Hanna - Review of Peacocke

7/30/2019 Hanna - Review of Peacocke

1/5

Philosophical Review

A Study of Concepts. by Christopher PeacockeReview by: Robert HannaThe Philosophical Review, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Jul., 1994), pp. 541-544Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185793 .

Accessed: 06/11/2012 18:09

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access to The Philosophical Review.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=dukehttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=philreviewhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2185793?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2185793?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=philreviewhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke


2/5

BOOK REVIEWSsory stimulation and scientific intersubjectivity s mediated by mentalisticdiscourse. In this and many other ways Pursuit of Truth presents a fascinat-ing new view of the relationship between naturalistic and mentalistic per-spectives on cognitive meaning and objective knowledge.22

GARYEBBSUniversityfPennsylvanianow that Quine stresses he role of empathy n shaping our linguistic ispositions,and accepts "irreduciblymentalwaysofgrouping physical tates nd events" (72).There is no hope leftforan austere naturalistic ccount of the objectivepull.22Forhelpfulcommentson earlier drafts am grateful o Scott Kimbrough,GaryHatfield,JayWallace,and Miriam Solomon.

ThePhilosophical eview, ol. 103, No. 3 (July 994)A STUDY OF CONCEPTS. By CHRISTOPHEREACOCKE. Cambridge: MIT

Press, 1992. Pp. xv,266.AfterKant, concepts have pride-of-placen epistemology,emantics, ndthe philosophy fmind:they unction s rulesfororganizingperceptions,as the primary bjectsof rationalanalysis, s singularor general proposi-tional terms, nd as the basic constituents f beliefs. Yet concepts havereceived surprisinglyittledirect,sustained attentionfrom contemporaryphilosophers of language and mind.A Study f Conceptshereafter C) ad-dresses this oversight.Buildingon Peacocke's earlierbooks (1983, 1986), SC pushesforward heexploration f thephilosophical errain etweenFregeansemantics nd con-temporary ognitive aturalism. is specialroute nto thetheory fconceptsis the analysis f "concept-possession": n thisapproach,a theory f con-ceptsshould be a theory bout a thinker's apacity ormastery fconcepts.And the mastery f a concept is nothingmore than an epistemic apacityto havepropositional ttitudes o thought-contentsontaining hatconcept.Now one mightask, Why adopt the view thatconcepts are capacities-asopposed to, say, ntensional omplexes,or terms n a functionalanguage-of-thought?eacocke's answerappears to be that onlyifconceptsare ca-pacitiesdo they tand omechance ofbeingboth (a) consistent ith regeansemantics,nd (b) scientificallyespectable,naturalizable ntities.The first hreechaptersof SC workout thegeneraloutlinesof a posses-sion-theoreticnalysisof concepts. In chapter 1 Peacocke develops thethesis thatconcepts are individuated olely by possession-conditions.n aWittgensteinianpirit, e holds that these conditionsmust mention"what

541


3/5

BOOK REVIEWSthinkers mployingthe concept find it natural to believe," that is, whattheyfind "primitivelyompelling" (13). Moreover, the conditions mustmentioncriteria or knowing he reference r semanticvalue of that con-cept. Building on thatfoundation, n chapter2 he argues that ome basic"systematic"features of thought-capacities for recombining the sameconcepts withdifferentingular terms-can be traced directly o a con-cept's essentialconnectionwith ts semantic value. In chapter 3 he thenworksout a possession-theoreticnalysisof perceptualconcepts in whichsuch conceptsreston fundamentalnonconceptual spatialrepresentations.The last five haptersexplore the broaderphilosophical mplications fthe possession-theoreticnalysis.Chapter4 deals with the metaphysics fconcepts; here Peacocke treatsdiscourseabout concepts as a special caseunder the general problemof analyzingdiscourse that (seemingly) men-tionsabstract bjects such as numbers. n chapter5 he givesan accountof how normative eatures f conceptscan be explained consistently ithnaturalism, ut without ppeal to "naturalized teleology" of the sortre-centlydeveloped byRuth Millikan (1984). His strategys to tie conceptsto the factthat"a thinkerfinds certaintransitions nd principles primi-tively ompellingand does so fromcertain causes" (138). Chapter 6 ex-tendshis theory o the analysisof the concept ofbelief,by givingposses-sion-conditionsn thatconcept in terms fconditionsof tsself-ascriptionand other-ascription.n chapter 7 he argues thatphilosophical and psy-chological theoriesof conceptsmust nterpenetrate, nd thatthere existsan empiricalsolution to Wittgenstein's amous puzzle of rule following:one can explain primitivelyompellingtransitionsn termsof "subration-al" causal states.Finally,n chapter8 he claimsthathis theory fconceptscan demonstrate heunintelligibilityf certainphilosophicalconceptsandhypotheseswithout alling nto verificationism.SC is a rich, nuanced, and provocativephilosophical work;each of itsdensely argued chaptersmeritsfurther lose study.But in the space re-mainingI want to focus critically n what I take to be the fundamentalthesisof thebook, namely, he "Principleof Dependence":

There can be nothingmoretothe natureof a conceptthanwhat s determinedbya correct ccount of thecapacity f a thinkerwhohas masteredtheconceptto have propositional ttitudes o contentscontainingthatconcept. (5)

Thus a concept s individuatedy tspossession-condition. oreover, ccord-ing to the principleof "Distinctness f Concepts" (2), conceptsare to bediscriminatedy employment f the same criterion hatFregeuses fordis-criminatingenses: foreverydifferencen cognitivenformativenessnderfailure f truth-preservingntersubstitutionntoopaque contexts here s acorresponding ifferencen concepts.Conceptsare therebyntities hat refarmore fine-grainedhaneither ctual-world xtensions r properties.542


4/5

BOOK REVIEWSBut Peacocke's theory unshead-on into a problemthatmimicsthe fa-mous "Mates problem" (Mates 1950) in the theory fsynonymy:t system-

atically istinguishes etweenconcepts thatmustbe, on any ntuitivelyc-ceptable theoryof concepts,completely dentical.' For example, take theconceptsFURZE and GORSE; these are completelydentical oncepts fanyare (although nytwoconceptsexpressedby ntuitivelyynonymouseneraltermswilldo); in particular,hey re identicalbyvirtue fsharing hesame"conceptual microstructure,"amely,M = (spiny+ yellow+ flowered+evergreen+ shrub+ growson European wastelands).Now, as mentioned,Peacocke adopts a Fregeantestforconcept-discrimination.utwhile(1) A, an arbitrarilyhosen rational human thinker, everwonderseven for a splitsecond whetherfurze s furze

is certainly rue,(2) A, an arbitrarilyhosen rational human thinker, everwonderseven for a split second whetherfurze s gorse

is ust as certainly alse. For rationalhuman thinkersnever wonder evenfora splitsecond about instantiationsf the law of identityn the form"Fs are Fs." But any rational human thinker, ecause nonomniscient,could certainlywonder for ust a splitsecond whetherfurze s gorse. Soaccording to Peacocke's theory, URZE and GORSE must have differentpossession-conditions nd so be differentoncepts;but that s contrary othehypothesis.Can we give a diagnosis of Peacocke's "Mates problem"? It stems,think,preciselyfromhis attemptto create a holy alliance between Fre-gean semantics and cognitivenaturalism.Fregean contents are supersen-sitive o epistemicdifferencescrossequivalentbeliefs;yetnaturalizabilityrequires thatthese contents be able to enterdirectlynto physico-causalrelations. Peacocke's solution is to think of concepts as capacities-for-propositional-attitudes;ut this eems to have theunhappy resultofmak-ing themneither fishnor fowl.Antinaturalistsbout concepts (say,Kan-tians)will think hatPeacocke's concepts lack sufficientnternal tructureforconcept-analysis; nd thoroughgoing naturalistswill thinkthat Pea-cocke's concepts are too fine-grained or ntegration nto physico-causalroles. So Peacocke's theory s bound to please neithercamp: the allianceis unholy.2

ROBERTHANNAUniversityfColorado, oulder'Jerry odor notes the same difficultyn his 1993 (15).21would ike to thankChristopherhields ormanynterestingonversationsabout SC, and especiallyforhelpfulcommentson an earlierdraft f thisreview.

543


5/5

BOOK REVIEWSREFERENCES

Fodor,Jerry.993. "Unpackinga Dog." LondonReview fBooks7 October):14-15.Mates,Benson. 1950. "Synonymity." niversityf California ublicationsnPhilosophy,ol. 25. Berkeley:UniversityfCaliforniaPress, 201-26.Millikan,Ruth Garrett.1984. Language,Thought,nd other iologicalCate-gories. ambridge:MIT Press.Peacocke, Christopher. 983. Sense nd Content. xford:Oxford UniversityPress,Clarendon Press.. 1986. Thoughts. xford:Blackwell.

ThePhilosophicaleview, ol. 103,No. 3 (July 994)REPRESENTATION,MEANING,AND THOUGHT By GRANT GILLETT. Ox-ford: OxfordUniversity ress,Clarendon Press,1992. Pp. 213."Concepts and Generality," he titleof the first hapter,aptlydescribesthisbook as a whole: it is about concepts and it is general. Gillett ensiblyavoids the nastyproblemof sayingwhat a concept is by regarding grasp-ing a concept as primary nd the notion of a concept as an abstractionfrom that" (7). Graspinga concept allows one "both to group certainobjects n a principledway and to be able to reason about thatgrouping."This is a normative, ule-governedffair, ecause "in usinga concept oneacknowledges nd is answerableto a normwhich governswhetherone isrightor wrong n applying he concept" (8). Unfortunately,e are nevertoldwhat these rulesor normssay.For example,does the rule forapplyingthe concept yellowoone's canarydemand simply hat hecanarybe yellow,or is somethingmore substantial equired?Accordingto Gillett,whenone"can applytheconceptcorrectlyo a numberof objects,thenwe (and he)knowwhathe means by yellow'and it s clear thathe graspstheconcept"(13). However,what counts as applying he concept correctly epends onwhich concept is in question,and Gillettdoes not explainwhyyellows theone. Gillettneeds to distinguish ncorrectly pplyingthe concept yellowfromcorrectly pplyingsome other concept that shares some of its in-stances. t does not help to speak of "go[ing] on in the same way" (13)unless we know what counts as the same. Also, speakingof "the" conceptyellowmpliesthere s butone such concept.PerhapsGillett s referringothe meaning of theword 'yellow',assumingthere is one such thing,butto saythat"the cognitive ignificance f an expression s thewayofthink-ingabout or pickingout an object that s involved n a given thought boutthatobject" (141) does notexplainhow that oncept getstied to thatword.We learn onlythat"the cognitive ignificance f a term s thewaythat t

544

Documents

Hanna - Review of Peacocke