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BOEING is a trademark of Boeing Management Company.Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved. 1 of 28
High Assurance Smart Grid An Outcome of Power Engineering and Cyber Security Engineering
09 March 2010Tom OvermanChief Architect, Energy Solutions Cyber [email protected]
Smart Grid Cyber Securityis more than just applying IT security
to grid control linksIt is a total System Design approach
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved. 2 of 28
Agenda
Review of threat examples, with Lessons Learned
Grid integration
Threat Response:
– An Architectural Approach to achieve a High Assurance Smart Grid
High Assurance
– A broad term encompassing dimensions of both high security and high availability
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved.
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Threats against the emerging Smart Grid range from hackers on the low end to terrorists and nation/state adversaries on the high end
The Threat
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The ThreatLessons Learned
(IT Solutions Approach)Apply appropriate security to remote accessCritical patch installation needs to drive trusted agent statusData/command integrityDefense-in-depth strategies, Firewalls & IDSDelete user accounts after terminationsDon’t perform database updates on live systemsDon’t use administrative controls to solve system anomaliesIdentify controls to critical assetsIntegrated physical securityInvestigate anomalous system behaviorRole based accessSecure remote (trusted) access channelsTrusted agentsUse secure radio transmissions
All necessary, but not sufficientthese do not address grid control architecture
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NIST Smart Grid Conceptual Reference Diagram
System Details
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Example of Tomorrow’s Smart Highly Integrated Grid
CriticalLoads
Non-CriticalLoads Housing
Energy Consuming EquipmentElectric Vehicles
(Charging & Storage)Wind Solar
Distributed Energy Resources (DER)
On-Site Peaker
Other
Installation or Regional Networked Energy
Operations Center (NEOC)
Distributed Generators
Storage
Installation Utility Grid Interface
IntelligentSub Station
Energy DemandDriving InformationUtilities – Energy
Providers
Purchase/Demand Response/Stability Support
GeothermalPower
IntelligentTransformer Vault (HTV)
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Example of Tomorrow’s Vulnerabilities
CriticalLoads
Non-CriticalLoads Housing
Energy Consuming EquipmentElectric Vehicles
(Charging & Storage)Wind Solar
Distributed Energy Resources (DER)
On-Site Peaker
Other
Installation or Regional Networked Energy
Operations Center (NEOC)
Distributed Generators
Storage
Installation Utility Grid InterfaceIntelligent
Sub Station
Energy DemandDriving InformationUtilities – Energy
Providers
Purchase/Demand Response/Stability Support
GeothermalPower
IntelligentTransformer Vault (HTV)
Points of System Entry
Every node on the System represents a Point of System Entry for an attack
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Smart Grid Standards Overview and Relationships
Slide source:Scott NeumannUtility Integration Solutions, Inc.Used with permission
Behind the pretty pictures, the complex of interrelated standards will create vulnerabilities
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Threat Vectors
Making grid control systems ‘smarter’(more interconnected) exponentially increases vulnerabilities
Transmission ISO/RTO
Distribution
Attack
AMI/HAN
Utility Applications
Bulk Power
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Threat Response: High Assurance Smart Grid
Transmission ISO/RTO
Distribution
Protect
AMI/HAN
Utility Applications
1. In addition to good IT Security, implement distributed intelligence at end nodes and between entities. These agents analyze data from multiple sources before executing commands from potentially compromised links, systems and sensors
2. Physical and Cyber security can be applied within and between entities3. Defense in Depth within entities and reports to hierarchical SA systems
Includes traditional ‘IT Security’ controls such as encryption and authentication
Bulk Power
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High Assurance Smart Grid AttributesIntegrated Energy Management, Cyber Security and Physical Security with Defense in Depth
– Including strong Role Based Access Control (RBAC) for people and devices
Secure distributed architecture enables autonomy and eliminates single point of failure
Assume compromise in the system(through malice or system failure), and engineer energy control systems accordingly
Creating a High Assurance Smart Gridrequires utilizing the best attributes from multiple disciplines
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
S IEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access
Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway Physical
Security (e.g. tamper protection)
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Protocol Access Lists
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
Autonomous Sensors
Actuators
Secure NMS
protocolIDS
Sensors
Autonomous Protection
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access
Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
BulkPower
Trans-mission
Distri-bution
AMIHANBMSControl
Room DG
DSFRR
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Generic DOD “Security Onion”for Robust Cyber Security and Defense in Depth
Defense-In-Depth: Boundary to Core
Security Mgr (Log-On)
Defense-In-Depth: Architecture Layers
HMI
Security Mgr Service (Access Control)Cross-Domain Service
Key Mgt Security LabelRBAC
ServiceSecurityPolicy
Data MgtSecurity
VPNFilter
Router
PhysAccess
CSlv2SSL/TLS
PacketLabel
MediaEncryption
Audit
IDS
EnclaveBoundary
Protection Service Protection
Data ProtectionDetect/
Respond
Plus• Wireless
Networks• Classified
Interconnections• Key Mgt Infrastructure (KMI)/
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)• Detect and Respond
Aircraft Demo SystemTailored IA Controls
Future System IA Controls
Green Text
Blue Text+ Upgraded Green
Interconnect Mgt TEMPESTVPN
Sanitization
COMSEC
AuthenticationRole-Based
Access Control Malicious CodeConfigMgmt
KeyMgmt
IdentityMgmt
SessionEncryption
MediaEncryption
Data Label
Backup/Restore
IntegrityControls
RAID
PhysicalAccess Controls
FilteringRouter Anti-
TamperIntrusionDetectionSystem
Incident Reporting
Firewall
OPSEC
ControlledInterface
Clearance/Need to Know
Service
Infra-structure
Operating System
Network
Physical
FIREWALL
GUARD
Aspects of DOD defense in depth model must be applied to secure the Smart Grid
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High Assurance Smart Grid (HASG) Architecture
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway Physical
Security (e.g. tamper protection)
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Protocol Access Lists
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
Autonomous Sensors
Actuators
Secure NMS
protocolIDS
Sensors
Autonomous Protection
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
To raise the confidence level of the future grid, the complete architecture and points of entry must be properly engineered and architected
Use all appropriate technologies and controls to protect:
Centralized management systems
Data in transit between field devices and Control Room
Distributed sensors and actuators
HASG combines defense in depth with trust model
Engineer field sensors and actuators to be resistant to improper commands from potentially compromised Control Center management systems
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Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
DOD/DHSSystemHardeningCorrelation/
Response Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honey-pots
Protocol Access
Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
IPS Sensors
Secure NMS
protocol
WirelessSecurity
DistributedCyber Agentsdeveloped for
DOD
Notes:Certification and Accreditation per DOE, DOD and/or DHS Methods performed on entire systemEntire security solution developed and evaluated using security systems engineering procedures from DOE, DOD, DHS
Control Center Cyber Security Defense in Depth
Each instantiation in the architecture requires a slightly modified approach to raise the Probability of Assurance
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Sub Station and Field Device Cyber Security Defense in Depth
Each instantiation in the architecture requires a slightly modified approach to raise the Probability of Assurance
Firewall/External Gateway
SwitchportSecurity
IPSSensors
DHS caliberPhysical
Security for unmanned
assets
Honey-pots
Protocol Access
Lists
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
Autonomous Sensors/Actuators
Secure NMS
protocol
Routing Protocols
Authentication
Autonomous Protection
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
HIDS
WirelessSecurity
DistributedCyber Agentsdeveloped for
DOD
Notes:Certification and Accreditation per DOE, DOD and/or DHS Methods performed on entire systemEntire security solution developed and evaluated using security systems engineering procedures from DOE, DOD, DHS
DOD/DHSSystemHardening
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Energy Management, Cyber Security and Physical Security
An integrated solution must bring together Energy Management, Cyber Security and Physical Security
S2GCOE capabilities ensuresecure integration of:
Energy ManagementCyber SecurityPhysical Security
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Physical Security Architecture Proven by DHS
OpticalCamera
InfraredCamera
Secure Communications Link
UGS
UGS
UGS
900 MHz
OpticalCamera
InfraredCamera
900 MHz
900
MHz
MicrowaveFiber orCopper
Microwave,
Fiber or
Copper
Cyber / Physical Security Monitoring Center
HMIC2Server
RTURTU
CyberIntruder
PhysicalIntruder
SEIM
NIDSFeature Set
in Router
HASG incorporates DHS caliber physical security which was developed to protect unmanned critical assets along US borders
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Integrated Energy Management, Cyber Security and Physical Security with Defense in Depth
– Including strong Role Based Access Control (RBAC) for people and devices
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authoriz ation,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
S IEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access
Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway Physical
Security (e.g. tamper protection)
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Protocol Access Lists
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
Autonomous Sensors
Actuators
Secure NMS
protocolIDS
Sensors
Autonomous Protection
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access
Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
High Assurance Smart Grid Attributes
Secure distributed architecture enables autonomy and eliminates single point of failure
Assume compromise in the system(through malice or system failure), and engineer energy control systems accordingly
Creating a High Assurance Smart Gridrequires utilizing the best attributes from multiple disciplines
BulkPower
Trans-mission
Distri-bution
AMIHANBMSControl
Room DG
DSFRR
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Ener
gy F
low
Mesh with Distributed Intelligence
Mesh with Distributed GenerationQ: Why have a distributed control architecture?
A2: It reduces risk of the Control Room as a point of failure
EnergyMesh
Network
ControlMesh
NetworkFu
ture
Past
Pres
ent
HierarchicalPr
esen
t
Hierarchical
Grid
Con
trol
Flo
w
BulkPwr
T DBulkPwr
T D
Field Devices
CtrlRm
Substn
Substn
Substn
FFF
FFF
FFF
FField Devices
CtrlRm
Substn
Substn
Substn
FFF
FFF
FFF
F
A1: The Grid and Grid Control Architecture must match
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High Assurance Smart Grid Substation Example
In both examples, Control Room sends command to closeGrid segments are out of phase, which will cause damage if actuator closes
High Assurance Smart Grid comes only from integratingCyber Security, Physical Security, and Distributed Energy Management
In Substation 1, Actuator 1 trusts the command, activates, resulting in damage
In Substation 2, Actuator 2 receives a command to close, directly validates of local sensor status and Substation 3 status,and refuses the command
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Strong Distributed Cyber Security Enables Trusted Distributed Intelligence for Energy Control
Not just “Distributed Agents”but Distributed Intelligence
Many Agents are just “Rules-Based”
Autonomy requires Distributed Intelligence
Software Control Agents for:
Grid Management
Cyber Security
Physical Security
Smart Grid Control Node
EMI HardenedSingle Board Computer
Real Time Operating System
Control Agents
Pw
rFlo
wC
trl
Dem
and
/R
e spo
nse
I/F
FiberNIC
S2GCOEReal Time Version
Se n
sorI
nte g
r at io
n
Cy b
e rS
ecur
ity
Distributed Control Agents assure no action is taken based on a single input HASG leverages distributed cyber agents developed for DOD
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High Assurance Smart Grid ArchitectureAssume Failure and/or Compromise of Control System Components
BMS = Building Management SystemAMI = Advanced Metering InfrastructureHAN = Home Area Network
Cata-strophic
Implement Multi-Tier Model For Impact of System Failure
High
Medium Low
High Assurance Trust Model: Assume failure or compromise of Control Systems
Limit impact of failure or compromise by requiring field devices to synthesize Control Room commands and direct read of distributed sensors
1. Objectively characterize system criticality based on impact of failure (e.g. # customers impacted )
2. Control Room should not be the most critical grid system3. Field devices must rely on at least two independent inputs before taking action4. In any given day, failure or compromise of any single element should be assumed
DG = Distributed GenerationDS = Distributed StorageFRR = Frequency Responsive Reserve (Loadbanks, flywheels, etc.)
BulkPower
Trans-mission
Distri-bution
AMIHANBMSControl
Room DG
DS
FRR
Each entity in Trust Model has its own defense in depth “onion”
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved. 24 of 28
High Assurance Smart Grid AttributesIntegrated Energy Management, Cyber Security and Physical Security with Defense in Depth
– Including strong Role Based Access Control (RBAC) for people and devices
Secure distributed architecture (not hierarchical) enables autonomy and eliminates single points of failure
Assume compromise in the system(through malice or system failure), and engineer energy control systems accordingly
High Assurance Smart Grid Solutionsutilizing the best attributes from multiple disciplines
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authoriz ation,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
S IEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access
Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway Physical
Security (e.g. tamper protection)
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Protocol Access Lists
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
Autonomous Sensors
Actuators
Secure NMS
protocolIDS
Sensors
Autonomous Protection
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access
Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
BulkPower
Trans-mission
Distri-bution
AMIHANBMSControl
Room DG
DSFRR
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved. 25 of 28
The Solution – A System Design Approach
Smart Grid Cyber Security is more than just applying IT securityto grid control links – It is a total System design approach
High Assurance Architectural Requirements
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
S IEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access
Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
Firewall/External Gateway Physical
Security (e.g. tamper protection)
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Protocol Access Lists
Encryption- Data in Transit
- Data at Rest
Autonomous Sensors
Actuators
Secure NMS
protocolIDS
Sensors
Autonomous Protection
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Firewall/External Gateway
Physical Security
PKI
Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting
Encryption- Data in Transit
-Data at Rest
SIEM
HIDS
Host Firewall
Detection/Response
Layer
Data Protection
Layer
Service Protection
Layer
Boundary Protection
Layer
Honeypots
Protocol Access
Lists
Routing Protocols
Authentication
SwitchportSecurity
NIDS Sensors Secure
NMS protocol
BulkPower
Trans-mission
Distri-bution
AMIHANBMSControl
Room DG
DSFRR
Apply appropriate security to remote accessCritical patch installation needs to drive trusted agent statusData/command integrityDefense-in-depth strategies, Firewalls & IDSDelete user accounts after terminationsDon’t perform database updates on live systemsDon’t use administrative controlsto solve system anomaliesIdentify controls to critical assetsIntegrated physical securityInvestigate anomalous system behaviorRole based accessSecure remote (trusted) access channelsTrusted agentsUse secure radio transmissions
IT Lessons Learned
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved. 26 of 28
The Integrated Solution for a High Assurance Smart Grid:Energy Management, Cyber Security and Physical Security
1. Engineer energy control systems using High Assurance principles
– From utility, aviation, space and government systems
2. Distributed Intelligence
– For Cyber Security, Physical Security and Grid Management
3. Implement Role Based Access Controls
– For people and for devices
4. Deploy Cyber and Physical Security sensor solutions
– Integrated with Energy Management network systems
5. Provide Common Operational Picture (COP) capability
– Consolidated view of Energy Management, Cyber and Physical Security
High Assurance Smart Grid Solutions –An integrated approach across multiple disciplines
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved. 27 of 28
Summary:
High Assurance Smart Grid Solutions require the best possible security and reliability,
achieved by integrating Utility Applications and Control Systems
withDOD Cyber and DHS Physical Security Solutions
and with Power & Aerospace Control Systems Engineering.
Copyright © 2010 Boeing. All rights reserved. 28 of 28