HalpernThe Ideology of Silence_ Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier the Ideology of Silence_ Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier

7/27/2019 HalpernThe Ideology of Silence_ Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier the Ideology of Sile

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The Ideology of Silence: Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious FrontierAuthor(s): Charles J. HalperinSource: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 442-466Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/178551

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The Ideology of Silence: Prejudiceand Pragmatism on the MedievalReligious FrontierCHARLES J. HALPERINIndianapolis,IndianaHistorians have long debated the importanceof religion as a determiningfactor in relations between Christiansand Muslimsduringthe Middle Ages.On the one hand, each side consigned adherentsof the enemy's religion toeternal damnation.Religious animosityprovidedthe casus belli of crusadeandjihad; Christianand Muslim met each other on the field of battle withgreatfrequency.On the otherhand, Christian-Muslim elationsalso includedpeaceful commerce, institutionalborrowing, and even culturalexchange.Christians and Muslims spent more time fighting their coreligionists thanmakingwar on each other. Churchescontinuedto exist in the lands of Islam,and mosques survived under Christianrule as well. Such evidence has ledsome historiansto minimize the degree to which religious intolerance nflu-enced Christian-Muslim ontactsduringthe MiddleAges.Militaryconflict led to the creationof conquest societies in which rulersandruledpracticedrival exclusivist religions. In such situationsthe intensityof Christian-Muslim nteraction increased as a result of intimate physicalproximity. Frontier/conquest ocieties, therefore,providean excellent modelfor examiningthe interplaybetween the biases of religiousexclusivism andthe unavoidableexigencies of intractablereality. Catholics and Moors inSpain, Byzantinesandvarious Arab and Turkicpeoples,FrenchcrusadersandMuslimsin Palestine, and RussiansandMongols hadno choice butto recon-cile the ideological imperative of religious antagonismwith the inevitablecompromises of involuntarycoexistence, peaceful or no.2 In general thefrontier functioned as a zone across which mutual influences flowed rather

I For example, Robert S. Lopez, TheBirth of Europe (London, 1966), 75-76, 78-81.2 In each of the cases studied in this article, a religiousfrontiercoincided with anethnicone,that is, a people of one religion conquereda foreign people of another. There were medievalfrontiers,of course, which involvedpeoplesof the samereligion,forexample,CatholicNormansand Anglo-Saxons;peoples of different branchesof the same religion in schism, for example,Catholiccrusadersand the Byzantinesafter the FourthCrusade;''orthodox" and "heretics,"such as CatholicHungaryand Bogomil Bosnia or Sunniand Shi'ite Muslims;or Christiansand"pagans," such as Germans and Lithuaniansor Slavs. The phenomenonof Christian-Muslim0010-4175/84/3559-6362 $2.50 ? 1984 Society for ComparativeStudyof Society andHistory442


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 443thanas a barrieror boundary.3Differinghistorical circumstances n each ofthese four cases produced different configurationsof friendly and hostilerelationsin each society, and to some extent each situationretaineduniquefeatures. However, the common problems of religious conquest societiescreateenough similarityto justify comparisonand generalization.Thepolaritybetweenreligious prejudiceandpeaceful pragmatismprovidesa useful heuristic frameworkwithin which to analyze medieval Christian-Muslimrelations,but not a viable answerto the questionas to the natureofthe impactof religionon those relations. Few examplesof unrestrained atredor massacre and exterminationof the infidel occurred;and totally peacefulcooperationdevoid of any religious tension was rarely if ever achieved.Christian-Muslim elations invariable fell somewhere between the two ex-tremes,and it is the complexity andsubtletyof the resultingmosaicof mixedrelationswhich arouses scholarlycuriosity. A common patterndoes emergefrom the four cases of medieval religious conquest society, an ubiquitousmethod of mitigatingthe conflict between theoretical hatredand practicingtolerance,betweenopen warfareand institutionalborrowing,betweenpreju-dice andpragmatism.That common resolutionof the tension between beliefand realitywas the ideology of silence.The Christianreconquista of Spain from Islam led to the creation of thethirteenth-centuryrusaderkingdomof Valencia, the best-knownexampleofthe intensive relations betweenCatholicand Moor in medieval Spain.4 Kingfrontiersocieties, to my knowledge, never involvedthe same people, but that is verydifficulttoimagine since religion figured so heavily in the self-consciousness of medieval social groups.I am using ethnic and people here merely as generic terms without a specific conceptualcontent, largely to avoid dealing with the questionof medieval nationsand nationalism.Recent researchby social anthropologists uggests that ethnic groups develop not in isolationbut in interaction with other ethnic groups. See FrederickBarth, "Introduction," in EthnicGroupsand Boundaries: The Social Organizationof CultureDifference, FrederickBarth,ed.(Boston, 1969), 9-38.3 Owen Lattimoredevelopedtheconceptof the frontieras a zone to describerelationsbetweenthe Chinese and their Inner Asian nomadic neighbors. See Owen Lattimore, "China and theBarbarians," n Empirein the East, JosephBarnes,ed. (GardenCity, New York, 1934), 3-36;idem, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Boston, 1962); idem, Studies in FrontierHistory. Col-lected Papers, 1928-1958 (London, 1962), especially "The Frontierin History," 469-91.The dynamicsof Inner Asian empire building, in which a pastoralnomadicpeople acquiredsedentary ubjects,overlaptheprocessesof religiousfrontierconquest analyzed n thisessay, butdemandseparatetreatment.4 Robert Ignatius Bums, S.J.: "Journey from Islam. IncipientCultural Transition in theConqueredKingdomof Valencia(1240-1280)," Speculum,35:3 (1960), 337-56; "Social Riotson the Christian-MoslemFrontier:Thirteenth-Century alencia," AmericanHistoricalReview,66:3 (1960-1961), 778-800; "The Friars of the Sack in Valencia," Speculum, 36:3 (1961),435-38; "The Organizationof a Medieval CathedralCommunity:The Chapterof Valencia(1238-1280)," ChurchHistory, 31:1 (1962), 14-23; "The Parishas a FrontierInstitution nThirteenth-CenturyValencia," Speculum, 37:2 (1962), 244-51; "Les hospitalesdel reino deValencia en el sigle xiii," Annuario de estudios mediaevalis, 2 (1965), 135-54 [English-lan-guage summary, 751-52]; "A Medieval Income Tax: The Tithe in the Thirteenth-Century


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444 CHARLES J. HALPERINJames I of Arago-Catalonia 1208-76) conqueredand ruled Valencia as acolonialist,imperialistconquestsociety. In his autobiographyndpropagandahe presentedhimself as a crusader,expelling the Moors from Valencia andpurging t of theirevil, but his behavior did not consistentlyconform to thisimage. To minimize the cost of conquest in men and money he perforceproceeded more by negotiationthan force of arms. He fancied himself anexperton the Moors. Farfromdecryingthe elaborateetiquetteandceremonialuponwhichthe Moors insistedin theirnegotiations,he delighted nparticipat-ing knowledgeably n these infidelways. Rather handeporting heMoors, heissued sweeping guarantees of their political autonomy, religious invio-lability,and socioeconomic rightsin orderto inducethemto surrender.Mer-chantskepttheirquarters,villages theirlands, andnobles theircastles. Islambecame a licit religion in ChristianValencia.Catholicsconstitutedless than 15 percentof the populationof thirteenth-centuryValencia. Inevitably hey had to take much of Moorish Valenciaas itwas, producinga profound symbiosis of institutions. The Catholics retainedthe topographyof existing cities andvillages, provincialdivisions, the irriga-tionsystem,houses, anddwellings. Moorishtaxes, includingeverything romKingdomof Valencia," Speculum,41:3 (1966), 438-52; The CrusaderKingdomof Valencia:Reconstructionon a Thirteenth-Centuryrontier, 2 vols. (Cambridge,Mass., 1967); "Un mon-asterio-hospitaldel sigle xiii: San Vicente de Valencia," Annuariode estudios mediaevalis, 4(1968), 75-108 [English-language ummary,752]; "IrrigationTaxes in EarlyMudejarValencia:The Problem of the Alfarda," Speculum, 44:4 (1969), 560-67; "How to End a Crusade:Techniques orMakingPeace in theThirteenth-Century ingdomof Valencia," MilitaryAffairs,35:3 (1971), 142-48; "Bathsand Caravansariesn CrusaderValencia," Speculum,46:3 (1971),443-58; "Christian-IslamicConfrontationn the West: The Thirteenth-Century ream of Con-version," AmericanHistorical Review, 76:5 (1971), 1386-1434; "The SpiritualLife of Jamesthe Conqueror,King of Arago-Catalonia,1208-1276. PortraitandSelf-Portrait,"Catholic His-toricalReview,62:1 (1976), 1-35; "Renegades,Adventurers,andSharpBusinessmen:TheThir-teenth-CenturySpaniardin the Cause of Islam," Catholic Historical Review, 58:3 (1972),341-66; Islam under the Crusaders: Colonial Survival in the Thirteenth-Century ingdomofValencia (Princeton, 1973); "Le royaume chr6tiende Valence et ses vassaux musulmans,"Annales:economies, societes, civilisations, 28:1 (1973), 199-225; "SpanishIslam inTransition:AcculturativeSurvival and Its Price in the Christian Kingdom of Valencia," in Islam andCulturalChange in the Middle Ages, Speros Vryonis, Jr., ed. (Wiesbaden, 1975), 87-105;"Immigrantsfrom Islam: The Crusaders'Use of Muslims as Settlers in Thirteenth-CenturySpain," AmericanHistoricalReview 80:1 (1975), 21-42; "The Muslims in the ChristianFeudalOrder TheKingdomof Valencia, 1240-1280)," Studies in MedievalCulture,5 (1975), 105-26;"The MedievalCrossbow as SurgicalInstrument:An IllustratedCase History," Bulletinof theNew YorkAcademy of Medicine, 48 (1972), 983-89; Medieval Colonialism: Post-CrusadeExploitationof Islamic Valencia(Princeton,1976); "Mud6jarHistoryToday," Viator,8 (1977),128-43; "The Realms of Aragon:New Directions n MedievalHistory," MidwestQuarterly,18(1977), 225-39; and "Socioeconomic StructureandContinuity:MedievalSpanishIslam in theTax Recordsof CrusaderValencia," in The Islamic MiddleEast, 700-1900: Studies nEconomicand Social History, A. L. Udovitch, ed. (Princeton,1981), 251-28. Also, ElenaLourie, "FreeMoslems in the Balaeries under Christian Rule in the ThirteenthCentury," Speculum,45:4(1970), 624-49; JohnBoswell, The Royal Treasure:MuslimCommunitiesunder the CrownofAragon in the FourteenthCentury(New Haven, 1977); James Powers, "FrontierMunicipalBaths and Social Intercourse n Thirteenth-Century pain," AmericanHistorical Review 84:3(1979), 649-67.


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 445

licensing fees, rents, and monopoliesto currency,continuedin force. Jameseven issued some coins in Arabic. To keep the recordshe employed manyArabic-speakingMoors. In addition, Jews played a pervasiverole as inter-mediariesbetween Catholicsand Muslims. Christians raded,often in contra-band of war, with unconqueredMuslimsin Spainand North Africa. Christianmercenariesand adventurers requentlysoughtlivelihoods in Moorishlands,although heyfacedexcommunication f they servedas soldiersagainstfellowChristians. Some Catholics superficiallyadoptedthe ways of the Moors indress, food, and names. Since few Catholics seemed willing to migratetoValencia,James of necessity invited Moors to settlehis underpopulated ing-dom. The Pope foundthis anomalyintolerableandthreatened o excommuni-cate the king unlesshe revokedhis invitation.James had to accede, but, as heexpected and to his pleasure,his nobles refused to expel Moorishimmigrantswho had already arrivedin Valencia, and their taxes continued to fill hiscoffers.In the meantime the Catholic Churchbuilt a complete institutionalestab-lishment n Valenciaandinaugurated vigorousmissionarycampaign,led bypreacherswho had learned Arabic. The few Muslim intellectuals who de-fected to Christianity ed the Catholic illusion that no intelligentMoor wouldpreferIslam afterhavingbeen exposed to Christianity.Some Moors convert-ed for motives unrelated to genuine religious sentiment: avoidance of thegallows or criminal punishment,or the lure of materialadvancement. Theapostasy of some Catholics in Moorish service to Islam, fear of the stakenotwithstanding,horrifiedthe Church. When attemptsat rapprochement ndthe peaceful dissemination of Christianity among the Muslim populationfailed, the Catholicsswitchedto moremilitantpolicies. Missionaries n Mus-lim landssought, often successfully, the crownof martydom;n Valencia thebells in mosques converted to churches rang out a message of Christiansuperiorityo Islamrootedin nakedpower. Moorspaidthe tithe whichfundedmuchCatholicactivity and Moors constitutedthe overwhelmingmajorityofthepopulationof Valencia,but CatholicChurchrecordsrarelymentionthem.The Churchavoided confrontingthe unseemly realityof continuedMuslimpresence in crusaderValencia by the simplest possible expedient-silence.TheMoorishelite continued o thinkof itself as Muslim. AlthoughMoorishintellectual life had begun to decline before the Catholic conquest, Islamretained he loyaltyof its adherents.Fromthe Moorishpointof view, the stateof Muslim-Christianelations left muchto be desired. The CatholicSpaniardnobles did perceive the indigenousMoorish elite as their social equals, ac-cepted them as vassals, and even permittedsome Moorishnobles to be dub-bed. The similarityof chivalricnotions of honor and valor sharedby knightsof both faiths facilitatedsuch interaction. But other attemptsto respectandmaintainMorrish nstitutionsbackfired.King JamestransformedMuslim ur-ban andruralcommunalinstitutions nto legal corporations,a conceptalien to


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446 CHARLES J. HALPERINMuslims, because this status correspondedto Catholic perceptions andcustom. James also acted as the inheritorof the legal rightsof the Moorishauthorities;his meddlingin Moorish courtsprobablyundermined hem morethanbenign neglect would have. The variousattemptsat concession did notsatisfythe Moorisharistocracy,which couldnotresist thetemptationo revoltagainstCatholicauthority.A seriesof bloody rebellions led to the liquidationof Moorish castles and the obliteration of the Moorish aristocracy. TheMoors had receivedtoo manyprivilegesfromKing James to reconcile them-selves to the loss of political power, especially to infidels, andeven a sharedchivalricethos could not preventcivil war. Death or exile faced the unsuc-cessful rebels, andas a result of internalviolence, manyMoorishmerchants,scholars, nobles, and clergy voluntarilyleft Valencia for lands still underMuslimpoliticalauthority.The Catholics did notregrettheirdeparture;oler-ation of continuedMoorishpresence in Valenciaderived fromnecessity, notpreference.Defenseless peasantswere the only Moors who remained n Val-encia; after several generations they became genuine Mudejars, MuslimsunderChristianrule. Deprived of theirreligiousandpolitical leadershipandsubordinated o an alien faith, the Moors saw theirpositiondeterioratemoreand more.The Mudejarsbecame an oppressedminority. In the fourteenthcenturythey enjoyedroyalprotectionas a functionof their subservienceto the royaltreasury.During wartime, they were the group hurt most because of theirvulnerability.The kings did little to interdictconstantandviolentharassmentby hostile Catholics. In additionto victimizationby robbers,bandits,rapists,and extortionists,Muslim and even convertedChristianMoors fell prey tomassive urbanriots. The putative insincerityof their conversion providedChristian ioterswith the excuse to pillage ChristianMoors;RobertI. Burns,S. J., concludesthat ethnichatred urvivedandsuperseded upposedreligiousfellowship. The fines which the king imposedupon the offendingcities pro-vided financialrestitution o him but scant solace to the Mudejars.In this new stage of Catholic-Moorishrelations, social interactioncouldstill be intense,but now it reinforcedMudejar nferiority.Forexample, jointindulgenceof Moorishhouses of prostitutiononly contributedo the Catholicopinionof Moorsas immoralandof all Moorishwomen as fairgame. Usageof communalbaths,a Moorishinstitutioncopiedby theCatholics,mighthavegenerateda levelling effect, but instead the authoritiesprescribedseparatedays for Christianand Muslim use. Nothing inhibited the furtherexpressionof religious antagonism; ntolerancereachedits apex in the expulsionof theMoors from early modernSpainby Ferdinandand Isabella.The transient ynthesisandrough-and-readyoleranceof thirteenth-centuryValencia best illustratesboth the possibilities and inherent imitationsof themedievalreligious frontier. The garbledArabiclegal formulasin documentsin the Valencianarchives,ethnicpluralism,permission or Moorsto swearon


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 447the Koran,continuousborrowingof institutions,and intimatecontactacrossan all-too-openboundary-these productsof the moment, concessions dic-tatedby necessity, did not reflectgenuinetoleration.No Catholic n Valencia,includingKing James, could have concluded thatMoorish Islam had as muchright to exist as Catholic Christianity.Circumstancemade the licitness ofIslam and respect for Moorish custom and institutions,coexistence itself,merely unavoidable, not preferable.Burns concludes: "As if they were abattlingmarriedcouple, basically incompatible yet unable to disengage, thetwo worlds lived side by side, eruptingor subsidingin eccentricschedule."5Christianityand Islam in Spainwere "basically incompatible"because nei-ther recognized the ideological legitimacy of the other. In the long run,divorceprovedfeasible. Earlymodem Spainamassedthepreponderant owerto impose, at whatevercost, forced conversionor expulsion upon its Mude-jars. Neither the friendliness nor the hostility between Moor and Catholicshouldbe minimized or exaggerated.Bums perceptivelyobserves thatmedi-eval man had no less a capacityfor contradiction hanmodern,but when hecould resolve the contradictionby fiat, he preferredbigoted action to hypo-critical toleration.

Ultimatelyhatredoutranand overwhelmedcooperation n Spain, or, to putit anotherway, prejudiceoutweighedpragmatism.It could hardlyhave beenotherwise. Religiously motivated military conquest threw the adherents oftwo exclusivist religions into intimate and intense contact. A decline in re-ligious affiliationor overridingcircumstancescould only delay the inevitableexplosion. Yet the degree of compromise, of de facto tolerationandtempo-raryculturalosmosis, remains impressive. The delicate balance of the re-ligious frontier could not survive the homogenizing and integratingforcesunleashedby the process of building a nation-state n early modem Spain,when even Moriscos (or Marranos), et alone Mudejars or Jews), could findno room for themselves in the new monarchy.Ideologicalsilence girdedthe edifice of frontier oleration or as long as itendured.A rationaledid exist for the continuedexistence of Muslims in landsacquired or the statedpurposeof expellingthe infidelfaith, namelytradition.Inthe lands of SpanishIslam, tolerationof religiousminoritieshad an ancientlineage. King James merely perpetuated he patternof multireligioussocialcoexistence which he found in Valencia, reversingthe roles of politicallydominant and politically subordinatefaiths. Necessity dictatedthat not allMoors be expelled, even that furtherMoorish immigrationbe sought:whoelse but Moors could pay for the Christianstate and Church of Valencia?Canon law even supplied a half-heartedand thoroughlyanemicjustificationfortolerationof Islam underChristianrule: forced conversions to Christianitylacked legitimacy. One had to tolerate Islam until the Muslims voluntarily

5 Bums, Islam under the Crusaders, xiii.


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448 CHARLES J. HALPERIN

adoptedthe true faith. During this unfortunateand, it was expected, briefperiod,Muslims were forbidden o insultChristianity r interferewithChris-tian missionaryactivities, two almost impossiblecaveats from the point ofview of Muslim piety.6 In practicethe distinction between persuasionandcoercionoften became blurred.Inanyevent, the Catholicpowersof Valenciararely invoked tradition,necessity, or the carefullyconstructedniceties ofcanon law; silence better served to mitigate the contradictionbetween theobvious demands of crusader ethos and prejudiceand the requirementsofeveryday life in Spain."Feudal" normsplayed more of a role in facilitatingsocial compromisebetween Christiansand Moors than has been creditedto them. Social elitismlenta much-soughtrespectability,elegance, andgraceto theotherwisepoten-tially tawdryprocess of surrenderand negotiatinga modus vivendi. Honestfriendships, certainly social respect and intimacy, could develop in suchcircumstances. But such social interactioncould not breachthe wall of re-ligiousexclusivism. A Christianmightadmirea Moor for his moralqualities,butonly with the qualification hat suchqualitiesexisteddespite, notbecauseof, his adherenceto Islam. The decency of individual Muslims could notinfluencetheprevailingcontemptforIslamas a religion. It was notnecessaryto articulate his ubiquitousprejudice n every social context, yet it set abso-lute limits upon the viability of social understandingn Spain.Religion also restrictedcultural and intellectualcontact between Christianand Muslim. The demandsof imposinga new politicalorderandestablishingan ecclesiastical structure n thirteenth-centuryValencia left little time forculturalactivity, but Spain as a whole served as the intermediarybetweenCatholicEuropeandthe world of Islam in culture. Evaluationsof the impactof ArabiclearninguponChristianEuropevary, yet all analysesof the subjectattest to the obstacles createdby religious attitudes.The Arabsperhapscon-tributed omewhat to medieval Christianart andarchitecture,but theirinflu-ence here was greatestin the minor arts andcrafts, such as tapestries,whichhad the least to do with religious ideology. High culture evolved aroundreligion, and the taint of infidel Islam precluded very much borrowingorinfluence. Claims have been advanced for the connection between Arabicpoetry and that of Provence, or even for Muslim antecedentsof Dante, buttheyremain nconclusive or worse. The most-cited areaof Arab influenceonChristianculture s in the transmissionof classical Greeklearning, especiallyphilosophyandscience. The ambiguitiesanddifficultiesencompassed n thatprocess require more emphasis than they have received. Defenders of re-ligious orthodoxysuspectedthoseintellectualswho studied hepaganphiloso-phy, and even more so since they thereby exposed themselves to the per-nicious influence of Islamic intermediaries. Christian Aristotelians came

6 FrederickH. Russell, TheJust War in the MiddleAges (Cambridge,1975).


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 449underclose scrutinyby Churchauthoritiesbothfor studyingAristotle andforstudyinghim in Arabicdress. However, ChristianphilosophersstudiedAra-bic commentarieson Aristotle,not the Koranor the Shar'iat,andno Christianever applied Arabic learning to Christiantheology or canon law. Arabicscientific texts often hadto be purgedof illustrativematerialwhich was "tooMuslim." Indeed,Muslim Aristoteliansoften raninto troublewith their ownreligiousauthorities,and all studentsof classical learningon both sidesof thereligiousfrontierrisked accusationsof heresy andpracticeof impermissibleastrology. Any contact with the infidel threatenedadherenceto one's ownfaith,butexposureto culturalproductsreflectiveof infidel religionautomati-cally impugnedthe exclusive legitimacy of the true faith and deserved theseverestcondemnation. Muslim transmissionof the classical Greekheritagein philosophy and science to ChristianEurope in the Middle Ages did notdiminish religious antagonismbetween Christianand Muslim; the transfertook place in an atmosphereof general suspicion and despite the religioushostilityof the frontier.7In Catholic Valencia not even King James could offer an ideological de-fense of borrowingof Muslimpolitical, fiscal, administrative,andeconomicinstitutions.As far as I cantell, he nevertriedto do so. Indeed,silence on thisfeatureof the Christian-Muslim smosis in Valenciaso dominatedall writtenrecordsthatinvariablyonly the Arabicnameof a tax or institution estifiestoits Muslim origin. Obviously-then and now-convenience alone dictatedsuch institutionalborrowing;apparentlyan admissionof suchopportunismnthe face of the religiouslyinspiredrejectionof all Muslimpracticescould notbe tolerated. The ideology of silence reigned supreme in this significantsphereof Christian-Moorishontact in Valencia and Spain.Despite its individual historicalfeatures, the patternof Christian-Muslimrelations in Spain-the interplayof prejudiceand pragmatismand the func-tion of the ideology of silence-fits the other examples of the medievalreligious frontier.Mortalcombat and intense contact characterized elationsbetweentheByzan-tine empire and Muslims from the eruptionof the Arabs out of the desert inthe seventh century until the conquest of Constantinopleby the OttomanTurks in 1453. Byzantino-Muslimrelationsmay be divided into periods:theArab phase, comprising first the Umayyad dynasty, and after 750 the Ab-

7 Gustave E. von Grunebaum,Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation(Chicago,1953), especially 1-63; HamiltonGibb, "The Influence of Islamic Cultureon MedievalEurope,"Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 38:1 (September 1955), 82-98; F. Gabrieli, "TheTransmissionof Learningand LiteraryInfluence to WesternEurope," CambridgeHistory ofIslam(Cambridge,1970), II, 851-89; RichardLemay,AbuMa'shar andLatinAristotelianismnthe TwelfthCentury.TheRecovery of Aristotle's NaturalPhilosophy throughArabicAstrology(Beirut, 1962);Aziz S. Atiya, Crusade,Commerceand Culture(Bloomington, 1962), especially205-50, 257-61.


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basid;and the Turkicphase, underthe Seljuks, thentheTurkmen,andfinallythe Ottomans. Within these subdivisionsof Byzantino-Muslimcontact areabidingelements of the patternof Christian-Muslimelations found in Spainandelsewhere on the medieval religious frontier.8Withastonishingspeedthe Arabtribesmenconquered herichestprovincesof the Byzantine empire-Syria, Palestine, andEgypt. Naturally hey turnedto indigenousinstitutions n order to governtheirnewly acquired erritories.The Umayyad dynasty has with some merit been labelled neo-Byzantine,since it copied manyof the accoutrementsof Byzantinebureaucratic utocra-cy: taxes, weightsandmeasures,chancelleryandtreasurypractices,the Cop-tic or SyriacChristian cribes to maintain he accountbooks, cities, garrisons,administrativeunits and divisions, coinage, granaries, corvee, the roads,postal system, vocabularyof agriculture,commerce, crafts, music, law, im-perial palaces and their decoration(despite the Muslim prohibition againstpictorialrepresentation f the humanform), monuments,ceremonial,imperi-al rescripts,even rhetoric and reasoning. ChristianSemitic (not Greek)bu-reaucratic adresran mostgovernmentalmachinery.Inshort,Byzantinepolit-ical, economic, administrative,egal, andartistic nfluenceson the Umayyaddynastystronglyshapedits organizationand functioning.The new Muslimempireof the Umayyadsowed much of its structureandethos to the ChristianByzantine empire it had displaced.The Arabs had noprevious experience in controlling such impressive agriculturaland urbanareas; hey had little choice but to imitate and continue thepre-Arabpractice.Theirneophytestatusalone, however, does notconstitutea complete explana-tion of their imitativeproclivities;the SpanishCatholicswho conqueredVal-encia also preferredto use Moorish institutions instead of importingandimposingthosethey utilizedin otherregionsof Spain.Thedemographicsandpoliticsof frontierconquestdictated hatit was considerablymorepractical oprolong the institutions to which the majorityof one's subjects were ac-customed than to restructuresociety and governmentfrom scratchfrom aposition of numerical inferiority.The use of ethnoreligiousintermediariessoftened the process somewhat;just as the Spanish Catholics in Valencia

8 Speros Vryonis, Jr.: "Isadore Glabas and the Turkish 'Devshirme,'" Speculum, 31:3(1956), 433-43; "ByzantineCircus Factions and the Islamic FutuwwaOrganizations Neaniai,Fityan,Ahdath),"ByzantinischeZeitschrift,58:1 (1965), 45-59; "SeljukGulamsandOttomanDevshirmes," Der Islam, 41 (1965), 224-52; "Byzantium and Islam, Seventh-SeventeenthCenturies," East European Quarterly, 2:3 (1968), 205-40; "The Byzantine Legacy and Ot-toman Forms," DumbartonOaks Papers, 23-24 (1969-70), 253-308; "Byzantine AttitudestowardIslamduringthe Late MiddleAges," Greek,RomanandByzantineStudies, 12:2(1971),263-86; The Decline of Medieval Hellenismin Asia Minor and the Process of Islamizationromthe Eleventhto the FifteenthCenturies(Berkeley, 1971); "Religious ChangeandContinuity nthe Balkans and Anatoliafromthe Fourteenth o the SixteenthCenturies,"inIslamand CulturalChange, Vryonis, ed., 127-40; and "Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor,"DumbartonOaksPapers, 29 (1975), 41-71. Also, AnthonyBryer, "Greeks and Tirkmen: ThePontic Exception," DumbartonOaksPapers, 29 (1975), 113-48.


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relied on Jews, so the Umayyads employed EasternChristianSemites. Si-lence alone rationalizedsuch institutionalborrowingandco-optationof per-sonnel from the infidel.Like the Moorish influenceon Valencia, Byzantineinfluence on the Arabempire,no matterhow pervasive, provedtransient.In 750 the Abbasiddynas-ty shiftedthe capitalfrom Damascus to Baghdad.This relocation resultedinanincreasingPersian nfluenceanda morevibrantand consistentIslamizationof the Arabempire. Christianofficials now had to convert or resign;someByzantineforms gave way to Persian ones. Trilingualintermediaries,oftenJews as well as Arabic-speakingEasternChristians,now suppliedthe Ab-basidempire with the intellectual riches of classical Greece, as preserved nByzantium. Ancient Greek literatureandphilosophy, science, and medicinefound fertile soil in Muslim civilization. Nevertheless, the obstacles andrestraintson this culturaltransmission oreshadow those of the later Muslimre-transmissionof the classical heritageto ChristianEurope.Muslim intellectualsutilized the technical studies of ByzantineChristianscholars to assimilate the ancient Greek learning. Just as Aristotelianismitself, with its integralattitudestoward faith andreason, natureandphiloso-phy, arousedsuspicionin the world of Islam, so the Christian nvironment nwhich it entered Muslim civilization furthercomplicated matters. Muslimthinkersdemonstratedratherlittle interest in Christianity tself, not out oftolerancebut the indifferenceborn of supremeconfidence in the eventualuniversal disseminationof Islam. Muslim authors might present accuratedescriptivedata on Christiansocieties in encyclopediasandgeographies,butwithoutinterpolatingany positive judgmentsof Christianityas a religion. AMuslimmighteven admire or respecta Christianclergyman,but the religionof the infidel did not therebyearnany kudos. MuslimspraisedChristiansorlearnedfrom Christian ntellectuals in the same way that ChristianspraisedMuslims or learnedfrom Muslim intellectuals-despite theirreligion.The unavoidablecoexistenceof the Byzantineand Arabempiresproducedpragmaticcompromisesakin to those in Spain. A hybridsociety aroseon themilitary rontier,which foundliteraryexpressionin theepic Digenis Akritas.9Intermarriage,bilingualism,trade, chivalricequality, and migrationof peo-ples characterizedByzantino-Muslim elations. Suchfriendly nteraction venhad its parallelin internationalaffairs. Byzantiumand the caliphatecooper-atedin manning oint garrisons n the Caucasusagainstcommon foes and inseekingto restrain he increasingdepredationsof the Seljuksand Turkmen nAnatolia. In diplomaticexchange, Constantinople reatedBaghdadwith thesame grudgingequality it usually accorded to the Great Power which heldPersia, a concession to reality, despite Byzantine imperial theory, which

9 J. Mavrogordato, d. andtrans.,Digenis Akritas Oxford, 1956). HamiltonGibb assertsthatthere is no equivalentArabic-languageepic.


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452 CHARLES J. HALPERINcontinuedthe patternset with the Sassanids, or by Rome and the Parthiansbefore that. Common sense and necessity justified such behavior;neitherrationalefoundwidespreadarticulation.Neitherprovincialnor centralpragmaticattitudes oward the Arabempirecould, however, intrude nto the official Byzantineview of Islam. Accordingto ByzantineChristianreligiousprejudice,Islam was a pseudo-religion, dol-atrous and polytheistic, which advocatedsex and violence, practiceda sillyritual,could claim no miracles,andhad been siredby a false prophet.It waslegalisticand basedupona scripturewritten n the wrongliterary orm. Islamas a religionhadnothingto be said for it.10WhenMuslim doctorsof theologydeignedto discuss Christianityat all, as in religiousdebates, they began byattacking he Byzantinesas polytheistsbecauseof the doctrineof the Trinity,and proceededfrom there. Pragmaticcooperationhad no impacton the im-ages Christianityand Islam held of each other.Seljuk and Turkmenpressure upon the Byzantine citizenry of Anatoliaincreasedunderthe Ottomans,who slowly annexed Asia Minor,Turkicizingand Islamizing its population. Deprived of their fleeing aristocracyandchurchhierarchy,the Greekand Hellenized non-Greekpopulationconvertedto Islamfor the usual varied reasons:economic advantage,religiousconvic-tion, social mobility, aesthetics, fear, and duress. The mystic, missionary,and activist dervish orders played a central role in stimulatingapostasy,because dervish Islam drew heavily from the indigenous folk religion. Itretained he holy men, holy trees, holy sites, andmagicalpracticesof Anat-olia which theological puristsof both sides derided as superstition.A Chris-tian monkwho became a disciple of a dervishholy manillustrates he degreeof religiouseclecticismachievedin Anatolia.Thereceptivityof dervish Islamto the folk religion which preceded even Christianity n Anatoliano doubtfacilitated its spread.Trebizondremained mmuneto theprocessesof Islamicization n Anatolia.Safe behind ts mountain ittoral,thepoliticaland ecclesiastical elite remainedin place. It assiduouslycultivated the Turkiclanguage, intermarriage, om-merce with the nomads, and ecological cooperation: he same pasturesser-viced nomad andfarmer n differentseason. As a result,Christianityurvivedand Greek-speakingOrthodoxChristianscontinuedto inhabit the region.The nomadic Ottomansenjoyedthe statusof ghazi, warriorsof thejihad.They carried he holy warof Islaminto the heartof CentralEurope.12But in

10 John Meyendorff, "Byzantine Views of Islam," Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 18 (1964),113-32.11 Claude Cahen. Pre-Ottoman Turkey.A General Survey of the Material and SpiritualCultureandHistoryc. 1071-1330, J. Jones-Williams, rans.(New York, 1968), portrays muchlower level of Hellenization in Asia Minor before the Ottomanconquest than does SperosVryonis.12 Gy. Kaldy-Nagy, "The Holy War(jihad)in the FirstCenturiesof the OttomanEmpire,"HarvardUkrainianStudies, 3/4 (1979-80) (Eucharisterion-Pritsakestschrift),pt. 1, 467-73,


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 453building their empire in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuriesprimarilyinformerly Byzantine territories, the Ottomans copied copiously from theirreligiousfoes. Ottomanranks ncluded Christian armers,merchants,scribes,tax-collectors,artisans,warriors,sailors, artists, architects, slaves, andcon-cubines. The Ottoman sultan became the new Byzantineemperorof Con-stantinople.The sultan played the role of the basileus in selecting a Greekpatriarch,ust as the Catholicking of Valenciaplayedthe role of the Muslimruler n patronizingMuslim courts. The Ottomans nvited Christians o settlein a city whose conquestprovedthe superiorityof Islam overChristianity, ustas the Catholics hadinvitedMoors to settle in a kingdomdedicatedto expell-ing them from Spain. The sultan turnedHagia Sophia into a mosque andforbaderingingof the Christianchurchbells which sullied thepurityof Islam,just as in Valencia mosques acquiredbells and became churches. Christianpronoiarsbecame timariots. The Greekcommunitybecame a millet underanethnarch, he patriarch.Some institutionswhichtheOttomansborrowed romthe Seljuks may have been of Byzantino-Romanorigin, and otherOttomaninstitutionswhich look similarto Byzantineones mightreflectparallelevolu-tion. Forexample, every medieval society whose economy resteduponland-holding and whose sociopolitical order accordeda dominantposition to amilitaryaristocracymanaged to invent the fief. The Ottomantimar couldderive from the Seljuk iqtajust as easily as fromthe Byzantinepronoia, or itmighthave hada spontaneouscreation.Nevertheless,Byzantine nfluence onthe early Ottomanempire cannot be discounted.Althoughthe positionof Greek Christians n theearlyOttomanempirewasprecarious, heir statusdeclinedeven more in the sixteenthcentury.Fromthebeginning, the Ottomanshadextracted he devshirme(child-slavelevy) fromthe Christianpopulationto man thejanissary corpsandservein othercapaci-ties as gulams (slaves). Christiansremainedsecond-classcitizens. Thegener-ationof Ottomanswho came to powerin the sixteenthcentury,however, hadnever known Byzantine greatness. As the Ottoman empire became in-creasingly orthodox Sunni Muslim, respect for the Byzantine heritage de-clined and the position of the Greek Churchdeteriorated.13n the postcon-questcentury,the status of Greek Christians n theOttomanempiresank,justas in the case of the Moors in postconquestValencia. Historiansdisagreeuponwhetherthe emergencein the seventeenthandeighteenthcenturyof thephanariots,the Greekelite in Constantinople,exacerbatedor ameliorated hisminimizesthe role of religion in early Ottomanpolicy. Froma differentconceptualframework,so does Joseph Fletcher, "Turco-MongolMonarchicTradition n the OttomanEmpire," ibid.,236-51. Cf. Wiktor Weintraub, "Renaissance Poland and the AntemuraleChristianitatis,"ibid., pt. 2, 920-30.13 Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity:A Study of the Patriarchateof Con-stantinople rom the Eve of the TurkishConquestto the Greek Warof Independence(London,1968).


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454 CHARLES J. HALPERINsituation. The Byzantinecontribution o the Ottomanempirewaned once theconquerorshadsolidifiedtheir hold sufficientlyto be able to devote adequateenergies to creating autonomous institutionalmodels, duplicatingthe shiftfrom the Umayyadto the Abbasid Arabempires.The Ottomans,like the various Arab empires, never expelled the Chris-tians. Accordingto Islamic law, the Christians,like the Jews, qualified asPeoples of the Book. (Zoroastriansn Persia at firstpari passu held similarprivilege.) They could practicetheirreligionas long as they recognizedMus-lim authority,paidthepoll tax, didnot insultIslam, and did not interferewithconversionto Islam. The largesize of theChristianpopulationof theOttomanBalkans,forexample, madeexpulsionscarcely possible;thispracticalconsid-erationmighthave been more decisive at times than the qualifiedtheoreticaljustificationof continued Christianexistence in the realmof the Defender ofthe Faith, the Ottoman sultan.The persistenceof the millet system in the Ottomanempiredid not invali-date Ottomancommitmentto the jihad. Some Islamic fanaticsbelieved thateven Peoplesof the Book living underMuslimauthority hould be compelledto convert or face execution or enslavement, but such a policy could neverhave been appliedon a largescale. Probablymore of the Muslimtheologiansexpectedthatall unbelievers,includingthe Peoples of the Book, would con-vert to the true faith eventually. Concerningexternal infidels, the jihad for-bade war unless success could be guaranteed.Jihaddoctrinepermitted ruces,but for limited times only, since the imperativeof holy war could not berelaxed untilall peoples became worshippersof Allah. Thus Islamicdoctrinejustified the conduct of almost normal internationalrelations with infidelcountrieswhen pragmatismpreventedthe successful waging of the jihad.14Despitethe Byzantineimage of Islam as virtuallybeneathcontempt, someByzantine intellectuals echoed Tacitus and paintedthe Ottomans as noblesavages, whose superiorqualitiesexplainedOttomanexpansionat Byzantineexpense. Even within this mythologya religious prejudice ntruded.Accord-ing to the Byzantine writers, Ottomans were Christiansin everything butname;they practicedChristianmorality despite their adherence o an infidelreligion, whereasthe supposedlyChristianByzantineshadfallen away fromthe Christianvirtuesand led dissolute lives. Withoutacceptingan argumentwhich led to apostasy, these authorsfinessed theirreligious hostility towardIslam in orderto praise their Ottomanfutureconquerors. 5 Equallystereo-typed images of the Turksappearin a Byzantinetale accordingto which adervishholy manadvised a congregant o hire Greekartisans o build a gardenbecauseGreekswere good atbuildingthings,whereasTurksshowed a greaterproclivitytowarddestruction.Sucha slur was as much a distortionof the truth

14 E. Tyan, "Djihad," Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden, 1965), II, 538-40.15 Ihor Sevcenko, "The Decline of ByzantiumSeen throughthe Eyes of Its Intellectuals,"DumbartonOaks Papers, 15 (1961), 167-86.


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 455as was theportrayalof the Ottomansas idyllic shepherds,butwritersresortedto positive or negative stereotypes whenever it served their purpose, re-gardless of contraryevidence.At the beginningof the imperialcareer,the Ottomans ound it easier to co-opt Byzantineinstitutionalmodels and human resourcesthan to createtheirown. Intime, however, stability,thetransformationf the nomadic Ottomansintomerchants,craftsman,farmers,andcity-dwellers,and an increasingcon-fidence obviated the necessity to borrow infidel ways. Although Ottomanauthoritiesnever expelled unbelieversas the kings of Spain did, Christiansremainedsecond-class citizens and their institutionsand bureaucratic adresdeclinedin the Ottomanempireaftertheheydayof thereligiousfrontierof thefourteenthandfifteenth centuries.OrthodoxMuslim Ottomanhistoriographyof the sixteenthcenturyand later dealtwith the unseemlyimitationof Byzan-tine forms in the earlier Ottomanempire in the simplest possible manner: tthrew a discrete veil of silence over the entire subject. The Koran and theShar'iatprovidedsome ideologicaljustificationfortoleratingChristianminor-ities and for not always waging jihad on Christianneighbors,but none what-ever for institutionalborrowingor lettingChristianofficials exercise politicalor fiscal or administrativeauthorityover Muslims. The ideology of silenceservedits purposeon both sides of the religiousfrontierof the MiddleAges.On the oppositeend of the Mediterranean ea fromcrusaderValencia stoodthe crusaderkingdomof Jerusalem;unlike its sisterrealm, Jerusalemdid notsurvive.Earlystudies saw it as an intermediary etween the Muslim East andthe ChristianWest, where easygoing religioustolerationandthe orientaliza-tion of the crusadersproceeded apace.16 Some of the observationsabout thefriendshipbetweenthe two "races" smackof European mperialismor colo-nialism;moreover, recentresearchhas thoroughlyundermined his romanticand distortedpicture.17The crusaders' Jerusalem constituted a French colonial implant in Pal-estine, albeit one without a mothercountry. The French strove to separatethemselves at all costs notonly from the Muslimmajorityof theirsubjectsbutalso from the EasternChristians hey had ostensiblycome to liberate.Theymassacredorexpelledthe indigenouspopulationof thecity of Jerusalemtselfduringthe conquest, and took it over as it was, flat-roofedbuildingsandall.Perhaps they realized that flat roofs were superiorto their own styles. Al-thoughthey retained the existing structuresof all conqueredcities, the new

16 FredericDuncalf, "Some Influences of OrientalEnvironment n the Kingdomof Jerusa-lem," AnnualReportof the AmericanHistorical Association, 1 (1914), 137-45; John L. La-Monte, "The Significance of the Crusader States in Medieval History," Byzantion, 15(1940-41), 300-315.17 JoshuaPrawer,TheLatinKingdomofJerusalem.EuropeanColonialism n theMiddleAges(London, 1972). Cf. AharonBen-Ami, Social Changein a MuslimEnvironment.TheCrusaders'Kingdomof Jerusalem (Princeton, 1969).


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456 CHARLES J. HALPERINcastles and constructionsthat they built were in the Romanesquestyle andwith as few concessions to the new topographyas possible. Insufficientwatermade moats impractical, but little more than some local masonry dis-tinguished French crusader castles from those in France. In warfare thecrusaders earned romthe Arabs to makebetteruse of theirown light cavalryandinfantryand to stay inside their castlesuntiltheenemydeparted nsteadoftryingto breaksieges, butno self-respectingFrenchnoblewouldever draw abow, and crusader iegecraftderived from ByzantineandArmenianas muchas Muslimpractice.Forprotection rom the sun some crusadersaddeda clothcover over theirhelmets, not to be confused with the keffiyah.The Frenchlived in their cities and castles and left the Muslim agriculturalpopulationalone. Local rais governedthe villages, and the absenteeFrench lordsexer-cised control throughFrench- and Arabic-speakingSyrian Christian inter-mediaries,who saved the Frenchthe troubleof learningArabic. This practiceparallelsthe use of Jews in Valenciaand Semitic Christians n the Umayyadempire. The crusaders eft local taxes, a mixture of Byzantineand Muslimlevies, in place. Earlycrusadercoinage crudelyimitatedArabicmodels, butlater the Papacyobjectedto the "intolerable"phenomenonof Christianslo-gans in Arabicon the coinage of a crusaderkingdom. (One wonders if thepapacy took similar note of the less prevalentArabic-languagecoinage inValencia.) Perhapsthe lot of the Arab peasant improved, since without ademesnethe French lords did not impose corvee, but this materialameliora-tion of the tax loadprovided he Arabswithsmall solace for thehumiliationofliving underan infidelgovernment.TheFrenchhad no choice butto adoptthelocal diet, since importationof food was out of the question. The Muslimenvironmentoffered much in the way of creaturecomforts. Although someFrenchmanaged o takeadvantageof thecarpetsandwallhangings,baths andaquaducts, sewage systems, bed and table linen, porcelaindishes, soaps,dyes, spices, doctors andmedicines, and even blackslaves andeunuchs,thisMediterraneanifestyle attracted ven fewerCatholic ords in Palestinethan itdid in Valencia. The Frenchtransplanted he Frenchway of life to Palestineandlived withinit in the midst of the Muslim world.The Muslim world stimulatedno intellectualor culturalcuriosity in theFrench crusaders.In generalthe Frenchin Jerusalemdevoted few efforts tohigherculture. Romances andepics about the crusader tates were composedin the West, andcrusader aw came fromEurope. Philosophyandsciencedidnot exist.18 The refractoryattitudeof the crusaders nhibited even the mostobvious forms of artisticborrowing. New crusaderart works slavishly imi-tated Frenchmodels; except for the very Byzantinemosaics and illuminatedmanuscripts,depictions of the Orientin Frenchcrusaderartfollowed Euro-pean fantasy,not local reality.The crusadersbuiltRomanesquechurchesand

18 Steven Runciman,A History of the Crusades(Cambridge,1954), III, 489-92.


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 457castles, employinglocal symbols only on some ceramics. If not even climatecould induce the French to lessen the distinction between rulers and ruledinclothing-so that no Christianwoman, the Palestiniansun notwithstanding,ever wore full veil or trousers-then how much more rigorously did theFrenchavoid contactwith the Muslims and Muslim religious culture.No more thana dozen unavoidablyessentialArabicwords found theirwayinto the French vocabulary.Missionaries, as in Spain, could and did learnArabic, but the majorityof the Frenchnobility did not, less because of anabsenceof schools, universities,or creative scholarsthan the simple lack ofdesire to do so. The use of multilingual intermediarieshelped sustain thisfacet of social and culturalexclusivism.The realityof crusaderappreciationof Muslim militaryskill andchivalryshould not be dismissed because the relationshipbetween Richardthe Lion-Heartedand Saladinhas been romanticized n grade-Bcrusaderepic movies;such aristocraticmartialand social compatibilitycould hardlyeliminate theChristian-Muslimwarfarewhich broughtaboutoccasions for its exercise. Itdid, however, mitigate some of the harshnessof war for noble enemies, ascrusaders reatednobleMuslimcaptiveswithrespectandpermitted ansom,19andMuslimaristocrats eciprocated he courtesywith Christianknights. Par-allels to Valencia or the Byzantino-Muslimfrontierdepicted in the DigenisAkritasspringreadilyto mind.The various crusaderstates often spentmore time fightingeach other thanmaking war on the infidel. Christiandiplomacy often demanded allianceswith some Muslims againstothers, not to mention againstotherChristians.One alliancerepresents he most extreme case of suchreligious flexibility:theAssassins paid tribute to the Templars,and ratherthan see this convenientarrangementaltered, the Templars ambushed envoys sent by the king ofJerusalemo convert theAssassins to Christianity.Thepowerof theAssassinsforced the Hospitalersand most Outremerestates to reachagreementswiththem at one time or another; he same appliedto Muslim states who viewedthe sect as heretics.Thekingdomof Jerusalem, ike Valencia,had its Muslimfief-holders and some Muslim mercenaries.The use of Muslim soldiers orallies aroused the severest objections in the waves of fanaticcrusadingmi-grants who broughttheir unadulteratedprejudicesfresh from Europe. Thecrusaderkingdomcould not survive withoutreservemanpower,but the newrecruitsrefused to understand hat the militaryweakness of their side madeadroitdealings with the Muslims crucial.

William of Tyre personifies the conflict in crusaderranksover relationswith the Muslim states. A pullano or poulain, i.e., hybrid, born of mixedItalianand Frenchancestryin Jerusalemandwell educated n Europeat Paris19 Ousamaibn Mounkidh,TheAutobiographyof Ousdma ibn Mounkidh,George R. Potter,trans. (New York, 1929).


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458 CHARLES J. HALPERINandBologna, he had agood workingknowledgeof Greek and Arabic.No onepossessed superior qualifications to serve as an intermediarybetween theOutremereand Europe. And yet he failed totally in this task. William de-fendedthe crusaderkingdomsfromthe criticismsof bigotednewcomers. Heinsistedthat,given MuslimstrengthandChristianweakness,theonly way theChristiankingdoms could survive was througha policy of divide-and-con-quer, of seeking Muslim (and Byzantine) allies. The newcomers could noteven accept the need for strategicand tacticalcaution, insisting upon disas-trousmilitaryadventuresand frontal assaultsagainstsuperior nfidel forces.The new arrivalsblamedthe weaknessof the crusader tatesupontheirmoraldecline; the pullani had "gone native," soft and effeminate, an irrelevantexaggeration. William was not pro-Greek, let alone pro-Muslim, but hispatrioticdevotion to the crusader tates enabled himaccurately o see the needfor pragmatism.He perceivedthese states as extensions of Europe,hence thetitle of his OverseasHistory. His most articulatedattempt o break the ideo-logical silence which enveloped pragmaticpolicies on the medievalreligiousfrontier ell wide of the mark.Europeanaudiences made the book very popu-larbut overlooked its message;the book succeeded as divertingreadingaboutthe exotic andpicturesqueEast. William was subjected o criticism and scornin the crusaderstates, too controversiala figureever to achieve his ambitionof becoming patriarchof Jerusalem. The pullani programwent too far insacrificingprejudice orpragmatism,and the crusaders hereforerejected t.20The theoreticiansof the holy war and crusadecould have formulatedprop-erly nuanced rationales to justify the kind of policy William of Tyre advo-cated. In theoryit was not mandatoryo wage waragainstMuslim statesin allcases; a Muslim state could enjoy the legitimacyof natural aw if it toleratedits Christianminorities,did not interferewith Christianpilgrims,andpermit-ted Christianmissionaries to do God's work without impediment. Unfortu-nately, no Muslimpolity could possibly have accededto such impositionsonits treatment f Christians.Besides, according o the Christianheologians,noMuslim could legitimately rule Palestine, the Holy Land of Jesus Christ,regardless of the sacredness of Jerusalem to Islam, and some extremistsappliedtheirconceptof reconquista n such a way as to exclude frompoliticallegitimacy any Muslim authority n lands once partof the RomanEmpire.Such loadedformulationsof the circumstances n which a Muslimstatecouldbe grantedthe right not to be the object of a crusade offered little practicalguidanceto the crusadersn the Middle East. Infact such armchairheorizinglacked any realisticdimension.Two hundredyearsof FrenchCatholicand Muslimcontact n Jerusalemdidnot mitigate their mutualhostility. There was no bridge across the confes-sionalandsocial gapbetweenconquerorsandconquered.TheFrenchactively

20 R. H. C. Davis, "William of Tyre," in Relations between East and West in the MiddleAges, Derek Baker, ed. (Edinburg,1973), 64-76.


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 459

discouraged missionary activities to convert the Muslim populationlest acommon religion lessen their own monopoly on political power. The can-onical scruples against forced conversion were wasted on the Frenchcrusaders,since they had no enthusiasmfor even voluntaryconversion.Thesupposed religious toleranceof the crusaderstates derivedfrom self-interestandsupreme ndifference; he Muslims suppliedthe only availabletaxpayingpeasants,andkeepingthem Muslimprovidedthe excuse for absenteegover-nance through third parties. The extraordinaryarroganceof the Frencharistocracy21 ermittedan even smaller amountof pragmaticborrowingbe-tween Christianand Muslim in Palestine than in Spain because the Frenchsocial and culturaldisdainstronglyreinforcedreligious fastidiousness.Fromthe thirteenth o thefifteenthcenturies,Russia fell under heswayof theGolden Horde, the successor state on the Volga river of the grand Mongolempirefounded by Chinggis Khan.22However, the Tatars,as the Mongolsarecalled in the Russiansources, did not move into the Russianforestzone.In order to maintaintheirpastoralnomadicway of life, they remained n thePontic and Caspian steppe, where they became assimilated with the indige-nous Turkic-speakingnomadicpopulation,the Kipchaks. By the fourteenthcentury, the shamanistMongols had converted to Islam, so thatRusso-Tatarrelations became another variant of Christian-Muslim interaction. TheMongols restructuredhe social andpoliticalorderof the steppe,the mainstayof internationalcommerce and nomadism,23but they left the political in-frastructure f Russia alone because of its lesser importance o theireconomyandpolity. Chinggishad decreed the tolerationof all religionsin his empire,apracticeof mostInnerAsianempires; hus even the MuslimGolden Hordedidnot interferewith the RussianOrthodoxChurch. As a resultof the particularrelationshipbetween Russia and the Golden Horde, the Mongols influencedRussia, but the Russians did not influence the Tatars.24Therefore,unlike theothercases of the medievalreligiousfrontier, n theRusso-Tatar nstance, theconqueredwoundup borrowingthe institutionsof theirabsenteeconquerors.

21 Cf. David Jacoby, "The Encounterof Two Societies: WesternConquerorsn the Pelapon-nesus after the FourthCrusade," AmericanHistorical Review, 78:4 (1973), 873-906.22 A. N. Nasonov, Mongoly i Rus' (Istoriia Tatarskoipolitiki na Rusi) (Moscow-Leningrad,1940); Berthold Spuler, Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland, 2d expanded ed.(Wiesbaden,1965);B. D. Grekov and A. Iu. Iakubovskii,Zolotaia orda i ee padenie (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950); George Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven, 1953); MichaelRoublev, "The Scourgeof God," RussianHistory, forthcoming;CharlesJ. Halperin,Russiaandthe GoldenHorde. The Impact of the Mongols on RussianHistory (Bloomington, Indiana),inpress.23 G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, KochevnikiVostochnoiEvropypod vlast'iu zoloto-ordynskikhkhanov:Arkheologicheskiepamiatniki (Moscow, 1966); idem, Obshchestvennvi troi ZolotoiOrdy(Moscow, 1973).24 CharlesJ. Halperin,"Russia in theMongolEmpire n ComparativePerspective,"HarvardJournal of Asiatic Studies, 43:1 (June 1983), 239-61.


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The Mongol conquestof Russia was enormouslydestructive,andthe eco-nomic drain of subsequent raids and taxes was probably an even greaterassault. It is hardlysurprising hatthe medieval Russian sources presenttheTatarsas cruel and evil infidels, either instruments f divine chastisement orRussian sins or henchmen of the Devil, sowing discordamong true Chris-tians.25Experience ustifiedsuchinvective, although heMongolassaultshadnothingto do with religion. However, there is another side to the story ofRusso-Tatar elations.Considerableevidence demonstrates hat despite the stereotypednegativeimageof the Tatars n the Russiansources, less hostile relationsbetween thetwo peoples also existed. A numberof RussianprincesmarriedTatarprin-cesses, notably Gleb Vasil'kovich of Rostov, Fedor Rostislavovich ofYaroslavl',and Yurii Daniilovichof Moscow; the princessesconverted fromshamanism o Russian OrthodoxChristianity.The Russiansborrowedheavilyfrom Mongol political, military, administrative,and fiscal institutions,forexample, the postal service (yam)which the Mongols hadperfectedto carryinformationand people across the Eurasiancontinent26; he division of thearmyinto the five divisions of advanceguard, mainregiment, left and rightflanks,andrearguard; heMongolcustomstax, tax-collectorandseal (tamga),and treasury (kazna); and Mongol diplomatic etiquette.27The Russiansshowed praiseworthyperspicacity n imitatingthe institutions n warfareandgovernmentwhichhadpermitted he Mongols to createandcontrolanempirestretching rom the Pacific to the Baltic and Black Seas. The Muscovitesdidnot borrowinstitutionswhich did not suit them;for example, the census wastoo equitablefor the Russian aristocracy,and the diwan system of bureau-cracyfromPersiabore the taintof Islam. Insteadthe Russiansmostly copiedHorde nstitutions romthe all-Mongol empire, preferringMongol institutionsless associated with Islam. This additionalreligious factor influencing theRussianselectionof institutions o borrow,as compared o practices n Spain,the Muslim states, or crusaderJerusalem,did not minimize the extent ofborrowing. I suspect that the explanationof the Russian pattern ies in theintense relationsof the East Slavs with the TurkicpastoralnomadsduringtheprecedingKievan period, and from the simple opportunismcreatedby thepresence in the Horde's institutionalframeworkof structuresof both pre-MuslimandMuslimprovenance.Both intermarriagendinstitutionalborrow-ing thusfinessed thereligiousobstacle to pragmatic elations,through onver-

25 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "Asia throughRussianEyes," in Russia and Asia, Wayne S.Vucinich, ed. (Stanford, 1972), 3-29.26 Gustave Alef, "The Origin and Development of the Muscovite Postal Service,"Jahrbucheriir Geschichte Osteuropas, 15:1 (1967), 1-15.27 N. I. Veselovskii, "Tatarskoevliianie na posol'skii tseremonialv moskovskiiperiodrus-skoi istorii," Otchet Sv. Peterburgskago Universiteta za 1910, 1-19. Cf. Alan W. Fisher,"Muscovite-OttomanRelations in the Sixteenth and SeventeenthCenturies," HumanioraIsla-mica, 1 (1973), 207-17.


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 46I

sion andselectivity, but neitheractivityaccords well with thedepictionof theTatars n Russian sources as blood-suckinginfidels.The economic burden which Mongol rule imposed on the Russians waspartiallyoffset in two ways. First, Russianprinceswho participatedn jointRusso-Tatarmilitary campaignssharedin the booty. Second, Russianspar-ticipated n andprofitedfrom the expansionof international ommerceunderthe Pax Mongolica. In Russia the Mongols reroutedthe fur tradeto extractgreaterrevenue; as a result, Muscovite and Ustiug merchants, rather thanNovgorodian, reaped the benefits. Russians and Tatarsemployed some re-gions of the southeastern rontier,on the Riazan'border,for bothagricultureandnomadism,whichduplicated heecological symbiosisof Greek andTurk-men in Trebizond. Booty and commerce mitigatedthe economic drain ofMongol rule in Russia.28Presumably,those Russianprinces, nobles, officials, merchants,and cler-ics who dealt frequentlywith the Horde had the greatest incentive to learnTatar,the Turkicdialect which becamedominant n the Horde.At first, somebaptized bilingual Kipchaksserved as translators,althoughthis practicedidnot equal in scope or significancethe use of ethnic intermediaries lsewhereon the medieval religious frontier. Some Arabic names and slogans foundtheirway onto bilingualRussiancoins, parallelingValencia and Jerusalem.Thefifteenth-centuryTverianmerchantAfanasii Nikitin so mastereda kindoforientalpatoisof Turkic,Persian,and Arabicthat he unconsciously slippedinand out of it in composing his travelogueabout India.29Bilingualismmusthave been more prevalentthan our scanty sources admit.The Russianprincesand nobles sharedwith the Tatarsa sense of aristocrat-ic martialchivalry. If the Tatarshad not been noble opponents,therewouldhavebeen no glory forthe Russians in tryingto defeatthem. Captiveson bothsides weresometimes treatedwithrespect.The "feudal" ethos whichcrossedthereligiousandecological frontierbetween Christian edentaristand Muslimnomadfound predictableexpression in an epic poem, the Zadonshchina.30Forms of chivalry thus influenced social relationsbetween ChristiansandMuslims from Spainto the Balkans and Anatolia to the Middle East andtheRussiansteppe.The Russiansacquiredan intimatefamiliaritywith the geography,person-nel, society, mores, and customs of the Horde, an expertiseequal to that of

28 Thomas S. Noonan, "Russia's EasternTrade, 1150-1350: The ArcheologicalEvidence,"ArchivumEurasiae Medii Aevi, forthcoming;Janet Martin, "The Land of Darkness and theGolden Horde. The Fur Trade under the Mongols. XIII-XIV Centuries," Cahiers du monderusse et sovietique, 19:4 (1978), 401-22.29 Afanasii Nitikin, Khozhenie za tri moria Afanasiia Nikitina 1466-1472 gg., 2d ed.(Moscow, 1958).30 Povesti o Kulikovskoibitvy, M. N. Tikhomirov,V. F. Rzhiga, and L. A. Dmitriev, eds.(Moscow, 1959), 9-17. The most popular iterarygenre for the expressionof frontierchivalricrelations was the epic poem, hence El Cid, La Chanson de Roland, Digenis Akritas, and theZadonshchina.


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King James of Valencia about the Moors. They hadno choice but to acquiresuch knowledge, since political survival in dealingwith the Hordedependedon it.31The Russiansfully masteredMongol politicalconceptsandideology.They utilized suchMongol terms as orda (horde)and ulus (people-state)withease.32Most important, hey understood he singleoverridingpolitical princi-ple uponwhich the Mongol,empirerested,the blood legitimacyof the clan ofChinggis Khan. In literaryworks intended for a native audience, Russianbookmen manipulated hat principle to justify Russian policies toward theTatars.33The Muscovites may even have modelled their dynastic conceptupon that of the Chingissids.34Despite religious prejudice, the Russiansdevelopeda comprehensive,pragmatic xpertiseand even ideologicalfluencyin Horde affairs.ThattheMongols did not influence Russianhighculturewas attributableoRussianreligion practice, and not to a sense of the superiorityof Russianculture to that of the "barbarian"nomads. Horde culture cannot be calledinferior;Sarai,theHordecapital,with its aquaducts,caravansaries,medresses(religious schools), mosques, and foreign merchants'quarters,rivalledanymedieval Russian city. The Golden Horde enjoyed a respectableMuslimreligiousculture,whichis preciselywhytheRussianscould not borrow rom it.The Russiansdid not seek betterways to build amosqueorcommentupontheKoran.Thehighcultureof the Hordewas untouchable,religiouslytabu,to theRussians.35Texts of oriental iteraturewhichreachedRussia before or duringthe Mongol period had alreadybeen sanitized, i.e., Christianized,and it isdoubtful hatthe Russianseven knewof theirinfidelorigin.36As elsewhereonthemedievalreligiousfrontier, hose areasof life closest toreligion,such as theRussianhigh culture,most resisted infidel influence.The Muscovites could not discard all elements of pragmaticrelationswiththe Mongolsafter the overthrowof the "TatarYoke" in 1480. Muscovy still31 CharlesJ. Halperin, "Know Thy Enemy:Medieval RussianFamiliaritywith the Mongolsof the Golden Horde," Jahrbiicher ur GeschichteOsteuropas,30:2 (1982), 161-75.32 CharlesJ. Halperin,"Tsarevulus:Russia in the GoldenHorde," Cahiersdu monderusseet sovietique,23:2 (April-June1982), 257-63.33 MichaelCheriavsky, "Khan or Basileus:An Aspect of RussianMedieval PoliticalTheo-ry," Journalof theHistoryof Ideas, 20:4 (1959), 459-76; CharlesJ. Halperin,"A ChingissidSaint of the RussianOrthodoxChurch:The 'Life of Peter,Tsarevichof the Horde,' " Canadian-AmericanSlavic Studies, 9:3 (1975), 324-35; idem, "The Russian Land andthe Russian Tsar:The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408," Forschungen zur osteuropdischenGeschichte, 23 (1976), 7-103; idem, "The Defeat and Death of Batu," Russian History,10:1 (1983), 50-65; idem, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," Russia Mediaevalis,forthcoming;dem, Russia and the TatarYoke Columbus,Ohio), in press.34 MichaelCherniavsky,"Ivan the Terribleand the Iconographyof the KremlinCathedral fArchangelMichael," RussianHistory, 2:1 (1975), 3-28.35 Charles J. Halperin, "Medieval Myopia and the Mongol Period of Russian History,"RussianHistory, 5:2 (1978), 188-91.36 D. S. Likhachev, Poetika drevnerusskoi iteraturv(Leningrad, 1967), 11-13, identifiesthis patternbut explains it differently.


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 463had to deal with the successor states of the Golden Horde; annexationofKazan' and Astrakhan'waited until the 1550s, and of the Crimea, whichbecame a vassal of the Ottomans, until the late eighteenthcentury. Ching-gisids continued to enjoy high status in sixteenth-centuryMuscovy, the bythenRussianpostal service servedneitherporknoralcoholto Muslims, andaMuslim could swear an oath on a Koran kept in the Kremlin, a juridicalconveniencecommon in Valencia. Muslim envoys prayeddaily to Allah inthe capital of the Orthodox Christianempire of Muscovy. However, thegrowing social and political pressuresof Russian centralizationgeneratedtensions which found their outlet in religious and ethnic antagonism anddemands for homogeneity. A virulentlyanti-Muslimsentimentarose in themilitantwing of the RussianOrthodoxChurch,whichproducedanaggressivemissionary policy in annexed Kazan'. (This novel chauvinism andxenophobiawas also directed against Jews.) The development of an earlymodernnation-state n Muscovy37thus producedreactionsagainstelementsof the medieval frontierakin to those in fifteenth-centurySpain, the Abbasidreactionto the Umayyads, and the laterOttomanreversalof early Ottomanpractices.Like the Ottomanempire, the Russian empire containedsuch anever increasingMuslim populationthatnothingon the order of an expulsionpolicy ever became implemented. Duringthe Westernizingreforms of Peterthe Great at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenthcentury, Russia discarded its Mongol institutions. During the seventeenthcentury,Russianinvolvement with the steppein generaldeclinedandRussianneed for steppe expertise greatly diminished. Therefore,Russia's need forpragmaticrelationswith the Mongols outlastedMongol sovereignty by abouta century, after which the pressuresof prejudicereasserted hemselves withnew and greaterpotency.No medieval Russiansource of the Mongol periodcomments on the Rus-sian familiaritywith the steppe, or explains why Russians cultivated suchknowledge of the infidel. Russian OrthodoxChristiancanon law frownedupon socializing with the infidels, but Russianpriestscould accompanythenomadicHorde to provide for the religious needs of Russianfaithful;whyRussians oined in nomadic ourneyswiththe Hordewentunmentioned.Onlythe Mongol name betraysthe Hordeorigin of Mongol institutionsborrowedby the Muscovites. No medieval Russianmerchanthad a kind word to sayaboutsteppe merchants,andthe chroniclestreated ntermarriage ingerly. Achroniclewould criticize a rival Russianprincefor employingTatarmilitaryauxiliaries or assistance, but if the chronicler'sprincely patronrelied uponHorde military or political allies, this policy escaped critique. In a late-thirteenth-centuryermon, the bishop of Vladimir, Serapion,echoes Tacitus

37 Charles J. Halperin, "Masterand Man in Muscovy," in The Tsardomof Muscovy,A. E.Presniakov,ed., and R. Price, trans. (Gulf Breeze, Florida, 1978), vii-xvi.


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464 CHARLES J. HALPERINandpraisesthe ethicalandmoralrectitudeof theTatars.His purpose,howev-er, was to shame the Russiansfortheirsins, and in othersermonshe portraysTatarmisdeedswith graphicprecision.38Like the Byzantinepolemicistswhoinvokedthe virtuesof the Ottomans o explain Byzantinedecline, Serapion'ssermon represents idealizing propaganda,not accuratesociology. It is theexceptionwhich proves the rule that the Russiansdid not permittheirprag-maticrelationswiththeTatars o soften the religiouslyhostileportrayal f theinfidelsin themedieval Russian sources. Silence shroudedcooperation;valuejudgments concerningTatarsdwelt only on Tatarevil. No medieval Russianwriterarticulatedan ideology for coexistence with the Tatars.When necessary, SpanishCatholic and Muslim Moor, ByzantineOrthodoxChristianand Muslim Arab or Turk, French Catholic and Muslim, RussianOrthodox Christian and shamanist or Muslim Mongol, could all get alongwitheachother, could learnenoughof each other'slanguage,customs, geog-raphy,politicalandsocial structures,mores, and even religionto deal peace-fully with each other. In order to survive, minorityconquestsocieties had toadapt o the institutionsof the indigenous majoritypopulation.Even societiesacrossan open frontierhadto acquiresufficientexpertiseabout the enemy tobe ableto negotiatetruces,if notpeacetreaties. NeithertheSpanishCatholicsin thirteenth-centuryValencia nor the Umayyad Arabs or early OttomanTurkslet religiousprejudiceso blind them, even in fightinga holy war, thatthey triedto liquidatethe only possible taxpayingpopulationsof theirnewlyacquiredterritoriesor arousedmassive resistance by instituting policies offorcedconversion. The shared social ethos of medieval militaryaristocraciesplayed a more positive role than has been appreciated n facilitatingsuchpragmatic ooperation.From the Atlantic to the Volga, Christianand Muslimknights espoused common values: noble birth, social elitism, militaryskill,courage,love of warfare,thejoys of hunting.Suchsharedattitudesgracedtheprocesses of negotiatingtruces and treaties, of transferringallegiances andconcludingalliances, of social integration n multiethnicsocieties. Chivalrycontributed o peacefulrelations.Thus, in addition to warfare,the medievalfrontieralso experiencedbilingualism,intermarriage, ommerce, institutionalborrowing, alliances, social osmosis, and even some minimal culturalcrossfertilization.Such social compromises obtained only as long as they were necessary.Altered conditions which removed the necessity for pragmatismpermittedprejudice o gain the upperhand. Duringthe MiddleAges, Christianitydem-onstrated xtremely homogenizingtendencies.The ChristianGermans n theirDrang nach Osten did not exhibit muchtolerancefor the Slavic and Lithua-

38 E. V. Petukhov, Serapion Vladimirskii,russkii propovednikXIII veka (St. Petersburg,1888), Appendix, 13-15.


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PREJUDICE AND PRAGMATISM ON RELIGIOUS FRONTIERS 465nian populationswho stood in their way. The Byzantinesdid assimilatetheSlavicpopulationsof the Balkans which camecompletelyundertheircontrol.Islam, because of the social geographyof the regions which it dominated,manifestedgreatersocial and religious tolerationthan did Christianity,buteven so the Ottomans assimilatedthe Greek and ArmenianpopulationsofAnatolia. Duringthe early modem periodof history, the pressuresof nationbuilding permittedCatholicSpainandOrthodoxMuscovy to accumulatesuf-ficient power to alter the quid pro quo with theirreligious minorities:Spainexpelled the Moors, and Muscovy drasticallyworsened the situationof itsMuslim Tatarsubjects.When the Abbasidsdiscoveredthey had less need forByzantineofficials and institutions thanhad the Umayyads, they discardedthem; and the Ottomanschanged their minds once experience permitted t.The tendency, proclivity, propensity for religious conformismsurfaced inmedievalChristianandMuslim states wheneverit could, and as stronglyas itcould.Thus the medieval religious frontiersuffered a precariousexistence. Itfunctionedduringthe interim between the initial conquest and the develop-ment of power sufficient to allow the sentiments of the conqueredto bedisregarded,and also in situationswhereneitherside in the strugglehad theabilityto eliminatethe other. The transienceof the frontierderived from itsintrinsicinstability. The very existence of pragmaticrelationswith infidelsviolatedthe fundamentaland immutable hrustof the exclusivist religionsofChristianityand Islam.Only convoluted andexcessively qualifiedtheologicalargumentswere ca-pable of justifying the kinds of pragmaticrelations which characterized hemedieval religious frontier.One could permit religious toleration,but onlywithout insult to one's own faith. One could conclude truces, butno eternalpeace. Stark necessity vaguely rationalizedalliances, commerce, or otheractivities of peaceful cooperation. These meticulously constructed conces-sions to religioustoleranceor minimalrecognitionsof circumstancesbeyondone's controlrarelyintrude nto the writtenrecordsof the frontier/conquestsocieties, which were supposed to have the greatest need for ideologicalguidance n relationswithreligiousfoes. Andin neitherChristianitynor Islamdid any theory, no matterhow sophistic, ever legitimize the borrowingofinstitutionsfrom adherentsof an infidel faith.The demands of religiousprejudice preventedthe formulationor articula-tion of any medieval theories genuinely equivalent to modem concepts ofpeaceful coexistence or d6tente. One might admire, intermarrywith, tradewith, even borrowintellectualskills from, the infidel, but neverconcede thelegitimacy of his religion. To admit the legitimacy of the religion of theenemy would have automaticallycalled into questionthe insistenceupontheexclusivereligious superiorityof one's own. Since religionsubsumedunder tone's conceptionof thepoliticaland social order-of one's way of life-such


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466 CHARLES J. HALPERINideologicaltolerancewouldhave undermined he social, political, and cultur-al foundationsof one's own society andpolity. For this reason, exchange atthe intellectual evel, inextricably ied to religion,becameeven moredifficultto achieve.

By and large, therefore,medieval frontiersocieties preferred o deal withthe contradictionbetween ideal andreal, betweenprejudiceandpragmatism,with ideologically motivated silence. If one could not speak ill of one'senemy, it was preferable,and certainly safer, not to speak of him at all.Silence about the implicationsof borrowing nfidel institutionsor respectinginfidel customs was more effective in permitting uchactivityto continuethanself-servingreferencesto necessityor the circumscribedndulgencesof canonlaw orthe Shar'iat.It was less embarrassingo practice hephilosophythattheendsjustify the means thanto articulate t, since the ends were religiousanddifficult, emotionallyand intellectually,to reconcile with such opportunism,althoughnot impossible. An ideology of silence was functional. The phe-nomenonwas so pervasive, fromSpainto Byzantiumto Palestine to Russia,that it cannot be dismissedas simple hypocrisy. Yes, it was hypocritical,butthat accusation hardly does justice to so profound a patternof medievalsociointellectualhistory.Silence is, afterall, a powerful ideological tool. It is an effective, if notnecessarilyadmirable,way to avoid the unwelcomeimplicationsof refractoryreality,to avoiddiscussingthe gap betweenideological perfectionandprefer-ence, andthe imperfectionsof the real world. While silence mayserve differ-ent functions in differentideologies, in this case I assert that its impactwasbeneficial. Silence enabled medieval frontiersocietiesto practice,albeit tem-porarilyandwith considerabledifficulty, a type of religiouspluralismwhichmany modem societies seem unwilling or unableto imitateor duplicate.

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HalpernThe Ideology of Silence_ Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier the Ideology of Silence_ Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier