazardous chemicals, it is necessary for

industries to prepare an exhaustive offsite and onsite emergency preparedness plan.

The fire crew belonging to the fire fighting department shall be given intensive training

for the use of all equipment and in various fire fighting methods for handling different

types of fires.

5.11 Checklist for Capability Assessment

The checklist will help in assessing the preparedness, prevention and response

resources capabilities. The points included in the checklist are only indicative and there is a

need to closely examine the local requirements while preparing the checklist.

For good control and management of an incident, there are three important requisites.

¨ Defined Organisation

¨ Effective means

¨ Trained people

The organisation has to be properly structured for routine as well as emergency

purposes with clear understanding of duties and responsibilities. The structure has to consider

an execution and speedy implementation of the response plans; while at the same time, it

should be flexible enough to tune itself to the fast changing situations. All plans and procedures

for emergency handling should be established. Checklists in the form of Do’s and Don’ts of

preventive maintenance, strengthening of HSE, manufacturing utility staff are listed in the

subsequent subsections.

Work permit check list is described below:




PAGE NO: 5.40

Sr. No.

Precaution to be taken Yes No

1 Flow isolated by closing valves

2 De-pressurized – vacuum released

3 Drained fully and drain kept open

4 Personal PPe’s provided

5 Caution boards placed

6 Tools and tackles checked as per specifications

7 Head count of the area known to relevant persons

8 Trained Site supervisor nominated

9 Safety measures such as hydrant, alarms, sensors checked

5.11.1 Welding and Cutting Inspection Checklist

¨ Are only authorized and trained personnel permitted to use welding, cutting, or

brazing equipment?

¨ Does each operator have a copy of the appropriate operating instructions and

are they directed to follow them.

¨ Are compressed gas cylinders regularly examined for obvious signs of defects,

deep rusting, or leakage?

¨ Is care used in handling and storage of cylinders, safety valves, etc., to

prevent damage?

¨ Are precautions taken to prevent the mixture of air or oxygen with flammable

gases, except at a burner or in a standard touch?

¨ Are only approved apparatus (torches, regulators, pressure-reducing valves,

acetylene generators, manifolds) used?

¨ Are signs reading: DANGER-NO SMOKING, NO-MATCHES, OR NO-OPEN-

LIGHTS, or the equivalent posted?

¨ Are provisions made to never crack a fuel-gas cylinder valve near sources of

ignition?

¨ Before a regulator is removed, is the valve closed and gas released from the

regulator?

¨ Is red used to identify the acetylene (and other fuel-gas) hose, green for

Oxygen hose, and black for inert gas and air hose?




PAGE NO: 5.41

¨ Are pressure-reducing regulators used only for the gas and pressures for

which they are intended?

¨ Is open circuit (no load) voltage of arc welding and cutting machines as low as

possible and not in excess of the recommended limits?

¨ Under wet conditions, are automatic controls for reducing no load voltage use?

¨ Is grounding of the machine frame and safety ground connections of portable

machines checked periodically?

¨ Are electrodes removed from the holders when not in use?

¨ Is it required that electric power to the welder be shut off when no one is in

attendance?

¨ Is suitable fire extinguishing equipment available for immediate use?

¨ Is the welder forbidden to coil or loop welding electrode cable around his

body?

¨ Are wet machines thoroughly dried and tested before being used?

¨ Are work and electrode lead cables frequently inspected for wear and damage

and replaced when needed?

¨ Do means for connecting cable lengths have adequate insulation?

¨ When the object to be welded cannot be moved and fire hazards cannot be

removed, are shields used to confine heat, sparks, and slag?

¨ Are fire watchers assigned when welding or cutting is performed in locations

where a serious fire might develop?

¨ Are combustible floors kept wet, covered by damp sand, or protected by fire-

resistant shields?

¨ When floors are wet down, are personnel protected from possible electrical

shock?

¨ When welding is done on metal walls, are precautions taken to protect

combustibles on the other side?

¨ Is it required that eye protection helmets, hand shields, and goggles meet

appropriate standards?

5.11.2 Flammable Liquid Storage Facilities Checklist

¨ Are storage facilities, shelves, etc. arranged so that stores are secure against

sliding, collapse or falls?




PAGE NO: 5.42

¨ Are storage facilities kept free from accumulations of rubbish, unwanted

materials and objects that present hazards from tripping, fire, explosion and

harbourage of pests?

¨ Are freezers and storage areas lockable?

¨ Is the storage facility for bulk flammable liquids separated from the main

building?

¨ Is it clearly labelled as a fire-risk area?

¨ Does it have a gravity or mechanical exhaust ventilation system that is

separate from the main building system?

¨ Are the switches for lighting sealed or placed outside the building?

¨ Are the light fittings inside sealed to protect against ignition of vapours by

sparking?

¨ Are flammable liquids stored in proper, ventilated containers that are made of

Non-combustible materials?

¨ Are the contents of all containers correctly described on the labels?

¨ Are appropriate fire extinguishers and/or fire blankets placed outside but near

to the flammable liquid store?

¨ Are “No smoking” signs clearly displayed inside and outside the flammable

liquid store?

¨ Are only minimum amounts of flammable substances stored in laboratory

rooms?

¨ Are they stored in properly constructed flammable storage cabinets?

¨ Are these cabinets adequately labelled with “Flammable liquid – Fire hazard”

signs?

¨ Are personnel trained to properly use and transport flammable liquids?

5.11.3 Services Checklist

¨ Is each laboratory provided with enough sinks, water, electricity and gas

outlets for safe working?

¨ Is there an adequate inspection and maintenance programme for fuses, lights,

cables, pipes, etc.?

¨ Are faults corrected within a reasonable time?




PAGE NO: 5.43

¨ Are internal engineering and maintenance services available, with skilled

engineers and craftsmen who also have some knowledge of the nature of the

work of the laboratory?

¨ Is the access of engineering and maintenance personnel to various laboratory

areas controlled and documented?

¨ If no internal engineering and maintenance services are available, have local

engineers and builders been contacted and familiarized with the equipment

and work of the laboratory?

¨ Are cleaning services available?

¨ Is the access of cleaning personnel to various laboratory areas controlled and

documented?

¨ Are information technology services available and secured?

5.11.4 Fire Prevention and Fire Protection Checklist

¨ Is there a fire alarm system?

¨ Are the fire doors in good order?

¨ Is the fire detection system in good working order and regularly tested?

¨ Are fire alarm stations accessible?

¨ Are all exits marked by proper, illuminated signs?

¨ Is access to exits marked where the routes to them are not immediately

visible?

¨ Are all exits unobstructed by decorations, furniture and equipment, and

unlocked when the building is occupied?

¨ Is access to exits arranged so that it is not necessary to pass through a high-

hazard area to escape?

¨ Do all exits lead to an open space?

¨ Are corridors, aisles and circulation areas clear and unobstructed for

movement of staff and fire-fighting equipment?

¨ Is all fire-fighting equipment and apparatus easily identified by an appropriate

color code?

¨ Are portable fire extinguishers maintained fully charged and in working order,

and kept in designated places at all times?




PAGE NO: 5.44

¨ Are laboratory rooms with potential fire hazards equipped with appropriate

extinguishers and/or fire blankets for emergency use?

¨ If flammable liquids and gases are used in any room, is the mechanical

ventilation sufficient to remove vapours before they reach a hazardous

concentration?

¨ Are personnel trained to respond to fire emergencies?

5.11.5 Checklist for Compressed and Liquefied Gases

¨ Is each portable gas container legibly marked with its contents and correctly

colour coded?

¨ Are compressed-gas cylinders and their high-pressure and reduction valves

regularly inspected?

¨ Are reduction valves regularly maintained?

¨ Is a pressure-relief device connected when a cylinder is in use?

¨ Are protection caps in place when cylinders are not in use or are being

transported?

¨ Are all compressed gas cylinders secured so that they cannot fall, especially in

the event of natural disaster?

¨ Are cylinders and liquid petroleum gas tanks kept away from sources of heat?

¨ Are personnel trained to properly use and transport compressed and liquefied

gases?

5.11.6 Checklist for Electrical Hazards

¨ Are all new electrical installations and all replacements, modifications or

repairs made and maintained in accordance with a national electrical safety

code?

¨ Does the interior wiring have an earthed/grounded conductor (i.e. a three-wire

system)?

¨ Are circuit-breakers and earth-fault interrupters fitted to all laboratory circuits?

¨ Do all electrical appliances have testing laboratory approval?

¨ Are the flexible connecting cables of all equipment as short as practicable, in

good condition, and not frayed, damaged or spliced?

¨ Is each electric socket outlet used for only one appliance (no adapters to be

used)?




PAGE NO: 5.45

5.11.7 Checklist for Personal Protection

¨ Is protective clothing of approved design and fabric provided for all staff for

normal work, e.g. gowns, coveralls, aprons, gloves?

¨ Is additional protective clothing provided for work with hazardous chemicals

and radioactive and carcinogenic substances, e.g. rubber aprons and gloves

for chemicals and for dealing with spillages; heat-resistant gloves for

unloading autoclaves and ovens?

¨ Are safety glasses, goggles and shields (visors) provided?

¨ Are there eye-wash stations?

¨ Are there emergency showers (drench facilities)?

¨ Is radiation protection in accordance with national and international standards,

including provision of dosimeters?

¨ Are respirators available, regularly cleaned, disinfected, inspected and stored

in a clean and sanitary condition?

5.11.8 Checklist for Handling Chemical Substances

¨ Are incompatible chemicals effectively separated when stored or handled?

¨ Are all chemicals correctly labelled with names and warnings?

¨ Are chemical hazard warning charts prominently displayed?

¨ Is staff trained to deal with spills?

¨ Are flammable substances correctly and safely stored in minimal amounts in

approved cabinets?

¨ Are bottle carriers provided?

Documents

HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTDgpcb.gov.in/pdf/HPCL_PALANPUR_EIA_PART_2.pdf · receiving station are proposed to be constructed by HPCL at Kanpur in U.P., and existing facilities