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“Hegel’sPhilosophyofAction”ForthcominginTheOxfordHandbookofHegel,ed.DeanMoyar(OxfordUniversityPress)Thisisthepenultimateversion.Pleasecitethefinalversion.ChristopherYeomansPurdueUniversitycyeomans@purdue.eduThereareanumberofquestions,theanswerstowhichdefinespecifictheoreticalapproachestoHegel’sphilosophyofaction.Tobeginwith,doesHegelattempttogiveatheoryoffreewillthatrespondstothenaturalisticskepticismsoprevalentinthehistoryofmodernphilosophy?Thoughsomescholarsholdthatheisinterestedinprovidingsuchatheory,perhapsthemajorityviewisthatHegelinsteadsocializeshisconceptionofthewillsuchthatthetraditionalnaturalisticworriesarenolongergermane.1Asecondquestionis:doesHegelhaveatheoryofactionassuchthatcompeteswiththosefoundinthehistoryofmodernphilosophyandmoreparticularlyintheAnglophoneliteraturefromthemid-20thcenturyonwards?ThoughperhapsthemajorityviewisthatHegeldoeshavesuchatheoryofaction,itiscommonlyheldtobeindependentofanycommitmentstoaconceptionoffreewill,andtotakeaformradicallydifferentfromtheotherofferingsintheliteratureinvirtueofintroducingandessentiallyretrospectiveratherthanprospectiverelationbetweentheagentandheraction.2Ontheonehand,themajorityviewemphasizesfeaturesofHegel’stheoryofactionthatmustbeessentialpartsofacompletepresentationofit:thesocialaspect,whichmakestherecognitionofactionbyothersanessentialfeatureofactionitself;Hegel’sdistinctiveformulationoffreedomas“beingathomewithoneselfintheother”;andhisdenialthatthecategoryofcausationcanplumbthedepthsofintentionalactivity.Ontheotherhand,Hegelthinksthatthereareobjectivestructuresofrecognition,andthesereintroducemanyofthethemesofthetraditionalfreewilldebate;histechnicalformulationsoftheproblemactuallyproduceapluralityofmodelsofagencythathaveyettobeacknowledgedintheliterature;andamongthosemodelsareversionsofboththebelief-desireandteleologicalaccountsthatdominatethecontemporaryliterature.I.TheUnavoidableProblemoftheExplicabilityofFreeActionTotakeupthisfirstpointhere–theexistenceofobjectivestructuresofrecognition–istoaskwhatcategoriesseemtobeessentialforourattributionofactionstofreeagents.Wecansetoutsomeofthesebyattendingtothetermsinwhichonescholar,AlanPatten,arguesforthelegitimacyofseeingHegel’ssocial(ratherthannaturalistic)conceptionoffreedomasabonafideconceptionoffreewill.AsPattenargues,Hegel’sfreedomisopposedtoauthority,ratherthantraditionalfreewill,whichisopposedtodesiresplacedintheagentbyherhistoryorbiology:

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TwoparallelfeaturesofthecasessuggestthatHegel’sargumentshouldbetakenseriously.First,ineachcase,theagentallowsthedeterminationofsomeexternalagencyormechanismtobeasufficientreasonorjustificationforhisaction.Inthefirstcase,theagentpassivelyallowstheinstructionoftheauthoritytostandasajustificationofhisfinaldecisiontoact;inthesecondcase,hepassivelyallowsthesocialandnaturalprocessesthatdeterminewhatdesiresheexperiencestocountasasufficientguidetowhatheshoulddo.Secondly,inbothcases,theagentcouldsubjecttheproblemofwhattodotohisownthoughtandreason.3

Hereactionthatwedonotrecognizeasfullyattributabletotheagentisunderstoodintermsofthewayinwhichitallowsamechanisticcausewithrespecttowhichtheagentispassivetoserveasanexternalexplanationforaction.Bycontrast,freeactionthatisrecognizedassoattributableisexplicitlyunderstoodasinvolvingalternatepossibilities(theagentcouldhaveusedreason,butdidnot),andimplicitlyasinvolvinganinternalexplanationinwhichtheagentisactivewithrespecttoherowngoals.Thekeythen,istoprovideanexplanationofhowwecouldproduceactionsinthissecondway,andthatislargelyaconceptualproblemratherthaneitherascientific/naturalisticorsocialproblem.WecometothesamepointbythinkingthroughtheseconddominantaspectofcontemporarypresentationsofHegel’stheoryofagency,namelytheiremphasisoftheretrospectiveidentificationoftheintentionoftheagentsubsequenttotheaction.Thebasisofsuchidentificationcannotberestrictedtotheagent’srationalendorsement,sinceIcanendorsemanythingsthatIdonotdo,suchasothers’actionsorinvoluntarybehaviorsofmyownsuchasdigestion.Rather,thatretrospectiveendorsementmustgohandinhandwithsomeproductiverelationbetweentheagentandheraction,andthatputspressureonthecategorieswehaveforsuchrelations(i.e.,theitalicizednotionsabove).4InHegel,thosecategoriesarelargelydiscussedinhisScienceofLogic.HereIwanttopickuponjustoneformofthisdiscussion,namelythediscussionofthemodalities(actuality,necessityandpossibility).Ausualwayofthinkingaboutalternatepossibilitiesisintermsoffreechoice(i.e.,‘Willkür’inGerman).Onthisconception,thereisarangeofopportunitiesthattheworldmakespossiblequiteindependentoftheagent’sactivity,andthatactivityislimitedtopickingfromamongthegivenpossibilities.Onthisconceptionthereareavarietyofdifferentfuturepathsextendingfrompastconditions,andtheagentchoosestowalkoneratherthantheothers.Hegelthinksthatsuchanotionhasalimited(thoughnotunimportant)sphereofapplication,andasametaphysicalcategoryhecallsthis“realmodality.”Thedeeperconception(“absolutemodality”)isoneinwhichtheverycontinuumofpossibilitiesisestablishedbytheactionitself,andcomestoserveasthecontextforretrospectiveinterpretationpreciselybecauseitisfirstdiscriminatedasrelevantbytheactiontobeinterpreted.Onthisconceptionthereisonlyonenecessarypathfromthepastconditiontothefuture,andyetthatpathwithitsdistinctivepastconditionandfuturestateisonlyonepossiblepathfromamongothersthatconnecteddifferentpastconditionsanddifferentstates.Allof

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thesepathsliealongacontinuumandthecontrastsprovidetheresourcesforinterpretationbygeneratingthecontrastingfactthattheagenttookonepathratherthananother.Itisnotthatnothingisgiventotheagentinthissecondconception,buttheratioofthegiventothecreated(orconstituted)shiftsdramaticallyinthedirectionofthelatter.Hopefully,thebriefestofexamplesmayhelp:consideragentsassistingachildinneed.Onthemodelofrealmodality,wetaketheneedasagivenandtheninterpretagents’differentresponsestoitaschoicesbetweenoptionsforresponsetothatcondition(e.g.,doestheagenthelp,orturnaway,orcallforsomeoneelsetohelp).Butonthemodelofabsolutemodality,wetaketheneeditselftobepartiallyconstitutedbytheresponseoftheagent.Onecanseethisincontrastingparentingstyles:whatcountsasaneedwithrespecttoonestylecountsasanopportunityforthechildtopracticeself-reliancewithrespecttoanother.Eachchoiceofparentingstylegeneratesamatrixofpossibilitiesforevaluation,forexamplethedifferentkindsofbondsthatmightbeformedthroughattachmentparenting.InwhatfollowswewillfirstsetoutinthemostgeneralwaythegivenfieldofpossibilitiesforagencybytakingupHegel’sunderstandingofthethreesub-projectsofagencythatcombinetoconstitutefreeaction(SectionII).Thenwewilltakeupdifferentwaysofdoingthosethreethingsatonce(SectionIII),andthesewillbeinstancesofabsolutemodalitythatdefinethecontinuumofalternatepossibilitiesforactionbyprioritizingoneofthethreesub-projects.II.Threeprojectsofthewill

BuriedinthemiddleoftheIntroductiontothePhilosophyofRightarecorrelatedlistsofthreedifferentkindsofsubjectivityandthreedifferentkindsofobjectivitythatHegeltakestoberelevantforunderstandingthebasicprojectofwilling.Thatlatterprojectistheattempttomakesubjectivityobjectiveinsuchawaythattheformercanremainathomeandrecognizableinthelatter(PR§§25-7).Eachofthesethreecorrelationsthencharacterizesadifferentaspectofthatattempt,ordefinesadifferentconstituentprojectofself-determination.Freeactionquasuccessfulself-determinationingeneralrequires(atleastpartial)successateachoftheseconstituentprojectsinparticular.

Thefirstcorrelationisbetweensubjectivityasself-awarenessandobjectivityasthevocationandconceptofthewill.Asaconstituentprojectofself-determinationthisisself-appropriation–webelongtoourselvesinvirtueofknowingouractionstobefittingforabeingofacertainkindandthatmeansbydoingthosekindsofthings.InHegel’sconceptualterms,thisistheuniversaldriveofthewill,andsoisnaturallyassociatedwithacertainabstraction.Atthelimitofgenerality,weknowourselvesasrational,planningagentsandsoweownouractionsasthekindofthingsthatsuchcreaturesdo.

Thesecondcorrelationisbetweenfreechoice(Willkür)anddesireasformsofsubjectivity,andobjectivityasimmersionintheparticularfeaturesofone’s

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experience.Asaconstituentprojectofself-determinationthisisspecificationofcontent–weneedtodistinguishthesignalfromthenoiseofourlives.Themostbasicwaythatwedothisisbypursuingandenjoyingtheobjectsofourdesiresinthefaceofobstaclestosuchsatisfaction.Inlifethismustbedoneatarelativelyfine-grainedlevel,andsoitisnotsurprisingthatinHegel’sconceptualtermsthisistheparticulardriveofthewillandisthusassociatedwithacontinuumofoftenminuteoridiosyncraticdifferencesintaste,habits,resources,etc.

Thethirdcorrelationisbetweensubjective,unaccomplishedendsandobjective,accomplishedends.Asaconstituentprojectofself-determinationthisiseffectiveness–theneedtoseeoneselfasanagentratherthanapatient,toseetheworldasembodyingoneofmypurposespreciselybecauseIhavemadeitso.InHegel’sconceptualtermsthisistheindividualdriveofthewill,andisassociatedwithstrategiesfortakingthemeasureofthatcontinuumofparticulardesiresandhistoriesbyreferencetothegeneraloruniversalcharacterofwillingbeings.Thatis,effectivenessrequiresplanningandplanningrequiresagripontheessentialfeaturesofsituations.Itistheindividualprojectbothintheintuitivesensethatheretheagentmakeshermarkontheworldandstandsoutincontrasttootheragents,andinthetechnicalHegelianlogicalsensethatitinvolvestherelationofuniversalityandparticularity.

Insum,thebasicpicturearisingfromthesesectionsinthePhilosophyofRightisthatinwillingwearetryingsimultaneouslytotakepossessionofourselves,todistinguishbetweenwhatiscentralandwhatisperipheralintheeventsofourlives,andtomakehappenwhatwewanttohappeninthoseevents.Allactionisanattempttodothesethreethingsatonce,butdoingalmostanythreethingsatonceisverydifficultformosthumanbeings.Inmanyareasofourlifeinwhichwetrytodomultiplethingsatonce(forexample,musicalperformance),thereareexplicittrainingstrategiesdesignedtoseparatetherequisiteskillsandtrainthemindividuallybeforecombiningthem.Butnoonehaseverbeentaughtfirsttotakepossessionofthemselves,thentodistinguishthecentralfromtheperipheral,thirdtotranslatethosecentralideastotheworld,andfinallytoputthemalltogetherinacompleteperformanceofagency.IttakesHegeluntilthe1820seventogetclearonatheoreticaldescriptionofthethreeskillsofagency,andoneshudderstothinkofthesortofpracticaltrainingplanhemighthavedevisedforus.Thatsaid,atthesametimethatheisgettingclearonthesethreeskillsheseemstodiscoverintheworldoflivedexperiencethreegeneralstrategiesforsolvingthisproblemimplicitintheactivelivesofhiscontemporaries.Hecallsthesethreedifferentformsofagencyoraccountability(Zurechnungsfähigkeit),eachofwhichrepresentsaconceptualdistillationofcommonwaysoflifethatarethemselvesattemptstomanagethiscomplexityontheground,asitwere.5Anditwillturnoutthatoneofthemisan(admittedlyheterodox)versionofthebelief-desireaccountscommonintheAnglophonephilosophyofactionliterature,andanotheraversionofateleologicalaccount.Allthreeareformsofabsolutemodalityinthesensethattheyarewaysthatanagentcanherselfsetthecontextofalternatepossibilitiesrelevantfortheinterpretationofheractions.

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III.Threeformsofaccountability

Hegellabelseachoftheformsofaccountabilitybyadifferentrightofsubjectivity:therightsofknowledge,intention,andinsightintothegood.Theserightsareeachsemi-autonomousconditionsforthepossibilityofrecognitionofindividualagents,i.e.,theyaredifferentmodelsforsuchrecognitionandthusorganizedifferentwaysoflife.So,forexample,anagentexercisesthefirstformofaccountabilitywhentheylegitimatelyexpecttobeheldresponsibleforthoseandonly“thoseaspectsofitsdeedwhichitknewtobepresupposedwithinitsend,andwhichwerepresentinitspurpose”(PR§117).Butthereisalsoanaspectoftheformsofaccountabilitywhichismoredifficulttograsp:eachoftheformsisequallyabait-and-switchroutineinwhichtheagentachievessomethingslightlydifferentfromwhattheymeantoachieve.Thisbait-and-switchisnotacontingentfeatureofsomeparticularinterpersonalinteractions(e.g.,beingconnedbyasalesman)butsomethingessentialtoagency:weonlyactatallinsofaraswemistakeourgoalforsomethingthatitisn’tquite.Hegelseemstotakethistobeaconceptualfactabouttheprojectoffinitewillingassuch.Totakejustamundaneexample,Ihaveseenthemostexperienceddo-it-yourselfersmotivatethemselvesforanewprojectonthebasisoftimeandcostprojectionsthattheywouldnotbeforehandadmittobeasunrealisticastheyobviouslyare,andyetafterwardswouldneveractuallyjudgetheirperformanceonthebasisofthoseinitialprojections.

Hegel’sterminologyforthissecondaspectofactionis“theought[Sollen],”sincethestandardsforwhatwemeantodoandthestandardsforwhatweactuallydoarenotpreciselythesameandthusthelatterhavetheformofanexternalrequirementontheformer.Itisnotjustthatwemissagiventarget;rather,weshootatthetargetinoneguisebuthititinanother.Itisnotthatweinevitablyfallshortofahighmoralstandardbecauseofourhumanweakness;rather,weareboundtomisunderstandormisperceivethestandardweapplytoourselves.Inthissense,thesubjectiverightsareequallytheconditionsofpossibilityofmisrecognition.UnderstandingHegel’sphilosophyofactionthusrequiresseeinghowandinwhatrespecteachoftheformsofaccountabilityisarelativesuccessandarelativefailureatthegeneralprojectofmakingsubjectivityathomeinobjectivity.Thatis,understandingHegel’sphilosophyofactionrequiresunderstandingitasaphilosophyoffinitude.

WemightthereforetakesomedirectionfromHegel’sdiscussionofthisparadoxicalprojectintheLogic:

Thefinitudeofthisactivity[ofwilling]isthusthecontradictionthat,intheself-contradictingdeterminationsoftheobjectiveworld,thepurposeofthegoodisbothcarriedoutandnotcarriedout,andthatitispositedassomethinginessentialjustasmuchassomethingessential,assomethingactualandatthesametimeasmerelypossible.Thiscontradictionpresentsitselfastheendlessprogressionintheactualizationofthegood,thatisthereinestablishedmerelyasanought.(Herethosecontradictionscometothefore

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inwhichonestumblesaroundonthestandpointofmorality–Zusatz.)Formally,however,thiscontradictiondisappearsinthattheactivitysupersedesthesubjectivityofthepurposeandtherebytheobjectivity,theoppositionthroughwhichbotharefinite,andnotonlytheone-sidednessofthissubjectivitybutsubjectivityingeneral;anothersuchsubjectivity,thatistosay,anewgenerationofthisopposition,isnotdistinctfromwhatwassupposedtobeanearlierone.Thisreturnintoitselfisatthesametimetherecollectionofthecontentintoitself,whichisthegoodandtheidentityinitselfofbothsides,-therecollectionofthepresuppositionofthetheoreticalstance(§224),thattheobjectiswhatissubstantialinitselfandtrue.(Theunsatisfiedstrivingdisappearsifweknowthatthefinalpurposeoftheworldhasbeenbroughtaboutandtothesamedegreeeternallybringsitselfabout.Thisisgenerallythepostureoftheadultman,whiletheyouthbelievesthatthewholeworldisinabadwayandoutofitacompletelydifferentworldmustbemade….Thiscorrespondenceofisandought…isnotafrozenandinertcorrespondence;forthegood,thefinalpurposeoftheworld,isonlyinthatitproducesitselfagainandagain…-Zusatz)(EL§234,Z).

Thereisalotgoingonhere,butatafirstpasswecansaythatsatisfiedaction(“thepostureoftheadult”)asmuchasthephilosophicalunderstandingofactionrequireakindofstereoscopicvisiontoseehowthetensionswithinagencythatappeartobecripplingcontradictionsfromoneperspectivecouldbetheverywayofgoingonfromanother.Thekeyhereisthesubstitutionofonesubjectivityforanother:successfulaction(1)translatessubjectivityintoobjectivityonlyfor(2)anewoppositionbetweensubjectivityandobjectivitytoarise,andthephenomenonholdstogetheronlybecause(3)thisnewsubjectivitycansomehowbeidentifiedwiththefirstsubjectivity.Butthenthislatteridentificationappearstobejustasmuchobjectiveassubjective,sincethroughthatidentificationwetakeupagainthetheoreticalstancethatseesthetruthprimarilyintheobjectratherthanthesubject.

Letustakeabasiccaseasanexample:anagent(1)satisfiesherhungerbyeatingupabitoftheobjectiveworld;(2)hungerreturns;and(3)sherecognizesthisnewsituationofbeinghungryasthesameasthefirst,perhapsaspartofabitofpracticalplanning.Theagentmaysaytoherself,‘I’malwayshungryat9:30amsoIshouldremembertobringabagelwithmetowork;’or,moreperspicuously(ifslightlypedantically),‘I’mthekindofpersonwhoishungryat9:30everymorningsobringingabageltoworkisfittingforme.’Inthiswaytheagenttreatsherselfasanobjectofacertainkindthathasafeature(hungerat9:30)thatisindependentofhersubjectivestanceinthemomentofherregardingherselfashavingthatfeature,eventhoughtherelevantfeatureisitselfasubjectivestanceinthemomentofherregardingthebagelasanobjecttosatisfyherhunger.Ifhungerregistersthedifferenceorothernessbetweensubjectivedesireandobjectiveconditions,andconnectingepisodesofhungerbymeansofatypologythatsupportseffectiveplanningisawayofowningthatothernesswithouteliminatingit,thenwhatwehavehereisanexampleofbeingathomewithoneselfintheother,i.e.,ofHegelianfreedom.

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Sofar,sogood.Theexamplewejustgaveusesbiologicalneedtogeneratetherenewedoppositionbetweensubjectandobject(i.e.,hunger),justtotrytobringthestructureofthephenomenonintorelief.Onemightthink,then,thatformoredistinctivelyrationalorabstractends,suchasjusticeorthegood,theagentcouldtranscendthiscycleofrenewedoppositionandcometoafinalrestingplace.ButasthepassageabovefromtheEncyclopediaLogicalreadysuggests,suchreposeisnotthedestinyofagencyofanykind.Soweneedtodigalittledeepertodiscoverthemorefundamentalreasonforthiscontinualrenewaloftheoppositionbetweensubjectivityandobjectivity.

Togetatthisreason,weneedtobackupabitandsaysomethingaboutthegeneralcontextofHegel’smostdetaileddiscussionofaction,whichisintheMoralitysectionofthePhilosophyofRight.Hegelintroducesmoralityasawaytopreventthegenerationofcyclesofrevengeinresponsetoconflictingrightsclaims.Theproblemwithrevenge,hethinks,isnotitscontentbutitsform.Thatis,itisinprincipleappropriateforsomeonetostandupfortheirrightsbyretaliatingagainstanotherwhohasinfringedthem,butthepersonalnatureofthatretaliationmakesitalmostimpossibleforthatotheragenttoacceptitasappropriatetowhattheyhavedone.Thepersonalnatureofrevengemakesitdifficultfortheoriginalperpetratortoownitasafittingexperienceforthemtoundergoastheparticularfreeagentthattheyare,sinceitisnaturaltoseeitasanotherinjurythattreatsthemasathingratherthantheirownoriginalactionbeingreflectedbackuponthemasjustpunishmentunderprinciplesthattheyshouldotherwiseendorseasprotectingtheirownrightsaswell.Intermsoftheconstituentprojectsofself-determination,revengesucceedsatspecificationofcontent,butfailsatself-appropriation(PR§102).Thisisimportantforourpurposesonlybecauseitmeansthatself-appropriationisthemainproblemofMoralityandthusdominatesandevendeformsspecificationofcontentandeffectiveness.Andthisdeformationhasconsequencesthatarejustasmuchobjectiveassubjective,thusgeneratingthecontrastinstandardsthatmakesmoralitya“mere”requirement.Itisthisdeformationanditsconsequencesthatensurethecontinualrenewaloftheoppositionbetweensubjectivityandobjectivityatthesametimethatitmakespossibletherenewaloftheirsatisfactoryidentity.

ThisisthetaleHegeltriestotellintheprefatorysectionsofMorality(esp.PR§§108-113),thoughitmustbesaidthathisnarrativetechniqueleavesmuchtobedesired.WhatiscrucialthoughnotatallobviousisthatthesesectionsrepresentamodificationofthethreeformsofsubjectivityandobjectivityfromtheIntroduction.Tobeginwith,PR§109presentstheorientationofspecificationofcontentandeffectivenessbyself-appropriation,andthenPR§§111tracesthedeformationofspecificationofcontentrequiredbythatorientation.Thisdeformationistheheartofthefirstformofaccountability.

A.TheRightofKnowledge:“RelishingtheEnjoymentofPleasure”

InPR§111Hegelsaysthatregardlessofprovenanceoftheparticularconditionsanddesiresofthewill,wemustconsiderthatcontent“asthecontentofthewillreflected

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intoitselfinitsdeterminacy,andhenceoftheself-identicalanduniversalwill.”WehaveseenthisreflectionintoselfalreadyinourconsiderationoftheLogic’sdiscussionofwilling,inwhichaself-reflectingagentmakesakindofdoubleidentification.First,theagentidentifiesonedesirewithanother(inourexample,thetwoinstancesofhunger).Partandparcelofthisfirstidentificationisthecharacterizationoftheagentasacertaintypeorkindofthing(inourrudimentaryexample,thekindofapersonwhoishungryinthemorning).But,putanotherway,thisisasecondidentificationofthesubjectwithanobjectofthatkind(andthusthewayinwhichitinvolvestakingupthetheoreticalstance).Thissecondidentificationcomesoutasanentailmentoftheself-reflectionofthewill:asaresult,thewillhas“theinnerdeterminationofbeinginconformitywiththewillwhichhasbeinginitself,orofpossessingtheobjectivityoftheconcept.”

Hegelmeansallofthisratherliterally:wereflectonourselvesandmodifyoursubjectivestancesbymeansofseeingourselvesasacertainkindofobjectintheworld.“[T]hewillwhichhasbeinginitself”clearlyreferstotheagentregardedfromthetheoreticalperspectiveasanobjecthavingitsowntruththatcanbeknown,butitisslightlymoredifficulttosaywhyitshouldhavethe“objectivityoftheconcept.”Thekeyhereisthattheagentisknowntobeacertaintypeorkindofobject,whichintroducesgeneralityoruniversalityintotheagent’sself-relation.Thekeypointhereisthatthisgeneralityisinitiallyintroducedintotheprojectofspecificationofcontentbecauseofthewayinwhichthisprojectisnowcoloredbytheprojectofself-appropriation.Thatis,inorderforthecontenttobemycontent,ithastohaveaformconsistentwiththeformofminenessassuch—aformthatqualifiesitasanobjectthatmaybeappropriatedbyanagentwhocaninprinciplethenseethemselvesintheparticularpositionsofanother(evenifthatotherisjustthemselvesatadifferenttime).Hegelspellsthisoutnicelyinhislectures:“Nowthecontentmustbemineasitisaccomplished,andaswillitcontainsthedeterminationoftheuniversalityofthewill,forthewillwhichhasbeingforitselfistheinfiniteform,theinfiniteactivity,andthereforetheformwhichisathomewithitself[beisichseinde],identicalwithitself,i.e.,theuniversal”(VPRIII,344).Theinfinityoftheformisconnectedwiththe“postureoftheadult”inwhichpreciselytherepeatedgenerationofoppositionisseenasappropriatetothenatureofthesubject.Itisinfiniteinthequitetechnicalsensethatsuchagentknowsthatshewillfindherselfontheothersideofthatcontinuallyreappearinglimit,sothatthereisahelicalorcyclicalshapetotheprocessratherthanalinearprogression.

Thetypesorkindsthatmediatethisself-relationarenotunrelatedtotheparticularcontentofdesiresandconditions;rather,thetwosidesariseoutofoneprocess,asHegelistryingtomakeclearinthepassagefromthelesserLogicthatwequotedatlengthabove.InthegreaterLogicHegelcharacterizesthisprocessasadoublereflectionorDoppelscheinthroughwhichtheuniversalandtheparticularcometohavethedistinctivecontentandsignificancethattheydoonlyinrelationtoeachother(SL12.35/533).So,intheexampleabove,theself-identificationassomeonehungryinthemorningspicksoutcertainmotivationalstancesasparticulardesiresthatcontrastwithotherdesiresandfeelingsexperiencedatthesametime.The

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agentisahungrypersonratherthanagrumpyperson,astheinstancesofhungerarepickedoutastheparticularsignaloftheagent’slifewhereastheinstancesofsnappingatco-workersareexplainedasderivativeonthefailuretosatisfythathungerandthusasnoise.Thereis,ofcourse,ampleopportunityforself-deceptionhere,butthatisjustthewayagencyis.Totakeupthenotionofabsolutemodalityagain,thehungrypersonframestheactionalongonecontinuumofalternatepossibilitieswhereasthegrumpypersonframestheactionalonganother.Fortheformer,theactioncontrastswithpossibleactionssuchasrememberingtobringasnackorhavingforgottenbreakfastentirely.Forthelatter,itcontrastswithpossibleactionssuchasholdingone’stongueorproducingamorecompletedenunciation.

Tobrieflytakestock,whatwehavesofaristheorientationofspecificationofcontentbyself-appropriation,andnotyetanysenseofdeformation(thepossibilityofself-deceptionaside).Thatis,wehavethewayinwhichthisparticularrelationoftheprojectsofself-determinationisaconditionofthepossibilityofrecognition,notyetofmisrecognition.ThisisthepositivesideofwhatHegelcallsthe“rightofknowledge,”whichconsistsinrecognizingasmyowninthecontentofmyactionthoseactualfeaturesofitspublicshapethatgiveformtowhatIwantedtodo(i.e.,tomypurpose(Vorsatz))(PR§117-8).Ontheonehand,thisisacommonpositioninmodernphilosophythatdefinesaccountableactionbyreferencetothe(causal)effectivenessoftheagent’sbeliefsanddesires.Ontheotherhand,Hegelhasaquitespecifictakeonthewayinwhichbeliefs(i.e.,thetheoreticalperspective)anddesires(i.e.,thepracticalperspective)arerelatedtoeachother.Thistakeiscenteredonthewayinwhichbeliefsspecificallyabouttheselfarerelatedtotheself’sactive,practicalstancestowardstheworld(i.e.,todesires).Hegelalsohasaninterestingtakeonthewaysuchdesiresarerelatedtobeliefsingeneralandinparticulartoperceptualawarenessoftheexternalworld.LetusfirstofallpickuponthepositiveaspectofthissecondelementofHegel’stakebeforeturningtothewayinwhichbothaspectsgeneratethepossibilityofmisrecognition.

ThepositivesideofthissecondelementcanbefoundinHegel’sattributionofwholeheartedenjoymenttothisformofagency.Inarevealingearlymanuscriptwhendiscussingthewayoflifeofsomeoneembodyingthisfirstformofagency(here,afarmer),heclaimsthatitischaracteristicofthisfigurethathe“relishestheenjoymentofpleasure[denGenußdesVergnügensgenießt]”incontrasttothecraftsmanwhoprimarilyappreciatesthefactthathehasmadehimselfwhatheisandthemerchantwhoisbeyondanycapacityforenjoyment(JenaerRealphilosophie(GWVIII,269)).And,addingmoredetailtothisdifference,Hegelsaysinhislaterlecturesthat“Thisindifference[ofcraftsmenandmerchants]totimeandplace,tothedeterminate,isalien[totheagriculturalestate]...[T]heinsatiabilityofprofitisalientoit”(VPRIV,516).WewillputasideHegel’ssocialtypologyhere;whatisimportantforourpurposesishisattempttoprovideaconceptuallyrobustdefenseofthevalueofbasicdesiresatisfactionasaformofagency.Suchsatisfaction–i.e.,theaccurateperceptionofthechangeintheobjectiveworldinaccordwithsubjectivedesire,andthebeliefinthegoodnessoftheconditionsinwhichonefinds

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oneselfimmersed–isamodeofbeingathomewithoneselfintheotherandthusatleastminimallysolvingeachoftheconstituentprojectsofself-determination.6Byperceivingselfandworldasinthisrelation,theagenthasmadeatleastpartoftheworldherownandinsodoinghascometoakindofself-affirmationthatisworthyofrespect.

Thesetwopositivesidesthengiveusthewayinwhichthisfirstformofagencyconstitutesaconditionforthepossibilityofrecognition.Self-identificationasbeingofacertaintypegivesusaconceptionofwhatitistobeathomewithoneself,andtheenjoymentofthesatisfactionofdesiregivesusasenseofhowthisisdoneintheother.Buteveninhisinitialformulationsofthenatureofmorality,Hegelraisesthepossibilityofmisrecognition.Morespecifically,heraisesthepossibilityofamismatchbetweentheparticular,subjectivecontentofthewillandtheobjectivetruthofthewill,andthispossibilityiswhatmakesthecorrespondencebetweenthetwo“onlyarequirement”(PR§111).Herewegettothedeformationoftheprojectofspecificationofcontentbythatofform,specificallytheformthatarisesfromtheprojectofself-appropriation.Thuswecometothedeeperreasonfortherecurrenceoftheoppositionbetweensubjectivityandobjectivityasitconcernsthisfirstformofagency.Unsurprisingly,wecanseethisdeformationmanifestingitselfalongthesametwodimensions,i.e.,inboththerelationtotheselfandtherelationtotheworld.

RecallfromtheprevioussectionthatHegelinitiallythinksoftheprojectofspecificationofcontentastheattempt,bymeansoffreechoice,totranslateone’sneedsanddesiresintoanimmersiveexperienceoftheworld.Andwehavejustseenthewayinwhichenjoymentisakindofaffectivesignofthatimmersion.Butwealsosawthewayinwhichtheinfluenceofself-appropriationoncontentinterposedatypeorgeneralkindwithintheagent’srelationtotheirparticulardesires.Toputitstructurally,asecondkindofobjectivity(formalorconceptualratherthanperceptualobjectivity)intrudesitselfintotheformerlyintimaterelationbetweendesireanditssatisfaction.7AsHegelthinksofit,thebait-and-switchhereisthatIaimatperceptiblepleasurebutwhatIachieveactually(oratleastinaddition)isaformalorconceptualstatusofcountingasacertaintypeofperson.Toputitinthelogicaltermsweusedearlier,insteadofadirectrelationbetweenparticulars(i.e.,betweensubjectivedesireandobjectivesatisfactioninspecificconditions),wegetarelationbetweenaparticularandthewholeconceptualprocessofthereflectionofuniversalandparticular(i.e.,betweenaspecificdesireandtheDoppelscheinofparticulardesiresandgeneraltype).Butitisverydifficulttoknowexactlywhatkindofrelationthelattercouldbe,andcertainlyitisverydifferentfromtherelationatwhichtheagentaimedandwhichservedastheinitial(ifimplicit)standardforsuccessoftheaction.

Theinterpretiveproblemgetsevenworse.Hegelthinksthroughthisconceptualproblembymeansofatechnical,structuralmodificationofthesecondformofobjectivity–i.e.,theobjectivityconstitutiveoftheprojectofspecificationofcontent–butforthatveryreasonhisideaherehasremainedopaquetomostreaders,

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particularlythosewhothinkthatheintroducesthethreeformsofsubjectivityandobjectivityintheIntroductiononlytoimmediatelyrejecttwoofthemasirrelevant.Hereiswhatisactuallygoingon:InhisfirstdescriptionofobjectivecontentintheIntroductionaslackingtheformofself-consciousness,thereisnospecificreferencetosensibleexternality(PR§26(β)).Indeed,thisinitialconceptionofimmersioninparticularconditionsincludedethicalnormsandcustoms.Butundertheinfluenceoftheimportanceofself-appropriationwithinMoralitythereisamovetounderstandthoseparticularconditionsaslackingtheformofself-consciousnessbecausetheyaresensiblegivens(PR§108).InKantianterms,theinitialconfidentimmersioninthecustomarypatternofone’slifeisnowbeingconstruedasheteronomyratherthanautonomy.InthePhenomenology,thesamethinghappensinthestrugglebetweenfaithandtheEnlightenment:thelatterre-characterizesthetraditionalcontentanddevotionalinvestmentsoffaithasamerelysensible,perceptibleexternality(PhG425–26/¶576).Intheactualpracticeofagency,thiscreatesthepossibilityofmisrecognitionbecauseitgeneratesaneedforjustificationanddefenseofcertainactionswherethatneedwasnotpreviouslyfelt.Anyagentcaughtinthemidstofsuchashiftisboundtobedefensiveandsomewhatflat-footedinthefaceofthesenewexpectations.

Sotheinterpretiveproblemfollowsaconceptualproblemthatisarealproblemforagents,inHegel’sview.ThisisareminderthatwemusttakeseriouslyHegel’sadmonitionnottoindulgea“tendernessforworldlythings”(EL§48R):theyareasfulloftensionsandproblemsandcontradictionsasthoughtitself.Agoodphilosophyofactionmayneedtoreplicatethosetensionsifitistobedescriptivelyadequate,ratherthanattemptingtopaperoverthemwithacontrivedsolution.Andyetthephilosopherisnotthefirstagenttofacethisproblem–realagentsintheirownsocio-historicalcircumstanceshavefacedtheproblemsandcobbledtogethersomepartialsolutions,soitistoHegel’sunderstandingofthesethatwenowturninanattempttounderstandhowthesepossibilitiesofrecognitionandmisrecognitionholdtogetherasanintegralpracticeofagency.

AsHegelunderstandsagentsembroiledinthishistoricalmess,acommonstrategyistore-describethatimmersionasatradition,andspecificexpectationsascommandsorpromises.8Sincethisre-descriptioncharacterizesimmersionandexpectationsretroactivelyasspecifickindsoflawsornorms,newlawsornormscanthenbeassimilatedunderthesamerubrics.Wecanthencompleteourstructuralstoryasaconceptualanalysisofthesecommonstrategies.Foramoretenderheartedphilosopher,onemightexpecttheadvocacyofareturntothatearlierformofobjectivityasimmersion,orarestrictiontoitasthecontrollingforminthelightofthesetensions.ButHegelisnothingifnotapost-Kantianinthisrespect,soratherthanargueforanimmediatereturntothevalueofimmersion,asecondmoveismadetoreplacethosesensiblegivenswiththeviewpointsofotherself-consciouspersons(PR§§112–13).Hethusmovestothinkingoftheobjectivitycorrespondingtothesubjectivityoftheagent’sWillkürorcontingentchoiceasnowthewillsofothers.Thisexternalsubjectivityisthenawayinwhichsubjectivityisathomeinobjectivity:“Theexternalexistenceisthewill,whichbecomesexternalassubject,a

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subjectingeneralisgenerated,[and]Ireceivemysubjectivitythereinasobject”(VPRIII,346).

InourinitialformulationoftheproblemofagencydrawnfromthelesserLogic,above,thisis(3),i.e.,themomentofidentificationoftherecurringinstancesofsubjectivitywitheachother.Butnowweseethisidentificationinamoreradicalsensethaninthecaseofhunger,inwhichonlyinstancesofthesameagent’sintentionalstanceswereidentified.Ontheonehand,thismovesuggestsanewotherinwhichIcanfindmyselfathome,namelyintheopinionsandattitudesoffellowmembersofmysociety.Ontheotherhand,thisexternalsubjectivitybothhighlightsandchallengesmyownsubjectiveparticularity,whichisthelogicalaxisofspecificationofcontent:theopinionsanddesiresofothersareparticularsubjectivity,butsubjectivityexternaltomyown.Thuswealsohaveamoreradicalsenseinwhichtheoppositionbetweensubjectivityandobjectivityisnecessarilyratherthanmerelycontingentlyrecurrent.

Ifthefirstmoveoftheshift–i.e.,thecharacterizationofimmersiveobjectivityasmerelyperceived–openedupagulfbetweenthatforwhichweareaccountable(thespecificperceptiblefeaturesofoureffectiveactions)andthattowhichweareaccountable(theconceptofthewillassuch),thesecondshift(i.e.,theintroductionoftheopinionsanddesiresofothers)attemptstocoversomeofthedistancebetweenthesetwosensesofaccountability.Inthisconception,thatforwhichweareaccountablearechangesintheviewsofothers:

Inthemoralsphere,activitynecessarilyrelatesitselftothewillsofothers;theseareingeneraltheworldinrelationtowhichoneisactive...InmoralityIgeneratechangesalso,thereisanexternalmaterialonhand,[but]itisnotamatterofthealterationofthematerial,corporealworld;rather,theworldinrelationtowhichmysubjectivitystandsundertheconsiderationofmorality,isthesubjectivityofothers(VPRIV,307–08).

Furthermore,Hegelambivalentlydescribestherelevantexternalsubjectivitybothasthewillsofothersandasuniversalsubjectivity,sothewillsofothersbecomesapartialimageofthattowhichweareaccountableaswell.Wehaveaclosingofthegap—thesenseinwhichthatforwhichandthattowhichweareaccountablenowhaveamoresimilarifnotpreciselyidenticalform.IfthereisasinglepointinthePhilosophyofRightatwhichonecanlocateHegel’ssocialre-interpretationoftheproblemoffreeagency,thisisit;buthehasburieditsowellthatitiseasytomisstheextensivetensionswithinwhichitisembedded.

Aswenotedearlier,itisverydifficulttoknowexactlywhatkindofrelationthatbetweenparticulardesiresandthewholeconceptualprocessofthereflectionofuniversalandparticularcouldbe.Andthatproblempresentedthefirstformofagencyasabait-and-switchinwhichweachievedaconceptualstatuswhenweaimedatpleasure.WenowhaveHegel’sanswertothequestionofthenatureofthisrelation:itistheexpressiveandinterpretiverelationbetweenparticulardesireand

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thewholepublicworldofopinionandevaluation.Hethenmovesontoasking,whatdoesagencylooklikethatexplicitlyaimsatsuchaconceptualstatusinthefirstplace?

B.TheRightofIntention

Therearetwoparticularfeaturesofthissecondformofagencythatgodirectlytothequestionoftherelationbetweentheparticularchoiceandthepublicworld.Thefirstispurposiveness,andthesecondisuniversality.Togetherthesefeaturesdefinetherightofintention(Absicht),whichisthesubjectiverightattheheartofthissecondform.

Wecanbeginwithpurposiveness,whichconnectsHegel’sviewtothedistinctionwenotedintheintroductiontothischapterbetweencausalandteleologicaltheoriesofagency.Wejustlearnedthatwehavetoaimatsomething,andonemightthinkthatthenotionofaimingjustisanotionofpurposiveness.Howeveronethinksoftheconceptualproximityofthesetwonotions,Hegelwantstodrawsomeextensiveconsequencesfromthelatter.Inparticular,thisnew(ornewlyexplicit)characterizationoftherelationbetweensubjectivityandobjectivityintroducesadistinctionbetweenendsandmeansintothenatureofaction:

Theintention[Absicht]isthatwhichismineintheactioninafurtherdetermination[inweitererBestimmung]asthepurpose[Vorsatz].Intermsofitscontent,theintentionissomethingotherthanthemerepurpose.Thevaluethattheactionhasforme,theintention,isacontent,[and]thiscontentisfirstofalltheend[Zweck]ofanaction,andtheactionisthemeansfortheend.Thisend[is]thecontentofmyintention...(VPRIII,352).

Whereasthenotionofpurpose(Vorsatz)fromthefirstformofagencyemphasizesthetemporalrelationofprioritybetweensubjectivityandobjectivity(bothofwhichareobjectsofperception),thenotionofintention(Absicht)emphasizesthepriorityofthegoalovertheconditionsandresourcesforachievingthatgoal.So,ontheonehand,thisnotionofpurposivenessappearstobemerelymakingexplicitsomethingthatwasimplicitinthefirstformofagency.Thereare,ofcourse,goalswithinthatfirstform;buttheyareessentiallytakenasgivenineluctablybycircumstances(whetherbiologicalorsocial)ratherthanasproducedbytheprocessofagencyandthusassomethingforwhichtheagentcanbeheldresponsible.Ontheotherhand,thenotionofpurposivenessappearstonarrowthescopeofagencyoratleasttoreconceiveitsexpressivecenterasbeinganendthatanimatestherestoftheactionasameans,ratherthanbeingaspecificallymentalstancethananimatessomesucceedingphysicalrealization.

Second,Hegelwantstoemphasizethenewuniversalityofthissecondformofagency,andthishedoesinhisveryfirstpresentationofit:“thetruthoftheindividualistheuniversal,andthedeterminatecharacteroftheactionforitselfisnotanisolatedcontentconfinedtooneexternalunit,butauniversalcontent

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containingwithinitselfallitsvariousconnections”(PR§119).TospeakintermsofHegel’slogicaltheory,wemightsaythatpreciselybecauseitisaconceptualstatusatwhichtheagentaims,thatstatusgatherstogethersomeparticularsintoacontrastiverelationbothinternallyandexternally.Herethissecondfeature(universality)contrastswiththefirst(purposiveness).Whereasthefirstseemedtorestrictthescopeofthatforwhichtheagentwasaccountable,thesecondseemstoexpandit.

Together,thesetwofeatureshelptospecifythissecondformofagencyasaformofabsolutemodalityaswehavecharacterizedit.Specifically,thegoalestablishesacontinuumofalternatepossibilitiesintwosenses:first,thegoalcontrastswithotherrelatedgoalsthatmighthavebeenchosen;andsecond,thegoalestablishesanetworkofmeansthatmightbeemployedandresultingformsofachievingthegoal.

Infact,thesefirsttwofeaturesarelinkedinthedeterminatenegationofthefirstformofagency:“Thetransitionfrompurposetointention,isfromtheindividualityoftheimmediatemodification[ofactuality]totheuniversalityofaction,totheinteriorityoftheuniversalityoftheaction”(VPRIII,364).The“immediatemodification”wouldbeanexternal,perceptiblechange,whereas“theinteriorityoftheuniversalityoftheaction”wouldbetheinherentteleologicalconnectionsbetweenthatmodificationandotherfeaturesoftheextendedcontext.Itisimportanttoseethatthetensionbetweenthesetwofeatures–thefirstcontractingandthesecondexpandingthescopeofaccountability–isessentialtothisformofagencyanddefinitionalofitsintegrity.

Theeasiestwaytoseethisisintermsofthethirdfeature.Thisformofagencyaimsnotatjustanyconceptualstatus,butattheconceptualstatusofindependence.Preciselybydistinguishingbetweenendandmeansandadoptingapurposiverelationwithrespecttothenetworkofcircumstancesandprocessesthatformthecontextofaction,theagentclaimstobeanindependentoriginatorofactionintheworld:“Byacting,thehumanbeingisreflectedintohimself,theactioncomesoutofhim,heisthebeginneroftheaction.Inthismovement,whichheperforms,isacontent”(VPRIII,375).Theuniversalconceptionoftheendmakesthispossible,butalsothreatensitintheabsenceofadefinitedistinctionbetweenendandmeans.Inmoraltheory,onecanthinkofthedoctrineofthedoubleeffectasawayinwhichthisfirstfeatureisbroughtintotamethesecond:AtfirstIappeartoberesponsibleforallofthemanifoldandextendedconsequencesofmyactioninvirtueofthefactthattheyobtainaspartofthenecessaryandenablingrelationthatthespecificcircumstancesoftheworldhavetomypurpose.ButthemerefactthatIforesawsomeconsequencedoesnotmakeitapartofmyend–i.e.,itdoesnotmakeitapartofthecontentofmyintention–andsothatfactisinsufficienttodefinesuchaconsequenceasoneforwhichIamaccountable.Thisthirdfeature,then,givesageneralschemaforallofthedifferentformsofabsolutemodalitythatmightbeembodiedbyagentswhereonefeatureofthegoalthatdefinesthecontinuumofalternatepossibilitiesisthatitsachievementestablishestheindependenceoftheagent.

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Nowwecanreturntoourformulationoftheproblemoffiniteagencyaccordingtowhichsuchagency(1)translatessubjectivityintoobjectivityonlyfor(2)anewoppositionbetweensubjectivityandobjectivitytoarise,andthephenomenonholdstogetheronlybecause(3)thisnewsubjectivitycansomehowbeidentifiedwiththefirstsubjectivity.Whatwehavesofaris(1)forthissecondformofagency:someoneexercisingittranslatesagoalwhichisauniversalendintoobjectivitybymeansofthewholenetworkofconditionsandresourcesinwhichtheyareembedded.Theconceptionoftheendasuniversalarticulatesoneofthelessonslearnedfromthefirstformofagency,whichwastheneedtoclosethegapbetweenthatforwhichweareaccountableandthattowhichweareaccountable,butwithouterasingtheparticularsubjectivestanceoftheagentincontrasttotheirsurroundings.Herethatsubjectivestanceisrepresentedastheendorgoal,“theinteriorityoftheuniversalityoftheaction,”butbecauseofthatformitisinherentlyconnectedtothenetworkofmeans,prominentamongwhichareotheragentsandtheproductiveresourcesdevelopedcooperativelybetweenthem.Nonethelessthetensionbetweenthesetwofeaturesissupposedtobeproductive,tomakethethirdpossible–theconceptualstatusofindependenceasanobjectofrecognition.

ButthisisHegel,sorecognitionandmisrecognitiongohandinhand.Thisis(2)–i.e.,thewayinwhichthissecondformisalsoabait-and-switchroutine,orawayinwhichweaimatsomethingunderoneguisebuthititunderanotherwiththeresultthatourinitialgoalandourfinalachievementappearmismatched.Andherewemightdividethetwoformsofmisrecognitionintothetheoreticalandthepractical(thoughthisisnotalabelHegelhimselfuses).WhatImeanbythisisjustthatthefirstformofmisrecognitionconcernsprimarilytheagent’sunderstandingofthesourcesoftheirownmotivation,andthesecondconcernstheactualfailureofagentstobeembeddedinobjectivesystemsofnecessaryresourcesforagency.

Togetatthetheoreticalformofmisrecognition,wehavetocomebacktoourthreeconstituentprojectsofself-determination(self-appropriation,specificationofcontent,andeffectiveness).Thisformofmisrecognitionisdrivenbytheideathatthisnewkindofinnereffectivenessandthisnewmodelofthegoal-directedselfintermsofwhichagentsappropriatetheiractionstothemselvescreatedeepproblemsforspecifyingthecontentofthesubjectiveendsthemselves:

Forthecontentoftheseends,allthatpresentsitselfhereis(α) formalactivityitself,inasmuchasthesubjectactivelycommitsitselftowhateveritistoregardandpromoteasitsend...(β)Buttheasyetabstractandformalfreedomofsubjectivityhasamoredeterminatecontentonlyinitsnaturalsubjectiveexistence—itsneeds,inclinations,passions,opinions,fancies,etc.(PR§123)

Thatis,thecharacterizationofself-appropriationasthemereformalownershipofeffectiveness(α)imposesakindofcostonthespecificationofcontent,namelythatthiscontentisnowtobeunderstoodasnaturallydetermined.HereishowHegelputsthepointintheGriesheimlectures:

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Hereisfirstthefoundcontent,hereisnotyetthewillwhichisinconformitywithitsconcept;theconceptonlyistheanimating,thatwhichgeneratescontentoutofitself...Thecontentisherethusfirstsomethingfound.Itstillbelongstothenaturalsubject,butitmustatthesametimebeinternal,itisformallythatwhichismine,butnotthecontentofmyfreedom,ofmyconcept;thepositingofmyfreedomthereinisjustpositingingeneral(VPRIV,331).

SoIdonotfullyrecognizemyself–Iamnotinconformitywithmyconcept–whenIactinthissecondway.Evenworse,thislookstoreplicateaproblemwealreadysawinthefirstformofagencyinwhichthecontentofpurposesturnedouttobeasourceofheteronomyratherthanautonomy.

Hereiswhytheproblemrecurs:inordertotamethepotentiallydisastrousexpansionofthescopeofaccountabilityintroducedbytheuniversalityoftheendsandcontextsofagents,thisformofagencyinsistsonaformalfeatureofteleologicalprocesses,namelythedistinctionbetweenendsandmeans.Soitisbymeansofsuchaformalself-conceptionthatagentsappropriateactionstothemselves,buttheformalityofthemodelofthegoal-directedorend-settingselfhasaperverseandunexpectedeffectonthemoralpsychologyinwhichitistakentobeofparamountsignificance.Specifically,itstructurallyhighlightsnotthedesiredpureactivityoftherationalagent,butrathertheparticular,givencontentsofthesubjectivewill.ThiswidenstheKantiangapbetweenthetwoaspectsofthewillinsuchawaythatsuggeststhatatbestagentsmerelyaddtheir“oomph”togoalsthatarealreadygiventothembytheteleologicalnexusinwhichtheyareembedded.ToputthepointinKantianterms,thisformalself-appropriationraisesthespecterthatallpracticalreasoningishypotheticalratherthancategorical,andthusthepossibilitythatthereisnoautonomyatall.Toputitinotherterms,Iaimataconceptualstatusofindependencebutachieveaconceptualstatusofdependenceonthesourcesofmygoals,andthismeansthatIachieveastatusthatisjustasmuchachievedformeasbyme:“thepositingofmyfreedomthereinisjustpositingingeneral.”

Butaswesawwithrespecttothefirstformofagency,thereisaversionof(3)hereaswell–i.e.,awayinwhichthisreoccurrenceofthedividebetweensubjectivityandobjectivitycanbeidentifiedwiththefirstinaconceptionoftheagentasanobject.Inthissecondformofagencythisisdonebywayofthevalueofwelfare,whichisunderstoodfirstasthesatisfactionofthetotalityoftheindividualagent’sneedsanddesiresbutthenmorebroadlyasthesatisfactionofthetotalityofallagents’needsanddesires.Thebroader,universalconceptionofwelfareraisesittoadistinctivelymoralvalue,onHegel’swayofthinking,andsoarticulatesawayinwhicheventhisconceptualstatusofdependenceisadignifiedpositionworthyofrespect.Inthisway,theformalrationalityofthegoal-directed(end-setting)selfholdstogetherthedifferentinstancesofneednotonlyacrosstimeinanindividualagentbutacrosstheexperiencesofdifferentagents,andsoholdstogethertheconceptualstatusesofdependenceandindependence.InHegel’sdialectic,however,thismitigatingfeatureintroducesanotherdistinctivepossibilityofpracticalmisrecognition.

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InjustthesamewaythatHegelambivalentlydescribedthenewformofobjectivityarisinginthefirstformofagencysometimesasuniversalsubjectivityandsometimesasthechoicesandopinionsofothers,heambivalentlydescribesthevalueofwelfareasbothuniversalandasmerelyinvolving“manyotherparticularbeingsingeneral”(PR§125)oreven“theparticularwelfareoftheindividual”(PR§126R).InbothcasespartofHegel’spointistointroducecontingencyintotherelationbetweentheindividualaimingatsuchaformofobjectivityandthatobjectivityitselfbyshowingthatweaimatitunderoneguisebuthititunderanother.Inthisformofagencywehavetwoguisesofwelfare–oneformalandonematerial–andthoughHegelhasarguedthatinprinciplethetwocanbeidentifiedwemustnonethelesspickoneandhopethatbyhittingitwehitbothtargets.Theidentityhereispartial–itisliketheoverlapoftwospheresinaVenndiagram.Onecouldimagineanagentwithcolorblindnesswhoknewofthisoverlap,butcouldn’tvisuallymakeitoutclearlybecauseofitscoloration.Suchanagentwouldaimattheparttheycouldseeclearlyandhopethatbydoingsotheyhittheoverlap.Hegelthinksthatsomeofushaveamoralvisioninwhichtheparticularneedsthatconstitutethecontentofwelfarestandoutinrelief,andsomeofushaveamoralvisioninwhichtheformalself-ownershipofthegoal-directedself(i.e.,abstractpropertyright)standsoutinrelief.Bothgroupstrytohittheoverlapbetweenrightandwelfare,butthelimitationsoftheirperceptionsmakeitthecasethatatleastsomeofthetimetheyfailtohittheirtarget.

Hegeldescribesbothkindsofmisses,bothkindsofpracticalmisrecognition.Inbothcases,aninitialformofsubjectivity(eitherrightorwelfare)issuccessfullytranslatedintoobjectivityonlyfortheotherformofsubjectivitytoimmediatelycropupasinoppositiontotheobjectivitysotransformed.Hisdiscussionofthefirst–aimingattheidentityundertheguiseofwelfarebutmissingitsoverlapwithright–comesinPR§126.Hegel’sexamplehereisstealingleathertomakeshoesforthepoor:welfareismadeobjectivebutthenthesubjectiveclaimtopropertyrightislegitimatelyraisedagainstthisnewobjectivesituation.However,heismoreconcernedaboutthesecond–aimingattheidentityundertheguiseofabstractpropertyrightbutmissingitsoverlapwithwelfare.Thisformofmisrecognitioncomesaboutwhensomeone’sabstractfreedomsofownershipandcontractarerespected,buttheyarenonethelessdeprivedofthematerialbasisofthesatisfactionoftheirneeds.Sosubjectivityintheformofabstractpropertyrightistranslatedintoobjectivityonlyforthesubjectiveclaimofwelfaretoberaisedinoppositiontothisnewobjectivesituation.

Inhislectures,Hegelisquiteclearaboutwhyheismoreconcernedaboutthissecondform:hetakesafundamentalfeatureofhisworldtobethecloseproximityofthestruggleforsurvivalbythepoorandtheluxurysecuredbylegitimatepropertyclaimsoftherich(seeVPRIII,397–98&VPRIV,339).AndsointhepublishedtextofthePhilosophyofRight,hehasratherlittletosayaboutmitigatingstructuresforthefirstformofpracticalmisrecognition,butmoretosayaboutmitigatingstructuresforthesecond.

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Thismitigatingstructuregoesunderthename“therightofnecessity.”AsHegelinitiallypresentsit,itistherightofthepersonwhoisfacingthecatastrophiclossoftheirlifeitselftotakewhattheyneedtosurvive:

Thestarvinghumanbeinghastheabsoluterighttoviolatethepropertyofanother.Heviolatesthepropertyofanotheronlywithrespecttoalimitedcontent;itisinherentintherightofnecessity,however,thathedoesnotviolatetherightoftheotherasright.Theinterestispositedonlyinthislittlepieceofbread;hedoesnottreattheotherrightlessly[erbehandeltdenAnderennightrechtlos](VPRIV,341).

Inordertoseehowthisisaversionof(3)–i.e.,awayinwhichreoccurringgapbetweensubjectivityandobjectivitycanbepartiallybridged–wemustattendtothelogicalstructureofHegel’sunderstandinghere.Itinvolvesanexplicitre-identificationofwelfareandrightattheirextremes,seeminglyfarremovedfromtheiroverlaporpartialidentity.Inhislectureshesays“Yes,thehumanbeinghasarighttothisunrightfulaction.Forlifeisthetotalityofparticularity,theentirety[Gesamtheit]ofparticularityreducedtoitssimpleform...ParticularityhasrisentotheunityoftheI”(VPRIII,401).Thatis,anyparticularneedoftheagentwouldbeinsufficienttooverridearightsclaimorprovidethebasisforarightsclaimcontrarytothatofthepropertyowner,butthetotalityofthoseneedssharesthekindofformalselfhoodhadbythepersonalityatthebasisofthepropertyclaim,andsoprovidesacompetingrightsclaim.Inthisway,thenewassertionofsubjectiveoppositionintheformofwelfarecanbepartiallyidentifiedwiththeoriginalassertionofsubjectiveoppositionintheformofright.

ButHegeldoesnotrestrictthisrightofnecessitytotheimmediatesituationofthestarvingperson;rather,hedrawswide-rangingconsequencesfromit:

Fromtherightofnecessityarisesthebenefitofcompetence,wherebyadebtorispermittedtoretainhistools,agriculturalimplementsclothes,andingeneralasmuchofhisresources–i.e.,ofthepropertyofhiscreditors–asisdeemednecessarytosupporthim,evenaccordingtohisestate[sogarstandesgemäß](PR§127R).

Thisconsequencebringsthepartialidentityofwelfareandrightintroducedbytheextremecaseoftherightofnecessitybacktothecenter,backtocommonstructuresoflifeandtheordinarypracticeofmoraljudgment.Itsuggests,then,athirdformofagencythatwouldexplicitlyaimtomakejustthesekindsofjudgmentsaboutwhatkindsofneedsarecentrallyrelatedtotheeffectivenessofagency,andwhichareperipheral.

C.TheRightofInsightintotheGood

Thisthirdformofaccountabilityissimpler,inaway,butonlybecauseitsobjecthasbecomesocomplexthattheresourcesofmoralityassuchareonlybarelysufficienttocharacterizeiteveninoutline.Aswehavealreadynoted,thisthirdform

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aimsatobjectivityintheformofthegood,whichmeansthatitaimsatanobjectiveconsistencyofrightandwelfare.Butinthepreviousdiscussionofpracticalrecognition,rightandwelfareshowedupasessentiallysubjectiveclaims(i.e.,inthetechnicaltermsofthethreeprojectsofself-determination,asthesubjectivityofself-appropriationandthesubjectivityofcontent,respectively).Howisitthattheynowshowupontheobjectivesideoftheequation?ThethreefoldpatternwehavebeenfollowingfromtheLogicgivesusthekey:thisthirdformofagencyhastakenuppreciselythattheoreticalstancethatidentifiesthetworeoccurringformsofsubjectivitywitheachotherbyidentifyingthemassharedfeaturesofacertainkindofobject,anditdoessoaspartofapracticalprocessofplanning.Thisthirdformofagencyaimsatanobjectiveformofexistenceinwhichthesetwokindsofclaimsareinsomesortofharmonywitheachother–thisisitssubjectiveplanthatitattemptstorealizeintheactualworld.

Thatisthebait,butthereisaswitchaswell:“Everyrelationship(Verhältnis)containsanought(Sollen)andeventhegooddoesnotgetbeyondtheought.Theabstractideaofthegoodshouldberealized.Freedomhasthevocation(Bestimmung)ofthegood;freedomthatisparticularizedinitsownself—thisshouldberealized”(VPRIV,349).Withmentionofthe“ought,”wehavemovedonto(2)–misrecognitionorthewayinwhichtheoppositionbetweensubjectivityandobjectivityrecurs.TheobviouswaythatthishappenshereisinthePhilosophyofRight’sversionofHegel’sso-called“emptyformalismobjection”toKantianethics.HereisHegel’spresentationfromtheHotholectures:

Dutyhereisthuscompletelywithoutcontent,genusbutwithoutfurtherdeterminationtospecies[GattungnochohneFortbestimmungzurArt].Butthereshouldbeaction[Aberessollgehandletwerden],andsothequestionarises:wheredoesthedeterminingprinciple[dasBestimmende]fall?Induty,withrespecttotheobjectivewehavenothingbutthisabstractionofthegood.Thisisthatwhichiswithoutdetermination,sothedeterminingfallsonthesubjectiveside(VPRIII,424).

Wehaveaconceptionoftheobjectivegoodthatoughttobeabletoserveastheonlyneededaimorendofaformofagency,butisunabletodoso.ToputitintheKantiantermssuggestedbythepreviouscomparison,wehavenomediatingtermsbetweentheabstractformalityofthelawandtheparticularsatisfactionsthatcomposewelfare.Thislackofmediatingtermsunderminesthegoalofthisformofagency,whichistomakethekindsofjudgmentssuggestedbythebenefitofcompetence–i.e.,tomakejudgmentsaboutthepartialidentityofrightandwelfare

Thequestionthenbecomes,howdowegetto(3)–i.e.,howdoesthisformofagencyhangtogetherdespitethesedifficulties.Therecanbenorealhopeofimprovementonthesubjectiveside–Hegeldoesnotthinkthatifwejustthinkhardenoughaboutthenatureofteleologyorthedrivetoachievegoalsingeneralwewillfindanyspecificguidancehere.Theimprovementhastobeintheformweexpectfrom(3),i.e.,bytakingthetheoreticalattitudetotheobjectivesideandidentifyingthese

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competingsides(rightandwelfare)bymeansofamediatingkind.Butinsearchingforthosemediatingkindstheresourcesofmoralityassuchgiveoutandweareforced,Hegelthinks,tolookatthewaysthattheseformsofmoralagencyareembodiedattheintersectionsofdifferentinstitutionsanddifferentwaysoflife.TheseinstitutionsaretheonesHegeldiscussesinEthicalLife:family,civilsociety(i.e.,allvoluntaryassociations),andthestate.ThewaysoflifearedescribedbyHegelastheStändeortheestates,someofwhichwehaveseenalready.Eachofthesewaysoflifeisaformofabsolutemodality,butHegel’sinterestingpointisthataimingatotherwaysoflifeasobjectsisitselfadistinctivewayoflifeandthusitsownformofabsolutemodality.

IV.Conclusion

ThoughHegelhasastrikinglypluralisticphilosophyofaction,wehaveseenthatheintendsthatphilosophytomakegoodonarangeoftraditionalcommitmentsrunningfromthenecessityofalternatepossibilitiesthroughthevalueofdesiresatisfactiontothecentralityofgoal-directedness.Itisofcoursetruethatmanyofthosepossibilities,desiresandgoalsareessentiallysocialandevencollective,andthatdeterminingtheirnatureisapublicandoftenretrospectiveinterpretiveact.Butthatdeterminationmustalsotakeitscuefromtheinterpretivedirectionproposedwiththeactbytheagentherself,andthenotionofabsolutemodalityisHegel’swayofseeingthatcueasconsistinginthesuggestionofacontextofinterpretationbywayofmarkingoutthecontrastoftheactionwithacertainrangeofotherpossibleactions.Thereisahermeneuticcirclehere,andoneofHegel’smostuniquecontributionstothephilosophyofactionishisdevelopmentofthepublicorsocialarcofthatcircle.Thisshouldnot,however,leadustooverlooktheextenttowhichhedevelopedversionsofthecategoriesinvolvedinthemoretraditionalarcofthatcircle,suchasmodalities,desiresandgoals.

Patten,Alan.Hegel’sIdeaofFreedom.Oxford;NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2002.

Pippin,RobertB.Hegel’sPracticalPhilosophy :RationalAgencyasEthicalLife.Cambridge,UK ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008.

Quante,Michael.Hegel’sConceptofAction.TranslatedbyDeanMoyar.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004.

Speight,Allen.Hegel,Literature,andtheProblemofAgency.1edition.Cambridge,U.K. ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001.

Stekeler-Weithofer,Pirmin.PhilosophiedesSelbstbewußtseins:HegelsSystemalsFormanalysevonWissenundAutonomie.Auflage:Originalausgabe.FrankfurtamMain:SuhrkampVerlag,2005.

Westphal,KennethR.“‘TheBasicContextandStructureofHegel’sPhilosophyofRight’.”InTheCambridgeCompaniontoHegel,editedbyF.C.Beiser,234–69.Cambridge,1993.

Yeomans,ChristopherL.FreedomandReflection:HegelandtheLogicofAgency.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2011.

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———.TheExpansionofAutonomy:Hegel’sPluralisticPhilosophyofAction.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2015.

1See,e.g.,Pippin,Hegel’sPracticalPhilosophy,15–16.,Stekeler-Weithofer,PhilosophiedesSelbstbewußtseins,355–7,andWestphal,“‘TheBasicContextandStructureofHegel’sPhilosophyofRight’,”245.ArelatedthoughsometimesdistinctinterpretivepositionistoseeHegelasacompatibilist.2See,e.g.,Quante,Hegel’sConceptofAction,120–38,Speight,Hegel,Literature,4–5and44,andPippin,Hegel’sPracticalPhilosophy.3Patten,Hegel’sIdea,70.4Yeomans,FreedomandReflection,sec.1.1.5Theseformsofaccountabilityalsohavelegalconnotations–MichaelQuantetranslates‘Zurechnungsfähigkeit’as‘sanity’–butthisaspectisoutsidethescopeofthischapter.6SeealsoPhG¶362,whereHegelisclearthatallsuccessfulactioninvolvessomekindofself-confirmation,evenwhenthatsuccessismeasuredby“theenjoymentofpleasure.”7SeeVPRIV,306foraparticularlyclearstatementofthis.8Yeomans,ExpansionofAutonomy,chap.5.