Himagan v People of the Philippines

8/13/2019 Himagan v People of the Philippines

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G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents.Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner.KAPUNAN, J.:Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicatedin the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder 1 and attempted murder 2 were filed with the Rgional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on thebasis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNPfor grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shallbe terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasisours).On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspens

ion, 3 relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v.Sandiganbayan, 4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan. 5 In his order dated December 14, 1993 6 rnt judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, theaccused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motionfor reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied. 7 Hence, the petition for certiorari andmandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension.We find the petition devoid of merit.There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder andattempted murder under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering tha

t while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second sentenceof the same section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused.Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec.91 of RA 6975 which reads:Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shallapply to all personnel of the Department.he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90)days, thus:Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.

When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the periodof ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not apresidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in theservice; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall notbe counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional rightto equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the requirements in


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Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused fromoffice until the case is terminated" and the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must beterminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.We disagree.First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penaltyis six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should befinished.Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, shouldthe suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period with

out justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal 8 or civil liability. 9 If the triais unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his libertyby habeas corpus. 10Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more,Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90)days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that

the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent withR.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where thepenalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlikeR.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:

Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled toreinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive duringsuspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an information was filed against him for offenses under


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erminated. The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal,their meaning determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on NationalDefense relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all the more clear. We quote:So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?" What is this all about?REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now, ifit is charged with a crime, regular courts.SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case.Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substanceagainst a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law

is six years and one day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from the office until the case is terminated."REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more.SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and .. .?THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 Preventive Suspension.REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal caseat may baril pa rin at naguuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses.SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung maexempt na rito naman siya e.

REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . .xxx xxx xxxSEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case." Okay ito but I think we should also mandate the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba "the suspension of the accused from office until the case is terminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa e.REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case canbe, as Rene pointed out, can run to six years bagomaterminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should mandate. ..REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period.

REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that the caseshall also be terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon.REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory even if you put it in the law?SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a pa


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rticular situation.SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety days.REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these,well, looks exactly the same thing.SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We arereally keen on having it quick, swift.SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Antigraft cases before the Sandiganbayan, the preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days which can also be applicable here because this is a preventive suspension.SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be antigraft ha. The case filed against apoliceman may be antigraft in nature. . .SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for criminal cases. I know antigraft is a criminal case but here we are talking, let's say, of murder, rape, treason, robbery. That's why it is in that context that there is a difference between a purely antigraft case and a criminal case which could

be a serious case since it is six years and one day or more, so it must be alreadya grave felony.xxx xxx xxxREP. ALBANO. . . .What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use theVeloso case.THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The feeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case.What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is untilthe case is terminated, but he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us study what kind of language could be done along that line. So just on the National Police Commission . . .

SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not later than . . ." whatever we agree.THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police Commission. . . . . . 13The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classesof persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of

the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weaponsand the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstatedto his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against himare obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 ofR.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.


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The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause doesnot demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case.If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; 15 is germane tothe purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the sameclass; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification manot be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.ELENA P. DYCAICO, G.R. No. 161357 Petitioner, Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C. PUNO, PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING,

YNARESSANTIAGOSANDOVALGUTIERREZ, versus CARPIO, AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA,SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM CHICONAZARIOHYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" *andand SOCIAL SECURITY GARCIA, JJ.COMMISSION,

Respondents. Promulgated:November 30, 2

x xD E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of CouElena P. Dycaico which seeks to reverse and set aside the DecisionHYPERLINK "ht

tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o ""[1]dated April 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP

No. 69632. The assailed decision affirmed the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 of the Social Security Commission (SSC), denying the petitioners claim for survivors pension accruing from the death of her husband Bonifacio S. Dycaico, a Social Security System (SSS) memberpensioner. Likewise sought to be reversed and set asideis the appellate courts Resolution dated December 15, 2003, denying the petitionersmotion for reconsideration.


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The case arose from the following undisputed facts:

Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his

ata record (SSS Form RS1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and theireight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthlrom the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an applicationfor survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under Section 12B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security LawHYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l"_ftn3" \o "" [2]she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio asof the date of his retirement. The said proviso reads:Sec. 12B. Retirement Benefits. (d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the dat

e of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension.

Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the Records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was considered retired onJune 5, 1989 and monthly pension was cancelled upon our receipt of a report on his death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim application, submitted marriage contract with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after hisretirement date; hence, you could not be considered his primary beneficiary.In view of this, we regret that there is no other benefit due you. However, if you do not conform with us, you may file a formal petition with our Social Securit

y Commission to determine your benefit eligibility.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" [3]

On July 9, 2001, the petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that ther survivors pension was unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio designated herand their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS1 and that it was not indicated therein that only legitimate family members could be made beneficiaries. Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be legitimate relatives of the member to be entitled tothe survivors pension. The SSS is legally bound to respect Bonifacios designation of them as his


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beneficiaries. Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be interpreted to promote socialjustice.On February 6, 2002, the SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the petitioners claim. The SSC refuted the petitioners contention that primary beneficiaries need not be legitimate family members by citing the definitions of primary beneficiariesand dependentsin Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282. Under paragraph ) of the said provision, primary beneficiariesare [t]he dependent spouse until heor she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, andillegitimate children Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the other hand, defines dependentsas the following: (1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to receivesupport from the member; (2) [t]he legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twentyone (21) years of age, or if over twentyone (21) years of age, he iscongenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of selfsupport, physically or mentally; and (3) [t]he parent who is receiving regular support from the member. Based on the foregoing, according to the SSC,it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in ones capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with anddependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime.Under Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivors pension are those who qualify as


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such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner,who was not then the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not be considered his primary beneficiary. The SSC further opined that Bonifacios designation of the petitioner as one of his primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS1 is void, not only on moral considerations but also for misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the survivorspension under Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the SSCs Februay 6, 2002 Resolution. In the assailed Decision, dated April 15, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Citing the same provisions in Rep. Act No. 8282 as those cited by the SSC, the CA declared that since the petitioner was merely thecommonlaw wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS1 in 1980 is void. The CA further observed that Bonifacios children with the petitioner couldno longer qualify as primary beneficiaries because they have all reached twentyone (21) years of age. The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed 06 February 2002 Resolution of respondent Commission is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov200"_ftn5" \o "" [4]


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The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailen dated December 15, 2003, the appellate court denied her motion. Hence, the petitioners recourse to this Court.The petitioner points out that the term primary beneficiariesas used in Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not have any qualification. She thus theorizesthat regardless of whether the primary beneficiary designated by the member as such is legitimate or not, he or she is entitled to the survivors pension. Relianceby the appellate court and the SSC on the definitions of primary beneficiariesand dependentsin Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282 is allegedly unwarranted because these definitions cannot modify Section 12B(d) thereof.

The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got married in January 1997, a few months before he passed away, they merely intended to legalize their relationship and had no intention to commit any fraud. Further, since Rep. Act No. 8282 is a social legislation, it should be construed liberally in favor of claimants like the petitioner. She cites the Courts pronouncement that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" [5]The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 should be read in conjunction with the definition of the terms dependentsand primary beneficiariesin Section 8 thereof. Since the petitioner was not as yet the lega

l spouse of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, she is not entitledto claim the survivors pension accruing at the time of his death. The SSS insiststhat the designation by Bonifacio of the petitioner and their illegitimate children in his SSS Form RS1 is void.According to the SSS, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 8282 which provides that should there be no primary or secondary beneficiaries, the benefit accruing fromthe death of a member should go to his designated commonlaw spouseand that to rule otherwise would be to condone the designation of commonlaw spouses as beneficiaries, a clear case of circumventing the SS Law and a violation of public policy and morals.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" [6] Finally, the SSS is of the opinion that Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is clear and explicit; hence, there is no room for its

interpretation, only for application.In the Resolution dated July 19, 2005, the Court required the parties, as well as the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective comments on theissue of whether or not the proviso as of the date of his retirementin Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 violates the equal protection and due process clausesof the Constitution. The Court believes that this issue is intertwined with andindispensable to the resolution of the merits of the petition.In compliance therewith, in its comment, the SSC argues that the proviso as of the date of his retirementin Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not run afoulof the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it merely determines the reckoning date of qualification and entitlement of beneficiaries to the survivors

hip pension. It asserts that this classification of beneficiaries is based on valid and substantial distinctions that are germane to the legislative purpose of Rep. Act No. 8282.

The SSC also impugns the marriage of the petitioner to Bonifacio after his retirement stating that it was contracted as an afterthought to enable her to qualifyfor the survivorship pension upon the latters death. It further alleges that there is no violation of the due process clause as the petitioner was given her dayin court and was able to present her side.


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The SSS filed its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was not the legitimate spouse of the deceased member at the time when the contingencyoccurred (his retirement) and, therefore, she could not be considered a primarybeneficiary within the contemplation of Rep. Act No. 8282. The SSS posits that the statutes intent is to give survivorship pension only to primary beneficiariesat the time of the retirement of the deceased member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself ordains the persons entitled thereto and cannot be subject of change by the SSS.The Solicitor General agrees with the stance taken by the SSS that the proviso asof the date of his retirementmerely marks the period when the primary beneficiary must be so to be entitled to the benefits. It does not violate the equal protection clause because the classification resulting therefrom rests on substantial distinctions. Moreover, the condition as to the period for entitlement, i.e., asof the date of the members retirement, is relevant as it set the parameters for those availing of the benefits and it applies to all those similarly situated. TheSolicitor General is also of the view that the said proviso does not offend thedue process clause because claimants are given the opportunity to file their claims and to prove their case before the Commission.For clarity, Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is quoted anew below:Sec. 12B. Retirement Benefits.

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. Under Section 8(k) of the same law, the primary beneficiariesare:1. The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate chilFurther, the dependent spouseand dependent childrenare qualified under paragraph e) of the same section as follows:

1. The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support until he or she remarries; 2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate chilis unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twentyone (21) yearsof age, or if over twentyone years of age, he is congenitally or while still aminor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of selfsupport, physically or mentally.The SSS denied the petitioners application for survivors pension on the sole ground that she was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement;hence, she could not be considered as his primary beneficiary under Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.

The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirementin Sectiop. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries,is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm"\l "_ftn8" \o "" [7]

In an analogous case, Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,HY//sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" [8]the Court invalidated the proviso in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146HYPERLINK"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn10" \


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o "" [9]which stated that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pensionif his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before thepensioner qualified for the pension. In the said case, the Court characterized retirement benefits as property interest of the pensioner as well as his or her surviving spouse. The proviso, which denied a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the threeyear prohibited period, was declared offensive to the due process clause. There was outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving him or her an opportunity to be heard. The proviso was also held to infringethe equal protection clause as it discriminated against dependent spouses who contracted their respective marriages to pensioners within three years before they qualified for their pension.

For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso as of the date of tin Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly violates the due process andequal protection clauses of the Constitution.The proviso infringes the equal protection clause

As illustrated by the petitioners case, the proviso as of the date of his retirementin Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term primary beneficiariesresults in the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two groups:

(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted prior to the latters retirement; and(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement.Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective marriages are valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The distinction between them lies solely on the date the marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. As such, she and those similarly situated do not qualify as primary beneficiariesunder Section 12B(d) ofRep. Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are not entitled to survivors pension under thesame provision by reason of the subject proviso.

It is noted that the eligibility of dependent childrenwho are biological offsprings of a retired SSS member to be considered as his primary beneficiaries under Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is not substantially affected by the provisoas of the date of his retirement. A biological child, whether legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate, is entitled to survivors pension upon the death of a retiredSSS member so long as the said child is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twentyone (21) years of age, or if over twentyone (21) years ofage, he or she is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of selfsupport, physically or mentally.On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be considered primary beneficiariesunder Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is affected by th

e proviso as of the date of his retirementin the same manner as the dependent spouses. A legally adopted child who satisfies the requirements in Section 8(e)(2)HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" [10]thereof is considered a primary beneficiary of a retired SSS member upon the latters death only if the said child had been legally adopted prior tothe members retirement. One who was legally adopted by the SSS member after his or her retirement does not qualify as a primary beneficiary for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension under Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.In any case, the issue that now confronts the Court involves a dependent spouse


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who claims to have been unjustly deprived of her survivors pension under Section12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. Hence, the subsequent discussion will focus on theresultant classification of the dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries underthe said provision.As earlier stated, the petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. She and those similarly situated are undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso as ofthe date of his retirementdisqualifies them from being considered primary beneficiariesfor the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension.Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" [11] With respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in particular, as a social security law, it is recognized that it is permeated with provisions that draw lines in classifyingthose who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in this regard are entitled to deference as those of the institution charged under our scheme of government with the primary responsibility for making such judgments in light of competing policies and interests.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" [12]However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with respect to entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the fol

lowing requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" [13]The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso as of the date of his retirementto qualify the term primary beneficiariesin Section 12B(d) thereof. To the Courts mind, however, ireflects congressional concern with the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In particular, the provisowas apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by personssolely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the

other spouse.This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on whether the marriage wascontracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of theduration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies


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resulting in loss of income or financial burden."HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" [14] The nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently,such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policyobjective.For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in contemplation of imminent death, then it should have prescribed a definite durationofrelationshipor durational period of relationship as one of the requirements for entitlement to survivors pension. For example, in the United States, aprovision in their social security law which excludes from social security benefits the surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased wage earner who had their respective relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months prior to hisdeath, was declared valid.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" [15]Thus, nine months is recognized in the United States as the minimum duration of a marriage to consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the purpose of entitlement to survivorship pension.In contrast, the proviso as of the date of his retirementin Section 12B(d) in Rep. Act No. 8282 effectively disqualifies from entitlement to survivors pension all those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to retired SSS members werecontracted after the latters retirement. The duration of the marriage is not evenconsidered. It is observed that, in certain instances, the retirement age underRep. Act No. 8282 is sixty (60)


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years old.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" [16] A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after the said age may still last for more than ten years, assuming the member lives upto over seventy (70) years old. In such a case, it cannot be said that the marriage was a sham or was entered into solely for the purpose of enabling one spouseto obtain the financial benefits due upon the death of the other spouse. Nonetheless, the said surviving spouse is not entitled to survivors pension because he or she is not a primary beneficiary as of the date of retirement of the SSS member following Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is toosweeping because the proviso as of the date of his retirement,which effectively disqualifies the dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSSmember were contracted after the latters retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solelyfor the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law to provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss ofincome or financial burden.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2

005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" [17]The proviso infringes the due process clause

As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,HY//sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" [18]the Court characterized retirement benefits as a property interest of a retiree.We held therein that [i]n a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in thepension where the pension is part of the terms of employment.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" [19] Thus, it was ruled that, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due pro

cess clauseand [r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under preexisting law.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" [20] Further,since pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled tosurvivorship pension, a widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" [21]

Although the subject matter in the abovecited case involved the retirement ber P.D. No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn23"\o "" [22]covering government employees, the pronouncement therein that retirees e

njoy a protected property interest in their retirement benefits applies squarelyto those in the private sector under Rep. Act No. 8282. This is so because the mandatory contributions of both the employersHYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" [23]and the employeesHYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" [24]to the SSS do not, likewise, make the retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282 mere gratuity but form part of the latters compensation. Even the retirement benefits of selfemployed individuals, like Bonifacio, who have been included in the compulsory coverage of Rep. Act No. 8282HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" [25]are not m


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ere gratuity because they are required to pay both the employer and employee contributions.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" [26] Further, under Rep. Act No. 8282, the surviving spouse is entitled to survivors pension accruing on the death of the member; hence, the surviving spouses right to receive such benefit following the demise of the wife or husband, as the case may be, is also part of the latters contractual compensation.

The proviso as of the date of his retirementin Section 12B(d) of Rep. Actafoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouseswhose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after thelatters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.

By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective mSSS members were contracted after the latters retirement, the proviso as of the date of his retirementqualifying the term primary beneficiariesfor the purpose ofentitlement to survivors pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purposeof securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, isconclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunityto disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates thisconclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is

not necessarily or universally true. In the United States, this kind of presumptionis characterized as an irrebuttable presumptionand statutes creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" [27]

In the petitioners case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio got married in 1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship and not to commit fraud. This claim is quite believable. After all, they had been living togethersince 1980 and, in fact, during that time their eldest child was already twentyfour (24) years old. However, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacios bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically

disqualified from being considered as his primary beneficiary. In effect, the petitioner was deprived of the survivors benefits, a property interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due process require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his death.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" [28] Hence, the proviso as of the date of his retirementin Section 12B(d) which deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSSmembers this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.Conclusion

Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirementin Section 12B(d) is nullified, the enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension is not substantially affected since the following persons are considered as such under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282:(1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and(2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.


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In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse an

ren as follows:(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twentyone years (21) of age,or if over twentyone (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of selfsupport, physicallyor mentally.Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of the proviso as of the date of his retirementin Section 12B(d) of Rep.Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o"" [29] However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is absolutelynecessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Courtrequired the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age bynow, deserves to receive forthwith the survivors pension accruing upon the deathof her husband.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and Resoluti

on dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 69632 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proviso as of the date of his retirementin Section 12B(d) Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System cannot deny theclaim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivors pension on the basis of thisinvalid proviso.

SO ORDERED.[G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000]AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., NARCISO M. ARABE, LETICIA T. ENDOMA, ARISTIDES A. RAMOS, PANCHO M. RIVERA, TERESITA A. DE CASTRO, CANDIDA C. HABANA, AZUCENA C. FALCON, MARIA LUZ P. CAEDO, YOLANDA V. RIO, RUBEN S. ANIEVAS, LELISA L. SANCHEZ, VILLARDO A. TRINIDAD, ENRIQUE CH. ZUNIGA, ROMEO A. GONZALES, CASIANO G. ATUEL, JR.,

GEMMA L. BANARES, PERFECTO T. CAMPOS, ARNULFO A. AGUILAR, RUDOLPH R. MELON, MAGDALENA M. LAO, MARINA GERONA, FLORIANA O. DE GUIA, EMETERIO B. BRUCAL, NILDA C.CONCHA, YOLANDA P. FERMA, TEOTISTA C. ANGKIKO, FRANCISCO V. TRIAS, JENELYN E. ESTERNON, MILAGROS M. ABELLAR, ALICIA T. MOJICA, ELVIRA E. BAYBAY, PRICILLA P. GOLFO, ELISEA M. HIERCO, TERESITA L. DIMACUHA, MYRNA GUILLERMO, GRACIANO R. SAMELA,JR., NIMFA M. LAGASCA, JOSEFINA P. JARENO, NORMA V. ORDENES, FRANCISCO T. SERVANDO, VIOLETA M. ANONUEVO, ALFREDO O. BAYANI, MARIO J. RAMOS, EME FEROLINO, LEONIDES P. COMIA, MILAGROS E. GENEBLAZO, LORNA L. MENORCA, REYNALDO DE LA CRUZ, ROMULO A. FAZ, LIMUEL G. GADO, REY G. FABELLA, DOMINGUITO G. TACASA, IMELDA R.B. ROTONI, TITA FOJA, NOEMI F. CASTRO, LILIA B. CAWALING, ROBERT A. REYES, CONCEPCIONH. PARRENO, SERAFIN L. OLMEDO, ADOLFO L. ALLAN, PROSPERO D. CASTRO, ROSELLER C.GAPULAO, GLICERIO B. LAURENTE, BERNICE E. BERNABE, ADINA L. FERNANDEZ, ANITA M.PAALAN, ROSA P. PINOON, INOCENCIA P. DANGUE, JULITA E. MENDOZA, ELENA O. RAMOS,

GENE BE BARTE, FLORENCIA Z. MAGANITO, PABLO A. ARGA, PEDRO S. LUNA, CARMELITA P.LAUREL, VICTORINO I. MARASIGAN, ROMEO M. MENDOZA, JUAN C. MALABANAN, MANUEL B.ABRELI, JOSEPH T. MACAHIYA, LEONOR P. ARADA, JULIA G. PEREZ, MODESTO M. VILLADELREY, ARNULFO Y. FAJILAN, MARLON P. HERRERA, JAIME A. BISCOCHO, MICHAEL D. CASTILLO, MILAGROS H. BAYLOSIS, ARSENIO T. GUSTE, ALFREDO V. ORAYANI, DANTE A. PENAMANTE, ROMEO A. DE CHAVEZ, MANUEL M. ILAGAN, ALFREDO O. MANZA, JR., DOMINGO B. GUNIO, FIDEL V. PALERACIO, VICENTE V. DEL MORO, JUSTINO R. DEQUILLA, ERNESTO A. RUZOL, ROMEO D. DELGADO, ERLINDA P. MAGSINO, VERONICA R. CAMBRONERO, NORMA A. DEQUINA, WELLIE R. RAVINA, CORAZON T. LOPEZ, REMEDIOS R. QUIZON, LORETA E. VERGARA, MELECIA M. ASTRERA, VICENTA R. SAMANTE, HELEN M. CUENTOBUENDICHO, ANICIA V. MORAL


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ES, RISALINA C. GONZALES, ROSARIO CHARITO R. PABELLON, LOLITA L. MALADAGA, MAXIMO A. GLINDO, WILFREDO A. RODELAS, CELSO O. ROGO, RAMON C. VALENCIA, FELIPE R. FRANDO, ADEN B. DUNGO, OFELIA N. QUIBEN, LIGAYA S. VALENZUELA, EUNICE S. FAMILARIN, MARCELA DE LEON, ADELA M. JAMILLA, RENY ABLES, ADELA E. FABERES, ALICIA P. BALDOMAR, EDNA C. GARCIA, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, ELOISA P. TORRENO, CHARITO M. LACAMENTO, CLARENCIA M. AQUINO, HILDA DIMALANTA, ELSIE SIBAL, PURIFICACION TANGONAN, AMELITA FERNANDEZ, TEDDY C. MARIANO, LORETO SANGGALANG, GERARDO GONZALES, FEDERICO ONATE, JR., ARTURO BALIGNASAY, FELIX M. CABARIOS, JR., NORBERTO PUNZALAN, JAIME G. ALCANTARA, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA, ESTANISLAO SANCHEZ, ADORACION L. PINEDA, LUCILA S. DUNGCA, ADELAIDA B. LAOIJINDANUM, ROLANDO A. BALUYUT, FRANCISCO M. DAVID,LEONELLE S. MENDOZA, MA. LUZ A. BASILIO, NESTOR J. TIMBANG, HILDA P. DIZON, EMMANUEL E. IGNACIO, RAMON S. ABELLA, JOSELITO MATIAS, HEZEQUIAS B. GALANG, ERLINDAC. ZAPATA, IMELDA R. MANALASTAS, PEDRO L. PALO, AURECIO C. TRASPE, JOSEPHINE GALANG, FLORINDA R. MADULID, MAGDALENA W. SADI, NYDIA V.A. BOLISAY, PRESENTACION A. PALOM, ANTONIO B. ANCHETA, MACARIO L. SADI, PACIFICO E. GISAPON, FELICIANO C.CRUZ, IMELDA A. QUIMEL, LINDA D. SANDOVAL, MARILOU R. ORTIZ, NORMA F. SANTOS, MAGPAYO V. ABESAMIS, BONIFACIO B. VILLAFLOR, DANIEL O. TABIOS, CONSTANTE T. CATRIZ, JESUS E. ALICANTE, FEDERICO SACLAYAN, JR., NOLY G. UMINGA, FE FRAELI L. DE GUZMAN, RODRIGO S. WYCOCO, JOVEN HERMOGENES, RODOLFO D. BANAWA, ABELARDO O. CAPANZANA, ERNESTO Q. TIONGSON, ROSANNA CRUZ, OSCAR C. ONGOCO, CONSUELO A. KABIGTING, JULITA V. PASTELERO, ARSENIA V. BONDOC, ISIDRO A. TOMAS, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, CONSOLACION N. LABOG, ELENITA A. RIVERA, SOCORRO NOCES, RODOLFO GALLARDO, CARMENCITA M. ONGEO, CAMILO L. SEDURIFA, ARLEEN VIC B. OCHANDRA, EDGARDO E. APOSTOL, CLOTILDE C. CANETE, ALEJANDRO B. DEL AGUA, PILAR R. BUENO, TEODOICO C. MAGALLANES, P

ETRONIO N. PIANGCO, JR., JOSE M. FLORENDO, BIBIANO A. CAGNAN, ALICIA A. TUBI, RODOLFO C. NATAN, JAIME B. MENDONEZ, EDILBERTO EDANG, ROSENDA T. JENOVEVA, VEDASTOB. ELIZAN, JR., MILAGROS P. DE LUNA, ATILANO L. ISAAC, CORAZON L. J. PEPITO, LUCILA S. PINEDA, ROCHE B. CERRO, JOCELYN KL. LIBUT, REMBERTO L. GUTIERREZ, NAZARIO A. TRASMONTE, REYNALDO O. MACARAT, FLORENCIA M. MALIBAGO, IMELDA G. TUYAY, JUAN A. GIBA, JR., JOSE M. CAPACITE, ARCITA M. GARCIA, ANGEL G. DACUNO, RITA M. BEDIANG, RENATO L. CANDIDO, NESTORIO B. BOCO, JONATHAN C. AMBIDA, MONICA MACABARE,BENITO A. MONTALLANA, CLOTILDE C. APURAVALDEMORO, CIRIACO J. ARCENO, PABLO L. FORMARAN, JR., PROSPERO S. OLMEDO, IGNACIO V. CASCANO, SERAFIN L. CLUTARIO, ARTURO L. DIN, JUCHITA C. SY, RODOLFO L. ASUERO, PIO T. PORTES, MARILOU F. TAMAYO, MILAGROS P. LAMBINO, ESTANISLAO A. ESPINA, RENERIO D. ENGO, FERNANDO A. MOSCARE, CONCHITA A. PICARDAL, ELIAS T. TURLA, BONIFACIO T. LIM, JOSEFINA A. AGUILAR, ANTONIO O. TEPACE, GAVINO S. ASOTES, RENE P. MAGBUTAY, NICOLAS C. UY, JR., JESUS B.

LAVA, SENORA C. CALAGOS, RAFAEL A. PAYOD, MACARIO L. CIEGO, SALVADOR T. CRUZ, VIRGINIA V. BESAS, RAUL S. FIGUERDA, EDGAR R. DELOS REYES, TERESO R. ROSEL, JOSE J. MABANGUE, PRIMO D. PALOMO, JOHN C. YANGZON, ROMULO D. JABON, FIDENCIO Z. LA TORRE, JR., LETICIA R. MACARIOLA, CARLOS P. VARELA, JR., ANTONIO L. PEDRAZA, SALVACION A. LAMBAN, LINO L. JAPSON, EUNIA H. VACAL, ANTONIO F. VALDEZ, NATIVIDAD E.PRADO, LORENZO C. MERKA, GAUDIOSO A. RUEGO, ETERIO Z. ABOCEJO, DEMETRIA O. COROLLO, MARIA S. OBEN, ARTHUR V. LEYSON, PEDRO L. AVILA, DOMINADOR S. RODILLA, MARCIAL MAGPATOC, FEDERICO D. BARCELON, EVANGELINE DELA ROSA, ELENO GIL, ARSENIA GARCIA, HUMILDA ALICUM, DIOSDADO CAS, ABRAHAM MASAOY, SAMUEL ORALLO, AMELIA OLORES,CANDIDO URBANO, LOURDES FRIAS, ROEL SORIANO, EMELDA AGUSTIN, PAQUITO SORIANO, GERMAN BALOLONG, BENJAMIN C. ROSARIO, EFREN BUYA, LEONIDA LEGASPI, TOMAS ABELLA, JR., JOVENCIA CANTO, JUAN DACONO, MIGUEL BAUTISTA, LORNA PASCUAL, FERDINAND BRAGANZA, PRISCILLA PEREZ, ALMA LUZ SORIANO, JUAN VALENCIA, JR., JULIAN APOSTOL, ROSA

RIO GUICO, BONITA VIDAL, GUIA GARCIA, LEOCADIO GINEZ, CATALINA BANEZ, VERONICA TABILIN, ELVIRA CALSADO, ALIPIO LOPEZ, JOSEPHINE MALANA, PIO ANONUEVO, ELMA DEL ROSARIO, RUFINO FLORES, ANTONIO ORDONEZ, CARMEN CLAVERIA, ESTRELLA RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.D E C I S I O NPURISIMA, J.:At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise knownas "The Voters Registration Act of 1996".


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RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos onJune 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides:"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outsidethe original congressional district."By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution Nos. 970002HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn1" \o "" [1]and 970610HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn2" \o"" [2]for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directivesHYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn3" \o "" [3]reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition assailing the validityof Section 44 of RA 8189, contending that:ISECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSEENSHRINEDIN THE CONSTITUTION;IISECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE ON SEC

URITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS;IIISECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONSTITUTES A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;IVSECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC AND COMELECS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME, DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AND THEN REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY OWN OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES;VSECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT[Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil. Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF;and

VISECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT [ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON SEPARATEDAYS AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL FORM THREE DAYS BEFORE ITSPASSAGE.Petitionerscontentions revolve on the pivotal issue, whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional.The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption ofvalidity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it.Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there

is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.The Court is not persuaded by petitionersarguments. The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.HYPERL


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INK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn4" \o "" [4]After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements.The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the peopleof their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.In Lutz vs. Araneta,HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn5" \o "" [5]it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none". This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be truethat all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out.Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELE

C.Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due process of law. As held in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l"_ftn6" \o "" [6]"xxx the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under aspecific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. xxx" (italics supplied)The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee ofperpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or tr

ansferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the lawmaking authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.Untenable is petitionerscontention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that it is

still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials andemployees. But as a government agency tasked with the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passedby Congress.The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment oremasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELECs power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain.Petitionerscontention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject fromthat of RA 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is


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equally untenable.The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof", are:1. To prevent hodgepodge or logrolling legislation;2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition orotherwise if they shall so desire.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn7" \o "" [7]Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn8" \o "" [8]Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related andgermane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voters Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated inthe explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS,ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF

AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conductand procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn9" \o "" [9]In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled,the presumption is in favor of its validity.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn10" \o "" [10]

As regards the issue raised by petitioners whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have not convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part ofCongress. Respect due to coequal departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn11" \o "" [11]WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity ofSection 44 of RA 8189 UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.ELEAZAR P. QUINTO andGERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR.,Petitioners,

versus G.R. No. 189698


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Present:PUNO, C.J.,CARPIO,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDODE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ, andMENDOZA, JJ. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS,Respondent. Promulgated:February 22, 2010 x x

R E S O L U T I O NPUNO, C.J.:

Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the reission on Elections(COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movantsintervenorsmotions for reconsiderationinintervention, of this Courts December 1, 2009Decision (Decision).HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" [1]The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filedby Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698

.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" [2]Section 66 of the Omnibus Election CodeHYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o ""[3]and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" [4]mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functionsof their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movantsintervenors submit the following arguments:(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional

proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and members of the military in partisan political activity;(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because suchdifferential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law;(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safetyand interest demand such reversal.


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We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.I.Procedural IssuesFirst, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELECs motion for reconsideration which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the propriety of the motions for reconsiderationinintervention which were filed after the Court had rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision.i. Timeliness of COMELECs Motion for Reconsideration

Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56A of the 1997 Rules of Court,HYPERLINK "http:.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" [5]in relationto Section 1, Rule 52 of the same rules,HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" [6]COMELEC had a period offifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision within which to move for its reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December 14, 2009. The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on December 17,

2009 still within the reglementary period.ii. Propriety of the Motions for ReconsiderationinInterventionSection 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success ofeither of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to beadversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowedto intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a

separate proceeding.

Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the wouldbe intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case;and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" [7]Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the timewithin which a motion for intervention may be filed, viz.:

SECTION 2. Time to intervene.The motion for intervention may be filed at any time bee rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleadingininterventionshall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (italics supplied)This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, whohave not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/20


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10/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" [8]when the petition for review of thejudgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l"_ftn9" \o "" [9]and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" [10]In Lim v. Pacquing,HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.govh/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" [11]the motion forintervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on thesound discretion of the courtHYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" [12]after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" [13]We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" [14]Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" [15]We rule that, with the exception of the IBP Cebu City Chapter, all the movantsi

ntervenors may properly intervene in the case at bar.First, the movantsintervenors have each sufficiently established a substantialright or interest in the case.As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the December 1, 2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral process; and as a public officer, he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust andconfidence of the public in its system of government.On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are candidates in the May 2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in v

iew of the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts andare not likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured bythe assailed Decision, unless it is reversed.Moreover, the rights or interests of said movantsintervenors cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if this Courts Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of the land.

With regard to the IBP Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that this case involves the constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National Elections,and that there is a need for it to be allowed to intervene xxx so that the voice of its members in the legal profession would also be h

eard before this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental importance.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" [16]Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBPCebu City Chapter has failed to present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is,in character, too indistinguishable to justify its intervention.We now turn to the substantive issues.


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II.Substantive IssuesThe assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions;(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil servantsactivity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamentalright of these public appointive officials.We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.

III.Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with LawSection 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the presentstate of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:Incumbent Appointive Official. Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006

or the Fair Election Act,HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" [17]which repealed Section 67 of theOmnibus Election CodeHYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" [18]and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running,HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" [19]an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run foranother position without forfeiting his seat.These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IXB of the 1987 Cons

titution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging inany electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil serand employees in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange between Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:MS. QUESADA.


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x x x xSecondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in Section 1 (4), line12, and I quote: "No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity." This is almost the same provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the government service have actually experienced how this provision has been violated by the direct or indirect partisan political activities of many government officials.So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this provision more strict, and which would deter its violation?MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing rules on the matter are more than exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and employees in the public service from engaging in any form of partisan political activity. But the problem really lies in implementation because, if the head of a ministry, and even the superior officers of offices and agencies of government will themselves violate the constitutional injunction against partisan political activity, then no string of words that we may add to what is now here in this draft will really implement the constitutional intent against partisan political activity. x x xHYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" [20](italics supplied)

To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers a

nd employees is presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A, Title I,Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 respectively provide in relevant part:Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:x x x x(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:x x x x

(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holdinonpolitical office.x x x xSection 55. Political Activity. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall heuse his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of anyother person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current political problems orissues, or from mentioning the names of his candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offic

es may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawfulfor them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to anyof the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.

Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes intervention by civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities an election offense,viz.:SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:


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x x x x(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee,or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay selfdefense units and all other paramilitary units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.But Section 2(4), Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, thitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]hecivil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agenciesof the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with originl charters.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" [21]This is because elected public officials, by thevery nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost allyear round, even outside of the campaign period.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.g

ov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" [22]Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positionsincluded.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" [23]The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for public office whom they support. This is crystal clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2, Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13, between the words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete the word "ac

tivity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word CAMPAIGN.May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Aquino may proceed.MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except to vote" which was adopted in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a qualification of the general prohibition against taking part in elections.Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for asan exception to this prohibition, it will amount to disenfranchisement. We know

that suffrage, although plenary, is not an unconditional right. In other words,the Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold from any class theright to vote in an election, if public interest so required. I would only liketo reinstate the qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that thosewho may want to vote but who are likewise prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns or electioneering may vote.MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand that tno intention on the part of the Committee to disenfranchise any government official or employee. The elimination of the last clause of this provision was precis


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ely intended to protect the members of the civil service in the sense that theyare not being deprived of the freedom of expression in a political contest. The last phrase or clause might have given the impression that a government employee or worker has no right whatsoever in an election campaign except to vote, which is not the case. They are still free to express their views although the intention is not really to allow them to take part actively in a political campaign.HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l"_ftn24" \o "" [24]IV.Section 4(a) of Resolut

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