KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVENInstitute of Philosophy

HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF SUBLATION

A Critical Interpretation

Promoter: Professor William Desmond Dissertation presented to fulfill the requirements for the degree ofDoctor (Ph.D.) in PhilosophyBy: Ralph Palm

Leuven, 2009

KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT

LEUVEN

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my promoter Professor William Desmond for his invaluable guidance throughout the work on this dissertation; philosophical expertise is one thing, and insight another, and I have been lucky enough to study under someone gifted with both in excess. I would also like to thank Professor Ludovicus De Vos for his thoughtful and challenging comments; this study is all the stronger due to his input. I am grateful to the many other professors of the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, especially Professors Paul Cruysberghs, Herman De Dijn, Martin Moors, Bart Raymaekers, and Rudi Visker. What I know about philosophy I learned from them.

Thanks also go to those who helped me with the final preparation of this dissertation. Matthew Kostelecky helped proofread the text and provided valuable philosophical feedback. Jo Köhler was kind enough to double-check the German of the text for me. This dissertation was greatly strengthened through the contribution of Rembert De Blander, who assisted me with the statistical analysis in Chapter 2. My brother Eric Palm, who also helped with the proofreading, has forgotten more about the English language than I could seem to remember. To these four, as well as Renée, Michael, Julianne, Sydney, Heidi, Tom, Anneke, Frank, Luc, Vincent, Sarah, Michelle, Dan, Brian, Josh, Pascale, and anyone else that I have forgotten to mention: you should know that your friendship over the years will always be remembered.

This dissertation has involved a lot of hard work, but no small part of its successful completion has been due to blind luck. I was fortunate enough to be born to parents who have supported and encouraged me my entire life. This work would not have been possible without them, in more ways than I can count.

And to Iris: ik kan geen woorden vinden, in geen elke taal, om te zeggen hoe belangrijk je bent voor mij.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 1

GENERAL REMARKS .................................................................................................................................. 1 OUTLINE OF THE PROJECT ....................................................................................................................... 5

PART I: STRUCTURE .......................................................................................................................................... 8

CHAPTER 1: DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................ 8

A. POSITIVE DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................................................. 8 Remark: On Translating Aufheben .............................................................................................................. 13

B. NEGATIVE DEFINITIONS ......................................................................................................................... 15 1. Negation .................................................................................................................................................... 16 2. Synthesis .................................................................................................................................................... 18 3. Irony .......................................................................................................................................................... 21

CHAPTER 2: USAGE .......................................................................................................................................... 24

A. FREQUENCY ............................................................................................................................................... 24 Table 1. Number of Occurrences of the Various Forms .............................................................................. 26 Table 2. Summary of the Information on the Different Volumes ................................................................. 26 Table 3. Results of the Regression Analysis ................................................................................................. 29

B. SYNTAX ....................................................................................................................................................... 35 C. CONTEXT ..................................................................................................................................................... 38

Transition to Part II ....................................................................................................................................... 41

PART II: FUNCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 42

CHAPTER 3: BEING, NOTHING, AND BECOMING ................................................................................... 42

A. BEING AND NOTHING .............................................................................................................................. 45 Remark: On the Transitions in Hegel's Logic ............................................................................................... 48

B. BECOMING .................................................................................................................................................. 50

CHAPTER 4: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND CONTRADICTION .......................................................... 57

A. IDENTITY ..................................................................................................................................................... 59 1. Abstract Identity ........................................................................................................................................ 59 2. Essential Identity ....................................................................................................................................... 61

B. DIFFERENCE, DIVERSITY, AND OPPOSITION ..................................................................................... 65 1. Absolute Difference ................................................................................................................................... 65 2. Diversity .................................................................................................................................................... 68 3. Opposition ................................................................................................................................................. 70

C. CONTRADICTION ....................................................................................................................................... 73 1. First Explanation ....................................................................................................................................... 74 2. Second Explanation ................................................................................................................................... 84

CHAPTER 5: THE SYSTEM AND ITS MOMENTS ....................................................................................... 93

A. SYSTEM ....................................................................................................................................................... 93 B. IDEA .............................................................................................................................................................. 96 C. FORM AND METHOD .............................................................................................................................. 100

Transition to Part III .................................................................................................................................... 108

PART III: CRITIQUE ........................................................................................................................................ 109

CHAPTER 6: INTERNAL CRITIQUE ........................................................................................................... 109

A. DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 109 B. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................................. 118

CHAPTER 7: EXTERNAL CRITIQUE ........................................................................................................... 128

A. DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 128 B. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................................. 139

Remark: On Transcendence ....................................................................................................................... 142 Phenomenological Examples ....................................................................................................................... 143 1. Anxiety .................................................................................................................................................... 143 2. Trust ......................................................................................................................................................... 144 3. Hope ....................................................................................................................................................... 146

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................................... 156

A. METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................................................... 156 B. OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................................. 165 C. SIGNIFICANCE .......................................................................................................................................... 169

PART IV: SUPPLEMENTAL ........................................................................................................................... 181

DATA TABLES: FREQUENCY ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................... 181 Table 2. Summary of the Information on the Different Volumes ............................................................... 181 Table 3. Results of the Regression Analysis ............................................................................................... 181

A COMPARISON OF THE FIRST AND SECOND EDITIONS ............................................................................................... 182 First Edition, Paragraph 1 ............................................................................................................................ 182 Second Edition, Paragraph 1 ....................................................................................................................... 182 First Edition, Paragraph 2 ............................................................................................................................ 183 Second Edition, Paragraph 2 ....................................................................................................................... 183 First Edition, Paragraph 2.5 ........................................................................................................................ 183 First Edition, Paragraph 3 ............................................................................................................................ 184 Second Edition, Paragraph 3 ....................................................................................................................... 184

AUFHEBEN: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................... 185 General ........................................................................................................................................................ 185 Kant ............................................................................................................................................................. 185 Schiller ........................................................................................................................................................ 186 Marx ............................................................................................................................................................ 188

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................................... 191 Notes On Citations ...................................................................................................................................... 191 Works Cited ................................................................................................................................................. 191 Works Consulted ......................................................................................................................................... 193

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INTRODUCTION

GENERAL REMARKS

For Hegel, the concept of Aufheben, or sublation, is “one of the most important

concepts in philosophy, a fundamental determination, which repeatedly occurs throughout the

whole of philosophy…”1 Yet, for such an important concept, it has received relatively scant

treatment in the secondary literature. Among Anglophone Hegel scholars in particular,

extensive discussion of the concept is difficult to find outside of a translator’s preface.2 I

would like to take a small step toward rectifying this lacuna by presenting a critical

interpretation of Hegel’s concept of sublation.

Sublation can most simply be explained as the mainspring in the intricate clockwork

of Hegel’s thinking—that which drives it forward.3 Understanding what Hegel means by the

term 'sublation' in this technical sense is vitally important to understanding Hegel’s

philosophy as a whole.4 This word, in its various forms, is ubiquitous throughout Hegel’s

writings. Everywhere in Hegel, one can read over and over again how a given concept is

sublated in the transition to another. And while one can read volumes on those concepts and

1 “Aufheben und das Aufgehobene ist einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt…” (SL106; HW5/113). This is the First Edition version of the sentence. See Part IV for a comparison between the two editions. 2 See, for example, the translators' introduction of G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze, trans. and eds. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris (Hacket Publishing Company, 1991), xxvi, xxxv-xxxvi. This text is particularly interesting because, due a dispute among the translators, two different introductions are given. One of the points of contention is the proper translation of aufheben (between 'sublation' for Harris and Geraets and 'suspension' for Suchting). As a result of this dispute, their discussion is much more informative. This dispute in discussed in more detail in the Remark at the end of Chapter 1, Section A. 3 According to the Miller translation, Hegel writes, referring to his 'method' in the science of logic, "...the dialectic which it possesses within itself, which is the mainspring of its advance." The term 'mainspring', however, does not occur in the original: "...die Dialektik, die er an ihm selbst hat, welche ihn fortbewegt." (SL54; HW5/50) . While 'mainspring' is adequate, a more literal translation might be 'that which moves it forward'. For more on the relationship between sublation and dialectic, see Chapter 2, Section A and Chapter 5, Section C of this dissertation. 4 For a discussion of the difference between the technical sense Hegel gives to Aufheben and its meaning in everyday German, see Chapter 1, Section A.

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their interrelation, the literature contains only a few scattered remarks on what exactly the

word 'sublate’—the mechanism by which these transitions are carried out—actually means.

This study will attempt to show that the questions surrounding the meaning of

sublation in Hegel are not of a merely parochial, narrowly specialized interest. Many of the

most prevalent criticisms of Hegel hinge, one way or another, on a particular interpretation of

his concept of sublation. For example, the widely held notions that "Hegel’s philosophy

violates the law of non-contradiction" or that "Hegel’s philosophy is totalitarian" are both

contingent on a rejection of his claims about sublation.5 Thus, for both Hegel's defenders and

his critics, a firm grasp of his concept of sublation is essential.

Of course, the topic of this study is not without precedent. Any works on Hegel,

especially those works related to his logic, necessarily carry with it at least an implicit

interpretation of his concept of sublation. No one could have even begun to grasp the peculiar

meanings Hegel gives to logical moments like ‘Absolute Idea’ or ‘concept’ without already

having some understanding of sublation—even if it is one that rests only in the background.

In addition, one might well ask, why would we need a work on sublation, when we already

have hundreds on, say, dialectic?

The purpose of my approach here is to examine this old problem from a new angle. I

hope to demonstrate that a more elaborate and explicit treatment of Hegel’s logic in terms of

the concept of sublation offers certain hermeneutical advantages, which will be presented as

we proceed. It is my contention that a better understanding of Hegel's concept of sublation

will provide a better means to understand the rest of his thinking. To give a preliminary

example, in discussing Hegel’s logic in terms of dialectic, a conscientious author is forced

continually to remind his readers of the differences between the meaning of dialectic for

Hegel and the meaning of dialectic for other thinkers and in other traditions. This is especially

important in order to make clear the way in which Hegel's dialectic is not a formal method

5 For a more elaborate discussion of these criticisms, see Chapter 5.

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that can be readily abstracted from its subject matter.6 A treatment of Hegel’s logic in terms of

sublation helps avoid these sorts of potential confusions because sublation (in the technical

sense Hegel uses the term) is essentially unique to his thinking alone.7

On a more personal note, it is this distinctiveness that leads me to this topic. I began

my philosophical studies with an interest in issues of identity and difference in politics. From

there, I followed this interest into questions of identity and difference in intersubjectivity,

writing my Masters thesis on Husserl and Levinas,8 each of whom take either identity

(Husserl) or difference (Levinas) as somehow having priority over the other. In the end, I

found neither answer satisfactory. In Hegel, I discovered a thinker who seemed to treat

identity and difference not as competing privileges, but as ultimately interdependent. It is this

sort of interdependence that he expresses through the term 'sublation'.

Having moved from politics through social ontology to logic, I returned to the issues

which first sparked my interest in philosophy and found myself in a dilemma. While I found

that I sympathized with many aspects of Hegel’s logic, I could not fully endorse all of them.

While I had initially hoped to apply the concept of sublation to the other philosophical

questions that interested me, I came to realize through further study of his work that such an

application was not prudent, since any removal of the concept of sublation from the context of

its role in Hegel’s system would reduce it to exactly the kind of abstract, formal method

which Hegel (with good reason) rejected. I was led to the conclusion that what was needed

was some way to extract what I saw as the fruitful elements of Hegel’s concept of sublation

from his body of work as a whole in a way that at the same time addressed Hegel's concerns

about formal method.

6 Hegelian dialectic is not an abstract method that can simply be applied to various contents, but is rather essentially bound to the determination of the content of the Hegelian system itself. For Hegel’s rejection of any purely external formal method, as is found in traditional logic, see the Introduction of the Science of Logic, SL43-45; HW5/35-37. 7 For an account of this distinctiveness, see Part IV "Aufheben: A Brief Historical Overview".8 Ralph Palm, “Toward the Other in Husserl and Levinas: An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Sociality”, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2000.

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Earlier I wrote that sublation is the mainspring of dialectic, but this analogy is not

entirely apt. The system Hegel presents is not an extensively related, mechanistic unity from

which parts can be easily extracted and replaced. Rather, it is an intensively interrelated,

organic unity with each element dependent on all the others. According to Hegel's own

conception of this system, a more appropriate analogy would be not a clockwork, but a living

organism. Removed from its context, an element that makes up part of a living organism

ceases to function—both the organ and the organism die. In terms of this organic analogy, one

can see that it would be imprudent to browse through Hegel’s system and extract any single

element in isolation because the meaning of that element is dependent upon its position in and

relation to the whole. It is in this sense that these elements are much less like tools than

organs. Therefore, if there were a solution to this formal method problem, it would be less of

a mechanical repair than an organ transplant, and sublation less the mainspring of dialectic

than its heart.

Given this problem, the purpose of my critical interpretation is to analyze in detail

what Hegel says about sublation and how he uses it (Part I), to identify what role it plays in

his system (Part II), and then, based on these analyses, to evaluate its relative strengths and

weaknesses (Part III). It is only after such an analysis that any subsequent 'application' of the

concept of sublation could ever find a firm basis. My ultimate goal in this study will not be to

apply sublation, but rather to establish the necessary preliminary groundwork for such an

application—one that takes Hegel's rejection of formal method (and his reasons for doing so)

seriously. In terms of the organic analogy, I will not perform the 'organ transplant' here, but

rather conduct a sort of 'clinical study' in order to explore how such a procedure might be

beneficial, and to establish whether it would even be possible at all.

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OUTLINE OF THE PROJECT

In this study, I analyze of Hegel’s concept of sublation in three ways: structurally,

functionally, and critically. As we proceed, we will see how each of these analyses is

ultimately intertwined with all the others. The remainder of this section will specify more

precisely what I have in mind for each of these modes of analysis in particular.

The first part, on structure, analyzes Hegel’s concept of sublation in terms of how his

own writings present the concept, both explicitly and implicitly. Chapter 1, on the explicit

structure, first deals with Hegel's own discussions of sublation as such—his 'positive

definitions' of the term, or the points where Hegel states what sublation is. Next, this chapter

discusses the terms with which he contrasts sublation—his 'negative definitions', or points

where Hegel states what sublation is not. Chapter 2, on the implicit structure, looks at how

Hegel uses the term and what that usage can tell us about its meaning—from the general level

of the context in which and the frequency with which the term sublation occurs, down to the

specific level of the syntax of the sentences in which it is used. The benefit of approaching

sublation at this level of detail is that it will be useful for isolating some of the nuances of

Hegel’s sense of the term that might otherwise remain obscure. Thus, Part I will help clarify

the most common misconceptions about sublation and provide an overview that will guide

our later analysis. Continuing with the organic analogy, this section on the structure of the

concept could be said to present the anatomy of sublation.

The second part takes up three examples from the Science of Logic in order to

illustrate how the concept of sublation functions in Hegel's system. If Part I discusses what

sublation is, Part II discusses how it works. In the first chapter of this part (Chapter 3), I

discuss the classic first chapter of the Logic, in which Hegel treats the transition from Being

and Nothing to Becoming. In the second chapter of this part (Chapter 4) examines the second

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chapter of the second book of the Logic, on the “Determinations of Reflection”, in order to

discuss the relationships and subtle distinctions between the various moments of identity and

difference presented there. In the third chapter (Chapter 5), I look at the final chapter of the

Logic, on the Absolute Idea, in order to address the relationship between Hegel’s system as a

whole and its moments. In each case, these sets of examples will not be analyzed for their

own sake, but more specifically in terms of the role sublation plays in their development. It is

also important to note that while these three topics are just a small selection of the many

possible examples of how sublation functions in Hegel’s system, they have not been chosen

arbitrarily. These topics were chosen not only because they each represent a good example of

how sublation works in Hegel’s system, but also because they each illustrate important

aspects of the concept of sublation itself. Thus, the purpose of the functional analysis of Part

II is twofold: 1) to show concretely how sublation works in these moments and 2) to show

what these particular moments in turn can tell us about sublation itself. Analogically

speaking, if looking at the structure of a concept is like examining its anatomy, then analyzing

its function would be an examination of the physiology of sublation.

The third part should be both the most challenging and, I hope, the most fruitful

portion of my interpretation. Here, I offer two basic critiques of Hegel’s concept of sublation.

The first chapter of this part (Chapter 6) offers an internal critique of the concept—a critique

according to Hegel's own criteria and standards for philosophy. The second chapter (Chapter

7) presents an external critique—a critique appealing to premises not found in Hegel's

philosophy per se. At first glance, it might seem that only an internal critique would be a valid

one. However, this chapter also presents an argument for the way in which an external

critique can sometimes have its own sort of legitimacy, especially when offered in

conjunction with an internal one. While I believe the reference to internal criteria to be an

essential aspect of any critical analysis, I also believe that necessarily restricting one's

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arguments to those criteria alone is unduly limited. To summarize provisionally my argument:

the purpose of the history of philosophy cannot be only to understand the past; it must also

address its relevance for the present. The final chapter (Chapter 8) contains a series of

concluding remarks on this study's methodology, objectives, and significance. There I

summarize the results of the study, present the reasons underlying my approach, and explore

what I see as the potential significance of sublation for philosophy today. This last chapter

will also reveal the way the content of this study is reflected in its form. It is through a critical

interpretation of the relationship between the content and form of sublation that a solution to

the problem of applying the concept while at the same time addressing Hegel's rejection of

formal method will ultimately be found. In terms of the organic analogy, this third part would

make up the prognosis for sublation.

Part IV of this study contains various supplemental materials, including the data tables

used in Chapter 2, a side-by-side comparison of the first and second edition versions of the

passage in the Science of Logic in which Hegel offers his most elaborate discussion of

sublation, a brief historical overview of the concept of sublation, as well as the bibliography.

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PART I: STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 1: DEFINITIONS

A. POSITIVE DEFINITIONS

Hegel’s standard corpus contains four references to sublation as such. That is, there

are four moments in Hegel’s published writings where he does not simply use the term

sublation, but explicitly discusses its meaning. The earliest explicit reference to sublation is

found in the Phenomenology of Spirit.1 In this text, however, Hegel does little more than

mention the fact of the concept's complexity. Another explicit reference to sublation can be

found in the first part of the Encyclopedia.2 While this passage contains some specific

examples of what Hegel seems to have in mind, it is contained in the Zusätze, which are

additions by a later editor based on the lecture notes of Hegel’s students, and thus of

questionable reliability.3 The most elaborate and reliable of Hegel’s explicit references to

sublation are found in the two editions of his Science of Logic. I will rely primarily on an

1 "Sublation exhibits its true twofold meaning which we have seen in the negative: it is at once a negating and a preserving." "Das Aufheben stellt seine wahrhafte gedoppelte Bedeutung dar, welche wir an dem Negativen gesehen haben; es ist ein Negieren und ein Aufbewahren zugleich..." (PS68; HW3/94-TM) Note that in Miller’s original translation, aufheben is rendered here as ‘supersession’ here, which I have modified for the sake of consistency.2 "At this point, we should remember the double meaning of the German expression 'aufheben'. On the one hand, we understand it to mean 'clear away' or 'cancel', and in that sense we say that a law or regulation is cancelled.. But the words also means 'to preserve', and we say in this sense that something is well taken care of. This ambiguity in linguistic usage, through which the same word has a negative and a positive meaning, cannot be regarded as an accident nor yet as a reason to reproach language as if it were a source of confusion. We ought rather to recognize here the speculative spirit of our language, which transcends the 'either-or' of mere understanding.""Es ist hierbei an die gedoppelte Bedeutung unseres deutschen Ausdrucks aufheben zu erinnern. Unter aufheben verstehen wir einmal soviel als hinwegräumen, negieren, und sagen demgemäß z. B., ein Gesetz, eine Einrichtung usw. seien aufgehoben. Weiter heißt dann aber auch aufheben soviel als aufbewahren, und wir sprechen in diesem Sinn davon, daß etwas wohl aufgehoben sei. Dieser sprachgebräuchliche Doppelsinn, wonach dasselbe Wort eine negative und eine positive Bedeutung hat, darf nicht als zufällig angesehen noch etwa gar der Sprache zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, als zu Verwirrung Veranlassung gebend, sondern es ist darin der über das bloß verständige Entweder-Oder hinausschreitende spekulative Geist unserer Sprache zu erkennen." (EL154; HW8/204-205)3 Any mention of text from these additions here is purely for their explanatory value alone, and does not imply any philological claim as to their relative authenticity; that is, the Zusätze can be used to explain Hegel, but that does not mean their authorship need be attributed to him.

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exegesis of the more extensive second edition version in order to present Hegel’s explicit

definition of sublation.4

The remark on sublation from the Science of Logic comes at the end of the first

chapter of Book One (“The Doctrine of Being”) between his discussions of becoming and

determinate being (Dasein). It consists of only three paragraphs and begins with the passage

quoted at the opening of the introduction where Hegel claims that sublation is “one of the

most important concepts in philosophy.” Why, for Hegel, is sublation so significant?

We can begin to explain its importance by quoting the first lines of the second

paragraph: “‘To sublate’ has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to

preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to.”5 Now, a

word with more than one meaning is by no means remarkable in and of itself. Any dictionary

is full of them. Hegel, however, considers both of these meanings to function simultaneously.

He does not mean this simultaneity as a metaphor, or a pun, or in any figurative sense

whatsoever. The question is thus how one is to comprehend such a ‘literal double meaning’,

and therein lies the essence of sublation's complexity.

Hegel begins to suggest what he means in the next lines: “Even ‘to preserve’ includes

a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an

existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it.”6 Here, Hegel refers to

the common sense of aufheben used in ordinary, everyday German. As Walter Kaufmann

succinctly puts it, sublation “is what you do when something has fallen on the floor.”7 For

example, a book falls of a shelf and then I put it back. The "negative element" is my removal

of the book from the floor (i.e. its immediacy), but this action ‘preserves’ the book in so far as

4 See Part IV for a comparison of this passage in both editions.5 “Aufheben hat in der Sprache den gedoppelten Sinn, daß es soviel als aufbewahren, erhalten bedeutet und zugleich soviel als aufhören lassen, ein Ende machen.” (SL107; HW5/114) 6 “Das Aufbewahren selbst schließt schon das Negative in sich, daß etwas seiner Unmittelbarkeit und damit einem den äußerlichen Einwirkungen offenen Dasein entnommen wird, um es zu erhalten.” (SL107; HW5/114)7 Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation (University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 144. Few commentators before or since have so clear. Kaufmann's work on Hegel, while somewhat dated, is invaluable for just this sort of clarity that he provides in his explanations.

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it won’t get stepped on (i.e. "an existence which is open to external influences"). What is

important to note here is that the technical sense that Hegel gives to sublation is not arbitrarily

added to an ordinary German word, but is rather drawn out of it through a contemplation of

that ordinary sense.8

Hegel continues: “Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost

its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.”9 Here, Hegel emphasizes the

importance of the simultaneity of the two senses of sublation.10 It is also important to note

that, while Hegel draws out the preservative sense of sublation, this preservation does not

mean that the object remains unchanged.11

Hegel goes on to explain what he sees as the broader significance of this double

meaning: “The two definitions of ‘to sublate’ which we have given can be quoted as two

dictionary meanings of this word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has

come to use one and the same word for two opposite meanings.”12 Now we can see that Hegel

presents sublation as having a double meaning, which is to be taken not only as literal and

simultaneous, but also in which each meaning is opposed to the other. That is, the two

meanings are not only expressed at the same time, but they also (ordinarily) mutually exclude

each other. Since we are to take this literally, Hegel’s definition of sublation would seem, at

first, to violate the law of non-contradiction. Determining how one is to make sense of this (or

indeed, if it is possible to do so at all) will be discussed later in more detail.13 For the moment,

Hegel's claim must be provisionally accepted, at least as a possibility.

8 This distinction between Hegel's technical and nontechnical uses of aufheben is taken from Suchting's portion of the translator's introduction to The Encyclopedia Logic, ELxxxv. 9 “So ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine Unmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum nicht vernichtet ist.” (SL107; HW5/114-EA)10 I will discuss the difference between sublation and negation in more detail in the next section on Hegel's 'Negative Definitions' of sublation.11 Here I mean the grammatical object of the verb ‘to sublate’ and not the object in its technical, philosophical sense. Concepts can equally be ‘objects’ of sublation in this grammatical sense. See Chapter 2, Section B on Syntax for more details on this important distinction. 12 “Die angegebenen zwei Bestimmungen des Aufhebens können lexikalisch als zwei Bedeutungen dieses Wortes aufgeführt werden. Auffallend müßte es aber dabei sein, daß eine Sprache dazu gekommen ist, ein und dasselbe Wort für zwei entgegengesetzte Bestimmungen zu gebrauchen.” (SL107; HW5/114-EA)13 See Chapter 4, Section C.

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In the next lines, Hegel adds: “It is a delight to speculative thought to find in the

language words which have in themselves a speculative meaning; the German language has a

number of such.”14 Hegel here identifies sublation’s double meaning as a speculative one. Of

course, the term speculation does not have a pejorative connotation for Hegel. It is the term by

which he identifies his own thinking at its highest level. Hegel contrasts speculation with

what he refers to as ‘reflection’. Where reflection separates an object of thought into parts,

speculation reunites these parts—overcoming their opposition. This contrast between the

separation and the unity of opposites corresponds to the well-known distinction between

understanding and reason. In this way, when Hegel claims that sublation’s double meaning is

speculative, he is claiming, in effect, that it is rational.15

To summarize what we have seen so far, Hegel positively defines his technical sense

of sublation as having the meanings of both negation and preservation in a way that is:

· double· literal· simultaneous· self-opposed· speculative (or rational)

On top of this, Hegel seems to stack a third, simultaneously active meaning onto his already

crowded term. In remarking on the relationship between the German aufheben and the Latin

tollere, Hegel writes that: “The double meaning of the Latin tollere (which has become

famous through the Ciceronian pun: tollendum est Octavium) does not go so far; its

affirmative determination signifies only a lifting up.”16 Many commentators and translators

have interpreted Hegel to mean that, in addition to negation and preservation, Hegel intends to

add a third meaning of ‘elevation’. This addition is traditional and common in scholarly

treatments of the term. For example, Michael Inwood, in his entry on sublation in his Hegel 14 “Für das spekulative Denken ist es erfreulich, in der Sprache Wörter zu finden, welche eine spekulative Bedeutung an ihnen selbst haben; die deutsche Sprache hat mehrere dergleichen.” (SL107; HW5/114-EA)15 See the Encyclopedia passage cited earlier in this chapter, in note 2.16 “Der Doppelsinn des lateinischen tollere (der durch den Ciceronianischen Witz ‘tollendum esse Octavium’ berühmt geworden) geht nicht so weit, die affirmative Bestimmung geht nur bis zum Emporheben.” (SL107; HW5/114)

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Dictionary, writes:

What results from the sublation of something, e.g. the whole in which both it and its opposite survive as moments, is invariably higher than, or the truth of, the item(s) sublated. Thus despite Hegel's silence on the matter, it is reasonable to see...'elevation' as an ingredient in its Hegelian meaning."17

Inwood's (et al.) inference here is incorrect. While elevation may be implied by the

progressive nature of Hegel’s thought and is present in the ordinary German sense of

aufheben, it is not a feature of sublation in its technical Hegelian sense. From the Hegel

passage cited above, it is clear that, like aufheben, tollere has a double meaning—one positive

(‘affirmative") and one negative. In this passage, however, the affirmative meaning of tollere

("to lift up") is contrasted with the affirmative meaning of aufheben ("to preserve"). Tollere’s

affirmative meaning is said to be "only" elevation. Hegel is therefore claiming that the

opposition within aufheben is stronger than that of tollere, because in aufheben preservation

operates in a stronger contrast to negation than elevation does. In effect, preservation

‘replaces’ elevation as the affirmative meaning in the internal opposition contained within the

technical Hegelian sense of the term. In other words, the connotation of elevation (which

aufheben carries over from its non-technical, ordinary German sense) is not a third

denotation, but rather a weaker aspect of preservation.

Even though it contradicts Hegel's own explicit statements on the matter, the mistake

of interpolating the sense of 'elevation' into sublation is nevertheless an understandable one.

Elevation is both a part of the ordinary German sense of the term and implied by the overall

structure of Hegel's logic. However—and this is very important—elevation is not a sense of

Hegel's own strictly technical sense of the term itself. The error here is a matter of

interpolating the use that the term is put to (in Hegel's philosophy in general) into the

meaning of the term itself, thereby conflating Hegel's philosophy with his terminology. But

any philosophy is more than the mere sum of its vocabulary. While sublation is the operant

17 Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Blackwell, 1992), 284.

13

term18 in the overall process of Hegel's logic, it should not be conflated with that process. One

might say, for example, that 'all surgery involves cutting', but that does not mean that the

denotation of the term 'cutting' itself somehow implies surgery. Conflating the meaning of a

term with its use obscures both. Sublation is an important part of Hegel's logic, but that does

not mean one should mistake the part for the whole.

Such a conflation is also the reason why (English) translators have expended so much

effort trying to find the 'perfect word' to render Hegel's aufheben, using words like supersede,

sublimate, suspend, and so forth. The problem here is that no single English word (or, in fact,

a single word in any language) can convey the entirety of Hegel's intended philosophical

meaning. Moreover, the same would be true for almost any philosophically interesting term.

What is expected in these translations is that some perfect word choice could somehow 'bear

the weight' of explaining a concept's complexities—that translation could somehow serve as a

substitute for a more elaborate interpretation. What is required here, however, is not a better

translation, but a better explanation. It is from the moment one confuses the two, and (in the

case of elevation and sublation) begins interpolating Hegel's philosophy into his terminology

(e.g. with a translation like supersede), that Hegel's aufheben first becomes, for English

readers, something seemingly inexplicable.

Remark: On Translating Aufheben

This conflict between translation and explanation is also why in this study I have

simply adopted the traditional English translation of aufheben as sublation,19 rather than

18 By 'operant term', I mean that sublation is the 'logical operator' of Hegel's dialectical-speculative logic, in a manner analogous to the way conjunction, disjunction, negation, condition, and bicondition are the operators of formal (symbolic) logic, or the way addition, subtraction, multiplication and division are the operators of mathematics. Of course, in making this analogy, I do not mean to imply that Hegel's logic is literally formal in any respect. It is only an analogy, not an equivalence. 19 The translation of aufheben with 'sublation' comes originally from J.M. Stirling, The Secret of Hegel: Being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form and Matter (reprint Oliver and Boyd, 1898: original 1865). The link between the two terms is via tollere, of which sublatus is the past participle (Inwood, 283). The problem with this translation, in addition to the fact that 'sublation' has long been obsolete, is that while aufheben has been used to translate tollere into German (e.g. in Wolff and Baumgarten), Hegel himself contrasts the two terms.

14

experiment with some substitute. I am inclined to agree with Suchting that 'suspension' works

well as a possible English translation. Harris and Geraets's argument that suspension is "out of

place in pure logic" is a non sequitur.20 Suchting mentions that "The only objection I have

heard against the suggestion is that 'suspend' has an overtone of temporariness, which

aufheben, at least in Hegel's technical use of it, does not."21 Since Harris and Geraets's

introduction provides no real justification for their decision, one need not wonder for long

from whom Suchting heard this objection. It is, in any case, an unsound one, insofar as the

temporary connotations of 'suspension' are related to its institutional (and academic) senses,

and not, say, its physical or chemical senses; few would argue that salt is "temporarily"

suspended in seawater (except on a broad hydrological scale) or that the Brooklyn bridge (a

suspension bridge) is a "temporary" construction (opened 1883). I have not adopted this

substitution simply because its utility as a translation is metaphorical; suspension has a dual

sense, but it conveys Hegel's particular dual sense of aufheben only figuratively. Like

aufheben, suspension has a dual sense, but this does not mean anything other than that they

are comparable, not that they are synonymous. For example, the negative aspect of suspension

in its chemical sense—'dissolution'—is comparable to negation, but is not literally negation.

By contrast, Hegel is explicit in his contention that the double meaning of aufheben is to be

taken literally. Any introduction of metaphor into the equation, even if it is not the sort of

metaphor Hegel rejected, still risks confusion.

The problem is that there is no literal, direct translation for aufheben. Any English

term would simply be a place-holder, because there is no single verbum verbo equivalent.22

Nor is such a word-for-word substitution strictly necessary. Recognizing this, some

20 ELxxvi. No reason is given (by Harris and Geraets) why it would be 'out of place', or why it would even matter if it were. 21 ELxxvi22 For sublation's utility as a place-holder, see the translator's remark in Jean Luc-Nancy, Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. Jason Smith and Steven Miller (University of Minnesota, 2002), 118 n.13. Nancy himself is not interested in the "multiple choices of various translators" arguing instead that "One must mediate these and try to penetrate the thing." Nancy, 118.

15

translators have instead opted to translate aufheben with various terms in the same text, each

tailored to the specific context of each passage.23 In this case one buys precision at the cost of

textual integrity. The fact that for Hegel the term expresses a single operation is completely

lost and the problem of aufheben's complexity is simply ignored. Another possibility is

leaving the term untranslated in English.24 The problem with this approach is that as a German

word, it cannot be conjugated in an English sentence. As such, it is restricted to appearing in

its nominative form (Aufhebung) or as a gerund (Aufheben). In this case, the active, verbal

character of the term is lost. H. B. Nisbet applies the somewhat novel solution of combining

these approaches, translating aufheben with a variety of terms depending on the context, but

indicating each instance with the German original in parenthesis.25 Unfortunately, while this

solution works when translating Hegel's writings, it is of less use in discussing them.

Given these difficulties, the traditional option of 'sublation' is probably the least

problematic alternative. While the English term is obsolete and explains virtually nothing

about the original term's meaning, it does not conceal anything about it either. Also, since the

English term is no longer in common use, there is little chance that any connotation of it will

obscure the meaning of the original Hegelian term. With the use of such a place-holder,

however, an explanation of the original's meaning is absolutely essential. Providing such an

explanation of the term aufheben is an important function of this study.

B. NEGATIVE DEFINITIONS

Having now presented what Hegel says sublation is, I can now examine what Hegel

says it is not. Hegel contrasts his technical sense of sublation with three other concepts:

negation, synthesis, and irony. Analyzing these contrasts will help us further determine

Hegel’s basic comprehension of his concept of sublation.

23 See, for example, Clark Butler's recent translation of the Lectures on Logic: Berlin, 1831 (Indiana University Press, 2008). 24 Heidegger's Dasein, for example, is a similarly problematic term for the point of view of translation. 25 Hegel, G.W.F., Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1999).

16

1. Negation

First and foremost, Hegel contrasts sublation with simple negation. From the first lines

of the remark that we have been examining, Hegel writes of sublation that, “It is a

fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the

meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially distinguished from nothing.”26 This

distinction is of the most fundamental importance. When taken in its ordinary German sense,

aufheben can be, and most commonly is, a synonym for various types of negation (i.e. "to

cancel", "to abolish", etc.). By contrasting negation with sublation, Hegel draws a firm

distinction between this ordinary sense and his technical sense—informing his readers that

sublation should not be understood in a solely conventional way.

Hegel continues by specifying the distinction between sublation and negation more

precisely: “What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is

sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation;”27 When Hegel refers to ‘the sublated’

(das Aufgehobene) he is of course referring to the thing which undergoes the (syntactical)

operation, that which is being sublated.28 It is this result which he distinguishes from nothing

and it is precisely distinguished here as a result. In the lead-up to the passage cited, the

concept of nothing has just been defined by Hegel as that which is immediate and without

determination, or “complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content”29 The

sublated (das Aufgehobene), by contrast, is that which has been determined, or mediated.

Hegel makes things a bit more complicated when he continues by referring to the

sublated as “a non-being but as a result which has its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in

itself the determinations from which it originates.”30 The first problem here is that if the

26 “…eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt, deren Sinn bestimmt aufzufassen und besonders vom Nichts zu unterscheiden ist.” (SL107; HW5/113-EA)27 “…Was sich aufhebt, wird dadurch nicht zu Nichts. Nichts ist das Unmittelbare…” (SL107; HW5/113)28 For more on this, see Chapter 2, Section 1. 29 “…vollkommene Leerheit, Bestimmungs- und Inhaltslosigkeit…” (SL82; HW5/83)30 “ …es ist das Nichtseiende, aber als Resultat, das von einem Sein ausgegangen ist; es hat daher die Bestimmtheit, aus der es herkommt, noch an sich. ” (SL107; HW5/113-114-EA)

17

sublated is a ‘non-being’ (das Nichtseiende), then how is that to be distinguished from its

being reduced to nothing (Nichts)? The key to this distinction is the root -seiende (‘a being’).

The distinction Hegel makes here between nothing (Nichts) and a non-being (Nichtseiende)

corresponds to the distinction between being (Sein) and a being (Seiende). Nothing is an

indeterminate absence, while a non-being is some determinate thing that is (in some sense)

absent. What then is the nature of this determinate absence?

Insofar as the nothingness of the sublated is not the general abyss of pure nothing as

such, but the particular absence of a particular sort of non-being, it maintains a degree of

determination—the aforementioned determination from which it originates. This can be

clarified by repeating a line quoted earlier: “Thus what is sublated is at the same time

preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.”31 Thus, what

is negated in sublation is not the moment itself, but rather its immediacy. What is preserved is

its determinateness as a moment. The sublated is a non-being only in the sense that it is

removed from its finite particularity and taken up into a broader context—a context within

which it can be more fully determined and thus more fully comprehended. Hegel makes this

point clearer in a revision of the remark in the second edition of the Logic, when, in a

parenthetical reference in the first sentence he equates the sublated with the ideal (das

Ideelle). What is sublated is thus that which comes to be understood not as it is in its finite

particularity, but in its truth, as a moment of Hegel’s idealism. In this way, sublation can also

be interpreted as the act of idealization.32

At this point, I think the relationship between the positive and negative aspects of

sublation can best be clarified with an example. Think of an archeological artifact—a piece of

pottery lying discarded for thousands of years, exposed to the elements or buried in the sand.

One day, an archeologist discovers it, studies it, analyzes its significance for the civilization it

31 Cited above; see note 9.32 Of course, this is not in terms of an abstract, subjective idealism, but rather of a concrete, absolute idealism. For further explanation, see Chapter 5, Section B.

18

comes from, publishes a paper on it, and places it on the appropriate shelf in a museum. The

piece of pottery is removed from its immediacy (in the sand) and is taken up into the realm of

scientific study (in the museum). Whereas before it existed only as ancient rubbish, it has now

become a significant artifact. The pottery shard acquires its significance through being

collected, studied, dated, and thereby placed in a new, more fully determined context. Such a

process is analogous to the process of sublation.

With this example, we can begin to see why, even when the proper, technical sense of

sublation is taken into account, it can nevertheless be problematic. For instance, if in our

example one exchanges the piece of pottery for a religious idol, then we see that the object

‘properly understood’ loses not just the external circumstances of its ‘abstractness’, but it can

also lose essential aspects of its own significance. A religious idol in a museum, functioning

as a scientific object, no longer functions as an object of religious veneration. This example

suggests the possibility that whether sublation is considered problematic is dependent on the

nature of the object being sublated and not necessarily the concept of sublation as such.33 That

which is sublated is not annihilated, but it does not on that account remain unchanged. While

sublation should not be confused with simple negation, it should also not be forgotten that

negation makes up one half of sublation’s double meaning, and that the term is thus not in

every case simply innocuous.

2. Synthesis

When Hegel’s concept of sublation is confused with simple negation, its negative

sense is overemphasized and its affirmative sense is neglected. On the other hand, when

sublation is confused with synthesis, its positive sense is overemphasized and its negative

sense is neglected. Hegel is less direct in making this distinction, but it is nevertheless equally

important to grasp the concept of sublation in its full technical complexity.

33 I will address these potentially problematic aspects of sublation in more detail in Chapter 7.

19

Hegel’s clearest account of the difference between sublation and synthesis occurs in

the second chapter of the last section of the Science of Logic in his account of the “Idea of the

True” (Die Idee des Wahren).34 Here, Hegel describes the inadequacy of subjective cognition

(i.e. the subjective Idea) for theoretical cognition (i.e. the Idea of the True), for obtaining truth

in its proper sense. The specific difference between the two types of cognition is the

difference between synthesis and sublation.

Hegel defines truth as the unity of concept and reality.35 For Hegel, subjective

cognition is inadequate because its result is a synthesis, defined as “a unity of things that are

originally separate and only externally so conjoined.”36 Subjective cognition does not attain

the level of truth because synthesis, as an external unification, does not complete the

unification of concept and reality. In a clear reference to Kant’s synthetic unity of

apperception, Hegel writes: “At this standpoint, the object is credited with being an unknown

thing-in-itself behind cognition, and this character of the object, and with it truth too is

regarded as an absolute beyond for cognition.”37 For Hegel, subjective cognition claims a truth

that it does not, and cannot, possess so long as concept and reality remain only externally

related. Their unification is external because the unknowability of the thing-in-itself

interposes a boundary between concept and reality. Insofar as they are kept apart in this way,

both concept and reality remain abstract and thus, for Hegel, incomplete. Furthermore,

according to Hegel, subjective cognition is not merely inadequate but contradictory. The

contradiction is between subjective cognition’s truth-claims and its lack of truth, since,

according to Hegel's definition, it fails to fully unify concept and reality: “the contradiction of

34 Book 2, Section 3, Chapter 2 of the Science of Logic. (SL783-818; HW6/498-541)35 “...die Einheit des Begriffs und der Realität...” (SL785; HW6/499) For more on Hegel's concept of truth, see Chapter 5, Section B.36 “…einer Einheit von solchen, die ursprünglich geschieden, nur äußerlich so verbunden seien.” (SL784; HW6/499-EA)37 “Auf diesem Standpunkte wird dem Objekte eine unbekannte Dingheit-an-sich hinter dem Erkennen zugeschrieben und dieselbe und damit auch die Wahrheit als ein absolutes Jenseits für das Erkennen betrachtet.” (SL785; HW6/500-EA)

20

a truth which is at the same time is supposed not to be truth—of a cognition of what is, which

at the same time does not cognize the thing-in-itself.”38

Subjective cognition itself, however, is not satisfied with the external unity provided

by synthesis. It contains already at the beginning an “urge to truth.”39 This is the urge of

cognition not merely to synthesize itself with the otherness of its object but also the urge to

sublate that otherness, to negate its separateness (i.e. its abstractness) and to preserve it as a

moment of itself. For Hegel, what is sublated is not the object, the reality, but the otherness of

that reality which separates it from the concept. Thus, he says of the urge to truth: “The

specific nature of this urge is therefore to sublate its own subjectivity, to make its first abstract

reality into a concrete one…”40 In describing subjective cognition as ‘sublating itself’, Hegel

means that it is the contradiction between concept and reality that is sublated. The cognition

that operates via synthesis collapses and is replaced by a cognition which operates via

sublation. What is thus sublated at this moment of the system is the very inadequacy of

synthesis itself.

Much more could be said about the nature of this cognition. Our purpose here,

however, is not to analyze cognition but to distinguish sublation from synthesis. The

inadequacy of synthesis, as demonstrated here, should leave no doubt as to the inadequacy of

those old accounts that attribute to Hegel a ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’ formula,41 thus

bringing us one step further along in our study.

38 “...-der Widerspruch einer Wahrheit, die zugleich nicht Wahrheit sein soll, - eines Erkennens dessen, was ist, welches zugleich das Ding-an-sich nicht erkennt.” (SL785; HW6/500) Of course, Hegel has a very broad and complicated definition of contradiction, which will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 4, Section C.39 “der Trieb der Wahrheit” (SL783; HW6/498)40 “Der Trieb hat daher die Bestimmtheit, seine eigene Subjektivität aufzuheben, seine erst abstrakte Realität zur konkreten zu machen…” (SL783; HW6/498) I have here maintained Miller's translation of aufzuheben as sublation.41 For a brief historical account of this misconception, see Gustav Mueller, “The Hegel Legend of ‘Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis’", The Hegel Myths and Legends, ed. Jon Stewart (Northwestern, 1996), 301-305.

21

3. Irony

The last of the key concepts to be distinguished from sublation is irony. While

interpreting sublation as either negation or synthesis overemphasized one half or the other of

sublation’s double meaning, the difference between sublation and irony is to be found in the

nature of that double meaning itself.

At first glance, any confusion between sublation and irony hardly seems likely. It

would be a strange interpretation indeed that treated Hegel’s system as one (very) long joke.

However, irony is a trope that comes very close to the meaning Hegel assigns to sublation; a

treatment of irony will therefore be useful for refining our account. While many figurative

uses of language rely on some sort of double meaning, it is in irony that those meanings are

not simply compared (simile), equated (metaphor), or contrasted (juxtaposition), but opposed.

From our earlier list of positive characteristics, irony and sublation share three out of five.42

And while irony is of course not literal by definition, it cannot be assumed that irony is

without speculative significance.

Here, I have been referring to simple verbal irony. Hegel’s writings explicitly refer to

two other types of irony: Socratic irony and Romantic irony. Socratic irony refers to the

original Greek sense of eironeia, or feigned ignorance, where the opposition is between what

one knows and what one claims to know. For Socrates, this is obviously not a form of

deception, but a means by which to educate—leading away from commonly held assumptions

and towards a deeper truth.43

In Romantic irony on the other hand, the opposition is between one’s professed

attitudes, beliefs, and opinions and those one actually holds. Friedrich Schlegel conflates the

Socratic and the Romantic forms of irony:

[Socratic irony] involves and arouses a sense of the irreconcilable conflict between the absolute and the relative, between the necessity of complete communication and its

42 That is, double meaning, simultaneity, and opposition.43 LHP1/398; HW18/458.

22

impossibility. It is the freest of all liberties, since it allows one to rise above oneself…It is all the better if harmonious dolts do not know what to make of this constant self-parody, if they waver endlessly between belief and disbelief until they get dizzy and take a joke for gravity and gravity for a joke.44

Hegel, in contrast to Schlegel, distinguishes between Socratic and Romantic irony. According

to Hegel: “From this irony of our times [i.e. Romantic irony], the irony of Socrates is far

removed.”45 While he considers both to be merely subjective (and therefore abstract and

incomplete), the two are subjective in different ways. For Hegel, Socratic irony is above all

distinct from Romantic irony insofar as Socratic irony is directed against persons in

conversation, or their opinions about the world, while Romantic Irony is directed against what

is actual, or the world itself.46 For Hegel, Socratic irony is pedagogical, while Romantic irony

is skeptical. Socratic irony is limited insofar as it is merely pedagogical. It remains abstract

wherever an aporia remains. Romantic irony is skeptical insofar as the ironic attitude of the

‘divine genius’ or the ‘beautiful soul’ is placed over and against everything but himself: “the

vanity of everything factual, moral, and of intrinsic worth, the nullity of everything objective

and absolutely valid.”47 Furthermore:

This [Romantic] irony is thus a toying with everything, and it can transform all things into semblance: to this subjectivity nothing is any longer serious, for any seriousness which it has, immediately becomes dissipated in jokes, and all noble and divine truth vanishes away or becomes mere triviality.48

In contrast to these remarks against the irony of Friedrich Schlegel, Hegel recognizes a

more philosophically respectable form of irony: that of K.W.F. Solger. Hegel does not discuss

Solger’s thought at length, but he does refer to him with a great deal of respect. Hegel

considers Solger’s use of the concept of irony, while ultimately incomplete, to come from a

"genuinely speculative" longing. I will quote Hegel’s characterization of it at length:

44 Friedrich Schlegel, Lyceum Fragments 108 (1797), quoted in Inwood, 147.45 “Von dieser Ironie unserer Zeit ist die Ironie des Sokrates weit entfernt.” (LHP1/401-402; HW18/461)46 LHP1/400-401; HW18/461. 47 “…nun einerseits die Eitelkeit alles Sachlichen, Sittlichen und in sich Gehaltvollen, die Nichtigkeit alles Objektiven und an und für sich Geltenden.” (LA66; HW13/96)48 “Die Ironie ist das Spiel mit allem; dieser Subjektivität ist es mit nichts mehr Ernst, sie macht Ernst, vernichtet ihn aber wieder und kann alles in Schein verwandeln. Alle hohe und göttliche Wahrheit löst sich in Nichtigkeit (Gemeinheit) auf; aller Ernst ist zugleich nur Scherz.” (LHP1/401; HW18/460-EA)

23

In this process he [Solger] came to the dialectical moment of the Idea, to the point which I call ‘infinite absolute negativity’, to the activity of the Idea in so negating itself as infinite and universal as to become finitude and particularity, and in nevertheless sublating this negation in turn and so re-establishing the universal and infinite in the finite and particular. To this negativity Solger firmly clung, and of course it is one element in the speculative Idea, yet interpreted as this purely dialectical unrest and dissolution of both infinite and finite, only one element, and not, as Solger will have it, the whole Idea.49

With these last remarks, we can clearly see (aside from the obvious literal/figurative

distinction) how sublation is different from irony. The dissolution which occurs within irony

is homologous50 to the dissolution we saw with simple negation. And as with negation, it is

only one element of sublation’s double meaning, only half the story. Unlike that which is

treated ironically, what is sublated does not vanish and neither is it reduced to a mere

semblance or triviality. And while the sublated does not remain untouched or unaltered, it is

nevertheless preserved, in a significant, non-trivial way.

What precisely is lost and gained in the process of sublation will be further examined

in the following chapter, where I will examine not what Hegel says explicitly about the

meaning of the term 'sublation', but rather what is implicit in his usage of it.

49 “Hier kam er auf das dialektische Moment der Idee, auf den Punkt, den ich "unendliche absolute Negativität" nenne, auf die Tätigkeit der Idee, sich als das Unendliche und Allgemeine zu negieren zur Endlichkeit und Besonderheit und diese Negation ebensosehr wieder aufzuheben und somit das Allgemeine und Unendliche im Endlichen und Besonderen wiederherzustellen. An dieser Negativität hielt Solger fest, und allerdings ist sie ein Moment in der spekulativen Idee, doch, als diese bloße dialektische Unruhe und Auflösung des Unendlichen wie des Endlichen gefaßt, auch nur ein Moment, nicht aber, wie Solger es will, die ganze Idee.” (LA68-69; HW13/98-99)50 By 'homologous' I mean something more than merely analogous. It is not a similar structure, but the same structure. To put it another way, the two dissolutions are similar in that they both have the same structure, but the structures themselves are identical.

CHAPTER 2: USAGE

In Chapter 1, we saw how Hegel explicitly defines his technical conception of

sublation, both positively and negatively. Now, we will proceed further and examine what

Hegel's writings convey implicitly about sublation—not what he says about it, but how he

uses it.1 I examine Hegel's usage in three ways. First, I analyze the relative frequency with

which he uses various forms of aufheben. Second, I look at the grammatical syntax of the

sentences in which these uses occur. Third, I examine what the context in which he uses the

term can tell us about its precise meaning.

Taken in itself, this level of detail might initially seem excessive. However, what I

hope to show in these analyses would be difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty by

other, more general methods. The basic purpose of these analyses is to reinforce some of the

claims made in my textual analysis in Chapter 1. Furthermore, it is my hope that these

analyses will highlight certain aspects of Hegel's concept of sublation that might otherwise be

neglected or overlooked.

A. FREQUENCY

The first step in the analysis of Hegel's usage of 'sublation' will be to examine the

frequency with which the term occurs in Hegel's writings. By analyzing this frequency

statistically, relative to certain other variables, we will be able to draw certain conclusions

about Hegel's usage. The basic methodology behind this frequency analysis is derived from

what is called 'stylometry', a form of quantitative linguistics. However, the application here is

distinct. Stylometric analyses commonly use known features internal to a text (e.g. distinctive

features of a given writer's particular style) to ascertain unknown features external to the

1 The general treatment of Hegel's usage here is distinct from the treatment of its function in Part II insofar as this chapter treats its use in abstract, general terms, while the next Part will treat its use in relation to concrete moments of Hegel's logic. To put it another way, while general usage as an aspect of structure is an implicit feature of Hegel's writings, the particular uses that occur there are something explicit.

24

content of the text itself (e.g. questions regarding authorship or the sequence in which texts

were written). By contrast, this frequency analysis uses known external features (e.g. target

audience, sequence) to help determine features internal to the structure of the text itself. I am

not aware of any precedent for this approach, but I hope to demonstrate its potential utility by

way of example. It is also important to emphasize at the outset that this statistical approach is

only presented as one mode of analysis among many, and is offered as a supplement to, and

not a substitute for, more traditional modes of textual analysis.

Throughout his works, Hegel uses aufheben in a variety of declensions, conjugations,

and various other specialized forms. The four most common forms in which the term occurs

are:2

aufgehoben "is sublated" aufheben "to sublate"aufhebt "sublates"Aufhebung "sublation"

The data presented in the tables below are based on the frequency with which each of these

forms occur in Hegel's works and compared with other relevant information. The first table

(Table 1) lists the number of occurrences in Hegel's works of each of these forms of aufheben

compared with the number of instances of Dialektik.3 The second table (Table 2) summarizes

this material, together with other quantitative information about each volume: the total

number of pages per volume, the average date of each text, the total instances of all forms of a

term, the average number of occurrences per page (the frequency), and a comparison of the

average frequencies of aufheben and Dialektik.

2 Listed in order of frequency, highest to lowest. See Table 1 for details. Importantly, this list does not include instances of aufheben used separably (hebt...auf). This problem is addressed at the end of this section. 3 This data has been collected from the electronic version of Hegel's collected works: G.W.F. Hegel Werke. CD-ROM. Tapla-Verlag Berlin, Version 2.0, which is itself based on G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in 20 Bänden (Suhrkamp, 1970). The original files were converted to PDF format in order to facilitate navigation, search, and data collection.

25

Table 1. Number of Occurrences of the Various Forms 4

aufgehoben aufheben aufhebt Aufhebung Dialektik dialektischeEarly Writings 65 20 13 35 0 0Jena Writings 78 40 20 19 2 1Phenomenology of Spirit 165 107 37 6 12 21Nürnberg & Heidelberg 86 73 19 11 40 24Science of Logic 393 223 77 17 72 47Philosophy of Right 26 35 9 11 17 5Encyclopedia 227 140 50 63 66 36Berlin Writings 16 16 7 6 18 7Philosophy of History 20 9 8 4 5 2Philosophy of Fine Art 33 32 34 18 2 5Philosophy of Religion 131 88 39 43 16 14History of Philosophy 109 65 31 7 215 35

Table 2. Summary of the Information on the Different Volumes5

Pages Date Aufheben Dialektik DifferenceTotal Average Total Average Total Average Average

Early Writings 388 1798.5 133 0.34 0 0.00 0.33Jena Writings 276 1804 157 0.57 3 0.01 0.56Phenomenology of Spirit 296 1807 315 1.06 33 0.11 0.95Nürnberg & Heidelberg 454 1812.5 189 0.42 64 0.14 0.28Science of Logic 593 1814 710 1.20 119 0.20 1.00Philosophy of Right 270 1820 81 0.30 22 0.08 0.22Encyclopedia 773 1823.5 480 0.62 102 0.13 0.49Berlin Writings 317 1824.5 45 0.14 25 0.08 0.06Philosophy of History 288 1826 41 0.14 7 0.02 0.12Philosophy of Fine Art 887 1824 117 0.13 7 0.01 0.12Philosophy of Religion 508 1826 301 0.59 30 0.06 0.53History of Philosophy 843 1824 212 0.25 250 0.30 -0.05

An analysis of this data is used to make four basic claims, discussed below.

First of all, as one can see from Table 1, Hegel uses sublation most frequently in his

more technical works, i.e. the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic. The term

'technical' here does not indicate a vague impression of a text's complexity, but rather the

specific nature of their intended audience. Of the four books published by Hegel in his

4 The numbers in Table 1 indicate the total number of occurrences of each form of each term arranged by the volume of the Suhrkamp edition. Also, the last column (dialektische) includes all of the occurrences of its other declensions as well (e.g. dialektischer, dialektischen, etc.).5 The 'Pages Total' lists the total pages of each volume, as converted to PDF—importantly, not the page counts for the print edition. The 'Date Average' is average year for all the texts included in a given volume, according to the Suhrkamp edition. The averages listed for each term are simply the number of occurrences divided into the number of pages to get the frequency per page. The 'Difference Average' is the frequency of aufheben subtracted from that of Dialektik. A positive number indicates that aufheben is more common than Dialektik and by how much. A negative number is this column indicates that Dialektik is more common.

26

lifetime (i.e. the Phenomenology, the Logic, the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopedia),

the Phenomenology and the Logic were the only two written directly for an audience of

professional philosophers. While the Encyclopedia and the Philosophy of Right certainly have

serious philosophical content, they were originally published as textbooks or outlines for

students. Thus, for our purposes the designation 'technical' indicates a published work that is

not a student textbook.6 The remaining works listed are collections of unpublished writings,

short pieces, and compilations of lecture notes. What is interesting when one looks at the data

here is how the distinction between the intended audience of each set of works (i.e. technical

versus non-technical) seems to be related to the frequency of the term 'sublation'. The more

technical works (the Phenomenology and the Logic) average approximately one use of the

term sublation per page, while the next highest frequencies are barely half that.7 The nature of

the intended audience of the two texts, when regarded in combination with this frequency data

suggests that there is a relationship between the relative technicality of a Hegelian text and the

frequency with which he used the term 'sublation'. Such an association would support the

claim that Hegel makes use of sublation in a distinctively or predominantly technical sense.

Second, according to the data, Hegel's use of the term 'sublation' does not seem to

show any appreciable variation over time. That is to say, it does not seem to be the case that,

for example, Hegel becomes interested in the term at some point in his career, and from then

on uses it more often. For example, as one can see from Table 2, the average frequency in the

Early and Jena writings meets or exceeds the average frequency of the (much later) Berlin

writings or the lectures. More importantly, this aspect of the data would also suggest that

Hegel's frequent use of sublation does not begin with his explicit treatment of it in the Science

of Logic. It would seem that it is the topic of a given work, rather than the period of time in 6 This classification of Hegel's published writings is adopted from Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith (Yale, 1976), 76. 7 See Table 2 for details. Note especially the three 'clusters' in the average frequencies: the two most technical works (the Phenomenology of Spirit and Science of Logic) have frequencies of greater than 1. The majority of the other volumes have frequencies between roughly .3 to .6 and the Berlin Writings and Lectures (except the Philosophy of Religion) have frequencies below .25.

27

which Hegel wrote that work, that is related most directly with how often he uses the term

'sublation'.

****

In order to test these first two claims, a regression analysis was conducted,8 in which

the difference of the average frequencies of aufheben minus Dialektik (the last column of

Table 2) was related to the average volume date and each volume's 'technicality'.9 The results

of this regression analysis are presented in Table 3 (below).

A brief explanation of the information presented in Table 3 is in order.10 Regression

analysis is a statistical procedure for determining the relationship between a dependent

variable and one or more independent variables. (In this case, the dependent variable is the

difference in frequency between aufheben and Dialektik and the independent variables are the

average date of each volume and each volume's 'technicality'.) The 'coefficients' listed in the

table define the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. A coefficient

value of greater than zero (a positive value) indicates a relationship between the two

variables, where an increase in the value of the independent variable entails a proportional

increase in the dependent variable.11 In the same way, a negative coefficient value would

indicate an inverse relationship, and a coefficient of or around zero would indicate no

noticeable relationship. The 'p-value' indicates the probability of obtaining a result equal to or 8 Initially in the preparation of this chapter, my analysis of the data was conducted on the hypothetical basis discussed above. Later, I consulted with a statistician in order to test these hypotheses and better ground these claims. The regression analysis itself was conducted by Dr. Rembert De Blander (an econometric researcher at Louvain-la-Neuve) and testing these claims would not have been possible were it not for his contribution. The initial hypotheses themselves and the arguments subsequently derived from them are my own, as are any errors in my explanation. 9 'Technicality' was incorporated into the analysis through the use of what is called a "dummy variable", where 'technical' works were assigned a value of 1 and all others were assigned a value of 0. In regression analysis, such dummy variables are used when comparing quantitative data to other non-quantitative factors. 10 To avoid a lengthy digression, I will only discuss those terms most immediately relevant to the claims being made. These terms are underlined in Table 3. The other information in the table was used to calculate the results we will examine more closely. For a more detailed introduction to the statistical terms used here, see Chapter 6 "The Classical Multiple Linear Regression Model: Specification and Estimation" of W.H. Greene, Econometric Analysis (Prentice-Hall, 2000), 210-270.11 The proportion of the increase is determined by the value of the coefficient. A unit increase in the independent variable would entail an increase in the dependent variable equal to the coefficient. So, for example, in a relationship with a coefficient of .5, every +10 increase in the independent variable would entail an estimated +5 increase in the dependent variable.

28

more extreme than the observed result.12 The 'p-value' is thus a measure of the confidence one

can have in each conclusion. The lower the 'p-value', the less likely each result was arrived at

by chance, and thus the more reliable it is. The term 'R2' is the proportion of the variability in

the dependent variable that is accounted for by the statistical model under consideration. This

term is a measure of the confidence one can have not just in the individual coefficients but in

the overall analysis, indicating how likely other possible results are to be predicted by the

statistical model.

In more basic terms, regression analysis provides us with the tools to test a set of

hypotheses. In the case of this particular analysis, the hypotheses being tested are 1) "There is

a relationship between the frequency Hegel uses the term aufheben in a given text and the

technicality of that text" and 2) "There is no relationship between the frequency of aufheben

in a given text and when the text was written?"13 We can now look at the results of the

regression analysis, and thus verify whether these hypotheses are correct.

Table 3. Results of the Regression AnalysisDependent Difference of FrequenciesRegressor Coefficient Standard error t-value p-valueAverage volume date -0.0082 0.0064 -1.28 0.232“Technical” dummy 0.6430 0.1575 4.08 0.003constant 15.1839 11.6452 1.30 0.225R² 0.73Observations 12

From Table 3, one can see that the coefficient of the first relationship (-0.0082) is very

close to zero and that this relationship has p-value of 0.232. This indicates that there is no

statistically significant linear relationship between the average volume date and the frequency

aufheben is used.14 This confirms the second hypothesis that there is no appreciable variation 12 Here 'more extreme' simply means that positive values would be more positive and negative values would be more negative. The 'results' in this case are the coefficients. 13 More specifically, the frequency here is the relative frequency between aufheben and Dialektik. That is, we are testing not the frequency of aufheben alone but the degree of frequency of aufheben relative to that of Dialektik. 14 The coefficient value is a measure of the relationship between the two variables and the p-value is a measure of the statistical significance of that relationship. Thus, in this case, there is no appreciable relationship between frequency and date and there is a 23.2% chance that this result (or some more extreme result) would be arrived at

29

over time.15 The 'technical' dummy-variable, however, is highly significant (p-value = 0.003)

relative to the frequency. This confirms the first hypothesis that there is a significant

relationship between a work's technicality and its use of sublation.16 The regression analysis

was repeated using different transformations of the dependent variable (i.e. the relative

frequency), and this did not alter the conclusions.17 Thus, rather than merely guessing or

roughly estimating whether these hypotheses were correct, a regression analysis has allowed

us to determine whether these apparent relationships were really present or not and

furthermore to determine this to a measurable degree of confidence.

****

The third claim that can be derived from the data is that, as one can see from the first

part of Table 1, Hegel uses sublation primarily as a verb, rather than as a noun. The data show

three of the verbal forms (aufgehoben, aufheben, aufhebt) to be much more common than the

basic nominative form (Aufhebung). This point may seem fairly obvious, but is nevertheless

an important aspect of the next claim.

Fourth, as one can see from Table 2, while Hegel uses dialectic only sparingly,

sublation is, by contrast, nearly ubiquitous.18 When viewed in combination with the fact that

sublation is most often used as a verb, this difference in overall frequency supports my

contention from the introduction that sublation is the heart of dialectic. It is the heart of

dialectic in the specific sense that, when used as a verb, the term aufheben is the operant,

active term in Hegel's overall dialectical-speculative process. The verbal priority of aufheben

by chance. By contrast, a typical standard for statistical significance would be a p-value of .05 or .01, that is, a 5% or 1% probability. 15 That is, to the specified degree of confidence. 16 A coefficient of 0.6430 indicates that there is a direct, positive relationship between the technicality of a work and its use of sublation. A p-value of .003 indicates that there is only a .3% chance that this value would occur by chance. 17 That is to say, different ways of calculating these values were used in order to verify that the analysis is in fact correct. 18 Robert Solomon remarks on the infrequency of the use of the term 'dialectic' in the Phenomenology of Spirit, but, as we can see from the data, this infrequency is not specific to the Phenomenology alone; it is characteristic of Hegel's entire body of work. For his interpretation of Hegelian dialectic in general, see Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel (Oxford, 1983), 21-27.

30

relative to Dialektik (which is, by contrast, used as a noun or adjective) in combination with

their close conceptual relationship suggests that a particular instance of the term 'sublation' (in

its technical sense19) is a particular instance of dialectic in operation. In other words, these

differences—that aufheben is more common as a verb and much more common that Dialektik

—suggest that 'dialectic' is the term Hegel uses when he is speaking abstractly about or

describing his logic but 'sublation' is the term he uses more concretely when he is actually

doing logic. This claim is further supported by the fact that the only volume where the

frequency of dialectic exceeds that of sublation is the Lectures on the History of Philosophy—

precisely where Hegel is focused on describing the thinking of others, rather than on

presenting his own. In this sense, taking sublation as the topic of study, rather than dialectic,

means that one can better focus on Hegel's logic as it is actually carried out, rather than on

how it is described or summarized.

Of course, this does not mean that treatments of Hegel's logic in terms of dialectic are

somehow incorrect. To the contrary, if sublation is the heart of dialectic, then both concepts

are present regardless of which term is used. The four claims I have made using this

frequency analysis only signify features of Hegel's way of expressing himself. It would be a

serious error to mistake the relative frequency of a term for something like its general

philosophical significance. That aufheben is used more often than Dialektik does not mean

that aufheben is somehow more important than Dialektik. What this difference does suggest is

that since sublation is the term that dominates Hegel's way of expressing his thinking, an

analysis that focuses on sublation can more accurately focus on instances of that expression.

The advantage of examining the science of logic in terms of sublation is that, while dialectic

19 A point of clarification: the fact that this frequency analysis is based on the total number of instances of sublation (regardless of whether each instance is technical or not) and the fact that there is a demonstrable direct relationship between the frequency of Hegel's use of sublation and the technicality of a given work (as established by the regression analysis) does not mean that I have assumed all usages of the term 'sublation' are in the technical sense. The relationship between technicality and sublation only suggests that sublation has a technical sense distinct from its ordinary one (i.e. a certain proportion). It does not mean that every instance would be a technical one.

31

is completely appropriate for discussions of Hegel's method generally or abstractly, sublation

more closely conforms to his concrete discussions of its operation or Hegel's own usage. In

other words, rather than use the abstract term to talk about something concrete, one can use

the concrete term itself.

A second advantage of this approach, as I mentioned in the introduction, is that

discussions of Hegel's logic framed abstractly in terms of dialectic run the risk of

misrepresenting what is at stake. The risk is that, insofar as dialectic is a noun and not a

verb,20 discussions of dialectic tend to reify Hegel's approach. Rather than discussing his logic

in the terms that Hegel himself (predominantly) uses, one talks about Hegel's method

abstractly as if it were something separable from the system as a whole—as an extensively

related 'tool', rather than an intensively related 'organ'. Even when one fully understands this

distinction and this abstraction or reification is only used as a way of speaking, Hegel's

method nevertheless runs the risk of being misconstrued as something detachable or external.

As it occurs in Hegel, dialectical method is less a thing that he uses that an act he (or more

specifically the concept) performs. Insofar as sublation is the operant term of Hegel's logic, 'to

sublate' is less the heart of dialectic than the beating of this heart.

In framing an interpretation of the science of logic in terms of its activity rather than

its method, I think one is better able to avoid this risk of reification. Even though the

distinction is not strictly necessary to understand Hegel's logic, it is helpful as a matter of

emphasis. Any activity, once it is taken up as an object of study, runs the risk of being talked

about as if it were a thing. Here, I have been often spoke about 'sublation' (i.e. nominatively),

but I can also speak about how one moment might 'be sublated' in another (i.e. verbally). At

the same time, the reverse is not possible: one can speak about 'dialectic', but not how one

20 I mean this in the sense of 'primarily', not 'exclusively'. Clearly, one can see from Table 1 that 'dialectic' is also used in adjectival forms, and is not only used as a noun, and that 'sublation' is also used in both adjectival and nominative forms. The point is that 'dialectic' is primarily nominative and 'sublation' (or better, 'to sublate') is primarily verbal. This primacy is also reflected in their relative frequency (i.e. the differences in the averages).

32

moment might be 'dialecticized' in another. By approaching Hegel's logic in a way that

preserves this priority of the verbal over the nominative, one can better approximate Hegel's

own use of language, and thus acquire a more accurate and concrete image of his thinking.

****

Before going on to summarize the conclusions of this frequency analysis, certain

limitations in the data should be noted and accounted for. First of all, the edition from which

the data is collected is not ideal. The count of the number of occurrences is taken from the

electronic edition of the collected works (Suhrkamp), rather than the complete works

(Meiner). However, relying on the collected works does have the benefit that, since different

versions of the same text are not included (e.g. from 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831), there are

no 'double counts' from the same text (e.g. the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion was not

counted four times). So while the data is not drawn from a complete collection of every

version of every work, the lack of the inclusion of multiple versions actually means that the

data from this edition offers a more accurate account Hegel's usage.21 By examining the

collected works rather than the complete works, I have in a loose sense taken the 'average' of

the content of each text so that those texts with multiple versions do not skew the results.22

Second, the tables, for reasons of clarity, do not list the myriad minor variations that Hegel

uses only rarely (e.g. Sichaufheben, hinaufhebt, etc.). Such forms are extremely rare in Hegel

(relative to the listed forms) and would not unduly affect the results. Finally, and most

problematically, the tables do not list instances where aufheben is used separably (i.e.

hebt....auf). This problem is due to the limitations of the search software that is currently

commonly available (as of 2009). Given the tools at my disposal, I was able to search for

individual words, but not for syntactically separated elements of the same word. It should be 21 One could also say that the difference between the collected works and the complete works is comparable to the difference between a statistical sample of a population and the total population. Viewed in this sense, the fact that the sample is not identical to the population would be advantage, not a disadvantage, in terms of the reliability of our analysis. 22 The choice of edition was also a practical consideration insofar as there is no electronic version of the Meiner edition yet available.

33

noted, however, even this last limitation does not fundamentally alter the conclusions drawn

from the data. The absence of separable occurrences of aufheben indicates that the use of

sublation (as a verb) is even more frequent than the data indicates. In other words, aufheben is

undercounted, not overcounted, and thus the results that are the basis of our third and fourth

claim (e.g. that it is more commonly used as a verb and that it is more common than

Dialektik) would be even more pronounced than those indicated.23 Furthermore, relative to

our first and second claims (technicality and the lack of variation over time), by assuming that

the (uncounted) number of separable occurrences follows the same pattern across the different

volumes as aufheben's other (counted) forms,24 other regression analyses conducted for

hypothetical higher total occurrences of aufheben found no appreciable change in the results.25

Therefore, while this last limitation could be resolved by a physical, page-by-page count (or

with better software), such precision is not necessary in order to establish any of our four

basic claims.

Thus, while the frequency analysis presented in this section has certain limitations of

which I am well aware, it is not without significance or purpose. This analysis has allowed me

to demonstrate, rather than merely assert, four basic claims: 1) that Hegel uses the term

'sublation' in a technical philosophical sense, 2) that sublation has some significance for Hegel

before his explicit discussion of the term, 3) that sublation is used primarily as a verb rather

than a noun, and 4) that the term 'sublation' is used much more frequently than the term

'dialectic'. This relative 'verbal priority' between sublation and dialectic established by these

last two points is my reason for focusing this study on sublation rather than dialectic. Without

establishing (on some basis) this priority of sublation over dialectic, my entire decision to

23 This point also applies to the second limitation of undercount of the extremely rare forms. 24 This is a reasonable assumption, statistically speaking, insofar as it is an assumption about the nature of the German language and/or Hegel's writing style, and not the texts in the sample in particular. 25 Other regression analyzes were conducted for hypothetical total counts of 2, 3, and 10 times the given total with no change in the conclusions. This means that even if the data collected here missed up to one half, two thirds, or 90% of the actual number of occurrences of aufheben, the statistical conclusions would still hold. Part of the purpose of including the regression analysis in the first place was to compensate for the absence of separable instances from the sample.

34

approach Hegel's logic in terms of the concept of sublation itself might have seemed arbitrary.

Therefore, while frequency analysis alone (or any other form of quantitative linguistic

analysis) cannot by itself explain the significance of a term, it can, when conducted in

conjunction with other analyses, provide valuable supplemental information that can augment

and better ground such analyses. In this case, the quantitative analysis tells us that we are

probably looking in the right place—at an important concept. Why and how this concept is

important is a question for our other modes of analysis.

B. SYNTAX

The second step in our analysis of Hegel's usage of the term 'sublation' is to examine

the grammar of the various forms of usage: more specifically, the syntax. What is specifically

interesting about the syntax of sublation is what one can generically refer to as its

'grammatical object'. For any given sentence in which the word 'sublation' occurs, examining

the syntax allows us to make an initial determination of the specific nature of that sublation.

Put simply, by determining the precise grammatical object of a given instance of sublation,

one can glean a great deal about the relative emphasis Hegel places on the two opposed

meanings of sublation. That is to say, by determining with precision what is being sublated,

one can determine how it is being sublated.26 How exactly this will work is described in what

follows.

What exactly is being sublated can be determined simply by identifying the

grammatical object of a given instance of sublation. When Hegel uses sublation as a verb (e.g.

aufhebt, aufgehoben, hebt...auf..., etc.) that which is being sublated is the direct object. In

English translation, this is rendered in either the active (i.e. 'y sublates x') or passive (i.e. 'x is

sublated') voice. The grammatical object is even more obvious in German, insofar as the

direct object is declined in the accusative case. The grammatical object of sublation when the 26 That is, to a certain extent. See Chapter 2, Section C for a more extended discussion. My point here is that syntactical analysis can be one helpful tool in making such determinations, but is once again not the only tool.

35

word is used as an adjective (e.g. als aufgehobene) is equally easy to determine—the object is

simply the noun being modified. Even when sublation is used as a noun, as for example when

Hegel uses it in the form 'the sublation of x' (e.g. der Aufhebung des x), sublation still refers to

some grammatical object that is being sublated.

Having first determined what is being sublated, one can then determine how it is being

sublated. When the grammatical object of sublation is a moment, then the sense of negation

tends to be emphasized. When the grammatical object is a relation between moments, then the

sense of preservation tends to be emphasized. A few examples should make this clearer.

This first passage is an example where the sense of sublation as negation is

emphasized: "They [being and nothing] are therefore in this unity, but as vanishing moments,

only as sublated. They sink from their initially imagined self-subsistence to the status of

moments, which are still distinct, but at the same time are sublated."27 In this example, the

grammatical object of the two instances of sublation is "They" (Sie), referring in both

instances to the moments being and nothing. So, in this example, the moments, rather than the

relations between them, are the grammatical object of sublation. At the same time, both

instances of the term 'sublation' in the passage clearly emphasize the sense of sublation as

negation. In the first case, sublation is equated with the 'vanishing' of the "vanishing

moments" (Verschwindende). In the second case, sublation is contrasted with what is "still

distinct" (noch unterschiedenen). Thus, this passage illustrates the association between the

sublation of a moment (rather than of a relation between moments) and the sense of sublation

that emphasizes negation.28

This second passage serves as an example where the sense of sublation as preservation

is emphasized: "The subjective logic is the logic of the concept, of essence which has sublated 27 "Sie sind also in dieser Einheit, aber als Verschwindende, nur als Aufgehobene. Sie sinken von ihrer zunächst vorgestellten Selbständigkeit zu Momenten herab, noch unterschiedenen, aber zugleich aufgehobenen." (SL105; HW5/112)28 This example is somewhat artificial since I have abstracted these two sentences from their broader context. This abstraction is intended to isolate the syntactical element being described, not to obscure Hegel's meaning. The full passage is quoted below in Section C of this chapter, note 36.

36

its relationship to being or its semblance (Schein), and in its determination is no longer

external but is subjective—free, self-subsistent and self-determining, or rather it is the subject

itself."29 In this example, the grammatical object of sublation is "relationship" (Beziehung).

More specifically, it is the sublation, by the logic of the concept, of the relationship between

essence and being. In this instance, the sense of sublation as preservation is clearly

emphasized. What is negated is not being or essence, but the nature of the relationship

between the two. At the level of the concept, the external determination of being and essence

is replaced with a self-determination.30 The externality is negated, but at the same time both of

the moments themselves are preserved. Thus, this passage illustrates the association between

the sublation of a relationship between moments (rather than the moments themselves) and

the sense of sublation as preservation.31

Having carefully examined the grammar of particular sentences in which the word

sublation occurs, we can draw two important conclusions. First and foremost, we can see that

there is a pattern in Hegel's use of sublation. When used 'directly' (the sublation of moments),

the sense of negation is emphasized. When used 'indirectly' (the sublation of the relation

between moments), the sense of preservation is emphasized. Recognition of this pattern helps

to show that Hegel's system is not simply an arbitrary aggregate of moments that can each be

read independently of the other. At the same time, the variations in the pattern—the fact that

the 'literal double meanings' of sublation are not always weighted equally—help show how

Hegel's system is not simply the result of the repetitious application of an abstract formal

method. There is a pattern here, but at the level of grammar, rather than dialectic.32

29 "Die subjektive Logik ist die Logik des Begriffs, - des Wesens, das seine Beziehung auf ein Sein oder seinen Schein aufgehoben hat und in seiner Bestimmung nicht erlich mehr, sondern das freie selbstdige, sich in sich bestimmende Subjektive oder vielmehr das Subjekt selbst ist." (SL64; HW5/62-EA)30 For more information on this distinction, see Chapter 5.31 Or more precisely, the sense in which preservation is weighted as equally as negation. 32 This is another reason why I have chosen to examine sublation, rather than dialectic, as the topic of this dissertation. The variations in Hegel's use of the concept of sublation will also be addressed in Part II.

37

I should note at this point that a sense of these sorts of patterns33 is helpful but not

sufficient for a thorough interpretation of Hegel's concept of sublation. In my emphasis on the

importance of this 'grammar of dialectic', I am in no way advocating a reductively structuralist

approach to the interpretation of Hegel. To do so would be simply to repeat the old mistake of

the 'textbook' reading of Hegel (e.g. the Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis formula), which treats

Hegel as having the sort of merely formal method that he explicitly condemns.34 Rather, it is

my claim that structural methods can act as a useful supplement to (but again, not a

replacement of) a more historiographical approach. When reading Hegel (or any text, for that

matter), one can never, for specific reasons we will see in the next section, be so foolish as to

neglect an equally close attention to context.

C. CONTEXT

While structural analyses such as examinations of word frequency and syntax can be

useful tools, providing helpful glimpses into certain aspects of Hegel's concept of sublation,

they cannot (by themselves) present a complete picture. Thus, the third step in our analysis

will be to look at what the context in which Hegel employs the concept of sublation implies

about its specific meaning.

The most important aspect of context to take note of here is Hegel's frequent use of the

term 'sublation' with an emphasis on the sense of negation, but with the addition of some sort

of qualifying remark. Along these lines, a relatively common formulation in Hegel's writings

is that something is said to be sublated in the negative sense, "but equally" (aber ebensosehr)

or "but at the same time" (aber zugleich) it is preserved. For an illustration of this, we can

return to the first example from the section on syntax,35 this time looking at the broader

context of the paragraph as a whole.

33 By this I mean structural associations in general, including patterns of both frequency and syntax. 34 SL43-45; HW5/35-37.35 Also cited in part in previous section, in note 27.

38

Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing; but as the unity of being and nothing it is this determinate unity in which there is both being and nothing. But in so far as being and nothing, each unseparated from its other is, each is not. They are therefore in this unity, but as vanishing moments, only as sublated. They sink from their initially imagined self-subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct, but at the same time are sublated.36

By simply extending the scope of the quotation, and slightly altering which words are

emphasized, one can acquire a very different perspective on the cited passage. While the

syntax of the term 'sublation' (taken in isolation) indicates that being and nothing are simply

negated (or taken as "Verschwindende"), the context indicates they are equally preserved:

becoming is not simply some sort of destruction of being and nothing, but rather a

"determinate unity" in which both coexist. What is negated is not being or nothing, but their

"imagined self-subsistence", the notion that the relationship between the two is simple and

self-contained. Elaborating on the basic distinction from the earlier section on syntax, one

could say that while the grammatical object of the term sublation is in this instance 'being and

nothing', according to the broader context, the object of the concept of sublation is (in this

instance) the relationship between being and nothing.

Recognizing a distinction between the term and the concept of sublation is vitally

important for an accurate interpretation of Hegel's logic. As we have just seen, even when

Hegel uses the term sublation in a conventional (merely negative) sense, it is not necessarily

the case that the technical (double) meaning is entirely absent. For example, a critic wishing

to attribute a totalitarianism to Hegel's logic could find ample evidence to support his

conclusion by focusing on select quotations where Hegel uses the term in the conventional,

negative sense while ignoring the broader context in which Hegel discusses the concept of

36 "Das Werden, Entstehen und Vergehen, ist die Ungetrenntheit des Seins und Nichts; nicht die Einheit, welche vom Sein und Nichts abstrahiert, sondern als Einheit des Seins und Nichts ist es diese bestimmte Einheit oder [die,] in welcher sowohl Sein als Nichts ist. Aber indem Sein und Nichts jedes ungetrennt von seinem Anderen ist, ist es nicht. Sie sind also in dieser Einheit, aber als Verschwindende, nur als Aufgehobene. Sie sinken von ihrer zunächst vorgestellten Selbständigkeit zu Momenten herab, noch unterschiedenen, aber zugleich aufgehobenen." (SL105; HW5/111-112-EA)

39

sublation in its technical, double sense. Of course, a careful reader must always look beyond

the syntax to the context or else risk missing the point.37

The distinction between the term and the concept is important not just for avoiding a

misreading of Hegel's use of sublation, but also in order to avoid missing it altogether. In

some cases, the concept of sublation is present without any explicit use of the term at all. For

example:

...there is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or spirit or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity.38

Now, this passage makes clear (albeit implicit) use of both the positive and negative senses of

sublation. The opposition between immediacy and mediation is a "nullity" (i.e. it is negated).

At the same time, both immediacy and mediation are present, "contained equally" in

everything, in spite of the nullity of their opposition (i.e. they are preserved). Thus, the two

senses of sublation are both clearly present. Even elements of the syntactical structure are

found here, insofar as it is not immediacy or mediation that are a nullity but the opposition

between them. It would be absurd to claim that the concept of sublation is not at work here

simply because it is not referred to explicitly, simply because it is not named. Recognition of

this fact depends upon a distinction between the term and the concept of sublation.39

37 A 'linguistically positivist' interpretation, which assumes that a concept can never be present without the corresponding term, is forced to ignore these important contextual aspects. 38 "...daß es Nichts gibt, nichts im Himmel oder in der Natur oder im Geiste oder wo es sei, was nicht ebenso die Unmittelbarkeit enthält als die Vermittlung, so daß sich diese beiden Bestimmungen als ungetrennt und untrennbar und jener Gegensatz sich als ein Nichtiges zeigt." (SL68; HW5/66)39 This distinction between the term and the concept is also why it is not absurd to talk about Hegel's logic in terms of dialectic. If the presence of a concept necessarily required the presence of the term, then dialectic would be mysteriously absent from the vast proportion of Hegel's logic. While I have claimed that framing Hegel's logic in terms of dialectic can pose certain difficulties, it is certainly not absurd, or even incorrect, to do so.

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Transition to Part II

At this point, we have reached the conclusion of Part I of this study on the structure of

Hegel's concept of sublation. Several key aspects of this concept have been established. In

Chapter 1, we saw how Hegel explicitly defines the term 'sublation' and how he implicitly

distinguishes it from other related terms such as negation and synthesis. In Chapter 2, we saw

what Hegel's general usage of the term can tell us about the concept: 1) that sublation is the

operant, active expression of Hegel's logic; 2) that the meaning of a particular instance of

sublation can be better ascertained by attending to its grammatical object; 3) that a particular

instance of the concept of sublation cannot be either isolated from its context or completely

identified with instances of the term alone. Taken together, these structural aspects of Hegel's

concept of sublation will help us to examine, in Part II, how this concept functions in

individual moments and transitions in Hegel's logic.

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PART II: FUNCTION

CHAPTER 3: BEING, NOTHING, AND BECOMING

Having analyzed Hegel's explicit discussions of sublation and some implicit aspects of

his usage of the term, I will now examine some examples of how he applies the concept.1 The

functional analysis presented in Part II may seem to overlap with the treatment of usage in the

previous chapter. However, the topics they discuss are distinct. While Chapter 2 dealt with

Hegel's usage of sublation in general, Part II treats Hegel's specific uses of sublation in

individual moments and transitions. The earlier analyses of the structural aspects of sublation

have prepared us to determine with more precision exactly how sublation operates in Hegel's

logic. By first taking a general overview of the structure of sublation in Hegel's logic, we are

now be better equipped to perform a more precise and thorough exegesis of particular

instances of the concept. This structural overview will guide us in our subsequent textual

analysis, in the same way one might consult a map before setting off on a journey. If we wind

up in difficult or confusing terrain, our advanced preparations will give us a better idea of

how to find what we are looking for.

At the same time, by more looking closely at specific instances of Hegel's use of

sublation, we will be able to test whether the general statements made about sublation in the

first section are in fact valid for specific cases. Relative to Hegel's definitions, a functional

analysis will test whether Hegel's explicit statements about sublation in fact correspond to his

use of the term. Relative to Hegel's general usage, a functional analysis will test whether the

1 The general division between the structure and function of Hegel's logic is taken from J.N. Findlay, who writes at one point "Having so far dealt with what Hegel says about his Dialectic, we may know consider what he does with it., how it actually works in practice." J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination (Oxford, 1958), 71. While Findlay unfortunately goes on to discuss the "triadic structure of Hegel's writings" (Findlay, 71) and believes that this abstract structure is Hegel's actual "triadic pseudo-method" (Findlay, 353), he is nevertheless at least partially aware of the limits in this all-too-formal sort of interpretation, mentioning that "the triads of Hegel's system vary vastly in their make-up." (Findlay, 72) The variableness Findlay notices but offers little account of is what I examine more concretely in this Part of the dissertation.

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claims I have made about the implicit structure are in fact correct. The first test is necessary if

one does not merely want to assume, but rather to demonstrate, that Hegel does not contradict

himself, i.e. that his statements about sublation are in fact coherent. The second test is

necessary if one wants to make not only abstract, but also concrete claims about Hegel's

philosophy. It is only by actually traveling to our destination that we can see if the map we

originally consulted is accurate.

With these two purposes in mind, one can see how the structural and functional

analyses of Hegel's concept of sublation play complementary roles in this interpretation. Each

helps reciprocally to determine the other more fully, and helps isolate details and insights in a

way that neither could accomplish alone.

In this part, I take up three examples from the Science of Logic in order to show how

the concept of sublation functions in Hegel. I examine the role of sublation in three key

relationships: being and nothing,2 identity and difference,3 and the system and its moments.4

While these are only three of many possible examples, they are not chosen arbitrarily. Each

illustration will provide certain benefits.

First, choosing concepts that are more generally recognizable beyond the scope of

their particular Hegelian sense (i.e. more broadly relevant to ontology and/or systematic

philosophy as such) means that they should be more broadly elucidating than those more

specialized examples that might be only more narrowly relevant (e.g. Measure, Chemism,

etc.). As a general principle, the more widely recognized a concept is, the more helpful it

should be for the purposes of exposition.

Second, in practical terms, some sort of selection must be made. An exhaustive

catalogue of every instance of sublation in the Science of Logic could very well be useful for

2 As discussed in Book 1, Section 1, Chapter 1 of the Science of Logic, also referring to becoming. 3 As discussed in Book 2, Section 1, Chapter 2 of the Science of Logic, also referring to similarity, diversity, opposition, and contradiction. 4 As discussed in Book 3, Section 3, Chapter 3 of the Science of Logic, referring to the Absolute Idea and its constituent moments.

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Hegel scholars treating any number of other topics, but it would be of little help for the

purpose of explaining the concept of sublation itself. It would constitute a counterproductive

digression away from the main thesis, like a child telling a story that goes on too long because

he does not know which details are the important ones. The topic of this dissertation is Hegel

concept of sublation, not Hegel's entire Science of Logic.5

Third, in addition to illustrating more specifically how sublation functions in Hegel's

logic, treating these three topics will enable me to address three more general questions

relevant to a broader understanding of the concept of sublation.

1) Is Hegel's logic simply absurd?2) Does Hegel violate the law of non-contradiction?3) How does Hegel conceive of his system?

From a Hegelian perspective, these questions may seem overly simplistic, but they are quite

common in references to Hegel by non-specialists. I will look at each of these questions, in

the chapters on being and nothing (Chapter 3), identity and difference (Chapter 4), and the

system and its moments (Chapter 5), respectively, through the lens of sublation. Through

these analyses, I hope to demonstrate how the structural-functional approach I have used here

can be useful as a way of elucidating a philosopher like Hegel.

Before we proceed, it is important to emphasize that the purpose of the discussion here

of moments like being, nothing, and becoming is a better understanding of Hegel's concept of

sublation, not these moments in themselves. As such, I must set aside important issues that do

not bear directly on the matter at hand. Specifically, I must set aside certain logical questions

(e.g. "Is it valid to begin the logic with being?") and metaphysical questions (e.g. "Is Hegel's

concept of being an adequate one?") which, while important, are not directly pertinent to the

issue at hand.

5 In this study, however, I have focused specifically on the concept of sublation as it appears in Hegel's logic, insofar as the Science of Logic contains its most explicit and elaborate expression.

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That being said, any discussion, regardless of its focus, needs to begin by laying some

sort of groundwork. So, while some discussion of being and nothing in themselves will be

unavoidable, the relevance to sublation should become apparent as we proceed.

A. BEING AND NOTHING

To start with, what does Hegel mean by "being" (Sein)? At the beginning of the

Science of Logic, he obviously does not mean it in the sense of 'a being' (that is a more

specific determination, clearly distinguishable in German as Seiende), but rather being in the

sense of 'being in general'. However, Hegel uses the term 'being' in the sense of 'being in

general' in two ways. On the one hand, 'being' refers to the entire subject-matter of Book 1

and its place in the Science of Logic as a whole (Die Lehre von Sein): being insofar as it is

externally determined (i.e. in contrast with essence and concept) and insofar as it is internally

determined (i.e. in terms of quality, quantity, measure, etc.). On the other hand, the term

'being' also refers to the specific subject-matter of the first part of Chapter 1: "pure being"

(reine Sein).6 Here, I will discuss being only in this latter sense. Any use of the term 'being'

should be understood to refer to pure being unless otherwise indicated.

Pure being is being as such, being in general, being "without any further

determination."7 "It has no diversity within itself nor any reference outwards"8 and "It is pure

indeterminateness and emptiness."9 Being is defined here as complete indeterminacy: if it did

contain or entail any determination whatsoever, it would already be a later moment, i.e. it

would be something else.10

6 SL82; HW5/82.7 "...ohne alle weitere Bestimmung..." (SL82; HW5/82)8 "...hat keine Verschiedenheit innerhalb seiner noch nach außen..." (SL82; HW5/82)9 "Es ist die reine Unbestimmtheit und Leere." (SL82; HW5/82)10 Hegel addresses why he thinks that logic must begin with this pure indeterminacy in the Introduction (SL67-78; HW5/65-79)

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Hegel goes on to define pure nothing (reine Nichts) as "complete emptiness, absence

of all determination and content—undifferentiatedness in itself".11 In addition, he states in his

first Remark that this nothing (Nichts) is not opposed to something (Etwas), because such a

nothing would already be a determinate nothing (ein bestimmtes Nichts). An equally apt term

for nothing as purely indeterminate would be 'non-being' (Nichtsein).12

The key point for Hegel here is that since pure being and pure nothing both lack any

determination, they are, in effect, the same. Hegel makes the same basic claim at the ends of

both sections A and B of Chapter 1: "Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing,

and neither more nor less than nothing."13 and "Nothing is, therefore, the same determination,

or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as pure being."14 This

identification clearly follows from the way Hegel defines his terms. If there were any feature

with which one could distinguish them, then that feature would be a determination, and they

would be something other than pure indeterminacy.

Although the sameness of being and nothing follows from his definitions, this does not

by itself make this notion clear. Hegel was well aware of this, adding to the three paragraphs

of the basic text, four extensive remarks and considerable revisions between the two editions.

In order to clarify what exactly Hegel means by "the unity of being and nothing" (Einheit des

Seins und Nichts), I will now discuss some of these remarks.15

The first point that should be mentioned is that while the notion that being and nothing

are the same makes sense if one accepts Hegel's definitions, it still seems paradoxical. On this

point, Hegel contrasts those determinations which occur in philosophy to those of "ordinary

11 "...vollkommene Leerheit, Bestimmungs- und Inhaltslosigkeit; Ununterschiedenheit in ihm selbst." (SL82; HW5/83)12 SL83; HW5/84. See also the contrast between nothing as such (Nichts) and a determinate nothing (Nichtseiende) already presented in Chapter 1, Section B, Subsection 1.13 "Das Sein, das unbestimmte Unmittelbare ist in der Tat Nichts und nicht mehr noch weniger als Nichts." (SL82; HW5/83)14 "Nichts ist somit dieselbe Bestimmung oder vielmehr Bestimmungslosigkeit und damit überhaupt dasselbe, was das reine Sein ist." (SL82; HW5/83)15 In order to lead more directly the relevance of all this for the analysis of sublation, I will treat these remarks thematically, rather than sequentially.

46

common sense" (gemeinen Menschenverstande).16 Hegel ascribes the reason that the notion

that being and nothing are the same sounds strange to common sense:

One source among others of such perplexity is that the ordinary consciousness brings with it to such an abstract logical proposition, conceptions of something concrete, forgetting that what is in question is not such concrete something but only the pure abstractions of being and nothing and that these alone are to be held firmly in mind.17

In order to clarify this distinction between the abstract philosophical discussion at hand and

the interpolation of concrete determinations by common sense, Hegel points out that, from the

proposition that being and nothing are the same, it does not follow that it makes no difference

whether a particular thing (e.g. a house, a 100 dollars) is or is not. "This inference from, or

application of, the proposition completely alters its meaning. The proposition contains the

pure abstractions of being and nothing; but the application converts them into a determinate

being and a determinate nothing."18 Thus, for Hegel, the reason common sense finds the

notion that being and nothing are the same to be paradoxical is that it obscures the distinction

between indeterminacy and determinacy.19

It would seem, however, that Hegel makes use of just this sort of paradox in the

transition from being and nothing to becoming (Werden). In the first paragraph on becoming,

entitled "Unity of Being and Nothing", he writes that "Pure being and pure nothings are,

therefore, the same.... But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other,

16 SL84; HW5/86. For a more detailed discussion of Hegel's contrast between philosophy and "ordinary common sense", see his essay "Who Thinks Abstractly?" in Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (Doubleday, 1965), 113-118.17 "Ein Grund solcher Verwirrungen ist unter anderen, daß das Bewußtsein zu solchem abstrakten logischen Satze Vorstellungen von einem konkreten Etwas mitbringt und vergißt, daß von einem solchen nicht die Rede ist, sondern nur von den reinen Abstraktionen des Seins und Nichts, und daß diese allein festzuhalten sind." (SL85; HW5/87)18 "Dieser Schluß oder Anwendung jenes Satzes verändert dessen Sinn vollkommen. Der Satz enthält die reinen Abstraktionen des Seins und Nichts; die Anwendung aber macht ein bestimmtes Sein und bestimmtes Nichts daraus." (SL85-86; HW5/87)19 Hegel applies a similar distinction to his criticism here of Kant's rejection of the ontological proof. (SL86-90; HW5/87-92) In brief: Hegel argues that while Kant is correct that one cannot infer the existence of finite things from their concept (e.g. Kant's "100 dollars"), one cannot extend this inference to God. Hegel points out the distinction between finite things, whose concept and existence are separable, and (the infinity of) God, whose concept and existence are inseparable. In effect, Hegel argues that (the nature of the existence of) God is not (the nature of the existence of) a 100 dollars.

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that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct...." 20 So, on the

one hand, Hegel dismisses the common sense notion that the unity of being and nothing is

paradoxical, and, on the other hand, he identifies it as the basis of the transition from being

and nothing to becoming. How is one to make sense of this? I will examine this problem in

the following subsection.

Remark: On the Transitions in Hegel's Logic

Before addressing this problem, we need to make a brief digression in order to clarify

the nature of 'transition' here, as this is an important part of understanding just what goes on in

the concept of sublation, as well as in the organization of Hegel's logic in general. First of all,

it is important to note that there is no essential priority between being and nothing. The

treatment in these opening pages of the Logic does not indicate any temporal sequence where

there would be something like 'first there was being, then there was nothing' or vice versa.

Implicitly, one can see that if there were any criteria for deciding their relative priority, this

would constitute an invalid introduction of a determination into their indeterminacy. Any

temporal sequence would be necessarily excluded for this reason. Explicitly, one can see that

Hegel contrasts his position with that of Parmenides, Buddhism, and Heraclitus, who

prioritize, respectively, being, nothing, and becoming. The most relevant part of this passage

comes from Hegel's rejection of Heraclitus (and similar "popular oriental proverbs"). While

they also unify being and nothing in becoming,

...these expressions have a substratum in which the transition takes place; being and nothing are held apart in time, are conceived as alternating in it, but are not thought in their abstraction and consequently, too, not so that they are in themselves absolutely the same.21

20 "Das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe..... Aber ebensosehr ist die Wahrheit nicht ihre Ununterschiedenheit, sondern daß sie nicht dasselbe, daß sie absolut unterschieden..." (SL82-83; HW5/83-EA)21 "Aber diese Ausdrücke haben ein Substrat, an dem der Übergang geschieht; Sein und Nichts werden in der Zeit auseinandergehalten, als in ihr abwechselnd vorgestellt, nicht aber in ihrer Abstraktion gedacht, und daher auch nicht so, daß sie an und für sich dasselbe sind." (SL84; HW5/84-85)

48

Here, Hegel specifically distinguishes his presentation of being and nothing from the notion

of being and nothing alternating in time. Significantly, the grounds of the distinction (i.e. that

when they are thought of temporally they are not thought in their abstraction) also preclude

any other sort of temporalization as well because any temporal priority would introduce a

determination into their indeterminacy.

If there is no temporal sequence among the transitions of Hegel's logic, what about

those passages where Hegel seems to suggest a historical sequence? The exclusion of the

former would seem to entail the exclusion of the latter. One cannot have history without time.

Referring to Parmenides and being, Hegel writes that "What is the first in the science had of

necessity to show itself historically as the first."22 Here and elsewhere, Hegel repeatedly

draws correspondences between logical moments and historical thinkers: Parmenides and

being, Heraclitus and becoming, and so forth. However, this need not contradict his position

that the transitions of the logic are not temporal. It is consistent if one interprets the historical

sequence as a reflection of the logical sequence, but not the other way around. In other words,

logic shapes history, but history does not shape logic—the necessity flows only one way.23

But if there is no temporal or historical sequence in the transitions of the Science of

Logic, then how are these transitions to be understood? The best, most coherent answer is that

the sequence of the Logic is an expository, or (more loosely speaking) a narrative one.24 More

precisely, the Science of Logic contains both a logical and an expository sequence, with the

latter being an account of the former. For example, the expository sequence of the Science of

22 "Was das Erste in der Wissenschaft ist, hat sich müssen geschichtlich als das Erste zeigen." (SL88; HW5/91)23 For a contrary interpretation, see Clark Butler, Hegel's Logic: Between Dialectic and History (Northwestern, 1996). Butler claims that the Science of Logic is a "reconstruction of history". (Butler, 4) I think this is not simply incorrect, but backwards. If Hegel's logic were interpreted in this way, then it would be determined by history (rather than determinate of history), and thus could never be self-determinate in the way that Hegel himself claims (i.e. it would be determined by something it does not itself determine). The Science of Logic (i.e. the book) is of course a product of history, but the science of logic itself (i.e. logical thinking, an account of which Hegel presents in the book) cannot be either historical or temporal, and at the same time be self-determinate.24 For a more detailed account of this specific set of transitions, see below.

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Logic in this chapter is "Being→Nothing→Becoming", but the logical sequence is "Being &

Nothing→ Becoming."

I will use two analogies to explain further what I mean by this distinction. In one

sense, the sequence of the logic is like a story: the main paragraphs are like the main plot,

while the remarks are like the flashbacks, foreshadowing, and digressions of a (somewhat

complicated) story.25 Like a story, the narrative sequence of the logic does not necessarily

correspond to the temporal sequence. Unlike a story, the sequence of the logic is a necessary

one. In this sense, the logical sequence of the science of logic is more like a (somewhat

complicated) math problem, the sort of problem where the sequence of the operation matters,

but not because it is in any way temporal. For example, solving the equation "1 + 3 x 5="

produces different results depending on the order in which the operations are carried out ("1 +

(3 x 5)=16" or "(1+3) x 5=20"). But of course, it makes no sense to say that this sequence of

operations would be temporal, i.e. that addition happens 'before' multiplication or vice versa.

Just because the sequence matters, it does not follow that the sequence must be a temporal

one. The same is true of Hegel's logic.

B. BECOMING

Paradox is, of course, an essential aspect of the transitions within Hegel's logic.26

Given Hegel's overall approach, the specific problem for the transition from being and

nothing to becoming is that there seems to be two paradoxes present: 1) the paradox of

claiming being and nothing are the same, and 2) the apparent contradiction between Hegel's

assertion that the paradox is part of the transition and at the same time his dismissal of this

paradox as one that troubles mere common sense alone.

25 Walter Kaufmann comments on this aspect of the text's organization: "The Logic is indeed a marvel of organization, and the use of 'Notes' is altogether ingenious. The device allows Hegel to anticipate objections, to elaborate, and to digress, while at the same time presenting an outline that is extraordinarily neat....Whatever seems worth saying is said—if necessary, in a note." (Kaufmann, 193)26 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, Section C.

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The solution to this problem is to be found in the location of the paradox.27 At the

level of being and nothing, being and nothing are the same (dasselbe).28 The unity (Einheit) of

being and nothing, on the other hand, arrives only at the level of becoming. Here, unity and

sameness are distinct insofar as this unity is more than mere sameness; it includes both their

sameness and their distinctiveness. In the transition to becoming, they are both the same and

not the same,

...and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth, therefore, is this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself.29

There are two relevant points here. First, the transition between being and nothing and

becoming is, in a conceptual sense, a sublation (even though the term is not explicitly used.)

Second, a distinction between being and nothing only appears at the level of becoming. At the

level of being and nothing themselves, there is no distinction and no determination (both are

pure indeterminacy). In becoming, there is also no difference between being and nothing

(because it is "immediately resolved"), but this resolution is something new—a

determination.30 Thus, the mistake of common sense is not in considering the unity of being

and nothing as contradictory per se, but rather in considering the paradox to exist at the level

of being and nothing in themselves. There are, in effect, two different paradoxes at play here:

the mistaken one of common sense (which confuses indeterminacy with determinacy) and the

operant one of the logic (which underlies the logical transition). In order to understand how

27 That is, its position in the logical sequence of the transition. 28 Hegel himself uses the term sphere (Sphäre) instead. I chose to use the term 'level' only to facilitate discussion in English (i.e. 'at the level of...' is much more idiomatic than 'in the sphere of...'). 29 "...jedes in seinem Gegenteil verschwindet. Ihre Wahrheit ist also diese Bewegung des unmittelbaren Verschwindens des einen in dem anderen: das Werden; eine Bewegung, worin beide unterschieden sind, aber durch einen Unterschied, der sich ebenso unmittelbar aufgelöst hat." (SL83; HW5/83-EA)30 This is only a sort of 'provisional determination' between being and nothing. It is a distinction, rather than a full determination (i.e. a negation). While it is minimally sufficient to remove them from the level of pure indeterminacy, being (and nothing) will only acquire a 'proper determination' at the level of determinate being (Dasein). In fact, it is the inadequate determinacy of this initial distinction (in becoming) that leads to the subsequent logical transition (to determinate being).

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exactly the operant contradiction functions, we must further clarify the specific nature of this

unity.

Hegel writes that the term unity is an "unfortunate word" (unglückliche Wort), and not

an entirely adequate way to express the relationship between opposites that he has in mind

here.

Unity...expresses wholly abstract sameness and sounds all the more blatantly paradoxical the more the terms of which it is asserted show themselves to be sheer opposites. So far then, it would be better to say only unseparatedness and inseparability, but then the affirmative aspect of the relation of the whole would not find expression.31

So, while the term unity expresses sameness, the concept Hegel is trying to express here

includes both sameness and otherness.32 The inseparability (Untrennbarkeit) of opposites, on

the other hand, is much clearer. For example, if one thinks of two sides of the same coin, one

can immediately recognize how the two sides would be both opposed and inseparable. But

Hegel continues to use the word unity because he also wants to express something

affirmative. To use the coin example again, the two sides are (negatively speaking)

inseparable but also form (positively speaking) a unity, i.e. a whole coin. Thus, Hegel uses the

term 'unity' in a special sense, which is not equivalent to sameness because it also includes a

negative moment.

Hegel gives a few other descriptions of this unity that are helpful in defining it more

precisely. In a discussion of Jacobi, Hegel compares the unity of being and nothing in

becoming to a synthesis: "Becoming is the synthesis of being and nothing; but because

synthesis suggests more than anything else the sense of an external bringing together of

mutually externally things already there, the name synthesis, synthetic unity, has rightly been

31 "Die Einheit drückt daher die ganz abstrakte Dieselbigkeit aus und lautet um so härter und auffallender, je mehr die, von denen sie ausgesprochen wird, sich schlechthin unterschieden zeigen. Für Einheit würde daher insofern besser nur Ungetrenntheit und Untrennbarkeit gesagt; aber damit ist das Affirmative der Beziehung des Ganzen nicht ausgedrückt." (SL91; HW5/94)32 In the case of being and nothing in becoming, it is a distinction that immediately resolves itself, but a distinction nonetheless.

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dropped."33 I have already discussed Hegel's criticism of the concept of synthesis relative to

sublation, and it is noteworthy that the same distinction reoccurs here.34 Thus, here we have a

negative definition of the unity of being and nothing in becoming; it is not, strictly speaking, a

synthesis.

Hegel provides further negative definitions at the end of the third remark. Here,

referring specifically to the transition of being and nothing "into each other" (which occurs in

becoming), Hegel warns against introducing later, more determinate mediations (bestimmte

Vermittlungen) too soon. More specifically, he writes that "the transition in question is not yet

a relation."35 Having made this distinction, Hegel goes on to specify that, since this transition

is not a fully developed relation, it is not the case that either being or nothing could be

considered a ground or a cause of the other. Thus, for Hegel, neither being nor nothing is

taken to be anything like a first principle or a first cause. And, by implication, Hegel's logic

would seem to be neither deductive nor metaphysical in any traditional sense.

So, while we have seen that the unity of being and nothing in becoming is not (only)

sameness, not (strictly speaking) a synthesis and not (technically) even a relation, the question

still remains: what is it?

At the level of being and nothing, the two are the same. Hegel refers to this sameness

as a mere "abstract unity" (abstrakte Einheit). By contrast, at the level of becoming, they are

in a "determinate unity" (bestimmte Einheit). In becoming, being and nothing are unified, but

unified in a way that removes them from their initial pure indeterminacy: "They are therefore

in this unity but only as vanishing, sublated moments. They sink from their initially imagined

33 "Werden ist diese immanente Synthesis des Seins und Nichts; aber weil der Synthesis der Sinn von einem äußerlichen Zusammenbringen äußerlich gegeneinander Vorhandener am nächsten liegt, ist mit Recht der Name Synthesis, synthetische Einheit außer Gebrauch gesetzt worden." (SL96; HW5/100)34 See the earlier discussion of the difference between synthesis and sublation in Chapter 1, Section B, Subsection 2.35 "...jenes Übergehen ist noch kein Verhältnis." (SL103; HW5/109) Here, Hegel clearly means relation (Verhältnis) in the more developed, technical sense he will discuss later in the Logic. If one assumes that 'relation' is here used in a less developed sense, then Hegel's claim that a transition is not a relation would be incoherent.

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self-subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same time are

sublated."36 The determinate unity of being and nothing found in the transition to becoming is

thus constituted by sublation.

This determinate unity is a sublation in the following sense. In their unity in

becoming, being and nothing are negated insofar as they lose their earlier indeterminacy.

They are no longer 'pure' being or 'pure' nothing, but are rather determined as moments of

becoming. At the same time, they are preserved in that they become distinct moments.37 With

this introduction of a determination, they are no longer indistinguishable. It is in this sense

that Hegel states earlier that "the two terms [being and nothing] have no separate subsistence

of their own but are only in becoming."38

This particular instance of sublation is interesting for two reasons. First, it is an

implicit use of the technical sense identified in Chapter 2. In both instances where the term

aufgehoben is used in the passage cited above, the syntax indicates that it is used in an

ordinary sense (i.e. synonymous with simple negation). From the context of the passage,

however, it is clear that both the negation and preservation which Hegel explicitly identifies

as the elements of sublation are present. Thus we see again, this time in more detail, that the

technical sense of the concept of sublation can be present even when the term itself is not

specifically used in that sense. Importantly, without this distinction between the concept and

the term, the transition from being and nothing to their unity in becoming becomes

indecipherable: if there is no technical sublation operant in the transition here, then there is no

means otherwise available by which the claim that they are both distinct and not distinct could

be interpreted as being coherent.

36 "Sie sind also in dieser Einheit, aber als Verschwindende, nur als Aufgehobene. Sie sinken von ihrer zunächst vorgestellten Selbständigkeit zu Momenten herab, noch unterschiedenen, aber zugleich aufgehobenen." (Sl105; HW5/112-EA)37 At the initial level, any distinctiveness they might have had was only 'imaginary' (e.g. as they are for 'common sense'). At the level of becoming, this distinctiveness becomes something philosophical, albeit in this somewhat unusual, sublated sense. 38 "... jene bestehen nicht für sich, sondern sind nur im Werden..." (SL93; HW5/97-EA)

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Second, it is a somewhat unusual sublation. In the subsequent transitions of the Logic,

the roles of negation and preservation are inverted. In the later transitions, it is the opposition

between terms that is negated, and the moments that are preserved. Here, in the transition

from being and nothing to becoming, it is their sameness (i.e. their indeterminacy) which is

negated in order to constitute them as moments, and this constitution is in effect their

preservation. Thus, while the structure is the same (i.e. in the general relationship between

negation and preservation), in this instance there is a variation in how sublation functions (i.e.

in how negation and preservation operate relative to different individual contents). The

presence of this sort of variation helps illustrate why identifying a structure in Hegel's logic is

not the same as attributing to Hegel a merely formal method. If Hegel's method were simply

an abstract, applied by rote—as if it were the operation of some sort of 'logic machine'—there

would be no such variations between the structure and the function of sublation. In other

words, the presence of occasional variations in the form suggests that the content itself

matters and thus that Hegel's explicit claim that his method it is not merely formal is

consistent with how the system is in fact articulated.39

To complete this analysis of how sublation functions in this first transition of the

Logic, two more things need to be said about the determinate unity of becoming. The

determination of being and nothing in becoming is in fact a double determination: coming-to-

be (Entstehen) and ceasing-to-be (Vergehen). In coming-to-be, "...nothing is immediate, that

is, the determination starts from nothing which relates itself to being, or in other words,

changes into it...." In ceasing-to-be, "...being is immediate, that is, the determination starts

from being which changes into nothing...."40 Hegel identifies both coming-to-be and ceasing-

to-be as types of becoming.

39 For more on the relation between form and content in Hegel's logic, see Chapter 5, Section C, Subsection 3 of this study.40 "...in der einen ist das Nichts als unmittelbar, d. h. sie ist anfangend vom Nichts, das sich auf das Sein bezieht, d. h. in dasselbe übergeht, in der anderen ist das Sein als unmittelbar, d. i. sie ist anfangend vom Sein, das in das Nichts übergeht..." (SL105-106; HW5/112)

55

Regarding these two determinations, Hegel writes "They are not reciprocally sublated

—the one does not sublate the other externally—but each sublates itself in itself and is in its

own self the opposite of itself."41 There are two things to note about this last passage. First,

even though these moments are in themselves suggestive of a temporal determination, once

again, there is no priority between them; coming-to-be is not 'before' ceasing-to-be, and vice

versa. Second, Hegel draws an implicit distinction here between 'reciprocal' and 'reflexive'. In

coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, it is not that being and nothing sublate each other

reciprocally, because this would be an external determination. (i.e. problematic in the same

way that synthesis is problematic.) Instead, Hegel prefers to express their sublation reflexively

—they do not sublate each other; rather, they each sublate themselves. In other words,

sublation is (strictly speaking) not an external determination of one moment operating on

another, but an internal determination from within a given moment operating on itself. To put

it another way, being and nothing are not sublated by becoming (externally), but rather sublate

themselves (internally) in becoming. While it sometimes easier, as a matter of exposition, to

talk about sublation in external terms, it is important to keep in mind that sublation is, for

Hegel, an internal, self-determination of the content itself. Thus, a fundamental point to keep

in mind about the function of sublation in Hegel's science of logic is that it is not the act of a

philosopher on a concept, or of one moment on another, but an act originating from within

each moment itself.

Having now completed the analysis of this first set of examples of the somewhat

unusual function of Hegel's concept of sublation in the transition from being and nothing to

becoming, I will now take up a second set: identity, difference, and contradiction.

41 "Sie heben sich nicht gegenseitig, nicht das eine äußerlich das andere auf, sondern jedes hebt sich an sich selbst auf und ist an ihm selbst das Gegenteil seiner." (SL106; HW5/112)

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CHAPTER 4: IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND

CONTRADICTION

In this chapter, I examine the function of sublation in Book 2, Section 1, Chapter 2 of

the Science of Logic, which discusses those moments Hegel calls the "essentialities"

(Wesenheiten), or the "determinations of reflection" (Reflexionsbestimmungen). These

essentialities include: identity (Identität), difference (Unterschied), diversity

(Verschiedenheit), opposition (Entgegensetzung), and contradiction (Widerpruch). My

purpose in using this set of moments as an example is twofold. First, it serves as another

illustration of how sublation specifically operates in Hegel's logic. Second, selecting this

chapter also allows me to treat in more detail the relationship between sublation and

contradiction (which I mentioned briefly in the first chapter). A proper grasp of this

relationship is not only useful as an illustration, but is a key to understanding the role of

sublation in Hegel's logic overall.

At the beginning of this chapter of the Logic, Hegel remarks that:

The determinations of reflection used to be taken up in the form of propositions, in which they were asserted to be valid for everything. These propositions ranked as the universal laws of thought that lie at the base of all thinking, that are absolute in themselves and incapable of proof, but are immediately and incontestably recognized and accepted as true by all thinking that grasps their meaning.1

Hegel associates these determinations of reflections with the traditional (Aristotlean) notion

of the categories, as "what is predicated or asserted of the existent."2 However, Hegel rejects

the expression of these categories in the form of propositions, as "laws of thought":

Consequently, if these† categories are put in the form of such propositions, then the opposite propositions equally appear: both present themselves with equal necessity and, as immediate assertions, are at least equally correct. The one, therefore, would

1 "Die Reflexionsbestimmungen pflegten sonst in die Form von Sätzen aufgenommen zu werden, worin von ihnen ausgesagt wurde, daß sie von allem gelten. Diese Sätze galten als die allgemeinen Denkgesetze, die allem Denken zum Grunde liegen, an ihnen selbst absolut und unbeweisbar seien, aber von jedem Denken, wie es ihren Sinn fasse, unmittelbar und unwidersprochen als wahr anerkannt und angenommen werden." (SL409; HW6/36-EA, TM)2 "...was von dem Seienden gesagt, behauptet wird." (SL410; HW6/36)

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demand proof as against the other, and consequently these assertions could no longer be credited with the character of immediately true and incontestable propositions of thought.3

So, rather than simply assert such laws of thought as given, here Hegel attempts to prove

them, or, to put it in more general terms, to examine and establish their foundations. This is

clearly quite an audacious ambition. From the outside looking in (i.e. from a non-Hegelian

perspective), it is very difficult at first to see how one could possibly prove the very

mechanisms by which one establishes a proof in the first place. Of course, Hegel announces

this ambition at the very outset of the Logic. In other (philosophical) sciences, content and

method are distinct, but "Logic, on the contrary, cannot presuppose any of these forms of

reflection and laws of thinking, for these constitute part of its own content and have first to be

established within the science."4

In the chapter considered here, Hegel offers a further, concrete indication of the scope

of this purpose:

...yet they are determinate against one another, as we shall find on closer examination of them, or as is immediately evident from the categories of identity, difference, and opposition; their form of reflection, therefore, does not exempt them from transition and contradiction. The several propositions which are set up as absolute laws of thought, and, therefore, more closely considered, opposed to one another and mutually sublate themselves.5

3 "Wenn diese Kategorien daher in solche Sätze gefaßt werden, so kommen ebensosehr die entgegengesetzten Sätze zum Vorschein; beide bieten sich mit gleicher Notwendigkeit dar und haben als unmittelbare Behauptungen wenigstens gleiches Recht. Der eine erforderte dadurch einen Beweis gegen den anderen, und diesen Behauptungen könnte daher nicht mehr der Charakter von unmittelbar wahren und unwidersprechlichen Sätzen des Denkens zukommen." (SL410; HW6/37-EA) †The specific categories Hegel refers to here are the earlier "determinations of the sphere of being" (quantity, quality, etc.), not the determinations of reflection per se. However, while Hegel of course draws a distinction between the nature of the relationship among these two sets of determinations, the specifics of this distinction need not concern us at this point. The significant claim (for the purposes of our analysis) is rather what they have in common: that both are equally subject to dialectical-speculative transitions, and, as logical determinations, must both be established, not simply asserted or assumed. 4 "Die Logik dagegen kann keine dieser Formen der Reflexion oder Regeln und Gesetze des Denkens voraussetzen, denn sie machen einen Teil ihres Inhalts selbst aus und haben erst innerhalb ihrer begründet zu werden." (SL43; HW5/35-EA)5 "...aber wie sich aus ihrer näheren Betrachtung ergeben wird - oder wie unmittelbar an ihnen als der Identität, der Verschiedenheit, der Entgegensetzung erhellt -, sind sie bestimmte gegeneinander; sie sind also durch ihre Form der Reflexion, dem Übergehen und dem Widerspruche nicht entnommen. Die mehreren Sätze, die als absolute Denkgesetze aufgestellt werden, sind daher, näher betrachtet, einander entgegengesetzt, sie widersprechen einander und heben sich gegenseitig auf." (SL411; HW6/38-EA)

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Thus, like the determinations of being, the determinations of reflection must be established

and not simply presupposed or taken as given. The manner in which Hegel treats these

determinations is not as an asserted enumeration or a sort of itemized list of distinct, separate

propositions, but rather as an attempt to establish the way in which they are related to one

another.6 More specifically, this relationship is to be understood as a series of (logical)

transitions, and, as we shall see, these transitions function in and through sublation.

A. IDENTITY

1. Abstract Identity

The first of these determinations of reflection is identity. Hegel immediately makes a

distinction between two senses of the term: essential identity (wesentliche Identität) and

abstract identity (abstrakte Identität). Essential identity is identity insofar as it is a moment

within Hegel's system. It is defined as "the immediacy of reflection" (Unmittelbarkeit der

Reflexion) and "identity-with-self" (Identität mit sich). As the immediacy of reflection,

identity is a moment of the sphere of essence (insofar as reflection as such is a moment of

essence). In this way, identity is not immediate in the sense that being and nothing are

immediate. Rather, it is a "sublated immediacy" (aufgehobene Unmittelbarkeit). That is,

instead of being immediate in the sense that it contains no determinations, it is immediate in

the sense that the determinations it contains are sublated within it. These earlier

determinations are negated insofar essential identity is taken up as immediate, but preserved

insofar as this (sublated) immediacy is not the same as the (pure) absence of determination we

saw in the discussion of being and nothing.

6 SL411; HW6/38. For those less familiar with Hegel's way of thinking, the notion that the determinations of reflection are related to one another is an important point to keep in mind. While, from a non-Hegelian point of view, the idea of 'proving proof' can readily seem absurd, the idea that these mechanisms might be related to each other is considerably less so. Presenting this weaker argument can serve as a point of access (i.e. educationally) into Hegel's own stronger arguments.

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Furthermore, this sublation is a reflexive one—a 'self-sublation'. Identity is not some

pre-existent concept or category that externally sublates (or 'consumes') earlier, separate

moments. Rather, identity is made up of (or 'constituted by') the sublation of those earlier

moments. To put it another way, the earlier moments are not sublated by identity, but rather in

identity. And since they are sublated in identity, their sublation is the self-sublation, the self-

determination, of identity itself—hence the phrase, "identity-with-self" (Identität mit sich).

Abstract identity, by contrast, is not (strictly speaking) a moment of the system. It

does not stand in relation to any (logically) earlier or subsequent moments, and thus it entails

no sublation. It is, for Hegel, simply an erroneous notion. Importantly, this error is not an

error that is sublated and ultimately included within the overall systematic framework. Aside

from a passing, negative reference in the main body of the text (which serves only to define

essential identity7) it is only discussed in the remarks. While these discussions are very

helpful in explaining the nature of the logical transitions, it is important to note that this

exposition is not part of these transitions. The remarks are a gloss on the system, not a part of

the system itself. 8 That being said, an understanding of abstract identity is necessary for a

complete understanding of essential identity (what one might also call 'systematic identity').

And since most of Hegel's explanation of abstract identity is contained in the remarks, I will

draw from both the main body text and the remarks for my analysis here.

7 "Sie ist insofern nicht abstrakte Identität oder nicht durch ein relatives Negieren entstanden, das außerhalb ihrer vorgegangen wäre und das Unterschiedene nur von ihr abgetrennt, übrigens aber dasselbe außer ihr als seiend gelassen hätte vor wie nach." (SL411; HW6/39)8 The distinction between the body of the text of the Logic and the remarks is an instance of the distinction (mentioned in the last chapter) between the logic and the exposition of the logic. It is important to add that this distinction should not be understood to in any way to diminish the importance of this exposition. Particularly in this chapter, Hegel relies heavily on his own jargon; without the exposition, his the logical sequence itself would be very difficult to comprehend. Thus, in my own exposition of the logic here, I will make extensive use of the explanations and examples Hegel gives in the remarks. While it is of course important to understand Hegel's technical vocabulary, simply repeating it explains nothing. Given this, it is my opinion that the best way to explain Hegel's logic is to make use of the glosses that he himself provides, as the basis for further elaboration, while at the same time keeping in mind the logical/expository distinction. An interpretation that insists on confining itself to the main-body text alone, albeit for valid logical-systematic reasons, handicaps itself from the start. The distinction between Hegel's logical argument and his exposition is adapted from Gadamer, who makes the distinction between "the concepts as they operate in thought and the thematization of them". See Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, 82.

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Hegel defines abstract identity most clearly in his second remark on this section: "The

proposition in its positive expression A=A is, in the first instance, nothing more than the

expression of an empty tautology."9 Hegel further notes that since this law of identity is a

tautology, it is merely formal, it has no content, and no further progress can be made from it.10

This identity is abstract because it is only one-sided: "It is admitted that the law of identity

expresses only a one-sided determinateness, that it contains only formal truth, a truth which is

abstract, incomplete."11 These notions of "one-sided" (einseitig) and "incomplete"

(unvollständig) are best understood in terms of Hegel's application of the premise that

'determination is negation'.12 Without some sort of negation,13 some contrast against which it

could be defined, a concept cannot be adequately determined. Thus, when Hegel claims that

some notion14 is one-sided or incomplete, he means that it lacks this other determination. In

this case, identity is only complete when it is understood not abstractly (not as separate and

distinct), but in relation to another determination: difference.

2. Essential Identity

Identity in its full speculative sense—essential identity—is inextricably related to

difference. This is in explicit contrast to merely abstract identity:

It is thus the empty identity that is rigidly adhered to by those who take it, as such, to be something true and are given to saying that identity is not difference, but that identity and difference are different. They do not see that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is different; for they are saying that identity is

9 "Dieser Satz in seinem positiven Ausdrucke A = A ist zunächst nichts weiter als der Ausdruck der leeren Tautologie." (SL413; HW6/41)10 This last point is clearly a criticism of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. For Hegel's treatment of Fichte, see LHP3/486-488; HW20/394-395. The point that 'no further progress can be made from it' is the reason Hegel makes a distinction between abstract and essential identity, because otherwise the series of logical transitions would 'derail' at this point, with no further progress beyond abstract identity alone being possible.11 "Es wird zugegeben, daß der Satz der Identität nur eine einseitige Bestimmtheit ausdrücke, daß er nur die formelle, eine abstrakte, unvollständige Wahrheit enthalte." (SL414; HW6/41-42)12 Hegel takes up this concept from Spinoza. See, for example, LHP3/267; HW20/178. 13 The specific type of negation required will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.14 It should be noted that when I use the term 'notion', I mean it as a generic (non-Hegelian) term that includes concepts, representations, thoughts, ideas, and so forth. I use this 'generic' term merely as a way of speaking, in order to avoid awkward stylistic constructions. For Hegel's technical term Begriff, I have used the word 'concept'. Please note that this is different from some older translation practices, notably Miller's translation of the Science of Logic that I have (with certain exceptions) relied on in this study.

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different from difference; since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different.15

It is in this sense that "...truth is complete only in the unity of identity and difference."16 The

specific form that this proposed 'unity of identity and difference' has yet to be presented.

Before arriving at that point, we need to address a few more of Hegel's problems with the

interpretation of identity as merely abstract.

The proper determination of identity involves its negation—difference. Hegel rejects

the claim that the law of identity could be grounded on experience as only a "manner of

speaking" (bloße Redensart).17 Even if the law of identity were immediately obvious to the

experience of every consciousness, it would not be an argument, but a presupposition. Along

the same lines, Hegel also rejects the idea that the expression of a tautology could ground the

law of identity. Hegel expresses this in very strong terms, in the following example:

If anyone opens his mouth and promises to state what God is, namely God is—God, expectation is cheated, for what was expected was a different determination; and if this statement is absolute truth, such absolute verbiage is very lightly esteemed; nothing will be held to be more boring and tedious than conversation which merely reiterates the same thing, or than such talk which yet is supposed to be truth.18

For Hegel, a tautology such as "God is God" is only formally true, what he calls elsewhere

merely correct (richtig). Hegel goes on to say that the expression of a tautology—when

offered as an attempt to ground the law of identity—is even self-contradictory (!): "[The

expression of a tautology] sets out to say something, to bring forward a further determination.

But since only the same thing is repeated, the opposite has happened, nothing has emerged. 15 "So ist [es] die leere Identität, an welcher diejenigen festhangen bleiben, welche sie als solche für etwas Wahres nehmen und immer vorzubringen pflegen, die Identität sei nicht die Verschiedenheit, sondern die Identität und die Verschiedenheit seien verschieden. Sie sehen nicht, daß sie schon hierin selbst sagen, daß die Identität ein Verschiedenes ist; denn sie sagen, die Identität sei verschieden von der Verschiedenheit; indem dies zugleich als die Natur der Identität zugegeben werden muß, so liegt darin, daß die Identität nicht äußerlich, sondern an ihr selbst, in ihrer Natur dies sei, verschieden zu sein." (SL413; HW6/41)16 "...die Wahrheit nur in der Einheit der Identität mit der Verschiedenheit vollständig ist..." (SL414; HW6/42)17 SL414; HW6/42.18 "Wenn einer den Mund auftut und anzugeben verspricht, was Gott sei, nämlich Gott sei - Gott, so findet sich die Erwartung getäuscht, denn sie sah einer verschiedenen Bestimmung entgegen; und wenn dieser Satz absolute Wahrheit ist, wird solche absolute Rednerei sehr gering geachtet; es wird nichts für langweiliger und lästiger gehalten werden als eine nur dasselbe wiederkäuende Unterhaltung, als solches Reden, das doch Wahrheit sein soll." (SL415; HW6/43-44-EA) I should also note that this is the Hegelian source for the critique of 'repetition' I present in Chapter 8, Section A.

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Such identical talk therefore contradicts itself."19 It is important to note a distinction here

between tautology as such and the specific examples or expressions of tautology that Hegel

presents here. On the one hand, the opposition within tautology as such is the aforementioned

point that identity cannot be different from difference without itself containing some

difference. On the other hand, the contradiction20 in particular expressions of tautology (e.g.

"God is God", "A plant is a plant", etc.) is the opposition between one's expectations about an

argument and the argument's claim. Importantly, this latter opposition is not a dialectical-

speculative one, and is not the basis on which Hegel presents the logical transition between

identity and difference. Strictly speaking, it serves only an illustrative or expository function,

rather than a systematic or logical one.

At the end of his second remark, Hegel addresses "the other expression of the law of

identity: A cannot at the same time be A and not A";21 that is, the law of contradiction (or,

more precisely, the law of non-contradiction).22 In the law of identity expressed (negatively)

as the law of non-contradiction, the precise relationship between identity and difference

becomes more apparent. In this formulation, identity explicitly includes an element of

negativity (i.e. the not-A).

In this proposition, therefore, identity is expressed—as the negation of negation. A and not A are distinguished, and these distinct terms are related to one and the same A. Identity, therefore, is here represented as this distinguishedness in one relation or as simple difference in the terms themselves.23

19 "...etwas zu sagen, eine weitere Bestimmung vorzubringen. Indem aber nur dasselbe wiederkehrt, so ist vielmehr das Gegenteil geschehen, es ist nichts herausgekommen. Solches identische Reden widerspricht sich also selbst." (SL415; HW6/44)20 Despite Hegel's use of the term, I have bracketed the word 'contradiction' here because the opposition of expectation discussed here is clearly not a contradiction in any formal sense. It is rather a sort of 'performative contradiction', the definition of which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 6, Section A.21 "Der andere Ausdruck des Satzes der Identität, A kann nicht zugleich A und Nicht-A sein..." (SL416; HW6/45)22 I use the phrase 'law of non-contradiction' here because Hegel himself uses the phrase 'law of contradiction' in two senses: the first refers to the negative expression of the law of identity and the second (in the third subsection) refers to contradiction in its speculative sense. For the sake of clarity, I will use the phrase 'law of contradiction' only to refer to this latter sense, discussed in the second section of this chapter below. 23 "Die Identität ist also in diesem Satze ausgedrückt - als Negation der Negation. A und Nicht-A sind unterschieden, diese Unterschiedenen sind auf ein und dasselbe A bezogen. Die Identität ist also als diese Unterschiedenheit in einer Beziehung oder als der einfache Unterschied an ihnen selbst hier dargestellt." (SL416; HW6/45-TM)

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Thus, this element of negativity shows, for Hegel, that identity contains two opposed

determinations: the 'pure' identity of the law of identity (which contains no difference) and the

identity of the law of non-contradiction (which contains, in effect, a double negation). While

the two laws are formally equivalent, they are not the same.24 The former contains no

determination; the later contains a determination (i.e. a negation), which is itself negated.

Importantly, this negation of negation, as distinct from the mere absence of negation, is a

sublation. The negation is itself negated (i.e. they are formally equivalent) but it is at the same

time preserved insofar as the negation of a negation is not the same as a mere absence of

negation.25 Without interpreting the negation of negation in terms of Hegel's concept of

sublation such a distinction would be unintelligible. Without the element of preservation,

there would be no distinction between the negation of negation and the mere absence of

negation. And if one were to conceive of the transitions in Hegel's logic as merely simple

negations (rather than as sublations), then this particular transition would be equally

unintelligible.

It is only by taking into account Hegel's overall argument that one can see past its

initial, prima facie absurdity. Over the years, more than one casual reader of the Logic has

undoubtedly rejected out of hand the notion that tautology could ever contain even the merest

glimmer of contradiction. Yet if Hegel's actual argument for this point is taken into account

(rather than just its conclusion), then this apparent absurdity is easily dispensed with. Identity

is not simply negated; it is sublated, and it is the technical, doubled sense of sublation that

makes this transition ultimately intelligible. At this point, any reader who remains skeptical

need only, at a minimum, keep in mind that for Hegel, "...these laws contain more than is

24 In case this distinction is not already clear, one could imagine having two apples and two oranges. Formally, they are equivalent (2=2), but, at the same time, apples are of course not the same (i.e. the same sort of fruit) as oranges.25 I take this interpretation of Hegel's logic in terms of the negation of negation from Dieter Henrich. See his "The Logic of Negation and its Application", Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, ed. and trans. David S. Pacini (Harvard, 2003), 316-331. The link between the negation of negation and sublation (i.e. that the negation of negation is the sublation of negation) is my own; Henrich does not mention the connection to aufheben in the text cited.

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meant by them...."26 and that, in the logical transition presented here, this 'more' is difference

itself.

B. DIFFERENCE, DIVERSITY, AND OPPOSITION

Following his initial account of the relationship between identity and difference, Hegel

offers three further determinations of difference itself: absolute difference (absoluter

Unterschied), diversity (Verschiedenheit), and opposition (Gegensatz). I will now discuss

each of these moments in turn. In order proceed more directly to my main thesis (i.e. the

relevance of these concepts for sublation), I will, in this case, focus only on the logical

transitions most relevant to the issue at hand, namely, the transitions between identity and

difference and between difference (qua opposition) and contradiction. These are the two

transitions that will tell us the most about sublation. However, in order to get from here to

there in a concrete way, the following intermediate moments (absolute difference, diversity,

and opposition) must first be addressed.

1. Absolute Difference

Hegel calls the first determination of difference "absolute difference". At a minimum,

this term helps us to distinguish difference in general (which would also include diversity and

opposition) from the particular character of its initial determination. However, Hegel himself

only uses this term three times in this section of the Logic. For the most part, he simply uses

the term "difference" (Unterschied) to refer to both the general and specific senses of the

term. For the purposes of my analysis here, I will use "absolute difference" in order to draw

the distinction more sharply, but the reader should bear in mind that this is not the term Hegel

himself predominantly employs.

26 "...daß diese Sätze mehr, als mit ihnen gemeint wird..[enhalten]." (SL416; HW6/45)

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Absolute difference is difference as "determinate", "self-related", and above all

"simple": "It is essential to grasp absolute difference as simple. In the absolute difference of A

and not A from each other, it is the simple not which, as such, constitutes it."27 It is this

simplicity of absolute difference that suggests why Hegel here uses the qualifier 'absolute' (i.e.

not relative). Hegel presents this in terms of a contrast between (absolute) difference and

otherness (Anderssein). Of course, there is a basic structural distinction at work here insofar

as absolute difference is a moment of the sphere of essence, while otherness is a moment of

the sphere of determinate being (Dasein). In the text itself, Hegel articulates the distinction as

follows: "The other of essence [i.e. absolute difference]...is the other in and for itself, not the

other as other of an other, existing outside it but simple determinateness itself."28 Thus,

absolute difference includes otherness, but as an earlier (sublated) moment. It is more

determinate than otherness alone.

Hegel uses this distinction between otherness and absolute difference to illustrate the

sense in which absolute difference is "self-related" difference. Absolute difference, as self-

related, is different only "from itself". This seemingly paradoxical expression is Hegel's way

of conveying that difference understood as absolute difference contains the same internal

conflict that abstract identity did: "But that which is different from difference is identity.... It

can equally be said that difference, as simple, is no difference; it is this only when it is in

relation with identity...."29 In this sense, absolute difference as separate and simple and only

self-related could also be called 'abstract difference'. Absolute difference is, also in this sense,

one sided insofar as it lacks the more complete determination it would have if defined not

simply as being self-related, but rather in some determinate relationship to its other, identity.

27 "Es ist wesentlich, den absoluten Unterschied als einfachen zu fassen. Im absoluten Unterschiede des A und Nicht-A voneinander ist es das einfache Nicht, was als solches denselben ausmacht." (SL417; HW6/46-EA) 28 "Das Andere des Wesens [dagegen] ist das Andere an und für sich, nicht das Andere als eines anderen außer ihm Befindlichen, die einfache Bestimmtheit an sich." (SL417; HW6/46)29 "Das Unterschiedene aber vom Unterschiede ist die Identität.... Es kann ebenso gesagt werden, der Unterschied als einfacher ist kein Unterschied; er ist dies erst in Beziehung auf die Identität..." (SL417; HW6/47)

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While certainly not an issue for Hegel himself, one can also consider this concept of

absolute difference in comparison to the twentieth century theories on radical alterity.30 For

Hegel, the notion of a difference that is 'beyond' identity in this way would be incoherent

insofar as such a difference would be both radically unrelated to identity and, at the same

time, defined in contrast to identity.

From the fact that Hegel would argue that such an absolute difference is self-

contradictory, however, it does not follow that Hegel's system eliminates or purges all

difference or difference as such. As we have already seen, the sublation operant in the logical

transitions is not a simple negation, where all the distinctions internal to the logic, once

treated, would be afterward cast aside. Difference is not simply negated, but also preserved.

Moreover, this preservation is utterly essential to the coherence of the logical transitions

themselves: if the differences between the moments were not in some sense preserved (qua

determinations), then these moments would lack the concrete determination that is Hegel's

whole reason for writing the Logic in the first place.31 If Hegel understood himself to be

simply negating—that is, eliminating—all of these distinctions, making them in the first place

would serve no coherent purpose. Without some preservation of difference, these

determinations would not even be determinations at all. Thus, a critic might claim that Hegel's

conception of difference is in some way inadequate, but to claim that Hegel himself proposes

or desires to purge all difference from his system is, to say the least, inaccurate. Far from

wishing to eliminate all difference, Hegel refers to difference "as the specific original ground

of all activity and self-movement",32 which for Hegel is high praise indeed.

30 I have in mind here primarily Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Duquesne, 1969), as well as those postmodern thinkers who draw from his work (e.g. Deleuze, Lyotard, et al.) For a convenient selection of this line of thinking and its relation to Hegel, see David King Keenan, ed. Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy (SUNY, 2004).31 The postmodern conflation (either deliberate or accidental) between 'absolute difference' and 'difference' is the principle source of contention between Hegel and this way of thinking. See note 30, above.32 "...als bestimmter Urgrund aller Tätigkeit und Selbstbewegung." (SL417; HW6/47)

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2. Diversity

So far, we have seen that identity and difference are (somehow) related to each other insofar

as each requires the other for its complete determination. However, Hegel has not yet

specified what (precisely) this complete determination entails. At this point,

...as each moment is thus only self-related, they are not determined against one another. Now because in this manner they are not different in themselves, the difference is external to them. The diverse moments are, therefore, mutually related, not as identity and difference, but merely as simply diverse moments, that are indifferent to one another and to their determinateness.33

Thus, the complete determination suggested in the passages on identity and (absolute)

difference has not yet arrived. We have seen the conflict within both moments, that both are

in-themselves (i.e. in their own self-relation) inadequate, but that conflict has not yet been

resolved. Identity and difference here remain only externally related. They each possess only

a one-sided determination and are not yet determined in full contrast to each other, not yet

internally related. Hegel refers to this relationship as an "indifference"34 because, without

being determined in relationship to each other, their variance35 is not a more fully determinate

difference. It is merely a "diversity".

33 "...indem so jedes dieser Momente nur auf sich bezogen ist, sind sie nicht bestimmt gegeneinander. - Weil sie nun auf diese Weise nicht an ihnen selbst unterschiedene sind, so ist der Unterschied ihnen äußerlich. Die Verschiedenen verhalten sich also nicht als Identität und Unterschied zueinander, sondern nur als Verschiedene überhaupt, die gleichgültig gegeneinander und gegen ihre Bestimmtheit sind." (SL418-419; HW6/48-EA)34 The term "indifference" here is also an obvious reference to Schelling (e.g. LHP3/512-545; HW20/420-454), and to Spinoza (e.g.SL382-383; HW5/454-455).35 'Variance' is of course, not a Hegelian term. One of the difficulties in talking about Hegel is that, since so many terms have there own peculiar technical definitions, it is difficult to speak about them in a general way without introducing an ambiguity into one's interpretation—between Hegel's technical sense of a given term and the interpreter's more general sense, e.g., when referring to a set of related concepts or those concepts in a more abstract sense. So, for instance, the term "Otherness" (Anderssein) might be more apt here, insofar as it is less determinate than difference. In fact, Hegel at one point refers to diversity as "the otherness as such of reflection" ("das Anderssein als solches der Reflexion")(SL418; HW6/48), suggesting there is a systematic correspondence between otherness (as a moment of determinate being) and diversity (as a moment of reflection). However, using the term 'otherness' here risks confusion: 'Are we still talking about the determinations of reflection?', 'Why is the author referring to this earlier concept here?', and so forth. In such cases, precision inhibits exposition, or in other words, the most technical explanation is not always the most helpful. One could write something like 'diversity is the otherness that is not yet opposition', but this expression, while accurate, adds nothing. Those who already understand the distinction being made here would not require the explanation in the first place. Therefore, my purpose in introducing the occasional non-Hegelian term into my interpretation of Hegel is motivated by the desire to avoid this sort of "absolute verbiage."

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Diversity itself has two moments: identity and difference.36 However, identity and

difference here have another sense than they have had previously. Earlier, identity and

difference were self-related (i.e. each 'inside' itself). Now, they are externally related 37(i.e.

each 'alongside' the other) as moments of diversity. Identity as a moment of diversity, or

external identity (äußerliche Identität), is "likeness" (Gleichheit). Difference as a moment of

diversity, or external difference (äußerliche Unterschied), is "unlikeness" (Ungleichheit).

Hegel uses the more general term "comparison" (das Vergleichen) to refer to both. With the

introduction of this new distinction, we can now get a better sense of how the various terms

might be applied in other contexts: identical things are 'the same'; different things are 'not the

same'; like things are 'similar'; unlike things are 'dissimilar'. One could also express this

distinction in terms of geometry: two circles are similar insofar they are both circles, but are

the same only if they have the same diameter; two triangles are similar if they contain the

same angles, but the same only if they have both the same angles and are the same length on

each side, and so on.38

On a speculative level, however, Hegel finds these distinctions problematic. The

distinction between likeness and unlikeness ultimately bears within it a similar difficulty to

that of the distinction between identity and difference:

But by this separation of one from the other they merely sublate themselves. The very thing that was supposed to hold off contradiction and dissolution from them, namely, that something is like something else in one respect, but is unlike it in another—this holding apart of likeness and unlikeness is their destruction. For both are

36 More specifically, Hegel refers to identity and difference being two moments of difference. (SL419; HW6/49) This follows from the progression of the logical transitions—from identity, to difference, and not the other way around. However, in this form of expression, 'difference' is obviously being used in two senses: difference as one moment and difference as it contains the two moments. However, what is clear from the context of the discussion is that this second difference is in fact diversity. Referring to the second sense of difference here as diversity allows us to maintain a bit more clarity on the matter. So while the claim that identity and difference are moments of diversity does not strictly correspond to Hegel's usage, it does correspond, practically speaking, to his meaning. 37 This reference to 'external relation' can help us to understand the distinction we made earlier between synthesis and sublation (See Chapter 1, Section B, Subsection 2). Synthesis is inadequate because the moments it brings together are only externally related, or merely diverse. Sublation, on the other hand, is an internal relation, because negation and preservation are not just dissimilar, but opposites. 38 Of course, this is only an illustration, and should not be understood as literally reducing identity and difference to merely quantitative determinations.

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determinations of difference [i.e. diversity]; they are relations to one another, the one being what the other is not; like is not unlike and unlike is not like; and both essentially have this relation and have no meaning apart from it....39

Thus, like identity and difference, likeness and unlikeness are understood as being separate,

and yet at the same time also requiring one another. With the sublation of the externality of

their relationship, likeness and unlikeness are brought into a "negative unity" (negative

Einheit). Hegel will call this negative unity "opposition" (Gegensatz).

3. Opposition

Hegel defines the third moment of difference—opposition—as the unity of identity

and difference: "In opposition, the determinate reflection, difference, finds its completion. It is

the unity of identity and difference; its moments are different in one identity and thus are

opposites."40 This 'difference in one identity' is Hegel's way of expressing that opposites are

internally related. The first way to appreciate this internal relation is to understand how it

contrasts to the two previously given types of relations. Identity and difference as such (i.e.

essential identity and absolute difference) are self-related, that is, each is defined 'within itself'

in isolation from any other determination. This first relation is incomplete because it lacks any

contrast with an other: without a negation, there can be no determination. Identity and

difference as moments of diversity (i.e. likeness and unlikeness) are externally related, that is,

each is defined 'alongside the other'. Here, the two moments are understood not in isolation

from each other, but nevertheless separately, as (for example) items on a list. This second

relation is inadequate because while the determination contains a negation, it is not yet a fully

articulated self-determination. In the case of moments that are internally related, each

39 "Durch diese ihre Trennung voneinander aber heben sie sich nur auf. Gerade was den Widerspruch und die Auflösung von ihnen abhalten soll, daß nämlich etwas einem anderen in einer Rücksicht gleich, in einer andern aber ungleich sei, - dies Auseinanderhalten der Gleichheit und Ungleichheit ist ihre Zerstörung. Denn beide sind Bestimmungen des Unterschiedes; sie sind Beziehungen aufeinander, das eine, zu sein, was das andere nicht ist; gleich ist nicht ungleich, und ungleich ist nicht gleich, und beide haben wesentlich diese Beziehung und außer ihr keine Bedeutung;" (SL420; HW6/50-51)40 "Im Gegensatze ist die bestimmte Reflexion, der Unterschied vollendet. Er ist die Einheit der Identität und der Verschiedenheit; seine Momente sind in einer Identität verschiedene; so sind sie entgegengesetzte." (SL424; HW6/55)

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moment is defined 'within the other'; that is, each moment is defined not only in itself or in

contrast to another moment, but in a contrast to another moment expressed in terms of that

other. This third type of relationship, where one term is understood not as not only distinct

from another, but indefinable without it, is opposition.

One could also articulate this continuum of relations in terms of the specific case of

identity and difference. For Hegel, identity and difference cannot be adequately defined in

isolation from one another or enumerated as a list of distinct terms (i.e. the law of identity, the

law of diversity, and so forth). Rather, identity and difference can only be adequately defined

in contrast to each other. Moreover, this contrast between identity and difference remains

inadequate as long as they remain understood as two separate terms, each subsisting

'alongside' the other, yet still each defined only 'for itself'. What Hegel requires is that identity

and difference each be defined in terms of the other: identity in terms of difference, difference

in terms of identity. Only in this way can their relationship be fully grasped. And only if their

relationship is fully grasped can the concepts themselves be fully determined. This way of

being 'mutually definitive' is essential to the concept of opposition.

Now, just as identity and difference were likeness and unlikeness as moments of

diversity, they are further developed as moments of opposition—as the positive (Positive) and

negative (Negative). The classic example of the positive and negative is the poles of a magnet;

one cannot have a magnet with a positive pole without also having a negative pole, and vice

versa. In the remark on this section, Hegel gives the example of positive and negative

integers. An even more accessible example might be simply the notions of right and left;

nothing can have a right side without having a left side and vice versa. For Hegel, identity and

difference are as mutually definitive as the notions of right and left.

Hegel's own expression of this mutually definitiveness is somewhat complex:

Therefore each of these moments is, in its determinateness, the whole. It is the whole in so far as it also contains its other moment; thus each contains reference to its non-

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being, and is only reflection-into-self or the whole, as essentially connected with its non-being.41

This can be best explained in terms of an example like right and left. Right and left are wholes

(i.e. complete) only insofar as each contains its opposite: 'right' is 'not-left' and 'left' is 'not-

right'. The two terms mutually define each other. At the same time, each also contains a

"reference to its (own) non-being"; that is, the 'left' in the 'not-left' that defines 'right' is itself

'not-right'. Thus, right and left are not simply defined in contrast to one another, but also

grasped as opposites, with each pole of that opposition containing what amounts to a double

negation.

This complex relation applies more broadly to opposed moments in general.

In the first place, then, each is, only in so far as the other is not; it is what it is, through the other, through its own non-being; [it is only positedness;] secondly, it is in so far as the other is not; it is what it is, through the non-being of the other; it is reflection-into-self.42

This 'reciprocal determination' is clearly a more elaborate determination than was present in

the earlier moments. As self-related, the moments of identity and difference are merely

posited or asserted. As externally related, the terms are merely contrasted or related in terms

of a simple negation. As internally related, opposed moments are neither simply asserted nor

simply contrasted to one another, but contrasted in and through their own determination.

But the positive or negative in itself essentially implies that to be an opposite is not merely a moment, does not stem from comparison, but is a determination belonging to the sides of the opposition themselves. They are therefore not positive or negative in themselves apart from the relation to the other; on the contrary, this relation—an exclusive relation—constitutes their determination or in-itself; in it, therefore, there are at the same time explicitly and actually [an und für sich] positive or negative.43

41 "...ebenso die Ungleichheit ist nur in derselben reflektierenden Beziehung, in welcher die Gleichheit ist. - Jedes dieser Momente ist also in seiner Bestimmtheit das Ganze. Es ist das Ganze, insofern es auch sein anderes Moment enthält; aber dies sein anderes ist ein gleichgültig seiendes; so enthält jedes die Beziehung auf sein Nichtsein und ist nur die Reflexion-in-sich oder das Ganze als sich wesentlich auf sein Nichtsein beziehend." (SL424; HW6/56)42 "Jedes ist so überhaupt erstens, insofern das Andere ist; es ist durch das Andere, durch sein eigenes Nichtsein das, was es ist; es ist nur Gesetztsein. Zweitens: es ist, insofern das Andere nicht ist; es ist durch das Nichtsein des Anderen das, was es ist; es ist Reflexion-in-sich. - Dieses beides ist aber die eine Vermittlung des Gegensatzes überhaupt, in der sie überhaupt nur Gesetzte sind." (SL425; HW6/57)43 "Aber das Positive oder Negative nicht als Gesetztsein und damit nicht als Entgegengesetztes, ist es jedes das Unmittelbare, Sein und Nichtsein. Das Positive und Negative sind aber die Momente des Gegensatzes, das Ansichsein derselben macht nur die Form ihres Reflektiertseins in sich aus. Es ist etwas an sich positiv, außer der Beziehung auf das Negative; und es ist etwas an sich negativ, außer der Beziehung auf das Negative; in

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Thus, for Hegel, complete determination, a determination that is not merely one-sided, entails

a 'reciprocal determination'. In the case at hand, the positive is not fully constituted as positive

unless it contains the negation of the negative and vice versa. Identity is not full constituted as

identity unless it contains the negation of difference, and so on. This complete determination

is not only relevant for the system as a whole, but also for the determination of each

individual moment. Just as any definition of 'right' would be incomplete without reference to

the notion of 'left', for Hegel, any definition of a given term is incomplete without reference to

its opposite.

Thus for Hegel, opposition is the more complete unity of identity and difference. Each

pole of an opposite both negates its other (insofar as the two terms are contrasted) and

preserves its other (insofar as each term contains its other as a double negation). Structurally

speaking, every opposition necessarily entails a sublation. And if every opposition contains a

sublation in this sense, and opposition is the unity of identity and difference, then sublation

could itself be described as the unity of identity and difference. More precisely, sublation is

the logically operant mechanism through which identity and difference are unified.

C. CONTRADICTION

We now arrive at one of the most difficult passages in Hegel's logic: his treatment of

contradiction. This difficulty is intuitively obvious: if each moment of Hegel's logic

constitutes a sort of proof of that moment, and since contradiction itself is included (and

indeed, must be included) as a moment of the logic, then in what sense can one comprehend a

proof of contradiction as such? It is difficult to express such a concept in any way that does

dieser Bestimmung wird bloß an dem abstrakten Momente dieses Reflektiertseins festgehalten. Allein das ansichseiende Positive oder Negative heißt wesentlich, daß entgegengesetzt zu sein nicht bloß Moment sei, noch der Vergleichung angehöre, sondern die eigene Bestimmung der Seiten des Gegensatzes ist. An sich positiv oder negativ sind sie also nicht außer der Beziehung auf Anderes, sondern [so,] daß diese Beziehung, und zwar als ausschließende, die Bestimmung oder das Ansichsein derselben ausmacht; hierin sind sie es also zugleich an und für sich." (SL427; HW6/59)

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not sound fundamentally incoherent, since it is not just at odds with our ordinary way of

thinking, but also with the overwhelming majority of the Western philosophical tradition.

Such an explanation is at least as difficult for the interpreter as for the philosopher

himself, and so I will proceed cautiously. In this section of the chapter, I will conform as

closely as possible to Hegel's own exposition, and offer two parallel explanations of the

concept of contradiction and its relevance for our analysis of the concept of sublation. First, I

will summarize the key elements of the argument Hegel makes in the main body of the text—

his logical argument. Second, I will present some of his remarks that follow that text—his

exposition of the logical argument. It is my hope that this doubled approach will better serve

the purposes of my own interpretation of Hegel's science of logic and assist my efforts to

render these complex passages more clearly.

1. First Explanation

At the beginning of this section of the Logic, Hegel takes a small step backward in

order to recapitulate what has led his readers up to this point:

Difference as such contains its sides as moments; in diversity they fall indifferently apart; in opposition as such, they are sides of the difference, one being determined only by the other, and therefore only moments; but they are no less determined within themselves, mutually indifferent and mutually exclusive: the self-subsistent determinations of reflection.44

So, at the level of opposition, the determinations of reflection become self-subsistent

(selbständig). They are no longer merely self-related or externally related, but internally

related: "As this whole, each is mediated with itself by its other and contains it. But further, it

is mediated with itself by the non-being of its other; thus it is a unity existing on its own and it

excludes the other from itself."45

44 "Der Unterschied überhaupt enthält seine beiden Seiten als Momente; in der Verschiedenheit fallen sie gleichgültig auseinander; im Gegensatze als solchem sind sie Seiten des Unterschiedes, eines nur durchs andere bestimmt, somit nur Momente; aber sie sind ebensosehr bestimmt an ihnen selbst, gleichgültig gegeneinander und sich gegenseitig ausschließend: die selbständigen Reflexionsbestimmungen." (SL431; HW6/64)45 "Als dieses Ganze ist jedes vermittelt durch sein Anderes mit sich und enthält dasselbe. Aber es ist ferner durch das Nichtsein seines Anderen mit sich vermittelt; so ist es für sich seiende Einheit und schließt das Andere aus sich aus." (SL431; HW6/64-65)

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This internal relation, which up to this point Hegel has insisted upon (and which has

grounded his criticisms of the inadequacy of earlier moments) itself becomes problematic.

The self-subsistent determinations of reflection that contains the opposite determination, and is self-subsistent in virtue of this inclusion, at the same time also excludes it; in its self-subsistence, therefore, it excludes from itself its own self-subsistence. For this consists in containing within itself its opposite determinations—through which alone it is not a relation to something external—but no less immediately in the fact that it is itself, and also excludes from itself the determination that is negative to it. It is thus contradiction.46

This is the basic logical transition from the moment of opposition to the moment of

contradiction. It is analogous to the earlier transitions between the moments of difference (e.g.

absolute difference, diversity, and opposition) insofar as each of these transitions (e.g.

absolute difference to diversity and diversity to opposition) involved an inadequate, weak

articulation of their variance. That is, absolute difference was inadequate because it assumed

there was no relation whatsoever to its other and diversity was inadequate because it assumed

the relation to its other was merely external. In each of these cases, the variance is understood

as inadequate because it is not completely articulated. Each sort of difference is contrasted to

some other, but remains for itself intact, to a certain extent, over and against its other. Hegel

will ultimately reject the very idea of such a self-subsistent difference. As we shall see, for

Hegel, difference is (ultimately) only completely articulated in contradiction.

Hegel himself explains the similarity among the logical transitions of difference as

follows: "Difference as such is already implicitly contradiction; for it is the unity of sides

which are, only in so far as they are not one—and it is the separation of sides which are, only

as separated in the same relation."47 In other words, contradiction is already implicitly present

from the outset in the form of the logical transitions themselves. Thus, structurally speaking, 46 "Indem die selbständige Reflexionsbestimmung in derselben Rücksicht, als sie die andere enthält und dadurch selbständig ist, die andere ausschließt, so schließt sie in ihrer Selbständigkeit ihre eigene Selbständigkeit aus sich aus, denn diese besteht darin, die ihr andere Bestimmung in sich zu enthalten und dadurch allein nicht Beziehung auf ein Äußerliches zu sein, - aber ebensosehr unmittelbar darin, sie selbst zu sein und die ihr negative Bestimmung von sich auszuschließen. Sie ist so der Widerspruch." (SL431; HW6/65-EA)47 "Der Unterschied überhaupt ist schon der Widerspruch an sich; denn er ist die Einheit von solchen, die nur sind, insofern sie nicht eins sind, - und die Trennung solcher, die nur sind als in derselben Beziehung getrennte." (SL431; HW6/65-EA)

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there is not simply an analogy among the logical transitions here, but a homology: that is, in

their structure, they are not simply similar but identical.48

Not only is there a homology among these transitions, there is also a progression. In

each case, the more closely related or more intertwined Hegel understands the two sides of a

variance to be (i.e. 'unrelated', external, or internal), the stronger he understands that variance

to be. One could think of this in terms of two magnets being pushed together; the closer they

are, the stronger the force keeping them apart. For Hegel, as well as for ordinary thinking,

contradiction is the strongest possible variance because unlike all of the earlier transitions,

which each involved their own particular contradiction, the transition from opposition

involves not just a contradiction, but the transition to contradiction as such.49 The implicit

contradictions of the earlier transitions at this point become explicit, not just as an element of

this or that particular logical operation but as a moment of the system as a whole.

The key difference between the previous, particular contradictions and contradiction

as a moment of Hegel's logic comes to the fore in the process of its resolution. Whereas

earlier contradictions were resolved as later moments, Hegel claims (initially) that

contradiction as such, as a moment rather than simply as an element of a logical transition,

must resolve itself ("Der Widerspruch löst sich auf"). This is where the principle difficulty for

ordinary thinking arises. That an argument or concept could result in a contradiction is easily

conceivable to both ordinary thinking and traditional philosophy. An argument that results in

a contradiction is simply false. That a particular contradiction could be resolved is also not (in

and of itself) problematic. In any argument, a particular contradiction is resolved either

48 The structural/formal distinction is important here. It is not the case that the transitions are simply 'the same', since their specific content (obviously) varies. Neither is it the case that their form is in every case identical (e.g. as we saw in the transition from being and nothing to becoming). Instead, one could say that forms of the transitions are identical in one respect (i.e. insofar as they entail contradiction), but not in the sense that they would be entirely and thoroughly uniform. In other words, the forms of the transitions are homologous (the same structure) but not isomorphic (the same form). 49 This distinction is particularly problematic in the transition from opposition to contradiction. In this case, the two overlap. There is the particular contradiction of the logical transition, which results in the next moment, but in the case of opposition, that particular contradiction results in contradiction as such. This complexity is treated in more detail below.

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insofar as at least one of its constituent terms is itself determined to be false or by

reformulating its terms in such a way that they are no longer mutually exclusive. It is in this

way that a claim is determined to be (at least possibly) true. This latter, utterly commonplace

approach is essentially similar to Hegel's own; generally speaking, each later moment resolves

the contradiction of the earlier moment by reformulating its terms. However, Hegel's claim

that contradiction as such could be resolved (and moreover that it could resolve itself) is, from

an ordinary or traditional point of view, utterly baffling. In order to explain this, we need first

to examine in detail how Hegel conceives of such a resolution.

Hegel presents two possible resolutions for contradiction. The first is, in effect, a

traditional one:

In the self-excluding reflection we have just considered, positive and negative, each in its self-subsistence, sublates itself; each is simply the transition or rather the self-transposition of itself into its opposite. This ceaseless vanishing of the opposites into themselves is the first unity resulting from contradiction; it is the null.50

So the "first unity" of contradiction is the one ordinary thinking would expect: nothing. Here,

the terms of opposition (the positive and negative) sublate themselves, and in doing so are

reduced from what they are on their own terms to what they are in the transition to their

opposite terms. Here, the result of a contradiction 'cancels out', or is demonstrated to be false,

to be nothing (i.e. a "null").

But what exactly does Hegel mean here when he says the two terms 'sublate

themselves'? It would seem that Hegel is using the term sublation here as a synonym for

simple negation (i.e. "ceaseless vanishing"). Once again, it is a specific, properly

contextualized interpretation of sublation that is the key to comprehending the logical

transition.

50 "In der sich selbst ausschließenden Reflexion, die betrachtet wurde, hebt das Positive und das Negative jedes in seiner Selbständigkeit sich selbst auf; jedes ist schlechthin das Übergehen oder vielmehr das sich Übersetzen seiner in sein Gegenteil. Dies rastlose Verschwinden der Entgegengesetzten in ihnen selbst ist die nächste Einheit, welche durch den Widerspruch zustande kommt; sie ist die Null." (SL433; HW6/67-EA)

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Hegel immediately follows the first (ordinary) resolution with a second (speculative)

one:

But contradiction contains not merely the negative, but also the positive; or, the self-excluding reflection is at the same time positing reflection; the result of contradiction is not merely a nullity. The positive and negative constitute the positedness of the self-subsistence. Their own negation of themselves sublates the positedness of the self-subsistence. It is this which in truth perishes [zugrunde geht] in contradiction.51

Since the positive and negative (in the moment of opposition) are also each a positedness,

their sublation (in the transition to contradiction) is more specifically a sublation of that

positedness.

Here, the specification of the grammatical object of sublation (i.e. positedness) is the

key to interpreting what is going on in the distinction between the first and second resolutions.

We can see here how Hegel uses the two senses of the word 'sublation' to distinguish two

ways of thinking. When treating an issue in terms of ordinary thinking, sublation is used in a

conventional, one-sided, merely negative sense. When treating an issue in speculative terms,

sublation is used in a technical sense and has both its negative and positive meanings.

Thus, by examining Hegel's use of the concept of sublation, one can see how ordinary

thinking is not simply external to speculative thinking but is a part of it. They are in effect,

opposites, but opposites in the speculative sense—that is, united as much as they are divided.

This point, however, presents a problem for Hegel's concept of sublation. If sublation

entails opposition and opposition is itself self-contradictory, then wouldn't that mean that

sublation's own unity of negation and preservation is itself self-contradictory? In order to

grasp this problem and try to resolve it, a careful examination of the specific difference

between opposition and contradiction will be essential. Otherwise, the concept of sublation

itself might seem to be self-contradictory.

51 "Der Widerspruch enthält aber nicht bloß das Negative, sondern auch das Positive; oder die sich selbst ausschließende Reflexion ist zugleich setzende Reflexion; das Resultat des Widerspruchs ist nicht nur Null. - Das Positive und Negative machen das Gesetztsein der Selbständigkeit aus; die Negation ihrer durch sie selbst hebt das Gesetztsein der Selbständigkeit auf. Dies ist es, was in Wahrheit im Widerspruche zugrunde geht." (SL433; HW6/67-EA)

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The key distinction between opposition and contradiction (in their speculative senses)

lies with two terms: self-subsistence (Selbständigkeit) and positedness (Gesetztsein). Both

opposition and contradiction involve self-subsistence. In opposition, this self-subsistence is

the result of the internal relation of the two terms.52 In the transition from opposition to

contradiction, this self-subsistence is sublated and the opposition collapses. This is the first,

negative resolution of contradiction. More specifically, however, it is important to keep in

mind that it is the positedness of the self-subsistence that is sublated. Positedness is simply the

character of being put forward or asserted. So, if their positedness is negated but their self-

subsistence is preserved, then, according to Hegel, this means that these moments acquire a

new, stronger form of unity.

This unity is the second, positive resolution of contradiction. Thus:

...the sublating of this positedness is not again a positedness as the negative of an other, but is a uniting with itself, the positive unity with itself. Self-subsistence is thus through its own negation a unity returned into itself, since it returns into itself through the negation of its own positedness. It is the unity of essence, being identical with itself through the negation, not of an other, but of itself.53

As with the other logical transitions, the progression here entails the further determination of

a given moment. And as with the other transitions, this determination is a self-determination.

And since "determination is negation", self-determination is self-negation. As with the other

transitions, this negation is not a simple negation, but a sublation.54 What is negated is the

52 It may seem counterintuitive that self-subsistence requires a relationship to an other. But it is important to keep in mind Hegel's speculative sense of opposition, in which (unlike other forms of difference) each term entails an internal relation to its other. Such a self-subsistence is further distinct from the weaker forms of self-relation (e.g. in identity and absolute difference). While the merely self-related moments are imagined in isolation from each other, self-subsistent moments incorporate their other into their own self-definition. So, while both self-relation and self-subsistence entail a reflexivity, self-subsistence is stronger insofar as it is more fully determined.53 "...das Aufheben dieses Gesetztseins ist daher nicht wieder Gesetztsein als das Negative eines Anderen, sondern ist das Zusammengehen mit sich selbst, das positive Einheit mit sich ist. Die Selbständigkeit ist so durch ihre eigene Negation in sich zurückkehrende Einheit, indem sie durch die Negation ihres Gesetztseins in sich zurückkehrt. Sie ist die Einheit des Wesens, durch die Negation nicht eines Anderen, sondern ihrer selbst identisch mit sich zu sein." (SL434; HW6/68-EA)54 Richard Dien Winfield writes that "Since each successive category leading to the final totality of self-thinking thought undergoes this dual negation and incorporation by what follows it, logical development can thus be described as being ordered by determinate negation." Richard Dien Winfield, "The Method of Hegel's Science of Logic", Essays in Hegel's Logic (SUNY, 1990), 50. It is in this sense that sublation is identifiable with determinate negation.

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isolation of the prior moment and what is preserved becomes an element of the subsequent

moment, thus forming a new unity.

At this moment, however, what is being sublated here is contradiction itself.

Contradiction, not only as an element of the logical transitions, but as such, as a moment,

contradicts itself. When expressed in these (reflexive) terms, the outlandishness of Hegel's

claims (relative to our ordinary way of thinking) is cast in sharp relief. What could Hegel

possibly mean by this?

Perhaps the best way to approach this issue is to start with what Hegel wants to

happen, and work backward to see how it might work. In this case, the goal is much clearer

than the process.

In effect, what Hegel is after is a proof via negation, or a double negation.55 So, if one

thinks of contradiction as the strongest possible sort of negation, then a contradiction of a

contradiction would be a type of double negation. In this sense, if a self-contradictory claim is

necessarily false, then a claim where a contradiction is itself contradicted would be

necessarily true. The point here is not that non-contradictory claims are necessarily true. As

such, these claims are only possibly true. Hegel's point is rather that claims proven via double

negation, in the form of a contradiction of a contradiction, are necessarily true. The

difference here is between non-contradiction and the contradiction of contradiction; the first is

a mere absence of contradiction, while the second is a determinate negation (i.e. a sublation)

of contradiction. This distinction is clear enough from the perspective of ordinary formal

logic; Hegel just expresses the point is his own unique way. Over the course of an argument,

the contradiction of the earlier moment is made explicit, or, in Hegel's way of speaking,

'contradicts itself'—thus establishing the later moment on that basis.56

55 That is, the negation of negation. 56 Furthermore, there is a sense in which all contradictions can be said to be 'self-contradictions', insofar as an argument is only said to be contradictory if it contains, within itself, two mutually exclusive claims.

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Now if a claim is posited, then it is merely asserted or presupposed to be true. On the

other hand, if a claim is deduced via a double negation, then it is not simply asserted, but

rather proven to be true. In the case of the transition at hand, the positedness of the moment is

negated while the moment itself is preserved. Thus, via sublation, a claim that was initially

presupposed is subsequently proved.

This process of sublation is not peculiar to this particular transition, but occurs

throughout Hegel's logic. The moments of the Logic are not simply presented in series, one

after the next with each merely distinct from all the others. Rather, each is also defined in

opposition to those moments before and after it. Furthermore, these moments are not only

defined in opposition to one another; they are each in turn revealed to be (according to Hegel)

self-contradictory.57 As the logic progresses through its series of oppositions and

contradictions, these contradictions are themselves negated and a series of double negations is

thereby established.

Thus, from Hegel's perspective, he has not presupposed the laws of identity,

difference, and so on; he has presented arguments for them via a specific form of double

negation, albeit one expressed in speculative terms. It is in this sense that Hegel can claim that

the complete determination of a moment, both in terms of its opposition to other moments and

its own self-contradiction, constitutes a sort of proof.

This point further explains why Hegel considered synthesis to be an inadequate way to

understand the transitions of the Logic.58 Synthesis is also a sort of unity of identity and

difference. The two terms of a synthesis are brought together in a unity, as a third term—the

result of the synthesis. However, the relationship between the two terms is only an external

relation; they are not opposed to one another, and therefore their relationship cannot yet entail

57 Indeed, these contradictions are what initiates each progression—the 'movement' from one moment to the next. The actual movement forward, however, occurs in the sublation of these contradictions. To return to the earlier 'watchmaker' analogy from the introduction: if sublation is the mainspring that drives the clockwork forward, then contradiction is the tension in the spring. 58 See Chapter 1, Section B, Subsection 2.

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any double negation. Without such a double negation, a synthesis of moments could not

produce a proof in the Hegelian sense.

Hegel refers to the result of this proof as a ground (Grund). Ground as such, as a

moment of essence, is the (positive) resolution of contradiction as such. Somewhat

frustratingly for the reader (and the interpreter) Hegel articulates this transition with a pun:

According to this positive side, in which the self-subsistence in opposition, as the excluding reflection, converts itself into a positedness which it no less sublates, opposition is not only destroyed [zugrunde zurückgegangen] but has withdrawn into its ground [in seinen Grund zurückgegangen].59

What Hegel expresses with his pun on zugrunde gegangen (literally, 'to fall to the ground')

and Grund is just the double negation discussed above. In this second, speculative resolution

of contradiction, contradiction is itself 'destroyed' (i.e. negated), and through this negation, the

moment of ground is established as a positive unity.

Hegel expresses this more directly toward the end of the section:

The resolved contradiction is therefore ground, essence as the unity of the positive and negative. In opposition, the determination has attained to self-subsistence; but ground is this completed self-subsistence; in it, the negative is self-subsistent essence, but as negative; as self-identical in this negativity, ground is just as much positive. Opposition and its contradiction is, therefore, in ground as much abolished [aufgehoben] as preserved.60

Thus, we arrive on the far side of this peculiar moment via a logical transition of an unusual

structure. Rather than the more linear transitions elsewhere, here we see a pair of branching

transitions along the path from opposition to ground. First, we have the transition from

opposition to contradiction, where the particular contradiction within opposition results in the

negative unity of contradiction as such (i.e. a "null"). Second, we have the transition from

59 "Nach dieser positiven Seite, daß die Selbständigkeit im Gegensatze als ausschließende Reflexion sich zum Gesetztsein macht und es ebensosehr aufhebt, Gesetztsein zu sein, ist der Gegensatz nicht nur zugrunde, sondern in seinen Grund zurückgegangen." (SL434; HW6/68)60 "Der aufgelöste Widerspruch ist also der Grund, das Wesen als Einheit des Positiven und Negativen. Im Gegensatze ist die Bestimmung zur Selbständigkeit gediehen; der Grund aber ist diese vollendete Selbständigkeit; das Negative ist in ihm selbständiges Wesen, aber als Negatives; so ist er ebensosehr das Positive als das in dieser Negativität mit sich Identische. Der Gegensatz und sein Widerspruch ist daher im Grunde sosehr aufgehoben als erhalten." (SL435; HW6/69-EA) Here of course, aufgehoben is used in a non-speculative sense, as a synonym for negation. This is clear from its use in contrast to erhalten. It is the conjunction of these two terms in context that expresses the concept of sublation in its technical sense. (See Chapter 2, Section C for an explanation of this distinction.)

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opposition to ground, which is the positive unity of contradiction as such. Here we see another

complexity in the role of contradiction in Hegel's logic. The first transition is, in effect, a non-

speculative dead end, where the result is not a positive one (i.e. another moment) but rather

nothing. However, this dead end (i.e. contradiction as such) is itself also the particular

contradiction that forms the basis of the positive transition to the next moment, ground. As

one can see in the passage cited above, this is presented as a transition between opposition

and ground. Unlike other moments, there is no point at which contradiction as such is

presented as a positive moment itself, as something coherent in its own terms prior to next

transition. As we have just seen, the positive unity of contradiction is not contradiction itself,

but ground. Contradiction is thus a strange moment of Hegel's logic. It is as if, in working

one's way through the Science of Logic, one were going up in skyscraper by climbing flights

of stairs (i.e. each transition), stopping at each floor (i.e. each moment), but then came across

one floor that was nothing but another flight of stairs (i.e. contradiction).

This strangeness, relative to the other moments, is partly due to the complex, twofold

role that sublation plays in these particular transitions. The first transition (opposition to

contradiction) contains a sublation, but only in an ordinary, one-sided sense (qua negation).

The second transition (opposition to ground) contains a sublation in the full, speculative

sense. It is only once we arrive at the moment of ground that opposition has been both

negated and preserved. It is this second transition that has important further implications for

our interpretation of the concept of sublation as such.

On the one hand, sublation entails an opposition. As we have seen, the positive and

negative meanings of sublation are instances of the positive and negative poles of opposition.

On the other hand, opposition has been shown to be self-contradictory and is sublated in

ground. But if sublation involves an opposition, then that means that (by transposition)

sublation might also sublate itself.

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If one were to interpret sublation as sublating itself, this would not mean simply that

sublation negates itself, because a transposition between sublation and opposition would be

contingent upon the speculative, doubled sense of sublation. (Sublation is its ordinary,

negative sense would not be an opposition.) The general processes and operations we have

outlined so far would suggest that sublation could be proven in a way similar to the way

opposition is. It could be proven if one were to interpret the contradiction between

preservation and negation as negated and the unity of the two senses as preserved. Strangely,

Hegel himself makes no reference to such a 'meta-sublation'.61 It is clear that Hegel makes no

attempt to prove sublation itself, insofar as it is not a moment of his system.62 Given the

processes I have outlined, however, there is no reason in principle that one could not do so.63

2. Second Explanation

To offer my second explanation of Hegel's concept of contradiction and its relevance

for sublation, I would now like to turn to two of the remarks, which discuss, respectively, the

law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction.

Hegel begins by defining the law of the excluded middle as: "something is either A or

not-A; there is no third."64 He follows this definition with some slight praise, stating, "This

law implies first, that everything is an opposite, is determined as either positive or negative."65

Hegel thinks this aspect of the law is correct and follows from the fact that identity and

difference pass over into opposition. At the same time, he is unwilling to move beyond this 61 Jean-Luc Nancy claims that "The concept of sublation is the concept of that which is its own upheaval and which, because it suppresses itself, itself succeeds itself, takes up where it itself leaves off." Nancy, 51. However, Nancy's interpretation is an interpolation into the text. Nowhere does Hegel himself argue, either implicitly or explicitly, that sublation in fact sublates itself. 62 The proof of opposition itself does not qualify as a proof of sublation because even though sublation involves opposition, it is not identical to it. The proof of opposition as such cannot be substituted the particular opposition found in sublation any more than it could replace the proof of every other opposition in the science of logic. If such a substitution were possible, it would make the individual proofs the other moments of the logic redundant, and replace Hegel's concrete proofs with a merely abstract determination. 63 For a further discussion of this 'sublation of sublation' and the implications of Hegel's silence on the matter, see the discussions in Chapters 6 and 8 of this study. 64 "Etwas ist entweder A oder Nicht-A; es gibt kein Drittes." (SL438; HW6/73)65 "Dieser Satz enthält zuerst, daß alles ein Entgegengesetztes ist, ein entweder als positiv oder als negativ Bestimmtes." (SL438; HW6/73)

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implication to embrace the law itself. On the one hand, he claims that this implication is

trivial and that opposition as it is generally understood is not an opposition in the proper,

speculative sense. It is not the opposition between two determinacies, but between a

determination (i.e. a particular predicate) and an indeterminacy (i.e. the absence of a particular

predicate).

On the other hand, Hegel's main problem with the law of the excluded middle is that,

while it may seem to follow from the law of non-contradiction, it is in fact self-contradictory.

The law of non-contradiction asserts that there is nothing that is A and not-A at the same time.

But, for Hegel,

It implies that there is nothing that is neither A nor not-A, that there is not a third that is indifferent to the opposition. But in fact the third that is indifferent to the opposition is given in the law itself, namely, A itself is present in it...The something itself, therefore, is the third which was supposed to be excluded.66

This criticism, while made according to Hegel's speculative way of thinking, is equally

accessible to ordinary thinking insofar as it requires no speculatively formulated concepts. In

other words, while it is a speculative claim, it is also easily understood from the point of view

of ordinary thinking.

Hegel concludes this remark with one sentence explaining why he decides to treat the

law of the excluded middle at this point:

Since the opposite determinations in the something are just as much posited as sublated in this positing, the third which has here the form of a dead something, when taken more profoundly, is the unity of reflection into which the opposition withdraws as its ground.67

Thus, while a discussion of the law of the excluded middle may have initially seemed like a

digression, it is in fact relevant to the issue at hand. Since the positive unity of contradiction

(i.e. the "unity of reflection" in the passage cited above) is, in this sense, a "third", the present 66 "Er enthält, daß es nicht etwas gebe, welches weder A noch Nicht-A, daß es nicht ein Drittes gebe, das gegen den Gegensatz gleichgültig sei. In der Tat aber gibt es in diesem Satze selbst das Dritte, das gleichgültig gegen den Gegensatz ist, nämlich A selbst ist darin vorhanden.... Das Etwas selbst ist also das Dritte, welches ausgeschlossen sein sollte." (SL438-39; HW6/74)67 "Indem die entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen im Etwas ebensosehr gesetzt als in diesem Setzen aufgehobene sind, so ist das Dritte, das hier die Gestalt eines toten Etwas hat, tiefer genommen die Einheit der Reflexion, in welche als in den Grund die Entgegensetzung zurückgeht." (SL439; HW6/74)

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transition requires Hegel to address and reject (in terms of speculative thinking) the law of the

excluded middle. If Hegel had not explicitly rejected this law, then the very origin of ground

(and thus, his whole conception of proof) would have been vulnerable to criticism on that

basis.

Hegel's critique of the law of the excluded middle has an additional, unstated, but

more general implication as well. The result of any sublation is necessarily, by definition,

such a third. Therefore, not only is the rejection of the law of the excluded middle necessary

for the logical transition from contradiction to ground, it is necessary for any logical transition

whatsoever insofar as all logical transitions, qua determination, entail sublation.

Having rejected the law of the excluded middle and having earlier rejected similar

formulations of formal laws for identity, difference, and so forth, Hegel then claims that

contradiction ought to be expressed as such a law as well. Given Hegel's earlier rejections of

these sorts of formulations, however, I would interpret this as having an expository or

pedagogical (rather than a speculative or logical) function. It would be easy to accuse Hegel

of being inconsistent here. However, it seems to me that, given the context, Hegel's purpose in

formulating a law here is not to lapse back into a formal way of thinking, but rather to use the

formal way of speaking, in order to help explain his (not formal, but speculative) position.

Such an expository technique is consistent with his overall approach: to begin with a common

assumption or way thinking, demonstrate its inadequacies, and thereby gain a more

determinate, more fully developed perspective.

Hegel's "law of contradiction" is not the law of identity again (i.e. the law of non-

contradiction), but rather, literally, the law of contradiction: "everything is inherently

contradictory."68 Hegel recognizes how strange this sounds to his readers. Since his purpose

here is expository, he is trying to explain the speculative content. That is, rather than discuss

his speculative concept of contradiction in his own jargon (i.e. "for itself") as he does in the

68 "Alle Dinge sind an sich selbst widersprechend." (SL439; HW6/74)

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main body text, he discusses it here in contrast to ordinary thinking (i.e. "in itself", or for

another).

Thus, Hegel begins his explanation by stating: "But it is one of the fundamental

prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking, that contradiction is not so

characteristically essential and immanent a determination as identity...."69 He goes on to claim

that contradiction is in fact more profound than identity because:

For as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.70

Before explaining in detail what he means when he says that contradiction is "the root of all

movement and vitality", Hegel first works through some potential objections to his general

claim about contradiction's significance.

Two potential objections are immediately presented: 1) "...there is nothing that is

contradictory..."71 and 2) "...the contradictory cannot be imagined or thought...."72 Regarding

the first objection, that contradictions do not exist, Hegel offers a series of counter-examples:

ordinary phenomena that he takes to represent contradictions that exist in the world. The first

of these counter-examples is movement. Referring to Zeno's paradox, Hegel writes: "The

ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that they pointed out in motion; but it

does not follow that therefore there is no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent

contradiction itself."73 In effect, Hegel here inverts Zeno's paradox; rather than taking the

contradictions in movement to mean that movement does not exist, Hegel flips things around

and claims that these contradictions are evidence that movement is itself contradictory. 69 "Es ist aber eines der Grundvorurteile der bisherigen Logik und des gewöhnlichen Vorstellens, als ob der Widerspruch nicht eine so wesenhafte und immanente Bestimmung sei als die Identität;" (SL439; HW6/75)70 "Denn die Identität ihm gegenüber ist nur die Bestimmung des einfachen Unmittelbaren, des toten Seins; er aber ist die Wurzel aller Bewegung und Lebendigkeit; nur insofern etwas in sich selbst einen Widerspruch hat, bewegt es sich, hat Trieb und Tätigkeit." (SL439; HW6/75)71 "...daß es nichts Widersprechendes gebe..." (SL439; HW6/75)72 "...das Widersprechende könne nicht vorgestellt noch gedacht werden..." (SL439-40; HW6/75)73 "Man muß den alten Dialektikern die Widersprüche zugeben, die sie in der Bewegung aufzeigen, aber daraus folgt nicht, daß darum die Bewegung nicht ist, sondern vielmehr, daß die Bewegung der daseiende Widerspruch selbst ist." (SL440; HW6/76)

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In addition to movement, Hegel offers another perhaps more accessible counter-

example: desire (Trieb). "Similarly, internal self-movement proper, desire in general...is

nothing else but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and

deficient, the negative of itself."74 So, according to Hegel, desire, as "internal self-movement",

is also an existent contradiction. An organism that desires is both self-contained, insofar as it

is an organism, and deficient, insofar as it (by definition) lacks what it desires. It is the

"negative of itself" (in Hegel's terms) insofar as this tension—which Hegel identifies as a

contradiction—is contained within it.

Immediately following this point, Hegel gives a third counter-example: life (Leben).

"Something is [therefore] alive only in so far as it contains contradiction within it, and

moreover is this power to hold and endure the contradiction within it."75 Each of Hegel's

examples builds on the previous one. Movement is an existent contradiction, desire is a form

of movement, and life requires desire as a necessary condition.76 Thus, for Hegel,

contradictions do not merely exist 'outside' of thought; they are ubiquitous. And since, of

course, Hegel cannot offer a full suite of concrete examples for the notion that "everything is

contradictory", he starts by choosing examples that are as broad as possible in their scope.

The argument itself comes later.

Having addressed the first objection, that contradictions do not exist, Hegel moves on

to the second, that they cannot be thought. Hegel, to the contrary, claims that thinking

contradiction is essential to thought.

Speculative thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and in it, its own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated by it as in ordinary

74 "Ebenso ist die innere, die eigentliche Selbstbewegung, der Trieb überhaupt...nichts anderes, als daß Etwas in sich selbst und der Mangel, das Negative seiner selbst, in einer und derselben Rücksicht ist." (SL440; HW6/76)75 "Etwas ist also lebendig, nur insofern es den Widerspruch in sich enthält, und zwar diese Kraft ist, den Widerspruch in sich zu fassen und auszuhalten." (SL440; HW6/76)76 We need not go into detail here on Hegel's concept of life in order to understand Hegel's purpose in mentioning it in this context, i.e. as an example of the ubiquity of contradiction.

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thinking, where its determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other determinations or into nothing.77

Thus, the conception and role of contradiction is a key distinction between ordinary and

speculative thinking. But at this point, this distinction has yet to be specified. What does

Hegel mean when he says that ordinary thinking is "dominated" by contradiction?

In order to explain this point, Hegel gives another series of examples of (what he

understands to be) contradictions. Contradictions, Hegel claims, exist in any opposition:78 for

example, above/below, right/left, father/child, and so on. Each pole of an opposition is both

contrasted to its other and at the same time remains undefined without it. Father is not a father

without a child.79 Right and left, without each other, are just arbitrary directions (i.e. "this

way" or "that way"). As we saw in the complex transition from opposition to ground, all

oppositions are (ultimately) also contradictions.

In this way, ordinary thinking contains contradictions just as much as speculative

thinking. The difference is that ordinary thinking is not aware of such contradictions as

contradictions.80 Thus, for Hegel, ordinary thinking is inadequate here not because it does not

contain contradictions, but because it is not aware that it does. Such a lack of awareness is

inadequate for philosophy.81 Furthermore, Hegel's logic is often criticized for 'containing'

contradiction, but this is typically based on a misinterpretation of Hegel's argument. As we

saw earlier, contradiction as such is not itself a positive moment of Hegel's system. As such,

Hegel does not attempt to prove any particular contradiction, but rather to demonstrate the

77 "Das spekulative Denken besteht nur darin, daß das Denken den Widerspruch und in ihm sich selbst festhält, nicht aber, daß es sich, wie es dem Vorstellen geht, von ihm beherrschen und durch ihn sich seine Bestimmungen nur in andere oder in nichts auflösen läßt." (SL440-41; HW6/76-EA)78 This point was already made, in more abstract terms, in the transition from opposition to contradiction. The logical transition proper is the transition from opposition as such to contradiction as such. Here, in this remark, Hegel offers expository examples of particular oppositions as particular contradictions, used in order to explain and expand on the earlier logical transition; these particular examples are not presented here as logical transitions themselves.79 Hegel uses the word "son" here instead. While Hegel is of course a child of his times, I have broadened the argument for the sake of not only political, but also logical, correctness. A father is of course as much a father if he has daughter as when he has a son, gender biases of nineteenth century Germany notwithstanding.... 80 SL441; HW6/77.81 That is, for Hegel's concept of philosophy.

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role contradiction plays in logic as such. Contradiction plays a similar role in formal logic as

well; recognizing a contradiction is how one can tell a set of claims is false. Thus, ordinary

thinking also makes use of contradictions. However, this does not mean that, in terms of

ordinary thinking, formal logic would itself be self-contradictory. Thus, from the mere

'containment' of a contradiction,82 it does not follow that an argument is necessarily false. A

grain of sand contained within in an oyster forms a pearl, but from this it does not follow that

a pearl is made of sand. Hegel's logic 'contains' contradictions, but, just as it is for ordinary

thinking, it is the particular use that he puts these contradictions to that matters. Additionally,

Hegel rightly points out that the only way one might be in a position to put them to use is to

be aware of them first.

For Hegel, this lack of awareness of contradiction in ordinary thinking extends well

beyond opposition. The sum total of all realities here (i.e. "everything", as expressed in the

law of contradiction), when interpreted as the sum total of all determinate beings, is also the

sum total of all negations (since, of course, determination is negation). In this sense,

'everything' entails 'every difference', and, following from the logical progression we have

outlined throughout this chapter: "More precisely, when the difference of reality is taken into

account, it develops from difference into opposition, and from this into contradiction, so that

in the end the sum total of all realities simply becomes absolute contradiction within itself."83

Thus, at the end of a long chain of reasoning, we can see what Hegel means by his "law of

contradiction".

Since Hegel thinks that "everything is contradictory", what does that mean for his

philosophy? Wouldn't such a claim make him a skeptic? Indeed, a skeptic of a most radical

82 In terms of ordinary thinking, an argument which 'refers to' or 'makes use of' contradiction might be a more precise way to express this idea; such arguments could be quite different from those that are themselves contradictory. In other words, if I point out a contradiction in another person's argument, my own argument 'makes use of' (or 'contains') a contradiction, but this does not mean that my argument is itself (therefore) contradictory. 83 "Näher den Unterschied der Realität genommen, so wird er aus der Verschiedenheit zum Gegensatze und damit zum Widerspruch und der Inbegriff aller Realitäten überhaupt zum absoluten Widerspruch in sich selbst." (SL442; HW6/78)

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sort? And is the claim that everything is contradictory even coherent? After all, if every

determination entailed a contradiction, wouldn't the very determination that constitutes the

law that everything is contradictory also, itself, be a contradiction, and render the whole point

moot?84

For an ordinary way of thinking, the notion that everything would be contradictory is

of course nonsense. Hegel anticipates this objection:

Ordinary—but not speculative—thinking, which abhors contradiction, as nature abhors a vacuum, rejects this conclusion; for in considering contradiction, it stops short at the one-sided resolution of it into nothing, and fails to recognize the positive side of contradiction where it becomes absolute activity and absolute ground.85

Since ordinary thinking is, according to Hegel, unaware of the contradictions within its own

thought, it is unable to move beyond them. Its view of contradiction is one-sided, incomplete.

It misses what, for Hegel, is the truth of contradiction:

This contradictory side of course resolves itself into nothing, it withdraws into its negative unity. Now the thing, the subject, the concept is just this negative unity itself; it is inherently self-contradictory, but it is no less the contradiction resolved: it is the ground that contains and supports its determinations. The thing, subject, or concept, as reflected into itself in its sphere, is its resolved contradiction, but its entire sphere is again also determinate, different; it is thus a finite sphere and this means a contradictory one. It is not itself the resolution of this higher contradiction but has a higher sphere for its positive unity,86 for its ground.87

In order explain this key passage, we need to expand on three points (italicized in the

quotation). First, when Hegel says that "everything is contradictory", he is adding the

84 For more on skepticism as a sort of 'performative contradiction', see Chapter 8.85 "Der gewöhnliche horror, den das vorstellende, nicht spekulative Denken - wie die Natur vor dem vacuum - vor dem Widerspruche hat, verwirft diese Konsequenz; denn es bleibt bei der einseitigen Betrachtung der Auflösung des Widerspruchs in nichts stehen und erkennt die positive Seite desselben nicht, nach welcher er absolute Tätigkeit und absoluter Grund wird." (SL442; HW6/78-EA)86 Please note that I have read "positive unity" in place of the original text's use of "negative unity". The reference to negative unity here seems to be some sort of textual error. From the context, especially when compared to the citation above (in the preceding footnote) and the contrast set up in the first line of the passage, it seems Hegel would have meant 'positive unity' here. 87 "Dieses Widersprechende löst sich allerdings in nichts auf, es geht in seine negative Einheit zurück. Das Ding, das Subjekt, der Begriff ist nun eben diese negative Einheit selbst; es ist ein an sich selbst Widersprechendes, aber ebensosehr der aufgelöste Widerspruch; es ist der Grund, der seine Bestimmungen enthält und trägt. Das Ding, das Subjekt oder der Begriff ist als in seiner Sphäre in sich reflektiert sein aufgelöster Widerspruch, aber seine ganze Sphäre ist auch wieder eine bestimmte, verschiedene; so ist sie eine endliche, und dies heißt eine widersprechende. Von diesem höheren Widerspruche ist nicht sie selbst die Auflösung, sondern hat eine höhere Sphäre zu ihrer negativen Einheit, zu ihrem Grunde." (SL442-443; HW6/79-EA, TM) Although I have corrected the English translation (as noted above), I have left the German as it stands in the original, for the sake of comparison.

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speculative sense of 'contradictory' to the customary one. A contradictory claim is a false one,

but a contradiction can also resolves itself, speculatively, into something positive, namely, a

ground. Second, it is not everything that is contradictory per se, but more specifically

everything finite. In identifying the finite with the contradictory, Hegel is part of a long

tradition, going back to Plato and the Eleatics. According to this tradition, the finite is

complex, corrupt, and full of contradictions; simplicity, perfection, and truth on the other

hand are the province of the infinite. Third, Hegel claims that contradiction resolves itself, but

—very importantly—not at the level of the finite. For finite things, subjects, and concepts, the

resolution of their internal contradictions occurs in a "higher sphere".

To put this last point another way: any finite moment of the system is grounded not by

itself, but by its sublation in a later moment. That moment is in turn sublated and grounded in

a yet later moment, and so on. Ultimately, the only element of Hegel's system that completely

grounds or proves itself is the system as whole. This relationship between the determination

of the moments relative to the completion of the system will be the topic of the following

chapter.

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CHAPTER 5: THE SYSTEM AND ITS MOMENTS

We now arrive at our third and final example of the function of sublation in Hegel's

Science of Logic. Previously, I have examined examples of the role of sublation in Hegel's

doctrine of being (e.g. being, nothing, and becoming) and his doctrine of essence (e.g.

identity, difference, and contradiction). In the final chapter of this Part, I analyze an example

from the third part of the Science of Logic on Hegel's doctrine of the concept. Unlike the

previous examples, however, which looked at the particular logical transitions between

moments, here I take up the relationship of those moments in general to the whole, to the

system as such. Like the previous chapters in this part, this functional analysis has a twofold

purpose: 1) to examine in more detail how sublation operates and 2) to provide evidence and

details in support of my more general, structural claims from Part I.

This chapter on the system and its moments is organized into two basic sections. First,

I provide a basic overview of Hegel's concept of system (and certain significant, related

terms). As is my practice in this part of the dissertation, this analysis of Hegel's concept of

system is exegetical in nature. It focuses primarily on the account found in Science of Logic,

Volume 2, Section 3, Chapter 3, which is the final chapter of the Logic on the Absolute Idea.

Second, I look at the relevance of the relationship between the system and its moments to

Hegel's concept of sublation.

A. SYSTEM

In order to examine the relationship between the system and its moments, we must

first begin with a presentation of Hegel's concept of system. First and foremost, his

understanding of system is essentially bound up with Kant's. So, we must briefly step outside

the examination of Hegel's text and over to Kant in order to ensure that our later textual

analysis begins from the right starting point. Kant defines system as follows:

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In accordance with reason's legislative prescriptions, our diverse modes of knowledge must not be permitted to be a mere rhapsody, but must form a system. Only so can they further the essential ends of reason. By a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea.1

For Kant, system "is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science...."2

Furthermore, for Kant: "This idea is the concept provided by reason—of the form of the

whole—in so far as the concept determines a priori not only the scope of its manifold content,

but also the positions which the parts occupy relatively to one another."3 One can easily

recognize these Kantian concepts and the role they play (reiterated) in Hegel's own writings.

Given the historical context in which Hegel worked, it is to be expected that his

explanations would assume familiarity with these terms and their Kantian meanings. In a note

at the beginning of the Science of Logic, Hegel writes:

I would mention that in this work I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy and this its merit remains unaffected by whatever faults may be found in it.4

Understanding Hegel's exposition, both in general and in the case at hand (i.e. of his concept

of system) thus requires that one keep in mind Hegel's somewhat complex relationship to his

most eminent predecessor. The complexity that I have in mind is the result of Hegel's

assumptions here about the relationship between his predecessor and his audience. Hegel

often naturally assumes his readers' familiarity with Kant. He does not necessarily explain

every detail and its significance himself because Kant had of course already done that (i.e.

Kantian philosophy understood as "the base and the starting point of recent German

philosophy"). On the one hand, this is a fairly obvious point to make. On the other hand, this

1 CPR A832/B860-EA.2 ibid.3 ibid. 4 "Ich erinnere, daß ich auf die Kantische Philosophie in diesem Werke darum häufig Rücksicht nehme (was manchen überflüssig scheinen könnte), weil sie - ihre nähere Bestimmtheit sowie die besonderen Teile der Ausführung mögen sonst und auch in diesem Werke betrachtet werden, wie sie wollen - die Grundlage und den Ausgangspunkt der neueren deutschen Philosophie ausmacht und dies ihr Verdienst durch das, was an ihr ausgesetzt werden möge, ihr ungeschmälert bleibt." (SL61; HW5/59)

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assumption of familiarity is so fundamental to Hegel's exposition that he often also does not

bother to explain where his thinking differs from Kant's. Instead, Hegel trusts his readers'

assumed familiarity to alert them to any discrepancies (i.e. "whatever faults may be found in

it"). For any contemporary interpreter, working in a milieu almost 200 years removed from

Hegel's own time, it is important to note such expositional assumptions and discrepancies.

Hegel's assumptions about his audience are not something we (i.e. contemporaries writing and

thinking about Hegel) necessarily share.

So, for Hegel as with Kant, the concept of system is closely related to that of the

concept of idea. In the introduction to his Encyclopedia, Hegel writes of philosophy in general

that:

Free and genuine thought is inwardly concrete; hence it is Idea, and in all its universality it is the Idea or the Absolute. The science of it is essentially a system, since what is concretely true is so only in its inward self-unfolding and in taking and holding itself together in unity, i.e. as totality. Only through the distinguishing, and determination of its distinctions, can what is concretely true be the necessity of these distinctions and the freedom of the whole.5

Thus, for both Hegel and Kant, a system is what makes philosophy "scientific". Such a system

differs from a "mere rhapsody", an aggregate (coacervatio), in that it has an organizing

principle (i.e. an idea) that unifies it. A scientific system is thus not merely a collection of

knowledge, but an organization of knowledge (articulatio).

For Hegel, the relationship between system and idea is much stronger than that found

in Kant. System does not merely require an idea; it is an idea. In fact, it is ultimately one idea

—the Absolute Idea. This equivalence expresses that for Hegel the idea serves a constitutive

function rather a regulative one (as it does for Kant).6 In other words, the Absolute Idea does

not simply organize and unify the system; it is identical with the system itself. Hegel states

5 "Der freie und wahrhafte Gedanke ist in sich konkret, und so ist er Idee, und in seiner ganzen Allgemeinheit die Idee oder das Absolute. Die Wissenschaft desselben ist wesentlich System, weil das Wahre als konkret nur als sich in sich entfaltend und in Einheit zusammennehmend und -haltend, d. i. als Totalität ist und nur durch Unterscheidung und Bestimmung seiner Unterschiede die Notwendigkeit derselben und die Freiheit des Ganzen sein kann." (EL38-39; HW8/59-EA)6 CPR A179-180/B222-223.

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this equivalence explicitly: "...the system of its peculiar elements constitutes the whole

Idea...."7 For Kant, the ideas remains beyond the capacities of human knowledge; they

organize and guide the system, but they are not (essentially) a part of it. At the same time, the

ideas are said to determine the system, to organize it. Hegel sees this as a contradiction; Kant's

ideas are said to be both determinate (i.e. regulative or determining) and also indeterminate

(i.e. only regulative or beyond determination). That which is beyond our ability to determine

would remain abstract and indeterminate, but for Hegel, "genuine thought"—systematic

thought—must be determinate, or concrete. Furthermore, in order to be concrete, the system

must be determined completely: "...only the whole of the Science is the presentation of the

Idea...."8 Any incompleteness would be a lack of determination; any externality would be

problematic.

This, for Hegel, has a practical importance as well. If freedom is understood as self-

determination, then a thinking that is determined by something beyond itself would not be

free. Therefore, any incompleteness, any lack of determination within the system, would also

render it unfree. A system, then, must not only be completely determinate, but also

completely self-determinate. And since for Hegel the system is the idea, this idea must also be

equally self-determinate. A detailed analysis of this idea and the nature of its self-

determination (ultimately, as it relates to sublation) will be the focus of the next section of this

chapter.

B. IDEA

According to Hegel, "The idea is the adequate concept, that which is objectively true

or the true as such. When anything, whatever, possesses truth, it possesses it through its Idea,

or, something possesses truth only insofar as it is Idea."9 A couple of points should be made

7 "...[daß] das System ihrer eigentümlichen Elemente die ganze Idee ausmacht..." (EL39; HW8/60)8 "...nur das Ganze der Wissenschaft ist die Darstellung der Idee..." (EL42; HW8/63)9 "Die Idee ist der adäquate Begriff, das objektive Wahre oder das Wahre als solches. Wenn irgend etwas Wahrheit hat, hat es sie durch seine Idee, oder etwas hat nur Wahrheit, insofern es Idee ist." (SL755; HW6/462-

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about this brief quotation. First of all, the term idea is obviously not a synonym for concept.

For both Kant and Hegel, an idea is a specific sort of concept, a "concept of reason".10 In other

words, all ideas are concepts, but not all concepts reach the level of the idea(s). This point is

of course obvious to readers already familiar with Kantian and/or Hegelian thinking. The

point needs to be made explicit here only because Hegel occasionally refers to 'concept' in the

passages cited below. From the context of these passages, however, it is clear he is referring

to idea or Absolute Idea insofar as it is also a concept (or in its conceptuality) and not

conflating their distinct meanings.

Second, while for Kant, the ideas are not knowable insofar as they cannot be brought

under the transcendental schematism,11 for Hegel, the idea is by definition knowable; the idea

is "the true as such". Hegel identifies the idea with truth insofar as he defines the idea as "the

unity of concept and objectivity". Thus, the idea is the "adequate" concept because it is at this

level that the concept is unified with its objectivity. Hegel defines this unity as truth insofar as

he takes up a more traditional understanding of truth. The correspondence of a proposition

with reality becomes, for Hegel, "the agreement of thought with its object";12 here, the

correspondence is reinterpreted on a speculative level. Hegel's concept of truth is notably not

a coherence theory of truth. For Hegel, truth is not a matter of the coherence of one set of

concepts with another, but rather of the 'correspondence' of the concept with reality (i.e. its

objectivity). This is obviously not a representational correspondence or a connection with an

external reality 'over there' (as it is for the understanding) but a speculative correspondence, a

unity internal to the idea itself. For Hegel, truth is not a matter of linking concepts with other EA)10 SL755; HW6/462. There, Hegel explicitly attributes this definition to Kant. 11 That is, the synthesis of intuitions and the concepts of the understanding (i.e. the categories) by either the productive imagination (A edition) or the understanding itself (B edition). For Kant, only objects constituted by such a synthesis can be said to be known (i.e. constituted as possible objects of knowledge). For a summary of this process, see CPR A51-52/B75-76. For an account of the differences between the A and B versions of this synthesis, see Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Indiana, 1997), 112-120. Interestingly, sublation in Hegel plays a role analogous to that of synthesis in Kant insofar as both are the respective operations required for knowledge, and therefore truth. On the other hand, the differences between the two are numerous, and the resulting systems (while sharing a common, critical purpose) are quite distinct. 12 "... die Übereinstimmung des Denkens mit dem Gegenstande..." (SL44; HW5/37)

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concepts, or a matter of linking concepts to external reality. Rather, Hegel sees truth as

unifying the concept with objectivity as its own objectivity. In Hegel's concept of truth,

concept and objectivity correspond, not as a gap bridged between two distinct realms, but as

the realization that this gap is a sort of illusion or error.13

This distinction between what truth is for understanding and what truth is for

speculation produces a twofold definition for what we might otherwise call truth: a

descriptive definition and a normative one. Truth in the descriptive sense, referring to any

correspondence between a concept and empirical reality, is referred to by Hegel as being

merely correct (richtig). Hegel reserves a more normative sense for the word true (wahr)

itself, which refers to only a subset of what is correct. Truth in the higher, normative sense

only exists where concept and reality correspond completely, as not merely externally linked

but internally unified. So, for example, the statement "The chair is in the room" may or may

not be (descriptively) correct, but it would never be, according Hegel, (normatively) true

because chairs do not have the sort of existence where their concept and their objectivity can

ever be internally unified.14 This is also the reason why Hegel claims that his concept of truth

has no empirical use.15 By contrast, what is true, according to Hegel's normative definition,

are the stages (Life, the True, the Good, the Absolute), modes (Nature, Spirit, Logic16), and

13 I am indebted to Professor Ludovicus De Vos for clarifying this point for me (personal conversation). 14 Such a lack of (internal) correspondence between concept and objectivity is, for Hegel, characteristic of everything finite. Finite things 'in the world' cannot be true, precisely because their concept cannot be unified with their objectivity. Hegel's more normative conception of truth means that truth only exists in and for those few moments (or moment) where such a complete unity is possible. For Hegel, that finite things cannot be true is not a weakness of his conception of truth, but rather a definitive aspect of finitude. That the concept of a chair and an existent chair are distinct is because a chair is a finite thing. On the other hand, for an idea (in a general sense) its concept and its existence are not separable, and thus become for Hegel the locus of the truly infinite. 15 SL755; HW6/462.16 As a mode of the idea, logic has a peculiar character: "The logical aspect of the absolute idea may also be called a mode of it; but whereas mode signifies a particular kind, a determinateness of form, the logical aspect, on the contrary, is the universal mode in which all particular modes are sublated and enfolded." "Das Logische der absoluten Idee kann auch eine Weise derselben genannt werden; aber indem die Weise eine besondere Art, eine Bestimmtheit der Form bezeichnet, so ist das Logische dagegen die allgemeine Weise, in der alle besonderen aufgehoben und eingehüllt sind. " (SL825; HW6/550-EA) This dual nature (insofar as logic both appears alongside other modes and at the same time incorporates those modes) is a likely source for confusion about the precise architectonic of Hegel's concept of system, for example, in accounts of the relationship between logic and the philosophies of nature and spirit. For Hegel, logic can be talked about as if it were one of three equiprimordial modes of philosophy, alongside nature and spirit, but it is ultimately "the universal mode", determinative of and expressed in those other, secondary modes. In this way, for Hegel, logic has a certain

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expressions (in art, religion, and philosophy) of the idea itself.17 Truth as the unity of concept

and objectivity reaches its apotheosis with the Absolute Idea; it is truth "in and for itself", the

idea's absolute knowledge of itself.18

What then is this Absolute Idea? According to Hegel:

It is the sole subject matter and content of philosophy. Since it contains all determinateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularization, it has various shapes (Gestalten), and the business of philosophy is to cognize it in these.19

Thus, the Absolute Idea is not simply one moment of the system alongside other moments, or

even simply the highest moment; rather, it contains all other moments within itself. It is in this

sense that the Absolute Idea can be said to be identical to the system itself. Of course, it is not

simply a collection of these moments, or their underlying presupposition, but the concrete

determination of them. Therefore, the determination of all the moments of the system, over

the entire course of the Science of Logic, is at the same time the self-determination of the

Absolute Idea.

This self-determination of the Absolute Idea is of a special kind, due to the specific

relation within the Absolute Idea between form and content. "Thus the logical idea has itself

as the infinite form for its content.... More exactly, the Absolute Idea itself has for its content

merely this, that the form-determination is its own completed totality, the pure Concept."20

Thus, the Absolute Idea has its own form for its content. By arriving at this point, Hegel

understands himself to have realized the objective he set for himself at the beginning; not to

preeminence over other types of philosophy.17 SL824; HW6/549.18 Here is the full passage in context: "Thirdly, spirit cognizes the Idea as its absolute truth, as the truth that is in and for itself; the infinite Idea in which cognition and action are equalized, and which is the absolute knowledge of itself." "Drittens erkennt der Geist die Idee als seine absolute Wahrheit, als die Wahrheit, die an und für sich ist; die unendliche Idee, in welcher Erkennen und Tun sich ausgeglichen hat und die das absolute Wissen ihrer selbst ist." (SL760; HW6/469-EA)19 "Sie ist der einzige Gegenstand und Inhalt der Philosophie. Indem sie alle Bestimmtheit in sich enthält und ihr Wesen dies ist, durch ihre Selbstbestimmung oder Besonderung zu sich zurückzukehren, so hat sie verschiedene Gestaltungen, und das Geschäft der Philosophie ist, sie in diesen zu erkennen." (SL824; HW6/549-EA)20 "Die logische Idee hat somit sich als die unendliche Form zu ihrem Inhalte... Die absolute Idee selbst hat näher nur dies zu ihrem Inhalt, daß die Formbestimmung ihre eigene vollendete Totalität, der reine Begriff ist." (SL825; HW6/550-TM)

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offer not a merely formal logic, where the formal aspects of logic are themselves assumed,

but to present a logic where the form is taken up as the content of logic itself.21 It is with this

unification or 'closure' that Hegel grasps the Absolute Idea as not only self-determinate, but

completely self-determinate.

C. FORM AND METHOD

Immediately following the passage cited above, Hegel adds this qualification:

Now the determinateness of the Idea and the entire course followed by this determinateness has constituted the subject matter [Gegenstand] of the science of logic, from which course the absolute idea itself has issued into an existence of its own; but the nature of this its existence has shown itself to be this, that determinateness does not have the shape [Gestalt] of a content, but exists wholly as form, and that accordingly the idea is the absolutely universal idea. Therefore what remains to be considered here is not a content as such, but the universal aspect of its form—that is, the method.22

This would appear to be one of Hegel's awkwardly paradoxical expressions, but once again

there is an important terminological distinction at work. While the Absolute Idea has the form

of logic as its content, this content is of a peculiar nature; it is not a particular content ("a

content"), but a universal one (or, more precisely, one with a "universal aspect"). The form,

while taken up as the subject matter (Gegenstand) of the science of logic, nevertheless

remains a form. In fact, the determination that has taken place (over "the entire course" of the

science of logic) has established—has proven—this form. To put it another way, the goal of

the study of logic is not the proper application of a set of formal rules to this or that particular

content, but the taking up of those rules as the subject matter, the study of logic itself. The

method of proof itself is that which is to be proven.

The science of logic as a whole constitutes the demonstration of this proof:

21 SL43; HW5/35.22 "Die Bestimmtheit der Idee und der ganze Verlauf dieser Bestimmtheit nun hat den Gegenstand der logischen Wissenschaft ausgemacht, aus welchem Verlauf die absolute Idee selbst für sich hervorgegangen ist; für sich aber hat sie sich als dies gezeigt, daß die Bestimmtheit nicht die Gestalt eines Inhalts hat, sondern schlechthin als Form, daß die Idee hiernach als die schlechthin allgemeine Idee ist. Was also hier noch zu betrachten kommt, ist somit nicht ein Inhalt als solcher, sondern das Allgemeine seiner Form, - d. i. die Methode." (SL825; HW6/550-EA)

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Against this however we can appeal not only to the fundamental concept of the science of logic; its entire course, in which all possible shapes (Gestalten) of a given content and of objects came up for consideration, has demonstrated their transition and untruth; also that not merely was it impossible for a given object to be the foundation to which the absolute form stood in a merely external and contingent relationship but that, on the contrary, the absolute form has proved itself to be the absolute foundation and ultimate truth.23

In other words, the other moments of the system, as they transition from one to the next,

demonstrate or determine their "untruth", their contradiction, and thus (in part) their negation.

But since, according to Hegel, he has demonstrated the "untruth" of "all possible shapes" of

these contents, this, in turn, demonstrates the "truth" of their "absolute form" (the Absolute

Idea). In this way, the Absolute Idea is proven and the system as a whole is established—and

the individual moments preserved—via double negation.24

The foundation or ground of Hegel's logical method is thus not a presupposition, but a

conclusion; it is not merely determining, but is itself determined. In this way, Hegel

understands his approach to have succeeded where the early approaches had failed. Hegel saw

the earlier metaphysical dogmatism (e.g. Wolff and Baumgarten) as inadequate because it was

based on presuppositions, premises determining our knowledge but not determined by it,

which remained inaccessible to knowledge and were, therefore, untrue. For Hegel, Kant's

philosophy bore within it a remainder of the same flaw (e.g. the thing-in-itself). For Hegel,

any such externality to the system, any element that was determining but not itself

determined, left truth vulnerable to the threat of skepticism. One could argue that Hegel's

entire purpose in formulating his system was to establish an ultimate defense against such

skepticism.25

23 "Aber es kann hiergegen nicht nur auf den Grundbegriff vom Logischen sich berufen werden, sondern der ganze Verlauf desselben, worin alle Gestalten eines gegebenen Inhalts und der Objekte vorgekommen sind, hat ihren Übergang und Unwahrheit gezeigt, und statt daß ein gegebenes Objekt die Grundlage sein könnte, zu der sich die absolute Form nur als äußerliche und zufällige Bestimmung verhielte, hat sich diese vielmehr als die absolute Grundlage und letzte Wahrheit erwiesen." (SL826; HW6/551-EA)24 See Chapter 4, Section C, Subsection 1. 25 For a detailed account of this interpretation, see Michael Forster, Hegel and Skepticism (Harvard, 1989), 117-147. The defense against skepticism is of course one of the basic purposes of critical philosophy in general (the other being the freedom from dogmatism).

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The relationship between Hegel's method and this purpose (the defense against

skepticism) can best be illustrated by reference to the account Hegel gives toward the end of

the Science of Logic of dialectic. Hegel begins by claiming that dialectic has often been

misunderstood, in both ancient and modern philosophy. The first misunderstanding Hegel

mentions is that "Dialectic has often been regarded as an art, as though it rested on a

subjective talent and did not belong to the objectivity of the concept."26 That which is an art

(Kunst, in the sense of techne) would be something external, something that works on its

content from the outside, while for Hegel, dialectic is internal to "the objectivity of the

concept" and thus to truth, something that operates from out of the content itself. The second

(related) misunderstanding Hegel mentions is that dialectic has often been applied to this or

that subject matter as something contingent rather than being understood as a necessary aspect

of thinking as such. Hegel gives three examples of this: the Eleatics' application of dialectic to

motion, Plato's application of dialectic against "the general ideas and concepts of his time,

especially those of the Sophists"27 and most significantly for us, skepticism's application of

dialectic to not only the "the immediate so-called facts of consciousness and maxims of

common life, but also to all the concepts of science."28 Hegel goes on to note by way of

contrast, "Now the conclusion drawn from dialectic of this kind is in general the

contradiction and nullity of the assertions made."29 In Hegel's account in this passage, the

result of dialectic understood as a "nullity" can be understood in one of two senses: in an

"objective sense" where the problem lies with the subject matter (e.g. the Eleatics on motion)

or in a "subjective sense" where the problem lies with cognition (e.g. the sort of "common

sense" that regards dialectic as a mere trick or nonsense). According to Hegel, this latter

26 "Man hat die Dialektik oft als eine Kunst betrachtet, als ob sie auf einem subjektiven Talente beruhe und nicht der Objektivität des Begriffes angehöre." (SL831; HW6/557-558)27 "...die Vorstellungen und Begriffe seiner Zeit, insbesondere der Sophisten..." (SL831; HW6/558)28 "...unmittelbaren sogenannten Tatsachen des Bewußtseins und Maximen des gemeinen Lebens, sondern auch auf alle wissenschaftlichen Begriffe..." (SL831-832; HW6/558-EA)29 "Die Folgerung nun, die aus solcher Dialektik gezogen wird, ist überhaupt der Widerspruch und die Nichtigkeit der aufgestellten Behauptungen." (SL832; HW6/558-EA)

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sense, when extended to cognition as such, is the view of both skepticism and Kantian

philosophy. Therefore, Hegel's understanding of Kant's philosophy as inadequate is closely

related to the fact that Hegel believed Kant's response to skepticism to be inadequate.30

What both of these senses and each of the approaches mentioned above have in

common is that they understand dialectic to have "only a negative result".31 According to

Hegel, what they miss is the additional, positive result of dialectic.32 For Hegel, the negative

result of dialectic—contradiction—is not something contingent, a flaw in a particular subject

matter or a particular way of thinking, but a necessary aspect of thinking as such. Hegel

credits Kant with the modern expression of this insight: "It must be regarded as a step of

infinite importance that dialectic is once more recognized as necessary to reason, although the

result to be drawn from it must be the opposite of that arrived at by Kant."33 But for Kant (et

al.) a contradiction is still merely negative. For Hegel, this (mis)understanding of the result is

the problem with formal thinking in general:

On this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the concept. Formal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation.34

In other words, not only is contradiction a necessary aspect of thinking as such, it is just as

much a part of formal thinking as speculative thinking. The difference is not that one way of

30 For Hegel, it is what he sees as the remainder of dogmatism in Kant's philosophy (e.g. the thing-in-itself) that leaves it vulnerable to skepticism. Thus, Hegel does not want to return to a pre-Kantian dogmatism, but rather just the opposite. He believes the basic problem with Kant's philosophy is that it is insufficiently critical. For more on the relationship between Kant and Hegel relative to issues of dogmatism, skepticism, and criticism, see Frederick Beiser, Hegel (Routledge, 2005), 156-157.31 "...nur ein negatives Resultat..." (SL832; HW6/559)32 This aspect has already been discussed at length, in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, Section B. 33 "Es ist als ein unendlich wichtiger Schritt anzusehen, daß die Dialektik wieder als der Vernunft notwendig anerkannt worden, obgleich das entgegengesetzte Resultat gegen das, welches daraus hervorgegangen, gezogen werden muß." (SL831; HW6/558-EA)34 "Es macht sich darüber den bestimmten Grundsatz, daß der Widerspruch nicht denkbar sei; in der Tat aber ist das Denken des Widerspruchs das wesentliche Moment des Begriffes. Das formelle Denken denkt denselben auch faktisch, nur sieht es sogleich von ihm weg und geht von ihm in jenem Sagen nur zur abstrakten Negation über." (SL835; HW6/563-EA)

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thinking is contradictory and one way is not, but that both ways of thinking essentially entail

contradiction; it is only that formal thinking is unable, or unwilling, to recognize this.

But how, one might well ask, is this any different than skepticism, which also claims

that contradiction is a negativity essential to thinking? The difference between Hegel's logic

and skepticism is that, for Hegel, contradiction has an additional positive function.

It is the simple point of the negative relation to self, the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublation of the opposition between concept and reality, and the unity that is truth.35

Essentially, the recognition of the positive function of this negativity in dialectic depends

upon Hegel's concept of sublation. As we have seen from the beginning, it is sublation that

expresses a negation the result of which is not merely a nullity. Thus, sublation is not only the

operant concept in the logical transitions, the mainspring of dialectic, but is also essential and

fundamental to Hegel's concept of truth, and moreover, to the defense of this concept of truth

against skepticism. Hegel's concept of sublation is precisely what distinguishes his philosophy

from a thoroughgoing skepticism.

This important point illustrates how the postmodern 'totalitarian reading' of Hegel as a

dogmatic arch-rationalist is not only incorrect, but almost completely backward. If Hegel's

concept of sublation were only a synonym for simple negation, which reduced that which is

sublated to merely nothing and eliminated all differences as such, 'reducing the other to the

same' and so on, then Hegel's system would not be a rationalist, dogmatic one at all. It would

be just the opposite—skepticism.

At the same time, Hegel's opposition to skepticism is an opposition in the Hegelian

sense; it entails that which it opposes. This can be seen in Hegel's account of dialectic that I

have been discussing. The negativity of dialectical method, as it is employed in skepticism, 35 "Sie ist der einfache Punkt der negativen Beziehung auf sich, der innerste Quell aller Tätigkeit, lebendiger und geistiger Selbstbewegung, die dialektische Seele, die alles Wahre an ihm selbst hat, durch die es allein Wahres ist; denn auf dieser Subjektivität allein ruht das Aufheben des Gegensatzes zwischen Begriff und Realität und die Einheit, welche die Wahrheit ist." (SL835; HW6/536-EA)

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not contingently or in a piecemeal way but against "all the concepts of science", is Hegel's

method as well, with but one key exception. Hegel extends this dialectical negativity a vital

step further to include that negativity itself. To put it another way, rather than simply

attempting to prove knowledge, Hegel also wants to disprove skepticism. In this sense,

Hegel's logic is an internal critique of skepticism itself, where Hegel turns its own method and

strength against it.

We can see in more detail how this is indeed an internal critique of skepticism by

(briefly) recapitulating Hegel's method.36 Beginning from the immediate, that immediate is

first negated. In the skeptical sense, it is shown to be contradictory and as a result, it is

reduced to nothing. Then, this negation is itself revealed to be inadequate and a second

negation is revealed. "The second negative, the negative of the negative, at which we have

arrived, is this sublation of contradiction...."37 This "negative of the negative" is Hegel's

turning of skepticism back on itself,38 the result of which is something positive: "In this

turning point of the method, the course of cognition at the same time returns into itself. As

self-sublating contradiction this negativity is the restoration of the first immediacy, of simple

universality...."39 Thus, Hegel does not simply reject skepticism; rather, he interprets

skepticism (i.e. the result of skepticism, contradiction) to have sublated itself. Through this

36 This is an abstract account, divorced from the content, the problems with which we have already addressed. However, Hegel himself gives just such an abstract account in this chapter. The discrepancy can be resolved simply by noting (again) the distinction between an exposition or description of the method and the logical operation of that method. Hegel's account here is also noteworthy insofar as it is an example of Hegel tendency to use the term 'dialectic' to describe his method in general, rather than employing it the particular logical operations themselves. See also Chapter 2, Section A on this point. 37 "Das zweite Negative, das Negative des Negativen, zu dem wir gekommen, ist jenes Aufheben des Widerspruches..." (SL835; HW6/563)38 Hegel of course writes as if the concepts do this themselves. This manner of speaking is a necessary implication of his conception of the system as self-determinate. If Hegel wrote as if he himself were performing these sorts of operations, then this would call into question his claim that it is the system itself that is truly self-determinate and not simply determined personally by him. According to Hegel's own self-conception, this is not his system but rather the system. The exposition of this thinking is Hegel's own, but the logical sequence is (according to Hegel) that of thinking itself. 39 "In diesem Wendepunkt der Methode kehrt der Verlauf des Erkennens zugleich in sich selbst zurück. Diese Negativität ist als der sich aufhebende Widerspruch die Herstellung der ersten Unmittelbarkeit, der einfachen Allgemeinheit;" (SL836; HW6/563-EA)

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process the immediacy of the beginning is restored. Insofar as this process is carried out over

the whole of the science of logic, the result is truth.40

With this return to the beginning, the circle is complete.41 The idea (as Absolute)

becomes the system (as the system's absolute comprehension of itself).

In conclusion, there remains only this to be said about this idea, that in it, first, the science of logic has grasped its own concept. In the sphere of being, the beginning of its content [objective logic, metaphysics, etc.], its concept appears as knowing in a subjective reflection external to that content. But in the idea of absolute cognition, the concept has become the idea's own content. The idea is itself the pure concept that has itself for subject matter [Gegenstand] and which, in running itself as subject matter through the totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, into the system of the science [of logic], and concludes by apprehending this process of comprehending itself, thereby sublating its standing as content and subject matter and cognizing the concept of the science.42

Thus, the system comprehends itself through the determination of its moments. Each

constituent moment is determined by its sublation in a latter moment. The totality of these

sublations, the completion of the system, constitutes the ground of the system—its concrete

proof. As complete, this ground is the sublation of every constituent moment within the

system itself. Each of these moments is grounded both in its sublation in the next and as a

moment of the system as a whole. In other words, there are two key roles that sublation plays

40 The full quote, in context, reads: "Now more precisely the third is the immediate, but the immediate resulting from sublation of mediation, the simple resulting from sublation of difference, the positive resulting from sublation of the negative, the concept that has realized itself by means of its otherness and by the sublation of this reality has become united with itself, and has restored its absolute reality, its simple relation to itself. This result is therefore the truth." "Näher ist nun das Dritte das Unmittelbare, aber durch Aufhebung der Vermittlung, das Einfache durch Aufheben des Unterschiedes, das Positive durch Aufheben des Negativen, der Begriff, der sich durch das Anderssein realisiert und durch Aufheben dieser Realität mit sich zusammengegangen [ist] und seine absolute Realität, seine einfache Beziehung auf sich hergestellt hat. Dies Resultat ist daher die Wahrheit." (SL837; HW6/564-EA)41 Hegel himself uses the image of a circle to characterize this process, e.g. EL39; HW8/60. However, from this description it does not follow that Hegel's argument is circular in the sense of being a vicious circle. The term 'circle' never appears in Hegel as part of the logical sequence itself, but only in descriptions of it. One might argue that some aspect or another of Hegel's argument is circular in a non-metaphorical sense, but given the distinction between the logic and its exposition, Hegel's use of the term 'circle' by itself is not sufficient grounds for such a claim. 42 "Es ist von dieser Idee zum Schlusse nur noch dies zu erwähnen, daß in ihr erstlich die logische Wissenschaft ihren eigenen Begriff erfaßt hat. Bei dem Sein, dem Anfange ihres Inhalts erscheint ihr Begriff als ein demselben äußerliches Wissen in subjektiver Reflexion. In der Idee des absoluten Erkennens aber ist er zu ihrem eigenen Inhalte geworden. Sie ist selbst der reine Begriff, der sich zum Gegenstande hat und der, indem er sich als Gegenstand [habend] die Totalität seiner Bestimmungen durchläuft, sich zum Ganzen seiner Realität, zum Systeme der Wissenschaft ausbildet und damit schließt, dies Begreifen seiner selbst zu erfassen, somit seine Stellung als Inhalt und Gegenstand aufzuheben und den Begriff der Wissenschaft zu erkennen." (SL842-43; HW6/571-TM)

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relative to the particular moments of the science of logic: the sublation of each individual

transition between moments and the sublation of those moments within the system as a whole.

The former is sublation as the determination of each moment; the latter is sublation as the

completion of the system itself.

Importantly, both of these aspects are vital to Hegel's claim to truth. Without the

determination of each moment and the transitions between them, the system would remain

abstract—no more than an elaborately articulated set of assumptions, a sort of 'truth without

proof'.43 Without the completion of the system there would be no reconciliation of the concept

with its reality, and the system would lack its ground—a sort of 'proof without truth'.44

Without determination, the system would be merely a collection of premises that might

happen to be correct, but that would lack the sort of proof that would make them true.

Without completion, the system would contain determinations, but not be self-determinate

itself, and thus not free in Hegel's sense of the term. Without this freedom, the system could

not be true because it would remain determined by something and not determinate of itself.

As we have seen, this first requirement, determinateness, suggests a problem with

those who would accuse Hegel of being an arch-rationalist, i.e. of dogmatism. The second

requirement—completeness—suggests a problem for those would like to follow Hegel, but

not all the way to the end.45 Without completion, without a return to the beginning, such a

position would be, from a Hegelian point of view, nothing more than skepticism. According

to his own self-conception, Hegel's position is of course neither dogmatic nor skeptical, but

critical. In this way, Hegel sees himself as having taken up the goal Kant proposed and having

fully carried it out and, as we have seen in this chapter, the concept of sublation is essential to

this understanding of Hegel's philosophy as a critical one.

43 That is, there would be a truth-claim asserted, but no argument establishing it. 44 That is, there would be a series of arguments, but no conclusion. It should be clear that both of these phrases ('truth without proof' and 'proof without truth') are used in a figurative sense, and that I am not literally claiming truth and proof would be separable from one another. 45 See, for example, Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge, 1975), 538.

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Transition to Part III

Having arrived at the end of Part II of this study on the function of Hegel's concept of

sublation, several further features of sublation have now been distinguished. In Chapter 3, we

saw how sublation operates in the transition from being and nothing to becoming. More

specifically, we saw the unusual structure of the first transition of Hegel's Science of Logic.

Unlike the other transitions, the sublation here is not of the opposition between two moments

but rather of their sameness. The way sublation functions there supports the claim that Hegel's

logic is not in fact the rote application of an external formal method. In Chapter 4, we

examined the relationship between sublation and the determinations of reflection: identity,

difference, opposition, and contradiction. By the end of that chapter, we had seen how an

analysis of Hegel's science of logic in terms of sublation can offer a response to certain

common critiques of it; for example, Hegel's logic does not seek to abolish all difference or

violate the law of non-contradiction. In Chapter 5, we looked at how sublation defines the

relationship between the system and its moments. By the end of this chapter, it had been

shown how and it what sense sublation determines the science of logic as a whole. Sublation

in its speculative sense is required for both the determination of each moment relative to the

next as well as for the complete self-determination of those moments in the system as a

whole. In the third part of this study, I will use the structural and functional analysis of the

concept of sublation as the basis for a critical examination of Hegel's logic.

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PART III: CRITIQUE

CHAPTER 6: INTERNAL CRITIQUE

The critical part of my interpretation of Hegel's logic in terms of sublation will be

carried out in three chapters. The first (Chapter 6) will be an internal critique of Hegel's

concept of sublation. This is a critique of Hegel according to his own standards, i.e. the

criteria that have been established in Parts I and II. The second chapter of Part III (Chapter 7)

will be an external critique of Hegel's concept of sublation. This will be a critique according

not to Hegel's standards, but rather my own.1 The final chapter (Chapter 8) will be an

evaluation of the significance of Hegel's concept of sublation, both in terms of this study's

methodology and objectives, as well as the implications of sublation for philosophical

interpretation in general.

This chapter begins by outlining a basic definition of internal critique, as well as other

relevant definitions for the concepts that I use here. In the second half of this chapter, I

present an internal critique of Hegel's logical approach. This critique is of course contingent

upon Hegel's concept of sublation, and draws heavily on my earlier structural and functional

analyses.

A. DEFINITIONS

To begin with, what exactly is meant by the term 'internal critique'? For our purposes,

an internal critique can best be defined as an interpretation2 that evaluates the relative merits

and flaws of a given text3 according to standards established by the text itself. Accordingly, in

1 The basis for the particular legitimacy of external critique will be argued in Chapter 7. 2 A more elaborate discussion of the relationship between interpretation and critique will be discussed in Chapter 8. 3 By 'text' here I mean individual texts, but also parts of texts, or sets of texts. According to this more generally inclusive definition, a 'text', as the object of interpretation, could include an author's entire corpus. According to my understanding, this is what is meant when one talks about, for example, a criticism 'of Hegel' (or 'of Kant', etc.) That is, a 'criticism of Hegel' would be a criticism of his body of available written work, a 'criticism of

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an internal critique, the text and its interpretation share a set of premises in common. That is

to say, in an internal critique the argument of the text and the argument of the interpretation

have one or more premises in common. Those individuals who positively evaluate a given

text on this basis can be called apologists. Those who negatively evaluate a text on this basis

are simply called critics. While this distinction can have pejorative connotations, suggesting

that only those who negatively evaluate a text 'think critically', it is important to note that both

apologists and critics can meet the standard of an internal critique as I have stipulated it here.

Strictly speaking, an internal critique is the only legitimate one.4 Its legitimacy is

based on the mutual recognition of the set of premises as shared. This mutual recognition

occurs in any debate between (perhaps hypothetical5) apologists and critics. It is a mutual

recognition in principle that the interpretation at issue is made from a common set of

premises. Where apologists and critics differ is on the conclusions that ought to be derived

from these premises, not on the premises themselves. A debate over a particular criticism can

be said to be reasonable when such a mutual recognition is present between two or more

interlocutors.

Without some sort of recognition of the legitimacy of a given interpretation, without

some premises being mutually recognized as being shared in common, no reasonable

discourse is possible. It is important to keep in mind here that a mutual recognition of

legitimacy is not the same thing as agreement. An apologist and a critic need not agree with

each other about any of the particular conclusions involved. Indeed, by definition, they do not

Hegel's logic' would be a critical analysis of his written work as it relates to the topic of logic, and so forth. In other words, when I use the word 'text' here, I mean it in a broad, hermeneutical sense. And while I have here focused predominantly on one particular work (Hegel's Science of Logic), that focus will not be the sole purview of my critique. 4 Hegel himself insists on the exclusive legitimacy of internal critique. See Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Oxford, 1960), vii and Beiser, 157. However, more generally speaking I believe it is possible for an external critique to also be legitimate. My justification for this claim and an explanation of the relationship between internal and external critique will make up the second and third chapters of this part, respectively. 5 This hypothetical mutual recognition is the common standard for the critique of most historical texts. One way to test if an interpretation meets this standard is to ask something like "Would the author have agreed?" The mutual recognition can only be non-hypothetical when either a) the author of the text is still living or b) there are interlocutors involved that position themselves as its defenders.

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agree; each views the other's interpretation as incorrect. What makes a debate reasonable is

not the agreement among the involved parties but that, since they share a set of premises in

common, the potential that they could at some point agree. In this sense, reasonableness could

also be referred to as convincibility. By this I mean that, over the course of given debate, it

should at least be possible for reasonable interlocutors to be convinced of some (i.e. at least

one) of the others' conclusions.

Of course, convincibility is not the same thing as actually being convinced. It is not

necessary for two parties, ultimately, to reach any final agreement for a debate to have been

reasonable according to the definitions I have outlined here. This presents, however, an

immediate difficulty: if only potential, rather than actual, agreement is necessary for a debate

to be reasonable, then how is one to tell the difference between a reasonable debate and an

unreasonable one? To answer this question, we need to look at the reason that a reasonable

debate is something desirable in the first place.

The reason reasonable debate is for which we should strive is that it is a standard that

is performatively instantiated by the act of debating itself. Before we proceed, I should define

this concept in more detail.

I will define 'performativity' here as that aspect of a statement which involves its

function as an act or the context in which this act is carried out. This definition differs from

J.L. Austin's concept of a "performative utterance" in that performativity does not refer to a

particular type of speech act, but to a feature of speech acts in general.6 It is closer to Searle's

concept of an "indirect speech act" except that it is not focused on those acts that express

some meaning separate from a statement's explicit content.7 Performativity here is simply a

feature of the meaning of any speech act—the sense in which it is an act—and not a feature

peculiar to certain acts. In this sense, a performative standard is a criterion or expectation that

6 See J.L. Austin's How to Do Things With Words (Oxford, 1962).7 See John Searle's Expression and Meaning (Cambridge, 1979), 38-57.

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is instantiated in the act and/or context of making a statement, rather than in the content of

that statement. Taking this distinction between a statement's content and its performativity

into account also entails that it is possible for a statement to be performatively contradictory.

That is, a statement might contradict itself not only through some contradiction in its content,

but also through a contradiction between the content and the nature of the act of making the

statement.8

For example, the sentence "This sentence is false" is clearly an ordinary, formal

contradiction. It is the classic "liar's paradox", necessarily contradictory when written in any

language or however it might be otherwise formalized. On the other hand, "This sentence is in

Dutch" is a performative contradiction. That it is a contradiction depends, not on the specific

nature of the content, but on the nature of the act or context in which it is made; in this case, it

depends upon the language in which it is written. If I had expressed the same logical content

in Dutch—"Deze zin is in het Nederlands"—then there would of course be no contradiction

present.

Broadening this from statements to arguments as a whole, the same distinction applies.

For example, "De gustibus non est disputandum" is not a formal contradiction, but it would be

a performative contradiction in the context of, say, an argument about the merits of a

particular work of art. That one is arguing that a particular work is good or bad always already

assumes that there are some criteria for deciding whether the work is good or bad. Two

people may disagree about what those criteria are, but once they are engaged in a debate, they

have already assumed, performatively, that such criteria exist. One can coherently claim that

it is not possible to argue about taste, but one cannot coherently make that claim while at the

same time arguing about taste.

8 According to Austin, performatives cannot be contradictory insofar as they have no truth-value. It is Searle that introduces this possibility, with his distinction between the direct and indirect speech act.

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As a second example, consider a political realist's position that 'states should not take

morality into account in their international relations.' Abstracted from any particular policy

issue, this statement is not formally contradictory per se. However, once it is offered in the

context of a debate on the morality of a particular policy (e.g. whether to support a

dictatorship), then it becomes a performative contradiction. The political realist

simultaneously claims that morality should not be taken into account in the decision and

simultaneously takes a side on the moral issue at stake. For example, a Cold War strategist

claims that morality should not be taken into account when deciding whether or not to support

a dictatorship because Communism must be opposed on moral grounds. The theory professes

to be amoral, but is in fact already based on a certain morality. One can coherently claim that

morality should not be taken into account in foreign policy, but one cannot coherently make

that claim while at the same time arguing on a moral basis.

So, by taking the performativity of statements into account, and by broadening it to

apply to arguments, one can say that in a debate between any two given parties, the act of

debating itself assumes that both parties are reasonable, i.e. convincible. This assumption of

convincibility is a sort of 'meta-premise' shared by any two parties in a debate. The fact that

this basic premise is shared is established in the debate insofar as the two interlocutors each

provide reasons (i.e. grounds) for their respective claims. The act of providing grounds

performatively assumes that this act has some purpose. If one did not expect those grounds to

be (at least potentially) acceptable to the other party, there would be no purpose in providing

them in the first place. In other words, without reasonableness, the act of debating (or

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critique)9 would be an act of futility.10 In this way, the criterion of reasonableness is

performatively instantiated in any act of debating.

In answer to our earlier question, one can distinguish a reasonable debate from an

unreasonable one based on the nature of the grounds provided by either of the parties. In a

reasonable debate, each party will offer as grounds for their claim one of the basic shared

premises or secondary premises derived from them. Of course, qua debate, the two parties

will not necessarily agree. Indeed, by definition they will not, at least at first. In the process of

debating, any number of these elements might be called into question. Either party may argue,

for example, that essential premises were missing, or that their interlocutors' reasoning from

one premise to another was somehow flawed, and so forth. But what then would an

unreasonable debate look like?

An unreasonable debate (or an unreasonable interlocutor, or an unreasonable critique)

would primarily be indicated by the nature of the grounds offered in support of the claims

involved, e.g. ad hominem attacks. Unreasonableness might also be indicated by an

interlocutor's non-discursive behavior as well, such as shouting, fist pounding, leaving the

room, and so on. What both these types of claims and behaviors have in common is that they

are described as unreasonable because they constitute a refusal to provide grounds. It is

important to point out, however, that not being convinced by reasonable grounds does not

make an interlocutor unreasonable. In trying to define a reasonable tone in a debate, it is

always important to keep in mind that it is (potential) convincibility, not (actually) being

9 The respective natures of critique and debate are deeply intertwined. One does not offer a critique without assuming an audience for that critique. One does not offer grounds unless one anticipates some response. The relationship between critique and debate is articulated here in reference to a critiques 'publicity'. See below.10 While I do not fully elaborate an argument for it here, I would further suggest that any self-consciously futile argument would be performatively contradictory. While I do not offer an argument for this claim here, I would point out that Hegel himself considers such futility to be contradictory as well, i.e. in his critique of 'absolute verbiage', mentioned previously in Chapter 4, Section A, Subsection 2.

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convinced that is the criterion. Not being convinced does not mean an interlocutor is being

unreasonable. Not giving reasons does.11

Furthermore, a debate can be said to be reasonable even if the shared premises are not

present from the beginning. Rather, what is essential is the potential that shared premises

could be established at some point. In this way, in a reasonable debate, even the specific

nature of the set of shared premises could be called into question. For example, two parties

might have a divergent understanding of the premises they had thought they shared (i.e.

arguing at cross purposes). In such situations, a new set of shared premises could be

established, the original premises could be further clarified, or the two parties might simply

mutually recognize the situation and conclude their debate (i.e. agree to disagree.) In such a

case, the actual reasonableness of a debate might not be established until the very end. Where

the only shared premise is the ultimate, mutual recognition that the two parties do not share

any other relevant premises in common, the debate can still be said to be reasonable, insofar

as the two parties share at least this last recognition in common.

Of course, since reasonableness is, as a criterion, performatively instantiated in the act

of debating itself, it is far preferable for a debate to be reasonable from the outset. In fact, as I

have argued here, reasonable debate is the only coherent form of debate. Otherwise, too much

time can be wasted in confusion and one runs the risk of futility. The best way to minimize

the risk of such confusion and futility is to begin by establishing and clarifying one's basic

premises. This is why it is important, before engaging in such a critique, to lay some sort of

11 According the definitions of these terms as I have presented them here, the criterion of reasonableness by no means require any ascertainment of intent or other kind of psychological insight. It is only the linguistic, textual character, accessible to both parties (i.e. as 'accessible to all'), that can be categorized as reasonable or unreasonable. So this means, importantly, that an interpreter's motives are irrelevant. For example, a lawyer makes his case in court. He might make his case because he is being paid, as a favor to a loved one, or out of devotion to a political cause. None of those motives—only the argument that makes up the lawyer's case—could be characterized as being either reasonable or unreasonable, according to the definitions I have stipulated here. In making this distinction, I have in mind the particular issue of religiously-motivated public policy arguments made in a secular, liberal society. I do not believe that faith disqualifies anyone from engaging in such debate, and that such a claim made in response to a religiously motivated argument would be ad hominem. Religious grounds (e.g. '...because the Bible says so') are what would be excluded from a reasonable public debate in a secular society, but not religious motivations (e.g. '...because I am a Christian').

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groundwork, to establish, as clearly as possible, just what one takes to be the relevant set of

shared basic premises.

This has, in fact, been a key purpose in both my earlier structural and functional

analyses, as well as this (apparent) digression into the nature of criticism and debate. The

former was needed in order to make explicit the premises I take to be shared in the critique of

Hegel I present below. The latter was necessary in order to make explicit the specific

relationship between the earlier parts and this one. The importance of this 'making explicit'

brings me to one last performative criterion for any act of criticism, what I will call, for lack

of a better word, its publicity.

Any criticism is essentially public in the sense that it is necessarily intended for some

audience. The act of formulating any critique always assumes at least one interlocutor, even

if, at the moment the critique is offered, such an interlocutor is only hypothetical. In a written

work, for example, the interlocutor might be the intended audience. Such an interlocutor

remains hypothetical unless or until a reader responds to that work. Without such an (at least

hypothetical) interlocutor, there is no purpose in providing grounds for one's claims in the

first place. Without someone to convince, why would one bother to make an argument? If no

one is listening, why speak? If no one will read a work, why write it? It is in this sense that

critique and debate are inseparable. This is why in defining the former, I have taken so much

time discussing the latter.

To summarize, an act of criticism has two (mutually intertwined) performative

criteria: reasonableness and publicity. Reasonableness requires that one offer grounds for

one's claims. Publicity requires that those grounds be accessible to one's (actual or potential)

interlocutors. Internal criticism further requires that the grounds offered belong to (or be

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derived from) a shared set of premises. For the sake of publicity, it is important to make what

one takes to be those shared premises as explicit and as clear as possible.12

In the context of the present study, the following criticism will be internal insofar as it

is based on my account of Hegel's concept of sublation. The shared set of premises is Hegel's

text, and one of the purposes of my prior analysis has been to make what I take to be key

premises explicit (i.e. those aspects of the text most relevant to my critique). This is also why

I have occasionally taken the time to explain elements of Hegel's thinking that may seem

obvious to one already familiar with Hegel's writings, why I have often written as if to a

general audience, rather than to my real audience of a defense committee made up of

specialists. If one were to assume one's audience holds a common interpretation of Hegel's

work, to assume a set of 'things everyone knows' about Hegel, then the shared set of premises

necessary for an internal critique would remain merely implicit. Leaving the set of shared

premises implicit runs the risk of arguing at cross purposes, misunderstandings, and so forth.

Here, I have taken the additional step of elaborating on my understanding of the nature

of criticism in general. It has not been my intent to offer any kind of normative, prescriptive

methodology here, but rather a descriptive account of what I take to be the nature of text,

interpretation, criticism, and debate, and moreover, how each of these concepts is closely

intertwined with the others. This analysis of the nature of criticism has served the same

purpose as my earlier analysis of Hegel: to make explicit my premises and, most importantly

in this case, my understanding of the criteria of an internal critique. Without stating such

criteria explicitly, one runs the risk that one's critique may not be recognizable as internal at

all. Having now laid out this preliminary groundwork, we can now move on to the critical

analysis proper.

12 The excessive use of jargon or too many assumptions about the knowledge-base of one's audience are other commonly encountered problems of relating to the publicity of a critique.

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B. ANALYSIS

At the end of the previous chapter, I indicated two of Hegel's criteria for his system:

determination and completeness. The criterion of determination requires that any particular

determining element of logic must also itself be determined. Otherwise, the resultant system

would remain abstract, unfree, and unproven; what I summarized with the phrase "truth

without proof". The criterion of completion requires that every logically determining element

must also itself be determined. Otherwise, the resultant system would not reconcile its

concept with its objectivity, and thus would not be, according to Hegel, true; what I

summarized with the phrase "proof without truth". Without both determination and

completeness, Hegel's system would not be self-determinate.

In addition, we have seen the key role sublation plays in both of these criteria. The

determination of any particular moment is its sublation relative to the next, i.e. in the

transition to the next moment. The completion of the system is the sublation of these moments

relative to the whole.

These two requirements—that the system be both determinate and complete—pose a

serious problem for Hegel as well. As we have seen, Hegel adamantly insists on both, and

both are absolutely necessary according to his own standard of truth. To take one explicit

example, in response to some objections on the nature of the beginning of the Science of

Logic, Hegel writes:

Whatever objections to it might be raised—say, the limitations of human knowledge, the need to examine critically the instrument of cognition before starting to deal with the subject matter—are themselves presuppositions, which as concrete determinations involve the demand for their mediation and proof. Since therefore they possess no formal advantage over the beginning with the subject matter against which they protest, but on the contrary themselves require deduction on account of their more concrete content, their claim to prior consideration must be treated as an empty presumption.13

13 "Was man gegen ihn vorbringen möchte - etwa von den Schranken der menschlichen Erkenntnis, von dem Erfordernis, ehe man an die Sache gehe, das Instrument des Erkennens kritisch zu untersuchen -, sind selbst Voraussetzungen, die als konkrete Bestimmungen die Forderung ihrer Vermittlung und Begründung mit sich führen. Da sie hiermit formell nichts vor dem Anfange mit der Sache, gegen den sie protestieren, voraushaben und vielmehr wegen des konkreteren Inhalts einer Ableitung bedürftig sind, so sind sie nur für eitle Anmaßungen

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In other words, any concrete content requires determination, requires proof. That which

determines our cognition must itself be determined. Otherwise, such a determining would

remain merely an indeterminate presupposition. This, as we have seen, is Hegel's whole

purpose—the articulation of the totality of determinations, through every moment and every

transition, over the entire course of the science of logic. This is, of course, not a requirement

that everything that could be determined by the logic be determined, but that every

determination be determined that would determine the logic itself. Completeness is not some

artificial requirement that Hegel enumerate every possible element determinable by logic (e.g.

every possible determination of every philosophical science), but that Hegel determine every

element that determines the logic itself. The criterion of completeness means that the science

of logic must be self-determinate, not that it must somehow 'determine everything'. To put it

yet another way: in order to take up its form as its own content, the science of logic must

determine itself. As the science of logic, it also determines the form of thinking in the other

philosophical sciences. From this, however, it does not follow that the content of these other

sciences would also be reducible to logic and thereby also be required to be completely

determined. What is required for completeness is only the determination of those elements

that determine the logic itself.

Yet there remains at least one determining element of Hegel's logic that is not itself

determined in this way—Hegel's concept of sublation. Sublation is not itself a moment of the

system. No logical transition is ever presented for it and it is never established as a result.14

While there are any number of 'self-sublations', there is never a moment where sublation

sublates, and thus determines, itself. At the same time, Hegel refers to sublation from the very

zu nehmen, daß auf sie viel mehr als [auf] etwas anderes zu achten sei." (SL841; HW6/569-EA)14 See Chapter 4, Section B, Subsection 2 for a more detailed discussion of this. One could also note that Hegel's explicit description of sublation (that I discussed in Chapter 1) occurs in a remark, not in the main-body text. Hegel's definition of sublation is therefore part of his exposition of the logic, not itself part of the logical sequence per se.

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outset as a "fundamental determination." Thus, it would seem that the operant element of

Hegel's method of proof is not itself proven.

If this is indeed the case, that sublation is a logically determining element that is not

itself determined, then Hegel's system would be, by his own standards, incomplete, and thus

not, in Hegel's sense of the term, true. Again, such a lacuna would be a failure according to

Hegel's own criteria. Furthermore, Hegel himself was well aware of this problem, as it is one

that he explicitly mentions. In the context of a discussion of dialectic, Hegel writes:

To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole logic consists of such.15

So, while Hegel explicitly addresses the problem, one can see that the defense offered here is

wholly insufficient. "To hold fast to the positive in its negative" is said to be both "the most

important feature in rational cognition" and yet, at the same time, requires "only the simplest

reflection". Of course, simplicity is, for Hegel, no grounds at all and he manages to avoid

appealing to it directly.16 Instead, the "examples of the proof" are said to be found throughout

"the whole logic."17 In other words, Hegel claims here that the proofs for the concept of

sublation are found in the logical transitions themselves, where it is operant as the 'holding

fast to the positive in its negative', i.e. as negation and preservation. Of course, in these

transitions, sublation is not that which is being proven. In these transitions, sublation is what

is determining the transitions but is not itself that which is being determined by them. In more

Hegelian terms, sublation is (an aspect of) the form of these transitions, but not their content.

15 "Das Positive in seinem Negativen, dem Inhalt der Voraussetzung, im Resultate festzuhalten, dies ist das Wichtigste im vernünftigen Erkennen; es gehört zugleich nur die einfachste Reflexion dazu, um sich von der absoluten Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit dieses Erfordernisses zu überzeugen, und was die Beispiele von Beweisen hierzu betrifft, so besteht die ganze Logik darin." (SL834; HW6/560-EA)16 What is 'simple' in this sense is not a ground because it is immediate, not mediated or determined. In other words, something 'simple' is an assumption, not an argument. See, for example, Hegel's rejection of immediate knowledge in thinkers like Jacobi, e.g. LHP3/417-418; HW20/323.17 An example, however, is not itself a proof. Instances of the use of sublation does not mean that sublation itself is taken up as the content that is being determined in that proof. Sublation is part of the form of these proofs, not their content or that which is being proven.

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In order, though, for the science of logic to be completely self-determinate, its form must be

taken up as its content. The absence of a logical determination of sublation means that the

ground of the system (i.e. the system as a whole) contains (at least) one element that is not

itself grounded. Hegel's own demand for the complete determination of every logically

determining element means that (regarding the concept of sublation) Hegel's system is not

complete. Hegel seems to recognize the problem here, but, given the clear inadequacy of his

defense, at once seems to turn away from it. The problem of Hegel's basic task—to take up

the form of logic as its own content—is in this way deferred but not resolved.

In anticipation of possible objections to this criticism, I will continue by analyzing

elements of this critique in more detail. First of all, the word 'sublation' does not occur in this

passage explicitly. One might therefore object that sublation must not be the concept to which

Hegel refers here. While it is correct that Hegel does not use the term 'sublation' here

explicitly, the presence of the concept is clear from the context.18 Immediately preceding the

cited passage, Hegel writes:

The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken as the usual result of dialectic; rather it is the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated—contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other.19

From the context of this passage and its relation to the passage cited above, we can see that

the element in question 1) is described as "the most important feature in rational cognition",20

2) includes both negation and preservation,21 3) results in a negation that is distinct from

nothing,22 4) is described in contrast to "the usual result of dialectic", and 5) occurs

18 See Chapter 2, Section C for my justification of this distinction. 19 "Das Unmittelbare ist nach dieser negativen Seite in dem Anderen untergegangen, aber das Andere ist wesentlich nicht das leere Negative, das Nichts, das als das gewöhnliche Resultat der Dialektik genommen wird, sondern es ist das Andere des Ersten, das Negative des Unmittelbaren; also ist es bestimmt als das Vermittelte, - enthält überhaupt die Bestimmung des Ersten in sich. Das Erste ist somit wesentlich auch im Anderen aufbewahrt und erhalten." (SL834; HW6/561-EA)20 Compare to Hegel's description of sublation as "one of the most important concepts in philosophy" (Already cited in the Introduction, note 1.)21 Compare to Hegel's explicit definition of sublation, treated in Chapter 1, Section A. 22 Compare to Hegel's implicit definition of sublation, treated in Chapter 1, Section B, Subsection 1.

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throughout the whole logic.23 Given these five points of commonality between sublation and

the concept being referred to in this passage, to argue that the concept referred to here is not

sublation because the term is absent would be a bit like seeing a certain black-and-white

striped mammalian quadruped running across a plain in Africa and refusing to call it a zebra.

Even if one were to persist with such a linguistically positivist interpretation and assume that

a concept cannot be present without its term, then that would necessarily raise the question:

what then is present? What is this element that is both "the most important feature in rational

cognition" and at the same time so simple that it requires no proof? Whatever this

hypothetical element would be, it would still pose the same, unresolved problem.

Persisting, one could continue to claim that the concept being addressed here is not

sublation. Even if we, for the sake of argument, grant that possibility, what other possible

elements could fit this description? Could Hegel be referring to opposition, or contradiction,

or dialectic, or something else? Without listing every possible proposed alternative, one can

categorize these possibilities into two basic groups: those concepts that are moments of the

system (e.g. opposition) and those that are not (e.g. dialectic). The former are excluded as

possibilities because, if Hegel were here referring to some (logically determined) moment of

his system, then he would not need to argue that no proof is required. The proof would be

present in the transition to the given moment. On the other hand, if one were to argue that one

of the latter, 'non-moments' was a legitimate alternative, then the problem would once again

be simply deferred, not resolved. If Hegel is referring here to some other determining element

that is not itself proven, then that element would be just as problematic, for exactly the same

reasons.

Another possible objection is related to Hegel's concept of the completeness of the

system. Of course, that the system must be complete does not mean that it must somehow

23 Compare to Hegel's description of sublation as "...a fundamental determination, which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy…” (Already cited in the Introduction, note 1.)

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contain everything. "The truth is the whole" does not mean that every single word of the

system has to be proven in order for it to be true. This would be an enumeration—a list of

every possible determination that could be made in logic. This is, of course, not what Hegel

himself requires. Rather, what Hegel requires is completion. Completion does not require the

determination of everything that could be determined by the logic, but everything that

determines the logic itself. In this sense, completion does not mean total determination but

rather self-determination. For Hegel, the science of logic must be self-determinate if it is to be

true, but it does not on that account need to 'prove everything'. (A recognition of the

distinction between enumeration and completeness is very important, at the very least in order

to avoid the appearance of pressing unrealistic and incoherent demands onto Hegel.) One

might argue that what this entails is that every moment of the system has to be proven. Thus,

since sublation is not itself a moment of the system, it might not seem necessary that it be

determined in this way.

This objection, while somewhat more substantive, is still flawed. That sublation is not

a moment of the system is exactly the problem. If one assumes, for the sake of argument, that

Hegel fully determines every moment of the system, that as a moment each is logically

determinate, relative to both its subsequent moment and the whole, and that these

determinations are what make up the self-determination of the system (as the self-

determination of the Absolute Idea), one must nevertheless acknowledge there remains a

potential difficulty. If there were a logically determining element of the system that was not

itself logically determined as a moment, then the system would not be self-determinate. And,

as we have seen here, sublation is just such an element.

One could also try to preclude such a possibility in advance, via reference to Hegel's

concept of limit (Grenze). One might argue that any such determining-but-not-determined

element could easily be incorporated into the system, because the very act of determining

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such a boundary (i.e. 'outside the system') would render the element in question determined

(i.e. 'inside the system'). This is only a potential solution and not an actual one. While it is

possible to argue this, my point is that Hegel himself does not. In reading a text, one cannot

project solutions to a text's problems into that text and, at the same time, assume that they

must be a part of it simply because otherwise it would be incoherent. Such assumptions are

question-begging because they assume that a coherence must be present when it is that very

coherence that is at issue. Furthermore, my criticism here is not directed at the possibility of

systematic philosophy as such. I make no claim against the possibility of some other person, a

later philosopher or commentator, formulating a complete system, only that, in this case,

Hegel himself does not offer one.24

Along similar lines, one could argue that Hegel did not intend to establish every

possible logical determination, but to establish the framework within which later thinkers

could do so, thus 'filling in the gaps', so to speak. Such gaps, it could be argued, would not be

a problem for the system because they are still contained within the overall framework of the

system. To put this argument in terms of an analogy: if one man builds a house and another

man later adds furniture or some paint, it does not mean that the first man did not actually

finish the house. In more general terms, later additions or modifications do not necessarily

indicate an earlier incompleteness.

The problem with this 'framework argument' is similar to the problem with the 'limit

argument' mentioned above. According to Hegel's requirement of completeness, it is possible

for later philosophical determinations to be made. In insisting on the importance of

completeness for Hegel, I am not somehow claiming that Hegel requires anything like 'the

end of philosophy'. Yet, in order for the system to be self-determinate and thus free and true,

24 In addition, this (hypothetical) argument illustrates a problem with Hegel's 'limit-argument' in general. (See SL132; HW5/143.) Hegel is correct to say, in a certain sense, that in defining any limit, we always already define what is beyond it. However, such a determination entails only that there is something beyond the limit, not what that something is. This problem will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 7), in terms of the determination of indeterminacy.

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what cannot be left for later is anything essential to the system—anything without which it

would not be a system. As such, this means that what cannot be left for later is anything that

determines the system itself. More specifically, this means that later philosophers might make

further determinations through the system or within the system, but never of the system. If

Hegel had deliberately left room for other philosophers to determine something essential to

the self-determination of the system itself, then he could not have legitimately claimed to

have completed it. Leaving room for infinite later progress of this type would involve a "bad

infinite", which would, of course, be unacceptable to Hegel. To return to the earlier

construction analogy, one might be said to have finished a house even if it lacked furniture or

paint, but not if it was put together without any nails. One could also compare a systematic

philosopher to a watchmaker. A watchmaker could be said to have finished a watch even if it

lacked something like a chain or a wristband or if it was later repaired. A watchmaker,

however, could not be said to have completed making a watch if he left out the mainspring.

Such a watch would not tell time; it would not (essentially) be a watch at all. It is my position

in this internal critique that Hegel's system lacks such a mainspring, and that this is a

fundamental flaw in its very design.

One could still ask 'Is sublation really so important? Is sublation really what you call a

"determining element"? Isn't sublation just an ordinary German word that Hegel happens to

use?' Setting aside, for the sake of argument, that Hegel himself insists upon sublation's

importance and its determining character, this objection does make the helpful point that it is

of course not necessary for Hegel to define logically every term he uses. It would not make

any sense, for example, to require Hegel to define every word, down to each und, aber, oder,

and so forth. That such terms are not determined as moments is not problematic because they

are not logically determinative; ordinary language alone is not essential to proof. Again, it is

the determination of all logically determinative elements that is required for completeness—

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those elements without which no proof could be made. So, for Hegel, every moment of the

system is logically determinative relative to the moment after it; each moment's contradiction

is resolved within it and this resolution simultaneously constitutes that subsequent moment. In

other words, each transition entails a logical determination. The point of my critique is that

while the determination of each moment determines the content of each transition, in failing

to determine sublation, Hegel fails to take into account the full form of those transitions. The

reconciliation of form and content in the science of logic occurs only at the macro-level of the

Absolute Idea. At the micro-level, the operant level of the very mechanism that makes each

individual transition possible, no such reconciliation ever occurs and the form of the particular

transitions (i.e. sublation) is never itself a content.

Indeed, it could even be argued that such a micro-level resolution would be impossible

for Hegel. If such a resolution occurred, if sublation were ever itself determined as a moment,

then one of two things would result. Either sublation would function just as any other moment

and would collapse under its own internal contradictions—thus establishing Hegel's

transitions to be, in a certain sense, false. Or, sublation would be resolved as true, as the

reconciliation of the concept with its objectivity, in which case sublation would be just as true

as the Absolute Idea. But in that case, sublation would either actually be the Absolute Idea25

or there would be a truth prior to the Absolute Idea, in which case the Absolute Idea would

itself be unnecessary.

In other words, either the Absolute Idea is true or sublation is true. But if either is

false, concept and objectivity are not reconciled and the system is false. Thus, Hegel's

25 It may seem odd to equate sublation with the Absolute Idea, but it is necessary to refute the possibility. Sublation and the Absolute Idea are of course distinct. Hegel claims that the "examples of proof" of sublation occur throughout the logic. The proof of the Absolute Idea, on the other hand, requires the complete system as a whole, and is not a proof repeated in every transition. In other words, unlike Hegel's problematic characterization of sublation here, the proof of the Absolute Idea is not plural—there is only one.

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ultimately univocal conception of truth precludes his system, by his own definition, from

actually being true. This is a contradiction in the system that is not resolved by it.26

There is one last possible objection. One could argue that 'This is only a few sentences

in a massive work. Aren't you making too much of this one passage? Is one minor

misstatement really sufficient reason to reject an entire system?' My response to this would be

that the passage cited as the basis of this critique is only the occasion for a much deeper

objection. This passage only indicates that Hegel himself was aware of the problem. The

problem itself runs throughout the entire Science of Logic. It would still have been present

even if Hegel had been unaware of it, even if he had never mentioned it. A problem with

sublation is a problem with every logical transition, every determination. The absence of a

determination of sublation means that Hegel's system is not complete, not wholly self-

determinate, and not true, according to his own criteria. It is a fundamental flaw at the very

heart of the system itself.

26 As was explained in Chapter 4, Section C, for Hegel the system can contain contradictions but it cannot itself be contradictory. All of the contradictions it contains must be resolved at some point in order for the system itself to be true.

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CHAPTER 7: EXTERNAL CRITIQUE

Having presented my internal critique of Hegel's logic in terms of sublation, I will

now offer an external critique of it. Relative to this second critique, I take my internal critique

to have served a propaedeutic function. That is, having criticized Hegel's logic on internal

grounds, I understand this to have laid the groundwork for a broader critique. An internal

critique can function in this way insofar as, having rejected one set of premises on their own

terms, a critic might offer an alternative set of premises in their place. In this way, an external

critique can serve a positive function, where an internal critique alone cannot.1

Accordingly, I begin by first defining what I mean by the term 'external critique'. In

doing so, I hope to suggest the way in which such a critique can also be a legitimate one. This

legitimacy differs from the legitimacy of an internal critique, but that difference should not in

itself preclude the possibility. Next, I present my external critique of Hegel's logic, again in

light of his concept of sublation. Ultimately, I will show how certain moments cannot be

determined by means of a logic of sublation as Hegel understands it. Thus, this external

critique will call into question the foundations of Hegel's logic, albeit in a different and

somewhat more controversial way.

A. DEFINITIONS

In contrast to our earlier definition of internal critique, we can define an external

critique as an interpretation that evaluates the relative merits and flaws of a text based on a set

of standards not found in the text itself. Traditionally, such a critique is seldom, if ever,

understood as being worthy of the name. Kant, for example, asserts the superiority of his

(internal) critique of pure reason over those approaches which lack this sort of critical

1 That is, on the basis of a prior and/or concomitant internal critique. I explain my reasoning on this point below.

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structure, arguing "there can, properly speaking, be no polemic of pure reason."2 Furthermore,

Kant argues:

The critique of pure reason can be regarded as the true tribunal for all disputes of pure reason; for it is not involved in these disputes†—disputes which are immediately concerned with objects—but is directed to the determining and estimating of the rights of reason in general, in accordance with the principles of their first institution.

In the absence of this critique reason is, as it were, in the state of nature, and can establish and secure its assertions and claims only through war. The critique, on the other hand, arriving at all its decisions in the light of fundamental principles of its own institution, the authority of which no one can question, secures to us the peace of a legal order, in which our disputes have to be conducted solely by the recognized methods of legal action.3

According to this passage, there are two forms of dispute: critique and polemic, where

critique is to law as polemic is to war.4 Criticism is comparable to law in the sense that the

interlocutors share a common set of premises in the same way that opposing litigants would

(qua litigants) share a recognition of the legitimacy of their own legal system. Polemic is

comparable to war because, without a set of premises shared between interlocutors, there is no

means to resolve a dispute in a way that is recognizably legitimate for both parties. Under

such circumstances, reasonable debate gives way to a struggle of blind assertion, a conflict of

mere power or dogmatic authority. In Kant's terms, without the "legal order" of critique,

disputes occur in a "state of nature". Kant thus sees the structure of an internal critique as

analogous to that of an institutionalized political order (i.e. of a state); polemic is by contrast

mere anarchy.

I would like to argue, however, that there are circumstances under which such a

polemic can have its own legitimacy. In effect, I would like to offer a sort of 'just war theory'

for polemic.5 In order to avoid confusion, however, I will use the term 'external critique' to

2 CPR A750/B7783 CPR A751/B779-EA. The sort of dispute Kant refers to here (†) are speculative disputes about the transcendent, "a dispute about a thing the reality of which" neither interlocutor can "present in actual or even possible experience." (A750/B778) I am indebted to Howard Caygill, in his Kant Dictionary article on "critical philosophy" (Caygill, 138) for pointing me toward this legal metaphor and the contrast Kant makes to war. 4 Kant is obviously playing off the etymology of the term 'polemic', referring to its Greek root polemos, meaning 'war'.5 This 'just war theory' will be a necessarily a brief sketch, more of a 'just war hypothesis' than a proper theory. The purpose here is of course to establish the grounds of my later remarks on Hegel, not to establish a second,

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refer to those external critiques that are (or can be) legitimate and reserve the term 'polemic'

for those critiques that are external and not legitimate.

The legitimacy of an argument, as we have seen, can be defined by a mutual

recognition of a shared set of premises. I would argue that this definition of legitimacy holds

regardless of whether one is referring to an internal or external critique. However, if this

definition of legitimacy is maintained, how could an external critique ever acquire such a

shared set of premises?

The key distinction here is the locus of legitimacy. In an internal critique, the common

set of premises is shared with the text itself (and/or with apologists for that text). The locus of

legitimacy is thus found in relation to the text itself. In an external critique, on the other hand,

the common set of premises is shared with a third party. Given the earlier claim that all

critiques are essentially public, this third party can be referred to as the audience. The locus of

legitimacy of an external critique is thus found not in the critic's relation to the text, but in

relation to the intended audience of his critique.

This distinction can be further explained by shifting focus from critique to debate. As

corollaries to these two types of critique, one can define two types of debate: direct debate

and indirect debate. In a direct debate, one attempts to convince one's interlocutor. In an

indirect debate, one still argues with one's interlocutors, but the purpose of this argument is

instead to convince one's audience.6

Thus, by combining this distinction with our earlier definition of reasonableness as

convincibility,7 it is clear how an external critique can potentially be a reasonable one. If the

mutual recognition of a shared set of premises is necessary for legitimacy, and if such a

legitimacy is necessary for reasonableness, then it is not strictly necessary that one share a set

of premises with the text per se. The key requirement for legitimacy is that there is a

separate thesis. 6 Direct and indirect debate are very often two aspects of a single conversation or written exchange.7 Chapter 6, Section A.

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recognition of a common set of premises, not where that commonality is found. Thus, a

critique may be recognized as legitimate even if it only shares premises with its audience.

Whether a critique is recognized as legitimate depends more on whom the critique is directed

toward than the nature of the critique itself.

One possible exception to this could be a certain sort of dogmatic fundamentalist who

would only ever accept his or her own interpretation of a single text as the shared set of

premises.8 Such a fundamentalist could only ever recognize an internal critique of that text as

legitimate if it were based on their own interpretation. However, this sort of fanatic is more of

a logical possibility than a real problem. In order for such fanatics to pose a coherent problem

here, not only would they have to derive all their premises (for all of their arguments) from a

single text, they would also have to derive their exclusivism from that text as well. For

example, there are legal theorists in the United States—so-called 'strict constructionists'—that

claim that the only legal principles they will acknowledge as legitimate are those found in the

text of the U.S. Constitution itself. The problem, however, is that this strict constructionism is,

in the U.S. Constitution itself, nowhere to be found.9 In this way, this sort of fundamentalist

hermeneutic is (very often) a sort of performative contradiction. Thus, while there are real

people who make such arguments, they are (typically) not internally coherent and thus do not

pose a substantial problem.

So, while it is possible for a certain sort of person to view only one interpretation of

one text as the only possible locus of legitimacy, most people have the capacity to recognize

some sorts of external critique as legitimate. That is not to say these people would necessarily

be willing to recognize any critique as legitimate, only that there is nearly always some sort of

possible common ground available for making one. At the very least, one should be able to 8 Here, the term 'fundamentalist' is understood here in a hermeneutical sense, not referring to any particular movement, denomination, or ideology. 9 In fact, the Ninth Amendment specifically precludes such a narrow, exclusivist interpretation, reading: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The strict-constructionist claim that the only legal rights citizens have are enumerated in the text of the Constitution is contradicted by that very text.

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abstract from one their internal premises in order to find a common ground. For example, one

might argue with a fanatical Marxist that the institutionalization of Marxist principles is not

the best way to help the poor. While, as a fanatic, such a person is unlikely to agree, there

remains in such an appeal the logical possibility of agreement (i.e. the common ground of

wanting to help the poor), which is the standard that we have stipulated as the minimum

criteria for reasonableness.10

Instead of a myopic adherence to a single interpretation of a single text, one might

instead insist on the exclusive legitimacy of internal critiques in general. Upon reaching this

point, however, the dispute becomes merely one of semantics. If such a person were to

concede the definitions and requirements for internal critique stipulated earlier, then he or she

would agree with our criteria for legitimacy (i.e. a shared set of premises). If, however, such a

person has no particular attachment to a single text, if he or she really is only committed to

internal critique in general, then the locus of this legitimacy would, by definition, be flexible;

that is, multiple common grounds would be available. It would thus be possible for this

person to recognize an external critique as I have defined it here as legitimate. To put it

another way: I would understand a person who claimed that only internal critiques (in

general) were exclusively legitimate to be insisting that critiques are only legitimate when

based on a shared set of premises. In this case, the dispute would no longer be about whether

or not commonality is required, but how one defines that commonality. It is in this sense that

the difference would be only semantic.

If one prefers, the definition of external critique could be articulated as a type of

internal critique insofar as both are based on a shared set of premises. In other words, an

external critique is external to a text, but, if legitimate, still internal to its audience. It is only

10 The actual reasonableness of one's interlocutor is independently related to one's own reasonableness. For example, one might offer a set of premises, have the interlocutor accept those premises, then offer a valid argument, and nevertheless be confronted with an interlocutor who refuses to agree. This interlocutor's ultimate refusal would not alter the fact that one's argument was itself offered on a reasonable basis.

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the locus of legitimacy that differs. As long as one had no fixed or pre-determined notions of

which loci are permissible and impermissible (e.g. a fixation on a single text), then there

would be no reason one could not (at least, in principle) acknowledge certain forms of

external critique as reasonable.

Consider the admittedly hyperbolic example of condemnations of the Holocaust. It

would be perverse—in the extreme—to consider such criticisms illegitimate because they did

not appeal to a shared set of premises with National Socialism. Here, the premises of the

critique are shared with the audience, not the opponent. We recognize such criticisms as

legitimate because we share the 'common premise' of the horror over what occurred. On this

basis, whether or not the critic finds some sort of internal contradiction within Nazism itself is

completely irrelevant to our recognition of the legitimacy of his or her critique. This is,

granted, an extreme case, but it clearly establishes the possibility of a legitimate external

critique. To put it another way, if one can recognize that a criticism of the horrors of Nazism

need not share principles with Nazism, then one can recognize the possibility that internal

critique alone is not the only legitimate form of argument.11

Returning to Kant's political analogy where polemic is considered to be something like

war, one could argue that the possibility of a legitimate external critique suggests the

possibility of something like a just war, something akin to the possibility of a right to

resistance. If a set of premises is like the legal system of a state, it could be the case that a

'state' is corrupt, non-functional, or otherwise fundamentally flawed. In such cases, it could be

that a 'state' needs to be overthrown; that is, that we must begin again from some new set of

premises. Under these circumstances, it is not the case that one necessarily insists on the

abolition of the 'state' as such (i.e. the abandonment of any principles of reasonableness

whatsoever), but rather the establishment of a new 'state'. Just as all revolutionaries are not

11 The point of this Nazism example is that it is possible to recognize external critiques as legitimate, not that all cases where an external critique might be legitimate necessarily involve such extremity.

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necessarily anarchists, the rejection of the exclusive legitimacy of internal critique is not

necessarily a rejection of reasonableness as such. The purpose of my argument here is not to

reject reasonableness, but to question the notion that it exists in only one form.12

If one is still uncomfortable with the idea of an external critique being called

reasonable, one could instead use a term like 'justifiable polemic'. Again, however, this

distinction would only be semantic. According to the definitions that have been stipulated,

such a critique, if it shares a common ground with its audience, could just as well be called

reasonable. Furthermore, I make no attempt here to establish any general principles by which

one might distinguish in advance between (illegitimate) polemic and (legitimate) external

critique. My purpose is not to specify some set of criteria upon which one could make the

distinction, but only to suggest that such a distinction is possible.

There are at least two problems with this conception of external critique that must be

addressed before we proceed. First of all, in an external critique, shared premises cannot, as

shared, be made fully explicit beforehand. Unlike the case of internal critique, this would be

impossible by definition. An interlocutor might make his own premises explicit, but an

audience (qua audience) cannot. If a member of the audience were to do so, he or she would

step forward and become an interlocutor. Accordingly, the shared premises in an external

critique always begin as something implicit. In this sense, an interlocutor can never be fully

certain that his premises are shared by a given audience. This can sometimes lead to

confusion, arguing at cross purposes, the appearance of unreasonableness, and so forth.

This possibility leads us to a second, closely related problem. In an external critique,

since the commonality of its premises can only ever be implicit, its reasonableness is, at the

outset, only ever hypothetical. That is, while an interlocutor might state his or her premises

explicitly and in great detail, whether or not these premises are shared cannot be determined

12 I should also point out that, like Kant's comparison between polemic and war, the analogy between external critique and revolution is also a hyperbole. An external critique need not be 'revolutionary' in order to be legitimate.

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with any certainty beforehand. As we saw in our discussion of internal critique,

reasonableness requires only potential agreement.13 However, the possibility of agreement in

an external critique is different. Offering an internal critique, an interlocutor, having based his

or her argument on the premises of the text itself, knows that the possibility of agreement

exists (i.e. the possibility itself is known.) With an internal critique, an interlocutor may not

know whether or not his audience agrees with him, but he can know whether such agreement

is possible. When offering an external critique, however, the interlocutor cannot be certain

that even the possibility of agreement exists (i.e. the possibility itself is unknown.) With an

external critique, not only would an interlocutor not know if his audience would accept his

premises, he would not even know, initially, if they could. To put the point more succinctly:

the distinction here between the legitimacy of an internal critique versus an external critique is

between a known possibility and an unknown possibility.

These two points present a serious difficulty for the possibility of a legitimate external

critique. If the reasonableness of one's argument is only ever implicit or hypothetical, then

how can one distinguish between a legitimate external critique and a mere polemic?

Analogically speaking, making an external critique could easily be like arguing with silence,

shouting into an abyss, or tossing a message in a bottle into the sea, addressed to no one. An

external critique could easily become a performative contradiction, an incoherent, purposeless

argument.14 The desire to avoid this risk might seem like a very good motive to insist upon

internal critique exclusively. In his argument for a critical philosophy, Kant himself makes

much the same point.15

There is, however, a solution to this basic problem—a way to conceive of external

critiques as being something more than a hollow gesture. What if the hypothetical common

13 See Chapter 6, Section A.14 It should be noted that performative contradiction is a problem for the coherence of arguments, not the meaning of statements. Irony, for example, entails a performative contradiction (between the literal and intended meaning), but from this it does not follow that ironic statements are therefore meaningless.15 See the context surrounding the passage cited in note 3 at the beginning of this chapter.

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ground of one's external critique was something like a scientific hypothesis? Looking at in

this way, one could test the hypothesis in the act of offering the critique itself. While it would

not be possible to establish the common ground in advance, it would be possible to verify the

commonality of the ground after the fact, through the nature of the response the argument

receives. If one offers an external critique and it elicits internal critiques of itself in response,

then the original critique was probably reasonable; that is, the audience probably found some

sort of common ground with the critique, something they recognized as being worthy of a

response. If the critique elicits no response (e.g. blank stares), or no arguments in response

(e.g. "That's absurd!", "You're an idiot."), then it probably did not find any common ground

with its audience. Just because the reasonableness of an external critique cannot be known in

advance does not necessarily mean it cannot be known at all.

So why go to all this trouble? If external critiques are only legitimate if they develop

into internal critiques (i.e. direct debates), then they are merely potential internal critiques. If

this is the case, why should one not insist on actual internal critiques alone? While external

critiques may seem like a less reliable means of making one's case, they do offer at least one

advantage. An internal critique, in and of itself, cannot offer anything fundamentally new. If

the premises of a given text are the only ones available for any reflection on that text, then no

progress beyond that text is ultimately possible. Instead, one remains forever born back into

the past. In this sense, an exclusive insistence upon internal critique alone has an essentially

conservative bias.16 It is, in effect, an unjustified presupposition, the assumption that the only

thing of importance is the text at hand and that no new beginning could not possibly offer

anything of value.

To explain better what I mean here, I can offer a simple example. Hannah Arendt's

Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy17 has often been accused of misunderstanding Kant's

16 I mean 'conservative' here in a historical, rather than an ideological sense. An exclusive insistence on internal critique alone is not, to my knowledge, the sole provenance of any one political faction. 17 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (University of Chicago, 1992).

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concept of judgment.18 Such criticism assumes that the only possible purpose in thinking

about Kant would be Kant scholarship, i.e., the historical study of Kant as an end in itself. But

what if the end were not the study of Kant, but the study of judgment? If one focused

exclusively only on what Kant said about judgment, one could never say anything new about

it. In relying on internal critique alone, regardless of the content of one's claims, these claims

would always remain fundamentally Kantian. No matter how much these claims differed from

Kant's own position, they would remain expressed in Kantian terms. Arendt opts instead to

speak not in Kant's voice but in her own. I must confess it makes little sense to me to interpret

the act of finding one's own voice as if it were something unreasonable.

Furthermore, I should add that this argument for the potential legitimacy of an external

critique is not a call for something like a new methodology, or worse, an 'etiquette guide' for

polite debating. Rather, it is a description of what happens, performatively, when one debates

—a structure already embedded in philosophy and its history, not a new structure to be

imposed upon it. Well-received external critiques (i.e. legitimate ones, those that eventually

find some common ground and do not remain mere polemics) are an essential aspect of

progress in philosophy. They are necessary for the transition from one paradigm to another.19

To refer to the Arendt example: it is by virtue of a sort of 'misreading'20 that we recognize a

thinker like Arendt as not simply a Kantian or a Heideggerian, but a thinker in her own right.

Progress, in whatever discipline or period, requires just this sort of externality.21

18 For a discussion of such interpretations, see, for example, Annelies Degryse, "Sensus Communis as the Inner Awareness of Plurality: A Different Interpretation of Hannah Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy", Philosophy and Social Criticism 35 (2010, forthcoming).19 The notion of a 'paradigm shift' in philosophy is problematic here. The two main difficulties are 1) philosophy by its very nature does not enjoy the same sort of consensus as exists in, say, physics and 2) I offer nothing like Kuhn's historical argument on which properly to base such a claim. Suffice it to say, this reference to 'paradigm shifts' in philosophy is only a loose analogy, not a specific historical claim. For a detailed account of the concept of paradigm shift, see Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago, 1962). 20 This argument is an adaptation of that found in Harold Bloom's Anxiety of Influence (Oxford, 1972). Bloom argues there that each new 'strong' poet achieve his own voice by, in effect, 'misreading' his predecessor. This 'misreading' is not simply a mistake, but rather serves a positive function. It opens the space for the emergence of a new voice. Here, I have simply generalized Bloom's argument from poets to philosophers. 21 I offer no quantitative evaluation here. By 'progress' I simply mean 'forward in time', not necessarily better or worse.

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Relative to this progress, internal and external critique serve a sort of complementary

function. An internal critique is a necessary first step in order to understand any aspect of the

history of ideas or any past vocabulary. At the same time, an internal critique can serve as a

propaedeutic to an external one insofar as a successful internal critique can suggest that a new

vocabulary might be helpful or even required. It is in this sense that an internal critique can

open the space for an external one.22

This is also why I have gone to such lengths, in the context of a work on Hegel, to

make my more general methodological reasoning clear and explain in detail my

understanding of internal and external critique. In addition to the need to make my premises

as explicit as possible, and thus minimize the risk posed by potential sources of

misunderstanding, I also needed to clarify the premises underlying my understanding of the

nature of argument as such. By offering not only my arguments about Hegel but also my

reasons for making them in this way, it is my hope that they will be received in the spirit that

they are intended. In particular, my purpose in this section has been to make as clear as

possible that in offering an external critique, it is not my goal simply to assert my own views

alone, but to offer something constructive within the context of and in combination with my

earlier internal critique.

To that end, I will now offer my external critique of Hegel's concept of sublation. My

hope is that my appeal to a certain set of experiences and an understanding of those

experiences will at least be recognizable to my readers. And though this critique is not itself

offered on wholly internal Hegelian grounds, I hope that there is at least the possibility that

they might be recognized as legitimate ones nevertheless.

22 While I have tried in this study to offer both, an internal critique can just as easily open the space for an external critique when these arguments are made by different individuals. Their complementary structure need not hinge on there being made by the same person. In fact, historically speaking, it seems quite clear that it does not.

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B. ANALYSIS

I will now present what one might call a 'phenomenological' critique of Hegel's logic

in terms of sublation. To begin with, we can define phenomenology here as the analysis of

experience, as something distinct from knowledge. That is to say, in this conception of

phenomenology, experiences are taken to have their own validity, irreducible to anything like

their correspondence with reality or their determination as knowledge. Take pain, for

example. One cannot only imagine that one is in pain. The experience of pain may or may not

correspond to any injury, but the experience itself exists regardless of whether or not there is

any known underlying physical cause. As an experience, a headache is still a headache,

whether it is psychosomatic or the result of physical trauma. The subsequent determination of

whether a headache is psychosomatic or the result of a physical trauma would be a matter of

knowledge. Phenomenology in this sense addresses experience not epistemologically, as a

source for knowledge, but in its own terms.

This is clearly not Hegel's own use of the term 'phenomenology'. Here, we are not

concerned with the appearances of spirit or of consciousness in general, but with

consciousness more narrowly considered in terms of ordinary subjective experience. This

narrowed focus has more in common with the Husserlian conception of phenomenology. Like

Husserl, we are not concerned with the empirical study of contingently subjective experience,

but with the essence of such experiences. Unlike Husserl, we are not concerned with these

experiences for their own sake, but with the use of them as examples or illustrations in order

to understand better the broader implications of Hegel's logic. The purpose here is not to

understand experience per se, but to use experience as a means to understand logic.

Importantly, this conception of phenomenology is utterly distinct from an appeal to

something like an abstract common sense. The purpose is not to invoke what 'everyone

knows' about this or that particular experience in vague terms, but to analyze such experiences

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in order to determine something concrete and essential about their structure. In Hegelian

terms, the appeal to experience in phenomenology here is not the appeal to something

immediate, but to something mediated. In this sense, phenomenology as it is defined here can

also be understood as 'the logic of experience'.

More specifically, I want to analyze this logic of experience in terms of Hegel's

concept of sublation. For Hegel, knowledge requires determination and determination requires

sublation. Therefore, according to Hegel, all possible objects of knowledge must be

determinable in some way by sublation. It will be my contention, however, that there are

certain forms of experience that can at the same time be known and yet cannot be properly

determined via sublation in this way.

The key distinction here is between knowledge, defined as the consciousness of a

determinate object, and experience, defined as a form of consciousness indifferent to the

determination of its object. Importantly, that experience (as it is defined here) is indifferent to

the determination of its object does not necessarily mean that it is completely indeterminable.

In order to explain this layered conception of determination, consider the following example.

Pretend that I don't know the capital of Uzbekistan. The capital of Uzbekistan would be

(contingently, for me) indeterminate. In this case, such indeterminacy would indicate a lack of

knowledge. At the same time, I would still have an experience of this indeterminacy (i.e. the

experience of ignorance). This ignorance would not—as a form of experience—necessarily be

wholly indeterminate, since the experience itself would be a possible object of knowledge. It

would still be possible for me to know the fact that I don't know. As such, experiences

themselves (whether or not their objects are determinate) can still be (determinate) objects of

knowledge. To render this more formally: "I don't know (x)" is an indeterminate statement; "I

know (I don't know x)" is a determinate one. In other words, a first-order indeterminacy does

not necessarily entail a second-order indeterminacy.

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Following on this example, if I were asked "What is the capital of Uzbekistan?" I

could offer three possible types of responses.23

1) "Tashkent." (i.e. a correct, certain response)2) "Dushanbe?" (i.e. an incorrect, uncertain response)3) "I don't know." (i.e. an indeterminate but certain response)

In the first case, there is a first-order determination of the object and thus knowledge of the

object. There is also a second-order determination of the experience, the experience of

knowing the correct answer. The first answer is a complete determination and thus indicates

knowledge. In the second case, there is no first-order determination and thus no knowledge,

because the answer is incorrect. Furthermore, there is no second-order determination of the

experience, because I don't know whether my answer is correct. This second answer is a

complete indetermination and thus entails no knowledge whatsoever. In the third case,

however, while there is no first-order determination (because I don't know the answer to the

question), there is a second-order determination. The third answer is thus an incomplete

determination. Here, there is no knowledge of the object but there is knowledge of the

experience (i.e. knowledge of one's own ignorance). It is the structure of this third answer that

we are most interested in here.

Of course, this Uzbekistan example only concerns something contingent. Logic, on the

other hand, concerns what is necessary. If we are to examine the logic of experience properly,

we must consider this same structure on the level of necessity. That is, we must now examine

those experiences whose objects are not merely contingently indeterminate, but necessarily

indeterminate. Without even the possibility of determination, the objects of such experiences

would not be merely contingently unknown but necessarily unknowable. This unknowability

can also be referred to as transcendence.24

23 There are of course other possible responses (e.g. "Tashkent?", an uncertain but correct response, or "Dushanbe.", a certain but incorrect response), but an exhaustive exploration of the alternative logical possibilities is not necessary to illustrate the basic claim being made here. 24 This definition stems from the modern, Kantian definition of the transcendent, as that which passes beyond the limits of possible (determinate) experience. See CPR A296/B353.

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Remark: On Transcendence

One important point needs to be made before we can proceed. I cannot emphasize

enough that the concept of transcendence presented here is a logical concept, not a

metaphysical one. For the purposes of my argument, I have no interest in the question of the

existence of any transcendent content(s). Rather, the issue at hand is the structure or the form

of transcendence in general. A logic of transcendence would apply regardless of the existence

or non-existence of any possible content.

Moreover, I should stress that my personal religious beliefs are irrelevant to my

argument here. In fact, I have deliberately framed the issue here 'agnostically', specifically in

order to exclude possible religious and/or denominational conflicts and misunderstandings. If

transcendence is defined as unknowability, then neither believers nor atheists would have any

logical grounds (on this basis) for metaphysical knowledge claims about the existence or non-

existence of the divine. Thus, whether one does or does not recognize my claims about

transcendence as legitimate is in no way dependent upon whether one shares my beliefs. This

is an external critique of Hegel's logic, but not a denominational one, and is thus still in

principle accessible to everyone, i.e. reasonable.

****

The fundamental basis for my analysis of the logic of (the experience of)

transcendence is the distinction made earlier between first- and second-order determination.25

According to the stipulated definition, a first-order determination of transcendence is

impossible; it is by definition unknowable. Furthermore, it is not simply contingently but

necessarily precluded. As we saw earlier, however, a first-order indeterminacy does not

necessarily exclude the possibility of a second-order determination. While one cannot have

knowledge of a transcendent content, it would nevertheless be possible to have an experience

25 That is, in the 'Uzbekistan example' presented above.

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of transcendence. Furthermore, one could have knowledge of the form of that experience.26 I

could know that I experienced something without knowing what it was. Thus, while I may not

be able to determine the object of such an experience, I could determine the nature of the

experience itself.

Phenomenological Examples

In order to illustrate what I mean here, I will now present a few phenomenological

examples of experiences of transcendence. I should note at the outset that none of these

examples refer to anything supernatural. Rather, they represent mundane examples of

transcendence from within ordinary, everyday human experience. This may, at first, seem

paradoxical, but the meaning and import should become clear as we proceed.

1. Anxiety

One example of an experience of transcendence is anxiety. In anxiety, one feels

uneasy, without knowing the specific object of one's unease. This definition of anxiety is

distinct from fear, where one does know the object of one's unease.27 Anxiety is an experience

of transcendence, according to my terms, because the object is not simply indeterminate, but

indeterminable; it is not simply unknown, but unknowable. It is necessarily unknowable in the

sense that if the object of unease were known, it would not be anxiety but fear.28

In order to clarify this distinction, we can consider the following example. Imagine

that a doctor gives a patient a drug that induces anxiety. This anxiety would have a cause (i.e.

the drug) but not an object; that is, there would not necessarily be anything toward which the

patient directs his unease. Indeed, since the cause of such anxiety would be physiological 26 That is, a knowledge of (the experience of transcendence).27 These definitions are of course adapted from Heidegger. See Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, trans. David Farrell Krell (Routledge, 1978), 100. 28 That is to say, it is necessarily unknowable in terms of the essence of the experience itself. Empirically speaking, one might come to know the source of one's anxiety (e.g. through psychotherapy), but in that case, the anxiety qua anxiety would cease to be present. In fact, this elimination of anxiety would be the entire purpose of such therapy. Thus, when I say here that anxiety is necessarily unknowable, I mean this in a phenomenological and not empirical sense.

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rather than psychological or environmental, any fixation on a particular object would be a

post facto rationalization or cathexis. It is in this sense that anxiety, in its essence, has no

determinate object. If it is possible to feel anxious without feeling anxious about something,

then it follows that a determinate object is not a necessary, essential aspect the experience

itself.

In other words, this lack of an object in anxiety is not something merely contingent. It

is not that anxiety might not have a determinate object, but that, as anxiety, it cannot. To

reinforce the point further, we can also distinguish between the experience of anxiety and the

fear of the unknown. In the fear of the unknown, the object of one's unease happens to be

unknown, but is not therefore unknowable. If I hear a noise downstairs at night, I might be

frightened but I can get out of bed and check. If I found a burglar, the object of my fear would

become the burglar. If I found nothing, my fear would dissipate. In either case, what had been

indeterminate would become determined. In anxiety, on the other hand, there is in effect

nothing to check, nothing to determine. If there were, the experience would not be, or would

cease to be, one of anxiety. To ascribe or determine an object to anxiety is to falsify the

experience itself, to misunderstand or misrepresent what anxiety is.29 Therefore,

phenomenologically speaking, anxiety is essentially an experience of transcendence—an

experience not of the unknown, but the unknowable.

2. Trust

A second example of an experience of transcendence is trust. Trust can be defined as a

belief in the truthfulness or responsibility of another person. If I trust someone, I believe that

they are telling the truth or will do what they promise. Importantly, trust is a belief essentially

29 Once again, this is what anxiety is phenomenologically speaking, qua experience. This is not a claim about the psychology of anxiety (e.g. its causes), or its physiology (e.g. its physical effects, at the biological level), but rather a claim about the nature of the experience itself. Just as we saw with the example of pain from the beginning of this section, one cannot 'only imagine' one is anxious. Qua experience, the causes are irrelevant to determining the essence of anxiety (or, in fact, of any other experience as experience).

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without certainty. If I were to attempt to determine with certainty whether someone was

telling the truth or had fulfilled a promise, then I would by definition not trust him or her.

Insofar as trust lacks determination in this way, trust and (first-order) knowledge can be said

to be mutually exclusive.

It is, of course, not the case that the truthfulness or responsibility of a person are, in

themselves, indeterminable. Rather, they are indeterminable as trust. One cannot both trust

another person and, at the same time, be completely certain of their statements or actions. If I

trust someone, an attempt to determine their trustworthiness would undermine that trust. In

more formal terms, any determination of the object (i.e. the trustworthiness of the person in

question) undermines the experience (i.e. the experience of trusting that person). As with

anxiety, trust is an experience that is abolished by a complete determination of its object. This

is even easier to see in the example of trust, because its negation does not simply transform it

into another experience (fear), but into its opposite (distrust).

In addition, empirically speaking, it is not the case that trust is essentially something

naïve. To the contrary, trust is an essential aspect of many social relationships. Without it,

such relationships can break down or disappear altogether. For example, if I visit my friends'

house and they offer to take my coat and hang it up, I let them take it because there is a basic

level of trust between us. If, on the other hand, I keep my coat and other possessions with me

at all times and assume that they would rob me if given the opportunity, they probably aren't

my friends; in this case, the relationship of friendship would not exist. Nor is social trust

exclusive to interpersonal relationships. Other social relationships, relationships between

persons and groups, relationships with institutions and so on, are equally dependent on trust.

For example, if I put my money in a bank, I trust that the bank in question will be able to

return my money later. If enough people cease to believe this, there is a run on the bank;

people withdraw their money and the bank collapses. The very existence of such an institution

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is dependent upon the trust of its customers.30 In this sense, trust is essential to any number of

social phenomena.

On an interpersonal level, the complete absence of trust in others would not be a

personality trait of cunning or intelligence. It would not be a matter of thoroughgoing and

complete knowledge; rather, it would manifest itself as a dysfunctional paranoia. In the case

of trust, one can see that there is such a thing as too much certainty or too much

determination. In effect, sometimes the unknowable is itself something necessary. Moreover,

trust understood as an experience of transcendence demonstrates the manner in which such

experiences are not necessarily ephemeral, incidental, or merely mystical but something

essential to our everyday life. This also suggests that a logic that is incapable of evaluating

such experiences in their own terms may be, in some cases, too limited or even undesirable in

a broadly philosophical sense.

3. Hope

Our last example of an experience of transcendence will be hope. Hope can be defined

as the desire for some future outcome.31 Now, the future as such is by definition unknowable.

At the moment it can be determined with any certainty, it has already become the present.

Therefore, the future can be understood as something transcendent; and in the same sense, an

experience of the future like hope can be understood as an experience of transcendence.32

Just because we cannot know the future, however, does not mean that we have no

experience of it. Our hopes (or despair) about the future shape our actions in the present. I go

30 Francis Fukuyama, in his book Trust, discusses the importance of trust in these sorts of social relationships, specifically as they pertain to economics. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Free Press, 1995).31 Or, alternatively, the belief that some positive outcome will occur. For the purposes of this example, however, and having already addressed belief under 'trust', I will here focus on hope in this more narrow sense of this desire. 32 In relation to the future, the experience of despair (as hopelessness) would have a similar fundamental structure. This is worth noting that if transcendence is defined as unknowability, and experiences like anxiety and despair are experiences of transcendence, then such experiences are not necessarily something fundamentally good or positive. By keeping this in mind, one can better conceptualize the logic of transcendence as something 'accessible to all', and distinct from any particular denomination or ideology.

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to work because I hope to get paid; I buy food because I plan to eat it. A person who followed

the slogan 'live in the moment' too literally would barely be able to function. Being unable to

plan or delay gratification in any way, he would resemble an animal more than a man. Insofar

as they shape our actions in the present, our feelings about the future are an experience of a

content of which we can have no knowledge. In other words, the future determines us without

itself being determinable.

Insofar as the future continually becomes the present, there is a tension between a

hope about the future and its eventual realization (or non-realization) in the present. One

cannot have some hope for the future and at the same time have that hope realized. Once it is

realized, it is no longer a hope; the two are, in their essence, mutually exclusive.

Now, one might well argue that given the choice between hope and its realization, one

ought to prefer the latter. Indeed, Hegel makes much the same point.33 However, the notion

that it is somehow better to have realization than hope is, I think, only half-correct. It is not

simply this or that realization that matters, but also the very experience of hope itself. Without

hope for the future we could take no action and make no plans. Whether or not a particular

hope is realized is inessential to whether we act or plan, precisely because we do not know

when we take the action or make the plan whether it will actually work. In this sense, in its

effect on our present actions, the experience of hope has its own significance, irrespective of

its eventual realization (or non-realization).

The significance of hope in this sense can be explained in more detail by looking at

the psychological phenomena of learned helplessness.34 In learned helplessness, one becomes

less likely to take action because of repeated experiences of failure (of that action, or of action

in general). A common example is that of an elephant in the circus. When the elephant first

33 PR165; HW7/416-417.34 This concept was first introduced through the research of American psychologists Martin Seligman and Steve Maier in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For a detailed survey of the concept, see Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman, Learned Helplessness: A Theory for the Age of Personal Control (Oxford, 1995).

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comes to the circus, he is bound with a thick metal chain. The elephant struggles against the

chain, but cannot break free. Eventually, after repeated failures to escape, the elephant stops

trying. The metal chain is eventually replaced with a simple rope. The elephant still does not

try to escape, because from its repeated failures it has learned that its struggles are useless. In

this example, we see how hope itself has its own significance irrespective of its realization. It

is the lack of hope, not a lack of strength, that keeps the elephant bound. A lack of hope

inhibits any realization of escape, of freedom.35 Hope has its own significance irrespective of

its realization because hope itself is very often a precondition for any possible realization.

Hegel's preference for realization over hope is based on sound motives. Hegel rightly

points out that to offer only hope, in lieu of its realization, and always promising but never

delivering would be oppressive. Hegel presents an alternative between a religion that offers

only hope for the future (never realized) and (his own conception of) religious hope as

reconciled with, or realized in, the present. Hegel offers his reconciliation as a means to

defend religion against criticisms based on the first conception. However, what Hegel's

defense leaves out is a third alternative, wherein religious hope is not merely a de facto

facilitator of oppression but a source for positive change. For example, the movement to

abolish slavery in the United States in the nineteenth century was primarily motivated by

religious concerns; the abolitionists had the hope that they could eliminate slavery. Without

such hope, no efforts to actually get rid of slavery could have taken place. Conceiving of the

issue as being limited to a choice between hope or realization ignores the role that hope itself,

as an experience, plays in realization. If one is to realize one's hopes, then hope is itself a

necessary first condition. In this sense, the relationship between hope and its realization is

conjunctive (both/and) not disjunctive (either/or).

35 In human beings, learned helplessness is associated with clinical depression, characterized, among other things, by this very same inability to act.

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At the same time, as hope, its realization is never determinable: always potential,

never actual. The experience of hope, the experience that shapes our actions, that makes the

realization of our hopes possible, is itself the experience of something indeterminable. The

realization of a hoped for outcome determines and at the same time abolishes the experience

of hope. In its realization, hope is negated but not preserved. In this sense, hope could not be

sublated and at the same time properly determined as an experience in its own right.

****

Having examined these three experiences of transcendence (anxiety, trust, and hope36),

we can now address their broader significance for Hegel's concept of sublation. The purpose

of presenting these examples is to test the concept of sublation, in order to see how a logic of

sublation might function within a certain logic of experience (namely, this conception of

phenomenology). As we have seen, determinations within Hegel's logic necessarily entail

sublation. But what if one applied this sort of determination to the sort of moments that have

just been discussed? What would the results be?37

At first glance, sublation and transcendence would seem to be mutually exclusive

concepts; that is, one could not have both transcendence and sublation. Insofar as

transcendence is unknowable it is indeterminable; it could not be determined in itself by

sublation. On the other hand, for Hegel, it is not any transcendent content that must be

sublated, but the contradiction between its determinacy and indeterminacy. For Hegel, of

course, such a contradiction could indeed be sublated, resolved as a later moment; in this case,

36 These are by no means the only possible examples of experiences of transcendence, experiences which determine us by are not themselves determinable. Other examples might include wonder, mystery, surprise, desire, laughter, and so forth. For a discussion of such topics, especially in their relation to Hegel, see, for example (on laughter), William Desmond, Beyond Hegel and Dialectic (SUNY, 1992), 273-281. 37 It is important to note here that this test does not represent the conversion of Hegel's logic into some sort of formal method, that could be applied to this or that content irrespective of the whole. Rather, the purpose of these phenomenological examples is just their utility as examples. This is means their utility for analyzing the topic of logic, not a discussion of a separate topic (in this case, phenomenology) in itself. This is also the reason I have referred to my usage of phenomenology here as 'the logic of experience'—to make this relationship clearer.

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any given transcendent moment would be negated (in its unknowability) and preserved (as a

moment that is now in a certain sense known).

If, in the face of such an argument, one were to insist nevertheless on the coherence of

a logic of transcendence, one might anticipate the counterargument that 'This is not

philosophy.' For Hegel, philosophy is defined as being strictly concerned with knowledge (i.e.

that which is determinable). Therefore, according to Hegel, transcendence could not be a

subject matter of philosophy, strictly speaking, except as an error to be overcome.

Assuming for the sake of argument that this definition of philosophy does not

constitute an instance of petitio principii, that defining in advance what is and is not

philosophy does not constitute an assumption about the conclusion regarding what is and is

not philosophy, one could nevertheless press the question: why would transcendence not be a

proper subject matter for philosophy?

In order to address this question, we must go back to Hegel's own conception of what

we have called here 'transcendence'. When Hegel refers to this concept, he often uses the term

Jenseits. As a preposition, the term means 'beyond' or 'across'. As a noun, it means 'the

Beyond', in the sense of 'the Hereafter' or 'Kingdom Come'.38 Hegel further equates this

concept with the infinite in the sense of the "bad infinite" (schlechte Unendlichkeit). The bad

infinite is an infinite that is conceived to be beyond the finite or beyond determination. For

Hegel such a beyond is self-contradictory, because 'beyond' is itself a determination.39 Thus,

transcendence, taken as a 'beyond' (i.e. as a transcendent content), is equally self-

contradictory.40 38 Thus, Jenseits does not simply have a prepositional or logical sense; it also has strong religious and/or metaphysical connotations. 39 An 'indeterminate' infinite defined simply as the opposite of the 'determinate' finite is itself determined by this opposition.40 Hegel's use of the term 'Hinausgehen' can also be taken to refer to transcendence (e.g. as in Miller's translation), but this is in a different sense than I have used the term here. Hinausgehen is used in reference to transcendence conceived of not as a content, but an act: 'to transcend', or more literally 'to go out beyond'. In English, the term by itself can be used to mean 'to surpass', 'to exit' or 'to depart'. The term can be used in reference to the act of transcending a limit (e.g. SL142; HW5/155) or the logical 'surpassing' of one moment by the next. In this sense, it is roughly similar to sublation, insofar as sublation is the particular form through which this 'surpassing' is carried out. (However, while this 'elevation' is achieved through sublation but is not itself a

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The bad infinite is contrasted by Hegel with the "true infinite" (wahrhafte

Unendlichkeit).41 The true infinite is that infinite wherein the infinite is not conceived as

simply other than or distinct from the finite, but the negation of the finite. Thus, given the

nature of negation for Hegel (i.e. negation as determination), the true infinite is in effect the

sublation of the finite, or more precisely, the sublation of the opposition between the finite

and the infinite. The determination of the finite by the infinite is no less a determination of the

infinite by the finite. This determination is thus not the determination of any 'infinite content',

but of infinity as such, the form of infinity. In the sublation of the contradiction between the

finite and the infinite, the contradiction of their separation is resolved as a later moment.

Hegel's resolution of this particular contradiction is strikingly similar to the first-order/

second-order distinction we discussed earlier. In fact, the underlying structure is identical for

any such resolution. A given moment (moment A) is shown to contain a contradiction. The

contradiction is then negated and the elements of it are preserved, via sublation, in the

transition to the later moment (moment B). In terms of the distinction we have introduced, A

is a first-order statement and B is a second-order statement. The indeterminacy of the first-

order (the contradiction within A) is subordinate to the determinacy of the second-order (its

resolution/determination as B). In this way, a determination is made, but never from within

the moment itself. The determination is only present for a 'later' (second-order) moment.

Formulated in this way, Hegel would (hypothetically) be able to recognize such a first-

order/second-order distinction in knowledge, since it is just such a distinction that makes his

own resolutions of contradictions possible.

If Hegel's logic would be able to admit such a distinction, then why would an

experience of transcendence be excluded as a possible subject matter for philosophy? The

part of sublation, as we have seen in Chapter 1, Section A). Despite the risk of potential confusion, I have used the term 'transcendence' here as an umbrella term, referring to the general characteristics of the various types of 'bad infinite', 'infinite progress', 'the beyond', and so on (i.e. their indeterminacy as 'beyond' determination). Such a 'generic' concept was necessary in order to make my later arguments more clear and succinct. However, since this is a generic use of the term 'transcendence', it should not be taken in any strictly Hegelian sense. 41 SL148; HW5/163.

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relationship between an experience of transcendence and a transcendent content is

homologous (i.e. identical in structure) to the relationship between the true infinite and the

bad infinite. The experience of transcendence and the true infinite are both second-order

determinations of an indeterminable content (a transcendent content or a bad infinite,

respectively). So, if the second-order determination of the true infinite functions as a

resolution of the contradiction of the bad infinite, then it would seem as if an analysis of the

experience of transcendence could fulfill the same function for transcendence—that it would

not be determinable in itself as a content, but that it would be determinable as an experience

in its form.

It does not seem to be the case that Hegel himself would admit such a parallel. The

coexistence of indeterminacy and determinacy in the bad infinite is cited as the contradiction

that must be resolved within it; what makes it 'bad' is that it is taken to be both indeterminate,

in itself, and determinate, as something standing over and against the finite. At the same time,

the sublation of the opposition between the bad infinite and the finite is what constitutes the

true infinite. In this sublation, however, the 'bad' infinite is not really preserved but destroyed;

the content is not taken to have something like its own limited validity within a certain sphere,

but is instead dismissed as an error. The transcendence of the bad infinite is thus eliminated.

On the other hand, given our analysis of the logic of the experience of transcendence,

we can see how the first-order/second-order distinction suggests that such a dismissal is not

strictly necessary. The form of an experience of indeterminacy is itself determinable,

irrespective of the determination (or even determinability) of its content. Contrary to Hegel's

own position, however, it is logically possible to sublate the opposition between the

transcendent and the non-transcendent in such a way that it preserves (that it sublates and thus

does not simply eliminate) transcendence itself. Transcendence can be negated as an object of

knowledge, but preserved as an object of experience. By taking the experience as the object of

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a second-order knowledge, transcendence itself can be sublated—negated as a possible object

of knowledge but nevertheless preserved as an object of experience.42

Hegel's own formulation cannot account for such a sublation. For Hegel, all possible

objects of experience (i.e. of consciousness, of thought) must be determinable, as either error

or truth. Without such determinability, truth itself, as the ultimate reconciliation of form with

content, would be impossible. Under these conditions, the possibility of knowledge would,

according to Hegel, collapse into skepticism.

For Hegel, any persistence of transcendence as anything other than an error to be

completely negated would leave open the possibility of such a collapse. An experience of

transcendence, as an experience of unknowability, would have (to put it in another

vocabulary) no truth-value. As unknowable, transcendence would not be determinable as

either true or false. If, however, such an indeterminacy were sublated in the manner described,

then one could have knowledge of an experience that is not itself reducible to knowledge; a

gap would remain between form and content and their ultimate reconciliation as a system

would be impossible. The system would not be complete.

At the same time, the sublation of transcendence as the experience of transcendence is

possible, given Hegel's own conception of determination. The same first-order/second-order

distinction that allows Hegel to resolve contradictions in his system also leaves open the

possibility of the impossibility of such a system. Therefore, Hegel's logic simultaneously

cannot and yet must accept such a first-order/second-order distinction. If Hegel was to reject

the possibility of the sublation of transcendence (as the experience of transcendence), then he

would be forced to reject the very form of determination (sublation) that makes the ultimate

reconciliation of his system possible in the first place. In other words, the nature of

determination within Hegel's system precludes its completion.

42 In other words, one need not negate the 'bad' and preserve the infinite (as the true infinite). One could instead negate and preserve the 'bad' itself (i.e. the beyond); negated as a possible object of first-order knowledge, but preserved as an object of second-order knowledge.

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Once again, we can see an unresolved contradiction between Hegel's concepts of

determination and completeness. However, the contradiction presented in this chapter is

external to Hegel's own premises. The desirability of preserving the experience of

transcendence as more than a mere error—as a possible topic of philosophy—is not a desire

that Hegel, according to his own premises, need share. Nevertheless, as I have tried to show

with my 'phenomenological' examples, such a preservation may in fact be something

philosophically desirable. It is my position that a concept of philosophy that can only be

coherent insofar as it excludes such topics from consideration by philosophy may be too

limited. Such a philosophy's limitation is that it can only account for these sorts of moments

as errors to be overcome, rather than as (at least potentially) essential aspects of the range of

human experience.

In fact, such a philosophy of completion cannot really determine whether such

moments would be essential or not, since the requirement that they be excluded as mere errors

is essential to such a philosophy. According to Hegel's own conception of the system, these

topics are not excluded a priori but through the process of the system's own self-development.

At the same time, the goal of completeness that Hegel sets requires the exclusion of such

topics. The problem for Hegel here is less in his method or in how he attempts to articulate a

completely self-determinate logic than his goal or that he attempts to do so in the first place.43

Given the goal of completeness, such a philosophy cannot determine whether such

phenomena should be excluded because they already must be excluded from the very

beginning. At best, a philosophy of completeness can only ever determine how they are to be

excluded. In effect, the inclination to formulate a complete philosophy always already

precludes the possibility of its actual completion. For this reason, while the exclusion of

43 The consequences of this problem, both for Hegel and philosophy in general, will be discussed in the following chapter (Chapter 8, Section C).

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experiences of transcendence as possible topics of philosophy is not a Hegelian concern, I

nevertheless believe it to be a legitimate one.

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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS

I will now end this dissertation with three sets of concluding remarks. First of all, I

begin by evaluating this study's methodology, both in terms of its specific approach and in

relation to more general methodological considerations. I then address some of the objectives

of the interpretation I have presented, especially focusing on the particular manner of its

presentation. Lastly, I offer some general comments on the significance of Hegel's concept of

sublation and its relevance not only for the study of Hegel, but also for philosophy in general.

A. METHODOLOGY

I will begin my consideration of this study's methodology by considering its

organization. The first two parts of this study treat the structure and function of Hegel's

concept of sublation, respectively. As I mentioned in the introduction, if the structure of

sublation can be called its 'anatomy', its function could be referred to as its 'physiology'. In my

analysis of its structure, I have tried to define Hegel's concept of sublation in its relation to

and in its distinction from other, related concepts. In my analysis of its function, I selected a

few key examples in order to illustrate how sublation operates within the transitions of

Hegel's logic. It might seem as though structure and function overlap to a certain degree, and

this would be, in a certain sense, correct: one cannot really understand one of these aspects

without reference to the other. For the purposes of my analysis, however, I have presented

them as if they were separate for the sake of clarity. I could have presented the structure in

terms of function or vice versa (as a single section), but this would have run the risk of

confusing topics with examples. One might say that, together, the structural and functional

sections serve as the 'interpretative half' of my critical interpretation of Hegel's concept of

sublation.

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Along these lines, the second 'critical half' of my interpretation is what I have treated

in this third part. In the previous two chapters, I discussed two types of critique: internal and

external. In addition to these methodological reflections, I presented two corresponding

critiques of Hegel's concept of sublation. My internal critique claimed that Hegel's system is

ultimately incomplete1 insofar as sublation is a determinative element of the system that is not

itself determined. As an internal critique, I articulated this problem according to Hegel's own

standards and criteria. My second, external critique claimed that Hegel's goal of a complete

self-determination is (potentially) undesirable insofar as it necessarily excludes certain

important topics from philosophical consideration. This critique obviously appeals to criteria

that are not found within Hegel himself, but as I have attempted to show, I am fully aware of

this and it does not necessarily mean the critique is without value. What has not yet been

addressed, however, is the specific relationship between these two types of critique. It is my

position that these two critiques are not merely additions to the interpretation I have presented

in the 'interpretative half', but are rather essentially related to it. The remainder of this section

will be devoted to exploring this relationship in more detail.

To start with, I need to show how internal and external critique are themselves related.

As we have seen, an internal critique is one whose locus of legitimacy is found within the text

while an external critique is one whose locus of legitimacy is found outside of the text. In

addition to these two forms of legitimacy, these critiques also have two types of relevance.

Continuing along our earlier line of reasoning, we can say that a relevant critique is one that

shares at least one premise in common with its audience and/or interlocutors. I call this

relevance because it is this sort of commonality that allows an audience to recognize a

critique as a position that might matter to them. A person holding no premise in common with

1 To repeat myself, in order to ensure that I am clear on this point: my claim that Hegel's system is incomplete is not a complaint that he does not treat individually all possible topics of philosophy (i.e. that it is not an enumeration) but rather that it does not treat a topic (e.g. sublation) that he must, according to the criteria that he himself has insisted upon, i.e. the complete self-determination of the form of the logic as its own content.

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a particular critique would have no means to access that critique; it would be of no importance

to him or her. Now, an external critique is relevant as long as it shares at least one premise

with its audience. Thus, any external critique that meets the standard of legitimacy we

addressed in the previous chapter would also be a relevant one. A legitimate internal critique,

however, is not necessarily a relevant one, insofar as it is possible to offer an interpretation of

a text that shares premises with the text itself but not the audience.

As I have defined it here, relevance is effectively the converse of (internal) legitimacy.

And just as the legitimacy of external critique can be expressed in terms of internal critique,2

the relevance of internal critique can be expressed in terms of external critique. An internal

critique can be said to be also external (and thus relevant) insofar as its premises are typically

not limited to the text alone. A hostile or negative critique obviously has premises beyond the

text itself; that is, those points upon which the text and the critique disagree (this is true of

both internal and external negative critiques). Less obviously, a positive critique (i.e. a

defense or apology) also contains additional premises beyond those found in the text itself.

Insofar as an apology explains or justifies an argument found in a text, it has already taken a

step beyond it, given that it understands such an addition to be required in the first place. In

this way, every relevant critique contains some element of externality, just as every legitimate

critique contains some element of internality.

In this conception of the relationship between legitimacy and relevance, these two

types of critiques constitute two complementary and mutually co-determinate aspects of

interpretation as such. If both legitimacy and relevance are understood as necessary in order

to have a valid interpretation,3 then there would be no 'purely' external or 'purely' internal

2 Chapter 6, Section A. 3 By valid interpretation, I merely mean an interpretation that is recognized as such, as an interpretation, and not something else (e.g. a polemic or a repetition). Another way to express the same point would be to say that legitimacy and relevance are essential aspects of interpretation, aspects without which no interpretation is present. In addition, this reference to hermeneutical validity is made in analogy to logical validity, but it should be considered a more or less figurative use of the term. Just because I refer to interpretations as 'valid' does not mean that this is the same sort of validity present in formal logic.

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interpretation that would also be valid. A purely external interpretation would have no

premises in common with either the text or its audience and thus be neither legitimate nor

relevant. Such an interpreter would essentially be formulating arguments in what amounts to a

sort of private language—talking only to him- or herself. On the other hand, a purely internal

interpretation would have no premises in common with its audience and no premises beyond

the text itself. Such an interpretation would contain no additional information, explanation or

justification at all, but would essentially be a repetition of claims from the text itself.4 Strictly

speaking, such an interpretation would be legitimate but it would also be completely

irrelevant to any audience5 insofar as it would be completely redundant relative to the text

itself. Such a repetition would constitute a performative contradiction insofar as its content

(providing no additional information) would contradict its purpose (to provide such

information). For an audience, there would be no coherent reason to read such an

interpretation when one could just as easily read the original text instead.

Now, it is difficult to imagine an example of a concrete argument that would qualify

as such an extremely 'pure' interpretation one way or the other. And that is precisely my point.

The reason it is difficult to imagine such a pure interpretation is that any interpretations we

would recognize as such (i.e. as valid) essentially lacks such purity. All valid interpretations

contain both internal and external aspects. One can imagine the contrast between internality

and externality along a continuum with the 'pure' types placed at the two extremes.

Conceptualized in this way, internal and external critique cease to be two mutually exclusive

forms and become instead two different aspects of interpretation as such. In other words, the

difference between the two is not one of kind but of relative degree. Moreover, internality and

4 A practical example of such a 'repetition' would be a book report done by a primary or secondary school student. A book report repeats certain content from the text to prove that the student has read it, but would rarely be recognized as an interpretation in the usual sense. For the Hegelian source of this concept, see Chapter 4, Section A, in reference to Hegel's comments on "absolute verbiage". 5 It would not even be relevant to a living author of an interpreted text, who would likely respond with something to the effect of 'Yes, that's what I said.'

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externality are mutually determinative aspects of interpretation in general:6 an internal critique

cannot be relevant without at least some externality and an external critique cannot be

legitimate without at least some internality. According to this conception, what we commonly

recognize as internal critiques are simply 'more internal' than external ones and vice versa. For

lack of a better term, I have called the understanding of interpretation presented here 'critical

interpretation'.7

Three additional features of critical interpretation should be noted. First of all, this

account should explain why I have used the terms 'critique' and 'interpretation' almost

interchangeably.8 That all critiques are also interpretations is clear insofar as all critiques (no

matter what their degree of validity) at least attempt to understand or explain a text (i.e. they

contain some element of internality). As such, even in circumstances where the degree of

internality is deemed to be insufficient, an element of internality is still present. What the

concept of critical interpretation adds is that all (valid) interpretations are also essentially

critical insofar as they necessarily reach beyond the text itself. That is to say, these

interpretations contain some element of externality insofar as they purport to offer something

that the text itself does not.

Second, I am extremely reticent about assigning the concept of critical interpretation

any label at all, even if only provisionally. While such a label is helpful for the purpose of

explanation, the use of any such term also runs the risk of being mistaken for something like a

6 Precisely the same point was made by the literary critic Northrop Frye. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton University Press, 1957). Frye refers to what I have termed 'internality' as the 'centripetal' movement of criticism; my term 'externality' is equivalent to Frye's 'centrifugal' movement. While internality and externality are also of course 'movements', in the sense that interpretation is less a (static) thing than a (dynamic) act, I have avoided Frye's terminology simply because I will use the metaphor of movement to apply to different concepts ('internalization' and 'externalization'; see below), and I do not want to confuse the exposition by mixing my metaphors. 7 This name is imperfect for two reasons. First, the term is rather vague, having little explanatory value. Second, it runs the risk of being confused with similar terms (e.g. 'critical hermeneutics') from thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas (see his Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Beacon, 1972)). Specifically defining the similarities and differences between my use of the term and Habermas's (et al.) would go well beyond the scope of this study. Here, it would perhaps be best to treat 'critical interpretation' as merely a label, rather than as a kind of definition. 8 I have made use of this synonymity previously, but have not yet defined it. I should also mention that this identity is a commonplace of literary criticism, which I have merely adapted to philosophy.

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recommended method or technique. This is unequivocally not my intent. I understand the

term critical interpretation to refer to a description of interpretation, not a prescription for it.

The mutual determination of internality and externality is not something that I claim should

be present in an interpretation, but something, I argue, that is present in any interpretations we

recognize as such; we recognize interpretations as valid (that is, legitimate and relevant) and

even as interpretations only insofar as they contain this sort of mutual determination.

Lastly, I should rephrase how I understand the relationship between internality and

externality more precisely. Initially, I presented internal and external critique as if they were

two qualitatively distinct types of critique because this is how they are generally understood. I

then argued, in this chapter, that they are better understood as two quantitatively9 distinct but

mutually determinative aspects of one type of critique or interpretation as such. However, this

is still not precise enough. Insofar as the qualitative distinction between the two breaks down

when one considers the relationship between legitimacy and relevance, it is the fixed, rigid

opposition between them that collapses.10 Insofar as internality and externality are understood

in this way, one can also say that, in critical interpretation, the opposition between internality

and externality is sublated.11

Another way to express the same point is to say that (critical) interpretation is the

sublation of a text.12 In any given interpretation, the text is both preserved and negated. It is 9 I use the term 'quantitatively' here in a somewhat loose sense. While I have claimed that internality and externality are differences of degree not kind, I do not think that these differences are something that could be quantified in any empirical or mathematical sense. It is a matter of 'more or less', but not precisely 'how much'. In other words, in response to the question 'How internal is this critique?', an answer like '7' would be absurd; a coherent answer would be something more along the lines of 'internal (or not internal) enough'. 10 In other words, it is not that internality and externality are mutually determinative as two separate and distinct forms, but rather that they are determined as two aspects of one and the same form, i.e. that of interpretation as such. In Hegelian terms, one would say this mutual determination is not a synthesis.11 Another possible label that could be used instead of critical interpretation is 'interpretation as sublation'. While this is more specific and less likely to be confused with other approaches, it is considerably more awkward and of little explanatory value to those not already familiar with Hegel. I will refer to it occasionally in what follows, but only in order to emphasize the sublative nature of what I have otherwise called critical interpretation. 12 It is important to note here that the thinking underlying my conception of critical interpretation is not taken from Habermas, but is rather essentially an adaptation of Gadamer's concept of interpretation as a "fusion of horizons" (Horizontverschmelzung). See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (Continuum, 2002), 306. The primary difference between my position and Gadamer's is one of emphasis. Articulating the point in terms of sublation (rather than as a fusion) only accentuates the fact that

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preserved insofar as the content of the text is taken up into the interpretation as its subject-

matter; it is negated insofar as an interpretation necessarily goes beyond the text itself by

adding its own comments, justifications, evaluations, and so forth. To express this in the terms

we have been using here, the text is preserved in the internality of its interpretation and

negated by the externality of it.

The primary implication of understanding interpretation as sublation is that, from this

point of view, there would be no 'text-in-itself'.13 In other words, if an interpretation of a text

is a sublation of that text, then there is (essentially) no text that is separable and distinct from

(or 'prior to') an interpretation of that text. Obviously, I do not mean this in any empirical

sense, where books do not exist until we pick them up and read them. Rather, I claim that

there is no text-in-itself in a hermeneutical sense. We have no access to texts prior to our

understanding of (or attempts to understand) them.14 This is because, outside of the realm of

interpretation, texts have no meaning. These last two points require further explanation.

If one understands meaning necessarily to entail some form of expression, then there

would be no meaning present without something being conveyed from the text to a reader. In

this sense, a reader is required for meaning to be present; there is no meaningful text without

one. Furthermore, such a reader cannot be said to have understood the meaning of text unless

he or she has, to a certain extent, internalized it; that is, without some reception of what it is

that the text conveys, there is also no meaning. Meaning as such requires both expression and

reception in order to be, in fact, meaning. A basic criterion for such internalization is that

meaning that has been both expressed and received can be re-expressed, or externalized, or

made public. One could say that internalization is the capacity for externalization. This point

the unification of the horizon of the text with that of its interpretation is not a mutual synthesis of two horizons, or an indeterminate amalgamation or blending, but the determinate incorporation the former into the latter. 13 Just as for Hegel there is ultimately no thing-in-itself. See SL494-496; HW6/142-144 on the "Dissolution of the Thing" (Die Auflösung des Dings).14 Here, I mean understanding in its hermeneutical (Verstehen), rather than its discursive (Verstand) sense. In this sense, it is not a way of thinking opposed to reason, but is rather a 'reasoning' about texts. The reason I have not simply used the term 'reason' instead is that it would be awkward to do so in English, given the context (e.g. sentences like "I 'reasoned' the text" would make little sense).

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can best be illustrated with reference to an example of a lack of reception. A child forced to

memorize a poem in school is not said to have understood the meaning of that poem if he or

she can only repeat the words but not explain what the poem means in his or her own terms.

Similarly, a parrot or an audio recorder can repeat words but cannot, of course, understand

their meaning. If one accepts that the evidence of internalization is such a capacity for

externalization, then all understandings of the meaning of a text would also be interpretations

of that text.

This idea can be rephrased in terms of sublation. When I read and understand the

meaning of a text, I preserve or grasp the content of the text only insofar as I also (at least

implicitly) negate the content, or insofar as I am able to re-express the content of the text in

my own terms. Inversely, if I am unable to do so, if I lack this capacity for re-expression, I am

not recognized as having grasped the content. In a hermeneutical sense, there is no text-in-

itself, no text 'beyond' interpretation, because such a text would have no meaning. Take, for

example, a very simple text: I leave my wife a note reading "I went to the store." Now, as a

text-in-itself, this text would be almost meaningless ("What store did he go to?", "When did

he go?", and so on.) For my wife, however, this note would mean that I went to the grocery

store near our house, that I will probably be back within the hour, and so on. The note is only

fully meaningful insofar as my wife is familiar with our neighborhood, her husband's habits,

and so forth. Moreover, if asked, she can re-express the content of the note to a third-party as

something more generally meaningful ("He went to the grocery store three blocks from here

and will be back in about an hour") because she would understand the full meaning of the

note. In this sense, understanding a text and the ability to (re)interpret it are identical.

If this is true of simple texts, it is even more so when dealing with complex texts like

those found in, say, the history of philosophy. In terms of critical interpretation, one cannot

really grasp a text from one historical period within another historical period while, at the

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same time, grasping it solely and exclusively as it originally appeared. While understanding

factors such as an author's intent, the historical context, and so forth provide invaluable and

necessary information for understanding a text, it is important to note that these aspects

cannot be the final or sole criteria for interpretation. Such data are necessary but not sufficient

for the hermeneutical understanding of a historical text because, in and of themselves, they

remain purely internal criteria (of the text); the requisite externality (of the interpreter) may

still be lacking.

Just as I can have no access to any text-in-itself, I can also have no access to anything

like a 'history-in-itself' for analogous reasons. The only way for me to understand any given

historical period15 is to be able to re-express its ways of understanding in my own

(contemporary) terms.16 This idea is hardly new; indeed, it was well known to Hegel himself:

Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his times; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over the Rhodes.17

This is no less true for the study of Hegel than it was for Hegel.

A presentation of Hegel's concept of sublation, one that truly understands that concept,

requires some sort of critical distance from it. Given the nearly 200 years between the time

when Hegel wrote and the time when I read him, I could not have understood Hegel's concept

of sublation without some sort of critical re-appraisal of what it means for me, for us, now. If

one accepts (even if only provisionally) critical interpretation as I have outlined it here, then

one can see how a proper understanding of the history of philosophy is inseparable from a

critical approach to that history. It is in this sense that I understand the idea that, "One must be

a philosopher to understand as philosophy the history of philosophy."18 It is this understanding

15 Or any historical author, movement, shift, issue, etc. 16 This rejection of 'originalism' should not be construed as some sort of historical relativism. I will address my reasoning for why this is the case in the next section of this chapter. 17 "Was das Individuum betrifft, so ist ohnehin jedes ein Sohn seiner Zeit; so ist auch die Philosophie ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfaßt. Es ist ebenso töricht zu wähnen, irgendeine Philosophie gehe über ihre gegenwärtige Welt hinaus, als, ein Individuum überspringe seine Zeit, springe über Rhodus hinaus." (PR11; HW7/26)18 William Desmond, Being and the Between (SUNY, 1995), xvi.

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of philosophical method in general that has led me to organize my study in the way that I

have. In this dissertation, I have presented both an interpretation and a criticism of Hegel's

concept of sublation because the two are, in the end, inseparable.

B. OBJECTIVES

I have spent a great deal of time in this chapter discussing the nature of criticism,

interpretation, and method in very general terms rather than focusing more closely on

sublation itself. To some, these passages may have seemed like unnecessary digressions from

my main thesis. Nevertheless, I believe that they have been a necessary component of my

exposition. In order to explain why this is the case, I need to make my objectives for this

study of Hegel's concept of sublation more explicit.

My purpose in discussing critical interpretation has not been to provide a general

theory of hermeneutics. To articulate properly such a theory would have taken several

dissertations: on meaning, understanding, critique, and so forth. I am well aware that my

treatment of these topics has been very brief and overly simplified. The brevity of my

treatment of these topics has, unfortunately, meant that I have often made too many assertions

and offered too few justifications. However, it has not been my purpose to offer a fully

grounded and properly justified general hermeneutics. Rather, my intent has only been to

explain just enough to show why I have presented this study of Hegel's concept of sublation in

the form that I have. It is less a theory of hermeneutics than the outline for one. For a study of

a specific historical concept like Hegel's concept of sublation, I think such an outline suffices.

The outline I have presented here should be helpful in several respects. First, an

explanation of my general approach to interpretation makes the organization of this study

clearer. As previously discussed, the first two parts treat sublation internally, in Hegel's own

terms; the third part treats sublation externally, or in my own (the interpreter's) terms, with the

internal critique of Chapter 6 serving as a vital link between the two. These various parts

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might have seemed separate or even arbitrarily connected, but, given the explanation of my

general approach, one can now see how they are interrelated. A critical perspective is as

essential to understanding Hegel's concept of sublation (or any other text) as a thoroughly

grounded knowledge of the concept itself (or any other text) would be to making a proper

critique of it. Any treatment of Hegel's concept of sublation that lacked one or the other would

have been incomplete.

There is, of course, nothing unique in this approach. That is why I have taken pains to

mention, repeatedly, how critical interpretation is a description of interpretation and not a

prescription for it. On a broader scale, I see this structure of interpretation reflected in the

practice of academic philosophy in general. Anecdotally speaking, some philosophers tend to

focus more on the internal aspects of philosophical texts, while others focus on the more

external aspects. But as with the internality and externality of any individual interpretation, I

see this as a difference of degree, not of kind. In addition, as is the case with individual

critical interpretations, the interaction of these differences among interpreters serves a

positive, complementary function. From my point of view, it is this interaction that, on a

social, interpersonal level constitutes the 'community of letters'. My account of critical

interpretation could equally be understood as an attempt to both internalize this dynamic as

well as a means of making the complementary nature of this interaction explicit. While I have

presented each of these aspects as parts of a single study, there is no reason, in principle, that

they would not function in the same complementary way on a social level, with different

interpreters focusing on different ends of the interpretative spectrum, while at the same time

recognizing that they are working together toward a common purpose.

The second reason for presenting this outline is that it explains why, in this study, I did

not take a more historiographical approach. A reader might very well consider this study's

dearth of broader historical context a serious, perhaps even fatal, lacuna. However, before it

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would have been possible to explain the nature of the historical transformations of the concept

of sublation leading up to and following from Hegel, it was first necessary to present the

concept itself. Without first addressing the specific structure and function of Hegel's concept

of sublation, one cannot explain what it is about the concept that changes over time between,

say, Kant and Hegel, or between Hegel and Marx, and so on. One could not simply assume

the peculiarity of Hegel's concept of sublation as something generally understood, and then

explain its historical progression, because without first making its peculiarities explicit, one

would not be able to recognize what has in fact changed over time. Essentially, I see a

structural, functional, and critical interpretation of the concept of sublation as serving a

propaedeutic function for any subsequent historiographical analysis. In Hegelian terms, I

think of this as analogous to the relationship between logic and history; one cannot grasp the

latter without first making explicit the former. For this reason, my critical interpretation of

Hegel's concept of sublation is essentially an interpretation of the logic of sublation rather

than its history.19

Finally, it has been important for me to explain my general approach in order to make

explicit the relationship between the subject-matter of this study and its organization. My

conception of a critically interpretative approach was not arrived at arbitrarily; rather it has

followed from my study of Hegel's concept of sublation itself. Insofar as critical interpretation

entails sublation—of the opposition between interpretation and critique and of the opposition

between internal and external critique—the content of this study (i.e. sublation) is reflected in

its form (i.e. critical interpretation). This coincidence of content and form20 is nothing like a

system in the Hegelian sense. As I have mentioned, the presentation here is an explanation,

not a justification; there is no ground. As presented, there is merely a sort of parallelism

19 Such a history is of course not precluded. For a brief historical overview of Hegel's concept of sublation, see Part IV. For a somewhat more detailed account of its development, see, for example, Fulda's entry on "Aufheben" in Joachim Ritter's Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Schwabe, 1971), 618-620.20 That is, an interpretation of Hegel's concept of sublation (i.e. the content) that is based on an understanding of interpretation as sublation (i.e. the form).

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between the content of this study and its form, although I do consider this parallel to be highly

suggestive.

The parallel is suggestive for two reasons. First of all, it indicates an internal

coherence in this treatment of Hegel's concept of sublation. There is an analogy between my

explanation of my approach and Hegel's justification for his system. Like Hegel's system

(albeit on a much smaller scale), the form of this study is defined by its content and not the

other way around. I have also done my best to explain interpretation as sublation in a way that

is analogous to the manner in which Hegel justifies his own system. Of course, this is only an

analogy; the explanation is still not a self-determination of form and content. In this study,

form and content remain only two 'parallel lines' and not a single complete 'circle'.

Second, if, in some later project, something like a 'circle' could be circumscribed

around this relationship between the form and content of sublation (i.e. if a general

hermeneutics were thoroughly justified on this quasi-Hegelian basis), then it would be

possible to demonstrate how the application of the concept of sublation in philosophy does

not necessarily fall afoul of the problem of an externally formal method. A properly grounded

theory of interpretation as sublation would be neither an externally formal hermeneutic, nor a

philosophical or ontological hermeneutic, but an internal and self-determinate logical

hermeneutic.21 A 'transplant' of the concept of sublation from Hegel's logic to such a

hermeneutic would enable one to apply the concept of sublation to a broader set of

philosophical issues while at the same time avoiding the problems that Hegel identified with

formal method, thus resolving the problem I presented in the introduction. Of course, for now,

such a full justification of such a project remains well beyond my current task. My ultimate

21 That is, 'logical' in the Hegelian rather than formal sense. To put it another way, I mean to suggest the possibility of applying Hegel's concept of sublation to contemporary issues in hermeneutics (e.g. the possibility of criticism, the relation to tradition, etc.)

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objective in this study has been only to lay the groundwork for this project, in order to suggest

that and how it might be possible.22

C. SIGNIFICANCE

Hegel would likely consider such a theory of critical interpretation to be, at best,

superfluous. After all, the reconciliation of form and content for philosophy is his own

project. However, Hegel's solution, insofar as it requires both determination and

completeness, has been shown to be both inadequate (according to my internal critique) and

potentially undesirable (according to my external critique). In this final remark, I will address

some of the implications and consequences of these critiques in order to address the

significance of Hegel's concept of sublation for philosophy in general.

For Hegel, the reconciliation of form and content requires a complete and (self)

determinate system, i.e. the Absolute Idea.23

But in the idea of absolute cognition the concept has become the idea's own content. The idea is itself the pure concept that has itself for subject matter and which, in running itself as subject matter through the totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, into the system of the science, and concludes by apprehending this process of comprehending itself, thereby superseding (aufzuheben) its standing as content and subject matter and cognizing the concept of the science.24

In this way, the Absolute Idea is "the sole subject matter and content of philosophy"25 and,

furthermore, "the Absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth and is all

truth."26 The Absolute Idea is thus for Hegel the sole locus of truth, the only place where

22 For an alternative interpretation of Hegel in terms of hermeneutics, see Paul Redding, Hegel's Hermeneutics (Cornell University Press, 1996). In his book, Redding interprets Hegel's logic as if it were already hermeneutical. 23 Regarding Hegel, it should be clear by this point that this reconciliation is not a synthesis of two separate moments 'form' and 'content', but rather the sublation of the content of philosophy determined as its own form. 24 "In der Idee des absoluten Erkennens aber ist er zu ihrem eigenen Inhalte geworden. Sie ist selbst der reine Begriff, der sich zum Gegenstande hat und der, indem er sich als Gegenstand [habend] die Totalität seiner Bestimmungen durchläuft, sich zum Ganzen seiner Realität, zum Systeme der Wissenschaft ausbildet und damit schließt, dies Begreifen seiner selbst zu erfassen, somit seine Stellung als Inhalt und Gegenstand aufzuheben und den Begriff der Wissenschaft zu erkennen." (SL843; HW6/572)25 "Sie ist der einzige Gegenstand und Inhalt der Philosophie." (SL824; HW6/549)26 "...die absolute Idee allein ist Sein, unvergängliches Leben, sich wissende Wahrheit, und ist alle Wahrheit." (SL824; HW6/549)

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concept and objectivity are adequately and completely unified.27 This means that, for Hegel,

truth is ultimately univocal; there is only one truth.

Hegel would therefore reject the sort of 'hermeneutical shift' I have just suggested.28 If

truth is univocal, then it cannot be open to interpretation. If truth were a matter of

interpretation, then it would be possible for there to be multiple truths. That is, if meaning is a

matter of both expression and reception, then variations in reception (e.g. in different

historical contexts) could produce different valid interpretations, different 'truths' in relation to

the same text. And if there were such a thing as multiple truths, then it would also be possible

for these two truths to contradict each other.29 Therefore, in admitting the possibility of this

sort of pluralism, critical interpretation would seem to be vulnerable to skepticism. Indeed,

such a hermeneutical approach would ultimately seem to be a form of skepticism.30

I am not certain, however, that such a pluralism would necessarily be vulnerable to

skepticism in this way. In order to illustrate my doubts on this point, I must first make a

distinction. Pluralism can be considered to be skeptical in two different senses; it seems

vulnerable to both relativism and equipollence. Briefly, we can define relativism as the

problem that if there are many truths, then there is no truth at all, and equipollence as the

problem that if there are many truths, then there is no way to decide between them. I will now

address each of these problems in turn.

First of all, the claim that pluralism would necessarily be relativism is simply

incorrect. To use a mathematical metaphor, 'greater than one' does not necessarily equal

infinity, and it certainly does not equal zero. This can be better illustrated with reference to

interpretation as sublation. Just as there is no text-in-itself, there is also no text merely and

27 See Chapter 5, Section C for details.28 That is, a shift from a logic of concepts to an interpretation of texts.29 Hegel would claim that the notion of multiple truths would be necessarily contradictory, insofar as neither truth could be the wholly self-determinate reconciliation of concept and objectivity as long as remained set apart over and against its other. 30 For Hegel's rejection of skepticism, see Michael Forster, Hegel and Skepticism (Harvard, 1989), cited previously and discussed in Chapter 6, Section B.

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solely 'for us'. Just as there is no purely internal text ('beyond' interpretation), there is also no

purely external one, where interpretation would be reduced to a merely personal response

alone ('beyond' the text). If interpretation were a matter of reception alone, then there would

be a potentially infinite number of possible interpretations and no possibility of determination

whatsoever. However, to claim that interpretation is the sublation of the text is, of course, not

the same as claiming that it is simply the negation of the text. If a sublation is present (in a

transplanted, quasi-Hegelian sense), then the text must not be simply negated, but also

preserved. There may be multiple valid interpretations but, from this, it does not follow that

one interpretation is necessarily as valid as any other.

Take, for example, the play Hamlet. In that text, one can find valid grounds for

claiming that Hamlet is fundamentally motivated by melancholy. Alternatively, one can also

find equally valid grounds for claiming that he is fundamentally motivated by anger.31 But

while there are grounds for claiming Shakespeare's Prince of Denmark is melancholy or

angry, there are no such grounds for claiming that Hamlet is happy or Swedish. Just because

there is more than one possible interpretation does not mean an interpretation cannot be

wrong. The fact that there is more than one potentially valid interpretation does not

necessarily entail that there are an infinite number of valid interpretations. Therefore, since

there remains the possibility of some determination among them, pluralism does not

necessarily entail relativism.

The second problem with pluralism—equipollence—is a far more serious one. In

hermeneutical terms, if multiple valid interpretations of a text are possible, then there would

be, by definition, no grounds for deciding between them. While pluralism can contain

31 There are obviously grounds for claiming Hamlet is both melancholy and angry, but the point is the question of his fundamental motivation, i.e. whether he is depressed because he is angry at being usurped (etc.) or angry because he is depressed and grieving over his dead father. This question, I would argue, is undecidable based on the text of the play alone. The various possible answers to this question determine to a great extent how the character is played. For examples of how these different interpretations of the play affect its staging, one can compare and contrast the different films versions, for example, the anger of Franco Zeffirelli's Hamlet (1990) as opposed to the melancholy of Laurence Oliver's (1948) or Kenneth Branagh's (1996).

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determination, an indeterminacy always remains between two (or more) 'truths'. For Hegel,

such an indeterminacy would constitute a contradiction, where the 'two truths' would remain

separate and set over and against one another; the lack of the possibility of complete self-

determination would be the lack of the possibility of truth. Therefore, pluralism (as

equipollent) would seem to be a skepticism.

In order to respond to this difficulty, we must take a step backward and ask why

skepticism is itself a problem. First of all, it must be clear that when referring to skepticism

here I mean what Hegel calls ancient skepticism: not a skepticism about a particular kind of

knowledge (as in modern skepticism), but a skepticism about the possibility of knowledge as

such (what one might also call 'absolute skepticism').32 Here, we can immediately see why

skepticism is a problem for Hegel's concept of philosophy. If philosophy is concerned with

possible objects of knowledge, then knowledge itself must be established (not simply

assumed) as a possibility.

One can, however, easily see how such an absolute skepticism is not really a problem

at all. If a skepticism were to reject the possibility of knowledge as such, then it would also

reject its own claim to know that this is the case; it would entail a rejection of its own

knowledge-claim. This point can also be phrased in terms of the distinction between first- and

second-order knowledge. The claim "I know (I don't know x)" is coherent; the claim "I know

(I can't know any x)" is not, since as the second clause contradicts the first. To articulate such

an absolute skepticism would therefore be a performative contradiction. In this sense,

skepticism is not a threat; it is a fallacy.33

32 I will use the ahistorical term 'absolute skepticism' below, rather than the more Hegelian term 'ancient skepticism', because it permits the inclusion of relatively more recent forms of skepticism that fit the definition, e.g. romantic irony, deconstruction, and so on. 33 Following on my inclusion of deconstruction as an instance of absolute skepticism, I should make an important distinction. It is not any particular deconstruction of a text that is necessarily problematic; individually, these deconstructions would be simply instances of internal critique. However, once generalized to a theory like 'deconstructionism', as a principle that would apply to all possible texts, deconstruction would fall victim to this fallacy. The same performative contradiction is also present in Lyotard's "incredulity towards meta-narratives" (Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (University of Minnesota, 1984), xxiv), insofar as this statement is itself such a meta-narrative.

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Of course, Hegel himself makes use of the same type of argument. In the

Phenomenology of Spirit, one can read how skepticism contradicts itself.34 In the Science of

Logic, one can read how even contradiction contradicts itself and is sublated as ground.35 But

if skepticism contradicts itself, then why is an absolute cognition itself necessary as a defense

against skepticism? Why is an ultimate, univocal, single ground required for philosophy? It

would seem that, if skepticism is already found to be incoherent, then a subsequent absolute

cognition would be unnecessary.

Hegel sees it as necessary because as long as there are unsublated moments of the

system, contradictions remain within and among those moments. If one were to sublate

contradiction as such, without sublating the individual contradictions among the various

moments, then such a logic would remain abstract. An abstract logic would be a merely

formal one, and the reconciliation of form and content (as the truth of the Absolute Idea)

would not be accomplished. This is why, for Hegel, the defense against skepticism requires a

complete system.

It is my contention, however, that such completeness, in addition to being 1)

inadequately presented in Hegel and 2) potentially undesirable, is also 3) unnecessary.36 It is

not necessary to sublate all possible contradictions because it is not the presence of individual

contradictions that is a threat to the possibility of knowledge as such; rather, the threat to

philosophy is found in absolute skepticism alone. That "I can't know x" does not mean "I can't

know y" An individual indeterminacy does not make determinacy as such (and thus

knowledge) impossible. Furthermore, as we have seen, an individual indeterminacy does not

mean that one cannot have a determination of that indeterminacy, i.e. "I know (I don't know

34 PS126; HW3/163.35 As discussed in Chapter 4, Section C.36 I have not argued here that absolute cognition is impossible, because I think to do so risks falling afoul the same performative contradiction that undermined absolute skepticism. If there were a position from which one could claim "I know I can't know absolutely", it would be difficult make the case that this argument is not itself made from some sort of absolute standpoint.

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x)." Again, this possibility is implicitly entailed by Hegel's own logic.37 And if completeness

is unnecessary to establish the conditions of possibility of knowledge, then pluralism would

be a possibility.

This possibility of pluralism requires further explanation. I have not claimed that

pluralism is necessary. If I were to make a claim like "all truths are plural", then such a

pluralism would indeed be relativism. Instead, I make only the more limited claim that

pluralism is possible, that "some truths are plural". Furthermore, while there would be an

equipollence between such truths, this does not mean that they are completely indeterminable.

On a second-order level, their equipollence could be determined, as equipollent: "I know (x

and y are both true)."38 In other words, on this second-order level, the presence of

equipollence does not entail an absence of knowledge. Therefore, admitting the possibility of

pluralism would not result in an absolute skepticism, since it preserves the possibility of

knowledge.

What this means is that, insofar as critical interpretation is (potentially) pluralistic, it

also admits the possibility of knowledge in the determinate but not absolute sense of the term.

The fact that multiple valid interpretations are possible does not mean that determinate

knowledge of a text is impossible. In cases where two interpretations are both equally valid,

what is required is a recognition (qua determination) of that equal validity. So, returning to

our Hamlet example, if I recognize that both claims (that he is fundamentally melancholy and

fundamentally angry) have equal validity, such a recognition functions as a second-order

interpretation, which sublates and thus determines the indeterminacy (the equipollence) of the

first-order. I cannot decide between "Hamlet is angry" and "Hamlet is melancholy", but I can

37 As we saw in Chapter 7, Section B.38 This is of course still possible even if "x and y" are not simply different, but also contradictory, insofar as a first-order contradiction does not necessarily entail a second-order one.

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know that I cannot decide. Interpretation is, in this way, a form of knowledge. What this

means is that interpretation is not restricted to meaning, but can also involve truth.39

The truth of interpretation here is obviously not truth in the Hegelian sense of the

term. As I have presented it here, however, this hermeneutical truth is analogous to Hegel's

concept of truth. Just as Hegelian truth (i.e. the Absolute Idea) is the reconciliation of the

concept with its objectivity, a true interpretation is one that reconciles a text with its

interpreter(s). Just as, for Hegel, there can be no truth that is purely objective or purely

subjective, for critical interpretation there can be no true interpretation that is either purely

internal or purely external. An interpretation reconciles the internality of a text with the

externality of an interpreter and in this way is recognized as an interpretation or an

understanding of the meaning of a text (and not merely as a polemic or repetition). Grasped in

this way, critical interpretation would not be an abstract formal method because there is no

pre-determination of the content. There is, for example, no requirement that all texts must be

interpreted in light of a single topic, such as economics, sexuality, language, and so on.40

There are also no external formal criteria, no pre-determined forms, that a valid interpretation

must take external to interpretation as such. The criteria for a valid interpretation are internal

to the relationship between the text and the interpreter itself; the criteria are not defined in

advance or separably, but are performatively instantiated by the act of interpretation itself.

Such internal criteria would mean that a plurality of valid interpretations is possible

insofar as critical interpretation does not assume a particular type of text or a particular type

of interpretation in advance of or separate from the act of interpretation itself. At the same

time, these criteria do not mean that all interpretations are equally valid because the range of

possible valid interpretations is still limited, both by the content of the text and the context of

39 If a legitimate and relevant interpretation can be described figuratively as 'valid', then an interpretation that is also true could be described, in the same analogical sense relative to logic, as 'sound'. 40 Such interpretations fall victim to what Frye calls the "deterministic fallacy", which he (amusingly) defines as "...the rhetorical device of putting his [the critic's] favorite study into a causal relationship with whatever interests him less." Frye, 6.

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the interpreter. To put this in more concrete terms, consider the example of historical

interpretation. A valid historical interpretation reconciles a historical text with the interpreter's

own time. That different interpretations may be recognized as valid at different times or in

different contexts does not mean that interpretation is simply either a matter of the

interpreter's own whims where the past would be merely a playground for one's own musings,

or some imaginary 'pure objectivism' that claims to resurrect the past in the present. Both of

these extremes are excluded not by some dogmatically assumed criteria, but in the very act of

interpretation itself.41 Interpretation, grasped in this way, would be self-determinate.

Another way to express this point would be to say that interpretation as sublation

would be performatively (rather than systematically) self-determinate. That is, any given act

of interpretation performatively assumes that it is a valid interpretation insofar as the

interpretation is advanced in the first place. The purpose of a general hermeneutics fully and

explicitly articulated along these lines would be to ground what would otherwise remain only

an implicit assumption of every act of interpretation. It would be grounded, not according to

some external criteria, but on criteria wholly internal to interpretation itself. In this way,

critical interpretation (as a general theory) would serve a role relative to particular

philosophical interpretations analogous to the role of Hegel's logic relative to the other

philosophical sciences and their moments. It would provide a self-determinate ground for

interpretation while, at the same time, having the advantage of being able to remain open to

the possibilities of transcendence and pluralism.

From a Hegelian point of view, what would be absent from such a self-determinate

theory of critical interpretation is completeness. From his perspective, a self-determination

that is not also complete would be incoherent. However, as I have argued, a lack of

completeness does not entail an absence of determination of knowledge. Therefore, a

hermeneutic shift from (self-determinate) logic to (self-determinate) interpretation would not

41 That is, when understood as interpretation as sublation.

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mean that philosophy would thereby abandon all claims to knowledge. Interpretation would

not be something other than knowledge (restricted only to edification42) or a special kind of

knowledge (reserved for the humanities) but the performatively instantiated ground

underlying the conditions of the possibility of knowledge.43 Critical interpretation would not

be one approach among many, with hermeneutical fields like literary criticism and edifying

philosophy set over and against fields like natural science or systematic philosophy. The

difference between, say, literary criticism and statistics would be in their modes of

interpretation: language and mathematics, respectively. Within the framework outlined,

different fields would each be defined by their respective shared set of premises. What they

would have in common is that they are all fundamentally grounded as interpretation,44

analogous to the way Hegel's logic grounds the other philosophical sciences. Through such a

general hermeneutical theory, knowledge would be establishable on a non-dogmatic, critical

basis that would be equally both self-determinate (insofar as it is performatively instantiated

and not merely presupposed) and, at the same time, capable of remaining open to

transcendence and pluralism. Self-determination in this non-Hegelian sense (without

completeness) thus retains the virtue of the Hegelian approach in that it avoids any dogmatic

dependence on unreflected, implicit assumptions while, at the same time, avoiding what I

have articulated as Hegel's limitations—that his solution is inadequate, undesirable, and

unnecessary.

42 I take this term and the subsequent distinction between 'systematic' and 'edifying' philosophy from Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 1979), 360, 367-368.43 In this sense, another label that might be used for what I have called critical interpretation is 'transcendental hermeneutics' (a phrase taken from Karl-Otto Apel). The problem with this label is that it requires sufficient familiarity with Kant to recognize the distinction between 'transcendental' (concerned with the conditions of possibility of knowledge) and 'transcendent' (that which is said to be beyond knowledge). Without this distinction, 'transcendental hermeneutics' might appear to be concerned with interpreting what I referred to earlier as the experiences of transcendence, rather than the conditions of possibility of all knowledge as such. 44 It is important to note here that this concept of interpretation (as a performatively instantiated ground) should be distinguished from interpretation as one mode set over and against others, for example, as the method of the humanities as opposed to that of the natural sciences. If interpretation is capable of knowledge, then distinctions like these, or Rorty's distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy (and any hierarchy between them) would collapse. This would effectively entail a sublation of the traditional dichotomy (from Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber) between understanding (Verstehen) and explanation (Erklärung).

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It is important to note that such a shift is not without its own negative consequences as

well. While critical interpretation can involve determination and thus knowledge, on this basis

no complete self-determination or complete self-knowledge would be possible. Therefore, this

sort of hermeneutical shift would mean that there would always be answers that escape us;

there would always be dilemmas that cannot be resolved. We would always remain to a

certain degree determined by factors we cannot ourselves (completely) overcome.

In Hegelian terms, this would mean that, for critical interpretation, there is ultimately

no freedom. For Hegel, "The pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of the concept

is itself raised into concept, is an absolute liberation for which there is no longer any

immediate determination that is not equally posited and itself concept...."45 In critical

interpretation, insofar as there would remain the possibility of a determination that is not itself

determined, no such "absolute liberation" could take place. I would agree (to a certain extent)

with Hegel that this would be tragic. For example, when confronted with an ethical dilemma,

such a pluralism would mean that it would be possible for there to be two equally valid

positions on an issue, and that there would be no way to justify deciding between them.46

Nevertheless, the negative impact and implications of those sorts of consequences are

not sufficient grounds to reject the line of reasoning that leads to them. In the case of an

ethical dilemma of the sort mentioned, we cannot resolve such a tragic conflict by

transforming it into a comedy, by simply assuming there must be a happy ending because we

do not like the alternative. Without falsifying the phenomena, the best we could do in the face

of such a dilemma is to recognize it as a tragedy. Thus, insofar as critical interpretation

includes the possibility of pluralism, there would remain the possibility of a "tragedy of

45 "Die reine Idee, in welcher die Bestimmtheit oder Realität des Begriffes selbst zum Begriffe erhoben ist, ist vielmehr absolute Befreiung, für welche keine unmittelbare Bestimmung mehr ist, die nicht ebensosehr gesetzt und der Begriff ist;" (SL843; HW6/573-EA) See also the discussion of freedom in Chapter 5, Section C. 46 One can see a specific example of such a dilemma in Sophocles' Antigone, the conflict of which Hegel himself takes as paradigmatic for Greek tragedy. See LA1208-1213/HW15/538-544. For a nice summary of Hegel's concept of tragedy as 'tragic conflict', see Walter Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy (Princeton, 1972), 202-212.

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truth"—that there might be problems that we can recognize but not solve. Such a conception

of philosophy would not necessarily be concerned with overcoming every problem; rather, it

would have the capacity to admit the possibility that sometimes the only solution might be

acceptance. While Hegel would understand this last possibility as a weakness, I see it as a

strength.

In order to reach the point where we would be able to acknowledge the possibility of

the validity of such 'mere' acceptance, we must be able to move beyond Hegel; his weakness

would have to become our strength. This 'moving beyond' is not nearly as easy as it might

seem to some. On the one hand, moving beyond Hegel cannot simply be a matter of ignoring

him. In that case, his broad influence, both positive and negative, would remain merely

implicit and undetermined. On other hand, the more familiar one is with Hegel, the more

difficult finding a way out seems to become. Michel Foucault expresses this problem well:

But to truly escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us.47

In other words, the very logic that constitutes Hegelian thinking would seem to preclude the

possibility of transcending it. Any anti-Hegelian, insofar as he or she is opposed to Hegel,

would, according Hegel's own concept of opposition, remain defined by him and thus, in this

sense, remain Hegelian.

At the same time, the very logic that poses this problem also already contains the

solution: Hegel's concept of sublation. For the most part, I think Hegel was right; sublation is

indeed "...one of the most important concepts in philosophy, a fundamental determination,

47 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (Tavistock, 1972), 235. Foucault expresses this point with a bit more hostility than would be required to support my own position. However, in spite his personal attitude, I think he nevertheless captures the essence of problem. I would only add that this problem for anti-Hegelianism need not be characterized as an 'insidious trick' to be recognized as a problem.

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which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy….”48 For Hegel, the concept of

sublation is essential to the very fabric of thinking itself. This too, I think, is correct, albeit in

a slightly different sense than Hegel's own. I have tried to suggest that sublation might be

inherent in every act of interpretation just as, for Hegel, it is inherent in philosophical thinking

as such. But if this is correct, then it would mean that it would be possible for Hegel's own

thought to itself be not simply opposed but sublated.49

I make no claim here to have actually accomplished such a sublation of Hegel. This

would require a far more elaborate study than a treatment of Hegel's concept of sublation

alone. My own point is more limited and claims only that such a sublation is possible. Thus,

the ultimate task of this study has not been to overcome Hegel, but rather to demonstrate, on

'Hegelogical'50 grounds, this possibility. Regardless of whether one thinks such an overcoming

is necessary or not, I hope that it is clear that Hegel's concept of sublation, as the golden

thread running through his logic, is the key to unraveling it.

48 “Aufheben und das Aufgehobene ist einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt…” (SL106; HW5/113) Already cited in the Introduction, note 1. 49 This same distinction has already been expressed in the distinction made between the rubrics 'anti-Hegelian' and 'post-Hegelian'. See, for example, William Desmond, Art and the Absolute: a Study of Hegel's Aesthetics (SUNY Press, 1986), 79. Such a 'post-Hegelian' inclination is hardly original to this study; here, I have only rephrased it as a 'sublation of Hegel', essentially restating the grounds for such approaches in other terms.50 That is, of or relating to Hegel's logic. I have used this rather odd-sounding term only because the term 'Hegelian' might risk confusion with Hegel's own thought and the term 'post-Hegelian' can include reference to philosophies whose underlying logic is vastly different from Hegel's. Instead, I mean of or relating to Hegel's logic as I have applied it here, in analogy to but not necessarily identical with Hegel's own.

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PART IV: SUPPLEMENTAL

Data Tables: Frequency AnalysisThe Frequency Analysis tables from Chapter 2 are included here for ease of reference.

Table 1. Number of Occurrences of the Various Forms

aufgehoben aufheben aufhebt Aufhebung Dialektik dialektischeEarly Writings 65 20 13 35 0 0Jena Writings 78 40 20 19 2 1Phenomenology of Spirit 165 107 37 6 12 21Nürnberg & Heidelberg 86 73 19 11 40 24Science of Logic 393 223 77 17 72 47Philosophy of Right 26 35 9 11 17 5Encyclopedia 227 140 50 63 66 36Berlin Writings 16 16 7 6 18 7Philosophy of History 20 9 8 4 5 2Philosophy of Fine Art 33 32 34 18 2 5Philosophy of Religion 131 88 39 43 16 14History of Philosophy 109 65 31 7 215 35

Table 2. Summary of the Information on the Different Volumes

Pages Date Aufheben Dialektik DifferenceTotal Average Total Average Total Average Average

Early Writings 388 1798.5 133 0.34 0 0.00 0.33Jena Writings 276 1804 157 0.57 3 0.01 0.56Phenomenology of Spirit 296 1807 315 1.06 33 0.11 0.95Nürnberg & Heidelberg 454 1812.5 189 0.42 64 0.14 0.28Science of Logic 593 1814 710 1.20 119 0.20 1.00Philosophy of Right 270 1820 81 0.30 22 0.08 0.22Encyclopedia 773 1823.5 480 0.62 102 0.13 0.49Berlin Writings 317 1824.5 45 0.14 25 0.08 0.06Philosophy of History 288 1826 41 0.14 7 0.02 0.12Philosophy of Fine Art 887 1824 117 0.13 7 0.01 0.12Philosophy of Religion 508 1826 301 0.59 30 0.06 0.53History of Philosophy 843 1824 212 0.25 250 0.30 -0.05

Table 3. Results of the Regression Analysis

Dependent Difference of FrequenciesRegressor Coefficient Standard error t-value p-valueAverage volume date -0.0082 0.0064 -1.28 0.232“Technical” dummy 0.6430 0.1575 4.08 0.003constant 15.1839 11.6452 1.30 0.225R² 0.73Observations 12

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A Comparison of the First and Second EditionsThe following excerpt compares the first (1812) and second editions (1831) of Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik. It includes the entire text of Hegel's remark (Anmerkung) from the end of Chapter 1, following the section on the "Sublation of Becoming" (Aufheben des Werdens). These three paragraphs represent Hegel's most elaborate and detailed treatment of his concept of sublation. It is quoted frequently and discussed at length in Chapter 1 of this study. I have quoted the entire remark here so that readers might compare the two versions, and more easily view the whole context of the passages cited earlier only in part.

The First Edition text is quoted from the Meiner edition (GW11/57-58). The Second Edition text is quoted from the Suhrkamp edition (HW5/112-114). An English version of the Second Edition can be found in the Miller translation (SL106-108)

I have divided the text into three basic paragraphs, which correspond across both editions. Underlined text appears in first edition but is absent from the second. Text in bold indicates text added in the second edition. Text that is both underlined and in bold indicates text altered between the two editions (e.g. verschwunden (vanished) to vernichtet (destroyed)).

The notable changes in the Second Edition are the characterization of aufheben as "Ideelle" in paragraph 1 and the extended explanation added to paragraph 2. The paragraph labeled '2.5' appears in the First Edition but not the Second.

First Edition, Paragraph 1Aufheben und das Aufgehobene ist einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt, deren Sinn bestimmt aufzufassen und besonders vom Nichts zu unterscheiden ist. - Was sich aufhebt, wird dadurch nicht zu Nichts. Nichts ist das Unmittelbare; ein Aufgehobenes dagegen ist ein Vermitteltes, es ist das Nichtseiende, aber als Resultat, das von einem Sein ausgegangen ist; es hat daher die Bestimmtheit, aus der es herkommt, noch an sich.

Second Edition, Paragraph 1Aufheben und das Aufgehobene (das Ideelle) ist einer der wichtigsten Begriffe der Philosophie, eine Grundbestimmung, die schlechthin allenthalben wiederkehrt, deren Sinn bestimmt aufzufassen und besonders vom Nichts zu unterscheiden ist. - Was sich aufhebt, wird dadurch nicht zu Nichts. Nichts ist das Unmittelbare; ein Aufgehobenes dagegen ist ein Vermitteltes, es ist das Nichtseiende, aber als Resultat, das von einem Sein ausgegangen ist; es hat daher die Bestimmtheit, aus der es herkommt, noch an sich.

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First Edition, Paragraph 2Aufheben hat in der Sprache den gedoppelten Sinn, daß es soviel als aufbewahren, erhalten bedeutet und zugleich soviel als aufhören lassen, ein Ende machen. Das Aufbewahren selbst schließt schon das Negative in sich, daß etwas seiner Unmittelbarkeit und damit einem den äußerlichen Einwirkungen offenen Dasein entnommen wird, um es zu erhalten. - So ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine Unmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum nicht verschwunden ist.

Second Edition, Paragraph 2Aufheben hat in der Sprache den gedoppelten Sinn, daß es soviel als aufbewahren, erhalten bedeutet und zugleich soviel als aufhören lassen, ein Ende machen. Das Aufbewahren selbst schließt schon das Negative in sich, daß etwas seiner Unmittelbarkeit und damit einem den äußerlichen Einwirkungen offenen Dasein entnommen wird, um es zu erhalten. - So ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine Unmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum nicht vernichtet ist. Die angegebenen zwei Bestimmungen des Aufhebens können lexikalisch als zwei Bedeutungen dieses Wortes aufgeführt werden. Auffallend müßte es aber dabei sein, daß eine Sprache dazu gekommen ist, ein und dasselbe Wort für zwei entgegengesetzte Bestimmungen zu gebrauchen. Für das spekulative Denken ist es erfreulich, in der Sprache Wörter zu finden, welche eine spekulative Bedeutung an ihnen selbst haben; die deutsche Sprache hat mehrere dergleichen. Der Doppelsinn des lateinischen tollere (der durch den Ciceronianischen Witz "tollendum esse Octavium" berühmt geworden) geht nicht so weit, die affirmative Bestimmung geht nur bis zum Emporheben. Etwas ist nur insofern aufgehoben, als es in die Einheit mit seinem Entgegengesetzten getreten ist; in dieser näheren Bestimmung als ein Reflektiertes kann es passend Moment genannt werden. Gewicht und Entfernung von einem Punkt heißen beim Hebel dessen mechanische Momente, um der Dieselbigkeit ihrer Wirkung willen bei aller sonstigen Verschiedenheit eines Reellen, wie das ein Gewicht ist, und eines Ideellen, der bloßen räumlichen Bestimmung, der Linie; s. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 3. Ausgabe [1830], § 261 Anm. - Noch öfter wird die Bemerkung sich aufdrängen, daß die philosophische Kunstsprache für reflektierte Bestimmungen lateinische Ausdrücke gebraucht, entweder weil die Muttersprache keine Ausdrücke dafür hat oder, wenn sie deren hat wie hier, weil ihr Ausdruck mehr an das Unmittelbare, die fremde Sprache aber mehr an das Reflektierte erinnert.

First Edition, Paragraph 2.5 Das Aufgehobene genauer bestimmt, so ist hier etwas nur insofern aufgehoben, als es in die Einheit mit seinem Entgegengesetzten getreten ist; es ist in dieser nähern Bestimmung ein reflectirtes, und kann passend Moment genannt werden. –Wie noch öfter die Bemerkung sich aufdringen wird, daß die philosophische Kuntsprache, für reflectirte Bestimmungen l ateinische Ausdrücke gebraucht.

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First Edition, Paragraph 3Der nähere Sinn und Ausdruck, den Sein und Nichts, indem sie nunmehr Momente sind, erhalten, hat sich bei der Betrachtung des Daseins als der Einheit, in der sie aufbewahrt sind, näher zu ergeben. Sein ist Sein, und Nichts ist Nichts, nur in ihrer Unterschiedenheit von einander; in ihrer Wahrheit aber, in ihrer Einheit sind sie als diese Bestimmungen verschwunden, und sind nun etwas anderes. Sein und Nichts sind dasselbe; darum weil sie dasselbe sind, sind sie nicht mehr Sein und Nichts, und haben eine verschiedene Bestimmung; im Werden waren sie Entstehen und Vergehen; im Dasein als einer anders bestimmten Einheit sind sie wieder anders bestimmte Momente.

Second Edition, Paragraph 3Der nähere Sinn und Ausdruck, den Sein und Nichts, indem sie nunmehr Momente sind, erhalten, hat sich bei der Betrachtung des Daseins als der Einheit, in der sie aufbewahrt sind, zu ergeben. Sein ist Sein und Nichts ist Nichts nur in ihrer Unterschiedenheit voneinander; in ihrer Wahrheit aber, in ihrer Einheit sind sie als diese Bestimmungen verschwunden und sind nun etwas anderes. Sein und Nichts sind dasselbe; darum weil sie dasselbe sind, sind sie nicht mehr Sein und Nichts und haben eine verschiedene Bestimmung; im Werden waren sie Entstehen und Vergehen; im Dasein als einer anders bestimmten Einheit sind sie wieder anders bestimmte Momente. Diese Einheit bleibt nun ihre Grundlage, aus der sie nicht mehr zur abstrakten Bedeutung von Sein und Nichts heraustreten.

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Aufheben: A Brief Historical Overview

GeneralThe purpose of this overview is to illustrate how Hegel's concept of sublation, as I

have interpreted it in this study, is unique to Hegel alone. In order to do so, I look at just a

small handful of historical examples and mention how Hegel's technical sense of the term

aufheben differs from each. The purpose of these examples is not to present a complete

history of the concept, but to show the ways Hegel's concept differs from certain key thinkers

with which it is commonly identified. Therefore, this overview is more of a suggestion of

uniqueness than a complete demonstration. By carefully targeting certain common alternate

conceptions of aufheben and how Hegel differs from them, however, I believe this suggestion

should suffice.

At the beginning of modern German philosophy, the word aufheben is simply used to

render the Latin tollere. This identification is found, for example, in the writings of Christian

Wolff. The difference between aufheben and tollere for Hegel was already discussed in

Chapter 1, Section A of this study. To recapitulate the point here: while Hegel notes that

aufheben means both to negate and to preserve, he claims that tollere's positive meaning is not

as strong. According to Hegel, aufheben's sense of preservation is to be contrasted with

tollere's sense of elevation. In this way, Hegel distinguishes his technical conception of

aufheben not only from tollere, but also from those uses of aufheben that are equated with

tollere (e.g. Wolff's sense of aufheben).

KantThe term aufheben achieves a certain prominence in subsequent German philosophy

thanks to Kant. In the preface to the second (B) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787),

Kant makes his well-known remark "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge,

in order to make room for faith...."1 In this common English version of the famous phrase, 1 " Ich mußte also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen..." (CPR Bxxx-EA)

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translator Norman Kemp Smith uses the English word 'to deny' to render the German

aufheben.2 I would hypothesize that it is possible that it is this sentence that brings aufheben

to the attention of later thinkers as a significant philosophical concept. However, for our

purposes, this need only remain a hypothesis. What is important for our purposes is Kant's

usage relative to Hegel's.

It would seem that Kant uses aufheben in both a negative and positive sense here,

insofar as knowledge—as the grammatical object being sublated—is clearly both negated and,

at the same time, not completely abolished. In the Critique of Pure Reason, knowledge is

limited (i.e. negated) so that it can be defended against both dogmatism and skepticism (i.e.

preserved). Interpreted in this way, Kant's usage of the term would seem similar to Hegel's.

There is, however, at least one important distinction between the two—the difference in the

choice of grammatical object. For Kant, knowledge is that which is being sublated, rather than

the opposition between concepts like knowledge and faith. Instead of sublating the difference

between knowledge and faith in order to establish a unity, Kant uses the term aufheben to

articulate a difference. Knowledge is sublated in order "to make room" (Platz zu bekommen,

literally 'to make a place') for faith. Aufheben is thus used here in the sense of a negation; not

a complete negation or annihilation by any means, but a negation nonetheless; more

specifically, the term is used in the sense of limitation. In Kant, the term aufheben determines

a division between opposites rather than a unity. So while Kant's critical philosophy could be

interpreted as a sublation of knowledge (in the Hegelian sense of aufheben), that is not how

Kant uses the term here. Hegel's and Kant's uses aufheben would is in this sense distinct.

Schiller A few years later (1794) Schiller, in his On the Aesthetic Education of Man, uses the

term aufheben a number of times as a philosophical concept. For example, in the eighteenth

2 I am indebted to Howard Caygill (A Kant Dictionary (Blackwell, 1995), 193) for calling my attention to this quote in relation to aufheben.

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Letter, he writes, "Beauty unites these two opposed states and thus sublates [hebt...auf] the

opposition. But because both states remain eternally opposed to each other, they cannot be

united in any other way than by being sublated [aufgehoben]."3 Here, unlike Kant, Schiller

uses the term aufheben in relation to a unity of opposites, in a manner that seems quite

Hegelian. As in Hegel, it is the opposition between concepts, rather than the concepts

themselves, that is here the grammatical object of sublation.

This unity of opposites, however, is not ultimately a Hegelian one. Later in the same

Letter, Schiller writes:

Our second task, therefore, is to make this union complete; and to do it with such unmitigated thoroughness that both these conditions totally disappear [gänzlich verschwinden] in a third without leaving any trace of division behind in the new whole that has been made; otherwise we shall succeed in distinguishing but never in uniting them.4

In the broader context of Schiller's remarks, we can thus see how his conception of the unity

of opposites through aufheben is in this case distinct from Hegel's. For Schiller, this

unification requires that the two opposites "totally disappear" (gänzlich verschwinden),

leaving no trace. For Hegel, on the other hand, "Thus what is sublated is at the same

preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated."5 The German

term for the result Hegel rejects here—vernichtet (annihilated, destroyed)—is from the

Second Edition of the Science of Logic. In the First Edition, the term Hegel uses for this

rejected result is verschwunden (disappeared).6 The term that Hegel rejects as a result is the

same term Schiller uses (emphasized in the passage quoted above) to describe his own result.

Thus, while both Schiller and Hegel use aufheben in relation to the unity of opposites, they

3 Schiller, Frederich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. E.M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby (Oxford, 1967), 123. The Wilkinson and Willboughy edition includes the German original on the facing pages. However, I have used a modified version of Walter Kaufmann's translation of this phrase instead, in order to highlight the use of aufheben. See Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation (University of Notre Dame, 1965), 25. 4 "Unser zweites Geschäft ist also, diese Verbindung vollkommen zu machen, sie so rein und vollständig durchzuführen, dass beide Zustände in einem Dirtten gänzlich verschwinden und keine Spur der Teilung in dem Ganzen zurückbleibt sonst vereinzeln wir, aber vereinigen nicht." (Schiller, 125) 5 " So ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine Unmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum nicht vernichtet ist." (SL107; HW5/114-EA)6 See "A Comparison of the First and Second Editions", above.

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each use the term in exactly the opposite sense of the other. Furthermore, the fact that in the

first edition of the Logic Hegel uses the exact word that Schiller does to describe what he

rejects seems, at least, to be quite a remarkable coincidence.

Hegel himself was well aware of Schiller's essay. Writing to Schelling a year later

(1795), Hegel calls Schiller's essay "a masterpiece".7 Given Hegel's esteem of this work and

the remarkable coincidence of terminology, one could readily suppose (again hypothetically)

that Hegel was inspired by Schiller when formulating his own concept of aufheben. However,

I think Schiller's English editors (Wilkinson and Willoughby) go too far when they claim that

"In this double sense aufheben was to become a key-term of Hegel's dialectical method."8 As I

have just shown, while Schiller uses the term in relation to the unity of opposites, the resulting

unity is precisely the opposite of that found in Hegel's own concept of aufheben. Schiller uses

aufheben as a synonym for what I have called simple negation.9 As I have previously noted,

the interpretation of sublation as simple negation completely obscures Hegel's own

conception of the term and its purpose in the science of logic: Hegel's essentially critical

philosophy is thereby warped into a destructive, skeptical one. Given its consequences and the

fundamental misunderstandings that result from it, this interpretation of aufheben as simple

negation is amazingly common, for reasons we will see momentarily.

MarxHegel's concept of sublation as both negation and preservation broke down quite

rapidly after his death. In very general, schematic terms, the Old Hegelians, who used Hegel's

philosophy as a means to defend tradition, emphasized the sense of preservation over negation

and the Young Hegelians, who used Hegel's philosophy to attack those traditions, emphasized

the sense of negation over preservation. On a conceptual level, neither faction maintained the

7 Hegel, G.W.F., Hegel: The Letters, Trans. Clark Butler (Indiana, 1984), 36. 8 Schiller, 305. 9 See Chapter 1, Section A, Subsection 1.

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concept of aufheben in Hegel's own, doubled sense. I will not explore the particular stages of

decay here, but we can take up one prominent example.

Marx uses the term Aufhebung in a famous line from the Communist Manifesto: "In

this sense, the theory of the Communist Party may be summed up in a single sentence:

abolition of private property."10 The Communist aufheben of private property is quite

obviously a simple negation. All property is completely subsumed in the state—it is purely

totalitarian, and any preservation of private property would be considered merely bourgeois.

The Marxist sense of aufheben clearly does not possess the preservative element of Hegel's

concept.11

From this example, it would seem that by the time we arrive at Marx, the concept of

aufheben has lost much if not all of the technical, double sense in which Hegel used it. In

effect, one could say that, by the time we reach Marx, the concept of aufheben had reverted to

a pre-Hegelian form, much closer to Schiller's than Hegel's. It is as if Hegel's fusion of

negation and preservation in his concept of aufheben was somehow unstable, like something

radioactive with a short half-life, rapidly decaying into its component parts or simpler states.

Karl Löwith aptly summarizes this phenomena with the line "Hegel's pupils and successors

put asunder what he had so painfully joined together, and demanded decisions in the place of

his mediations."12 I suspect that this decay serves as a sort of crossroads for subsequent

misinterpretations of Hegel's concept of sublation (e.g. the postmodern 'totalitarian' reading).

Of course, actually demonstrating the progression of this 'putting asunder' would

require more than this brief set of examples. I have offered this overview not as a substitute

for a proper historical analysis of the pre- and post-Hegelian development of the concept of

aufheben, but only in order to suggest a sense of the uniqueness of Hegel's technical sense of 10 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, ed. Frederic L. Bender (Norton, 1977), 68. In German, the sentence reads "In diesem Sinn können die Kommunisten ihre Theorie in dem einen Ausdruck: Aufhebung des Privateigentums, zusammenfassen." (Karl Marx Frederich Engels Werke (Dietz, 1977), 4/475)11 On this distinction between the Hegelian and Marxist concepts of aufheben (rather than simply a focus on dialectic) see, for example, Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge, 1975), 554.12 Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, trans. David E. Green (Columbia, 1964), 244.

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aufheben and to illustrate concretely some of the ways my structural-functional approach

might augment further analysis.

190

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Hegel Werke (Suhrkamp) HWGesammelte Werke (Meiner) GWScience of Logic SLEncyclopedia ELPhenomenology of Spirit PSLectures on Fine Art LALectures on the History of Philosophy LHPCritique of Pure Reason CPR

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In addition, changes that I have made in the cited passages are indicated as follows:Emphasis Added EATranslation Modified TM

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