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I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Headquarters U.S. Air Force
Lt Gen Dave Deptula
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
The Future Fight:
Technology in the Battlespace
1
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
What’s at Risk
Air, Space &
Cyberspace
Superiority
Nuclear
Deterrence
Global
Precision
Attack
3
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
What’s at Risk
Special
Operations
Personnel
Recovery
Agile Combat
Support
Rapid Global
Mobility
5
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Legacy Threats
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
SAMS
Destroy
Target
8
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Emerging Threats
Plan
Mission
Mission
PrepLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
Expanded Challenges
Mission Phases
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
SAMS
Destroy
Target
Exploiting Technology Learning from US Ops Information OperationsExploiting Technology Learning from US Ops Information Operations
9
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Exploiting Technology
10
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Emerging Threats
Expanded Challenges
Exploiting Technology Learning from US Ops Information Operations
11
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Learning from US Operations
12
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Emerging Threats
Expanded Challenges
Exploiting Technology Learning from US Ops Information Operations
13
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Adversary
Information Operations
Adversary Information Operations:
Media savvy adversary …
Camera as the Weapon …
Creating the visuals to reinforce an
orchestrated desired effect …
Able to “oscillate” reality:
Information to shape our operations
Deny us use of ways & means …
Secure, assure, & reinforce the
population without presence …
14
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Plan MissionExpanded Challenges
Exploiting Technology Learning from US Ops Information Operations
Plan
Mission
Mission
PrepLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADs
Destroy
Target
Mission Phases
Plan
Mission
Mission
PrepLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADs
Destroy
Target
Mission Phases
Cyber
Warfare
15
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Mission Prep
Plan
Mission
Mission
PrepLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
GBAD
Destroy
Target
Cyber
Warfare
Foreign ISR
Plan
Mission
Mission
PrepLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
18
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Foreign ISR
Pearl HarborFax Tapping Equipment
19
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Launch
Plan
Mission
Mission
PrepLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
GBAD
Destroy
Target
Cyber
Warfare
Attack
Basing
Foreign ISR
Plan
Mission
Mission
PrepLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
20
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Surface-to-Surface Missiles
23
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Surface-to-Surface Missiles
24
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Threats to Ground Domain
25
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Transit
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
GBAD
Destroy
Target
Cyber
Warfare
Attack
Basing
Attack Space
AssetsForeign ISR
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
26
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Nuclear
Detonation
in Space
Ground Site
Attack
Orbital Threats
Interceptors
Reversible Non-Reversible
SOSI
Ongoing Challenges:
Attack Space Assets
Cyber Attack GPS Jamming SAR Jamming Laser Damage
D&D SATCOM Jamming Laser Blinding
User
Equipment
Logistics
Finance
Weather
BroadcastingSCIENCECommunications
Aviation
Precision StrikeNavigation
Space AccessMissile WarningMissile Defense
Indications &
Warning (I&W)
Battle Damage Assessment
(BDA)
28
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Transit
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
Cyber
Warfare
Attack
BasingDeny
Combat
Support
Attack Space
Assets
Foreign ISR
29
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Avoid DetectionAdvanced
Sensors
Cyber
Warfare
Attack
Basing
Deny
Combat
Support
Attack Space
Assets
Foreign ISR
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
GBAD
Destroy
Target
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
31
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Skywave type OTH Radar
Sensor Cueing Speeds Detection… And Engagement
PRC PCL Prototype
NEBO-SVU
Zhuk-AE
Ongoing Challenges:
Advanced Sensors
32
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Engage Enemy Fighters
Cyber
Warfare
Attack
Basing
Deny
Combat
Support
Air-To-Air
Threat
Advanced
Sensors
Foreign ISR
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
GBAD
Destroy
Target
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
Attack Space
Assets
33
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Russian PAK-FA
Jointly developed by Russia and India
—work begun on first prototype
Most advanced foreign fighter in the world
Chinese XXJ
F-22-like configuration, capabilities
Developing radar technology with goal
of F-35/F-22-like capability
Aspiring to F-22 Performance While Proliferating to F-35 Quantities
Adversary 5th Generation
Fighters
35
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
1970 1980 20001990 2010 2020
DP Start 1st flt IOC
DP Start 1st flt IOC
DP Start 1st flt IOC
USAF F-22
Raptor
19 yrs – Start to IOC
Conceptual Drawing
of Russian PAK-FA
8 yrs – Start to IOC?
USAF F-35A
Joint Strike Fighter
12 yrs – Start to IOC
Conceptual Drawing
of Chinese XXJ
< 8 yrs ? – Start to IOC
DP IOC
Fighter Comparison
36
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Russia and China Developing Fighters Aimed
at Challenging F-22 Dominance
*Assessed
F-15 Su-35 F-35 F-22 PAK-FA XXJ*
Reduced RCS
Stealth
Internal Weapons Bay
Supercruise
Supermaneuverability
AESA Radar
Adv Electronic Attack
Sensor Fusion
Ultra-Long Range AAM
In Service 1974 2010 2013 2005 2015 2020
How They Match Up
37
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Country Aircraft
Russia Su-30/FLANKER
MiG-29/FULCRUM
China F-10 & FJ-17
Expanded Challenges:
Proliferation – Fighters
Russian aircraft sold or awaiting delivery
Chinese aircraft sold or awaiting delivery
RS/CH aircraft sales talks ongoing
38
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Ongoing Challenges:
Engage Enemy IADS
Cyber
Warfare
Attack
Basing
Deny
Combat
Support
Air-To-Air
Threat
Ground-Based
Threat
Advanced
Sensors
Attack Space
Assets
Foreign ISR
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
39
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Expanded Challenges:
Engage Enemy IADS
Houston
Dallas/Ft Worth
Tulsa
Kansas CitySt. Louis
Denver
Omaha
Oklahoma City
SAM Reach 1960s~2000
Memphis
Albuquerque
40
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Expanded Challenges:
Engage Enemy IADS
Houston
Dallas/Ft Worth
Kansas CitySt. Louis
Denver
Omaha
Memphis
Albuquerque
Oklahoma City
Tulsa
SAM Reach Today
41
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Expanded Challenges:
Engage Enemy IADS
Tulsa
Oklahoma City
Houston
Kansas CitySt. Louis
Denver
Omaha
Memphis
Albuquerque
SAM Deployed at Oklahoma City, OK.
SA-2D (27 NM) Legacy
SA-10 (49 NM)
SA-20 PMU1 (81 NM) Modern
SA-20 PMU2 (110 NM)
SA-21 (130 NM) Emerging
Mod. SA-21 (210 NM) 2007+
New Russian SAM (300+ NM) 2020+
Dallas/Ft Worth
SAM Reach 2011~2020
42
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Deployed Advanced SAMs
SA-10 Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria,
China, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Ukraine
SA-20 Russia, China, Greece, Vietnam
SA-21 Russia
SA-12 Russia, Belarus, Ukraine
HQ-9 China
UNCLASSIFIED
Deployed Advanced SAM Capability
Contract Signed, Awaiting Delivery
Interest in Advanced SAM
Advanced SAM Proliferation
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Conflict Challenges:
Destroy Target
Target
Ground-Based
Threat
Advanced
Sensors
Attack Space
Assets
Foreign ISR
Cyber
Warfare
Attack
Basing
Deny
Combat
Support
Air-To-Air
Threat
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
GBAD
Destroy
Target
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
IADS
Destroy
Target
44
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
What One Can See, All Can See
What Any Can See, Any Can Shoot
Conflict Challenges:
Target - C4 Trends
45
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Emerging Threats
Plan
Mission
Prep
AssetLaunch Transit
Avoid
Detection
Engage
Fighters
Engage
GBAD
Destroy
Target
Cyber
Warfare
Foreign ISR
Attack
Basing
Attack Space
Assets
Deny
Combat
Support
Advanced
Sensors
Air-To-Air
Threat
Ground-Based
Threat
Target
46
I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e
Conclusion
Threats to US Air Force capabilities are rapidly
growing as a result of advanced technology and
learning from US operational successes
…Will attack us in every
domain, at every phase
... future threat environment will not be like
that we have seen in the past…
47