1

Police departments throughout the modern world tend to share an essentially military

organizational structure and pattern of work. Among the features that are self-evident

and already inseparable from typical police work (Bittner, 1980) are a centralized

organizational structure, a hierarchical chain of command, authoritative leadership,

uniform outward appearance, top-down communication by means of orders and

directives and down-up action reporting, and internal control over rank-and-file by

commanders through strong internal discipline (Bittner, 1995; Bordua and Reiss, 1966;

Roberg and Kuykendall, 1993; Walker, 1999).

This military influence on police organization is hardly surprising. First, stemming

from a common social necessity of organized physical defense and offense in large

geographical and social spaces, these two institutions are the only ones authorized in

modern Western democracies to use physical force (including weapons) against people

in the name of the state. The military usually apply force against outside enemies, who

must be neutralized by aggressive means. The police force use it against internal ones,

civilians who sometimes are suspected of crimes or public disturbances and must

accordingly be arrested and investigated, within judicial process restraints - such as the

use of minimal reasonable force - which protect their constitutional rights (Dunlop,

1999). However, this dichotomy has not been always clear-cut: the army is sometimes

called to assist the police in internal security and public disturbance functions, and the

police sometimes assist the army in paramilitary functions (Hills, 1995). Second, the

importance of the military as a model and a source of agents, ideas, and work patterns

for bureaucratic institutions in general (see Weber, 1968), and particularly for modern

criminal justice systems (see Foucault, 1977; Rothman, 1971), is commonly recognized.

In the latter, the application of military principles and patterns to police work is as old as

its own history.1

2

This social phenomenon whereby police forces (like other hierarchically modeled

organizations) assume attributes that are characteristic of the armed forces may be

defined generally as militarization of the police. In this study, militarization refers to a

broad social phenomenon whereby a part of the population (in this case police forces)

becomes socially, organizationally, institutionally, and/or ideologically dependent on, or

controlled by the military itself or by military principles, usually without direct military

participation or initiative (see Enloe, 1980: 132). In many cases, this phenomenon is not

expressed solely by the external, superficial adoption of military organizational or

administrative principles; it is based on the internalization of an ideology of militarism,

the value and belief system providing the conceptual and ideological rationale

supporting militarization. This ideological message emphasizes military values such as

physical force, aggressiveness, order, discipline, and self-sacrifice as appropriate and

desirable for the resolution of problems, for example, police problems. It glorifies

military means such as military power, sophisticated equipment, and advanced

technology for the achievement of goals (Ben Eliezer, 1998; Haggerty and Ericson,

1999; Kraska, 1994; 1996; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997).2

The Present Study

This social and organizational phenomenon is not constant and unique in its intensity

and expressions across time and place. To be more specific, consider a theoretical

continuum of low to high degrees of militarization. Then array various polices forces,

say a cross-section or a specific department, during time along this continuum according

to their levels of militarization. These will run from situations of increased

militarization of the police (relatively greater influence of the military itself or military

3

patterns on police work) to opposite situations of demilitarization (relatively less

influence). In the context of this study, “militarization” and “demilitarization” are

proposed as organizer concepts in interpreting the historical, social, and organizational

processes that have taken place in police forces over the past century.

This study analyzes changes and trends in police forces along this militarization

continuum, focusing specifically on two entirely different policing models. First, the

highly decentralized and fragmented American police system is taken as reference here

as representing militarization trends in other modern Western nations. Developments in

the US, as the dominant political, economic, cultural, and even military power, typically

influence policies and practices in other countries; this applies to the police field also

(Haggerty and Ericson, 1999: 234). Moreover, the scope, the experience, the absolute

and relative number of different police forces and programs, and the range and depth of

pertinent research and scholarly work, clearly place the American police reality and

changes at the forefront of the policing field. Generally, recent American policing

ventures have been characterized in both rhetoric and in practice as moving away from a

paramilitary, professional model of policing to a less-military and more sophisticated

kind of professionalism. This new approach - community policing - realigns police

tasks, redefines and broadens police roles, and seeks a wider mandate to allow more

meaningful interaction with citizens (Friedmann, 1992: 159). Still, while perhaps

predominant, this trend is certainly not the only one. A simultaneous secondary trend

exists, towards an even more militarized model of policing than before, mainly for

handling serious crimes and public order disturbances. In it, the usually clear limits

between military and police forces are currently becoming constantly less distinct.

The second model, serving as the main focus of this study, is the unitary and very

militarized and centralized Israel National Police (INP). This model exemplifies an

4

attempt to shift from a highly quasi-military model, with a sharp combat-security

inclination, to a general demilitarization in the national police, suggesting an apparent

“policing revolution” in Israel. The chief purpose of this study is to describe these

demilitarization trends in the INP, with the American trends taken as the reference. They

are analyzed within the frame of social processes experienced by the societies in which

these police forces operate.

Trends in American Policing

The militaristic character of police work was less prominent prior to World War I.

During that period, police forces adopted external military work patterns without

parallel internalization of the ideological messages of militarism. This was a period in

which a significant part of police work concentrated on providing social/public services

to the local community, in the frame of broad local political control over the police

activities (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Weisenhorn, 1995: 423). However, the proximity

among police officers, citizens, and local politicians often led to local corruption and

excessive political intervention (Peak and Glensor, 1996; Walker, 1999).

Influenced by the progressive movement and by the growing American emphasis on

bureaucracy in business and industry, at the start of the 20th century the police as an

institution underwent a gradual process of professionalization. It aimed at transforming

the police into an effective and professional body free of political influences and local

corruption, hence greater militarization. These processes were reflected in the adoption

and implementation of essentially military organizational and administrative principles

and in the dissemination of the institutional ideological messages of militarism among

police officers. According to the newly defined “professional” police goals, law

5

enforcement became the exclusive and main specialization area of the police, to be

formulated in terms of the intentionally quasi-military metaphor, “war against crime”

(rather than a campaign or a struggle against it) by aggressive military means. The new

image of the police was characterized by operational and technological sophistication,

independence from external and political intervention, tight discipline according to a

clear hierarchical scale of powers, obedience to orders and directives, internal control of

police activities, and structural division into highly-specialized units (Bittner, 1995;

Fogelson, 1977; Klockars, 1985; Mawby, 1990).3

This militarization trend started coming under fire in the 1960s. It was argued that the

implementation of rigid military principles in police work, which did not result in a

significant reduction of the rates of either crime or unresolved cases (see Moore and

Kelling, 1985), was not compatible with the essentially unpredictable, civilian, and

decentralized nature of police work (Auten, 1981; Bayley, 1994; Bittner, 1995; Franz

and Jones, 1987; Fry and Berkes, 1983). There was widespread consensus that the

police could not fight crime as the army fights, alone. Also, the military model led to a

serious deterioration in the relationship between police departments and the

communities in which they worked, bringing about a severe reduction in public

willingness to report crimes as well as to help the police in solving criminal cases

(Wilson and Kelling, 1982).

This criticism of the military model led to a demand for the development of an

alternative model of policing, more effective and “civilian” rather than “military”. The

search was principally for renewed balance among police roles, recognition of the

civilian-serving aspects of police work, and the need to reintegrate police functions into

communities (Trojanowicz and Carter, 1988). The outcome was the development of the

“community policing” philosophy. By now this has become the most popular police

6

approach, currently applied in many countries as the main alternative to the military

model (see Greene, 1995; Miller and Hess, 1998; Pate, 1989; Peak and Glensor, 1996;

Trojanowicz and Harden, 1985).

Paradoxically, in parallel to this trend towards a more demilitarized and civilian

“community policing” approach, various police scholars (particularly Peter B. Kraska

and his associates) have interestingly documented an opposite, secondary trend. This is a

renewed and simultaneous process of militarization of “high-risk” police work (in

situations involving drug trading and gun possession), demanding highly skilled

specialists in use of force. This renewed militarization is primarily recognizable in the

sharp rise in the number of paramilitary police units, equipped with a variety of military

equipment and technology, and built on the model of military special combat teams.

There has been an expansion in their activities, being actually involved in classical and

traditional police work. The irony is that these units are perceived by many police

commands and officers as determining the changes toward community policing because

they simply constitute more appropriate means for accomplishing community goals and

values (Kraska, 1996; 1999; Kraska and Cubellis, 1997; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997).

The Militarization Trend in the Israeli Police

Unlike American police forces, Israel has only one, national, police force, the Israel

National Police (INP). The organizational mode of the INP is highly militaristic,

hierarchical, and centralized, with a distinct combat-security orientation (Brewer et al.,

1996; Gamson and Yuchtman, 1977). This is expressed in its highly centralized

command hierarchy, sharp division of authority and responsibility, clear definition of

the organizational position of each police rank and/or level, strictly authoritative

7

leadership, written regulations, orders, and norms of behavior, rigid discipline, close

internal control over police officer action, manifest distance between commander and

rank-and-file level, and many military symbols and ceremonies. The organizational

pyramid is headed by the Inspector-General of Police who, like the Chief-of-Staff of the

Israel Defense Forces (IDF), is directly nominated by, and subordinate to a

governmental authority (in the police case, the Ministry of Internal Security). Unlikely

the situation in the US, the INP budget is provided by this ministry as part of the

national budget; none of it is from municipal or other taxes. The Inspector-General has

no political affiliations and is usually a veteran police officer. The chain of command is

very strict, allowing for close scrutiny of all levels of the INP organization by the central

command level. The INP is geographically organized into districts and sub-districts, the

latter consisting of the local police stations and sub-stations providing police services to

the public. The centralized organization of the INP is facilitated by the small size of the

country and its population. In 1999 the INP had 25,700 serving police officers, the great

majority (about 90%) Jewish, with women constituting about 20% of the overall police

workforce (Haberfeld and Herzog, 2000).

As in every police force, the INP’s police functions include crime prevention,

maintenance of law and order, apprehension of suspected offenders, and traffic law

enforcement and control. However, in 1974, following a government decision,

responsibility for “internal security” (i.e., providing proactive and reactive functions to

fight terrorism within the borders of the country) was transferred from the IDF to the

INP. Organizationally, this new assignment to the INP served to reinforce the quasi-

military model of police organization in order to allow efficient deployment of police

forces and speedy response to terrorist attacks and serious disturbances of public order.

This renewed process of police militarization was expressed in a number of ways. The

8

first was the creation of a national network of special paramilitary police units such as

anti-terrorist units, special patrol units, and the incorporation and reinforcement of the

already existing Border Police into the INP.4 The second was the quest for fresh

recruitment reservoirs to find candidates suited to the reinforced combat-security role.

This resulted in massive recruitment into the INP of young men demobilized from crack

army units, in peak physical condition, experienced in small-team military operations,

highly disciplined, and trained in the use of physical force (Gilboa, 1998: 23-24).

Militarization of the INP has led to the dissemination and adoption of militaristic

views among police officers. Still today the combat dimension predominates over the

civilian-service dimension in INP formal training and informal organizational

subculture. On the one hand, the Police Academy trains police officers mainly for self-

defense, crowd dispersal, weapons firing, climbing obstacles, moving around urban

environments, subduing suspects, and using weapons (Hakimi, 1996). On the other

hand, Israeli police officers tend to define policing issues such as crime or public

disturbances in terms of “war,” thereby justifying forceful measures. The prevailing

police subculture boasts a strong esprit de corps (as in the army) which serves to

perpetuate alienation and separation from the public. An “us against them” stand

prevails regarding anyone who “isn’t a cop,” particularly minorities (Palestinian and

Israeli Arabs) or groups identified as “typical criminal offenders” (see Gimshi, 1999;

Haberfeld and Herzog, 2000; Herzog, 1998; Kremnitzer Committee, 1994; Ministry of

Police Comptroller, 1993). This perspective of the offender as an enemy, who only

understands the language of force, tends to induce “pre-violence behavior,” namely

exaggerated suspicion, rude and inconsiderate conduct, resort to unreasonable and

9

unnecessary measures, unwillingness to explain or to listen, and acceptance of violence

for its own sake (Kremnitzer Committee, 1994: 13).

Sources of Militarization in the INP

Several important sources have effected the militarization and militarist ideology of

the INP. America has traditionally been perceived as a very important source for

learning and even for imitation with regard to social and cultural issues, including

policing (see Bensinger, 1998). However, the most important influences are local and

specific to the INP, among them the British Mandatory Police, the IDF, and Israeli

society in general.

The birth of the INP in 1948 was attended by severe wartime conditions (the War of

Independence). This resulted in police affairs being placed very low on the list of

priorities of Israel’s first government, in contrast to the army, the labor shortage (able-

bodied youth were sent to fight the war), and the very limited budget. In this difficult

situation the new police administration chose to adopt the existing military police model

of the British Mandatory Police, operating under the British Mandate for Palestine

between 1922 and 1948, for its primary organizational, administrative, and operational

structure. Apart from being the most convenient model to adopt at that time, the choice

was also based on the knowledge that British rule had introduced advanced police-work

patterns and a professional approach in several areas, including police administration,

discipline, and organization (Hod, 1996: 137). The new INP adopted from the British

police its legal basis, conventional policing techniques and tools (uniforms, rank

structure, orders, training systems, discipline norms, organizational outlook, buildings,

and even their military-style ceremonies), and in particular its centralized administration

and structure. It should be noted that as a colonial police force, the main role of the

11

Mandatory police was to assist the British government to rule the colony, with its

Jewish and Arab residents, by means of a paramilitary centralized force. Its main

occupation was combat-security-oriented treatment of serious mass disturbances, riots,

and terrorism (Gimshi, 1999; 23-26; Shadmi, 1998: 220).

The second local source for the militarization of the INP was the IDF. Since Israel’s

establishment, the external threat from its neighboring countries to its existence as an

independent state has been the most dominant motif of Israeli life. Throughout the years,

the IDF has been perceived as one of the foremost institutions in people’s lives and in

the history of the state, and a pivotal symbol and carrier of Israeli collective goals and

values (Azarya, 1983: 120; Kimmerling, 1993; Lissak, 1994). In contrast to the situation

in many Western societies, in which the military is ascribed distancing and dividing

characteristics (see Dunlop, 1999: 218), in Israeli society the army is ascribed

approximating and connecting characteristics, conveying a feeling of belonging and

dominance. This is due mainly to universal conscription and large-scale active reserve

duty, which bring a large part of the population into close contact with the military.

Because of its heavy demands on a significant part of the lives of its citizens, the

aphorism that “an Israeli citizen is a soldier on eleven months’ annual leave” is not so

far-fetched (Brewer et al., 1996: 130; Landau, 1998).

The influence of the IDF on the militarization of the INP is seen at various levels.

First, the military model has always served as a model for the police administration,

especially during its early years when its senior posts were filled by high-ranking army

officers with little or no police experience (Hod, 1996: 266). Second, because of the

tendency to perceive the INP as a paramilitary force, and even as the “junior step-

brother of the IDF”, it is frequently called upon to perform combat and security

functions, in respect of acts against both the state and Jews (closely analogous to what

11

the Mandatory British Police had previously done in respect of acts against the British).5

Third, most police officers enter the force after their three years of compulsory military

service, often after active participation in combat or paramilitary or security operations.

In both the regular and reserve army, they have undergone military socialization, which

transformed them from citizens into warriors ready to fight enemies. In view of the

military characteristics of the INP, its security orientation, and the military experience of

its police officers, police work is often perceived by them as a “natural” extension of

their military service, in which the internalized ideology of militarism is translated into

police reality (Gimshi, 1999: 218).6

Beyond these influences, Israeli society itself can be seen as a fundamental source of

militarization. Israeli society is highly democratic, but at the same time it is

characterized by a high degree of centralization and militarization. Despite the extreme

social, demographic, and economic changes that Israeli society has experience in its

short history, its most potent source of stress has remained the constant security threat

(Landau, 1998; Lissak, 1994). Israel’s establishment under conditions of armed conflict,

and its subsequent involvement in five major wars, numerous retaliatory and deterrent

operations, and countless acts of hostility and terrorism, both inside and outside its

borders, has made it a society inclined to militarism, easily mobilized and recruited into

military action as the need arises. Kimmerling (1984: 13) and Ben-Eliezer (1998: x)

argue that in the course of Israel’s history, military principles and practices have

gradually become institutionalized and a routine part of everyday life. The point has

been reached where militaristic and aggressive solutions to national problems of the

state have come to be perceived not only as valuable in themselves but as legitimate and

desirable, hence the best option. According to Kimmerling (1993), militarism is one of

12

the main principles governing the way Israeli society determines its ground rules, its

identity, and its borders.

This situation of constant warfare touches on the lives not only of citizens serving in

the security forces (including the INP); the intensification of Islamic terror against

civilian targets contributes to a general sense of insecurity in society as a whole. The

need to take precautionary steps and maintain a high level of alert serves as a constant

reminder that the potential threat to life menaces everyone, everywhere. Unfortunately,

this reality also leads to a security-linked “us-against-them” view of minority groups,

among them Palestinian and Israeli Arab populations, defined stereotypically as part of a

hostile national group, or as the “enemy” or “security threats.”

The Demilitarization Trend of the INP

Although the militarist character and the dominance of the combat aspect of the INP

have persevered for over fifty years, the pattern and the intensity of these features have

not remained constant; they have changed in response to changes in the situation of the

country and society. In general, and similarly to the American police forces during the

first half of the 20th

century, this ongoing process has been directed toward the

professionalization of police work, that is, the improvement of the police efficiency and

effectiveness. This process of change, expressed mainly in organizational reforms, has

transformed the INP from a small, somewhat amateur and ill-equipped force into a

highly professional and technologically sophisticated large-scale organization (Hod,

1996; Shadmi, 1998).

On the declarative level, most of the reforms were initiated to achieve more efficient

treatment of new external security threats and internal public disturbances and riots.

13

They were also meant to respond to growing concern in the police administration about

public (and even political) criticism of a general lack of police effectiveness in adapting

to the changing conditions of Israeli society, particularly of problems linked to poor

police performance (Brewer et al., 1996: 136; Hovav and Amir, 1979). These

considerations resulted in organizational reforms in major police areas (such as patrols,

investigation, recruitment, training, planning, deployment) and measures to increase

professionalization and specialization in specific areas (such as juvenile delinquency,

intelligence and detective work, and the development of technological resources).

However, most of the reforms served to reinforce work principles and patterns that were

essentially military, and deemed to provide solutions to these problems; accordingly

they increased militarization of the police (Shadmi, 1998).

In more recent years a new process of comprehensive change has been initiated

involving redefinition of police roles and functions and the development of the most

appropriate organizational model for their achievement. Compared with previous

attempts at reform, this phase in the development of the INP seems to be revolutionary

in character and orientation. To cite Gimshi, a high-ranking police officer and scholar,

... it is possible to state that for the first time in the INP’s history, a strategic

plan that expresses a deep change in the organizational culture of the police, a

change in the perception of the police role, a change in the work patterns with

the public, and a change in the administrative approach and organizational

structure of the police, is being implemented. (1999: 29).

For the first time in the historical development of the INP, the organizational,

administrative, and functional changes being introduced are aimed at moving it away

from its military character and orientation, into more significantly civilian ones;

accordingly, it is a process of demilitarization. This process is expressed operationally in

various specific changes, being part of a deliberate strategic planning by the police

administration. In the following we identify and illustrate the main aspects of this

14

process: the adoption of a community policing perspective; the increased focus on the

reduction of crime; the organizational and administrative decentralization of the police;

and decisions related to the composition of police workforce.

From State Needs to Community Needs

On the declarative level, the INP has always been defined as a service-oriented police

force (Gimshi, 1999: 29). However, Israel as a society in the making, created basically

as national homeland for Jews from around the world, under a permanent security threat,

constitutes a classic example of national interests playing a decisive role in the policies

and the organizational and administrative construction of its institutions, among them its

national police (Hod, 1996; Shadmi, 1998). Since its establishment, the INP has seen

itself as an active partner in the effort to achieve such national goals. This stems from

the statist conception that the state and the community are essentially identical entities,

so service to the young nation and its goals is perceived as service to the community.

However, due to its limited resources, the INP has constantly been forced to

compromise and massively invest human and material resources in military-security

statist goals such as the maintenance of internal security and public order, at the expense

of the goals and needs of the communities. For instance, local police officers, who

supply the greater part of classic policing services to the public, often find themselves

deployed elsewhere in the country to deal with urgent security needs. Such

circumstances have inadvertently weakened the local stations, impairing the service

given to the citizens (Shadmi, 1998).7

Influenced by rising crime rates after Yom Kippur War in 1973, a number of formal

steps were taken during the 1970s and 1980s to reinforce public cooperation with the

15

INP (for example, encouragement of public volunteering for the Civil Guard), thereby to

compensate for its statist orientation. However, although such developments did lead to

more “positive” contact between the police and the public, they were mainly confined to

public-relations efforts (Gimshi, 1999). Especially during the early 1990s, following the

well-documented introduction of community policing in the US, the INP embarked on a

series of experimental programs emphasizing service and problem-solving strategies

(Weisburd et al., 1997). This was largely due to the perceived loss of contact with the

population, loss of the police force’s intelligence base in it, and loss of respect by the

community for the police (Friedmann, 1992: 132). However, the radical change

happened in 1994, when the Inspector-General decided to abandon the traditional

military-cum-statist approach and adopt a community policing strategy which would

focus on the interests and expectations of the community through partnership with local

government and community representatives and organizations. The Unit for Community

Policing was established with the general aim of training police officers and civilians,

encouraging programs focused on a problem-solving approach, and developing an

organizational police culture oriented to public service. According to this plan, by about

2003 the struggle against crime and the maintenance of public order will have become

part of social processes defined on the local community level, with the police acting as

an important partner.8

From Security Focus to Crime Focus

Militarization of American policing is usually associated with proclamations of all-out

war against crime; in Israel, militarization was mainly influenced by the necessity for

effective police deployment to deal with permanent problems of internal security and

public order. As already noted, these problems have constantly taken priority over other

16

areas, including social problems such as crime, traditionally seen as pertaining to the

micro-social level and therefore less important (Gamson and Yuchtman, 1977: 202-203;

Hod, 1996; INP, 1956). This extraordinarily heavy burden took its toll on effective and

efficient policing in the area of traditional police functions: many resources were

allocated to building up effective professional units whose mission was to prevent

terrorism and minimize risks and hazards for public order. Note that the traditionally

low priority assigned to crime problems was not only based on ideological

considerations. Due to the security situation, much of the social stress linked to crime in

the western world was not seen as a major problem in Israel, either on the national or on

the police level, at least not until the 1970s (Rahav, 1998; Shadmi, 1998). Moreover, in

the early years of the state, a great part of the population, both Jewish and Arab, was

organized in local communities, especially in rural areas. Events related to crime were

treated informally within these communities, if possible without an approach to the

police (Weisburd et al., 1997: 114-115).

This situation began to change during the 1970s, when mainly after the social crisis

experienced in the wake of the Yom Kippur War (1973) sharp increases in crime rates

resulted in a demand by the public and the media for more measures to be taken to

reduce crime rates. The Shimron Committee, set up in 1978 to examine the crime

problem in Israel, strongly recommended that the crime control role of the INP be

reemphasized. However, during the same period the country experienced marked

deterioration in the internal security situation, and in consequence the government

decided to transfer overall responsibility for internal security to the INP. Despite the

Committee’s recommendations, the security aspect of police activity prevailed, again at

the expense of the struggle against crime (Shadmi, 1998: 228).

17

Recently the external security threat has diminished, but in consequence social

conflicts among the different groups composing Israeli society have intensified. One

major effect is increased crime rates (see Rahav, 1998), generating a sense of

helplessness among law-enforcement officials, and still more among citizens, who

perceive police treatment of crime problems as inefficient. In light of this situation, the

police administration took another unprecedented decision. Although the INP

maintained its dual function (security and crime), a more appropriate balance between

the two functions was sought, with the “classical” roles of the police, especially the

struggle against crime, taking priority. This decision is currently reflected in the

significant increase in the number of police officers especially recruited for this goal on

the sub-district and station level, the establishment of special units for the treatment of

crime hot-spots, and increased attention to crime problems in training and supervision

(Vilk, 1999). The decision to assign top priority to crime represents an almost

revolutionary decision for the INP. For the first time in its history, crime events, which

includes far more adversarial police contact with Jews than was true in the early days,

are not perceived as secondary to national police goals but as a threat to the personal

safety and quality of life of citizens and the community on the micro level.

From Centralization to Decentralization

As already mentioned, one of the main characteristics of the INP is its high degree of

organizational and administrative centralization, with the Inspector-General at the top of

the pyramid, directly subordinate to the national government. The function of the

minister responsible for the police is to determine general policy guidelines, especially

with regard to important national issues. This policy is implemented in a vertical top-

18

down military fashion, from the national headquarters downwards, via the district and

sub-district level, to the level of the police stations located around the country.

In recent years, attempts have been made to redesign the organizational and

administrative structure of the INP with the aim of achieving a higher degree of

decentralization and flatness. Organizationally, this change is reflected in the gradual

reinforcement and transfer of financial and human resources on two levels: first, from

the headquarters level to field police stations, in an attempt to flatten out the

organizational structure and do away with the middle management (sub-district ) level;

and second, from central downtown police stations to “mini-stations” (or community

policing centers, usually one-man police centers but sometimes a mobile or temporary

center) set up in a specific area, such as in commercial, entertainment, and tourist

centers, and outlying neighborhoods, to deal with their specific problems. In this way, it

was hoped to achieve greater economy of police resources, to eliminate unnecessary

bureaucracy, and to improve communication between the police administration and the

police stations (see Bayley, 1994; Kelling and Moore, 1988).

Administratively, this change is expressed by the recent adoption (in 1998) of the

“Policing by Objectives” approach which facilitates the determination of most local

police goals (eight out of ten) at the police-station level in cooperation with local

government representatives and community organizations. These local police objectives,

usually defined once a year, should serve as an operational “translation” of the main

problems affecting the quality of life of residents. The aim of this administrative change

is to bring residents and police officers into a true partnership in determining the main

goals and their implementation. This change significantly affects the roles and

responsibilities of local authorities with regard to issues such as the struggle against

crime and crime prevention. Unlike the American model, mayors (and other local

19

community bodies) have never had any formal or legal authority to influence local

police action. As yet, the process of implementing a preventive strategy to achieve those

objectives is not attained by a truly “partnership approach”, as is expected by the

community policing paradigm. However, many multi-agency models of tackling crime

and in-civilities, traditionally not considered a part of the policing work of the stations,

are already being integrated in it.

From a Combat Ethos to a Civilian Ethos

In its early years, due to severe workforce shortages, the INP actually failed to recruit

police officers with the ideal characteristics prescribed by the military image of the

police officer modeled on the “soldier”. This was mainly on account of the higher

prestige ascribed to service in the IDF, the low salary offered by the INP, and the

distasteful connotation of police work following bitter experiences at the hands of the

Mandatory British Police. Except for the higher ranks, this led to recruitment mainly

from the lowest socioeconomic groups and immigrants, many of whom saw police

training as an aid to absorption into Israeli society (Brewer et al., 1996: 135).

This situation gradually changed following implementation of several police reforms

aimed at transforming the image of the INP into an organized and professional body

offering appropriate remuneration and incentives. The multi-level recruitment system in

the 1970s and other such schemes were developed to recruit college graduates and

professionals, in many cases directly to high ranks and administrative positions. As a

result, the working salary and the working conditions of the police have generally

improved since then, exceeding the average in the Israeli public sector workforce. Still,

at the same time the transfer of internal security functions to the INP served to reinforce

21

militarization. Consequently, as noted above, younger men compatible with the military

perception of police work were recruited, with ex-army officers often recruited straight

into high police positions (Shadmi, 1998: 226-227).

More recently, the effort to recruit higher quality candidates has led to a move away

from the police officer stereotype based on the military/combat model and an attempt to

recruit a workforce with values and attitudes more compatible with the role of a modern

police officer such as cultural tolerance, sensitivity, restraint, and a service orientation.

For example, in addition to a battery of personal interviews and psychometric tests

aimed to find these traits, all candidates must have matriculated high school after 12

years of schooling.

The trend of change in the workforce domain has been mainly expressed on two

levels: the recruitment of more women and a gradual process of civilianization of police

positions. The latter means the replacement of police officers by civilians for posts not

directly related to typical police work, or the hiring of services (e.g., catering, vehicle

repair, computers, maintenance) on the private market (see Schwartz et al., 1975). Note

however that although civilianization appears to be in line with demilitarization, its

implementation in Israel stemmed mainly from budgetary and organizational

considerations: savings on the management level leading to wider deployment of police

officers on the station level.

Women have always played a role in the INP. However, their recruitment to the INP

was not based on gender considerations but on the lack of suitable male candidates

(Hod, 1998). In the early years of the INP, women were recruited for “female” roles

(such as clerical work and guarding female prisoners) and, during the 1960s, patrol and

traffic functions. During the 1970s, following the recruitment of more skilled personnel,

women’s recruitment was intensified, some women even reaching command and senior

21

administration positions. Currently, almost every function is open to women (including

combat roles in the Border Police and special patrol units) and there are women in the

senior ranks of the INP. Nevertheless, women still lag behind men in number, rank, and

job opportunities (Hod, 1998). Similar to the situation in US during the 1960s and

1970s, in Israel, following submission of a petition to the Supreme Court against the

INP, the police administration found itself having to devote thought to the issue of

women’s recruitment. The report of an internal commission determined that the police

should increase the number of women serving in the INP with the aim of women

comprising one-quarter of its workforce within ten years.

Social Sources of Demilitarization Policing Trends

Militarization and the present demilitarization trends do not arise in a vacuum: police

forces are a direct reflection of the priorities, divisions, and social and economic

conditions of the societies in which they exist. Therefore, police innovations such as

organizational and functional changes on the militarization continuum should be viewed

from a broader perspective, that is, as an attempt by police forces to adapt to the

changing needs and character of the societies in which they work and from which police

officers come. The question that arises is how demilitarization helps police forces to

adapt to the changing social conditions around them.

According to Skogan (1995), community policing in US has been the result of parallel

changes in the American society that support its development and dissemination (see

also Peak and Glensor, 1996). The most important structural factor is politics: coalitions

of groups, mainly minorities, which frequently have had hostile relations with the

police, are a potent political force in many American cities. Hence, political leaders

22

have an interest in curbing police abuse, and in promoting a style of policing that serves

their constituents. Next is shifts in societal organization, including a general trend

toward decentralization of large-scale organizations into smaller, more flexible and

responsive units, coupled with an increased reliance on market-like mechanisms to

secure a customer orientation. Third is new levels of concern about police effectiveness,

due to rising crime rates within hard fiscal and financial constraints, which prevent

resolution of the problem by the hiring of more police officers in the traditional way.

And fourth is the emergence of relatively well-educated and sophisticated police

administrators, who, armed with university degrees, are both much more aware of the

limitations of traditional policing and more receptive to the social shift toward

liberalization and customer orientation among public organizations (Skogan, 1995: 90-

93).

Unlikely the situation in the US, Israel matches the model of in-house initiated change

toward demilitarization in its national force, not precipitated by formal external

pressures, public outcries, blue-ribbon commissions, or a political agenda (Friedmann,

1992: 176). Nevertheless, and despite the great differences between the two societies,

social and cultural factors similar to those in the US may be said to underpin the

demilitarization trend of the Israel Police. According to Israeli sociologists (Almog,

1995; Levy, 1997; Peri, 1996), Israeli society itself has been undergoing a

comprehensive process of demilitarization. This process has led to the gradual

development of an Israeli “civil society”, that is, differentiation and separation between

the state and a part of society, comprising a complex of autonomous institutions -

economic, religious, intellectual and political, which is acquiring a life of its own,

largely autonomous from the state. This part engages in individual and collective

activities no longer guided primarily by the rules of primordial collectivities and

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directed by the state (Shils, 1991). This development is based mostly on values such as

democratization, pluralism, decentralization of power and influence, and liberalism

(Amir, 1997). These dimensions on the macro-level of Israeli society are described

briefly in the following.

The political level: The public at large, as well as many of the politicians representing

them, no longer see aggressive military means as a legitimate way of solving political

problems. Israel has finally succeeded in achieving two peace agreements with former

enemies, Egypt and Jordan, an agreement expressing a historical compromise with the

Palestinians in the territories occupied in the 1967 Six Day War, and negotiation tracks

with a great part of the Arab world. With the easing of the existential security threat

over Israel, local and internal issues have become more salient. They are expressed in

both the actual worsening of internal conflicts between groups within the Israeli society,

and in the recent discourses of the different political parties and their representation in

the Knesset (parliament) during last general elections. Accordingly, local authorities and

leaders are demanding the cooperation of local police on local issues. This situation has

led to the political decentralization of power, resources, and services from the national

to the local level (Gimshi, 1999).

The social level: Israel was created as an autonomous homeland for Jews, who

migrated to it from all over the world. In the early years, it may said that it was

populated generally by two groups: Jews, who saw themselves as one people united

against external threats; and Palestinians and other Arabs, who were perceived by the

Jewish majority as part of the external threat. Over time, with the diminution of

existential threat, the divisions among Jews (secular vs. orthodox; European vs. Asian-

African; native-born vs. new immigrants; left-wing vs. right -wing) have become

24

apparent and have been reflected in increases in social conflicts and consequently in

crime rates and instances of violent public disorder.

The economic level: With higher standards of living and an accumulation of

economic resources in the middle classes over the past two decades, materialistic and

consumerist values have become very salient. As a result, “civil” economic values, such

as individualism, competition, privatization, and criticism, have gradually replaced

economic centralization and institutional collectivism. Consequently, a market economy

composed of autonomous private associations, institutions, and business firms, which

according to Shils (1991) constitute the appropriate pattern of the economic life of a

civil society, began to flourish in Israel. This change, like the above-mentioned situation

in the US, is also reflected in the public sector (including the police), in a “service

revolution”, emphasizing consumer needs and the implementation of advanced

management approaches (Shalev and Yehezkeally, 1997).

The institutional level: The IDF has gradually become less dominant in Israeli

society. In recent years, it has been reduced in size (relative to the size of the population)

and it receives a smaller portion of the national budget. The extent of its autonomy has

also been curtailed, and concomitantly civilian bodies have gained in strength as

reflected in increased control and supervision by the State Comptroller, the judicial

system, the media, soldiers’ parent groups, etc. Even the image of the army has become

increasing dominance of materialistic values has brought about a change in the eroded:

motivation of youth to serve in the army.

The cultural level: The strengthening of the anti-militaristic wing in Israeli society is

extremely evident on the cultural level. The army now finds itself constantly criticized

by the media and the arts (books, movies, the theater). Issues such as the inappropriate

behavior of soldiers, maltreatment of subordinates by commanders, and even cover-up

25

of operational accidents, previously taboo, have become the topics of public debate in

the media. The questioned “no-choice” war in Lebanon (1982-1985) and the moral

shake-up of the IDF during the Intifada due to its “police” functions created a crisis in

the relationship between the army and civilian society.

Renewed militarization in American police forces

Like the demilitarization trend, this recent secondary trend of militarization of police

in general, and in respect of crime and drug problems in particular, seems not to be

accidental in the US. Kraska (1999) finds its social reasons in the ending of the Cold

War threat, with the consequent loss of the communist enemy, and a situation of severe

economic recession, where the leading industrial nations (mainly the military-industrial

complex) have no external enemies to mobilize against. In these circumstances it is

reasonable to assume that the war against internal enemies, dangerous offenders, rioters,

and drug dealers, obtains higher priority (Christie, 1994: 13-14; see also Nadelman,

1993: 475; Sherry, 1995: 431). The international dimensions of crime, particularly drug

trading, is formally recognized in the US, and there is awareness of the routine burden

on local police forces and of the efficiency and renewed popularity of the military.

Accordingly, the US Congress has legislated some laws and regulations permitting the

use of military resources, equipment, and expertise in support of American civilian

police forces and other foreign military forces (such as in Latin America), mainly for the

war on drugs (Dunlop, 1999: 219; Haggerty and Ericson, 1999; Zirnite, 1998). This

macro-level situation has caused a dual development. On the one hand, there is

increasing involvement of the military in domestic security and law enforcement, such

as the war on drugs and illegal immigration, namely police-ization of the military

(Dunlop, 1999; Dunn, 1996; 1999; Kraska, 1993). On the other, there is the rise and

26

enlargement of paramilitary units in police forces, namely the aforementioned renewed

process of militarization in the police. These two trends have led to a gradual blurring of

the traditional limits of the functions between external (the military) and internal (the

police) security forces. The consequence is the subtle targeting of certain civilian

populations as internal “security” threats, which can be located and handled by military

methods of information gathering and processing, operations, and technology (on this

last aspect see Haggerty and Ericson, 1999). In this new situation, both sides benefit: the

military broadens its mandate from external to internal problems; the police force gets

advanced technology, budgets, and training from the military, hence it is perceived by

the public as more effective and legitimate, and ultimately more professional (Kraska,

1999: 213).

Conclusions

That both the American and Israeli police forces are currently undergoing a process of

attempted demilitarization is quite evident. This trend, which is supported by their

police administrations and many social scientists, seems to constitute a natural

development, based on broad social processes in both societies, towards

decentralization, liberalization, improved relationships with the public, and customer

orientation. However, these factors do not assure the successful institutionalization of

the change or its persistence in the long term. At the beginning of the 21st century it is

still too early to assess its impact. As in the American situation (Greene and Mastrofski,

1991; Hunter and Barker, 1993; Rosenbaum, 1994; Walker, 1999), many programs of

community policing in Israel may still be perceived as traditional anti-crime, anti-drug

efforts. In some police stations and regions there is little more than rhetoric, while

demilitarization efforts are still applied as a way of appearing to be progressive and

innovative without actual abandonment of traditional militarized policing. A major

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obstacle to real change common to both countries seems to be the police organizational

culture. Police officers on every police level are habituated to act and to think according

to militaristic principles and find it difficult to adopt “civilian” thought and work

patterns. These factors may lead them to oppose and even to sabotage the process

(Landstrom and Savage, 1992; Peak and Glensor, 1996; Shalev and Yehezkeally, 1997;

Skolnick and Bayley, 1986). Willingness to change is therefore a fundamental

requirement for demilitarization implementation: police agencies must modify their

organizational culture.

Some additional obstacles seem to be more particular to Israel. For example, there is a

lack of local cooperative tendencies (unlikely national ones) in Israeli society that could

facilitate active participation in community policing. Apart from religious Jewish

communities, some Arab communities, cooperative and collectivist villages, and even

ideological settlements in the territories, there is very little sense of community in Israel

(Gimshi, 1999; Weisburd et al., 1997: 117-118).9 This obviously raises the question of

how may the Israeli high police command establish community policing if one cannot

clearly identify communities there. An answer is given by Bensinger (1998): community

policing (like organizational and administrative decentralization, and civilianization of

police positions) is just “another” artificial application of “American solutions to

American problems” in Israel, akin to others applied in Israeli society in general, and in

its criminal system in particular.

Moreover, Israeli media coverage of eventual “municipal police forces” has already

created a fear of political involvement and use of the police by local politicians

(Yehezkeally and Shalev, 1996: 36). An additional particular obstacle to Israel is the

fact that despite the aforementioned organizational changes, the INP continues to work

as national police, subordinated to central government and acting according to broad

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national, rather than local considerations. Police policy is still determined by the

Ministry of Internal Security and operationalization is still the responsibility of the

Inspector-General (Gilboa, 1998; Shadmi, 1998). As a result, the military character of

the police is likely to prevail as long as severe problems of internal security and public

order exist. In conclusiףn, continued monitoring will be required to assess

demilitarization trends in both countries on the operational level.

If these developments towards demilitarization in the police rest on broad social

changes, what may be said about the secondary trend of renewed militarization in the

US? Compared with the earlier trend, this change seems to be more worrying. Kraska

(1999: 213) raises some possible consequences: does it actually reflect a trend towards a

new form of totalitarianism? Or is it perhaps an advance towards new forms of

technological and intelligence surveillance, especially of targeted “internal threats”?

What is more clear is that the blurring of limits between the military and the police force

has always been disadvantageous for the public whom the latter is supposed to serve. As

Dunlop (1999:227) concluded, “A military organization adept at destroying targets and

undermining enemy command and control structures is not necessarily the best

organization to do such work in a democracy”.