Jai-Alai vs. BPI

66 SCRA 29, Aug. 6, 1975FACTS: Jai-Alai Corp. deposited with BPI the ten checks acquired from Ramirez, a sales

agent of the Inter-Island Gas and a regular jai-alai bettor. The checks were all payable

to Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. or order. Inter-Island Gas discovered that all the

indorsements made on the checks purportedly by its cashiers were forgeries. The

drawers of the checks demanded reimbursement from the drawee bank-banks, who in

turn demanded from BPI. BPI thus debited Jai-Alai's current account and forwarded to it

the checks containing the forged indorsements which the petitioner refused to accept.

ISSUE: Whether or not BPI had the right to debit the current account of Jai0Alai

Corporation.

HELD: YES. The court held that BPI acted within legal bounds when it debited the

petitioners account. When the holder deposits his check with the collecting bank, the

nature of the relationship created at that stage was one of agency, that is, bank was to

collect from the drawee of the checks the corresponding proceeds. Having indorsed the

checks to respondent bank, petitioner is deemed to have given the warranty prescribed

in Section 66 of the NIL that every single one of those checks is genuine and in all

respects what it purports to be.   Moreover, Jai Alai Corporation negligent in accepting

the checks without question from Antonio Ramirez, notwithstanding that the payee was

the Inter-Island Gas Services, Inc. and it did not appear that he was authorized to

indorse it.

PNB vs. Bartolome Picornell

G.R. Nos. L-18751/L-18915, September 26, 1922

FACTS: A bill of exchange was drawn by Picornell ordering its principal Hyndman, Tavera & Ventura (HTV) to pay PNB for the amount obtained by Picornell for the purchase of bales of tobacco in Cebu as per HTV’s instructions. The instrument was later on accepted by HTV, however HTV notified Picornell that upon their inspection of the tobacco there was a certain portion which was of no use and was damaged. Thereafter, HTV informed PNB that it refused to pay the BOE because of the noncompliance of the Picornell. Hence the bank brought this instant action.

ISSUE: Whether or not HTV is liable to pay the Bills of Exchange considering the bales of tobacco were of poor quality.

HELD: Yes. The court held that the fact that the tobacco was or was not of inferior quality does not concern the bank. Partial want of consideration, if it was, does not exist with respect to the bank which paid to Picornell the full value of said bill of exchange. The bank was a holder in due course, and was such for value full and complete. HTV cannot escape liability in view of section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. As to Picornell, he warranted, as drawer of the bill, that it would be accepted upon proper presentment and paid in due course, and as it was not paid, he became liable to the payment of its value to the holder thereof, which is the plaintiff bank. The drawee, the HTV company, or its successors, J. Pardo de Tavera, accepted the bill and is primarily liable for the value of the negotiable instrument, while the drawer Picornell, is secondarily liable. However, no question has been raised about this aspect of the responsibility of the defendants. The appellants are liable to PNB for the value of the bill of exchange

PNB vs. CA

25 SCRA 693, October 29, 1968

FACTS: On about January 15, 1962 Augusto Lim deposited in his current account with the PCIB GSIS Check No. 645915 in the sum of P57,415.00, drawn against the PNB. Upon clearing the amount was debited against the account of the GSIS in the PNB. Subsequently, or on January 31, 1962, upon demand from the GSIS, said sum of P57,415.00 was re-credited to the latter's account, for the reason that the signatures of its officers on the check were forged; and that, thereupon, or on February 2, 1962, the PNB demanded from the PCIB the refund of said sum, which the PCIB refused to do. Hence, the present action against the PCIB.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions relative to acceptance are applicable to checks.

HELD: No.. The Supreme court ruled that “in general, ‘acceptance,’ in the sense in which this term is used in the Negotiable Instrument Law is not required for checks, for the same are payable on demand Indeed, ‘acceptance’ and ‘payment’ are, within the purview of the said law, essentially different things, for the former is ‘a promise to perform an act,’ whereas, the latter is the ‘actual performance’ thereof. In the words of the law, ‘the acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer,’ which, in case of checks, is the payment, on demand, of a given sum of money. Upon the other hand, actual payment of the amount of checks implies not only an asset to said order of the drawer and recognition of the drawer’s obligation to pay the aforementioned sum, but, also, a compliance with such obligation”. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the warranties of an acceptor under Sec. 62 of the NIL apply to the drawee who paid without prior acceptance.

Ang Tiong vs. Ting

22 SCRA 713, 714, February 22, 1968]FACTS:On August 15, 1960: Lorenzo Ting issued a PBCom check payable to "cash or bearer" with Felipe Ang's signature (indorsement in blank) at the back thereof. The instrument was received by the Ang Tiong who presented it to the bank for payment. However the drawee bank dishonored. Ting made a written demand to both Ting and Ang to no avail. Hence Tiong filed a suit for collection. The lower court adjudged for Ang Tiong. Only Ang appealed to the CFI, however the court also ruled in favor of Ang Tiong. Thereafter Ang appealed with the CA which certified it to the Supreme Court because the issued raised are purely law. Ang in his appeal contend among others that he

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not Article 2071 of the Civil Code should apply to Ang’s liability.

2) Whether or Not Ang is a general endorser.

HELD: 1) NO. The court held that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument are

not controverted. That the appellee is a holder thereof for value is admitted. Having arisen from a bank check which is indisputably a negotiable instrument, the present case is, therefore, in so far as the indorsee is concerned vis-a-vis the indorser, governed solely plaintiff the Negotiable Instruments Law (see secs. 1 and 185). Article 2071 of the new Civil Code, invoked by the appellant, the pertinent portion of which states, "The guarantor, even before been paid, may proceed against the principal debtor; (1) when he is sued for the payment; . . . the action of the guarantor is to obtain release from the guaranty, to demand a security that shall protect him from any proceedings by the creditor . . .," is here completely irrelevant and can have no application whatsoever.

2) Yes. The Supreme Court is in agreement with the trial judge that nothing in the check in question indicates that the appellant is not a general endorser within the purview of the Negotiable instruments law which makes “a person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor" a general indorser, — "unless he clearly indicates plaintiff appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity," which he did not do. And section 66 ordains that "every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course" (a) that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; (b) that he has a good title to it; (c) that all prior parties have capacity to contract; and (d) that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting. In addition, "he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, and that if it be dishonored, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder."

People vs. Maniego

148 SCRA 30, February 27, 1987

FACTS: The accused Julia T. Maniego was indicted together with two (2) other persons for the crime of Malversation. She was inflicted as an indorser of the checks that were allegedly worthless. In the absence of evidence against her the court acquits her but civil liability was imposed on her. Hence Maniego appealed to the CA which certified the case the case to the Supreme Court since issue raised are questions of law.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or Not the acquittal of Maniego n the criminal case will absolve her

from the civil liabile2) Whether or not Maniego was a mere indorser hence could not be held liable

on account of dishonor of the checks.

HELD:1) No. The court held that contrary to her submission, Maniego’s acquittal on

reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation imputed to her and her two (2) co-accused did not operate to absolve her from civil liability for the reimbursement of the amount rightfully due to the Government as owner therefor. Her liability therefor could properly be adjudged, as it was so adjudged, by the Trial Court on the basis of the evidence before it, which adequately establishes that she was an indorser of several checks drawn by her sister, which were dishonored after they had been exchanged with cash belonging to the Government, then in the official custody of Lt. Ubay.

2) No. The court held that under the law, the holder or last indorsee of a negotiable instrument has the right to "enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon." 18 Among the "parties liable thereon" is an indorser of the instrument i.e., "a person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer, or acceptor ** unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity. " 19 Such an indorser "who indorses without qualification," inter alia "engages that on due presentment, ** (the instrument) shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it." 

Clark vs. Sellner

GR No. 16477, November 22, 1921

Facts: George Sellner, with WH Clarke and John Mave, signed a note in favor of RN Clark dated 1 July 1914 in Manila for the amount of P12,000. The note matured, but its amount was not paid. Sellner filed an action in alleging that he did not receive anything of value for the transaction, that the instrumnet was not presented to sellner for payment, and that Sellner, being an accommodation party is not liable unless the note is negotiated, which was allegedly not done.

Issue: Whether or not Sellner is an accommodation party liable for the note.

Held: Yes, the court held that Sellner, as one of the signers of the note, is one of the joint and several debtors on the note, and as such he is liable under Section 60 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. By putting his signature to the note, he lent his name, not to the creditor, but to those who signed with him placing himself with respect to the creditor in the same position and with the same liability as the said signers. It should be noted that the phrase”without receiving value therefore” as used in section 29 means “without receiving value by virtue of the instrument” and not, as it apparently is supposed to mean, “without receiving payment for lending his name.”  It is immaterial as far as the creditor is concerned, whether one of the signers has or has not received anything in payment for the use of his name. In this case, the legal situation of Sellner is that of a joint surety who upon the maturity of the note, pay the debt, demand thecollateral security and dispose of it to his benefit. As to the plaintiff, he is a holder for value