Guardianship Cases

8/10/2019 Guardianship Cases

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LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI,

Petitioner,

- versus-

ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER andAMANDA, all surnamed PABALE,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 151243

Present:

PUNO, CJ *

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 30, 2008

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D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the reversal and setting asideof the Decision,2[2] dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; aswell as the Resolution,3[3] dated 19 December 2001 of the same court denyingreconsideration of its aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailedDecision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executedby Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, allsurnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in Calamba,Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed

and set aside the Decision,4[4] dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofPasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5[5] The 2 December 1997 Decision of theRTC declared null and void the two sales agreements involving the subject property enteredinto by Nave with different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and thePabale siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Naves

successor-in-interest.

There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined bythe Court of Appeals to be as follows:

This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando,representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the


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Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.,docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of landlocated in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged that onJanuary 3, 1984, a handwritten Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan (Contract to Sell) was entered

into by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] renegedon their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment he tenderedto her as previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore.[Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to execute thecorresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and

damages.

[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute thecorresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) shewas not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to her for hersignature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed that it was for the sale of herproperty in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returnedto [Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. Herrepudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partialdown payment to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold the propertyin good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale

siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before shereceived a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of actionagainst her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not aparty to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party ininterest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the corporation there being noevidence to show that he was duly authorized to do so.

Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now theland owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint was amended to include [thePabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied*Naves+ Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that shewas adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to *Fernandos+ amended

complaint.

Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with Counterclaim andCross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact thatshe was made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of thetransaction in issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the trialcourt admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim.

Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Motion toAdmit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabalesiblings], this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficientbased on the psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra.Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, thesame was denied by the court a quo.

[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in Criminal Case No.1308-85-C entitled People vs. Nelly S. Nave she raised therein as adefense her mentaldeficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contractentered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null and void, the SecondAmended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings] should beadmitted.

Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case wassuspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave]with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-Cwith Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered

in the said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides with the Brosasspouses has categorically refused to be examined again at the National Mental Hospital, theCourt is constrained to accept the Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986submitted by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the supporting report dated April 20, 1987submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental Hospital and hereby findsNelly S. Nave an incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, aperson who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental processescannot without outside aid take care of herself and manage her properties, becomingthereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said condition having become severe since

the year 1980. She and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C.Paner is hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further ordersfrom this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as regular guardian, Atty. Paner is orderedto participate actively in the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of protectingher interests from the prejudicial sales of her real properties, from the overpayment in theforeclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering her lost jewelries andmonies and other personal effects.

SO ORDERED.


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Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, while the appealinterposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failureto pay the required docketing fees within the reglementary period.

In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20, 1993, Atty. VedastoGesmundo, *Naves+ sole heir, she being an orphan and childless, executedan Affidavit ofSelf-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave].

On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for theissuance of a writ of execution of the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C(petition for guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 withthe court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that(1) they were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be boundby the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by thelate [Nave] in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case.

The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997, Atty. VedastoGesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts permission for his substitution for the late

defendant Nelly in the instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respectivepre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri]alleging that since the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo asevidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In refutation,Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he executed is a Deed ofDonation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same wasalready revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution should bedenied.

On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot make a ruling as tothe conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heardon the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the dispositiveportion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3, 1984 executed by NellyS. Nave and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and effect;

2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984 executed by Nelly S.Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and void and of no force and effect;

3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property covered by TCTNo. 111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna;

4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over the property infavor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of reconveyance because the sale in theirfavor has been declared null and void;

5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the property to Ms.[Alamayri] and to account for its income from the time they took over possession to the timethe same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and thereafter pay the said income to thelatter;

6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and severally, to pay Ms.[Alamayri]:

a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and

b. the costs.6[6]

S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the

Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely to question the portion of the 2December 1997 Decision of the RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly andseverally pay Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.

The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the RTCerred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20


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February 1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground that Navewas found incompetent since the year 1980.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the appeals of S.M.Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando Realty Corporation,represented by its President, Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed byRommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. TheDecision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C ishereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding the VALIDITY of theDeed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.

No pronouncements as to costs.7[7]

Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate court,invoking the Decision,8[8] dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the guardianship proceedings,docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which found Nave incompetent, her conditionbecoming severe since 1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian.Said Decision already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom.Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an incompetentsince 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into should be declared null andvoid, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over thesubject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.

According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of the RTC in its22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having participated in the said guardianshipproceedings through their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly namedin its orders Jose Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October

1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed on 21 November2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she could mark andsubmit as evidence certain documents to establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed thechildren of Jose Pabale.

Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for Reconsideration

of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting

Naves incompetence since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his rightto the subject property as owner upon Naves death in accordance with the laws of

succession. It must be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC thesupposed transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a quorefrained from ruling thereon.

In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for lack ofmerit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo.

Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review onCertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following assignment of errors:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WASINCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988 CANNOT RETROACTTO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 INFAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGNO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON RESPONDENTS PABALES.

III


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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING

TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSEPABALE AS THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.9[9]

It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of

the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same factmay no longer be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata,more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.

This Court is not persuaded.

Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a

thing or matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing finaljudgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of

competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights ofthe parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicialtribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 10[10]

It is espoused in the Rules o f Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39,which read:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final orderrendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final

order, may be as follows:

x x x x

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudgedor as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive betweenthe parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of theaction or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in thesame capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only isdeemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon itsface to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein ornecessary thereto.

The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows:

(1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes theparties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suitinvolving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Anyright, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determinationof an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on themerits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated betweenthe parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subjectmatters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction betweenthe principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate asevidence.11[11] In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and whichcorresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, isreferred to as bar by former judgment; while the second general rule, which is embodied in

paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as conclusiveness of judgment.

The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the followingenlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:


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The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by formerjudgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.

The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question whichwas in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a courtof competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the partiesto that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in

any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other courtof concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgmentremains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment inone action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the sameparties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point orquestion is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determinationof that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or theirprivies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issueand adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identityof cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.

Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201,210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinctionbetween bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon thesame claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars therelitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on adifferent claim or cause of action.

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issueand adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connectedwith the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied inthe final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto

and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually orformally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgmentcould not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered ashaving settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgmentnecessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgmentitself.12[12]

Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, furtherdifferentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:

There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was

rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subjectmatter, and causes of action. In this i nstance, the judgment in the first case constitutes anabsolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of

competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well astheir privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of actionbefore the same or other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causesof action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directlycontroverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is theconcept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any right,

fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of anaction before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusivelysettled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their

privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions isthe same.13[13]

In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact orquestion already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceedprovided that it will no longer touch o n the same fact or question adjudged in the first case.Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causesof action.

Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no application to theinstant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.

No identity of parties


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SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for theappointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging herincompetence.

A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor or anincompetent, the latter being described as a person suffering the penalty of civil interdiction

or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,

those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons notbeing of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becomingthereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.14[14]

Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, towit:

Rule 93

APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS

SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident.Any relative,friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent orlawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the courthaving jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, orboth, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the UnitedStates in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director ofHealth, in favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolatedleper.

SEC. 2. Contents of petition.A petition for the appointment of a general guardian mustshow, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or convenient;

(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and ofthe persons having him in their care;

(d) The probable value and character of his estate;

(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.

The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall render voidthe issuance of letters of guardianship.

SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof.When a petition for the appointmentof a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, andshall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petitionresiding in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetenthimself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given.

SEC. 4. Opposition to petition.Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition,contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor, competency of thealleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and maypray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to anysuitable person named in the opposition.

SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue.At the hearing of the petition the allegedincompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the requirednotice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in supportof their respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or incompetent itshall appoint a suitable guardian of his person o r estate, or both, with the powers and dutieshereinafter specified.

x x x x


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SEC. 8. Service of judgment.Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served uponthe civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person residesor where his property or part thereof is situated.

A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties,

i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, VerdastoGesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no named respondent/s.

Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition containthe names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent andthose having him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the minoror incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.

The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 ofthe Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or anincompetent who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, whois most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that thepeople who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closestto and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives livingwithin the same province and/or the persons caring for him.

It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors o f the minor orincompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple: because theirpresence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a

given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed minor orincompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity ofsaid contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith.

Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually tookpart in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives, nor are they the ones caringfor her. Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or specialnotices of the hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not establishedthat the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests ontwo Orders, dated 30 October 198715[15] and 19 November 1987,16[16] issued by the RTCin SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who wassupposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates.However, the said Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed thefather of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to appear in the saidhearings on their behalf.

Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit and markadditional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the Pabale siblings.

It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receiveevidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in casesfalling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conductnew trials or further proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conductshearings and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for judgment.17[17] Itmust be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to MarkExhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus sought to submit additional evidence as

to the identity of Jose Pabale, not o nly after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted forjudgment, but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in said caseon 10 April 2001.

The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available evidencesin support of their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed submitted for

judgment. Only under exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence afterhaving rendered judgment;18[18] otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the


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parties may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri failed toprovide any explanation why she did not present her evidence earlier. Merely invoking thatthe ends of justice would have been best served if she was allowed to present additionalevidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the general rules of procedure. Obedienceto the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair resultstherefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on thepolicy of liberal construction.19[19] Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate theadjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by therules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the

rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate therules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules appliesonly to proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true thatlitigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecutedin accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administrationof justice.20[20]

Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny her Motion toSchedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for being late. In its Resolution, dated19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the followinggrounds:

While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents Pabale siblings]participated in the guardianship proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentionedtherein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentaryevidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannotbind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being noallegation to the effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court.21[21]

As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do provethat the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30 October 1987 and 19 November1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still notconfirm his authority to represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is thefact that Jose Pabale was not at a ll a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 February 1984 over

the subject property, which was executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Withoutproper authority, Jose Pabales presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146 -86-C shouldnot bind his children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the subjectproperty.

Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.

No identity of issues

Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar th e latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Naves competency

in 1984, when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabalesiblings.

In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time o ffiling of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian overher person and estate.

In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No.675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed ofSale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence,rendering the said sale void.

While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be established attwo separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent


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in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22[22] theCourt ruled that despite the fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by thetrial court only nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove thatshe was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-year gapherein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that

of 1984 given the intervening period.

Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declaredincapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved;that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of hismind.23[23] The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests uponthe person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will bepresumed.24[24]

Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986,when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared anincompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC,resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986,

Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as theDeed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismallyfailed to do, having relied entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No.146-86-C.

Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition having become s evere since the year 1980.25[25]

But there is no basis for such a declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in saidDecision, prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,26[26] and (2) byDr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27[27] both stated that upon their examination,Nave was suffering from organic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with

psychotic episodes, which impaired her judgment. There was nothing in the said medical

reports, however, which may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said mentalcondition. All they said was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and againin 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which made him realize that hermind was very impressionable and capable of being manipulated, on the occasions when

Nave visited the court from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves incompetency from1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than invoking the 22 June1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother to establish withher own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20 February1984 Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to renderthe said deed void.

All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C andCivil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Naves incompetency bythe year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that

Nave still had capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the Deedof Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court ofAppeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deedof Sale.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. TheDecision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is herebyAFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.

SO ORDERED.


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[G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001.]

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, Petitioner, v. HELEN G. BELMES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant,"promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the

motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decisionare:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother o f Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of theUnited States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During hislifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,Helen G. Belmes.

"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court ofCebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie andVincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years

old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It i s claimed in the petition that the minors areresidents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from theirfathers death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.

"Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily.

"On July 15, 1987, Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian overthe persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

"On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted anopposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed asimilar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the RegionalTrial Court of Pagadian City.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary


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"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for theRemoval of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the naturalmother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors atMaralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that thepetition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the t ime the petition was filedBonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being anaturalized American citizen.

"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmesmotion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. andinstead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as suchguardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for areconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988." 1

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order ofOctober 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.

The Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in theabsence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental

authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of theFamily Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the RevisedRules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minorchildren without need of a court appointment and only for good reason may another personbe named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any reason at all whyHelen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as naturalguardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be anabdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and theconstitution on family solidarity." 2

On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, raising thefollowing "legal points" :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to beappointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary toexisting jurisprudence.

"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes, thebiological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the minors despite the undisputedproof that under her custody, her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times byOppositors live-in partner.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified petitionerBonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of subjectminors despite the fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as

judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is clearly not a statutoryrequirement to become guardian."cralaw virtua1aw library

At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15,1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie turned eighteen onSeptember 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth Certificate. 3 Respondent thus prayed that this casebe dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianshipproceedings. The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolutiondated November 11, 1998.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot with respect

to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by petitioner should be resolved.

The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minorVincent should be his guardian.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural motherof the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This rulingfinds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ARTICLE 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over thepersons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall

prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the correspondingnatural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala Eslao v. Court of Appeals, 4 this Courtheld:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents

to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a

right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is notcreated by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parentalrelationship." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.

Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substituteparental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ARTICLE 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parentalauthority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 5 this Court ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of theircommon children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shallcontinue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or

unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the survivinggrandparent."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in


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case of death, absence or unsuitability of Respondent. Considering that respondent is verymuch alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has toprove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability.

Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is notsuited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morallyunfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerieseveral times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianshipproceeding.

Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannotqualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and aresident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities andobligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty ofdischarging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merelydelegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.cralaw : red

Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the

Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age andher conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No.CBU-16884 6 filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here.Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent foronly two years is not certain.

Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who arenot within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. InGuerrero v. Teran, 7 this Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that herappointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing inthe law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians.However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon thisquestion, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceasedpersons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty byappointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to theappointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject tothe jurisdiction of our courts here."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense thatValerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship ofrespondent Helen Belmes.

Costs against petitioner.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I share the opinion very well expressed by Madame Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez inher ponencia.

There is in law and jurisprudence a recognition of the deep ties that bind parent and child.Parents are thus placed first in rank in matters of parental authority. Substitute parental

authority may be exercised by the grandparents only in case the parents have died or areabsent or declared unfit in proper proceedings for that purpose. 1 Parental authority standsto include the right and duty to the custody of the child, excepting only, of course, whatmight otherwise be best for the c hilds welfare.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

When the law speaks of family relations, it must be deemed to ref er, unless the contrary isthere indicated or the context of the law otherwise clearly conveys, to both legitimate andillegitimate ties. The childs illegitimacy does not in any way affect the order of priority in the

exercise of parental authority. Indeed, Article 176 of the Family Code states that anillegitimate child shall be under the parental authority of the mother who, consequentially,should also be entitled to the custody of the child. 2


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- versus -

BARTOLOME SY, ROSALINO SY, FLORECITA SY, ROLANDO SY,LOURDES SY, ROSAURO SY, JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY,

Respondents.

CARPIO, J.

Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt. The first Petition, G.R. No. 114217, assails the Decision29[2] dated May 6, 1993 andthe Resolution30[3] dated February 28, 1994 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.17686. On the other hand, the second Petition, G.R. No. 150797, questions the Decisiondated February 28, 2001 and the Resolution dated November 5, 2001 of the CA in CA-G.R. SPNo. 46244.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

G.R. No. 114217

On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against spouses JoseSy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, OscarSy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy,Julieta Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon,Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 8578.31[4]

Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, BartolomeSy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy Bang by his second marriageto respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy arethe children of Sy Bang from his first marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan andMa. Emma Sy are the children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan.32[5]


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Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties,including several businesses.33[6]

During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it wasagreed that the management, supervision or administration of the common properties

and/or the entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed temporarily in the hands ofpetitioner Jose Sy Bang, as trustee, with authority to delegate some of his functions to any ofpetitioners or private respondents. Thus, the function or duty o f bookkeeper was delegatedby Jose Sy Bang to his co-petitioner Julian Sy, and the duty or function of management andoperation of the business of cinema of the co mmon ownership was delegated by petitionerJose Sy Bang to respondent Rosauro Sy.34[7]

Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the threecinema houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall exclusively pertain torespondents for their support and sustenance, pending the termination of Civil Case No.8578, for Judicial Partition, and the income from the vast parts of the entire estate and other

businesses of their common father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since theyear 1980, private respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of theoperation and management of the three cinema houses, with the income derived therefromevenly divided among themselves for their support and maintenance.35[8]

On March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on theCompromise Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil Case No. 8578 byplaintiff Rolando Sy and defendants Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. On April 2, 1981, the Judgerendered a Second Partial Decision based on the pretrial order of the co urt, dated March 25,1981, entered into by and between respondent Renato Sy and petitioner spouses. Said First

Partial Decision and Second Partial Decision had long become final, without an appeal havingbeen interposed by any of the parties.36[9]

On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision,37[10] the dispositiveportion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders this Third Partial Decision:

(a) Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets, their income, produce andimprovements, as well as all the rights, interests or participations (sic) in the names ofdefendants Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan and their children, defendants Zenaidaand Ma. Emma; both surnamed Sy, and defendants Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, asbelonging to the estate of Sy Bang, including the properties in the names of said defendantswhich are enumerated in the Complaints in this case and all those properties, rights andinterests which said defendants may have concealed or fraudulently transferred in the namesof other persons, their agents or representatives;

(b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: his surviving widow,Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy and her children, Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, Rolando, Rosauro,Maria Lourdes, Florecita and Julieta, all surnamed Sy, and his children by his first wife,namely: Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, Lucio Sy, Oscar Sy and Renato Sy;

(c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs entitled theretoafter the extent thereof shall have been determined at the conclusion of the properaccounting which the parties in this case, their agents and representatives, shall render and

after segregating and delivering to Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy her o ne-half (1/2) share in theconjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband Sy Bang;


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(d) Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for partition ofproperties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy.

SO ORDERED.

On June 16, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for Inhibition,alleging, among others, that the Judge had patently shown partiality in favor of their co-defendants in the case. This motion was denied on August 16, 1982.38[11]

On July 4, 1982, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition (Disqualification)and Mandamus with Restraining Order with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 60957.The Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition was denied, and the Petition for Mandamuswith Restraining Order was Noted.39[12]

On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the first Order,40[13] Mrs. Lucita L.Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners Motion for New Trial and/orReconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their Supplemental Motion, dated July 12, 1982,were denied for lack of merit; and (2) in the second Order,41[14] the Judge ordered theimmediate cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title i nthe names of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.

On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the receiver, Mrs. Lucita L.Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino Sy.42[15]

While the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was pending before the FirstDivision of the Supreme Court, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 61519. A Temporary Restraining Order wasissued on August 31, 1982, to enjoin the Judge from taking any action in Civil Case No. 8578and, likewise, restraining the effectivity of and compliance with the Resolution dated August16, 1982, the two Orders dated August 17, 1982, and the Order dated August 18, 1982.

On September 2, 1982, petitioners withdrew their Petition for Mandamus with RestrainingOrder, docketed as G.R. No. 60957.

On September 11, 1982, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was filed by Mrs. Lucita L.

Sarmiento, the appointed receiver, which was opposed by petitioners on September 24,1982. 43[16]

After several incidents in the case, the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred the petition to the CAfor proper determination and disposition.

The CA rendered the assailed Decision44[17] on May 6, 1993, denying due course to anddismissing the petition for lack of merit. It held that Judge Puno acted correctly in issuing theassailed Third Partial Decision. The CA said that the act of Judge Puno in rendering a partial


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decision was in accord with then Rule 36, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, which stated thatin an action against several defendants, the court may, when a judgment is proper, render

judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. Itfound that the judges decision to defer resolution on the properties in the name of Rosalino,

Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique would not affect the resolution on the properties in thenames of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada, Julian, Ro sa, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma, since the propertieswere separable and distinct from one another such that the claim that the same formed partof the Sy Bang estate could be the subject of separate suits.

The CA also upheld the judges appointment o f a receiver, saying thatthe judge did so afterboth parties had presented their evidence and upon verified petition filed by respondents,and in order to preserve the properties under litigation. Further, the CA found proper theorder to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of title in the names ofRosalino, Rolando and Bartolome.

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 28, 1994.45[18]

On April 22, 1994, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 of theRules of Court.

The Court denied the Petition for non-compliance with Circulars 1-88 and 19-91 for failure ofpetitioners to attach the registry receipt. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, and thePetition was reinstated on July 13, 1994.

In this Petition for Review, petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision and Resolution in

CA-G.R. SP No. 17686 and, consequently, the nullification of the Third Partial Decision andorders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 8578. They also pray for the Court to direct the trialcourt to proceed with the reception of further evidence in Civil Case No. 8578.46[19] Inparticular, petitioners allege that the CA decided questions of substance not in accord with

law when it upheld the trial courts Third Partial Decision which, they alleged, was renderedin violation of their rights to due process.

Petitioners narrate that the trial court initially gave them two trial daysMay 26and 27, 1982to present their evidence. However, at the hearing on May 26, the judgeforced them to terminate the presentation of their evidence. On June 2, 1982, followingpetitioners submission of additional documentary evidence, the trial court scheduled the

case for hearing on June 8 and 9, 1982, at 2 oclock in the afternoon in view of theimportance of the issue concerning whether all the properties in the names of Enrique Sy,Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as those inthe names of other party-litigants in this case) shall be declared or included as part of theEstate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic) presented byAttys. Raya and Camaligan. At the June 8 hearing, petitioners presented additional evidence.

Unknown to them, however, the trial court had already rendered its Third Partial Decision at11 oclock that morning. Thus, petitioners argue that said Third Partial Decision is

void.47[20]

They also question the trial courts First Order dated August 17, 1982 and Order

dated August 18, 1982 granting the prayer for receivership and appointing a receiver,respectively, both allegedly issued without a hearing and without showing the necessity toappoint a receiver. Lastly, they question the Second Order dated August 17, 1982 cancelingthe notice of lis pendens ex parte and without any showing that the notice was for thepurpose of molesting the adverse parties, or that it was not necessary to protect the rights ofthe party who caused it to be recorded.48[21]

On May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of WidowsAllowance. She alleged that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an extensive estate. Theproperties of the estate were found by the trial court to be their conjugal properties. Fromthe time of Sy Bangs death in 1971 until the filing of the motion, Rosita was not given any

widows allowance as provided in Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court by the parties in


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possession and control of her husbands estate, or her share in the conjugal

partnership.49[22]

In their Comment on the Motion for Payment of Widows Allowance, petitioners

argued that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the same isgranted only during the settlement of the estate of the decedent, and this allowance,under Article 188 of the Civil Code (now Article 133 of the Family Code), shall be taken from

the common mass of property during the liquidation of the inventoried properties.50[23]Considering that the case before the trial court is a special civil action for partition under Rule69 of the Rules of Court, Rosita is not entitled to widows allowance.

On September 23, 1996, the Court granted the Motion for Payment of Widows

Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Rosita P25,000.00 as thewidows allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang, effective September 1, 1996 and

every month thereafter until the estate is finally settled or until further orders from theCourt.51[24]

In a Manifestation dated October 1, 1996, petitioners informed the Court thatRosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present and future claimsagainst petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties to the case.52[25] Attachedthereto was a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein Rosita and Enrique stated that they were given

P1 million and a 229-square meter parcel of land, for which reason they were withdrawing asplaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8578.53[26]

Respondents, except Enrique Sy, filed a Counter-Manifestation and Opposition toDrop Rosita Sy as a Party.54[27] They said that it would be ridiculous for Rosita to give up hershare in Sy Bangs estate, amounting to hundreds of millions of pesos, which had already

been ordered partitioned by the trial court, to the prejudice of her seven full-blooded

children. They alleged that Rosita was not in possession of her full faculties when she affixedher thumbmark on the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age, her frequent illness, andher lack of ability to read or write. Hence, they filed a petition before the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Lucena City for guardianship over her person and properties. They alsoalleged that Enrique and some of Jo se Sy Bangs children would stealthily visit Rosita in

Rosauros house while the latter was away. On one of those occasions, she was asked toaffix her thumbmark on some documents she could not read and knew nothing about. Theyclaim that Rosita has never received a single centavo of the P1 million allegedly given her.

In their Reply to Counter-Manifestation,55[28] petitioners countered thatrespondents failed to present any concrete evidence to challenge the Sinumpaang Salaysay.

Since the same was duly notarized, it was a public document and presumed valid. They,likewise, alleged that the Counter-Manifestation was filed without Rositas authorization as,in fact, she had written her counsel with instructions to withdraw said pleading.56[29]Further, they averred that Rosita executed the Sinumpaang Salaysay while in full possessionof her faculties. They alleged that Rosita intended to oppose the petition for guardianshipand they presented a copy of a sworn certification from Rositas physician that she (Rosita)


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is physically fit and mentally competent to attend to her personal or businesstransactions.57[30]

On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts

September 23, 1996 Resolution. It alleged that Rosita and Enrique executed theirSinumpaang Salaysay on August 29, 1996. However, this development was made known tothe Court only on October 1, 1996; hence, the Court was not aware of this when it issued its

Resolution. Petitioners prayed for the reconsideration of the September 23, 1996 Resolutionand dropping Rosita and Enrique as parties to the case.58[31]

In their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents maintained that theCourt should not consider the Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents alleged that Rositathumbmarked the Sinumpaang Salaysay without understanding the contents of thedocument or the implications of her acts. Respondents also tried to demonstrate that theirmother would thumbmark any document that their children asked her to by exhibiting fourdocuments each denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay and thumbmarked by Rosita. Onepurported to disown the earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay. The second was a reproduction of theearlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with the amount changed to P100.00, the Transfer Certificate of

Title number changed to 12343567, and the size of the property to as big as the entireLucena City. The third purported to bequeath her shares in the conjugal partnership of

gains to Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino, while refusing to give any inheritance toFlorecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique. Lastly, the fourth contradicted the third in that it wasin favor of Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique, while disinheriting Rosauro, Bartolome,Rolando, and Rosalino. These, respondents assert, clearly show that their mother would signany document, no matter the contents, upon the request of any of her children.59[32]

The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on November 18, 1996.60[33]

Petitioners filed a Supplement to their Memorandum, additionally arguing that theThird Partial Decision did not only unduly bind the properties without due process, but alsoignored the fundamental rule on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles.61[34]

G.R. No. 150797

Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996, respondents filed a Joint Petition for the Guardianshipof the Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58 (Guardianshipcourt), docketed as Special Proceedings No. 96-34. On May 19, 1997, Rosauro Sy, whosought to be named as the special guardian, filed before the Guardianship court a Motion toOrder Court Deposit of Widows Allowance Ordered by t he Supreme Court.62[35] Then, hefiled a Motion before this Court seeking an Order for petitioners to pay Rosita P2,150,000.00in widows allowance and P25,000.00 every month thereafter,as ordered by this Court in itsSeptember 23, 1996 Resolution. He also prayed for petitioners imprisonment should they

fail to comply therewith.63[36]

On July 8, 1997, the Guardianship court issued an Order, the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:


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WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan; and their children,Zenaida Sy and Ma. Emma Sy; and Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, are hereby ordered todeposit to this Court, jointly and severally, the amount of P250,000.00 representing thewidows allowance of the incompetent Rosita Ferrera Sy corresponding the (sic) periods fromSeptember 1, 1996 to June 30, 1997, and additional amount of P25,000.00 per month andevery month thereafter, within the first ten (10) days of each month.64[37]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Rosauro, the appointed guardian, then

asked the Guardianship court to issue a writ of execution. Meanwhile, on December 10,1997, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46244to annul the July 8, 1997 Order and October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Guardianshipcourt.65[38]

In a Decision66*39+ dated February 28, 2001, the CA ruled in respondents favor,

finding nothing legally objectionable in private respondent Rosauro Sys filing of the motionto order the deposit of the widows allowance ordered by the Supreme Court in G.R. No.

114217 or, for that matter, in the public respondents grant thereof in the order herein

assailed. More so, when the public respondents actions are viewed in the light of theSupreme Courts denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration of its resolution dated

September 23, 1996.67[40] Thus it held:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed resolutiondated September 23, 1996 (sic) is AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on November 5, 2001,68[41]petitioners filed this Petition for Review69[42] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying forthis Court to reverse the CAs February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the

Motion for Reconsideration, and to declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded itsjurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widows allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-34.70*43+ They argued that the Guardianship courts jurisdiction is limited to determiningwhether Rosita was incompetent and, upon finding in the affirmative, appointing a guardian.Moreover, under Rule 83, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, a widows allowance can only bepaid in an estate proceeding. Even if the complaint for partition were to be considered as

estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the partition case had the exclusivejurisdiction to executethe payment of the widows allowance.71[44]

They raised the following issues:


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The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Guardianship Courts Order dated 8 July 1997,

and Resolution dated 9 October 1997, in that:

I

The trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited jurisdiction, had no authority toenforce payment of widows allowance.

II

The payment of widows allowance cannot be implemented at *the+ present because the

estate of Sy Bangthe source from which payment is to be takenhas not been determinedwith finality.

III

The Order of the trial court purporting to enforce payment of widows allowance unduly

modified the express terms of this Honorable Courts Resolution granting it.72[45]

Petitioners, likewise, question the Guardianship courts omission of the phrase tobe taken from the estate of Sy Bang from the July 8, 1997 Order. They interpreted this to

mean that the Guardianship court was ordering that the widows allowance be taken from

their own properties and not from the estate of Sy Bangan undue modification of thisCourts September 23, 1996 Resolution.73[46]

On January 21, 2002, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 114217 and G.R.No. 150797. The parties submitted their respective Memoranda on May 21, 2003 and June19, 2003, both of which were noted by this Court in its August 11, 2003 Resolution.

Pending the issuance of this Courts Decision in the two cases, respondent Rosauro

Sy filed, on November 11, 2003, a Motion to Order Deposit in Courtof Supreme CourtsOrdered Widows Allowance Effective September 23, 1996 and Upon Failure of Petitioners

Julian Sy, et al. to Comply Therewith to Order Their Imprisonment Until Compliance. Healleged that his mother had been ill and had no means to support herself except through hisfinancial assistance, and that respondents had not complied with this Courts September 23,

1996 Resolution, promulgated seven years earlier.74*47+ He argued that respondentsdefiance constituted indirect contempt of court. That the Guardianship court had foundthem guilty of indirect contempt did not help his mother because she was still unable tocollect her widows allowance.75[48]

Petitioners opposed said Motion arguing that the estate from which the widows

allowance is to be taken has not been settled. They also reiterated that Rosita, together withson Enrique, had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving all claims against petitioners.

Hence, there was no legal ground to cite them in contempt.76[49]

On April 4, 2005, this Court granted Rosauros Motion, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds petitioner Iluminada Tan (widow ofdeceased petitioner Jose Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma


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Sy, Julian Sy and the latters wife Ro saTan, GUILTY of contempt of this Court and arecollectively sentenced to pay a FINE equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount dueand unpaid to Rosita Ferrera-Sy by way of a widows allowance pursuant to this Courts

Resolution of September 13, 1996, and accordingly ORDERS their immediate imprisonmentuntil they shall have complied with said Resolution by paying Rosita Ferrera-Sy the amount ofTWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P2,600,100.00),representing her total accumulated unpaid widows allowance from September, 1996 to

April, 2005 at the rate of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) a month, plus six(6%) percent interest thereon. The Court further DIRECTS petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita

Ferrera-Sy her monthly widowsallowance for the succeeding months as they fall due, underpain of imprisonment.

This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.77[50]

Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court fine of P260,010.00 on April 5,2005.78[51]

Respondents, except Rosauro Sy (who had died), filed a Motion for Execution79[52]before this Court on April 25, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner Rosa Tan filed a Motion forReconsideration with Prayer for Clarification.80[53] She alleged that, in accordance with

Chinese culture, she had no participation in the management of the family business or SyBangs estate. After her husbands death, she allegedly inherited nothing but debts and

liabilities, and, having no income of her own, was now in a quandary on how these can bepaid. She asked the Court to consider that she had not disobeyed its Resolution and toconsider her motion.

Other petitioners, Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma, also filed a Motion for Reconsideration

with Prayer for Clarification.81[54] They stressed that the P1 million and the piece of landRosita had already received from Jose Sy Bang in 1996 should form part of the widowsallowance. They also argued that whatever allowance Rosita may be entitled to should comefrom the estate of Sy Bang. They further argued the unfairness of being made to pay theallowance when none of them participated in the management of Sy Bangs estate; Zenaida

and Ma. Emma being minors at the time of his death, while Iluminada and Rosa had nosignificant role in the family business.

Respondents then filed a Motion for Issuance of Order Requiring Respondents toDeposit with the Supreme Courts Cashier its O rdered Widows Allowance82[55] and aMotion for Execution of Resolution dated April 4, 2005.83[56] Petitioners opposed the

same.84[57]


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On July 25, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution granting both of respondentsmotions and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.85[58]

Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed, on August 15, 2005, aManifestation of Compliance and Motion for Clarification.86[59] They maintained that theissues they had raised in the motion for reconsideration had not been duly resolved. Theyargued that when this Court issued its September 23, 1996 Resolution, it was not yet aware

that Rosita had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, wherein she waived her claims and causesof action against petitioners. They also informed this Court that, on April 17, 1998, theGuardianship court had issued an Order which recognized a t emporary agreement based

on the voluntary offer of Jose Sy Bang of a financial assistance of P5,000.00 per month toRosita while the case was pending. Moreover, as a manifestation of good faith, petitionersIluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the P430,000.00 out of their own funds in partialcompliance with the Courts Resolution. However, the same did not in any way constitute a

waiver of their rights or defenses in the present case. They underscored the fact that theallowance must come from the estate of Sy Bang, and not from Jose Sy Bang or any of thelatters heirs, the extent of which remained undetermined. They further asked the Court to

adjudicate the liability for the widows allowance to be equally divided between them and

the other set of petitioners, the heirs of Julian Sy.

On August 30, 2005, respondents filed a motion asking this Court to issue an Orderfor the immediate incarceration of petitioners for refusing to comply with the Courts

resolution.87[60] They aver that the period within which petitioners were to comply with theCourts Resolution had now lapsed, and thus, petitioners must now be incarcerated for

failure to abide by said Resolution. They likewise asked the Court to refer petitioners

counsel, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violations ofthe Canons of Professional Responsibility or to declare him in contempt of court. Theyalleged that despite the finality of the Courts denial of petitioners motion for

reconsideration, Atty. Joyas still filed a Manifestation with compliance arguing the same

points. Further, Atty. Joyas is not petitioners counsel of record in this case since he never

formally entered his appearance before the Court.88[61]

In a Resolution dated September 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to referAtty. Joyas to the IBP for being a wrong remedy.89[62]

Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma then filed an OmnibusMotion,90*63+ seeking an extension of time to comply with the Courts Resolution and

Motion to delete the penalty of fine as a consequence of voluntary compliance. They insistthat their compliance with the order to pay the widows allowance should obliterate,

expunge, and blot out the penalty of fine and imprisonment. They alleged that for theirfailure to comply with this Courts Resolution, the RTC, Lucena City, found them guilty of

indirect contempt and imposed on them a fine of P30,000.00. They had appealed said orderto the CA.

They also tried to make a case out of the use of the terms joint and several in theSeptember 23 Resolution, and collectively in the April 5, 2005 Resolution. They argued

that joint and several creates individual liability for each of the parties for the full amount

of the obligation, while collectivelymeans that all members of the group are responsibletogether for the action of the group. Hence, collectively would mean that the liability

belongs equally to the two groups of petitioners. They requested for an additional 60 days toraise the necessary amount. They also asked the Court to hold their imprisonment inabeyance until their just and reasonable compliance with the Co urts orders.

Barely a month later, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed anotherManifestation stressing that Sy Bangs marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void. They claimed that


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respondents have falsified documents to lead the courts into believing that Rositas marriage

to Sy Bang is valid.

The Omnibus Motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005.Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Immediately Order Incarceration ofPetitioners,91[64] which petitioners opposed.92[65]

In a Resolution dated December 12, 2005,93[66] the Court issued a Warrant ofArrest94[67] against petitioners and directed the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) todetain them until they complied with this Courts April 4, 2005 and July 25, 2005 Resolutions.

Petitioner Rosa Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion.95[68] She informed theCourt that, to show that she was not obstinate and contumacious of the Court and its orders,she had begged and pleaded with her relatives to raise money to comply, but concedes thatshe was only able to raise a minimal amount since she has no source of income herself andneeds financial support to buy her food and medicines. She obtained her brothers help and

the latter issued six checks in the total amount of P650,000.00. She also alleged that she wasnot informed by her husbands counsel of t he developments in the case, and remained

unconsulted on any of the matters or incidents of the case. She reiterated that she had no

participation in the management of the Sy Bang estate and received nothing of value uponher husbands death. She prayed that the Court would not consider her failure to raise anyfurther amount as contempt or defiance of its orders.

The motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2006.

In an Urgent Manifestation of Compliance with the Contempt Resolutions withPayment of Widows Allowance with Prayer Reiterating the Lifting of Warrant of Arrest onHumanitarian Grounds,96[69] petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma asked the Courtto delete the penalty of indefinite imprisonment considering their partial compliance and thepartial compliance of Rosa Tan. They expressed willingness to deposit the widows allowancewith the Supreme Courts Cashier pending the determination of Sy Bangs estate. They

reasoned that the money to be deposited is their own and does not belong to Sy Bangs

estate. The deposit is made for the sole purpose of deleting the penalty of indefiniteimprisonment. They claim that they are not willfully disobeying the Courts order but are

merely hesitating to comply because of pending incidents such as the falsification chargesagainst Rosita, the resolution of the partition case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed byRosita, and the pendency of Rositas guardianship proceedings, as well as humanitarian

considerations. Thus, they prayed for the Court to reconsider the order of contempt and torecall the warrant of arrest.

On February 15, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution97[70] lifting the warrant ofarrest on petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, and Rosa Tan on the condition that theyissue the corresponding checks to settle the accrued widows allowance of Rosita Ferrera-Sy.They were also directed to submit proof of their compliance to the Court within ten (10) daysfrom notice.


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In a Manifestation98[71] dated February 28, 2006, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaidaand Ma. Emma informed the Court that they had deposited the checks in favor of Rosita withthe RTC, Lucena City, Branch 58, during the proceedings on February 28, 2006.99[72]

Respondents filed a Comment to the Manifestation arguing that the deposit of saidchecks, amounting to P1,073,053.00, does not amount to full compliance with the Courts

order considering that the accrued widows allowance now amounted to P4,528,125.00.

Then, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed a Motion to includeRosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for thePayment

Documents

Guardianship Cases