Hazard Communication Technology Safety Data Sheetsaeasseincludes.asse.org/professionalsafety/pastissues/052/08/39_Ak... · Called technology safety data sheets (TSDS), ... (JSA) or

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Technology SafetyData Sheets

Moving critical safety information upstreamto design engineers and downstream to workers

By Magdy Akladios and Gary Winn

CHEMICAL HAZARDS and methods to relatethose hazards to workers, managers and designershave challenged SH&E professionals for manyyears. Incidents such as the catastrophe at UnionCarbide’s facility in Bhopal, India, led to a strongpush for what is now known as the right-to-knowmovement (EPA, 2006). It also prompted several reg-ulations, such as OSHA’s Hazard Communication(HazCom) standard (29 CFR 1910.1200). Under thisstandard, OSHA mandates that all users of chemi-cals should maintain what are now called materialsafety data sheets (MSDS). Produced by chemicalmanufacturers, MSDS provide information such asmanufacturer name and contacts, hazardous ingre-dients, physical data, fire and explosion hazard data,health hazard data, reactivity (instability) data, spillor leak procedures, special protection informationand special precautions (ANSI, 1998).

Like chemicals, man/machine interactions havebecome more complex because of technologicaladvances. This complexity increases the level of riskto which workers are exposed. As a result, identify-ing and assessing associated hazards has increasedin complexity as well. To better manage these con-cerns, information sheets simulating MSDS forchemicals were introduced (McCabe & Lippy, 2001).

Called technology safety data sheets (TSDS), thesedocuments aim to capture and relate a conciseabstract of technical information in a user-friendlyformat. TSDS use information gathered through haz-ard analysis techniques such as job safety analysis(JSA) or failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).Much as MSDS provide chemical hazard informationto different audiences in one format, TSDS are com-munication tools to be used by various audiences.

According to Department of Energy (DOE) andNational Institute for Environmental Health Sciences(NIEHS) (1996), a TSDS is a “technology-specific doc-ument designed to provide, among other informa-tion, the identity and relative risk of safety and healthhazards associated with a technology. It can be used

as a tool to manage safety throughout the technologydevelopment and implementation process, and it canprovide developers with a method to collect andreport hazard information in a form understood bythe user community.”

History & OriginationTSDS was originally developed in 1994 by

Matthew Fitzgerald while working under a contractfor the DOE. In 1995, DOE entered into a cooperativeagreement with the International Union of OperatingEngineers (IUOE) to begin addressing worker safetyand health considerations related to environmentaltechnology research, development and demonstra-tion programs (McCabe & Lippy, 2001).

In 2000, DOE’s Environmental ManagementAdvisory Board (EMAB) recommended that a TSDSbe provided for every technology at mid-stagereview (EMAB, 2000). DOE then began to pilot testTSDS as a way to provide guidance on avoidingpotential hazards in individual technologies(McCabe & Lippy, 2001). Although it was laterreported that mid-stage reviewwas too early for full TSDSdevelopment, it was conclud-ed that “it is never too early fora technology developer to startconsidering safety and healthin the research and develop-ment process” (McCabe &Lippy, 2001).

TSDS FormatCurrently no regulatory

mandate is in place for a TSDSto be developed or for the for-mat to be used if one is devel-oped. However, publishedguidelines suggest that the fol-lowing elements be included:technology identity, process

Magdy Akladios, Ph.D., P.E., CSP, CPE,CSHM, is an assistant professor in the Schoolof Science and Computer Engineering at theUniversity of Houston, Clear Lake. Aprofessional member of ASSE’s Gulf CoastChapter, Akladios holds a B.S.M.E. from CairoUniversity, as well as an M.S.I.E., M.B.A. andM.S. in Occupational Safety & Health, and aPh.D., all from West Virginia University.

Gary L. Winn, Ph.D., CHST, is a professor inthe safety management program within theDepartment of Industrial and ManagementSystems Engineering at West VirginiaUniversity in Morgantown. A professionalmember of ASSE’s Northern West VirginiaChapter, Winn holds a B.A. from Wright StateUniversity, an M.A. from University of Daytonaand a Ph.D. from Ohio State University.

www.asse.org AUGUST 2007 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 39

Abstract: New technolo-gies and processes canpose risks to users, muchlike those caused byexposure to chemicals. Aspart of the right-to-knowconcept, a standardizedresource such as technol-ogy safety data sheets(TSDS) can provide work-ers with the adequateknowledge to protectthemselves from thoserisks. This article describesTSDS and discusses howthese tools can be usedto educate managers,designers, engineers andother potential users onbasic aspects of safetyand health.

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40 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY AUGUST 2007 www.asse.org

Comparing PSM & TSDS ElementsElement PSM TSDS

Table 1Table 1

Gather and dis-play technolo-gy’s information

Hazard analysis

Operatingprocedures

•Information pertaining to the dangers of thehighly hazardous chemicals used or producedby the process.•Information pertaining to the technology inthe process (diagrams that will help usersunderstand the process, and maintain it undercontrol).•Information pertaining to the equipment suchas condition’s design must be documented(ASME, API, ANSI, NFPA codes).Based on this information, PSM will perform aPHA or safety analysis. Depending on the com-plexities of the process, an appropriate tech-nique will be selected. Options include:what-if/checklist; HAZOP; FMEA; FTA.

PSM standard requires development and imple-mentation of written operating procedures thatprovide clear instructions for safely conductingactivities involved in each covered process.Steps for each operating phase are initial start-up; normal, temporary and emergency opera-tions; normal shutdown; and startup followinga turnaround or after emergency shutdown.

•Technology identity;•process description;•process diagrams.These sections provide key technical information topeople in order to understand the technology as isrequired by the standard.

•Safety hazards;•health hazards;•system safety analysis;•phase analysis.No decision is made on the use of any hazardanalysis technique. Section 7 in the first version ofTSDS describes the results of a hazard analysis, butit does not determine how to do it. The lastest pro-tocols eliminate the section and stipulate the use ofthese techniques to determine an appropriateassessment of the hazards. Another importantpoint refers to the format used by TSDS. Itdescribes the results obtained in the hazards analy-sis by separating the hazards descriptions in tosafety hazards, health hazards, phase analysis haz-ards and emergency conditions. Each topic consti-tutes a section.•Safety and health plan;•emergency condition information;•special considerations.TSDS also present a specific section, namely phaseanalysis, to describe the hazards involved in eachlife cycle phase of the technology. This concept canhelp developers incorporate safety aspects intodesigns or to final users to address hazards duringthe use and deployment stage in the technology.

description, process diagram or photograph, con-taminants and the medium, associated safety haz-ards, associated health hazards, phase analysis,safety and health plan required elements, commentsand special considerations, and case studies (DOE &NIEHS, 1996).

The initial format compiled the elements outlinedin OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) stan-dard (29 CFR 1910.119) and presented them in a man-ner that could be used by employees who operate andmaintain the technology, SH&E professionals chargedwith protecting personnel on hazardous waste sitesand regulators who must write permits for technolo-gies on state Superfund sites (Lippy, 2003). The initialformat focused on processes themselves, and on theways operators and maintenance personnel interactedwith these processes. Depending on the complexities

involved, an appropriate hazard analysis techniquewas selected (e.g., what-if/checklist, hazard and oper-ability study, FMEA, fault tree analysis).

Theoretically, the original format contained infor-mation accumulated throughout the entire processof development, demonstration and deployment ofa technology. In its Policy for Occupational Safetyand Health in Sciences and Technology Programs,DOE requires the use of TSDS, starting at appropri-ate points in the engineering development phase formaximum benefit (IUOE, 2002).

A second-generation format has emerged in thepast 5 years. In this format, developers focus onworker issues such as behavior and willingness totake risks. Hence, hazard analysis techniques thatfocused on process safety no longer fit their objec-tives. Since JSAs focus more on tasks performed by



expands their applicationbeyond preventing or miti-gating the release of haz-ardous chemicals to use withother types of work-relatedhazards. The TSDS presentshazards in a clear, compre-hensible format, making itan important document forcommunicating hazards inany type of industry.

Proposed New FormatThe lack of a standardized

procedure and format hasprompted the proposal ofa unified approach. TSDStake advantage of hazardanalysis techniques (or safe-ty analysis methods). Thissystematic approach enablesdevelopers to analyze di-verse objects, ranging fromsimple machine components to complex productionprocesses. It also addresses ways in which operatorsand maintenance personnel interact with theseprocesses. Thus, the first step in developing a TSDSis to recognize the nature of the object being ana-lyzed. This will help to determine the approach andhazard analysis method to be used during the devel-opment of a TSDS.

Operation AnalysisGrimaldi (1975) defined the fundamentals of

operation analysis as follows:1) Break down the job or operation into its ele-

mentary steps.2) List them in their proper order.3) Examine them critically.The operation analysis technique investigates the

steps of a job to identify and eliminate those that areinefficient. SH&E professionals examine each stepfor its accident-causing potential. Four units—dubbed the 4 Ms—should be considered when ana-lyzing a job operation for its possible hazards:

•man: all persons related to the job;•method: working procedures;•machine: simple tools to complex systems;•material: includes substances and items other

than machines.Heinrich, Petersen and Roos (1980) explain how a

production system should be divided into units tofacilitate the identification of hazards. The same con-cept is presented by Harms-Ringdahl (2002) whendescribing a modern production system where thesimple machine has been replaced by a productionsystem. In this context, a production system “can beseen as a number of elements that must interact fora desired result” (Harms-Ringdahl, 2002).

The main components of a production systeminclude technical equipment and physical condi-tions; individuals within the company; organizationand activities; surroundings, including society.

a person and how well a procedure is executed, theyare a more viable alternative. Therefore, processsafety has given way to occupational safety in theeffort to produce an effective communication tool.

Sutton (2003) suggests that occupational safetyand process safety are both part of an overall systemsafety, but asserts that they are separate and distinct.He also suggests a relationship between system safe-ty, occupational safety and process safety:

Indeed, during the follow-up to seriousprocess-related accidents, it is often observedthat the facility in question had a good occu-pational safety record, which is one reasonsenior managers are often so stunned after amajor incident—their good occupational safe-ty record had led them to believe that all waswell. For these reasons, the line from occupa-tional safety to process safety is not solid, indi-cating a weak link. On the other hand, afacility with a good process safety programprobably will do well at occupational safety, sothat line is solid, indicating a stronger link(Sutton, 2003).Since worker safety is the ultimate goal, the sec-

ond-generation TSDS format illustrates and commu-nicates safety and health information to workers andcombines both approaches into one source (Table 1).

Process Safety ManagementThe major objective of PSM is to prevent or miti-

gate the release of hazardous chemicals likely tocause serious accidents. To achieve this, PSM hasthree stages: identification, evaluation, and mitiga-tion or prevention of chemical releases that couldoccur as a result of failures in process, procedures orequipment. To control such hazards, workers mustdevelop the necessary expertise, experience, judg-ment and initiative to properly implement andmaintain an effective PSM that includes gatheringand displaying information, identifying and assess-ing hazards, and writing operating and training pro-cedures (OSHA, 1994).

Three main sources of information are required toimplement a PSM:

•information on the hazards of the highly haz-ardous chemicals used or produced by the process;

•information on the technology in the process(e.g., diagrams that will help users understand theprocess and maintain it under control);

•information about equipment conditions (e.g.,pressure and temperature limits).

Based on this information, PSM uses a tool calledprocess hazard analysis (PHA). Depending on thecomplexity of the process, an appropriate techniquesuch as what-if/checklist, hazard and operabilityanalysis (HAZOP), failure modes and effects analy-sis (FMEA) or fault tree analysis (FTA) is selected.Finally, the PSM standard requires development andimplementation of written operating proceduresthat provide clear instructions for safely conductingactivities involved in each covered process.

The TSDS format compiles these PSM phases and

Hazards are bestcontrolled before theyare created. However, if adesigned system goes tomarket, worker behaviorcan be modified to avoidaccidents. Therefore, aTSDS may be used withdesigners and/or workersand safety managersin mind.



1) deductive: based on a list of undesired events;2) inductive: based on physical part failure

modes;3) inductive: based on human failure modes.

Developing a TSDS: What Works BestMore than 50 hazard analysis methods are avail-

able. Harms-Ringdahl (2002) describes 10 selectmethods based on the belief that these techniquesare simple to apply and suitable for use in the work-

According to Harms-Ringdahl (2002), these four ele-ments constitute a method of separating a job oroperation, when analyzed, into simple compounds.Literature related to hazard analysis techniquesoffers a broad range of names for these techniques.While many of these techniques are similar, theymay have different naming conventions due to lackof standardization of safety terminology and com-munication. The three basic thought processes bywhich hazards may be identified are:

Hazard Analysis TechniquesTechnique Applications Pros Cons

Table 2Table 2

Technical (T)Energy analysis

HAZOP

FMEA

FTA

Event tree analysis

Human (H)Action error method(several similar ones)

a) Hierarchical taskanalysis

System (THOa)

Job safety analysis

Deviation analysis

Safety function analysis

Change analysis

a) Audits (ingeneral)

All types of systems

Chemical installations

Mechanical and electrotechnicalsystems; can be widenedAll types of (technical) systems

All types of (technical) systems

People’s actions in systemsWell-defined procedures inprocess industry, for exampleMap out the task of an individ-ual, all types of systems

Also organization oriented

Defined work procedure for anindividual worker or a team




Check of (safety) management;all types of systems

Can give “strict” resultsSimple method, quick, givesan overview.Well known, many manuals,straightforward to use.Well established, internationalstandard.Well established, international-standard; logical summary ofcauses of an accident; basis forprobabilistic calculations.Well established. Provides aclear picture of sequence ofevents after a failure. Basis forprobabilistic calculations.Human actions are essentialStraightforward use, rathersimple.Goal oriented, well structureddescription. A basis for furtheranalysis.Organizational activities aredecisiveSimple to learn/apply; similarto traditional safety thinking.

Generic; works on most sys-tems, simple flexible principle.Generic; works on most sys-tems; focus on safety, makingit right from the beginning.General; simple principle.

Essential to check that SMworks. With a suitable check-list, it can be rather easy.

Human/organization missedLimited analysis of causes.

Time-consuming.

Time-consuming. Many possi-ble failures.Time-consuming and difficult;errors can be concealed; binary(yes or no).

Rather difficult. Binary (yes orno).

Difficult to model and predictFocus on normal process.Many possible failures.Does not support identificationof risks (not a real safety analy-sis method).Difficult to model and predict

Too traditional, new hazardsnot found; not suitable in auto-matic systems.Sensitive to structuring, manydeviations at different levels.Rather difficult, results can bepresented in different forms.

Based on occurred accidents;assumes that the original sys-tem is safe enough.Depends much on the check-list; can be an empty formality;difficult to apply on flat organ-izations.

Note. From Safety Analysis Principles and Practice in Occupational Safety, by L. Harms-Ringdahl, 2002, New York: Taylor & Francis Inc.aTHO = technical, human and organizational aspects.



know what protective measures to use to guardagainst these hazards. TSDS also provide informa-tion to designers to help them control hazards viadesign modifications. Not only is this important forthe technology in question, it also provides subtleknowledge and helps educate non-SH&E profes-sionals on the basic aspects of safety and healthissues and the different ways to mitigate these risks.

To reach the level of standard communicationtool, additional concepts must be described as well.For example, it is critical to clearly describe the tech-nology, process or task (e.g., an entire installation,type of machine, specific machine, part or workplaceas a production line or production process, trans-portation system, specific type of work, organiza-tional routines) in which the engineers, worker orSH&E professional will be involved. Importantissues related with this aspect are:

•display of information related to the technology,such as flow process diagram, schemes of differentsystems, and pictures and diagrams showing thesteps to perform a task;

•use of brief operation description to understandthe object or task.

A worker’s risk perception as a consequence ofhazard assessment will help modify his/her behav-ior. The worker can better visualize how risky agiven technology or task is and his/her perceptionhelps the SH&E manager to rank hazards and makeappropriate decisions.

Since each organization has a unique way of char-

place. He also proposes a classification of techniquesin three groups:

•Technically oriented: moves from specific togeneral; used to analyze equipment or components.

•Human oriented: for analyzing human errorsand task; used to predict human errors in a definedtask, and to consider what can go wrong.

•Organization oriented: involve all elementsrelated to organizational activities such as how thework is performed and by whom, safety routines, etc.

Table 2 describes several of these methods, theirarea of application, and the positive and negativecharacteristics associated with them.

Approaches for Different AudiencesHazards are best controlled before they are creat-

ed—that is, during the design phase of a process,system or technology. Designers can modify engi-neering aspects to design safe technologies beforethey go into production. However, if a designed sys-tem goes to market, worker behavior can be modi-fied to avoid accidents. Therefore, a TSDS may beused with designers and/or workers and safetymanagers in mind.

Although the focus of a PHA is process safetyissues, it will likely uncover occupational safety con-cerns and vice versa. TSDS developers must classifytheir findings and provide the right information tothe right audience. This is when the TSDS takes onan important role as a communication tool.

First, workers need to know the hazards to whichthey are being exposed. Second, workers need to

Figure 1Figure 1

Example 1: TSDS Elements



acterizing the degree of hazard, there is nostandard methodology in this area.

Another consideration is the life cycleof the technology and all the differentstates that can occur from cradle to grave.These safety considerations apply duringplanning, design, production start, opera-tion and decommissioning. MIL-STD-882Bspecifies general system designs require-ments: Eliminate identified hazards orreduce associated risk through design,including material selections or substitu-tion, and select those with least riskthroughout the life cycle of the systemwhen potentially hazardous materialsmust be used (DOD, 1984).

Selecting the Development TeamAccording to Harms-Ringdahl (2002),

composition of the TSDS developmentteam depends on what is to be studied,not necessarily the knowledge of the haz-ard analysis methodology. “An importantadvantage in creating a team lies in theway the analysis can be rooted at compa-ny levels. Through a stage-by-stageprocess of clarification and adjustment,results can become broadly accepted with-in the company” (Harms-Ringdahl, 2002).

Several problems can arise if just oneperson conducts the entire analysis(Harms-Ringdahl, 2002). Therefore, a mul-tidisciplinary team must perform the haz-ard analysis that leads to the preparationof a TSDS; this team should include anexpert in the technology under investiga-tion; a potential user(s) of the technologysuch as a worker(s) with the skills neededto operate the technology; and expertswith knowledge of the specific hazardanalysis methodology to be used. In addi-tion, if the technology poses a hazard thatrequires specific knowledge, an expert inthat field must be present as part of theteam (IUOE, 2002).

TSDS in PracticeOne effective approach developed by

IUOE (2002) arises from an adaptation ofMIL-STD-882D (DOD, 2000). This methodconsiders both probability and severity ina quantitative way. Simply, the standardrequires that risk assessment be used informulating decisions related to resolvingidentified hazards (Brauer, 1994).

Another approach was developed bythe Indiana University of Pennsylvania’sNational Environmental Education Train-ing Center (IUP-NEETC). This methodevaluates probability as the chance of thehazard occurring only when the technolo-gy is in operation or under maintenance.

Advantages of TSDSTSDS provide several advantages:

1) Multiple approaches to hazard identification revealdifferent hazards.

2) TSDS is the most thorough, comprehensive format ofidentifying, evaluating and controlling hazards in a singledocument.

3) TSDS allows a quantitative risk value and hazard rat-ing to be calculated based on risk, which is the multiplica-tion of the probability and severity. This resulting riskrating typically ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 being no hazardand 4 being the highest level of hazard. The latter iswhere one finds the potential for imminent danger to lifeor health.

4) TSDS acts as a checklist for designers, engineers,SH&E professionals, workers and other personnel on thedifferent risks associated with the technology.

5) Educates non-SH&E professionals on safety issues.6) TSDS acts as a legal document that safety measures

has been accounted for and addressed.7) TSDS describes the responsibilities of each person

coming into contact of a particular technology.8) TSDS holds designers and engineers accountable for

unsafe designs.9) TSDS acts as a reference for users of similar technolo-

gies to follow.

Figure 2Figure 2




This technique also has a color-codednumerical rating that indicates the poten-tial severity of injury and/or illness due toexisting hazards. An important contribu-tion to the TSDS format is the added visu-alization of the hazard assessment in aneasy-to-understand color matrix.

Figures 1 through 6 provide examplesof a TSDS for a thermal desorption tech-nology at McClellan Air Force Base inSacramento, CA (IUP-NEEC, 2003). Thisexample shows the additions of hazardcolor-coding, which directs the reader tofocus on the most important hazards first.Less-hazardous situations are also sum-marized, but are given secondary impor-tance. The quantitative risk valuation andhazard rating is calculated based on thefollowing formula:

Risk = Probability of Occurrence xSeverity

The five possible probabilities are:A = ImprobableB = RemoteC = OccasionalD = ProbableE = Frequent

The four possible levels of severity are:I = NegligibleII = MarginalIII = CriticalIV = Catastrophic

The resulting four possible levels ofrisk are low (indicated by white), medium(indicated by yellow), serious (indicatedby orange) and high (indicated by red).

ConclusionWhile no standardized format is cur-

rently available to document and commu-nicate technology-related hazards toworkers, SH&E professionals, engineersor other personnel involved in the use of agiven technology, such documentation isneeded. A standardized TSDS can providea clear description (both verbally andvisually) of the technology, process or taskin which the worker will be involved;incorporate hazard assessment informa-tion; and describe various situations aris-ing throughout a system’s life cycle.

When a multidisciplinary team is creat-ed to develop a TSDS, the analysis can berooted at different company levels.Through a stage-by-stage process of clari-fication and adjustment, results canbecome broadly accepted within a givencompany.

The ultimate goal of a TSDS is to identi-fy key hazards and suggest solutions tomitigate them. As the examples show, TSDS

Figure 3Figure 3


Figure 4Figure 4




provides “recommended controls” for eachhazard identified. Ultimately, if all theserecommendations are followed, the riskchart should be moved from the red zone(high risk) to the white zone (low risk). �

ReferencesANSI. (1998). Hazardous industrial chemicals:

Material safety data sheets preparation. ANSI Z400.1-1998. New York: Author.

Brauer, R. (1994). Safety and health for engineers.New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Environmental Management Advisory Board.(2000). Resolution on the consideration of occupa-tional safety and health in the EM-OST technologydevelopment program. Washington, DC: EPA,Author.

EPA. (2006). Chemical emergency preparednessand prevention overview. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2006,from http://yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/Ceppoweb.nsf/content/epcraOverview.htm.

Grimaldi, J.V. (1975). Safety management (3rd ed.).Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.

Harms-Ringdahl, L. (2002). Safety analysis princi-ples and practice in occupational safety. New York:Taylor & Francis Inc.

Heinrich, H., Petersen, D. & Roos, N. (1980).Industrial accident prevention: A safety managementapproach (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Indiana University of Pennsylvania NationalEnvironmental Education & Training Center. (2003).TSDS development protocol and standard. Indiana,PA: Author.

International Union of Operating Engineers(IUOE). (1999). New environmental remediationtechnologies guidance criteria for occupational safetyand health [National workshop]. Beckley, WV:Author.

IUOE. (2002). How to prepare technology safety datasheets. Beckley, WV: Author.

Lippy, B. (2003). Technology safety data sheets:The U.S. Department of Energy’s innovative effortsto mitigate or eliminate hazards during design andto inform workers about the risks of new technolo-gies. Proceedings from the International Conference onEnvironmental Remediation and Radioactive WasteManagement, Oxford, England.

McCabe, B. & Lippy, B. (2001). Long-term stew-ardship of the DOE workforce: Integrating safety andhealth into the design and development of DOEcleanup technologies. Paper presented at the WM’01Conference, Tucson, AZ. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2006,from http://www.wmsym.org/Abstracts/2001/37/37-8.pdf.

OSHA. (1994). Process safety managementguidelines for compliance. Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Labor, Author.

Raafat, H. & Simpson, P. (2002). Integrating safe-ty during the machine design stage. Retrieved March2, 2003, from http://www.nsc.org/issues/isd/safede1.pdf.

Sutton, I. (2003). Process hazards analysis.Houston, TX: Sutton Technical Books.

U.S. Department of Defense. (1984). Systemsafety program requirements. MIL-STD-882B. Wash-ington, DC: Author.

U.S. Department of Defense. (2000). Standardpractice for system safety. MIL-STD-882D. Washing-ton, DC: Author.

U.S. Department of Energy & NationalInstitute for Environmental Health Sciences. (1996).Anticipating occupational hazards of cleanup tech-nologies: Remembering the worker. [Guidance docu-ment and technical workshop report]. Washington,DC: Author.

Figure 5Figure 5


Figure 6Figure 6



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Hazard Communication Technology Safety Data Sheetsaeasseincludes.asse.org/professionalsafety/pastissues/052/08/39_Ak... · Called technology safety data sheets (TSDS), ... (JSA) or