H A R RY A N A S TA S I O U , ’ T H E B R O K E N O L I V E B R A N C H : N AT I O N A L I S M , E T H N I C C O N F L I C T, A N D T H E Q U E S T F O R P E A C E I N C Y P R U S , ’ S Y R A C U S E , N . Y. : S Y R A C U S E U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S , 2 0 0 8 , C H P. 7

POSTREFERENDA POLİTİCAL REALİTİES IN CYPRUS

WHAT FACTORS HAVE SHAPED THE OPINION AND STANCE OF THE İNTERNATİONAL COMMUNİTY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFERANDUM? (I)

• While officially accepting the outcome of the referendum, the EU and the UN held the GC side primarily responsible for derailing the effort to resolve the Cyprus problem, mainly in view of certain vital political and diplomatic facts centering on Papadopoulos’s leadership and his supporting coalition government.

WHAT FACTORS HAVE SHAPED THE OPINION AND STANCE OF THE İNTERNATİONAL COMMUNİTY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFERANDUM? (II)

• First, during the New York talks in early April, Papadopoulos had agreed with the UN secretary-general that the Cypriot leaders would commence negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan; Greece and Turkey would join the negotiations if the Cypriot leaders were not able to conclude; and the secretary-general would fill in the blanks of the UN plan, which would then be put to a referendum prior to Cyprus’s entry into the EU.

WHAT FACTORS HAVE SHAPED THE OPINION AND STANCE OF THE İNTERNATİONAL COMMUNİTY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFERANDUM?(III)

• On the basis of diplomatic protocol, the understanding of the UN and the EU was that Papadopoulos’s formal commitment to this process meant that he had accepted, at least at a minimal level, the framework of the Annan Plan; he had endorsed the possible contributions of Greece and Turkey; and he had welcomed, if necessary, the final drafting of the plan by the UN secretary-general.

WHAT FACTORS HAVE SHAPED THE OPINION AND STANCE OF THE İNTERNATİONAL COMMUNİTY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFERANDUM?(IV)

• The Europeans, in particular, felt strongly offended that after giving his formal consent to the process, the GC leader had resorted to nationalist appeals to his community to vote “a resounding ‘no’” to the Annan Plan.

• These facts were echoed in the UN secretary-general’s post-referendum report of May 28, 2004.

WHAT FACTORS HAVE SHAPED THE OPINION AND STANCE OF THE İNTERNATİONAL COMMUNİTY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFERANDUM?(V)

• Second, those citizens and diplomats who had invested their energy and hope in a negotiated settlement were shocked at Papadopoulos’s explanation as to why he had participated in the negotiations that were so explicitly based on accepting the framework of the Annan Plan.

• Papadopoulos explained to the GC people that he had agreed to participate in the UN talks because, had he not done so, he would have acted contrary to the perennial policy of the GC National Council—that the GC side seeks a solution to the Cyprus problem through negotiations under the auspices of the UN.

• Such a statement revealed that Papadopoulos’s participation was formalistic and tactical rather than substantive.

WHAT FACTORS HAVE SHAPED THE OPINION AND STANCE OF THE İNTERNATİONAL COMMUNİTY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFERANDUM?(VI)

• Third, the European and the UN officials were stunned at Papadopoulos’s articulation of his rationale for rejecting the Annan Plan.

• In his Easter week broadcast, the GC leader explained that his negative position on the Annan Plan was justified because accepting the plan would have meant “doing away with our internationally recognized state [the GC-controlled Republic of Cyprus] at the very moment it strengthens its political weight, with its accession to the European Union” (Papadopoulos 2004).

WHAT FACTORS HAVE SHAPED THE OPINION AND STANCE OF THE İNTERNATİONAL COMMUNİTY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFERANDUM?(VII)

• The statement revealed that Papadopoulos’s priority was not the solution to the Cyprus problem and the accession of a united Cyprus to the EU, which had grounded the entire logic of the UN talks. Instead, it was the preservation of the Republic of Cyprus, even at the price of perpetuating the Cyprus problem and, further, of ushering the conflict into the union.

• Moreover, his adamant fixation on preserving the Republic of Cyprus rather than supporting the finalization of a new united Cyprus republic, reveals that his assessment of the Annan Plan was not based on the plan’s own merits but on his overshadowing preference for perpetuating the old nationalist ideal of attaining a unitary, ethnocentric state. This ideal has proven disastrous whenever pursued by any faction in any society of multiethnic composition.

UN’S RESPONSE (I)

• Referring to Papadopoulos’s explanation, the UN secretary-general asserted, “I was surprised at this statement, in light of what Mr. Papadopoulos had said to me in Brussels in January. I was also surprised at his interpretation of the plan, since the plan was designed to allow each side to maintain its position on how the new state of affairs would come into being” (United Nations 2004c; see also United Nations 2003a, pars. 66–67).

UN’S RESPONSE(II)

• Not surprisingly, in a briefing to the Security Council immediately following the Cyprus referendum, undersecretary-general for political affairs Kieran Prendergast stated that while the results of the referendum were respected, the UN characterized them as “disappointing.” Regretfully, it was noted, “the United Nation had come closer than ever before to solving one of the most delicate and complex conflicts on its agenda” (United Nations 2004b).

UN’S RESPONSE(III)

• In light of both the historic displacement of Denktash by the moderate Talat—with the backing of the Turkish government—and Greece’s original support of the Annan Plan, Papadopoulos emerged as the new leading figure of stubbornness in the Cyprus problem.

• From the EU and UN perspectives, Papadopoulos had undertaken the role and status previously attributed to Denktash. In the changing and novel political context, this was so striking that the UN explicitly profiled Papadopoulos’s nationalist rejectionism in its official reports.

UN’S RESPONSE(IV)

• The new political realities were succinctly formalized in the UN secretary- general’s report on Cyprus of May 28, 2004, which in essence set the stage for the politics of post-referendum Cyprus. In his report, Annan elaborated in chronological and thematic detail the up-to-date process and outcomes of the Cyprus negotiations, including their implications for the postreferendum era.

UN’S RESPONSE(V)

• Traditionally, the reports of the UN secretary-general tended to lay the burden of responsibility more on the TC and Turkish side for the failure to resolve the problem. But the May 2004 report placed the responsibility for the impasse on the GC side. And it did so in a manner that marked a decisive change in the UN’s perspective and language on Cyprus.

UN’S RESPONSE(VI)

• The international diplomatic mobilization leading up to the referendum and the entry of Cyprus into the EU marked the most extraordinary, elaborate, and comprehensive diplomatic and political effort for resolving the Cyprus problem ever undertaken.

• It entailed a long and arduous process during which Turkey had clearly changed its position in favor of a settlement, the TCs had shifted their stance in favor of reunification, Denktash’s secessionist nationalism had been marginalized, and Greece ha expressly backed the Annan Plan in parallel with its conditional support of Turkey’s European orientation.

• With this unprecedented historical convergence, the swaying of GCs by their leadership to vote “no” to the UN peace plan was truly tragic.

UN’S RESPONSE(VII)

• By comparison, the secretary-general’s criticisms of the TC side were few.

• Moreover, he explicitly acknowledged both the positive change in the TC position (p. 4) and the steadfast commitment of Turkey to solving the problem in accordance with the UN plan (p. 2).

• The only serious criticism was that their delay in changing their position in favor of a settlement had weakened the incentives for the GC side.

EU’S RESPONSE(I)

• Addressing the European Parliament during the aftermath of the Cyprus referenda, EU commissioner for enlargement Gunter Verheugen explicitly accused Papadopoulos of having misled him in the handling of the Cyprus problem. “I feel cheated by the Greek Cypriot government,” Verheugen announced. “For months on end I have done everything I could in good faith to make it possible for the Greek Cypriot side t accept this plan on the understanding that this is what they intended to do. Now things look very different” (Quetteville 2004).

EU’S RESPONSE(II)

• As the commissioner was rarely heard using such strong language in his politica conduct, his official reprimand of the GC leader at the highest level of an EU institution reflected the gravity of the matter in the eyes of the Europeans. • Verheugen went on to say that “if the Greek

Cypriot government had publicly supported it [the Annan Plan], the Yes vote would have won” (Europarl 2004).

EU’S RESPONSE(III)

• The political gravity of the situation was further attested by the discussion that followed in the European Parliament.

• It was noted that “the No vote by the Greek side is due to a feeling of insecurity. But accession to the European Union by a reunified island would have brought better guarantees of security” (Europarl 2004).

• Verheugen also stressed that “the UN plan called for a withdrawal of the troops” and that “without this pla there will probably be more troops” (Europarl 2004).

EU’S RESPONSE(IV)

• The accession of Cyprus to the EU had confronted the Europeans with a critical question regarding the political culture(s) that new member states usher into the union. • The set of chapters by which the union defines

the criteria and process of harmonization for acceding countries lack a key element: the explicit and demonstrable adoption by the countries concerned of an expanded concept of democracy that includes interethnic and transethnic conciliatory values.

EUROPEAN POLİTİCAL CULTURE AND CYPRUS ACCESSİON(I)

• With the establishment of the EU as a political entity in 1992, advancing European integration further than the former European Community, the conditions were created for moving beyond mere functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to harmonization.

• What could have been added to the harmonization requirements was for acceding states to adopt explicitly the interethnic and trans-ethnic political values and culture of the EU.

EUROPEAN POLİTİCAL CULTURE AND CYPRUS ACCESSİON(II)

• Such a requirement would expect the acceding countries to forego, in principle, the ethnocentric, adversarial nationalism that has marked the historical legacy of European countries.

• The bodies that would be expected to adhere to this post-nationalist, politico-cultural harmonization may range from the government to the major political parties of acceding countries, but could extend to their major educational institutions and the mass media.

EUROPEAN POLİTİCAL CULTURE AND CYPRUS ACCESSİON(III)

• European values could be elaborated as a set of specific norms to be adopted by acceding countries as the professed orientation of their national sociopolitical organizations.

• Such an approach would certainly complement but also go beyond techno-administrative harmonization to the declared and institutionalized acceptance of post-nationalist political norms.

• Otherwise, the process of enlargement leaves the union vulnerable to the importation of covert nationalism through the new member-states.

EUROPEAN POLİTİCAL CULTURE AND CYPRUS ACCESSİON(IV)

• Following the Cyprus referendum, the discussion in the European Parliament and the confrontational exchanges between the GC representatives of the Papadopoulos government and European parliamentarians underscore the EU’s failure to effectively manage, and decisively transcend, the contradiction in principle between the union’s political culture and the lingering, traditional nationalism of new member-states.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON CYPRUS (I)

• Inevitably, following the historical apogee of the referendum and the entry of Cyprus in the EU, the international community’s political position on the Cyprus problem underwent a fundamental shift.

• The day after the referendum, The Economist stated that “by rejecting the [UN] proposal the Greek-Cypriots will have gained nothing other than the resentment of their fellow EU members; and they have lost the moral high ground they enjoyed in 30 years in which the Turkish-Cypriot side continually resisted a deal” (The Economist 2004a).

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON CYPRUS( II)

• On the purely abstract and formal legal level, the international community retained its original stance on the illegitimate status of the TRNC.

• However, on the political and economic level, it started to modify its approach.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON CYPRUS(III)

• The change was ushered into the international political arena with Annan’s Cyprus report to the Security Council following the referendum.

«The decision of the Turkish Cypriots [to vote in favor of the UN peace plan] is to be welcomed. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey have made clear their respect for the wish of the Turkish Cypriots to reunify in a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. The Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them.» (United Nations 2004)

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON CYPRUS(IV)

• While maintaining the UN’s refusal to recognize the TRNC, the secretary-general succinctly recommended opening legitimate international economic and political relations with the TCs.

• Even though his recommendation was not formalized by the UN, it still marked a significant shift in international politics on Cyprus.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON CYPRUS(V)

• In line with the secretary-general’s suggested approach, the European Commission recommended specific policies explicitly aiming at assisting the TCs economically.

• The European Commission decided that the green line dividing the TC north from the GC south would not be classed as an external border of the EU, even though conditions for the full implementation of the acquis communautaire in northern Cyprus were not yet in place.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON CYPRUS(VI)

• It subsequently approved measures to ease restrictions on trade and to allow TC goods to cross the green line and be exported to the European markets.

• The measures, which excluded certain items, required that all goods and products be governed by EU health and safety standards and be of TC origin, with certificates issued by the Chamber of Commerce of the TC north.

• By late August 2004, this policy came into effect.

THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON CYPRUS(V)

• The commission recommended that EU funds to the north not be placed under the management of the TRNC, which the union continued to view as an illegitimate state entity

• But in light of the new political environment that emerged in the post-referendum era, neither did the commission recommend that the funds be place under the management of the Republic of Cyprus, even though it continued to recognize the republic as the sole legitimate state entity of the Island.

• Instead, it suggested that aid to the TCs be administered directly by the European Commission.

EUROPEAN POLİTİCAL PERSPECTİVE ON POSTREFERENDUM/ EUROPEAN CYPRUS(I)

• The political implication of the stance of the European Commission was that as long as the Republic of Cyprus was controlled by GCs, its government couldn’t fully represent and manage TC affairs in northern Cyprus.

• Through this approach, the Europeans were not making a judgment on the legal status of the republic but rather on the political status of its GC government. In other words, as long as the Republic of Cyprus functioned under mono-ethnic GC control, its political status with respect to the TCs would remain ambivalent, particularly as it was originally founded as a bi-ethnic state and was to be restructured through a settlement into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

EUROPEAN POLİTİCAL PERSPECTİVE ON POSTREFERENDUM/ EUROPEAN CYPRUS(II)

• This action of the EU propelled to the political foreground the fact that the interethnic federal political settlement of the Cyprus problem remained an imperative. It clearly suggested that a negotiated settlement on the UN model was the way forward to full normalization of political life in Cyprus.

• Once again, the union’s approach to the Cyprus problem was grounded on policy decisions directed and forged by a conflict-transcending and peace-enhancing diagnosis and vision of Cyprus.

CONCLUSİON

• In the pre-referendum/pre-European integration era, the UN and the EU had always regarded the GC side as more forthcoming in its readiness to strive for a comprehensive settlement, and the Turkish side as more reluctant and resistant. Since the referendum and Cyprus’s EU membership, however, it was the Turkish side that was viewed as the willing party and the GC side as the rejectionist one.

A VİDEO BY CYPRUS2015

• http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/research/cyprus-peace-process/documentaries?start=3