Healthymagination at GE (in 2011) - JustAnswer · 2014. 2. 25. · Healthymagination at GE (in 2011) MARNE L. ARTHAUD-DA y ALICIA HORBACzEWSkI FRANk T. ROTHAERMEL. 2 H at GE As the

Time magazine called this era “The Decade from Hell,” and “when you are going through hell,” Winston Churchill advised, “keep going.”

—Opening statement of the GE 2009 Annual Report

IT HAD BEEN a heck of a decade for Jeffrey Immelt, Chairman and CEO of General Electric (GE), the quintessential American blue-chip company. Mr. Immelt’s new role as chief executive started on September 7, 2001, just four days before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since that tragedy, Mr. Immelt had spent his time putting out fire after fire. Because of 9/11, the U.S. economy was pushed into a reces-sion, and a global economic slowdown began. Several of GE’s key industrial sectors such as aviation and energy were especially hard hit, and even GE’s insurance business lost $600 million. The company that had repeatedly promised and delivered annual profit growth rates of 16 to 18 percent in the 1990s struggled to grow at half that pace in the new millennium.1

Beginning his tenure as CEO in 2001, Immelt continued GE’s transition from a low-margin, mainly commodities manufacturer to a more lucrative services company.2 At the same time, he took several steps to unify the GE brand around a stronger focus on innovation, including changing the GE motto to “Imagination at Work.” Immelt remembered keenly what GE’s former CEO Jack Welch had preached: “If the rate of change inside an organization is less than the rate outside, the end is in sight. . . . Leaders must develop a sixth sense, an ability to see around the corner.”3 Immelt’s ability to “see around the corner” was precisely the star talent that had gotten him to his job as CEO.

The global financial crisis beginning in 2008 compounded the company’s troubles even further. Because the conglomerate relied on its financial services unit, GE Capital, for more than 50 percent of its profits, the company found itself in grave danger. In 2009, GE announced that it had missed its quarterly earnings forecast just weeks after Immelt had reassured investors the company was on track, sending shockwaves throughout the financial industry.4 GE’s stock price fell by 13 percent by the end of that day, resulting in a $47 billion loss.5 One month later, Standard & Poor’s downgraded GE’s AAA credit rating, further underscoring the market’s lost confidence in GE’s financial health.6 Immelt quickly undertook a series of drastic actions to restabilize the company, including cutting the company’s dividend by 68 percent,7 downsizing the work force by 10 percent, and giving up his own bonus in both 2009 and 2010. He even asked Warren Buffett for a $15 billion liquidity injection. On March 5, 2009, GE’s share price hit an all-time low of $6.66, a figure symbolizing the culmination of GE’s “Decade from Hell.” From his assumption of the company leadership in 2001, Immelt had seen GE’s market capitalization cut in half, to about $200 billion by 2010. (See Exhibits 1a through 1d for financial performance data.)

Professor Marne L. Arthaud-Day, Research Associate Alicia Horbaczewski (GT MBA ’10) and Professor Frank T. Rothaermel prepared this case from public sources. This case is developed for the purpose of class discussion. It not intended to be used for any kind of endorsement, source of data, or depiction of efficient or inefficient management. © Arthaud-Day, Horbaczewski, & Rothaermel, 2013.

MHE-FTR-0100077645065

Healthymagination at GE (in 2011)

MARNE L. ARTHAUD-DAy

ALICIA HORBACzEWSkI

FRANk T. ROTHAERMEL

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Healthymagination at GE

As the financial crisis persisted, it became clear to both Immelt and GE’s investors that the com-pany needed to rethink its corporate strategy. Once a key resource utilized to finance acquisitions and smooth quarterly earnings for the other divisions, GE Capital’s losses were now a drain on the overall health of the firm. Increasingly, Immelt saw the financial crisis as an opportunity to move the company away from dependence on GE Capital and toward a new identity for the 21st century. He believed the key to future success was to figure out how to refocus GE away from declining businesses toward the rapidly growing industries of the future. The time was ripe for GE to return to its roots and become an industrial company again.

The first step in Immelt’s plan involved a series of corporate restructurings. Earlier in his tenure, Immelt had divested business units representing 40 percent of revenues and consolidated GE’s mul-tiple business divisions into just five: GE Capital, GE Technology Infrastructure, GE Energy, NBC Universal, and GE Home & Business Solutions. In 2008, he extended that process, selling portions of GE Capital and spinning off the famed GE Consumer and Industrial division, allowing GE to focus on an even narrower group of businesses. (See Exhibits 2a and 2b for changing product and geographic scope.) In 2009, Immelt announced his intent to shrink GE Capital to no more than 30 percent of the total corporate profits, and he sold a majority stake in NBC Universal to Comcast Corp.8 (See Exhibit 3 for an organizational chart.) The funds generated from the sale of NBC were used to offset loan losses from GE Capital and to fund investments in aviation, health care, and energy.9

These efforts were met with mixed reactions. While some analysts wondered whether the company was becoming too narrowly focused and losing the ability to hedge its bets, others recommended even further divestment. They pointed out that the company’s simplified organizational structure belied the fact that GE had engaged in 307 acquisitions and purchased stakes in another 105 firms from 2001–2010, while selling only 266 business units.10 In fact, acquisitions exceeded divestitures in all but 3 of the past 10 years (see Exhibit 4). Moreover, some of the purchases (e.g., homeland security, commercial real estate, and subprime mortgages) were at best tangentially related to GE’s stated focus on global technology, infrastructure, and industrial businesses.11 GE remained a sprawling conglomerate with a presence in a vast array of industries including electrical distribution, oil and gas, water and pro-cess technologies, aviation, health care, transportation, appliances, consumer electronics, lighting, and media.

Without the financial economies once supplied by GE Capital, Mr. Immelt needed to persuade inves-tors that his acquisitions were justified and that there was still a strategic reason for keeping these com-panies together under the GE corporate umbrella. Otherwise, investors would be better off investing in growth markets on their own, instead of subsidizing GE’s administrative costs. In the words of one analyst, “Reshaping GE [was] vital if the stock and Mr. Immelt [were] to regain their former luster.”12

History of Strategic Leadership at GE

The decline of GE’s value under Jeffrey Immelt’s leadership was striking when compared to the widely acknowledged successes of his predecessors. When Reginald Jones became the seventh CEO in 1972, he shifted GE away from its traditional focus on electrical equipment and appliances and concen-trated instead on services, transportation, and natural resources. Even more important, he is credited with implementing the notion of strategic planning at GE, having created 43 strategic business units to oversee its groups, divisions, and departments as well as manage the information generated by 43 stra-tegic plans. Over time, Reginald Jones added more management layers and finally grouped the busi-nesses into three divisions: consumer products, power systems, and technical products.13 Under his leadership, GE’s sales almost tripled to $27 billion, and he was named “CEO of the Decade” in 1979.14


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Jack Welch began working at GE in 1961 and was well known for his disdain for bureaucracy. Upon becoming CEO in 1981, Mr. Welch immediately instituted a massive downsizing effort. The restructuring did away with several layers of GE’s formal reporting structure, increasing the number of direct reports per manager from 5 to 15. The number of employees at GE dropped from 404,000 in 1980 to 292,000 by 1989.15 Mr. Welch’s strategy was not just to cut employees and costs, however. He envisioned a GE in which each of the businesses would be first or second in its industry in terms of market share, or else would be fixed, sold, or closed. From 1981 to 1987, he sold 200 businesses and acquired 370 businesses, for a net cost of $10 billion,16 earning Welch the title of “The Toughest Boss in America.”17 While Welch reigned over GE, market capitalization increased from $18 billion to over $500 billion.18 With GE’s performance outshining all other companies during his tenure, he gained not only admiration but also converts and devotees to the “Welch Way.”

The GE motto under Welch was “We Bring Good Things to Life.” Welch implemented this success-ful slogan by introducing GE to Six Sigma (6s), which was invented by Motorola in 1981. Six Sigma is a business-management process that focuses on improving the quality of outputs by removing the causes of potential defects and minimizing variability. The name Six Sigma comes from the statistical modeling of a manufacturing process in which the percentage of a process is 99.99966 percent free of defects. Under Welch’s leadership, every GE employee underwent extensive training to learn how to improve quality, lower costs, and increase productivity. GE now had decades of experience as a best-practice Six Sigma company and was renowned for its operational efficiency and mature management processes. Analysts estimated that the resulting performance tools that GE developed in technology, process, information, and culture brought in an additional $40 billion in revenue per year.19

A former football player for Dartmouth College and an MBA graduate from Harvard Business School, Jeff Immelt joined GE in 1982. He was only 45 years old when Jack Welch handpicked him as his successor above two other, more-experienced candidates—Robert Nardelli, who went on to become CEO of Home Depot and then Chrysler amidst considerable controversy, and Jim McNerney, who went on to head 3M and currently serves as CEO of Boeing.

Ecomagination

Immelt saw GE as a company known for solving problems. He believed energy and health care to be two of the most pressing problems in the world today, and he placed his bets accordingly. With GE’s long-standing expertise in industrial engineering, Immelt believed that GE was uniquely positioned to develop technological solutions for the world’s future energy needs. In 2004, GE spent $700 million on clean technology. With the launch of a new ecomagination initiative in 2005, Immelt pledged to triple that amount over the next five years.20

The ecomagination initiative was intended to “develop tomorrow’s solutions such as solar energy, hybrid locomotives, fuel cells, lower-emission aircraft engines, lighter and stronger durable materials, efficient lighting, and water purification technology.”21 Immelt saw it as a way to deliver more energy- efficient products and services to GE’s customers while generating reliable growth for the company. The program’s goals included increasing GE’s investment in green technology R&D, increasing the rev-enues raised from ecomagination products, reducing GE’s own greenhouse-gas emissions and improv-ing energy intensity, reducing water use and improving water reuse, and increasing communication with the public.22 In rolling out this initiative, Mr. Immelt also called upon the Bush administration to formulate a clear policy on environmental values and global warming.23

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Despite GE’s strong track record in industrial engineering and program management, some observ-ers received the news of the new eco-initiative with considerable skepticism. They questioned how serious GE was in its commitment to a green economy, given its past reputation for large-scale air and water pollution. As of 2000, GE was the fourth-largest producer of air pollution in the United States and the fifth-largest creator of toxic waste, after companies like Honeywell and Chevron. Critics argued that “Mr. Immelt’s credibility as a spokesman on national environmental policy is fatally flawed because of his company’s own intransigence in cleaning up its own toxic legacy.”24

yet over the next few years, Mr. Immelt succeeded in turning both the company and public opinion around with ecomagination. In 2009, BusinessWeek ranked GE as the #17 Most Innovative Company in the world, mostly because of its environmental initiatives. GE personnel created nearly 100 new green products spanning across company segments ranging from appliances to aviation, energy, lighting, transportation, and water. Indeed, there was such positive market response to ecomagination products that revenues from the program grew 260 percent, to $18 billion by 2009. That same year, Immelt com-mitted $1.5 billion annually in clean-technology R&D, with pledges to increase that value to $10 billion by 2015.25

The ecomagination initiative proved to be a success for GE (see Exhibit 5 for the results) in both real dollars and intangible goodwill. GE became one of the largest players in the wind-power industry, and was continuing to develop innovative new products such as the Evolution Series locomotive and GEnx aircraft engine, which burned significantly less fuel than their predecessors. By 2009, GE had success-fully lowered its greenhouse gas emissions by 22 percent and reduced its water use by 30 percent, with even further reductions planned for the future. In an ecomagination advertising campaign, Immelt was quoted as saying, “It’s no longer a zero-sum game—things that are good for the environment are also good for business.”26 Mr. Immelt learned through the ecomagination experience that with innovation, all stakeholders— customers, employees, investors and the public—can win.27

Healthymagination

“It’s the most valuable thing on earth.All the money in the world can’t buy it.Those who have it don’t always appreciate it.Those who have lost it will do anything to get it back.What is it?It’s Health.At GE, we believe what’s needed, right now, is a new mindset that embraces that health is everything.We call it healthymagination.” 28

Inspired by the success of ecomagination, Mr. Immelt launched GE’s $6 billion healthymagination initia-tive in May 2009, hoping to leverage the company’s technical knowledge, global position, and financial strength to transform the health care industry.29 He needed a repeat performance to rebuild the com-pany’s value, as well as to demonstrate that he could formulate and implement innovative strategies for GE on an ongoing basis. While ecomagination grew naturally from GE’s strengths in industrial engineer-ing, however, healthymagination would be a bit more of a stretch for GE’s employees on multiple fronts.


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ESTABLISHED COMPETITORS

Although GE first entered the health care business in 1915, it did not aggressively expand its presence until the advent of ultrasound technology in the 1980s. By that time, several competitors had already established a formidable presence in the health care market, placing GE at a competi-tive disadvantage. Playing catch-up through a series of acquisitions and joint ventures, GE quickly began competing in all of the primary health care market segments, including obstetrics, cardiology, and general radiology. The company’s strategy was deceptively simple: Launch premium medical products based on cutting-edge technologies. By 2010, GE Healthcare had gained envious market positions in most developed countries in the world,30 with $20 billion in assets and $18 billion in annual revenue.31

A NEW BUSINESS MODEL

The healthymagination initiative represented a significantly new business strategy aimed at address-ing the “changing needs and emerging opportunities in healthcare.”32 No longer content with sup-plying medical practitioners in developed economies with high-quality (and expensive) imaging equipment, Immelt viewed healthy magination as a bold declaration of GE’s intent to help “revolutionize health care all over the world”33 by addressing three critical needs: lowering health care costs, increas-ing access to innovations, and improving the quality of health outcomes.34 He believed all three metrics could be improved by 15 percent over the next five years. (See Exhibit 6 for the assessment process.) Though grounded in GE’s Healthcare division, the initiative would require the active involvement of GE Capital, GE Global Research, GE Water, and NBC Universal, as well as an advisory board of inter-national health care experts. Immelt pledged to invest $3 billion in health care–related R&D, $2 billion in financing, and $1 billion in technology and content by 2015:35

“We will invest in innovations that measurably improve cost, access and quality,” Mr. Immelt said. “That means lower-cost technology for more customers, products matched to specific local needs, and process expertise to help customers win. This reflects the new opportunities we see in health care. Our newest innovations—low-cost digital x-ray machines, portable ultrasounds, more affordable cardiac equipment—will save costs for doctors, hospitals, the government, families and businesses. This will help level the playing field in healthcare.”36

By the end of 2009, GE had already validated 24 new products through its healthymagination pro-gram. (See Exhibit 7 for a progress update and Exhibit 8 for a full list of validated products.) Some, like the handheld Vscan ultrasound and Brivo CT device, promised to make previously bulky and expen-sive diagnostic tools available to primary-care physicians, both in the United States and in developing nations such as India and China. Information technology innovations such as Qualibria (a patient data management system) and Centricity EMR (an electronic medical-records system) were designed to increase the quality and accessibility of medical data, enabling doctors to make better health care deci-sions while simultaneously reducing costs. In yet another example, GE Performance Solutions utilized its AgileTrac software suite to help Mount Sinai Hospital in New york City optimize its processes so that existing personnel could treat up to 10,000 more patients within its current treatment facility. To deepen the innovation pipeline even further, GE created a $250 million equity investment fund to sup-port the development of new companies and technologies consistent with its healthymagination goals.37

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CHANGING MANAGERIAL MINDSETS

While GE’s management center at Crotonville, New york, had a longstanding reputation for select-ing and training the best managers in the world, it was not clear how readily they would embrace Immelt’s new approach to doing business. GE was renowned for being lean and productive, but not necessarily agile and entrepreneurial. Changing long-established structures, processes, practices, and attitudes of the past several decades was a mammoth mission. This would be especially true at GE, where the prevailing attitude was, “Why do we have to change if we’re good?”38

GE’s development goal was to get young professionals ready to run a big business by age 30. Training programs that rotated almost 3,000 employees annually kept GE’s talent pipeline full. Senior executives spent at least 12 months in training and professional development during their first 15 years with GE.39 yet recently, Bloomberg Businessweek had run a cover story entitled, “Can GE Still Manage?”40 while The Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Newmark wondered “whether GE’s management still possesses superior skills and capabilities.”41 The central question seemed to be whether a formal HR system that originated in the 1950s could effectively equip leaders for the current-day decentralized business envi-ronment, in which the next breakthrough innovation was as likely to come from India or China as from the United States. Mr. Immelt had good reason to wonder whether GE’s managers would be able to embrace the highly uncertain environment as the “new normal”42 and respond in brave new ways. yet he needed the buy-in and support of GE’s legendary managers if he was to successfully embed innova-tion in a company long known for its performance culture.43

GETTING PERSONAL

At the same time that he was asking his employees to embrace a new business model, Immelt also issued them a more personal challenge. As an employer, GE was faced with health care costs of $2.5 billion a year, covering the lives of 600,000 U.S. employees.44 HealthAhead was implemented as a four-pronged approach to bringing better health to GE’s people, thereby reducing the company’s own health expenses. The components included health verification of company worksites, wellness pro-grams such as Health by Numbers, and a new consumer-based health insurance program.45 GE also issued a new policy mandating all worksites to be tobacco-free by March 2011, promising lower insur-ance premiums for employees who successfully quit smoking.46

Although promotional materials depicted workers exercising happily, praising the virtues of being smoke-free, and embracing the switch from name-brand to generic drugs, it was not yet clear that this picture accurately portrayed the sentiments of the entire work force. In the same year that GE stock prices took a dive, dividends were cut, and salaries were frozen at current levels, the new health plan (mandated for salaried employees and retirees under the age of 65) levied deductibles as high as $4,000 per year.47 How willingly would GE’s employees embrace healthymagination at such a personal level?

GAINING PUBLIC BUY-IN

As with ecomagination, Immelt also sought to engage the public in a national conversation on health care. GE conducted a national survey of consumers and doctors and found significant differences in their perceptions of healthy lifestyles.48 The company then utilized the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Canada, as a platform to launch a full-scale media campaign on health awareness, using athletic spokespeople like skaters Michelle kwan and Scott Hamilton. At the same time, NBC Universal sought to increase its emphasis on health and wellness programming through shows like Today and The


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Biggest Loser, while its The More You Know spots targeted issues such as diabetes, strokes, and nutri-tion.49 GE gained additional exposure through the launch of a healthymagination homepage, as well as its presence on sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and youTube. The initial numbers were impressive. In its 2009 healthy magination Annual Report, GE claimed to have made 247 million media impressions and helped facilitate the sharing of 2,225,834 healthy ideas.50 However, it was much more difficult to measure the financial return on this investment.

GOING INTERNATIONAL

Ultimately, Mr. Immelt saw lack of access to adequate health care as not just an American problem, but a global ill. According to the healthymagination website, 1.1 billion people on earth do not have access to clean drinking water, while another 2 billion lack basic sanitation and health care. In Canada, there is one doctor for every 470 people; in China, one doctor for every 950 people, and in Africa, one doctor for every 50,000 people.51 Immelt’s goal was for healthymagination to become a worldwide move-ment that would help to change these numbers. He believed that GE, with its international reach and influence, was in a unique position to foster global cooperation, spur health-related innovation, and leave a lasting impact around the world.

GE already had significant experience in international markets on which healthymagination could build. After the financial crisis plunged the world into a deep recession, GE had started to look even more to revenues from outside of the United States. Because annual growth in emerging markets could be three times that in developed markets,52 Mr. Immelt had strongly encouraged international sales in areas such as China, India, Turkey, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Latin America. In 1980, GE’s revenues outside the United States, at $4.8 billion, constituted 19 percent of total revenues; in 2008, this number had soared to $97 billion and more than half of GE’s total revenues.53 The percentage of GE’s sales from the U.S. market had declined from 66 percent to 46 percent just over the first eight years of Immelt’s tenure as CEO.

When Immelt traveled around the world and “looked around the corner,” he saw that success in developing countries was a prerequisite for continued vitality in developed ones.54 yet he also realized that emerging economies presented new and difficult challenges. For decades, GE and other industrial manufacturers had developed high-end products for primary use in industrialized nations and then adapted them for less-developed markets around the world. The world was different now. Economic growth in the United States and other wealthy countries was slowing, while information technol-ogy was increasing awareness of new technologies abroad. However, many second- and third-world nations still lacked the funds and basic infrastructure needed to support the resulting increase in tech-nological demand.

GE had experimented—successfully—with some alternative approaches to doing business in low-income countries. In kenya, it had established a partnership with a rural educational and clinical hos-pital to conduct research on the need for robust, low-maintenance, and inexpensive ICU/anesthesia products. In China, GE collaborated with the Ministry of Health to create a pilot program for stroke screening, utilizing GE’s ultrasound and EkG equipment. Projects in India were focused on providing better neonatal care to both rural and urban communities.55 Information gathered from such initiatives was resulting in a new model of “reverse-innovation,” in which products were developed in and for countries in Africa, China, or India, and then distributed globally as well as back at home (see Exhibit 9).56 Mr. Immelt believed this strategy would help prevent emerging corporate giants from developing countries from overtaking GE at home and abroad. But such a locally based approach was both time-consuming and more resource-intensive than GE’s traditional way of doing business.

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Perfect Timing?

The U.S. health care system was in dire straits at the time GE launched its healthymagination initia-tive. Health care spending as a percentage of GDP had more than tripled in the past 50 years, from 5 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 2010.57 Some predicted that health care spending would reach 20 per-cent of the U.S. GDP within the next few years, implying that one out of every five dollars would be spent on health care of some sort. Americans had the most expensive health care system in the world, spending almost $8,000 per person annually.58 The countries with the next highest per capita expendi-tures on health care were Canada, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Sweden, all of which spent between $3,000 and $4,000 per year.59 Sadly, comparisons with other developed countries showed that America’s health care system did not provide significantly better outcomes, despite costing a lot more money. The United States fared worse than the OECD average in basic health indicators such as life expectancy, stroke survival rates, and infant mortality.60

The United States was also unique among industrialized countries in that it did not have 100 percent coverage for its citizens. Some countries like Britain, Canada, and Sweden had “single-payer” systems in which the public service was supported through taxes. Others, like the Netherlands and Switzerland, required every family or individual to purchase insurance. Analysts estimated that 49 million Americans were without health insurance in 2009, including not just people who truly could not afford it but also people who chose not to buy it. Instead of treating preventable diseases with early care and detection, these uninsured free-riders turned up in emergency rooms where insured people and taxpayers were forced to cross-subsidize their expensive treatments amounting to tens of billions of dollars per year.61 Further con-tributing to the lack of access to health care in America were the insurance companies themselves, which had been allowed to select the safest patients and reject the sickest. This placed an unfair burden on the elderly and the ill who were unable to receive insurance coverage due to a preexisting condition. Even Americans who had health insurance coverage often found it “bankruptingly inadequate” if they became seriously ill or injured.62

After years of acrimonious debate over why these problems existed and what should be done to fix them, President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act into law on March 23, 2010. Its objectives were strikingly similar to those stated by GE’s healthymagination program just one year prior: to improve qual-ity, increase access, and lower the costs of health care in the United States. One of the primary provisions was that 32 million of the current 49 million uninsured would be mandated to purchase insurance by 2014. Government subsidies for this expense would be given for families making less than $88,000 a year. In the meantime, small businesses and non-profit organizations could receive tax credits for provid-ing health-insurance benefits to their employees, young adults would be permitted to remain on their parents’ plans until they turned 26 years old, and a new program was established to preserve employer coverage for people who retired before age 65. A second thrust of the new law was to bolster primary-care services and to place an increasing emphasis on preventive medicine. The legislation also enacted a host of new consumer protections aimed at limiting the power of the insurance companies, which would henceforth be forbidden from dropping people with preexisting conditions, placing lifetime caps on cov-erage allowances, or charging higher rates based on gender or health status.63, 64

Mr. Immelt believed that GE was in a unique position to take advantage of the business opportu-nities created by this new legislation. Not only did the company have a penchant for the evidence-based, data-driven, and quality-control operations so desperately needed in the health care industry, but through healthymagination’s advisory board, it had direct access to several high-profile health care experts. One of the most prominent was Tom Daschle, who had served four terms as a U.S. sena-tor from South Dakota, as a member of the Democratic Party. He co-authored a recent book entitled


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Critical: What We Can Do About the Healthcare Crisis, advocating for universal health care in America. (Daschle was offered the position of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services in the Obama administration, but withdrew his nomination amid controversy over his income tax fil-ings.65) GE was counting on the insights and connections of Mr. Daschle and the other advisory board members to guide the development of healthymagination’s new products and services and to get them into the health care plans of the future.

However, GE’s efforts could be in vain if Congress succeeds in its bid to repeal the Affordable Care legislation, or at a minimum de-fund the program. Critics were quick to point out the significant risk associated with building a business plan around legislation that could be repealed and subsidies that could be withdrawn due to a change in political administration.66

Back to Its Roots for Future Success?

Immelt knew the next few years would be especially critical for healthymagination—not to mention his career—for several reasons. The economy and GE’s earnings were finally starting to turn around, positioning the company for further growth in the future. In July 2010, GE’s profits increased by 16 per-cent—making this the biggest increase since the end of 2007. GE Capital’s credit losses were decreasing, and health care sales were rising, especially in China and India.67 At the same time, health care needs were as urgent as ever, both in the United States and abroad. The Affordable Care Act promised to create new opportunities for the types of technological and process innovations at which GE excelled, and GE had strong relationships with the U.S. government, at least for the time being. GE needed to make the most of these opportunities while they lasted.

As he prepared to address a cadre of several hundred GE leaders from across the globe at GE’s lead-ership center in Crotonville, Immelt found himself wondering whether ecomagination and healthymagination would be enough to restore GE’s former glory. Though up from its all-time low of $6.66, GE’s share price had yet to break $20 since the 2008 financial crisis—a far cry from the $60 per share value Immelt inherited when he took office. It would take more time and a concerted effort to recover the $200 billion GE had lost in market capitalization. CEOs were supposed to create—not destroy—firm value. While the board had been supportive of his turnaround efforts to date, Immelt had been at the helm for nearly 10 years with what some considered mediocre results. He wondered how much longer they would be willing to wait to reap the full benefits of his strategic plan.

In the meantime, the calls for further divestment continued. Once considered the “exception to the conglomerate rule,”68 GE’s financial premiums had evaporated with the downfall of GE Capital. Immelt himself saw the benefits of maintaining the company’s expertise in technology, services, and finance in order to achieve his ecomagination and healthymagination visions, but he was feeling increasing pres-sure to justify his decisions to retain or spin off longstanding divisions as he reconfigured the corporate strategy around those far-reaching goals. He needed to show investors there would be a clear benefit to keeping at least some financial and media capabilities in-house. He also knew it would be challeng-ing to demonstrate that ecomagination and healthymagination were broad enough to create synergy across GE’s different business units (see Exhibits 10a and 10b for business-unit financials), yet not so broad that the company would find its resources stretched across too many projects in too many dispa-rate industries. He knew that GE needed to return to its roots in industrial products and services, but sighed as he thought about the obstacles to be faced in the process of getting there. Could he persuade his managers, investors, and directors to continue on this journey with him?

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2002$0

$10$20$30$40$50$60$70

2004 2006 2008 2010

Minimum$6.66

(Thursday, March 5, 2009)

Maximum$59.88

(Friday, September 8, 2000)

Average$31.37

Immelt BecomesCEO, 9/7/2001

Global FinancialCrisis

Terrorist Attacks onWorld Trade Center,

9/11/2001

Daily Closing Prices

EXHIBIT 1a GE Share Price, 2001–2010

Source: www.WolframAlpha.com.

80%

9/3/2001Price History – GE (9/7/2001 – 12/14/2010)

1/6/2003 1/5/2004 1/3/2005 1/2/2006 1/1/2007 1/7/2008 1/5/2009 1/4/2010 12/13/2010

60%40%20%

0%220%240%260%280%

2100%General Electric Co. Dow Jones Industrial Average Index

EXHIBIT 1B GE Performance Relative to the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 2000–2010

Source: MSN money (http://money.msn.com/).


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EXHIBIT 1C Consolidated Income Statement, 2005–2010 ($ in millions, except per-share amounts)

Source: GE Annual Reports.

Revenues 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005

Sales of goods $60,812 $65,068 $69,100 $60,670 $64,297 $59,837

Sales of services 39,625 38,709 43,669 38,856 36,403 32,752

Other income 1,151 1,006 1,586 3,019 2,537 1,683

General Electric Capital Services, Inc. (GECS) revenues from services 48,623 50,495 68,160 69,943 60,154 55,970

Total revenues 150,211 155,278 182,515 172,488 163,391 150,242

Costs & Expenses Cost of goods sold 46,005 50,580 54,602 47,309 50,588 46,169

Cost of services sold 25,708 25,341 29,170 25,816 23,522 20,645

Interest & other financial charges 15,983 18,309 26,209 23,762 19,286 15,138

Investment contracts, insurance losses & insurance annuity benefits 3,012 3,017 3,213 3,469 3,214 5,474

Provision for losses on financing receivables 7,191 10,627 7,518 4,431 3,839 3,841

Other costs & expenses 38,104 37,409 42,662 41,089 38,322 36,257

Total costs & expenses 136,003 145,283 163,374 145,876 138,771 127,524

Earnings (loss) from continuing ops before income taxes 14,208 9,995 19,141 26,612 24,620 22,718 Benefit (provision) for income taxes

(1,050) 1,148

(1,052) (4,155) (3,954) (4,085)

Earnings from continuing operations 13,158 11,143 18,089 22,457 20,666 18,633 Earnings (loss) from discontinued operations

(979) 82 (679) (249) 163 (1,922)

Net earnings (loss) 12,179 11,225 17,410 22,208 20,829 16,711 Less net earnings attributable to noncontrolling interests (535) (200) — — — —

Less effect of accounting changes — — — — — —

Net earnings attributable to the company 11,644 11,025 17,410 22,208 20,829 16,711 Preferred stock dividends declared (300) (300) (75) — — —

Net earnings attributable to common shareowners $11,344 $10,725 $17,335 $22,208 $20,829 $16,711 Per Share Amounts Earnings (loss) per share-continuing operations-basic 1.15 1.03 1.79 2.21 1.99 1.73

Earnings (loss) per share-discontinued operations-basic (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) 0.02 (0.18)

Earnings (loss) per share-continuing operations-diluted 1.15 1.03 1.78 2.20 1.99 1.72

Earnings (loss) per share-discontinued operations-diluted (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) 0.02 (0.18)

Net earnings (loss) per share-basic 1.06 1.01 1.72 2.18 2.01 1.55

Net earnings (loss) per share-diluted 1.06 1.01 1.72 2.17 2.00 1.54

Dividends declared per share 0.46 0.61 1.24 1.15 1.03 0.91

Weighted average shares outstanding-basic 10,661 10,614 10,080 10,182 10,359 10,570

Weighted average shares outstanding-diluted 10,678 10,615 10,098 10,218 10,394 10,611

Year end shares outstanding 10,615 10,663 10,537 9,988 10,277 10,484

Total number of employees 287,000 304,900 323,000 327,000 319,000 316,000

Number of common stockholders 578,000 598,000 605,000 607,000 626,000 646,000

12


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14


GE Product Scope 2001($130 bn)

GE Product Scope 2010($150 bn)

$5.8,4%

$58.3,45%$11.7,

9%

$7.1,6%

$5.8,4%

$20.2,16%

$9.0,7%

$11.4,9% $37.5,

25%

$47.0,32%

$8.6,6%

$16.9,11%

$37.9,26%

Aircraft Engines Appliances CapitalIndustrial Productsand Systems

Materials NBCEnergy Infrastructure Capital FinanceHome & Bus. Solutions NBC UniversalTechnology Infrastructure

Source: GE Annual Reports, 2001 and 2010 (annual revenues in parentheses).

Source: GE Annual Reports, 2001 and 2010 (annual revenues in parentheses).

GE Geographic Scope 2001($130 bn)

GE Geographic Scope 2010($150 bn)

Americas OtherU.S. Europe Pacific Basin U.S. Europe Pacific Basin

Americas Middle Eastand Africa

Other

$5.5,4%

$3.8,3%

$11.4,9%

$23.9,18%

$85.0,66%

$3.5,3%

$31.8,21%

$21.6,14%

$70.5,47%

$13.4,9%

$9.1,6%

EXHIBIT 2B GE’s Changing Geographic Scope

EXHIBIT 2a GE’s Changing Product Scope


15

EXHIBIT 3 GE Organizational Chart, April 2010

Keith S. SherinVice Chairman & CFO, GE

Michael A. NealVice Chairman, GE

Jeffrey R. ImmeltChairman & CEO, GEJohn G. Rice

Vice Chairman, GEJohn Krenicki

Vice Chairman, GE

Energy

John KrenickiPresident & CEO

GE Energy

John G. RicePresident & CEOGE TechnologyInfrastrucure

Michael A. NealChairman & CEO

GE Capital

Charlene BegleyPresident & CEO

GE Home & BusinessSolutions

Jeffrey A. ZuckerPresident & CEONBC Universal

CableFilmInternationalNetworkSports & Olympics

Appliances & LightingIntelligent Platforms

AmericasAsia PacificAviation Financial ServicesConsumer FinanceEurope, Middle East & AfricaEnergy Financial ServicesReal Estate

AviationHealthcareTransportation

Energy ServicesOil & GasPower & Water

Corporate Staff

BusinessDevelopment

Marketing &Communications

InformationTechnology

ElizabethJ. Comstock

Charlene Begley Keith S. Sherin

Finance Global Research Human Resources

John F. Lynch FerdinandoBeccalli-Falco

International Legal

BrackettB. Denniston III

Mark M. LittlePamela Daley

TechnologyInfrastructure

GE Capital Home & BusinessSolutions

NBC Universal

Shareowners Corporate Executive Office Board of Directors

Source: GE website for Investor Relations (www.ge.com).

EXHIBIT 4 GE’s Acquisitions, Stake Purchases, and Divestitures, 2001–2010

Year Acquisitions Stakes divestitures

2010 14 3 23

2009 8 8 22

2008 31 16 26

2007 32 17 23

2006 40 13 29

2005 22 10 33

2004 34 6 19

2003 33 10 31

2002 48 6 32

2001 45 16 28

Source: www.alacrastore.com/mergers-acquisitions/General_Electric_Company-1006912.

16


EXHIBIT 5 Results of Ecomagination

2005 Goals 2009 Status

Double R&D to $1.5B on “green products” $1.5B on R&D for 75 “eco” products

Work with customers to increase revenues from $5B in 2005 to $20B in sales by 2010

$18B of revenue in 2009; 17% growth rate Global engagement

Reduce GE carbon footprint by 1% Reduction of 8%; save $100 MM/year

Be transparent and involved Founding member of USCAP

Source: http://wardsauto.com/keydata/historical/UsaSa01summary.xls.

$6B Investment: $3B Healthcare Product/Service, $2B Financing, $1B GE in these Areas

Cost Savings

15%

Imagination at Work HealthymaginationMay 7, 2009

Access Improvement

3rd Party Validation by Oxford Analytica

Quality Improvement

1) Greater efficiency • Asset optimization • Maximize throughput • Reduce diagnosis & treatment variance

2) Therapy decision support

3) Managing chronic diseases

1) Maternal & infant care

2) Water & sanitation

3) Screening for life- threatening conditions

4) Technology to extend reach (remote access and portability)

1) Reducing medical errors

2) Improving diagnostic capability

3) Remote medicine/ monitoring

4) Early disease detection

15% 15%

EXHIBIT 6 Assessment Process

Source: GE healthymagination, May 7, 2009 (http://www.ge.com/pdf/investors/events/05072009/ge_healthymagination_overview.pdf).


17

EXHIBIT 7 Validation Progress for Healthymagination

Source: GE healthymagination (http://www.healthymagination.com/).

Expand employee health efforts.

TO DATE, GE HAS:

Launched Health Ahead, a global employee wellness and site certification program to build a culture of health.

Increase the “value gap.”

TO DATE, GE HAS:

Taken steps to lower GE’s healthcare costs by focusing on key cost drivers and making our employees more aware of and responsible for cost-conscious decisions.

Invest $3 billion in R&D, $2 billion in financing and $1 billionin technology and content by 2015.

TO DATE, GE HAS:

Invested $700 million in R&D toward healthy-magination innovations.

Increased its healthy-magination portfolio to 24 products, on target for 100 innovations by 2015.

Pledged $350 million through Stimulus Simplicity and the healthymagination Fund.

Engage and report onhealthymaginationprogress.

TO DATE, GE HAS:

In addition to this report, GE is keeping the public informed through its healthymagination Web site, NBC/Universal platforms and its healthymagination Advisory Board.

5

Work with partnersto focus innovationson critical needs.

TO DATE, GE HAS:

Partnered with Intel and the Mayo Clinic for a study on home–based patient care.

Launched “Developing Health” a three–year $25 million program providing grant funding and volunteer support to nonprofit health centers in the United States.

Joined with Eli Lilly to develop technology that could enable faster, cheaper and smarter cancer therapies.

1 2 3 4

18


diagnostic technologies

AdreView

Brivo DR-F Digital X-Ray

Discovery NM/CT 570c

Discovery PET/CT 690 VCT

Discovery CT750 HD

Innova Interventional X-Ray

LightSpeed VCT Xte with ASiR or Snapshot Pulse

Logiq C5

MR Elastography

MRgFUS

Optima CT 660

Venue 40

Voluson Automated Technology

MAC 400

MAC 800

MAC i

Achilles

life Support

Engstrom Carestation

Lullaby Incubator XP

Lullaby Warmer

health Care it

Centricity Practice Solution

Clinical Decision Support for Diagnostic Imaging (CDS-DI)

Performance Solutions

AgileTrac

home health

QuietCare

EXHIBIT 8 List of Healthymagination Validated Products



19

EXHIBIT 9 GE’s New Model for Health Care Innovation


Old Way (Sequential)

1

1

1

New Way (Simultaneous)

Prevent/treat diseases

Two way innovation (U.S. ↔ World)Pervasive 1 simultaneous

distribution

Innovation

Later thought

Distribution

Impact outcomes

Cost 1 access 1 quality

Luminary → mainstream

U.S → World

Cost 1 quality 1 access

EXHIBIT 10a Revenues and Earnings by Strategic Business Unit, 2005–2010

(continued)

Summary of operating Segments

General Electric Company and Consolidated Affiliates

(In millions) 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005

Revenues

Energy Infrastructure $ 37,514 $ 37,134 $ 38,571 $ 30,698 $ 25,221 $ 21,921

Technology Infrastructure 37,860 42,474 46,316 42,801 37,687 33,873

NBC Universal 16,901 15,436 16,969 15,416 16,188 14,689

Capital Finance 47,040 50,622 67,008 66,301 56,378 49,071

Consumer & Industrial 8,648 9,703 11,737 12,663 13,202 13,040

Total segment revenues 147,963 155,369 180,601 167,879 148,676 132,594

Corporate items and eliminations 2,248 1,414 1,914 4,609 2,892 3,668

Consolidated revenues $150,211 $156,783 $182,515 $172,488 $151,568 $136,262

20


Source: GE 2011 Form 10-k.

Summary of operating Segments

General Electric Company and Consolidated Affiliates

(In millions) 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005

Segment profit

Energy Infrastructure $ 7,271 $ 7,105 $ 6,080 $ 4,817 $ 3,518 $ 3,222

Technology Infrastructure 6,314 6,785 8,152 7,883 7,308 6,188

NBC Universal 2,261 2,264 3,131 3,107 2,919 3,092

Capital Finance 3,265 1,462 8,632 12,243 10,397 8,414

Consumer & Industrial 457 370 365 1,034 970 732

Total segment profit 19,568 17,986 26,360 29,084 25,112 21,648

Corporate items and eliminations (3,321) (2,826) (2,691) (1,840) (1,548) (372)

GE interest and other financial charges

(1,600) (1,478) (2,153) (1,993) (1,668) (1,319)

GE provision for income taxes (2,024) (2,739) (3,427) (2,794) (2,552) (2,678)

Earnings from cont. operations 12,623 10,943 18,089 22,457 19,344 17,279

Earnings (loss) from discontinued operations, net of taxes (979) 82 (679) (249) 1,398 (559)

Consolidated net earnings $11,644 $11,025 $17,410 $22,208 $20,742 $16,720

EXHIBIT 10a (Continued)

Energy infrastructure

(in millions) 2010 2009 2008 2007

Revenues $37,514 $37,134 $38,571 $30,698

Segment Profit $7,271 $6,842 $6,080 $4,817

Revenues

Energy(a) $30,854 $30,185 $31,833 $24,788

Oil & Gas 7,561 7,743 7,417 6,849

Segment Profit

Energy(a) $6,235 $ 5,782 $ 5,067 $ 4,057

Oil & Gas 1,205 1,222 1,127 860

EXHIBIT 10B Additional Financial Data for Selected Business Units, 2007–2010

(a) During the first quarter of 2009, GE transferred Banque Artesia Nederland N.V. (Artesia) from CLL to Consumer. Prior period amounts were reclassified to conform to the current period’s presentation.



21

GE Capital(in millions) 2010 2009 2008 2007

Revenues $ 47,040 $49,746 $67,645 $66,301

Segment Profit $3,625 $1,462 $8,063 $12,243

total Assets $575,908 $607,707 $ 572,903

Revenues

CLL (a) $18,447 $20,762 $26,856 $26,982

Consumer (a) 17,822 17,634 24,177 25,054

Real Estate 3,744 4,009 6,646 7,021

Energy Financial Services 1,957 2,117 3,707 2,405

GECAS (a) 5,127 4,594 4,688 4,839

Segment Profit

CLL (a) $1,554 $963 $1,838 $ 3,787

Consumer (a) 2,629 1,419 3,623 4,283

Real Estate (1,741) (1,541) 1,144 2,285

Energy Financial Services 367 212 825 677

GECAS(a) 1,195 1,016 1,140 1,211

total Assets

CLL (a) $202,650 $ 210,742 $ 228,176

Consumer (a) 154,469 160,494 187,927

Real Estate 72,630 81,505 85,266

Energy Financial Services 19,549 22,616 22,079

GECAS (a) 49,106 48,178 49,455

EXHIBIT 10B (Continued)

technology infrastructure

(in millions) 2010 2009 2008 2007

Revenues $37,860 $38,517 $41,605 $38,339

Segment Profit $6,314 $6,758 $7,460 $7,187

Revenues

Aviation $30,854 $30,185 $19,239 $16,819

Health Care 16,897 16,015 17,392 16,997

Transportation 7,561 7,743 5,016 4,523

Segment Profit

Aviation $3,304 $3,923 $3,684 $3,222

Health Care 2,741 2,420 2,851 3,056

Transportation 315 473 962 936

(a) During the first quarter of 2009, GE transferred Banque Artesia Nederland N.V. (Artesia) from CLL to Consumer. Prior period amounts were reclassified to conform to the current period’s presentation.


22


Endnotes

1. “The hard way,” The Economist, October 18, 2003.

2. Mark, k. (2008), “General Electric: From Jack Welch to Jeffrey Immelt,” Ivey Business School Case.

3. “Peripheral vision: Detecting the weak signals that can make or break your company,” Wharton School of Pennsylvania, 2008.

4. “Embarrassed Immelt owns up to impact of credit crisis,” Financial Times, April 12, 2008.

5. “Immeltdown,” The Economist, April 19, 2008.

6. Glader, P. (2009), “GE’s Immelt to cite lessons learned,” The Wall Street Journal, December 15.

7. McGregor, J. (2009), “Health care: GE gets radical,” BusinessWeek, November 30.

8. Glader, P. (2009), “GE’s Immelt to cite lessons learned.”

9. Glader, P. (2009), “GE to invest in industrial businesses—Cash from NBC deal will help burnish aviation, healthcare and energy units,” The Wall Street Journal, December 4.

10. www.alacrastore.com/mergers-acquisitions/General_Electric_Company-1006912; accessed January 6, 2011.

11. Glader, P. (2010), “Live, from New york, GE’s moment of truth,” The Wall Street Journal, December 10.

12. Ibid.

13. Bartlett, C. A., and M. Wozny (2005), “GE’s two-decade transformation: Jack Welch’s leadership,” Harvard Business School Case, May 3.

14. Ibid.

15. Welch, J. (2001), Straight from the Gut (New york: Warner Books), p. 121.

16. Mark, k. (2008), “General Electric: From Jack Welch to Jeffrey Immelt.”

17. “Fortune’s survey lists nation’s toughest bosses,” The Washington Post, July 19, 1984.

18. Mark, k. (2008), “General Electric: From Jack Welch to Jeffrey Immelt.”

19. GE healthymagination, May 7, 2009 (http://www.ge.com/pdf/investors/events/05072009/ge_healthymagination_ overview.pdf).

20. Schiafo, R., and N. Sullivan (2005), “Talking green, acting dirty,” The New York Times, June 12.

21. Carney, Timothy (2011), “Want to know how GE paid $0 income taxes? Think green,” Washington Examiner, April 7.

22. GE ecomagination Annual Report, 2009.

23. Schiafo, R., and N. Sullivan, (2005), “Talking green, a cting dirty.”

24. Ibid.

25. GE ecomagination Annual Report, 2009.

26. Schiafo, R., and N. Sullivan (2005), “Talking green, acting dirty.”

27. GE healthymagination, May 7, 2009 (http://www.ge.com/pdf/investors/events/05072009/ge_ healthymagination_o verview.pdf).

28. http://www.ge.com/pdf/company/advertising/ healthymagination-manifesto.pdf.


23

29. GE healthymagination, May 7, 2009.

30. Immelt, J. R., V. Govindarajan, and C. Trimble (2009), “How GE is disrupting itself,” Harvard Business Review, October.


32. Ibid.

33. GE healthymagination Annual Report, 2009, p. 6.

34. GE healthymagination, May 7, 2009 (http://www.ge.com/pdf/investors/events/05072009/ge_ healthymagination_overview.pdf).

35. GE healthymagination Annual Report, 2009, p. 2.

36. Monegain, B. (2009), “GE’s ‘healthymagination’ tags $6 billion for IT innovation,” Healthcare IT News Online; accessed September 07, 2009.

37. GE healthymagination Annual Report, 2009.

38. “Can GE still manage?” Bloomberg Businessweek, April 25, 2010.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. “Newshub,” The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2010.

42. Immelt, J. R. (2009), “Letter to shareholders,” GE 2009 Annual Report.

43. Crainer, S. (2009), “From Edison to Immelt: The GE way,” Business Strategy Review, Autumn.



46. Martin, J., (2010), “General Electric to go tobacco-free in 2011: Work sites to be tobacco-free,” McClatchy–Tribune Business News, March 4.

47. McGregor, J. (2009), “Health care: GE gets radical,” BusinessWeek, November 30.


49. “NBCU announces new company-wide initiative: ‘Healthy at NBCU’; Campbell Soup company signs on as first ‘Healthy at NBCU’ advertiser; Multiplatform campaign promoting nutritional literacy to launch 2010; ‘The More you know’ launches new season of health-themed PSAs, co-branded with GE’s healthymagination,” PR Newswire, October 14, 2009.


51. “healthymagination: Changing the way we approach healthcare around the world,” www.healthymagination.com.

52. Immelt, J. R., V. Govindarajan, and C. Trimble (2009), “How GE is disrupting itself.”

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.


56. Immelt, J. R., V. Govindarajan, and C. Trimble (2009), “How GE is disrupting itself.”

24


57. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service, National Health Statistics Group, 2010.

58. “Heading for the emergency room,” The Economist, September 9, 2009.

59. Ibid.

60. “This is going to hurt,” The Economist, September 25, 2009.

61. “Heading for the emergency room,” The Economist, September 9, 2009.

62. “This is going to hurt,” The Economist.

63. “Signed, sealed, delivered,” The Economist, March 25, 2010.

64. “Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, by year,” HealthCare.gov; accessed August 31, 2010.

65. ”Daschle withdraws as nominee for HHS secretary,” Associated Press, February 3, 2009.

66. katz, J. (2010), “GE returns to its roots,” Industry Week, July.

67. Glader, P., and B. Sechler (2010), “GE’s earnings rise, ending a losing streak—Profit jumps 16% with assist from GE Capital Unit; Conglomerate’s revenue declines as industrial businesses lag,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17.

68. “Solving GE’s big problem,” The Economist, October 26, 2002.

Documents

Healthymagination at GE (in 2011) - JustAnswer · 2014. 2. 25. · Healthymagination at GE (in 2011) MARNE L. ARTHAUD-DA y ALICIA HORBACzEWSkI FRANk T. ROTHAERMEL. 2 H at GE As the