Gulf War - Big

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GULF WAR 1991

Gen

1. On 2nd Aug 90 Iraqi tps along with armr, hel and ac sp, invaded the tiny

kingdom of Kuwait. To fight against the invaders the world body united andmade the Coalition Force. Air power of 11 countries, Naval ships of 17

countries and Grd forces of 18 countries of the world participated in the war.

Allied force led by US conducted one of the most op successful wars in the

history, in which air power played a pre-eminent role.

2. In gulf war log sup was excellent which ultimately made huge

difference. With in six weeks the Iraqi war machine was crumbled by the

spectacular success of the most modern arsenal of the world.

3. Initially the Coalition Forces carr out massive air strikes (Op Desert

Storm) on the Iraqi tps to reduce their fighting capability and then launched

final grd offn (Op Desert Sabre) to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The war

ended with the unilateral cease-fire by the Coalition Forces on 28 Feb 91.

Backgrd of War

4. The relations between Iraq and Kuwait have remained uneasy onterritorial as well as ideological grounds. Both these countries were a part of

the Ottoman Empire. The World War I led to the collapse of the Ottoman

Empire and the creation of Iraq and a number of countries. Iraq got only a 20

miles stretch of coastline, on the other hand Kuwait possessed about 120

miles long shoreline on the Gulf. The arrangement was never accepted and

when Kuwait received its independence on 19 June 1961, Baghdad almost

immediately resented that Kuwait had been a part of Ottoman Empire and it

was an artificial British creation.

5. During the eighties Iraq raised the long standing question of ownership

of the Islands of War bah and Bunyan, the waterway leading to the Persian

Gulf. This waterway became the only alternative to the closed Sate-el-Arab

cluttered with debris from the Iran-Iraq war.

Causes of War

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6. Loss due to Oil Price. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the prices oil

fell as countries like Kuwait and UAE had exceeded the laid down quota of oil

production. Saddam claimed that this resulted in a loss of 14 billion dollars in

oil revenue for Iraq.

7. Oil Drilling from Rumaila. Iraq accused Kuwait of drilling slantingholes from Rumaila to tap oil from Iraqi territory. In this they claimed that

Kuwait had drained off 2.4 billion dollars worth of oil.

8. Membership of GCC. Despite the economic and mil clout that Iraq

enjoyed amongst the Arab nations, it could not gain Arab ldrship role. Its

attempt to become a member of the Gulf Coop Council (GCC) was upset by

Kuwait and Saudi Arab.

9. Border Demarcation. Although Kuwait was estb as a Seikh

Kingdom in 1756, its borders were not delineated till 1932. Kuwait achieved

independence in 1961 and Iraq has always claimed that Kuwait should form a

part of Iraq as it used to be a part of the old Ottoman province of Basra.

10. Inability to Repay Loans. Iraq could not repay about $80

billion loan that had been borrowed to finance the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq wanted

this loan to be waved off. But Kuwait decided not to forgive the debt.

11. Wealth of Kuwaitis.The Kuwaitis were incredibly rich and had huge

investments abroad. Access to this wealth could give resolved Iraq's financial

problems.

12. Ambition of Saddam. Saddam wanted to create a psychological

impact on her neighbors by posing Iraq a regional bully. By flexing its muscle

it aimed at sending message across the Arab world about its future role of

leadership in the Middle East.

ORBAT

13. Iraq. By 23 Feb 1991, the day before the coalition ground offensive

commenced, Iraq had about 35-36 divs in the Kuwait Theatre of Ops (KTO).

Details are:

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a. Tps : 6,00,000

b. Corps : 5

c. Divs : 35-36 (3 Armd, 8 mech, 22-23 Inf, 1 Marine, 1 Spl

Forces)

d. Tks : 4280

e. APC : 2880

f. Arty : 2950 Guns

150 Multiple Rocket Launchers.

g. AD : 2000 Guns

300 SAMs

h. Air Force:

(1) Pers : 5000

(2) Cbt ac : 600

(3) Bomb : 2 Sqns

(4) Fighter Ground Attk : 22 Sqns(5) Fighter Interceptors : 17 Sqns

14. Coalition. The total strength of coalition forces were:

a. Pers : 6,00,000

b. Tks : 3450

c. APC/ICVs : 2200 plus

d. Guns : 2000

e. Cobt Hel : 650

f. Cbt ac : 2070

g. Ac carriers : 06

h. Warships : 76

Iraqi Def Plan

15. Iraq's Perception of Mil Threat. As event unfolded themselves it

appears that Iraq had the following threat perception:

a. Counter air ops by the Coalition Forces to degrade Iraq's Air

Force's potential to support ground ops.

b. A massive air offensive to degrade the efficacy of the forward

defensive positions followed immediately by a multi prolonged ground

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offensive by mechanized formations, from the south driving straight for

the heart of Kuwait.

c. On reducing the initial defences in the south, the coalition could be

expected to make an amphibious landing from the Persian Gulf to

retake Kuwait city.

16. Iraqi Defence Plan. Salient features of the Iraqi defence plan were as

follows:

a. An obstacle belt filled with wire, oil filled trenches and mines were

constructed all along Saudi-Kuwait border. It had five layers.

b. Behind this formidable obstacle belt, nine inf divs were placed in

rows to cover the obstacle by fire and attrite Coalition.

c. The second defensive belt consisted of mobile armoured reserve.

Their task was to block enemy units that succeeded in penetrating the

first defensive belt and reinforce the front line units when needed.

d. The elite Republican Guards with their top-of-the line T-72 tanks

were kept as reserve. They were tasked to counter attk coalition units.

e. Iraq built a huge network of hardened ammunition storage and

command and control bunkers throughout KTO.

f. Iraq Army stockpiled huge quantities of chemical and biological

weapons with the front line units, placed at the disposal of the field

commanders to be used at own discretion.

Coalition Offn Plan

17. Phases of the Campaign. The campaign was planned to execute infour phases:

a. Phase-1. Strategic Air Campaign.

b. Phase-2. Air supremacy in KTO.

c. Phase-3. Battlefield Preparation.

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d. Phase-4. Offensive Ground Campaign.

18. Coalition Attk Plan. The coalition Army had two obvious choices; to

punch though the fixed Iraqi defence or to outflank them to the west. Gen

Schwarzkop opted the later. He planned to launch a swift outflanking move

around Iraq's exposed western flank to cut him before he had chance to

withdraw and then with the help of air and artillery destroy him in a major

tank battle south of River Euphrates. To this purpose, he assigned tasks to his

various formations as under:

a. VII Corps. It was tasked to jump off form Harf Al Batin, sweep

across the Iraqi western flank and then engage and destroy the

Republican Guards.

b. XVIII Airborne Corps. Its mission was to jump off from Rafah,sweep northeast to the Euphrates, then turn directly east, between

Kuwait-Iraq border and Basra to block the escape of the Iraqis and put

them in a killing zone.

c. MARCENT. It was tasked to launch a secondary attk from Saudi

frontiers across Kuwait to tie up as many Iraqi troops as was possible.

Then encircle Kuwait city from north and west and liberate Kuwait

International Airport.

d. Joint Forces Comd (JFC) - N. It was assigned the coastal

sector. Its mission was to encircle Kuwait city from the south and

capture it in conjunction with other Coalition Forces.

e. Special Forces. Well before the ground battle began, they were

to penetrate deep inside Iraq, rescue downed allied pilots and hunt for

SCUD launchers. Their main task was strategic reconnaissance.

f. Res. 1st Cav Div was initially designated as Theatre res by Comd in

Chief Cen Comd (CINCENT), ready to Cattk Iraqi forces.

g. Deception Plan. The deception plan was named Jail Mary

Play, was intended to convince Iraq that the main attack would be dir

into Kuwait, sp by an amphibious assault.

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Depl of Iraqi Forces

19. Depl of Iraqi Forces.

a. Intelligence sources estimated Iraqi forces in KTO in mid-October

most of the country's combat power.

b. 27 Iraqi divisions were deployed, including all eight Republican

Guard Forces Command (RGFC) divisions.

c. Of these 27 divs, nine were armoured or mechanised, 17 were

Infantry and one was special forces.

d. These elements were organized into the II Corps, III Corps, IVCorps and VII Corps, as well as the RGFC, which operated as a corps.

e. Iraqi manpower in the KTO numbered more than 435,000

supported by more than 3,600 tanks, almost 2,400 armoured personnel

carriers and more than 2,400 artillery pieces.

Depl of Coalition Forces

20. Depl of Coalition Forces. Initial Deployment of US Military Forces

and Other Coalition Forces are as fol:

a. The initial order to deploy combat forces to the Gulf was issued on

6 Aug 90.

b. CENTCOM began to deploy its combat forces on 7 Aug 90.

c. In three weeks, CINCCENT had seven brigades, three carrier battle

groups, 14 tactical fighter squadrons, four tactical airlift C-130

squadrons, a strategic bomber squadron and a Patriot air defense

missile umbrella 8,000 miles from the United States.

d. Arab League member nations also started deploying their forces to

Saudi Arabia. Egyptian and Syrian Special Forces were among the first

Arab forces to arrive.

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e. Primary defence was organized relying on air power and a thin line

of Saudi units along the Kuwait border and French and Egyptian forces

staging in King Khalid Military City (KKMC).

f. To the south of these forces, dug into defensive positions north

and west of Al-Jubayl and in the desert outside Dhahran was org.

21. Window of Vulnerability.

a. The ability of Coalition forces to defeat a determined Iraqi attack

into Saudi Arabia remained questionable, due to lack of heavy armoured

and mechanized forces. The weeks that passed until adequate heavy

forces arrived in theatre became known as the "Window of

Vulnerability".

b. However with the arrival of 1st Cav Div and Substantial air

reinforcements, by the early October, this "Window of Vulnerability"

had been narrowed.

The Btl

22. The mil conflict in the Gulf can be divided three stages:

a. Initial Stage pertained to mob of forces and resources req to wage

the war. Code named Desert Shield this op stands out as an

outstanding achievement in management and logs.

b. Sec stage of the conflict, the air campaign code named Desert

Storm will be studied for a long time as a classic in air warfare.

c. The culminating stage Desert Sabre though lasting a hundred

hrs emp of large mech forces in the desert terrain.

Desert Storm(Air Campaign)

23. Mil Objs. The mil obj of air campaign were:

a. Destroy Iraqi mil capabilities to wage war by attk Iraqi political/mil

ldrship and C2.

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b. Gain and Maint air superiority.

c. Cut Iraqi sup lines.

d. Destroy Iraqs NBC capability.

e. Destroy Republican Gd Forces.

24. Strat Objs.

a. To make the Iraqs population realise the folly of their ldrs action.

b. To condition the depl tps for a lightning gr offensive.

c. To pulverise the Iraqs civ govt with a view to quicken its down fall.

d. To ensure economic backwardness of Iraq for a long time to come.

e. To gain air supremacy.

25. Phases. Air campaign was launched by coalition forces in 4 phases.

The tgts that were planned to be destroyed in each ph are as fol:

a. Ph 1. NBC wpn instls, msl launching and storage sites, key

industrial units, C3I factories, power generation and transmission

facilities.

b. Ph 2. AD grd environment an airforce.

c. Ph 3. Battle posns and L of C.

d. Ph 4. Close Sp of own grd ops.

26. Coalition Air Caps. The allied air cap in fact encompassed the

total spectrum of air warfare. Starting form a highly sophisticated surv and int

system based on sensors in the space and at various altitudes lower down, it

could dir and del highly lethal fire power through a comb of ac and a wide

range of stand off wpns. High technology AD environments and other recce

and con means acted as force multipliers.

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27. Iraqi Air Caps. Iraqs air cap was essentially built around only the ac

and SSM. It was characterised by a near absence of eff electronic means req

for surv and creation of conducive AD environments. Most of the Iraqs fleet

comprised relatively older and obsolete eqpt.

28. Comparative Capability.

Allied Iraq Ratio

a. AD Environments.

(1) Satellites 22(Approx) - 22:0

(2) AWACS 5 1 5:1

(3)JSTARS 2-4 - 2:0

(4) Air Tankers 20-30(Approx) - 30:0

b. EW & AD Suppression24 1 24:1

c. Recce ac 40 8 5:1

d. Air Superiority Fs 271 463 1:2

e. Multirole ac 669 248 2.5:1

f. Tpt(C-141)etc 200 19 10:1

g. Sea Borne ac 90 - 9:0

h. Hels 700 249 2.5:1

29. Other Fire Del Means.

a. Coalition.

(1) Cruise Msl - Tomahawk. Which can be launched either

from ships, submarines or B-52 bombers. Range up to 1100 km.

(2) Lance SSM. Range up to 43 kms.

(3) Tac Msl System(TACMS). Range up to 60 km.

b. Iraq. Iraq was in possession of approx 200 SCUD launchers and

400-1000 SCUD msls before the commencement of war.

(1) SCUD.

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(a) Al-Hussain. Range up to 600 km.

(b) Al- Abbas. Range up to 900 km.

30. Conduct of Air Btl.

a. Coalition Air.

(1) In the 43 days of Gulf War, the Allied Air Force was able to

cont maint the surge rate and managed an astonishing 1,10000

sorties, at an average of over 2700 sorties per day.

(2) Before the air campaign began, deception ops were waged

by flying routine E-34 AWACS flts near the border which

conditioned Iraqs pers to consider such activity as normal.

(3) On the ni of 17 Jan 1991, coalition strike ac were aerially

refuelled just beyond Iraqs radar range and when the air

campaign began at 0130 hrs, the AWACS vectored the strike ac to

their tgts and surprise was achieved.

(4) The air campaign began with STEALTH F-117A and

TOMAHAWK cruise msl strikes virtually undetected.

(5) At dawn on the 17 Jan 91, French JAGUARS bombed Al Jaber

air base and SCUD msl silos. French MIRAGE 2000s flew def msns

over Saudi Arabia and strikes on munitions deps, naval bases and

other tgts.

(6) Eighty percent of sorties were eff meaning that 80% of the ac

reached their tgts. The others did not because of mech or weather

problems.

(7) By the end of the first 24 hrs, the coalition had flown 2107

cbt sorties, fired 196 TOMAHAWK msls.

(8) Allied lost 23x US, 8x UK, 1x France, 1x Italy, 4x Saudi Arabia

and 1xKuwait ac in the air campaign.

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b. Iraqi Air.

(1) Iraq also had an impressive AD system incl as many as

17000 SAM and between 9000 and 10000 AA Arty pieces. But,

resistance from Iraqs Air Force was almost non-existent. Only a

few Iraqs ac rose to challenge the allied air but they turned tail

before any air cbt could take place.

(2) On the first day it flew 96 sorties incl 53 cbt sorties. On the

2nd day, its sorties surged to 118 although cbt sorties dropped

sharply to 23. The no of cbt sorties remained the same on the third

day, cbt sorties acct for 58 out of 60 sorties flown. Thenceforth,

the no of sorties fluctuated but remained low until the sixteenth

day when the flying ceased.

(3) Due to extensive EW, long range SAMs were neutralised but

short range SAMs and AA guns did pose a challenge to the low

flying acs. The allied pilots therefore, resorted to bombing from

15000 ft.

(4) As a result of the relentless air war, almost 75% of fighting

capacity of Iraqs front line tps in Kuwait had been destroyed. Out

of 54 maj comm brs, 10 were completely destroyed, 40 were made

inoperative by partial destruction. Whereas, only 4 brs remained

op.

(5) A moderate est of the damage before start of gr campaign

caused to maj eqpt is shown on the slide:

(a) Tks. Approx 1772 destroyed out of a total of 2870.

(b) APCs. 948 knocked out from a total of 2870.

(c) Arty. More than 1474 pieces destroyed out of 3110

held before the war.

(d) ACs. Atleast 352 ac out of 708 were put out of action.

99 out of them were counted as cbt losses. 15 were captured

intact in Kuwait. Whereas, approx 112 fled away to Iran.

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(e) Ships/Crafts. Approx 60 sea vessels were destroyed

by air/naval actions.

(f) Iraqs aerial recce cap completely destroyed/put out of

action.

31. Salient Aspects of the Air Battle.

a. The air offensive started at 0130 hrs on 17 January 1991.

b. The Coalition Forces mounted 2500 to 3000 missions in a 24 hours

period.

c. More than 2700 aircraft representing 14 separate national or

service components took part.

d. The air campaign continued for 43 days until the cease fire.

e. The coalition losses of aircraft were US 23, Uk 8, France 1, Italy 1,

Saudi Arabia 4 and Kuwait 1.

Desert Sabre (Grd Campaign)

32. Coalition Forces.

a. US 3rd Army (Including British and French Forces).

(1) XVIII Airborne Corps.

(2) VII Corps.

b. 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

c. Joint Forces Command - North (JFC - N). Consisting of

Egyptian, Saudi and Syrian forces

d. Joint Forces Command-East (JFC-E). Consisting of Saudi

and GCC forces

33. Iraqi Forces.

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a. VII Corps (West). 7x inf div and 1x armd div.

b. IV Corps (Cen). 6x inf div, 1x armr and 1x mech div.

c. III Corps (East). 9x inf div, 1x armr div and 1x mech div.

d. II Corps (North). 3x inf div and 1x mech div.

e. Res. 8x Republican Gds div, 3x armr div and 3x inf div.

34. Btl.

G-Day (24 Feb 91).

a. The 1st MEF and JFC-E.

(1) At 0400 hr the first blow of the ground campaign was struck

by 1st MEF (1st and 2nd Marine Divs) and JFC-E as they began the

breach of Iraqi barrier system in south western Kuwait.

(2) The Marines found the first defensive belt abandoned but the

Iraqi 2nd line put up some resistance.

b. XVIII Airborne Corps. The XVIII Airborne corps had the mostcomplex mission and the farthest to travel of any ground forces. Its

objectives were:

(1) The French 6th Light Armoured Div would Seize As Salman

and protect corps flank (Euphrates valley).

(2) The 101st Airborne Div would fly northward to seize blocking

positions at Nasiriyah on Highway 8, the MSR of Iraq.

(3) The 24th Inf Div would strike in the direction of Talil Airbase

and then eastward toward Bashra to envelope the Iraqis.

(4) The paratroopers of 82nd Airborne Div were to secure

forward operating bases. Over three hundred helicopter ferried the

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troops and equipment in to the objective area is the largest

heliborne op in mil history.

(5) Before the attk six Special Forces teams were sent deep into

Iraqi rear, north of the Euphrates to keep a watch on Iraqi

reinforcement.

(6) By the mid night of 24/25 February, all elements of XVIII

Corps achieved their objectives without much difficulty. They were

about 93 miles into Iraq poised to continue the attk.

c. VII Corps. The VII Corps mission was to strike a killing blow at the

Iraqi Army's center of gravity - the heavy divs of the Republican Guards,

the two tanks and one mechanized divs.

35. G+1 (25 Feb 91).

a. XVIII Airborne Corps. XVIII Airborne Corps continued to drive in

to Iraq to interdict line of communication and Iraqi forces. By the

morning the French had surrounded As Salman and by evening, had

destroyed the 45th Iraqi Div.

b. VII Corps.

(1) On the VII Corps' right flank the UK 1st Armoured Div and 1st

Inf Div expanded the breach by defeating enemy brigades in the

front. The British Div turned right to hit the Iraqi 32nd Armoured

Div.

(2) On the VII Corps' left flank, the 1st Armoured Div resumed its

attk shortly after daybreak and made contact with the Iraqi 20th

Inf Div. In early afternoon it reached Al Busayah. Later in the night

of 25 February it contacted 12th Iraqi Armoured Div, and prepared

to continue attk at first light 26th February.

c. JFC-N. JFC-N in the centre continued to advance. At about 0400

hours the Egyptians continued their breaching ops and had secured a

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16 square kilometres bridgehead. By the end of the day they had seized

their objective and consolidated positions. The 9th Syrian Armoured Div

followed and supported.

36. G+2 (26 Feb 91).

a. XVIII Airborne Corps. The 24th Mechanized Div led the corpsattk into the Euphrates valley. The Div encountered its heaviest

resistance of the war. The Iraqi 47th and 49th Divs, the Republican

Guards Inf Div and 26th Commando Brigade stood and fought. The XVIII

Airborne force achieved all its objectives.

b. VII Crops. The 1st Armoured Div struck the Iraqi Medina Tank Div

while the 3rd Armoured div was destroying the Tawakalna Republican

Guards Div.

c. JFC-N. The JFC-N continued to attk seizing its objectives before

evening of 26 February. The plan was to pass through the US Marine

forces and liberate Kuwait city. TF Khalid secured its objectives and also

turned east towards Kuwait city.

37. G+3/4 (27/28 Feb 91).

a. XVIII Airborne Corps. At 0400 hrs the brigades of 24thMechanized Divs started moving east in three directions. The 1st

brigade roared towards Bashra running over retreating Iraqi columns.

The 2nd brigade raced across the runways at Jalibah Airbase. The 197th

Brigade headed west and demolished the airbase at Talil. By 0800 hrs,

the Corps took up a hasty defence just 30 miles west of Bashrah.

b. VII Corps. The Corps conducted a coordinated main attk against

the three tank Republican Guard Div- the Twakalna, the Al Medina and

the Hummurabi. By 0800 hours 28 Feb the Corps secured their

objectives and cleared the MSR between Al Jahra and Bashra.

c. JFC-E. Egyptian forces closed on Ali As Salim air field; The Kuwaiti

and Saudi forces secured objective hotel. Syrian forces continued to

handle PWs and secure JFC-N's line of communication. A brigade sized

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force entered Kuwait's western part. By 0800 hours on 28 February

Kuwait city was liberated.

d. Before dawn of 28 Feb, 40 out of 42 divs originally depl in Kuwait

and southern Iraq, including the Presidential Guard had been destroyed.

Almost 400 tanks were destroyed, 80% of artillery assets were

smashed. Coalition forces suffered some 138 KIA and about 350wounded. Iraqi deaths are estimated to be between 25,000 to 50,000

while estimate of Iraqi casualties range between 85,000 to 150,000.

Desert Shield (Log Campaign)

38. Gen. Gulf War was in fact a war of logistics, where a superior force in

material was put against a force superior in numbers, and in the end logistics

won. It was the foresight of logisticians that they catered for every aspect of

logistic support to the military, ingenuity that removed the hurdles of

shortage of military logistics by making optimal use of all possible sources

including commercial resources, and superb planning that empowered

placement of a technologically superior force with all its advantages in the

War Theatre. There are four general categories of supplies required by any

military organization to wage war; ammunition, petroleum, spare parts, and

food and medical supplies. These all supplies and other war machinery that

includes both men and material must be available at the desired place in

desired time frame.

Conduct of Logistics Operations Prior to Gulf War

39. Coalition Administration Chain of Comd. CENTCOM coord admin

and logistical plans, procedures and actions. Coalition used pull system.

Units requisitioned required supplies from higher HQ and each HQ maintained

a standing list of requests from its subordinate units, so as and when

demanded, requirements could be met immediately. Coordination and controlof various resources was as under:

a. Military Traffic Management Command.

b. U.S. Transportation Command.

c. Military Airlift Command..

d. Corps Support Command.

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40. The Coalitions Logistical Capabilities. Coalition had unlimited

supplies of almost all the items.

a. Ammunition.

b. Petroleum.

c. Food and Medical Supplies.

d. Transportation.

e. Saudi Arabia Infrastructure.

41. The Log Build Up. When US forces were ordered to deploy in the Gulf,

the challenges presented to logisticians was like nothing experienced since

word war II. The length of the logistics pipeline was more than 8500 miles i.e.

a 17-hour flight.

42. US Mob Plan. When on Aug 7, Saddam Hussains one million many

army was either in Kuwait or within a couple hundred miles of it. Theimmediate task confronting Schwarzkopf and his component (Army, Navy,

and Airforce) commanders was to get some troops and fire power

immediately. By August 14 the Air Force began landing the 82 Airborne

Division in Saudi Arabia.Both the Marines and Airborne Division were light

formations without much armor or heavy weapons. Within first thirty days,

more than 38,000 men and two Divisions were in Saudi Desert, most of them

brought by air. Over 150,000 tons of weapons, vehicles, equipment and

supplies had arrived. At the end of sixty days the number had grown to more

then 100,000 troops and a half million tons of cargo.

43. Strategic Perspective. The Gulf Operation started on 8 August 90, as

Operation Desert Shield. Initially, the emphasis was on a speedy build up to

deter the Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia. The magnitude of the tonnage

lifted to Saudi Arabia is as under:

a. Military Airlift Command. Military Airlift Command had to

requisition 117 aircraft from Civil Reserve Air Fleet to augment theirown strategic airlift capability, thus developing the capability of flying

5,000 passengers per day. They flew over 484,000 passengers and

524,000 tons of cargo.

b. Sea Lift. More than 8 division equivalent of equipment was

shipped to the Persian Gulf region, principally to sea ports and airfields.

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c. Industry Support. DLA (Defense Logistic Agency) and AMC (Army

Medical Command) took major contracting efforts. DLA dealt with the

accelerated production and delivery of desert uniforms, chemicals

defense clothes, desert boots, rations, repair parts, equipment,

weapons, fuel and ammunition.

d. Reserve Component. Over 1300 Army Reserve Corps units were

mobilized to perform various duties in US and abroad. RC personnel

were involved in combat support duties of various kinds i.e.

maintenance, quartermaster, petroleum, supply units, port operations,

ordinance, transportation, medical and depot support function.

44. Theatre Perspective. The principal theatre level logistics mission

involved the reception, onward movement and sustenance of operations.

Most Forward Support Bases were located north along the two highways,

designated MSR DODGE and the north south roadway adjacent to King Khalid

Military City MSR NASH. These bases were designated in series as ALPHA,

BRAVO, CHARLIE DELTA and ECHO. These bases were stocked with all classes

of supplies to support the two corps:

Class I - Food and water.

Class II - Clothing.

Class III - Fuel.

Class IV - Barrier material (barbed wire etc).

Class V - Ammunition.

Class VI - Major items e.g. M1A1 Tanks to replace losses.

Class VII - Medical.

Class VIII - Repair parts.

45. Log Sp US Tps. Logistic support of operations, Desert Shield and

Desert Storm, was done professionally and successfully despite extremeadverse conditions. Logistics challenges were magnified by the very complex

structure of the force. Due to commercial agreements Saudis provided a large

amount of logistic support.

a. Pers Items. The logistics system deployed support packs,

providing a variety of sundry and personal items in the field.

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b. Spl Eqpt. The theatre presented a unique opportunity to test

weapons and equipment in war environments. i.e. MI tanks, Bradley

fighting vehicles, satellite communications gear, aircraft carriers,

cruisers, destroyers, frigates and battle ship etc.

c. Med Sup. In addition to ultra modern hospitals operating onland, a number of the new hospital ships had been deployed, the

important ones being Mercy and Comfort.

d. Spare Parts. The great bulk of the requirement for

transportation in the operation was in keeping the logistics pipeline

open for heavy equipment, particularly the replacement of parts.

e. Mail. Postal authorities reported that over 30 millions pounds of

mail was shipped or air lifted to the desert till Christmas only. Express

mail was used to ship thousand of parcels per day.

Conduct of Logistic1stic Operations During Gulf War

46. Logistic Support In Operation Desert Shield & Desert Storm.

The war had nearly been won by air power alone; the army went in just

for mopping up operations. After receiving 38 days of extensive tactical and

strategic bombing Iraq was already on its knees. The 100 hours land offensiveappear short breezy but behind it, the invisible effort of build up logistic

support were the key pillars ensuring the text book victory.

47. During Operations.

a. The two corps commenced their operations to get into their attack

positions. During this movement, Theatre level support involved move

and control of 2,750 miles of MSR, which carried thousands of vehicles.

b. During the peak time 18 vehicles per minutes passed a single

point on the northern route. The movement of units, which covered

distances from 300 to 500 miles, continued 24 hours a day for 21 days.

7 Convoy Support Centres were established to provide food and rest for

drivers, fuel and maintenance services.

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c. On Jan 17, 1991, VII Corps along with its logistic base, began

moving from Harf Al Batin 150 miles westward to get into position for its

24 February assault. Each US combat division had a division support

command which consisted of:

(1) Main support battalion.

(2) Forward support battalion (for each combat brigade).

d. 7 US Army Divisions deployed in Saudi Arabia each of these seven

combat divisions had its own support command to meet short-term

supply, maintenance and medical needs. Each Corps Support Group was

composed of a Maintenance Battalion, Supply and Service Battalion, and

Transport Battalion.

e. Each armored brigade used 290-300 trucks to carry its

ammunition, fuel, water and supplies. A total of 3,500-4,000 trucks were

used to support the operations from logistic bases to forward.

Approximately the same number of trucks was required to keep

supplies going from ports to logistic bases.

f. Daily consummations by combat units were:

Fuel 5,000,000 gallons.

Water 1,300,000 gallons.

Food 708 tons.

Ammunition 34,000 tons.

Medical/misc 804 tons.

Analysis of Allied Logistic System

48. Allied Logistic Policy. As in the NATO context, the logistic policy

hinged around provision of logistic support by the participating nation in it

self. Integrating multinational logistic system created following problems:

a. Different nations were required to support a wider variety of

weapon system and support equipment.

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b. Planning for logistic support while reconciling different national

policies on :

(1) Reserve stock level

(2) Emergency repairs

(3) Casualty care

c. Excess logistic resources could not be appropriately distributed to

other participating nations.

d. Co-operating in logistic system was not evolved as a policy.

49. The Host Nation Integration. Commander-in-Chief Central Command

(CINCCENT) determined that his primary need was combat forces. This

assessment resulted in slipping the priority for deployment of support units

and thus the support units available to support early arriving combat units.

The Saudis provided a large amount of logistics support but the initial

negotiation process proved to be a difficult one.

50. Dev of Infrastructure. Developing of a theatre infrastructure was also

constrained. Law to $ 200,000 per project limited funding for minor

construction.

51. Organic Production. Deploying forces was dependent onextensive lateral support and depot re-supply prior to deployment. Post

deployment support was significantly enhanced by the surge of organic depot

production the availability of airlift to bring high priority items into the theatre

quickly.

52. Industrial Base. Support for the forces deployed to the theatre

depended in several areas on the ability of the industrial base to respond to

new and increased demands. Not all requirements were met in the quantitiesand within the time period desired. As an example, the US Army field-feeding

plan relied on ample supplies of T-rations but they were not currently in War-

Reserve stocks. Industry was unable to gear up production quickly enough to

meet the Armys increased requirements. Similarly, the industrial base was

unable to meet the theatre requirements for the newest and most preferred

tank-killing round. From weapon systems to individual items of supplies, a

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tremendous demand was placed on the nations Industrial base. Despite

some shortcomings, the industrial base was reasonably responsive to the

need of the forces.

53. The Deployment. The most stressful aspect of the operation has

been the air and sea-lift effort. On August 4, US forces were alerted for

deployment and on August 7, the first U.S forces began to arrive in SaudiArabia.

54. Military Air Lift. The coalition air forces transported more than half

a million tons of military material to the Gulf. Most of it was conveyed by US

Force, Military Airlift Command (MAC) which flew over 11,800 missions. The

time between a request made in Saudi Arabia, and delivery from continental

United States would total just 31 hours.

55. Sea Lift. When all available air assets were committed or using air was

non-practical, sea-lift was the only answer. The number of US ships went

down from 5000 in 1945, to 424 in 1990. For this, 8 fast sea lift ships and 36

maritime administrative reserve vessels were activated. Retired crewmen

manned some of these. In total 120 merchant and supply ships were

committed to the deployment of heavier ground forces and their supplies. By

New Year eve, over two million tons of equipment had been shipped to Saudi

Arabia by sea.

56. Transport. Each service deployed a greater percentage of truck

transportation units than combat units, yet still had transportation

requirements that had to be met with host nation support because the area

where US forces were operating had few roads and no railroads. Trucks-both

heavy Equipment Transporter (HETs) and vehicles with good off-road mobility

capability were a consideration during Operations. The most efficient way to

move armd vehicles over long distances in non-combat conditions is to move

them on trucks or by rail. Over 1,200 HETS, were required to support USforces during Operation Desert Storm. The Department had only about 500

HETs available. Obtaining 182 HETs (134 leased and 48 purchased) form US

trucking companies and acquiring 715 HETs form other nations satisfied the

requirement. Without these assets, it would have been very difficult to move

forces over the vast distances.

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57. Supplies viz. Transport. Throughout Operation Desert Shield there

was a long haul requirement to move supplies from ports to theatre storage

areas to consuming units. Division-sized units consume hundreds of tons of

supplies each day. When VII crops and XVIII Airborne Corps began shifting to

the west prior to their end run sweep, the transportation system was taxed

to the limited. The newly introduced Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactics Truck

(HEMITT) and the Marine Logistic Vehicle System (LVS), performed well in this

mission, but there were not enough of them. Once the ground offensive

began, many types of trucks struggled to keep up with the manoeuvre forces.

58. Logistic Command & Control. At the outset of the operation there

was a brief period when an adequate structure for Army command and

control of logistics unit was not available in the theatre. CENTCOM elected to

establish an ad hoc Logistic Headquarters to oversee this portion of force.

This was a satisfactory solution during the first phases of the deployment,and when the size of force increased in November, CENTCOM did not request

mobilization of a theatre level logistics command and control element

because it would have disrupted an already functioning system.

59. Medical Supply. Deployment of medical units began on 8 August,

and units from all services were involved. As the mission of the deployed

force evolved from deterrence to offensive operations, the medical support

requirements expanded. In addition, beds were provided by host nationsupport agreements with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. When the decision was

made to augment the forces in theatre to provide an offensive capability,

medical requirements were adjusted accordingly. In theatre bed

requirements increased, based on doctrinal rules, 18,100 were to be provided

by the host nation and staffed by US military persons. When the air war

began 7680 fully staffed beds were in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

60. Maintenance. Fine abrasive blowing sand creates special problems for

tacticians and maintenance alike. If equipment is protected from sand

Infiltration and accumulation, removal problems are less important.

Maintenance and lubrication techniques changed to prevent dust

accumulation, which pre-maturely wears and seals bearings and weapons

mechanisms. Helicopter rotor blades and canopies developed sand erosion

and required solar loading protection to achieve normal service life and

reduce maintenance requirements. Sand caused clogged airlines,

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overheating, and even vehicle fires. The environment demanded high

maintenance standards which was provided by the log elms.

61. Water. The assessed requirements of water for one Armed Division

were up to 2 million liters per day: that allowed for 40 liters per man per day

plus provision for hospital, NBC decontamination. By the end of Feb 1991,

nineteen reserve Osmosis Plants and twenty NBC water purification unitswere functional in the theatre. The nearly million coalition forces never ran

short of water, a commendable logistic achievement.

Lessons Learnt (Log)

62. Disrupting the logistics system played a vital role in destroying the Iraqi

Army, but that role was somewhat indirect. Had the war lasted longer than

100 hours, the Army would have had to curtail its activities due to shortages.

Disrupting Iraqs strategic highway and rail network enabled the Coalition to

destroy huge amounts of Iraqs military hardware. As the army tried to

withdraw, it was trapped and Coalition ground and air power destroyed the

remaining equipment at will. The massive destruction on the highway of

death between Kuwait and Iraq was the most notable example of the Iraqi

predicament. Following are few lessons which can be drawn from the war:-

63. Transportation. Heavy Equipment Transport (HETs) so that tanks

and other heavy equipment can move quickly, without damaging the road or

causing excessive wear and tear to tracked vehicles. The American found

themselves short of transportation and had to desperately requisition ships,

aircraft and trucks from commercial sources/friendly countries. An army,

which wants to have a capability for quick build up in critical areas, should

have adequate means of transportation to do so.

64. Materiel Handling. Another critical shortage was in the area of

material handling equipment, i.e fork-lifts, and mobile cranes. So not onlytransportation means are important but also means of handling them.

65. Trained Manpower. Along-with the equipment a need was felt to have

trained manpower to operate the equipment.

66. Logistics Wins Wars. This war demonstrated most conclusively that

logistics can win war. Lack of adequate logistic support other than any

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professional ability on the part of opponents contributes to the defeat of an

army.

67. Integrated Logistics. Three services combined their resources with

those of the other countries to organize such and efficient logistic system.

Therefore pooling of entire logistic resources of a nation for an efficient

logistic network is reqr.

68. Propositioning of Stores. The war highlighted that in future logistic

planner must preposition stores and supplies in the vicinity of potential

conflict areas to enable a rapid build up.

69. Reorganization of Units. Certain units may need to be reorganized to

make them more mobile and transportable, in order to avoid straining the

already stretched transportation resources.

70. Defense Industrial Base. Having a strong and well-developed

industrial infrastructure is absolutely vital for any nation to wage war.

71. Rapid Mobilization of Reserve. This war has once again

demonstrated the critical role played by the reserves in the success of any

war. Pakistan needs to urgently overhaul its outmoded system of reserves.

72. Revision of Wastage Rates. Towards the end of the war, even the US

had run short of ammunition of a few weapon systems and had the war

prolonged, the situation would have become critical.

73. Logistical Interdiction. The month long aerial interdiction of Iraq was

in fact largely instrumental in the destruction of Iraqi will to fight.

74. Keep the Logistic Plan Simple. The Logistic plan should be made

as simple as possible. This requires:

a. Emphasis on Training.

b. Flexibility in Planning and execution.

c. Centralized planning and decentralized execution.

d. Communication.

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75. Joint Planning. The administrative and operational chain of command

given the Diversity of nationalities in its composition created a lot of

operational friction.

76. Technological Developments.Tactics and technology should serve

side by side. This high-low mix is likely to present enormous challenges tologisticians.

77. Quantum of Support. Logistics systems should be made more

flexible to sustain the superfluity of supplies and maintenance.

78. Centralization. To balance between centralization and

decentralization. Logistics system should be able to provide continuing and

effective support on the modern battlefield.

Causes of Coalition Victory

79. The major factors, especially from mil point of view that contributed to

the coalition victory were:

a. Identification of the Correct Mil Objective and Maintenance

of Aim.The Allied could ident and destroy the correct mil objectives at

the first stage i.e. NBC wpn instl, msl launching site, C3I factories etcand maint their aim to liberate Kuwait.

b. Best Suited Doc. Allied plan to soften up the tgt by massive

air attk first and then by a coord grd-air action was proved to be the

best suited doc in Gulf war.

c. High Tech Wpn System. Allied used highly sophisticated

weapon system, stealth technology, cruise missiles and electronic

warfare to defeat tech inferior Iraqi tps.

d. C3I. Total integration of resources including C3I and the creation

of a viable unified command structure. On the other hand Allied could

destroy Iraqi C3I factories at the beginning of the btl.

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e. Air Supremacy. Absolute air supremacy over the theatre of

ops. Allied had supremacy over Iraq from Ad environments to ac.

f. Log Bal. Iraq could built up some res stocks in their def posn but

they failed to maint a secured L of C. On the other hand Coalition forces

took seven months to built up the stocks and ensured their secured L of

C.

g. Surprise and Deception. The exec of Coalition deception plan

caught Iraq by total surprise. This led to the rapid collapse of Iraqi

resistance.

h. Concentration of forces.

j. Training.

k. Maintenance of momentum.

l. Very effective psychological warfare.

Causes of Iraqi Defeat

80. Factors that led to the Iraqi defeat were:

a. Geo Political. Iraq was isolated internationally and depended

solely on his own resources, which were extremely limited.

b. Static Warfare. In an era of widely practiced mobile warfare Iraq

depended on positional warfare.

c. Training. Lack of training led to crisis in confidence in their

equipment and was further aggravated with their inability to fight at

night.

d. Integration of Forces. Because of lack of interaction between

svcs/arms the air force bowed out of the conflict in the early stages. The

integration between the Republican Guards and the Army was non-

existent.

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e. Air Defence. Even though Iraq had invested heavily in air

defence assets, these resources did not cover the entire country. Except

few isolated vulnerable areas.

f. Personnel Management. The Republican Guard was given

preferential treatment compared with the rest of the army. Added to

this, army personnel were kept to their post under threat of execution.These seriously eroded morale of the Iraqi forces.

g. Inferior C3I. Inferior command, control, communications and

intelligence system of Iraq when compared with the same of the

coalition forces.

Lessons Learnt

81. The Gulf conflict exhibited some unique dimensions of warfare

unprecedented in mil history. Many lessons can be drawn from this conflict

separately relating to politics and diplomacy, economy, international

relations, post cold war balance of power, coalition dynamics and mil. In

conformity with the scope of today's presentation, major mil lessons are:

a. Fixed Defence. The weakness of fixed def is that a determined

enemy, given sufficient time and study, can always overcome them.

b. Air Support. Due to lack of proper air support a formidable Iraqi

defence was not capable of dealing with the coalition attackers as

expected. On the other hand, the war was literally won by the Coalition

air campaign before the ground battle commenced.

c. Surprise and Deception. The superb execution of coalition

deception plan caught Iraq by total surprise. This led to the rapid

collapse of Iraqi resistance and quick allied victory.

d. Electronic Warfare. The Coalition's ability to degrade the

enemy's C&I system with a significant ECM capability was a major battle

winning factor. Therefore, one must retain its capability to fight under

ECM environment.

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e. Morale. The Gulf war proved once again that well trained, well

motivated and well led forces will prevail over poorly trained, poorly

motivated and poorly led troops. No matter what scientific and

technological advances are made on the battle field.

f. Logistics. Though Iraq could build up some reserve stocks in

their defensive positions but they could not maintain a secured line ofcommunication. On the other hand the coalitions forces took seven

months to build up their stocks and ensured their secured line of

communication.

g. All Arms Coop. Coop among the arms and services contribute to

the victory to a great extent. This has been amply demonstrated in the

Gulf war.

Concl

82. Invasion of Iraq in Kuwait has provided a huge shock to the world, it has

created a sense of insecurity among the states adjacent to such regional

super powers. It is not logical to think that the west would respond in the

similar way as that of the Gulf situation in case of any third world conflict,

since there are no obvious western interests other than the protection of the

nationals. However, the Gulf experience should help to deter those

contemplating blatant aggression. The deterrent effect of the Gulf war may

no doubt create a fear against such adventure.

Documents

Gulf War - Big