Flight Operations Communications 06/05/2015 Hangar Talk Delta Confidential and Proprietary Page 1 of 4

June 5, 2015

Previous Hangar Talk and Flight Standards Update articles are available via the “Line Lessons/Safety” link on the Flight Ops DeltaNet site.

Introduction

Hangar Talk is both about lessons learned and a confirmation of our professionalism. As professionals, we utilize our experiences to mitigate both the anticipated and unanticipated threats. As high achievers, many of us tend to internalize these issues. So our challenge is to share our experiences and our personal stories so that we can learn from each other—especially those situations that turned out to be a little more difficult than we might have anticipated.

This month’s Hangar Talk is about to two exceptional crews. Both crews utilized their outstanding stick and rudder proficiency, combined with excellent CRM and TEM skills to manage two very unique and complex non-normals.

B-717 ATL-SAV: Electrical Failure

This first event occurred during daylight IMC conditions. The First Officer was a new hire on his first OE rotation. The Atlanta departure weather was reported as obscured with 3,000’ RVR. Weather throughout the entire southeast was very similar. The logbook indicated that on the previous flight the right generator had failed during the takeoff roll resulting in a low speed RTO. On that previous flight after returning to the gate, the right electrical generator was placed on MEL and subsequently re-dispatched utilizing the left generator and the APU. That flight was completed uneventfully. (This aircraft also had a second MEL item for inoperative auto-spoilers).

Except for the extra time needed to review the MEL procedures, preflight, ground ops, and taxi-out were routine. With the RVR above the 1,600’ First Officer minimums, the Line Check Pilot permitted the new hire First Officer to be the Pilot Flying (PF). The takeoff was normal.

Still in IMC conditions, climbing through 8,000’ the crew reported hearing a loud thud. Concurrent with the thud, both flight directors biased out of view and the autopilot and autothrottles disconnected.

As the assigned PF, the new hire First Officer immediately assumed manual control of the jet. Because his Primary Flight Display (PFD) had failed, the First Officer was flying cross-cockpit using the Captain’s flight instruments. In fact, three of the six display units were blank. All had failed except the Captain’s PFD, ND, and Primary Engine Display.

The Captain declared an emergency, elected to climb to 14,000’ anticipating being above the clouds (which was not the case) and began to assess the source of the multiple failures. The Engine and Alert Display (EAD) displayed several fault messages, some of which were continuously disappearing and reappearing. Constant clicking and clunking noises occurred in the background. Since the First Officer had lost both his PFD and ND, the Captain wisely took over PF duties. The Captain later reported that his PFD had remained steady, but his flight director repeatedly cycled in and out-of-view. He then asked the First Officer to begin to find the appropriate QRH procedure while he coordinated

Hangar Talk

June 2015

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the emergency and possible divert options with ATC. Hand flying, communicating with ATC, coordinating the divert options and keeping the Flight Attendants informed made for a very busy cockpit. Next, the crew needed to make sense of the multiple status messages and determine what QRH procedure was appropriate to reference first.

The malfunction was clearly electrical, but with rapidly changing EAD messages and multiple display failures, the source of the problem was certainly not obvious.

The Captain ascertained that the continuous cycling of EAD messages had occurred because the main electrical buses were being repeatedly powered and unpowered. The Captain determined the core issue was with the right AC bus. The Captain directed his First Officer, with assistance from the jumpseat pilot, to accomplish the RIGHT GENERATOR OFF procedure.

After completing the RIGHT GENERATOR OFF QRH procedure, the Captain’s Flight Director and display units two and three returned to normal operation. All the First Officer’s displays remained blank. For some unexplained reason, multiple EAD messages continued to disappear and reappear with the exception of the auto-trim system, which was completely inoperative.

Although it appeared that the left generator remained on-line and the APU was still operating normally, the Captain noticed that the Emergency Power light was illuminated. This indicated that the main aircraft battery was being discharged. The 717 battery will provide standby power for approximately one hour.

At this point the Captain directed the First Officer to conduct the ENG FADEC ALTN QRH procedure and review the list of equipment available on emergency power to prepare for the possibility of further electrical failures.

Faced with the uncertain electrical condition, no autopilots, low visibility conditions throughout the Southeast, and an OE new hire pilot in the right seat, the Captain decided it was time to determine where to land. Coordinating with ATC and the OCC and informing the Flight Attendants and the passengers, the decision was made to return to ATL.

The N-A-T-S brief included that this would be a hand-flown, raw data, ILS approach to ATL Rwy 9R. Tower reported RVR was 2,600’. The approach and landing were uneventful. The Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) vehicles were dismissed after an external inspection was completed.

Maintenance replaced the following components: the right generator, left power conversion distribution contactor, left generator contactor, right generator relay, right bus tie and the electrical power control unit. A verification flight was then conducted with no abnormalities noted, and the aircraft was returned to service.

MD-88 DTW-ATL: Jammed Elevator on Takeoff

The second event involves a MD-88 departing from Detroit. The pilots had already flown two legs on this aircraft, the logbook was “clean” and there was no history of any flight control malfunctions. The daytime weather was VFR with 10 miles of visibility.

During the takeoff roll at approximately 110-120 knots (Vr was 141 knots), the Captain (who was PF), felt the aircraft pitch up prior to any elevator input. Due to the high speed and rapid acceleration, the Captain elected to continue the takeoff.

During liftoff the pitch up became excessive requiring forward yoke pressure and nose down trim to maintain a reasonable pitch attitude. The landing gear retracted normally. During initial climb, continued forward yoke pressure and additional nose down trim was needed to accelerate the aircraft. The aircraft felt very tail heavy. The Captain elected to retract the flaps and slats. After doing so, he reported that the flight controls began to feel “mushy” and the aircraft began to buffet. The Captain accelerated 250 knots and climbed to 9,000’. After he leveled off, he transferred control of the aircraft to the First Officer to confirm his assessment of the flight control problem. The First Officer confirmed that something was definitely abnormal.

Recognizing the potential seriousness of the situation, the Captain resumed control of the aircraft and asked the First Officer to declare an emergency. ATC provided vectors back towards Detroit and told them to maintain 9,000 feet. The Captain briefed the Flight Attendants on the intercom declaring a yellow emergency and not to expect an evacuation. The crew requested a 20 mile final to allow them the time to run all the required checklists and check aircraft controllability as they incrementally extended the flaps and slats. Prior to joining final, the First Officer made a PA to the passengers explaining the situation and informing them that they would land shortly.

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