Hearing Transcript - 11 August 2003 Afternoon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 11 August 2003 Afternoon

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98

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. In tidying up the drafts.

3 A. It came through, as I recall, very quickly and had to be

4 turned round very quickly. Mark saw it, I saw it, but

5 it was a very rapid revision/review of the work that we6 had, in effect, completed a month and a half earlier,

7 around about 20th June.

8 Q. Perhaps after lunch I can come back to what you drafted

9 and what Dr Kelly drafted in May and June, and then the

10 detail of what you had in September.

11 A. Certainly.

12 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.

13 (1.00 pm)

14 (The short adjournment)

15 (2.00 pm)

16 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Lamb, I was asking you some questions

17 about the dossier. Can you look at CAB/3/82 which is

18 going to come up on your screen. This is the earliest

19 version of the dossier we have been given. It is dated

20 20th June 2002. If you look at the top, it says:

21 "1 document version, 20th June 2002."

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. That talks about the history of UN weapons inspections

24 in Iraq. Is that the document to which you referred

25 earlier this morning?

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1 A. Correct.2 Q. And that is the document that you had had input into and

3 you had reviewed with Dr Kelly?

4 A. Correct, yes.

5 Q. And if one goes, then, to the contents of the dossier as

6 published, which is DOS/1/56, it rather looks as if that

7 has become chapter 2, is that right?

8 A. Or part 2, yes.

9 Q. Sorry, part 2. You then did not draft anything further

10 of the dossier?

11 A. After the 20th June version you just put on the screen?

12 Q. Yes.13 A. No, that was the end of my personal involvement, direct

14 personal involvement with the dossier, correct.

15 Q. We have been given another dossier dated

16 5th September 2002; and that is CAB/3/7. Did you see

17 this document at all? If it scrolls right down so you

18 can see the top of the page, you can see someone has

19 written in handwriting, I do not know who,

20 "5th September 2002"; have you seen that document

21 before?

22 A. I honestly cannot recall whether I saw that specific

23 document.24 Q. Right. So did you review any dossiers in September?


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25 A. I personally simply oversaw or was made aware, excuse

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1 me, of our revision, that is to say the revision made by

2 my department to the historical element that referred to

3 the UNSCOM inspections. That was the part that came4 back to the Counter Proliferation Department for

5 revision as necessary on 9th September and which was

6 dealt with by my colleague, Mr Peters.

7 Q. When you were giving evidence earlier this morning you

8 also said you had had some earlier involvement in

9 chapter 3 of the dossier. Can we bring up DOS/1/56

10 which was the current position, I think you said?

11 A. Correct, yes.

12 Q. That is chapter 3 of part 1. The current position, 1998

13 to 2002. You had some involvement in drafting that?

14 A. Not in drafting it, but in some of the meetings in the

15 Cabinet Office at which that particular element of the

16 briefing papers were being discussed.

17 Q. Right. Do you know when those meetings were? Were

18 those before June 2002 or in September 2002?

19 A. No, those were much earlier. So they took place in,

20 I believe, February/March 2002.

21 Q. Right. Did Dr Kelly attend any of those meetings?

22 A. Dr Kelly attended no meetings in the Cabinet Office

23 relevant to this dossier.

24 Q. Right. Did you discuss what became chapter 3 with

25 Dr Kelly?

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1 A. Most certainly. Our relationship with Dr Kelly was

2 a very easy one, a very relaxed one; and when he came

3 into the department we would, as a matter of course,

4 show him and tell him where we were up to. We would

5 show him drafts if drafts were available and we would

6 discuss them with him. This was, as I say, on an

7 informal basis. He was keen to find out from us where

8 we were, and we were keen obviously to put things back

9 to him to use him as a sounding board and a source if

10 need be of information and confirmation of any facts.11 Q. Looking at the contents page, those bits of the chapter

12 that you, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, would

13 have discussed, if I can use that term, I hope fairly,

14 with Dr Kelly would be part 2, History of UN Weapons

15 Inspection and chapter 3, The Current Position; is that

16 right?

17 A. That would be correct. I would add, however, there is

18 also part 3, Iraq Under Saddam Hussein, which became

19 known, informally at least, to those of us involved in

20 the Cabinet Office meetings, as the human rights element

21 of the dossier. There we would have discussed that also22 with Dr Kelly. He had an extremely close knowledge of


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23 Iraq and a very close knowledge of the nature of the

24 regime. I am sure that we discussed that with him

25 informally. I believe also that he would have discussed

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1 that with the relevant department in the Foreign Office2 which took responsibility for drafting that particular

3 section, which was --

4 Q. Who is that department --

5 A. Excuse me, which was our Middle Eastern department.

6 Q. So he would have had direct discussions with them as

7 well?

8 A. He would have had discussions with them. We were a very

9 close-knit group of people who had all worked on this

10 issue for some time. He knew us all well. Indeed, the

11 colleague in the Middle Eastern Department who was

12 responsible and oversaw the human rights element, had

13 previously been in the Counter Proliferation Department

14 and therefore was very well known too.

15 Q. Are you able to share his name with us?

16 A. That is Dr Amanda Tanfield(?).

17 Q. Right. So we have looked at Iraq Under Saddam Hussein,

18 if one is looking at the contents page, part 3; History

19 of UN Weapons Inspections, part 2; part 1, chapter 3,

20 Current Position. Did you have anything to do with

21 either chapter 1, the Role of Intelligence, or chapter

22 2, Iraq's Programmes?

23 A. Not as I recall, no.

24 Q. Can I take you to some documents where he describes his25 role in the programme? The first document is MoD/1/19.

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1 That is a letter of 30th June 2003. He describes, in

2 the third paragraph:

3 "As you know I have been involved in writing three

4 'dossiers' concerning Iraq -- the 1999 UNSCOM/Butler

5 Status of Verification Report... "

6 Do you know anything about that?

7 A. I know it historically as a document, sir, and that

8 obviously marks a stage in the UNSCOM assessment of the9 situation in Iraq; but I would be unable to go into any

10 detail as to its contents.

11 Q. You did not know about his own involvement in that?

12 A. Not personally, no.

13 Q. Then he talks about the September 2002 International

14 Institute of Strategic Studies report which was the IISS

15 one. You no doubt have seen that document?

16 A. I have seen that document, yes.

17 Q. Then he talks about the UK Government's Iraq's weapons

18 of mass destruction report.

19 A. Correct.20 Q. He says:


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21 "My contributions to the latter [the UK

22 Government's] were in part 2", which I think accords

23 with your evidence. He talks about history of UN

24 inspections and part 1, chapter 2, Iraq's programmes

25 1971 to 1998 at the behest of the Foreign and

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1 Commonwealth Office, which I think you were saying he

2 was really dealing with in part 1, chapter 3. Perhaps

3 he dealt with other people?

4 A. No, in theory he would have dealt with my department in

5 that respect. Clearly, he would have had expertise in

6 that area and covering that length of time because of

7 his time spent in Iraq and the inspections he had

8 conducted there. I think it is fair to say that the way

9 in which the dossier came into being does not

10 necessarily reflect the earlier component parts of the

11 dossier.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. And, therefore, when I said that my involvement and the

14 involvement of my department was essentially on the

15 programmes 1998 to 2002, and the historical element,

16 that was, I believe, accurate. I can understand that

17 Dr Kelly may have felt and may have believed that to

18 some extent his contribution extended and to some extent

19 it did -- if that is to be fair. In the course of our

20 discussions clearly he would provide us with very, very

21 detailed historical background and information on --

22 Q. Which would have gone back before 1998?23 A. Which would have gone back before 1998. But I am not

24 aware personally of any discussions with him on issues

25 prior to the 1990s.

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1 Q. Can you look at a document CAB/1/74 which was, in fact,

2 written by Michael Jay who is the Permanent Under

3 Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth

4 Department.

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. In the penultimate paragraph. This is referring to7 David Kelly:

8 "I should add that the person concerned did have

9 a hand in producing Part 2 of the September dossier

10 [which I think accords with what you said] on the

11 history of UNSCOM inspections. Because of his

12 first-hand experience, he was invited to comment on the

13 first draft of that chapter. For the same reason he was

14 also asked to produce the first draft of the box on

15 page 38, entitled 'Inspection of Iraq's biological

16 weapons programme'."

17 That accords with your understanding as well, is18 that correct?


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19 A. Correct, yes.

20 LORD HUTTON: Can I just ask you Mr Lamb: on part 2 of

21 the September dossier Dr Kelly would have commented on

22 that, he did not actually write it, he commented on it,

23 but he actually wrote, did he, the first draft of the

24 box on page 38?25 A. He would have written what eventually became the first

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1 draft in the box on page 38, because when we prepared

2 our first draft in April 2002, we felt that it would be

3 helpful and indeed very instructive to set out some

4 background on the specific instances relating to Iraq's

5 biological weapons programme which was obviously

6 Dr Kelly's very particular area of expertise.

7 Therefore, he contributed that particular element. He

8 also contributed and helped with other elements that

9 figure now elsewhere in the document, in particular on

10 pages 11 and 12, that relate to the chemical weapons and

11 biological weapons agents developed by Iraq, their

12 lethality and so on; and obviously he acted as technical

13 adviser in that respect.

14 LORD HUTTON: Yes; but when you say "contributed", do you

15 mean that he made comments on a draft that you or

16 someone else had written or that he wrote it himself?

17 A. With respect to Iraq's biological weapons programme, he

18 wrote that himself.

19 LORD HUTTON: I see, yes. Thank you very much.

20 MR DINGEMANS: Do you know how many drafts of the dossier21 were produced?

22 A. No is the quick answer to that. I think the best way of

23 describing the process that I was involved in was very

24 much something that I would call a rolling text, that is

25 to say it is a text that is constantly under revision

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1 and under review; and therefore although versions of it

2 would be printed and possibly circulated, it was always

3 understood that it was a work in progress. And I think

4 that the document on the 20th June, dated 20th June,5 which you showed me was, as I say, as far as we were

6 concerned in the Counter Proliferation Department, the

7 conclusion of our direct and immediate input to the

8 dossier.

9 Q. So you finish on 20th June with that document signed off

10 that I have shown you at least the first page on. And

11 then you have nothing really further to do with it until

12 September; is that right?

13 A. That would be right, yes, indeed.

14 Q. Do you know what version of the dossier you saw and were

15 asked to comment on in September and when you commented16 on it?


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17 A. Yes, I do. As I think I said earlier, it was the

18 historical element. It was essentially part 2.

19 Q. Right.

20 A. That came back to us for possible revision. It was seen

21 by my colleague, Mr Peters, and dealt with by Mr Peters.

22 That was all that Dr Kelly saw in the Foreign Office of23 that particular 9th September document.

24 Q. 9th September. So that must have been the dossier which

25 we have dated 5th September, is that a fair inference?

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1 A. I think it is a fair inference, sir, yes.

2 Q. But you would not be able, without seeing the documents,

3 no doubt, to be able to compare them?

4 A. I think even if I saw the documents I might have

5 difficulty at this distance in retracing the steps. But

6 I think it is a fair inference that they are very

7 comparable.

8 Q. And that was a draft he commented on, on 9th September,

9 in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office?

10 A. He was shown it by my colleague Mr Peters --

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. -- on 9th September. So he saw that element which was,

13 in actual fact, very faithful to the element that we had

14 concluded with on 20th June, and very faithful to what

15 eventually appeared in the dossier.

16 Q. Right. Do you know what he said in relation to that

17 part of it on 9th September?

18 A. I do not directly; but I know of his comments and19 attitude throughout the period of the drafting of that

20 section, which was that he was very supportive of it, as

21 were we all. He felt that this was something that

22 needed to be set out. It needed to be set in context,

23 the nature of both the Iraqi programme and how the

24 Iraqis had gone to some considerable length to conceal

25 their programmes and also to deter and dissuade the

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1 earlier UNSCOM inspections. And so, for him, it was

2 very much something that was going to -- as we all hoped3 at that time, indeed as came to actual fruition --

4 ensure that UN inspectors went back into Iraq, as indeed

5 they did.

6 Q. Do you know anything about his e-mailed comment which we

7 can see at CAB/3/21? We are in the documents that came

8 to the Inquiry this weekend, where part of it has been

9 redacted for security purposes, but it says this:

10 "10th September 2002", it is sent to someone whose

11 name is blanked out.

12 "I have just spoken to David Kelly (ex UNSCOM BW and

13 cleared) about the growth media amount page 8 top para14 line 2. It states that UN inspectors could not account


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15 for up to 20 tonnes of growth media..."

16 Pausing there. Growth media is what you grow the

17 biological weapons with; is that right?

18 A. Correct, yes, sir.

19 Q. So if you want lots of anthrax, you buy lots of growth

20 media?21 A. Absolutely; and they did, indeed, purchase very large

22 quantities.

23 Q. Yes:

24 "In fact 2.456 tonnes was missing. UNSCOM could not

25 account for a further 15.457 tonnes which Iraq claimed

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1 it used in BW [biological weapons] work. But Iraq has

2 not revealed its production documents therefore this

3 amount is unaccounted for. The existing wording is not

4 wrong -- but it has a [then it is a] lost of spin on

5 it", that may be a typo for "lots of spin on it".

6 First of all, have you seen this e-mail before?

7 A. I did not see it contemporaneously, sir, however I did

8 see it at the latter end of last week, yes, before it

9 was provided to the Tribunal.

10 Q. Do you know whether it means -- whether it is a typo or

11 not -- whether it means lots of spin on it or a loss of

12 spin on it?

13 A. I really cannot comment. I am afraid I do not know.

14 LORD HUTTON: Or a lot of spin on it.

15 MR DINGEMANS: Yes. And do you know whether that reflected

16 Dr Kelly's views of the dossier at the time, that there17 was lots of spin on it?

18 A. No, sir, I do not believe it did reflect his views.

19 I can obviously only speak for my contacts with him,

20 which were extensive, right up through a large part of

21 the drafting into September and beyond; and as he said

22 to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 15th July, he was

23 very supportive of the dossier and very supportive of

24 the analysis put forward in the dossier.

25 So I do not believe, and I have asked my colleagues

1111 on this particular point because, clearly, it has become

2 a matter of very real interest and concern to us; but

3 none of them recall any occasion in the Foreign Office

4 in which he indicated he had any concern or questions or

5 scepticism about any element of the dossier.

6 Q. Right. Do you know when the -- can I call it this the

7 45 minute claim; if I say the 45 minute claim, would you

8 know what I was talking about? All right.

9 Do you know when the 45 minute claim was first

10 inserted into the dossier?

11 A. I do not, sir, in a way that would be accurate enough to12 answer your question. I think, however, that colleagues


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13 who are due to follow me will be able and be in a much

14 better position to answer that question.

15 Q. Because your involvement was really June and then this

16 review in September?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. And were you aware of any unhappiness in defence19 intelligence staff, DIS, at the time?

20 A. I was unaware of any unhappiness.

21 Q. Right. Do you know, apart from your chapter, which

22 I think you have said remained broadly consistent

23 throughout -- and we have your chapter, the

24 United Nations history and then we have the final

25 version so we will be able to make a textural

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1 analysis -- do you know whether any changes or other

2 transformations took place in the dossier in the weeks

3 leading up to publication or you simply were not shown

4 those?

5 A. I was not involved with that process. By that stage it

6 was being handled by my senior officials. I was not

7 involved. I was, in fact, on leave throughout much of

8 the month of August. But I was not at all closely

9 involved in any work on the dossier in September.

10 Q. Right. And I think you are very kindly going to come

11 back and assist us with other aspects of the story later

12 on; but is that all that you can help with on the

13 drafting of the dossier, from your point of view?

14 A. I believe that it is, sir, yes. As I say, if I could15 make one simple comment: we worked extremely well in

16 a very relaxed manner, a very happy manner in many

17 respects. It was not a labour of love, it was something

18 we thought was extremely important, continue to believe

19 to be extremely important. I am only very saddened that

20 that happy atmosphere has the shadow of Dr Kelly's death

21 hanging over it.

22 LORD HUTTON: Mr Lamb, you have said that there was

23 a decision by the Prime Minister on 3rd September to

24 publish the dossier; but do I take it that it had always

25 been contemplated from an earlier part of the year that

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1 the dossier might be published?

2 A. My Lord, I think that we had a working assumption that

3 we were preparing a document that would be published.

4 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

5 A. And in all the work that we did, that was very much the

6 focus and the criteria on which we based our work.

7 LORD HUTTON: Yes I see. Thank you very much.

8 A. I do not believe that was formally confirmed until the

9 Prime Minister's statement on the 3rd but I think we10 took that as a working assumption.


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11 LORD HUTTON: Now you referred to meetings in the Cabinet

12 Office and you said that Dr Kelly did not attend any of

13 them. Were those meetings of a particular committee?

14 Were they just a group of officials or was there a name

15 given to that committee?

16 A. I do not recall the specific name that was given to it17 but it was a group of officials who met to discuss this

18 text, to keep it under review. It was very much as

19 I said a rolling process and a rolling text, whereby

20 a meeting would take place, my contribution would have

21 been submitted, it would be criticised by that

22 committee, suggestions made, drafting suggestions

23 proposed, and as necessary, if the group felt that there

24 were other elements that were required, a letter would

25 follow to me instructing me to provide additional

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1 elements.

2 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

3 A. That is the manner in which we worked.

4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Were the members of that group

5 officials, what, from the Foreign and Commonwealth

6 Office, from the Ministry of Defence, from the Cabinet

7 Office?

8 A. There were officials taken from all the relevant

9 departments, certainly the Foreign Office, the Ministry

10 of Defence, I believe defence and intelligence staff and

11 possibly from the agencies but I do not specifically

12 recall that.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes. When would have been the last of those

14 meetings which you would have attended?

15 A. I have documents that commissioned work for me in the

16 course of May and I obviously responded to those in the

17 course of May. The final text, as I saw it on 20th June

18 I would imagine that the last meeting must have taken

19 place in June of 2002.

20 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

21 A. However, the Cabinet Office can obviously confirm that.

22 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. There is a reference to I think

23 the assessment committee that advises the JIC. Were any24 members of the assessment committee in the group that

25 met?

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1 A. The assessment staff, sorry, I omitted that. The

2 assessment staff would be present at all of these

3 meetings.

4 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Mr Lamb.

5 I understand you are going to be good enough to come

6 back at a later stage. Thank you very much for helping

7 us today. I am most grateful.8 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Howard, please.


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7 when I read it there was one phrase in there that I read

8 as being a 'Kelly' statement..."

9 He talks about that. He also dealt with his

10 involvement in the dossier at MoD/1/47, at paragraph 5

11 at the top, you can see this. This is an interview that

12 is being conducted that we will come back to and look at13 in sequence. Just so that you know, it is on 7th July:

14 "Hatfield asked Kelly to describe in detail his

15 involvement in the Government's dossier of September

16 2002. Kelly said that to his recollection the idea of

17 a dossier arose in April 2002. He had drafted his

18 contributions during May and June. He then recalled

19 that the subject went into limbo. He was on leave for

20 two weeks in August and then on duty in New York and

21 consequently was not involved in any work during that

22 month. His only subsequent involvement was when he was

23 asked by DIS (in September) to look at the passages on

24 biological weapons and consider whether anything extra

25 could be added. He had suggested including a discussion

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1 of Smallpox, but that was subsequently rejected on the

2 grounds of there being inadequate intelligence. That

3 was the sum of his involvement. Howard asked if he had

4 contacted in order to check textural amendments".

5 That is you asking the question?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "Kelly replied that he had not. Howard also asked if

8 Kelly had discussed the dossier with DIS staff. Kelly9 replied that he could not recall any in depth

10 discussion. He recalled that there had not in any case

11 been much discussion of the dossier at the time."

12 Does that accord with what you have been able to

13 discover about Dr Kelly's involvement?

14 A. I think it is consistent with what I have been able to

15 discover. What we discovered was that aside from the

16 e-mail which we referred to or which you referred to in

17 the previous session, there was a meeting -- well,

18 meeting is probably too strong a word. There was an

19 informal discussion in the DIS we think held on20 19th September at which Dr Kelly was present, and this

21 was a hurriedly convened meeting just to sort of go over

22 the then latest draft of the dossier which I think is

23 the draft of 19th September.

24 Dr Kelly, at that meeting, according to those

25 present who I have been able to consult, confined his

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1 comments to the historical part of the dossier. There

2 is no recollection on any of their parts about whether

3 or not he raised smallpox or not but it is possible he4 could have raised it at that meeting.


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5 Q. At this stage you obviously were not involved?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Can I just pick up two further references to what he was

8 doing on official documentation? These were his staff

9 assessment to March 2003, it is MoD/3/16 at paragraph 2.

10 This is April 2002 to March 2003. This was a document11 that we just got. But at paragraph 2 it says this:

12 "Objective: Support to Non Proliferation

13 Department/Middle East Department, Foreign and

14 Commonwealth Office.

15 "To continue to provide advice on Iraq and its WMD

16 capability based on knowledge and experience.

17 "Comment: David has provided excellent authoritative

18 and timely advice to the FCO on all aspects of Iraqi

19 WMD, he is recognised internationally as an expert."

20 That obviously picks up Mr Lamb's involvement?

21 A. Yes. Hmm, hmm.

22 Q. At 18, MoD/3/18, in part C, I suspect this is Dr Wells'

23 assessment in the second paragraph:

24 "David Kelly is a recognised authority on all

25 aspects of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. As such

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1 his advice and input have been in high demand across

2 various Government departments during the last year.

3 David's advice has helped formulate UK policy with

4 respect to Iraqi WMD. David couples a deep technical

5 knowledge with political awareness which enables him to

6 operate in what is a high profile and politically7 sensitive area."

8 That is all that there is in the staff review, but

9 it is certainly suggesting, so far as the Ministry of

10 Defence were concerned, that he was still providing

11 advice on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

12 A. That is right, yes.

13 Q. Do you know how many drafts of the dossier were

14 produced?

15 A. No, I am afraid I do not. I was not directly involved

16 at the time. There were several. It was an iterative

17 process. I believe there was contact between the18 Cabinet Office, who were in overall charge of the

19 drafting, and organisations such as the DIS and others

20 almost on a daily basis. So I cannot precisely say how

21 many drafts there were.

22 Q. Because we have a number of drafts that appear to have

23 been circulated. First of all, can I take you to the

24 document which was produced on 20th June 2002. That is

25 CAB/3/82. Just to the first page of that.

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1 This is the one document version, 20th June 2002.2 Did you see this document at all? What were you doing


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3 at the time before you became DCDI?

4 A. I was the director general of corporate communications

5 in the MoD.

6 Q. So did you, in that capacity, have any involvement in

7 the dossier?

8 A. Very little. I think I recall having seen a draft of9 part of a possible dossier, possibly at around about

10 that time or maybe earlier, but I really cannot recall

11 in any detail. I was not directly involved.

12 Q. The next draft that we have been provided with is dated

13 5th September 2002. That is CAB/3/7. We only have, as

14 it were, the little manuscript writing at the top

15 right-hand corner which gives us the date of

16 5th September 2002.

17 The final draft we have is at CAB/3/22. That

18 appears to be dated 19th September 2002. Do you know

19 whether or not those represent all the drafts that were

20 produced?

21 A. I am sure they do not represent all the drafts. There

22 were certainly others produced. I believe one, for

23 example, was produced on 15th September. And there will

24 probably have been others as well. That is only what

25 I have been able to discover since I have been in this

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1 job.

2 Q. Right. And there is going to be no reason why we cannot

3 look at those drafts?

4 A. Well, that is not my responsibility.5 Q. No. Do you know when -- if I say the 45 minute claim,

6 to use shorthand, you do not need me to show you where

7 it is made in the original dossier, you know what I am

8 talking about?

9 A. I know what you mean, yes.

10 Q. Do you know when the 45 minute claim was first made in

11 any draft dossiers?

12 A. I do not know when it appeared in a draft dossier.

13 I know that the date of the intelligence was

14 30th August 2003.

15 Q. You said 2003.16 A. Sorry, 2002, I apologise. And I know that it was

17 reflected in a JIC assessment on 9th September but --

18 Q. Can I stop you there, because you may be able to explain

19 a reference. MoD/4/9, this is a document that we will

20 come back to, if I may, but do you see "45 minutes"?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Is this a document that you produced?

23 A. No, that was produced by the Cabinet Office assessment

24 staff.

25 Q. Right. Do you know when that was produced? It appears

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1 on the bottom to be 17th July 2003.

2 A. Certainly at around about that time, yes.

3 Q. And what it says in relation to 45 minutes is this:

4 "Concerns related to the level of certainty

5 expressed in the foreword and executive summary. By

6 this stage in the drafting process, following7 consultation with the DIS, the main text said:

8 'intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able

9 to deploy chemical or biological weapons within

10 45 minutes of an order to do so'. This reflected the

11 language in the 9th September JIC paper. The executive

12 summary expressed the point differently, as a judgement.

13 The personnel concerned did not share this judgement.

14 But it was agreed by the JIC."

15 The 9th September JIC paper is the document you have

16 just referred to, is that right?

17 A. Yes, that is right.

18 Q. So that was picking up the intelligence you say was

19 dated 30th August?

20 A. That is right.

21 Q. And it gets into the 9th September JIC paper?


23 Q. But the 9th September JIC paper is not a draft of the

24 dossier?


124

1 Q. Because the 5th September draft of the dossier, that

2 does not appear to have anything relating to the3 45 minutes in, but the 9th September does?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. That is your understanding, that the first reference to

6 45 minutes is in the 9th September JIC paper?

7 A. As I understand it, in terms of a completed intelligence

8 assessment, it would have been in that one, as

9 I understand it.

10 Q. Can I also just confirm this: as far as Dr Kelly's

11 security clearance, we heard this morning that that was

12 at the highest level, subject to a need to know basis.

13 But anything involving the dossier and its relationship14 with Iraqi weapons of mass destruction he would have

15 been cleared to see; is that right?

16 A. Almost certainly. I think that there was some

17 intelligence which was finally reflected in the dossier

18 which was compartmented and restricted to a very few

19 individuals, and that would not have included Dr Kelly;

20 but the majority of material which was reflected in the

21 dossier, he would have been cleared to see. He may not

22 necessarily have seen it but he would have had the --

23 Q. But he would have been cleared to see it?

24 A. That is right.25 Q. It has been said, on various broadcasts and


15/34

125

1 publications, that Dr Kelly told journalists that the

2 45 minute claim was added in the week before publication

3 and that it was single sourced where most other material

4 was double sourced. Can you first of all confirm with5 me whether or not the material was single sourced rather

6 than double sourced?

7 A. It came from a single source, a well established and

8 reliable source we have reported before on other issues.

9 Q. I think there have been various Government notices about

10 that and those Government notices have disclosed to the

11 public that he is said to have been an Iraqi military

12 officer; is that right?

13 A. As I understand it.

14 Q. So it was single source. The other claim it is said

15 that Dr Kelly made was that the 45 minute claim was

16 added in the week before publication. I have shown you

17 the 5th September dossier, not the whole of it, and

18 I have shown you the 19th September dossier. Do you

19 know whether or not that claim, if it was made, was

20 true?

21 A. I cannot say for certain. As you say, it was not in the

22 5th September dossier. That does not surprise me if the

23 intelligence was only dated 30th August. It would have

24 taken some analysis to decide how it fitted and what

25 else we ought to include. I think that it would

1261 probably have appeared in a version of the dossier which

2 preceded the 19th. As I recall -- again I have not been

3 able to check this -- as I recall, it probably appeared

4 in a version dated 15th September but others will be

5 better placed to give you a more authoritative answer on

6 that.

7 Q. It has been said in broadcasts that Dr Kelly suggested

8 to journalists that Downing Street knew that the claim

9 was wrong before it was broadcast. If he said that, was

10 that right?

11 A. No.12 Q. It has been said that Dr Kelly told journalists that the

13 transformation in the week before publication came about

14 because of Mr Campbell. If he said that, was that

15 right?

16 A. To the best of my knowledge, no.

17 Q. Can you help us with what meetings took place in

18 September? As I understand it, there was quite a lot of

19 activity running up to June 2002. In fact, we have seen

20 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office production in

21 June 2002. It seems that not much drafting went on over

22 the summer months; is that right?23 A. I do not have first hand knowledge of that; but that


16/34

24 certainly accords with the account that other people

25 have given me.

127

1 Q. Right. Then things seem to have started up again in

2 September. As far as you were concerned, do you know3 what involvement, if any, Mr Campbell had in relation to

4 the dossier?

5 A. I have no detailed knowledge. Mr Campbell chaired the

6 Iraq Communications Group which --

7 Q. Can you just stop there and tell me what the Iraq

8 Communications Group is?

9 A. That was an interdepartmental group of mainly directors

10 of communication, essentially to look at how the

11 Government's policy on Iraq as a whole should be

12 communicated through the media to the public.

13 Q. Where did that take place? That took place in No. 10,

14 did it?

15 A. Yes, it did.

16 Q. In fact, you, at the time, I think you have told us were

17 Ministry of Defence Communications --


19 Q. So you were on the --

20 A. I attended some of those meetings, yes.

21 Q. But some of them you managed to avoid and sent a deputy?

22 A. Indeed.

23 LORD HUTTON: Who chaired those meetings?

24 A. Alastair Campbell.

25 MR DINGEMANS: And did you attend the meetings that he

128

1 chaired in September 2002?

2 A. I am almost certain on 5th and 9th September I did not.

3 I checked on my diary for my previous job and there is

4 no record of my having attended them and I do not recall

5 having attended them.

6 Q. So you do not know what discussions would have taken

7 place at that group, relating to the dossier?

8 A. No, I am afraid not.

9 Q. There is reference to other meetings which took place,10 and we are going to hear about this from Mr Miller, on

11 9th and 17th September 2002; but you would not have

12 known about those either, is that right? Or you knew

13 about them?

14 A. I think these were the meetings that were held in the

15 assessment staff where members of the DIS attended.

16 I certainly would not have known about them at the time;

17 I am obviously aware of them now.

18 Q. Right. So at the time you did not know in relation to

19 that?

20 A. No.21 Q. Do you know or have you been able to find out what


17/34

22 Dr Kelly's involvement was in September 2002 with the

23 DIS?

24 A. I have only been able to identify two occasions. One

25 was when his views on growth media were recorded in an

1291 e-mail sent --

2 Q. Can I take you to that e-mail?

3 A. Certainly.

4 Q. It may help. CAB/3/21. This is the e-mail to which you

5 refer, is it?

6 A. That is right, yes.

7 Q. And I read it out before. Do you know how Dr Kelly came

8 to be making this comment? Someone must have shown him

9 a draft of the dossier.

10 A. I think that is very probable. I have actually spoken

11 to the individual concerned and I think on this

12 particular instance it sounds like the individual rang

13 Dr Kelly up with this line and just asked for a view.

14 But I do not know -- it is very possible he was shown

15 a copy of the dossier at that time, and the presumption

16 is that it was the dossier dated 5th September or that

17 draft that he saw.

18 Q. You spoke to the person who sent the e-mail or produced

19 the e-mail?

20 A. Produced the e-mail.

21 Q. Can you help us with the bottom lines?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you know what he intended to type?24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Because as it is typed, it obviously makes no sense.

130

1 A. I am sure what he meant to type was "it had a lot of

2 spin on it".

3 Q. And the "s" just got in it?

4 A. Yes, I believe so.

5 Q. Was that a view that was held by members of the DIS at

6 the time?

7 A. Perhaps I could just say something about this.8 Q. Yes, of course.

9 A. Because I did speak to the individual concerned and~--

10 Q. I understand you have redacted his details?

11 A. Indeed, yes. What he told me was this was an area where

12 you are trying to account for something that has not

13 been found. Where lots of different figures are around,

14 all of them in different ways are correct and it was

15 that where he meant to use the phrase "a lot of spin on

16 it". I think it is important, he also wanted to make

17 the point to me, and he explicitly did this unprompted,

18 that this was his view, not David Kelly's view.19 Q. So this was the person who sent the e-mail's view that


18/34

20 there was spin on it?

21 A. He used a phrase --

22 Q. Which has all sorts of dreadful connotations?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. That was his phrase rather than Dr Kelly's phrase?

25 A. Yes, that is what he told me.

131

1 Q. I had asked you also whether or not there were persons

2 in the DIS who were, broadly speaking, unhappy with the

3 direction of the dossier.

4 A. Hmm.

5 Q. Can you assist me at all in relation to that?

6 A. Yes. Again, this is not first hand knowledge but what

7 I have discovered since I have been in this post. At

8 the time the dossier was produced there was a very wide

9 variety of views on different parts of the dossier and

10 the language that was used in it. They were not

11 differences of view about whether intelligence should be

12 included or not, it was more about how the intelligence

13 was described or how it should be interpreted. It was,

14 for example, the difference between saying "intelligence

15 suggests, "intelligence shows, "intelligence indicates".

16 These meanings have quite a lot of -- you know, to

17 intelligence analysts they are quite important

18 distinctions.

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. I should say this sort of debate is quite normal and is

21 the sort of debate that we encourage all the time in the22 intelligence world. The process of intelligence

23 assessment, to be valuable, is something where different

24 viewpoints have to be reconciled and an element of

25 judgment applied. That is certainly what happened here.

132

1 At the end, towards the end of that process, two

2 individuals expressed concerns about some specific

3 language in the dossier to their line manager. That was

4 fully aired within the DIS; and those views were taken

5 into account before the Joint Intelligence Committee6 finally met to review the final text and approve it.

7 The Joint Intelligence Committee includes both the Chief

8 of Defence Intelligence and his deputy.

9 LORD HUTTON: Can I ask you: the views had been expressed in

10 the DIS but those views were then actually passed on to

11 the JIC; is that right?

12 A. I think that they were certainly passed on to the Chief

13 of Defence Intelligence and his deputy, who sit on the

14 JIC.


16 A. Whether every single view of every single DIS analyst17 was passed on I think that is unlikely, my Lord.


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18 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see.

19 MR DINGEMANS: Can we go back to MoD/4/9 where I think in

20 the document produced on 17th July 2003 it was said that

21 concerns fell into three groups.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. First of all can you help me with this document?24 A. Yes.

25 Q. I have it as Annex A.

133

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. I think you told us this was a briefing note, is that

3 right?

4 A. It is Annex A to a briefing note, it is attached to

5 a briefing note.

6 Q. Who produced Annex A?

7 A. The Cabinet Office assessment staff.

8 Q. Is that the JIC?

9 A. They service the JIC, they support the Joint

10 Intelligence Committee.

11 Q. It was said that concerns fell into three areas:

12 "Recent production of CBW agent."

13 As I think you indicated there was a concern about:

14 "...language in the dossier was too strong on the

15 continued production of chemical and biological agents.

16 These concerns related to the foreword, executive

17 summary and main text.

18 "The language in the dossier was stronger on this

19 issue than it had been in the 9th September JIC20 assessment. This reflected the arrival of further,

21 corroborative intelligence on 11th (and 23rd) September.

22 Because of its sensitivity, this had not been seen by

23 the personnel concerned (as they acknowledged)."

24 The 45 minutes I have read.

25 "Saddam and the importance of CBW.

134

1 "The DIS personnel did not agree that intelligence

2 'shows' Saddam attached great importance to possessing

3 weapons of mass destruction. They judged it only4 'indicated' this."

5 A. Hmm, hmm.

6 Q. That is because, I think you have told us, that persons

7 involved with intelligence are very careful with their

8 use of language?

9 A. That is right.

10 LORD HUTTON: To quite a lot of lay persons the distinction

11 between "shows" and "indicates" is an extremely fine

12 one.

13 A. Well, it is relatively fine; but it is important to

14 intelligence analysts.15 LORD HUTTON: In intelligence matters, yes.


20/34


21/34

14 him personally.

15 Q. And just for the sake of completeness, and so that it is

16 clear what your response was, can we turn to MoD/4/12,

17 where -- I hope I summarise this accurately -- you are

18 entirely happy that he has written, entirely happy that

19 he has done the right thing, but there was no question20 of any wrongful conduct?

21 A. Absolutely.

22 Q. Right. Mr Howard, I understand that you are also very

23 kindly going to come back and assist us with matters

24 later on in the chronology; but is that all that you can

25 help us with on the chronology?

137

1 A. On the involvement of Dr Kelly in --

2 Q. Sorry, yes, in the dossier.

3 A. I believe that is, yes.

4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Mr Howard, at the meeting on

5 19th September that Dr Kelly attended, would there have

6 been a discussion of the entire dossier as it then stood

7 at that meeting? I mean the whole dossier would have

8 been there to be discussed?

9 A. Yes.

10 LORD HUTTON: And would it have been a fairly lengthy

11 discussion? Might it have gone on for an hour or

12 longer? I appreciate it is hard for you to say.

13 A. It is very hard to say. I would guess that sort of time

14 would be right. I have looked at the comments that were

15 sent by the DIS to the Cabinet Office assessment staff16 on the 19th which I think reflect that meeting, and

17 there are I think three or four pages of comments. That

18 implies a reasonably lengthy meeting. So I think an

19 hour would be a reasonable guess, my Lord.

20 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Now, on a more general point, when the

21 dossier refers to weapons of mass destruction, would

22 that include artillery shells that might have been

23 loaded with gas? When one thinks of weapons of mass

24 destruction one tends to think of missiles that have

25 a range of 200 or 300 miles. But the term includes

138

1 artillery shells?

2 A. It certainly does, yes, that are filled with chemical

3 weapons or biological weapons.

4 LORD HUTTON: But with some sort of chemical or biological

5 factors; yes?

6 A. Yes, my Lord.

7 LORD HUTTON: When the dossier refers -- I think there are

8 four references. In the foreword by the Prime Minister

9 there is a reference to "military planning allows for

10 some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an11 order to use them"; but then the other three references


22/34

12 in the dossier refer to these weapons being "deployable

13 within 45 minutes". To your mind what does the word

14 "deployable" convey?

15 A. It conveys to me movement from fort storage areas to

16 units so that they could be used. There are various

17 ways of interpreting it. That is my interpretation.18 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Your interpretation would not

19 necessarily include their actual firing, then?

20 A. Well, having been deployed with the units, they would be

21 ready for firing straight away, as soon as the order

22 came. I think that would be the distinction.

23 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes. Yes. Thank you very much

24 Mr Howard. Your assistance has been helpful. I am

25 grateful.

139

1 A. Thank you.

2 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, if you were intending to have

3 a short break, before the next witness may be a good

4 time.

5 LORD HUTTON: Yes indeed.

6 (3.00 pm)

7 (Short Break)

8 (3.05 pm)

9 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Miller, please.

10 MR JULIAN MILLER (called)

11 Examined by MR DINGEMANS

12 Q. Could you give his Lordship your full name.

13 A. Julian Alexander Miller.14 Q. What is your occupation?

15 A. I am the chief of the assessment staff in Cabinet

16 Office.

17 Q. What does the assessment staff do?

18 A. It is a body responsible to the chairman of the Joint

19 Intelligence Committee. It provides principally

20 classified assessments for the Joint Intelligence

21 Committee and senior Whitehall customers. In doing its

22 business it draws on classified material from the

23 intelligence agencies as well as diplomatic and open

24 source reporting.25 Q. So you report up to the Joint Intelligence Committee?

140

1 A. That is right.

2 Q. Perhaps you can just help us with a brief description of

3 what that body does.

4 A. It is a body which brings together the chiefs of the

5 intelligence and security agencies with senior policy

6 makers in Whitehall, particularly from the Foreign

7 Office, Ministry of Defence, other interested

8 departments. It is a Cabinet Office committee chaired9 by John Scarlett, it meets once a week and provides


23/34

10 papers, assessments for officers and senior policy

11 makers in Whitehall dealing with a full range of foreign

12 security policy issues.

13 Q. You have told us often they meet, the JIC. How often do

14 you meet?

15 A. I do not have a body of my own that meets. I have16 a staff of about 30 people that sits in the Cabinet

17 Office and provides intelligence assessments, which are

18 then either issued in their own right or put to the

19 Joint Intelligence Committee for approval.

20 Q. And were you in your current position at the time that

21 the dossier was being produced last year?

22 A. Yes I was.

23 Q. Do you know how many drafts of the dossier were

24 produced?

25 A. The drafting process was a little complicated. As we

141

1 have heard, there was some work initiated in February

2 and March which had in mind the possibility of

3 publication. Towards the end of March, we reached

4 a stage where the element of that which I was working

5 on, which was to do with Iraq's weapons of mass

6 destruction, was potentially ready for publication. The

7 decision was taken not to go ahead and publish it. That

8 piece of work was then kept on the stocks if you like

9 and updated over the spring and summer.

10 Q. Why was it not published then?

11 A. I am not sure what the reason was.12 Q. Not your decision?

13 A. Not our decision.

14 Q. There were other documents which were being produced

15 which subsequently got tied up in the dossier?

16 A. Yes, there were --

17 Q. I think we have heard of the history of United Nations

18 inspections.

19 A. There was work on that. There was also a paper produced

20 on Saddam's regime, if you like, and the human rights

21 efforts. You have talked in earlier sessions about the

22 document on weapons inspections, dated 20th June; and,23 by that stage, there were three separate papers: that

24 one, a paper on human rights and a paper on weapons of

25 mass destruction. So those sat, if you like, as three

142

1 separate elements which could have been considered

2 a dossier which could have been handled individually.

3 Q. Can I just ask for DOS/1/56 which I hope is the contents

4 page of the dossier as published -- a sad life one

5 leads. If you look at part 1, part 2 and part 3. So

6 part 3 you say was the human rights, I think it had the7 shorthand?


24/34


9 Q. Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Then history of weapons

10 inspection under part 2, we know where that came from

11 because Mr Lamb has helped us with that.

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. What were you doing? You were doing part 1, generally,14 were you?

15 A. Yes, by June we had produced text which, I suppose,

16 broadly covered chapters 2 and 3 of part 1.

17 Q. We know that chapter 3 had at least been seen in draft

18 by Dr Kelly at about June time. I think that was

19 Mr Lamb's~--

20 A. I had understood he had seen part 2, I was not clear

21 whether he had seen part 3.

22 Q. Maybe I have misrecollected his evidence, but he had

23 seen part of your production?

24 A. Yes, that is my understanding. I have no direct

25 knowledge of that.

143

1 Q. You have no direct knowledge of what Dr Kelly had or had

2 not seen; is that right?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Did you know of Dr Kelly at this stage?

5 A. No, I did not.

6 Q. And where was the part 1 being produced, the weapons of

7 mass destruction chapter, as it were?

8 A. That was being produced in the assessment staff, my unit

9 in the Cabinet Office --10 Q. Yes.

11 A. -- in cooperation with the intelligence agencies and the

12 DIS.

13 Q. So the DIS would have reported up to you and you would

14 then have used some of their material?

15 A. I do not think I characterised it as reporting up. We

16 worked with them and we led the drafting process.

17 Q. Is it a fair impression that by June 2002 you are

18 reasonably well advanced in the sense that you have what

19 looks like part 1, part 2 and part 3 or the beginnings

20 of those and then not really much happens until21 September again, is that right? You are probably in the

22 best position to help us.

23 A. Well I did not really have much to do with what became

24 part 2 and part 3 at that stage. They were being

25 handled by the authors of those sections. What became

144

1 part 1, we had a text which evolved into part 1.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. Between June and the beginning of September we kept that

4 text updated as new intelligence arrived; and we, if you5 like, had a rolling version of that text over the summer


25/34

6 against the possibility that it might need to be

7 published at a later stage.

8 Q. Right. Then I think, as a matter of chronology, the

9 Prime Minister announced on 3rd September something

10 would be published.

11 A. Correct.12 Q. So, as a matter of reality, is this right: there was

13 then a lot more work done tidying it up for publication?

14 A. Yes, that is certainly correct. There was also

15 a decision taken to slightly expand the basis of the

16 document to say more about the role of intelligence, to

17 try to be more explicit about what intelligence told us

18 of Saddam's programmes.

19 Q. Do you know who was responsible for thinking that ought

20 to go into the dossier?

21 A. The general handling of the dossier was discussed at the

22 meeting which we have heard about on 5th September and

23 again 9th September.

24 Q. That was, I hope my memory is right, the No. 10 sort of

25 Iraq weapons communication group et cetera, was it?

145

1 A. Yes, that is right. I am not sure if it had a title at

2 that stage but it was a group of people who met in

3 No. 10 and decided how to handle the presentation of the

4 material.

5 Q. That was, I think we have heard from Mr Howard, although

6 he was not present at them, chaired by Mr Campbell?

7 A. Correct.8 Q. And with the communications officers for the respective

9 departments?

10 A. I am not sure whether it had the communications officers

11 for the respective departments or not. It had

12 representatives of departments and of the Cabinet Office

13 there.

14 LORD HUTTON: Were you present at either of those meetings?

15 A. I was present at the meeting on 5th September, my Lord.

16 MR DINGEMANS: Are you able to tell us what was discussed on

17 5th September?

18 A. My recollection is not very precise but it was to do19 with the need to look at the material we had, the need

20 to take account of how the public debate had moved on

21 over the summer, the extent to which public knowledge

22 and awareness of Iraq's capabilities had increased, to

23 decide what sort of material we should be covering in

24 terms of human rights and the history, and to talk about

25 how best to brigade the material that was already on the

146

1 stocks. It also started to talk about who should do

2 what and to allocate responsibility.3 Q. Do you know whether minutes of the 5th September or


26/34

4 indeed 9th September meeting are available?

5 A. I am afraid I do not know.

6 Q. But you were there on 5th September. So it was decided

7 at that meeting, I hope I put this fairly, that the

8 dossier was going to be expanded to deal with some areas

9 that the drafts did not deal with?10 A. It was to be expanded to be more detailed, I think is

11 how I put it.

12 Q. Right; and to have this explicit chapter which if we go

13 back to DOS/1/56 you can see relating to the role of

14 intelligence?

15 A. I do not think the specific decision to have that

16 chapter was taken on 5th September.

17 Q. Right. Now, we have three drafts of the dossier, which

18 I think you have seen on the screen?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. So if it is all right I will not go through the process.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. 20th June, 5th September, 19th September?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Have you seen any other drafts?

25 A. Yes.

147

1 Q. Right. And I think you said you thought there was one

2 on 15th September, was that you --

3 A. That was Martin Howard.

4 Q. Oh, Martin Howard thought there was one?

5 A. Can I say first of all about the draft of 20th June, and6 indeed 5th September, neither of those were, if you

7 like, complete elements, or complete in themselves. The

8 one on 20th June, if I understood the document you

9 showed us, was the material on the history of WMD

10 inspections. The document you showed us dated

11 5th September was, I think, the document for which my

12 team was responsible, dealing with Iraq's WMD

13 programmes.

14 Q. Right.

15 A. At both stages there was other material also on the

16 stocks, dealing with the other elements that we have17 discussed.

18 Q. So they were not at that stage complete dossiers, they

19 were only chapters of it, effectively?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. But if you had the draft or were responsible for the

22 draft dated 5th September, that, when the dossier was

23 finally published, included in that part of the dossier

24 the 45 minute claim?


1481 Q. Do you mind me using the shorthand?


27/34

2 A. No, no.

3 Q. Right, the 45 minute claim.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So it was not in the dossier on 5th September. Do you

6 know when it was added to the dossier?

7 A. Yes. It was added to the dossier immediately after it8 was included in the JIC assessment which Martin Howard

9 has referred to of 9th September. So it was in

10 a version of the dossier which we produced for working

11 purposes on 10th or 11th September.

12 Q. Right. Would it be possible, perhaps, to have a copy of

13 the first draft which had the 45 minute claim in it?

14 A. I am sure it would.

15 Q. Would Dr Kelly have seen any of these drafts?

16 A. I have no direct knowledge of what Dr Kelly saw beyond

17 the fact that on 10th September my staff received the

18 e-mail which you have shown earlier, which included

19 a comment on a specific point of historical fact from

20 Dr Kelly.

21 Q. Before I ask you a bit about the 45 minute claim, can

22 I just show you what Dr Kelly said to the Intelligence

23 and Security Committee at ISC/1/26. I am afraid we have

24 just got two lines at the bottom of that before we have

25 to go on to ISC/1/27. Mr Arbuthnot:

149

1 "45 minutes then you felt -- it was unwise to put it

2 in, is that right?"

3 Then if we go to 27, Dr Kelly said this:4 "I mean looking backwards, yes, I wasn't involved in

5 the actual inclusion of it or the information that was

6 there.

7 "Question: Had you seen any" -- now there has been

8 some tidying up of this transcript to ensure that

9 confidences are still proposed -- "intelligence material

10 to back it up?

11 "Answer: I'd seen no intelligence material relevant

12 to that topic whatsoever.

13 "Question: Have you since then seen any

14 intelligence material about that?15 "Answer: No."

16 Does that accord with your understanding that he had

17 not seen any intelligence material relating to the

18 45 minute claim?

19 A. I do not really have an understanding one way or the

20 other, I am afraid, on what Dr Kelly did or did not see.

21 Q. Were you aware of any unhappiness amongst DIS personnel

22 relating to the dossier at the time in September 2002?

23 A. No, I was not, and we had discussions with all the

24 interested people including the DIS; and they raised

25 a number of points with us. In the way we normally


28/34


29/34

25 He was asked a similar question about the DIS and said

152

1 that this was a matter for the defence secretary and

2 that he would pass this point on to MoD."

3 Then you can see from paragraph 5:4 "At the time of dossier, the DIS, like the rest of

5 the intelligence community, was heavily involved in

6 commenting and contributing to successive drafts of what

7 became the dossier published in September 2002. These

8 discussions were very complex and detailed right up to

9 the last minute. As an example, I attach some 6 pages

10 of working level comments which were passed by the DIS

11 to the assessments staff on 17th September. In the

12 course of this debate two individuals in DIST ..."

13 What is DIST? I know what DIS is.

14 A. I think it is the technical directorate of the DIS but

15 I am not absolutely confident.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 "... (one of whom is still in post and one of whom

18 has retired) raised in writing some specific concerns

19 about the precise wording on issues relevant to their

20 areas of expertise. These did not raise objections to

21 the use of material but were more about the description

22 to be used (intelligence shows, indicates or suggests)

23 [the wording I think everyone has spoken about].

24 I attach copies of the relevant minutes."

25 Were you aware, for example, of that level of

153

1 concern or comment?

2 A. At the time that we were preparing the dossier, I was

3 not. Perhaps for completeness I should say that in the

4 course of the discussions with the DIS the question was

5 raised about whether the 45 minutes material supported

6 the use of the word "judgment" as against "indication"

7 or "suggestion". Our view was that because it fitted

8 with other intelligence we had about Iraq's existing

9 command and control arrangements that it did support

10 that, the use of that word.11 Q. Yes.

12 A. That was then included in the draft of the dossier which

13 was circulated on 19th September, which I think you

14 have; and the subsequent comments we had on that draft

15 did not question that language. So we regarded that as

16 a point which had been aired and satisfactorily settled.

17 Q. Resolved, as it were?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Can I take you to the points raised on 19th September?

20 This is a document CAB/3/79. Parts of it, again, have

21 been redacted for obvious reasons. This is headed22 "Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Dossier -- Comments


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21 15th September, you have just explained why that means

22 19th September.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can I take you to CAB/3/80? If we look at the third

25 paragraph down which has "Page 11, Para 3" first bullet,

156

1 then it is:

2 "Amend to '2,390 litres of aflatoxin'".

3 Then if you look three below that, you have:

4 "Page 16 ... Bullet;

5 "Amend to '4.6 tonnes of growth media'".

6 Then the penultimate entry:

7 "Amend sentence to read 'UNSCOM established that in

8 1987 Iraq considered the use of mobile BW production

9 facilities. In the past ...'"

10 Then the reason for the change, that UNSCOM did not

11 establish that Iraq was planning to conceal from the

12 inspectors the capability to produce agents.

13 Doing the best I could, knowing what has been

14 published against Dr Kelly's background and reading

15 these documents that came in over the weekend, it seems

16 that those are comments that may have been made by

17 Dr Kelly. Are you able to help us with what

18 contributions, if any, he made on 19th September?

19 A. I am afraid I am not. I understand from recent

20 conversations with the DIS that they believe that he

21 did, through discussion with their people, contribute to

22 these comments but I do not know which comments came23 from him.

24 Q. No. You, I suppose for similar reasons, are unlikely to

25 know whether or not he was aware of any concerns that

157

1 might have been expressed within DIS about drafting of

2 the dossier?

3 A. I am afraid I have no knowledge of that.

4 Q. Do you know of anything else relating to Dr Kelly's

5 involvement in the drafting of the dossier?

6 A. No, I think I have only heard of the three points which7 we have already discussed: his contribution to the

8 original section on history of inspections, the comment

9 about growth media reported to us on 10th September --

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. -- and his possible comment on the later draft which may

12 have been reflected in the comments we were just looking

13 at.

14 Q. Can I just ask you these questions: it has been said

15 that Dr Kelly told journalists that the 45 minute claim

16 was added in the week before publication. Doing the

17 best you can, it looks like it got in on about18 15th September or --


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19 A. Earlier than that. It was 10th or 11th September.

20 Q. 10th or 11th, right. Then it is certainly in on the

21 15th September one?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you know whether Dr Kelly commented on the 10th or

24 11th?25 A. I have no reason to think he did.

158

1 Q. No. He may have done through DIS but nothing that you

2 can help with?

3 A. No.

4 Q. It has also been said that Dr Kelly told journalists

5 that it was added in late and was single sourced. As

6 far as you were aware, this was intelligence which was

7 single sourced, is that right?

8 A. Yes, it was a single source as we have heard,

9 a reliable, established one.

10 Q. If he had said that, he must have heard that from

11 someone?

12 A. It would seem so, yes.

13 LORD HUTTON: But do I understand from what you are saying

14 Mr Miller that there was other intelligence which

15 supported maybe not directly the 45 minute claim? I do

16 not want you to go into details, but did I understand

17 you correctly?

18 A. It did not support the specific timing.


20 A. But it supported the picture of Iraq having established21 command and control arrangements for the use of these

22 weapons and having those in place.

23 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Thank you.

24 MR DINGEMANS: It has been said that Dr Kelly told

25 journalists that Downing Street knew that the claim was

159

1 wrong. If he did say that, would that have been true or

2 not?

3 A. It would not have been true.

4 Q. And it has been said that Dr Kelly told journalists that5 the transformation in the week before publication came

6 about because of Campbell. If he had said that, would

7 that have been true?

8 A. No, it would not have been true in either sense in that

9 I do not think there was a transformation the week

10 before publication.

11 Q. Right.

12 A. And certainly changes such as the inclusion of the

13 reference to 45 minutes were nothing to do with No. 10.

14 Q. Right. That came about because the intelligence had

15 been picked up -- I think you use the mnemonic JIC in16 the 9th September and then it gets into the draft on


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15

16

17

18

19

2021

22

23

24

25

162

1 INDEX

2 PAGE

3 MR TERENCE THOMAS TAYLOR (called) ................ 3

4

5 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 4

6

7 MR RICHARD PAUL HATFIELD (called) ................ 14

8


10

11 MR PATRICK LAMB (called) ......................... 91

12


14

15 MR MARTIN HOWARD (called) ........................ 116


18

19 MR JULIAN MILLER (called) ........................ 140

20


22

23

24

25

163

Documents

Hearing Transcript - 11 August 2003 Afternoon