Harmful Intent: Organized Harmful Intent: Organized Crime & International Crime & International TerrorismTerrorism

““And hate with And hate with them is limitless them is limitless

as love.”as love.”

LermontovLermontov

Presentation ObjectivesPresentation Objectives

• Validate the link between organized Validate the link between organized crime syndicates and international crime syndicates and international terrorism. terrorism.

• Assess the inherent dangers posed Assess the inherent dangers posed by international crime to the by international crime to the Homeland Security mission. Homeland Security mission.

Presentation Objectives Presentation Objectives (Cont)(Cont)• Evaluate the social and political junctures Evaluate the social and political junctures

of organized crime and terrorist of organized crime and terrorist organizations through case studies.organizations through case studies.

• Critique the effectiveness of joint private Critique the effectiveness of joint private sector, military, and political efforts to sector, military, and political efforts to mitigate or eliminate terror/criminal mitigate or eliminate terror/criminal junctures as part of the international junctures as part of the international “Global War on Terror” (GWOT).“Global War on Terror” (GWOT).

Organized Crime and Organized Crime and Terrorists - CommonalitiesTerrorists - Commonalities

• Organization (hierarchic, cell, etc.)Organization (hierarchic, cell, etc.)

• Middlemen and contacts – various Middlemen and contacts – various venuesvenues

• Income-producing activitiesIncome-producing activities

• Meet goals through terror, coercion, Meet goals through terror, coercion, extortion, etc.extortion, etc.

• Utilize corrupt officials to meet needsUtilize corrupt officials to meet needs

Key Links Between IntlKey Links Between Intl. . Crime & TerrorismCrime & Terrorism

• Drug trafficking & narco-terrorismDrug trafficking & narco-terrorism

• Intl. arms trade - conventionalIntl. arms trade - conventional

• Intl. arms trade – WMDIntl. arms trade – WMD

• Human traffickingHuman trafficking

• Patent and trademark infringementPatent and trademark infringement

• Internet piracyInternet piracy

Case Study - AfghanistanCase Study - Afghanistan

• World Bank estimates >1/2 of Afghanistan’s World Bank estimates >1/2 of Afghanistan’s economy is based on the drug trade.economy is based on the drug trade.

• In 2003, the total illicit drug trade profits In 2003, the total illicit drug trade profits totaled approximately $2.33 billion U.S. totaled approximately $2.33 billion U.S. dollars.dollars.

• The primary concern is that the opium The primary concern is that the opium debacle will negate all Coalition Forces debacle will negate all Coalition Forces efforts to win the Global War on Terror in-efforts to win the Global War on Terror in-country.country.

Afghanistan – Opium Capital of Afghanistan – Opium Capital of the Worldthe World

Afghanistan – The EvidenceAfghanistan – The Evidence

The Illicit Arms Trade in Conventional The Illicit Arms Trade in Conventional

Weapons, Weapons, AmmunitionAmmunition, and , and ExplosivesExplosives

CommoditiesCommodities such such as diamonds, timber, as diamonds, timber,

slaves, etc. are slaves, etc. are turned into cash or, in turned into cash or, in

some cases, simply some cases, simply traded for weaponstraded for weapons..

Case Studies – The Illicit Arms Case Studies – The Illicit Arms MarketMarket

• The illicit international arms market is The illicit international arms market is referred to as the “Gray Market.”referred to as the “Gray Market.”

• While numerous nations support a very While numerous nations support a very active legal arms trade, illicit arms active legal arms trade, illicit arms trafficking proliferates primarily in regions trafficking proliferates primarily in regions with little or no political, law enforcement, with little or no political, law enforcement, or regulatory supervision of commercial or regulatory supervision of commercial brokering operations.brokering operations.

Extent of the Problem – Extent of the Problem – Specific ExamplesSpecific Examples

• Ukraine:Ukraine:

• 7 million rifles, 7 million rifles, pistols, pistols, machineguns, and machineguns, and mortarsmortars

• Moldavia:Moldavia:

• 42k small-arms42k small-arms

• 20,000 tons of 20,000 tons of munitions munitions including: aircraft including: aircraft bombs, rockets, bombs, rockets, 39k landmines39k landmines

Human Trafficking – Large Human Trafficking – Large Profit Margins for Terrorist Profit Margins for Terrorist Organizations World-wideOrganizations World-wide

Trafficking in PersonsTrafficking in Persons

"As of May 2004, the U.S. Government estimates that 14,500 to 17,500 people are trafficked annually into the United States, and 600,000 to 800,000 are trafficked globally.”

Post 9/11 Terrorist FundingPost 9/11 Terrorist Funding

• Al-Qaeda and similar Al-Qaeda and similar groups switched to groups switched to so-called “blood so-called “blood diamonds” as one diamonds” as one key source of key source of funding after 9/11.funding after 9/11.

• On-going civil wars On-going civil wars in Sierra Leone and in Sierra Leone and Angola provided a Angola provided a rich resource in rich resource in diamondsdiamonds

Al-Qaeda Diamond ConnectionAl-Qaeda Diamond Connection

“Al-“Al-Qaeda made a strategic decision to use diamonds

to fund its operations. Rebel armies, drugdealers, organised crime outfits and rogue

stateshave all recognized That rough diamonds can

beput to covert or illicit uses. Easy to transport

andconceal, and with an ability to maintain theirprice, they are already the favored method of

payment or bribe in many illegal transactions.”

Source: “For a Few Dollar$ More

How al Qaeda moved into the diamond tradeA Report”

Major Conflict Diamond “ Hot Major Conflict Diamond “ Hot Spots”Spots”

Cyber-TerrorismCyber-Terrorism

Case Study - EstoniaCase Study - Estonia

• Relatively modern state apparatusRelatively modern state apparatus

• Rapidly moved to on-line banking and Rapidly moved to on-line banking and personal living management after personal living management after collapse of the Soviet Unioncollapse of the Soviet Union

• Relatively modern infrastructureRelatively modern infrastructure

• Much tension between native Much tension between native Estonians and ethnic Russian Estonians and ethnic Russian residentsresidents

Estonia – Catalyst for Cyber-Estonia – Catalyst for Cyber-TerrorismTerrorism

• Movement of Russian WWII “Bronze Movement of Russian WWII “Bronze Soldier” monument from capital to a Soldier” monument from capital to a less conspicuous locationless conspicuous location

• Attacks initiated April 2007 and Attacks initiated April 2007 and targeted all major banking institutions. targeted all major banking institutions.

• IP addresses traced to Russian IP addresses traced to Russian government sourcesgovernment sources

• NATO involvement necessaryNATO involvement necessary

A New Paradigm for SuccessA New Paradigm for Success

• Realize that while combat between Realize that while combat between nation--state actors is a threat, the nation--state actors is a threat, the

threat posed by the nexus of threat posed by the nexus of international crime, terrorism, and international crime, terrorism, and

rampant corruption in some regions rampant corruption in some regions of the world is the most immediate of the world is the most immediate

threat to national security. threat to national security.

Strategies and Concepts for Strategies and Concepts for Risk MitigationRisk Mitigation

• Realization that criminal and terrorist Realization that criminal and terrorist threats are globalthreats are global

• Anti-corruption campaigns with real Anti-corruption campaigns with real penalties for corrupt actspenalties for corrupt acts

• Professionalization of law enforcement Professionalization of law enforcement and security institutions world-wideand security institutions world-wide

• Enhanced cooperation in intelligence and Enhanced cooperation in intelligence and counter-intelligence gathering operationscounter-intelligence gathering operations

Failure to Share Intelligence – Failure to Share Intelligence – Case-in-PointCase-in-Point

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, SFOR (the NATO “Stabilization Force) detained a

suspect for alleged involvement in terrorist activity. Ultimately, SFOR turned the suspect over to local law enforcement, which had to release him, since SFOR was not able to share its intelligence or provide evidence that could be used to sustain charges.”

The Future of Organized Crime The Future of Organized Crime & & TerrorismTerrorism

• Sources: Sources:

• http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/pub45270index.htmlpub45270index.html

•http://www.ifilm.com/video/2748861

The Dilemma – “The Enemy of The Dilemma – “The Enemy of My Enemy is My FriendMy Enemy is My Friend

The Enemy is RealThe Enemy is Real

http://www.youtube.com/watch?http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EdeThrJYWsAv=EdeThrJYWsA

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