Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War

Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War, 209-205 B.C.Author(s): Arthur M. EcksteinSource: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Vol. 51, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 2002), pp. 268-297Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436658Accessed: 07/09/2010 09:31

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GREEK MEDIATION IN THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR, 209-205 B.C.

Almost from the beginning of what modem scholars call the First Macedonian War, - the war fought in European Greece between the Aetolian League and its allies (most importantly the Romans), and Philip V of Macedon and his allies - prominent Greek states sought to bring the war to an end by diplomatic means. Their attempts at mediation occurred each year between 209 and 206 B.C., and eventually brought peace between Macedon and Aetolia in 206. Mediation by less prominent Greek states then brought peace in 205 between Macedon and Rome.I Great uncertainty exists, however, over the precise goal of the mediators of 209-206. Was their diplomatic intervention focused primarily on the fighting between Macedon and Aetolia, i.e., on bringing the Aetolians to a peace with Macedon independently of their Roman allies? Or did the mediating states always aim at a "comprehensive peace" in Greece that would include Rome? The first goal appears inimical to Roman interests, since it would have left the Romans alone to face Philip V. The second goal appears more congruent with the Ro- mans' strategic goal in the Greek East in this period - which was, above all, to keep Philip from attacking them while they had their hands full with Hannibal.2

Either of the above two conclusions would tell us a great deal about the attitude(s) of these Greek mediating states towards Rome. And this is important to know, because only a few years later (in 201 and 200 B.C.), three of the mediating states of 209-206 - Ptolemaic Egypt, the Rhodian Republic, and Athens - played crucial roles in urging Rome into a new war against Philip V (the Second Macedonian War). If the policies of these states had previously run counter to Roman interests and purposes regarding Macedon, then we would be confronted with what appears a true diplomatic revolution in the eastern Medi- terranean by 201-200 - a revolution that would itself require an explanation.

I V. KasU6ev points out that the modern term "mediation" actually covers a range of different ancient diplomatic interventions, from mere use of good offices to bring the contending parties together for peace talks, all the way to active proposal of specific compromise peace terms: "Schiedsgericht und Vermittlung in den Beziehungen zwischen den hellenistischen Staaten und Rom," Historia 45 (1997): 419-20. Because of the sparseness of our evidence, we cannot often discern the exact nature of the interventions of the neutral states in 209-205. What is clear is that serious attempts at mediation were made in each year.

2 On Roman goals in the Greek East during the First Macedonian War, see further below.

Historia, Band LI/3 (2002) ? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart

Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War, 209-205 B.C. 269

It was Maurice Holleaux, one of the founders of Hellenistic studies, who originally argued that the Greek mediators of 209-206 sought a peace between Macedon and Aetolia separate from Rome. The most forceful advocates of the opposite thesis, the thesis of a "comprehensive peace" including Rome, have been H. H. Schmitt and more recently J. W. Rich. And scholarly opinion remains deeply - and evenly - divided. The purpose of the present paper is a thorough re-examination of this problem.3

First, some preliminary observations. What is striking about the various negotiations of 209-206 as the ancient sources present them is how often there are peace talks between Greek mediators on one side and representatives of Macedon and Aetolia on the other, with the Romans simply not present. This circumstance is paralleled by the fact that to contemporaries this war was "the Aetolian War": that is, the Greeks perceived the main antagonists to be Mace- don and Aetolia.4 Moreover, in the one case where the Romans are explicitly attested as involved directly in the peace talks (App. Mac. 3: 207 B.C.), the Roman commander in Greece is shown attempting to subvert those negotiations completely, even though a "comprehensive peace" including Rome is precisely what is under discussion.5 This last fact suggests that whether the Greek mediators sought to create a separate Macedonian-Aetolian peace or not (and the evidence here is intriguing), this was still not the central issue as far as the Romans were concerned; for them, the main issue was simply a mediation which they did not want at all, no matter what its goals. The above findings tell us a great deal about how the policies of the Greek states which sought a

3 See Maurice Holleaux, Rome, la Grece, et les monarchies hellenistiques au flle siecle avant J.-C. (Paris, 1921): 35-38 and 74-75; vs. H. H. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (Munich, 1957): 17, 25-26, and esp. 193-211, and J. W. Rich, "Roman Aims in the First Macedo- nian War," PCPhS 210 (1984): 145-47. In support of Holleaux: F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius II (Oxford, 1967): 229; W. Huss, Untersuchungen zur Aufpenpolitik Ptolemaios' IV. (Munich, 1976): 129-31 and 167-68 (leaning); J. F. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, Engi., 1978): 163 (without discussion); C. Habicht, Studien zur Geschichte Athens in hellenistischer Zeit (Gottingen, 1982): 135-36; S. L. Ager, "Rhodes: The Rise and Fall of a Neutral Diplomat," Historia 40 (1992): 16 (without discussion). In support of Schmitt: in addition to Rich's important arguments, see B. Ferro, Le origini della seconda guerra macedonica (Palermo, 1960): 7, n. 6; E. Will, Histoire politique du monde hellenistique II (Nancy, 1982); R. M. Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984): 106 (without discussion); N. G. L. Hammond- F. W. Walbank, A History of Macedonia III (Oxford, 1988): 403 (without discussion). R. M. Errington, in The Cambridge Ancient History VIII (Second Edition: Cambridge, 1989): 102, is elliptical and unclear.

4 See Livy (P) 27.30.4 (inter Philippum atque Aetolos bellum ... ) and 30.10 (de Aetolico finiendo bello actum...); 28.7.10 (Aetolico bello...) and 7.14 (de finiendo Aetolico hello ageretur...). For the Polybian origin of this material, see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 195.

5 See esp. Rich (above, n. 3), 143-44; discussed below, pp. 278-280.

270 ARTHUR M. ECKSTEIN

mediated end to the war in 209-206 worked at cross-purposes to the objectives which the Roman Republic sought in Greece in this period. That this was also a conscious policy on the part of the mediators is shown especially by the anti- Roman remarks of the mediator in Polyb. 11.4-6. And this is a text which (as we shall see) does not stand alone.

Two aspects of the diplomatic context of the First Macedonian War also need to be underlined before we proceed. First, the ancients thought of Philip V as the aggressor in this war as far as Rome was concemed. The tradition was that Philip, enticed by news of Hannibal's invasion of Italy and the subsequent Roman defeats, turned his ambitions in 217 from Greece to the West. His aim became Macedonian expansion at Roman expense. Philip's new ambitions led to his sudden peace with Aetolia in 217 (ending the Social War of 220-217); to the abortive Macedonian naval expedition against Illyria in 216 (a region which had been in Rome's sphere of influence for more than a decade); and then to Philip's treaty of alliance with Hannibal in 215. Roman writers later exaggerat- ed the terms of this treaty, but even Polybius' more sober account shows that Philip was planning to seize Illyria, and even an invasion of Italy was not excluded.6 The worry of the Romans on learning of the Carthaginian-Macedo- nian alliance - coming on top of the great Roman defeat at Cannae the previous year - finds concrete expression in Rome's strong military reinforcement in the Adriatic region from 215 onwards.7 In 214 Philip sailed against Illyria a second time - but was foiled by Roman action. In the succeeding years, however, his overland conquests in Illyria were extensive. By 212 the king had reached the Adriatic coast and the port-town of Lissus - where he began to build a fleet. Philip was a man famous for his bold military gambles, and so to the Romans (if not to moderns) a threat even to Italy could not be discounted.8 The result was

6 On the difference between the Polybian and annalistic versions of Philip's treaty of alliance with Hannibal, see H. Mantel, "Der Biindnisvertrag Hannibals mit Philipp von Makedonien," in C. Schubert-K. Brodersen-U. Huttner, eds., Rom und der griechische Osten: Festschriftfur H. H. Schmitt (Stuttgart, 1995): 175-80.

7 On the importance of the Roman military preparations in the Adriatic for our understanding of Roman worries after 215, see J. Seibert, "Invasion aus dem Osten: Trauma, Propaganda oder Erfindung der Romer?," in Schubert-Brodersen-Huttner (above, n. 6): 239-41. News of Macedonian military-diplomatic initiatives in 217-216 had perhaps already led to a Roman diplomatic response: see Polyb. 5.105.8 (unfortunately vague as to chronology) with the comments of Seibert, 240, probably to be preferred to F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius I (Oxford, 1957): 630; cf. also Livy 22.33.3, with the comments of Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 391, and Errington in CAH (above, n. 3): 95.

8 On the extent of Philip's conquests by land in Illyria in 213-212, and new evidence that Philip had begun to build a war-fleet at Lissus, see Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 398-99. Philip's reputation as a military gambler is rightly underlined by Rich (above, n. 3), 129-30. Note the story that the Syracusans had approached Philip for help against Rome in 212: Livy 25.23.8-9, accepted by Rich, 130.


that M. Valerius Laevinus, the Roman commander in the Adriatic, entered into discussions at about this time (ca. 212) with the Aetolian League with the object of beginning a new war in Greece against Philip. These talks were successful by the early autumn of 211, and joint Roman-Aetolian military operations soon began. One should note, however, that the treaty of alliance with the Aetolians was not officially sworn at Rome until after a delay of almost two years - not until the summer of 209. That delay may have had diplomatic consequences, especially during the mediation effort of spring 209 (see below).9

Polybius says that from 217 onwards, Philip's policy towards Rome was consciously aggressive (5.101.9-102.1; 7.13.1). Similarly, Livy says that the primary Roman motive in the diplomatic initiative to the Aetolians was defensive, for a new war with Aetolia would keep Philip distracted in Greece, thereby impeding him from any idea of joining forces with Hannibal and the Carthagin- ians (26.24.16). These ancient judgments on the character of Macedonian- Roman relations between 217 and 21 1 seem borne out by the sequence of events described above - in which Philip is the clear aggressor. The sequence and its political-diplomatic implications are not doubted by modern scholars.10 But this means that in any subsequent peace negotiation in which Rome played a significant role, Philip or his representatives could hardly make confident public claims of having not started the conflict. Rather, it was obvious that the Macedonian king had opened these hostilities. This simple finding has importance because of what we are told was consistently said by representatives of Macedon at the various peace conferences we are discussing: that the Macedo- nians had not started the war that was being mediated. No one contradicted them (see below).

Harris and Rich are probably correct, however, that beyond the primarily defensive goal of the Romans - to keep Philip occupied in Greece - the Romans

9 On the terms of the Roman-Aetolian alliance, see the evidence in H. H. Schmitt, Die Staatsvertrage des Altertums III (Munich, 1969): 258-66. On the date of the agreement between M. Valerius Laevinus and the Aetolians - seemingly shown by the link Livy makes between Roman successes during the summer of 211 and the final Aetolian decision (26.24.3) - see E. Badian, "Aetolica," Latomus 17 (1958): 197-203, and Rich (above, n. 3), 155-57. Preliminary negotiations: see Livy 26.24.1. Livy says that the treaty was not formally sworn at Rome until two years later (biennio post...): i.e., perhaps sometime in summer 209. The reasons for this odd Roman delay in formalizing Laevinus' agreement are not known. Perhaps it was sheer Roman procedural clumsiness, and not hesitation over easten policy: so Badian (above), 206-8. But Errington (above, n. 3) now suggests that Laevinus had personally to defend the terms of the treaty (in which Rome got few concrete benefits - though one great strategic benefit) before the Senate, and that this did not happen until after his consulship in 210, when he was busy in Sicily: see CAH: 210.

10 See most recently Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 387-401; Err- ington in CAH: 94-101.


were also acting in Greece out of a desire for sheer revenge. Philip, after all, had struck at the Romans when they had committed not the slightest hostile act against him, and simply because they had appeared vulnerable: he deserved a new war on his doorstep as a punishing response to his conduct, and to inflict harm upon him.11 One may add that in a diplomatic world obsessed with questions of status, and the reputation for power, the punishment of Philip by war would restore to the Romans their status as a people with whom one did not trifle. In an international system that was a lawless anarchy, restoring and preserving such status was in itself important, for an acknowledged reputation for strength helped deter others, and in turn preserved a state's security.12

The motivations of the Aetolians in beginning a new war against Philip were, however, of a different nature. This is the second aspect of the diplomatic context of the later Greek mediations which needs to be understood. In contrast to the Romans, the Aetolians were the aggressors in the new war in terms of relations with Macedon. The Aetolian League had sworn peace with Philip six years previously, ending the Social War of 220-217; the basis of the peace had been uti possidetis, and there is no evidence that Philip had broken it.13 The Aetolian decision of 211 seems solely the result of a calculation of strategic advantage: they were lured to war by the prospect of recovering, with Roman

11 See W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome (Oxford, 1979/1984): 213; and Rich (above, n. 3), 129-31 and 149. The gaining of plunder, in part perhaps to finance the on-going Hannibalic War, was another goal: on this clause of the treaty with Aetolia, see the comments of Errington in CAH (above, n. 3): 100. The treaty also inevitably deepened Rome's relations with a network of pro-Aetolian and/or anti-Macedonian Greek states; but this should be seen as a natural consequence of international interaction (cf. Errington, 99), rather than as a Machiavellian plot on Rome's part to gain control of Greece (as in Rich, 131, and 150-51; cf. also Hammond III [above, n. 3J: 401).

12 For the establishment of status as a deep concern of Roman foreign relations, see R. Kallet-Marx, Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C. (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1995); 87-88 and 93-94; S. P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1999): Chapter 1; and esp. J. Linderski, "Ambassadors Go to Rome," in E. Frezouls-A. Jac- quemin, eds., Les Relations internationales: Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg, 15-17juin 1993 (Paris, 1995): 453-78. On the impact of international anarchy upon the actions of individual states, the basic text is Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, 1979). On the importance of maintaining reputation and status under a system of international anarchy, see A. M. Eckstein, "Brigands, Emperors, and Anarchy," Int. Hist. Rev. 22 (2000): esp. 876-79. Simultaneously, obsession with status seems to reflect the prevailing ethos of the aristocratic, slave-owning men who by and large made ancient diplomatic decisions: see the comments of B. S. Strauss, Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy, 403-386 B.C. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1986): 31-35.

13 The terms of the Peace of Naupactus: Schmitt, Staatsvertrage III (above, n. 9): 234-35. The unbroken peace in European Greece between 217 and 211: see esp. Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 390.


backing, the territories (and status) lost in 220-217 - and seizing more. Mace- don after 217 was, for the moment at least, a satisfied power in terms of its relations with the states of European Greece; and from that perspective it was not Philip who began what contemporaries called "the Aetolian War," but the Aetolians themselves. 14

Having established these basic diplomatic facts, let us proceed seriatim through the various attempts at mediation organized by the non-belligerent Greek states between 209 and 206, to see how far those states were acting contrary to Rome's interests. Any discussion of the diplomacy of 209-206 is, of course, bedevilled by the fragmentary and derivative nature of our sources. Polybius covered these diplomatic interactions in great detail (as is clear from Polyb. 10.25 and 11.4-6), but most of his direct account is lost. Livy preserves much information which obviously is based on Polybian material, but Livy's interest in Greek affairs is (equally obviously) not as intense as that of the Greek historian; witness his carelessness with chronology, or the gap in record- ing Greek events admitted at 29.12.1. Later writers such as Appian give us what seems highly important information - but the historicity of that information requires explicit defense. Any reconstruction, especially of the events of 207 and 206 B.C. (which the Livian narrative barely touches), must therefore remain tentative. We proceed on that basis.15

The first attempt at mediation of the war by non-belligerent Greek states occurred in late spring 209.16 The Aetolian League and their Roman allies had made significant gains in the war up to this point: the seizure of Anticyra in Phocis, and of Aegina; the adherence to the alliance of Elis, Messene, and Sparta; the prospective military intervention on the allied side of Attalus I of Pergamum. But these gains were balanced by a sudden turn of fortune in spring 209 when King Philip inflicted two successive severe defeats upon the Aetolian army near Lamia in east-central Greece (Livy 27.30.1-2).17 While at Phalara near the site of these victories, Philip was now approached by envoys from Ptolemy IV, the Rhodians, the Athenians, and the Chians (27.30.4).18 The

14 See Polyb. 9.30.8-9 for the Aetolian strategic aims; cf. Rich (above, n. 3), 145. 15 Livy's dependence upon obviously Polybian material for his account of the First Macedoni-

an War, and his chronological carelessness with this material: see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 193-94 and 198; Rich, 136-39. On Appian, see below, pp. 285, 287.

16 Livy dates this mediation to 208, but the reference to the Nemean Games (27.30.9) shows that these events actually occurred the year before: see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 194.

17 For an assessment of the strategic situation after Philip's twin victories near Lamia, see esp. Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 403. The best detailed account of the events between autumn 211 and spring 209 is Rich (above, n. 3), 131-34.

18 Habicht (above, n. 3), 136-37 with n. 80, noting an inscription which records the death of a Chian ambassador at Alexandria in March 209, suggests that the diplomatic offensive of the mediating states had in fact been coordinated from the court of the Ptolemies.


ambassadorial group had come, Livy says, "in order to bring an end to the war between Philip and the Aetolians" (venerunt ad dirimendum inter Philippum atque Aetolos bellum: 27.30.4). The mediators must already have directly approached the Aetolians, winning their consent for this overture, or else the mediators won Aetolian consent at this point, because the Aetolians soon sent to Phalara a non-belligerent mediator of their own, to join actively in the peace talks: Amynander, king of Athamania (adhibitus ab Aetolis... pacificator Amy- nander rex Athamanum: ibid.).

Livy reports that the private reasoning behind the intervention of these non- belligerent states was fear that Philip's war with Aetolia would lead to the growth of his power in European Greece (27.30.5).19 There is no reason to doubt this Livian analysis (which presumably derives from Polybian material).20 But the disruption of important commerce by the war may have been another factor that impelled some of the mediators to act. This may even be true of the Ptolemies, the regime most likely predominantly concerned with maintaining the current political-military balance of power: the Aetolians, after all, were famous as privateers during war-time, attacking just about anyone (see esp. Polyb. 4.3.1-3). And this would be an even stronger reason for primarily commercial states with strong interests in the Aegean trade (the Rhodians, the Chians) to try to intervene to stop Macedonian-Aetolian warfare.21 Note from this perspective, however, that the continuation of fighting just between Mace- don and Rome would probably mean a war focused in the Adriatic and northwest Greece - an area of no apparent interest to the Ptolemies, and much less important to all the commercially-minded states.22

The discussions at Phalara between Philip, the mediators, and the pro- Aetolian Amynander at any rate proved so promising that Philip eventually

19 Habicht (above, n. 3), 137, stresses that the motive ascribed to the mediators by the ancient sources is political: the preservation of a congenial balance of power among the Greek states; so, too, Huss (above, n. 3), 129-31, at least with regard to Ptolemy IV.

20 On the derivation of Livy 27.30 from Polybian material, see F. W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge, 1940): 89-90.

21 On Aetolian privateering, see now J. B. Scholten, The Politics of Plunder: Aetolians and their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279-219 B.C. (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 2000): Chapter 3. That the Ptolemies themselves were not immune to the commercial considerations here is suggested by E. Manni, "L'Egitto ptolemaico nei suoi rapporti politici con Roma," RFIC 27 (1949): 95. Huss (above, n. 3), 130 thinks it likely that economic motives were even stronger among the lesser mediating states. Note that in Polyb. 1 1.4.4- 5, in a speech primarily concerned with geopolitical reasons for ending the war, its destructiveness upon even innocent by-standers is impressed upon the Aetolians by a mediator (probably a Rhodian - see below, p. 288 and n. 66).

22 Huss (above, n. 3), 167 and n. 27, notes that the Ptolemies - in contrast to their great desire to keep peace in central and southern Greece and the Aegean - had no interest or interests in northwest Greece.


agreed to a 30-days' truce, until negotiations with the Aetolians themselves could begin at Aegium in Achaea (Livy 27.30.6, cf. 9). But who was included in this truce? Rich, the latest scholar to deal in detail with the Phalara events, has argued that nothing in Livy shows that in 209 the mediating states were intending to detach the Aetolians from their alliance with Rome into a separate peace with Philip.23 But the fact is that the Romans are nowhere mentioned in Livy 27.30.4-6. So far, we have seen only the Aetolians involved in any prospective peace-making with Philip - and the negotiations towards a basic framework for peace have evidently already gone far. The emphasis in Livy is precisely upon the diplomatic interactions of the mediators, the Aetolians or their representatives, and Philip; the private concerns of the mediators are focused on the growth of Philip's power via his conflict with Aetolia; there is no sign that the Romans even know about - let alone approve of - the Phalara talks.24

Such an analysis of Livy 27.30.4-6 is confirmed by the very next item in Livy 27.30- an item that has not been brought into the scholarly discussion. After agreeing to the 30-days' truce, Philip then went to his headquarters at Chalcis on Euboea, in order to prevent Attalus of Pergamum from landing there and seizing the island and its great fortress:

Chalcidem Euboeae venit [Philippus], ut Attalum, quem classe Euboeam petiturum adierat, portibus et litorum adpulsu arceret. Inde praesidio relicto adversus Attalum... (27.30.7-8). From this passage it is clear that although there is an important and promis-

ing truce established between Philip and the Aetolians as a result of the peace talks at Phalara, Attalus is not expected to participate in it, nor (apparently) has he even heard of it. On the contrary: Philip is concerned that Attalid military operations, led by the Pergamene king himself, are about to be launched against key Macedonian strongpoints south of Olympus, and he initiates military steps (note: not diplomatic steps) to prevent such operations. Yet while Philip might not have known the exact whereabouts of Attalus and his fleet, it should not have been that difficult for either Philip or the Aetolians or (especially) the non- belligerent mediators to send out diplomatic heralds or agents to find Attalus and inform him of the existence of a truce. But neither Philip nor the neutrals nor the Aetolians are depicted in the month after Phalara as attempting this. Of course our information is fragmentary, but we do have a detailed account of Philip's actions and itinerary (Livy 27.30.8-9), and we are dealing with more than an argument e silentio: what we explicitly hear about in respect to Attalus is Philip's military preparations against Attalid attack. There is no reason to

23 Rich (above, n. 3), 145. 24 See esp. Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 36 n. 4.


assume that Attalus was in a different category here from the Romans. The only difference is that - unlike Attalus - there was not even a rumor in Greece as yet that the Romans were about to appear there for the military campaign of 209 (cf. Livy 27.30.1 1).

The assumptions behind the conference at Aegium a month later emerge equally strongly in the fragmentary Polyb. 10.25 - where we are shown an explicit attempt to split the Aetolians off from Rome. The Polybian fragment is part of a speech by an ambassador, and it is securely located in the mediation efforts of 209.25 The fragment in its current condition does not say who the speaker is (but see below). The speaker says that at present "the Aetolians and those Peloponnesians in alliance with them" are bearing the brunt of the fighting with Philip, while the Romans hang back like a heavy phalanx which is allowing the light-armed forces to be the first to be exposed to danger ( 10.25.1 ); such an analogy would have particular force in the immediate aftermath of Philip's double defeat of the Aetolians at Lamia. The speaker also warns that if "the light-armed"' are defeated, the phalanx (i.e., the Romans) will move off unharmed (25.5), whereas if "the light-armed" are victorious, not only will "the phalanx" then move in to claim the lion's share of credit for the victory (cf. 25.2), but the Romans will attempt to bring the Aetolians and their allies, as well as the rest of Greece, under their control (25.5).

Since the speaker refers to an Aetolian victory in the war as something "may the Gods forbid" (10.25.5), it is likely that the above speech is from a Macedonian envoy at Aegium, and unlikely that it comes from an envoy of one of the states attempting mediation.26 But even coming from a Macedonian envoy, the tone of the speech in Polyb. 10.25 is striking in terms of the questions we are asking: the speaker sharply differentiates the Aetolians and their European Greek allies from the Romans, points out the sharply different interests between the two categories of combatants, and seeks to create anger and fear concerning Rome among the latter group, distancing them from the Romans. The tone of Polyb. 10.25 is thus completely consistent with Livy's narrative of the origins

25 The placement of Polyb. 10.25 within the mediation effort of 209: Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 229.

26 See Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 35 n. 4; Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 228. Schmitt suggests that Polyb. 10.25 is in fact a speech by one of the mediating ambassadors; he downplays the anti-Aetolian remark at 10.25.5 ("May the Gods forbid"), - which would be highly tactless coming from a neutral mediator - subsuming it under the general anti-Roman tone of the speech, i.e., the only problem with an Aetolian victory is that it would increase Roman power in Greece: Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 195, cf. earlier B. Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und makedonisc hen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea II (Gotha, 1888): 486. If this were correct, we would then have Polybian accounts of two anti-Roman speeches by mediating ambassadors during the course of the war: here at 10.25 and again at 11.4-6. But the expressed hope against an Aetolian victory at 10.15.5 is hard to accept as coming from a mediator.


of the Aegium conference: the point of the mediation is specifically to end the war between Macedon and Aetolia, which is detrimental to all Greeks.

Further, Schmitt suggests that Livy 27.30.10, another sentiment expressed at Aegium which is hostile to the Romans, is in fact a Livian (i.e., Polybian) version of the public position taken there by the non-belligerent mediators: ibi de Aetolico finiendo bello actum, ne causa aut Romanis aut Attalo intrandi Graeciam esset. There is no contradiction between this sentiment at Livy 27.30.10 and the one found at 27.30.5, at the preliminary talks at Phalara (which concerns the neutrals' fear of Philip, rather than fear of Rome and Attalus); the latter sentiment, representing the neutrals' private views, could hardly have been stated in public by them at Aegium with Philip himself present.27 Schmitt's does seem the most plausible interpretation of 27.30.10, for the alternative is that the passage is a public statement by Philip and his Achaean allies rather than the mediators - but that would not fit with what is obviously a proclamation of the general purpose of the peace conference, which should come from the mediators. And such an interpretation of the statement at Livy 27.30.10 would - again - be perfectly consistent with the entire public tone and purpose of the mediation of 209, which seems to be derogatory and excluding of the Romans.

The peace conference at Aegium collapsed when the Aetolians suddenly brought forward a series of territorial demands on Philip. One of these demands (or perhaps two) would have helped restore Rome's position in Illyria (Livy 27.30.13-14).28 Livy places the blame for the collapse of the Aegium talks squarely on the Aetolians (27.30.1 1); this must reflect the opinion of his source Polybius, who had little love for Aetolia - but there seems no reason to doubt that what Livy says happened.29 What is also clear from Livy is that the Romans were not present at the Aegium conference any more than they had been present at the preliminary talks at Phalara. Hence the Aetolian demands outraged Philip, because he now viewed the League as the defeated party in the war and himself as the acknowledged victor: enim vero indignum ratus Philippus victos victori sibi ultro condiciones ferre (27.30.14). This statement reveals the impact which Philip believed his twin victories at Lamia had had on the military situation. It also reveals how much the focus at Aegium was on the Aetolians alone - for Philip had never beaten the Romans.

27 Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 195-96. 28 The Aetolians demanded that Philip return his conquests in Atintania to the Romans; and

they demanded that Philip return the Ardiaei to the Illyrian dynasts Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus (who were currently allies of the Romans).

29 On Polybius' general attitude towards the Aetolians, see esp. D. Mendels, "Did Polybius Have 'Another' View of the Aetolian League?," Anc. Soc. 15/17 (1984/1986): 63-73, convincing against K. S. Sacks, "Polybius' Other View of Aetolia," JHS 95 (1975): 92- 106.


Rich argues that because the Aetolians' sudden territorial demands at Aegium included one (or perhaps two) demands that would benefit the Romans, the absence of the latter both at the Phalara talks and the Aegium conference means nothing: the Aetolian demands at the Aegium conference are strong evidence that the Romans were always intended to be included in the putative peace.30 But Livy explicitly says that the Aetolians' negotiating position hard- ened only when they heard the news that the Pergamene and Roman fleets had finally arrived in nearby Greek waters (27.30.11) - and he indicates that the new Aetolian demands were never meant to be taken seriously (ibid.). Thus it would appear that the Aetolians, demoralized by their defeats at Lamia, at first seriously considered a mediated peace with Philip - but when good news arrived, in the form of strong Roman and Pergamene reinforcements, they simply sought an excuse to break off the talks. This explains Philip's bitter remark at the end of the Aegium conference: he had always been for peace, the Aetolians for war (27.30.14). 31

In fact, an exact parallel to this type of Aetolian "zig-zagging" in diplomacy can be found from just a few years previously, during the Social War. In 218 the Aetolians, momentarily demoralized by Philip's success in sacking their capital at Thermum, accepted a proposal from non-belligerent mediators (Rhodes and Chios) for - precisely - a 30-days' truce, during which formal peace talks would begin (Polyb. 5.28.1). But when the Aetolians learned of severe political problems within Philip's court, they took heart, and suddenly backed off from the peace talks - making new demands (5.29.1-3).32 This seems the easiest explanation for the failure of the Aegium talks as well: the Aetolians, having gained a full month's respite from Philip, now subverted the peace negotiations they felt they no longer particularly needed, by making new and excessive demands (including a couple from which the Romans would benefit). But in that case, the Aetolians' demands at Aegium cannot count as strong evidence that the Romans were all along intended to be included in the peace of 209.33

Of course, it might be argued that a separate Macedonian-Aetolian peace was prohibited in the treaty of Roman-Aetolian alliance (Livy 26.22.12). But

30 Rich (above, n. 3), 145. 31 Ne antea quidem se aut de pace audisse aut indutias pepigisse dixit [Philippus] spem

ullam habentem quieturos Aetolos, sed ut omnes soc ios testes haberet se pacis, illos belli causam quaesisse.

32 For discussion of this incident, see Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 380.

33 On the Aetolian duplicity at Aegium, see esp. Ager (above, n. 3), 16 (adducing the parallel from the Social War as well). Cf. also R. M. Errington, Philopoemen (Oxford, 1969): 56, and Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 403 (both of whom, however, see the Aetolian demands at Aegium as having been formulated in a direct conspiracy with Rome to keep the war going).


here the problem is that the Aetolians violated precisely that clause of the treaty of alliance in 206, when they did indeed make a separate peace with Philip; they were not stopped by legalities (see below). For that matter, the Punic-Macedo- nian treaty of alliance of 215 contained a similar clause, forbidding a separate peace with Rome (Polyb. 7.9.12) - which did not prevent Philip in 205 from making a separate peace with Rome (see below). In both cases one could make the argument from political-military necessity, but this in itself shows that in a world ruled by Faustrecht, such clauses in treaties were mere hopeful rhetoric, not viewed as completely binding.34 In 209, not only were the Aetolians uncertain about the scale of Roman military intervention in Greece that year (hence their great relief about this at Livy 27.30.11), but one should also note that the Aetolian treaty of alliance with the Romans had not yet even been formally ratified and sworn at Rome - even after almost two years' waiting. This would be all the more reason for the Aetolians in 209, perhaps feeling left in the lurch by Rome (as they did in 206), to have felt free to leave the war after Philip's double victories at Lamia.35

Schmitt, unlike Rich, admits to the clear trend of the Livian narrative (and cf. Polyb. 10.25) that the neutral mediators were negotiating with King Philip and the Aetolians in 209 for the purpose of a peace solely between Philip and the League.36 However, Schmitt goes on to argue that this conduct by the mediating states should not be seen as counter to Roman interests, since a separate peace between Philip and Aetolia would inevitably have led to a peace between Philip and Rome - as happened in 206-205.37

This is very strained reasoning. A separate peace between Aetolia and Macedon in 209 would have left Rome in an extremely difficult strategic position in Greece. Abandoned by their major Greek ally, the Romans might well have been forced to make peace with Philip - but most likely on humiliat- ing and disadvantageous terms (including, no doubt, Philip's retention of the port of Lissus and all his Illyrian conquests, creating a permanent threat to Italy's Adriatic coast). Such a peace settlement would hardly have been in

34 Thus in Polybius' eye-witness account of the meeting of the Achaean faction led by Archon and Lycortas in 170 to decide whether to back Rome against Macedon in the Third Macedonian War or else to be neutral, many political considerations are brought forward - but one that is never mentioned is that Achaea actually had a formally-sworn treaty of alliance with Rome (see Polyb. 28.6).

35 On the Roman delay in formally swearing to the Aetolian alliance (Livy 26.24.14), see above, p. 271 and n. 9. On the total absence of the Romans from the peace negotiations of 209, see already A. M. Eckstein, "Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Media- tion," Historia 37 (1988): 418 n. 22.

36 Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 57, and 195-96. 37 Ibid., 57.


Rome's interest.38 But in 209 a continuation of war against Philip without the Aetolian League would hardly have been in Rome's interest either. It would have meant a conflict without major allied help on land against a formidable and aggressive enemy whose own military resources had not yet (in contrast to the situation in 206-205) been stretched very far.39 One need only consider the dilemma the Romans would have faced later in the summer of 209 itself, when, on top of having been deserted by the Aetolians, a strong Carthaginian fleet threateningly appeared off Corcyra (Livy 27.15.8, cf. 30.16): what if Philip had been free to march against the Roman position on the Adriatic coast at the same time? This strong Punic fleet reappeared in 208 at the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, in what was intended as a coordinated operation with Macedon (Livy 28.7.17-18, and 8.8).40 And in autumn 208, Philip himself began to build a fleet of 100 warships (Livy 28.8.14).41 In the actual circumstances of 209 and 208, with the Aetolian League (and its Peloponnesian allies) still heavily involved in the war, the Carthaginian naval threats were reduced to mere raids; and Philip's ship-building program had to be long delayed.42 But war is a situation of contingencies: those Punic naval expeditions to western Greece, and the Mace- donan ship-building program, would have looked very different if Rome in 209 and 208 had been reduced to fighting on its own limited resources available for the Greek theater. The dangerous isolation of the Romans would have been further underlined if, as happened historically, Attalus of Pergamum withdrew his fleet in 208 from helping Rome in the war (see below) - and if the Aetolians had abandoned Rome in 209, Attalus might well have left the war even sooner. All in all, it is difficult to see how the Greek mediators who sought a peace in

38 Even in the separate peace between Rome and Philip in 205, when the balance of power was somewhat more in Rome's favor, the Romans conceded Atintania to Philip: Livy 29.12.13 (a fact which, incidentally, shows the lack of seriousness of the sudden Aetolian demands about Atintania in 209: see above, p. 277 and n. 28). Walbank suggests that even in 205 Rome also conceded to Philip most of the king's Illyrian conquests of 213, including northern and western Dassaretia (though the fate of Lissus is unclear): see Philip V (above, n. 20): 103.

39 The contrast in Philip's power between 209 and 205 is stressed by Hammond, in Ham- mond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 404.

40 Even K.-E. Petzold, who is very disbelieving of the traditions concerning Macedonian- Carthaginian cooperation during 215-202, does not doubt the historicity of these threatening Punic expeditions under Bomilcar to western Greece: see Die Eroffnung des Zweiten Romisch-Makedonischen Krieges (Berlin, 1940): 49.

41 The historicity of this tradition is not doubted either. It derives from Polybius: see Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20), 97 and n. 5; Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank Ill (above, n. 3): 405.

42 By 201 Philip's war-fleet amounted to only 40 or 50 cataphracts, though some of these were very heavy ships: for sources and discussion, see Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20), 117 and n. 2, and Commentary II (above, n. 3): 505. By 201 Philip also had about 150 light lembi (Polyb. 16.2.9).


209 between Macedon and Aetolia were not acting in contradiction to Rome's desires and interests.

The mediation effort of 209 ultimately foundered; but this did not dissuade the non-belligerent Greek states from attempting a new mediation the next year. By spring 208, the war had momentarily turned against King Philip. A Dardani- an invasion in autumn 209 had gravely damaged the Macedonian homeland, and Philip's northern frontier continued throughout 208 to suffer from unsettled conditions; yet in spring 208 many of Philip's allies in central Greece and the Peloponnese were also calling upon him for immediate military help against the multiple threats posed simultaneously by Aetolian, Roman and Pergamene forces and, in the south, from Sparta.43 An embassy from the non-belligerent states now appeared in Greece: Ptolemaic Egypt and Rhodes are explicitly mentioned, but others may have been involved also, as in 209.44

This new embassy first approached the Aetolians, who happened to be meeting with their Roman allies at Heraclea, west of Thermopylae (Livy 28.7.14). The mediators were then sent on to consult with Philip, evidently in Thessaly (28.7.13). But the meeting with Philip was delayed, because the king suddenly took the offensive against his multiple enemies, and was spectacularly successful. He raided Heraclea itself, and captured Thermopylae from its Aetolian garrison, thereby opening up new areas of central Greece to his army; he then defeated Attalus of Pergamum near Opus, helping to drive Attalus and his fleet completely out of the war; then he conquered Epicnemidian Locris, the region east of Thermopylae previously under Aetolian control (June-July 208).45 By the time Philip met with the mediating envoys, at Elateia south of Thermopylae (July 208), he was flushed with victory. He gave the envoys a friendly but vague answer about ending the war, and sent them away (Livy 28.7.15: see below). In fact, he was more interested in advancing now into the Peloponnese and striking a blow

43 On the difficulties in Philip's strategic situation in spring 208, see Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20), 93-94. On the Dardanian invasion, see Livy 27.32.9-33.3, Justin 29.4.6, and Zon. 9.9, with Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 403.

44 It is sometimes suggested that Athens joined the mediators, as in 209, and that Chios joined as well: Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 119 n. 1; Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20), 94 n. 7; Errington, CAH (above, n. 3): 103. But Habicht (above, n. 3), 136-37, rightly points out that the Athenians are missing from the list of persistent mediators in the neutral ambassador's speech at Polyb. 1 1.4.1 (to be dated to 207 - see below), which suggests that they did not continue their efforts after the failure of 209. Chios, however, does appear in the list at Polyb. 11.4.1, so perhaps the Chians did participate in the mediation of 208 but Livy at 28.7.14 has abbreviated a more detailed list of mediators he found in Polybius: cf. Errington, 103. Note that Livy puts the mediation effort of 208 under events of 207, but his incidental reference to the Olympic games at 28.7.14 proves that it belongs in 208: Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 198.

45 For a convenient summary of Philip's successes in this period, see Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20), 95-96.


against Sparta, which was threatening his allies there - a goal he accomplished (28.7.14 and 16-17). At this time, too, Philip was expecting substantial Carthag- inian naval help for a new offensive in western Greece (28.7.17-18).

Were the Romans intended by the mediators of 208 to be included in their attempted peace? Schmitt and Rich are sure of this, because the envoys from the mediating states met at Heraclea with the assembled Aetolian magistrates, and Roman envoys were there as well (Polyb. 10.42.4), apparently to discuss strategy for the war; after this meeting, the mediators went on to Philip.46 It should be stressed that even if the Romans were intended to be included in the attempted mediation of 208, this would not effect our findings concerning the previous mediation of 209. But in fact the evidence on 208, when examined in its totality, turns out to be ambiguous.

First, it is clear that the envoys from the mediating states were seeking a meeting with the Aetolian leadership as the initial step towards peace. As it happened, they found the Aetolian magistrates gathered at Heraclea with representatives of P. Sulpicius Galba, the current Roman commander in Greece. But that may have come as a surprise and an accident: Philip, for one, did not expect to find the Aetolian magistrates meeting with anyone but themselves when he raided Heraclea to disperse their gathering (Polyb. 10.42.4-5), though he did know that Attalus of Pergamum - not the Romans - was nearby (10.42.4). That is, we should not conceive this as a situation where the neutrals intentionally invited the Romans to a preliminary conference on a mediated peace; rather, the ambassadors dealt with the complex situation they faced when they arrived at Heraclea.47 Second, we have a story in Frontinus (Strat. 1.4.6) which says that envoys of the Aetolians - not accompanied by any Romans - were sent slightly later to discuss peace with Philip. Indeed, the point of the Frontinus story is that Philip tricked the Aetolian envoys into thinking he was interested in peace with the League, so that he could take the Aetolian position at Thermopylae by surprise:

Philippus... Graeciam petens, cum Thermopylas occupatas audiret et ad eum legati Aetolorum venissent acturi de pace, retentis eis ipse magnis itineribus ad angustias pertendit securisque custodibus et legatorum redi- tus exspectantibus inopinatus Thermopylas traiecit.

46 Holleaux had thought this was a meeting of the Panaetolian Assembly: Rome, la GrkLe (above, n. 3), 36 n. 3. This is clearly not the case, but rather a special meeting of the Aetolian magistrates and perhaps the Aetolian Apocleti or Inner Council (cf. Toi; dpXov'ra; at Polyb. 10.42.4), to discuss strategy for the war: see Walbank, Commentary 11 (above, n. 3): 257; cf. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 198.

47 This is admitted by Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 197. In this sense, although Holleaux's statement that "les neutres n'y sont pour rien" (Rome, la Grece [above, n. 31, 36 n. 3) makes the non-belligerent ambassadors too passive at the Heraclea peace talks, his essential point - that the neutrals had not intentionally invited the Romans - gets to the heart of the matter (despite the criticism of Schmitt, 198).


For our understanding of what was going on in 208, this story seems at least a balance to Livy's information that the Romans were present when the neutral mediators met the Aetolian magistrates at Heraclea. We must canvass the possibility that the events surrounding the peace negotiations of 208 were more complicated than the passing references (themselves revealing Livian misun- derstanding of Polybius' language) which we find in Livy 28.7.48

Finally, Livy's own account of the eventual meeting of the Greek mediators with King Philip, a month or two after Heraclea, displays characteristics that are odd if the underlying assumption is that the interlocutors at Heraclea are discussing a comprehensive peace. The subject of the discussion is said to be de finiendo Aetolico bello (28.7.14). And the idea that this means exactly what it says, i.e., that what was being discussed was the ending of the war between Macedon and Aetolia, finds support in Philip's final remark to the mediators: he had not been the cause of this war (se neque causam eius bellifuisse: 28.7.15). A propagandistic statement, to be sure: but as we have seen above, Philip's remarks would have been nonsensical if the Romans were central to the peace process under discussion, for everyone knew that he had been the aggressor against Rome. Good propaganda requires at least some factual basis, and Philip's statement to the Greek mediators constitutes good propaganda only if Philip and the mediators were focused primarily on his relations with Aetolia - for it was indeed the Aetolians who had started war against him, in 211 (above, p. 271-273).49

My point is not to prove that the mediation effort of 208 was intended solely to bring the war between Macedon and the Aetolian League to an end; it of course remains possible that the Romans were indeed involved here. My point is merely to show that there is enough contrary evidence available to make us cautious about assuming that the mediators of 208 were always focused on a "comprehensive peace" including the Romans - for given the state of our evidence, this is not something we can know for certain.

In contrast to the effort in 209, the mediation effort of 208 failed even to obtain any serious discussion of specific peace terms. The belligerents - especially Philip - seem to have been more intent on prosecuting the war than

48 Livy's rendition of to; adpXovTaq Et; 'HpOKckEav &Opoi4eaOat (Polyb. 10.42.4) as concilium Aetolis Heracleam indictum at 28.5.13 (i.e., this was a meeting of the regular Panaetolian Assembly) is clearly a major error: see Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 257 (and above, n. 46). Rich (above, n. 3), 146, find it "inconceivable" that the Aetolians in 208 might have found an opportunity to negotiate a peace with Philip on their own; but Walbank does not: see Philip V (above, n. 20), 95 n. 1.

49 The implications of Livy 28.7.14 (de finiendo Aetolico bello ageretur ... ) are taken as obvious by Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 36 n. 4. Holleaux's position is strengthened by adding Philip's statement in the subsequent passage 28.7.15 (se neque causam eius bellifuisse).


negotiating its end.50 But in 207 important Greek neutrals tried once more to bring about a negotiated peace; and this time matters proceeded much further.

New developments made spring 207 a propitious time for a new diplomatic initiative. What should be stressed is that the tide in the war was still continuing to run in Philip's favor - especially from the point of view of Aetolia. The king's multiple victories on land during 208 had strengthened his already- formidable military reputation and the prestige of the Macedonian army: as he told his allies, no Greek forces wished to face him in battle (Livy [P] 28.8.3). Attalus of Pergamum, having barely escaped capture when Philip defeated him at Opus, had returned to Asia Minor to deal with an invasion of his kingdom by Philip's ally and in-law Prusias I of Bithynia; and Attalus would not be coming back. This dealt a serious blow to the Aetolians, depriving them of a most trusted and major ally in the war.51 As for the Romans, their naval campaign in the Aegean in summer 208, while destructive to Philip's Greek allies, had had little strategic impact, and in spring 207 they showed no sign of stirring from their bases in the Adriatic. Indeed, it is certain that the legion originally sent to the Adriatic/Greek theater with M. Valerius Laevinus' fleet in 214 had now been withdrawn - which meant that the most the Aetolian League could hope for from Rome was more naval raids, rather than significant operations on land.52 Meanwhile, Philip's allies the Achaeans, under the energetic leadership of Philopoemen, had produced a powerful new army. This meant that Aetolia's allies the Spartans, rather than being of help to the League, would soon face their own severe problems.53 Nowhere the Aetolians looked were their pros- pects promising. It was a return to the situation of spring 209.

Our information on the important mediation efforts of 207 consists unfortunately of a problematic and summary account in Appian (Mac. 3), a vague reference in Dio (frg. 57.58, cf. Zon. 9.11), and a tantalizing fragment of

50 Cf. Errington, CAH (above, n. 3): 103. 51 On the close relations between the Aetolians and the rulers of Pergamum, see R. Mc-

Shane, The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum (Urbana, Ill., 1964): 100-2 and 106-7. The relationship dated from before ca. 250 and grew closer in the 220s (McShane, 100-1). King Attalus had even been elected one of the two Aetolian generals for 209 - a very great honor (Livy 27.29.10 and 30.1).

52 On the date of the withdrawal of the legion, which left only Roman naval forces in the Greek theater of operations, see Rich (above, n. 3), 153-55. Roman inaction in the Adriatic and in Greece in spring and early summer 207 may also have been caused by concern in the Senate over Hasdrubal's threatened invasion of Italy, which in the event came down the Po Valley and along Italy's Adriatic coast: see Hammond, in Hammond- Walbank III (above, n. 3): 406.

53 On Philopoemen's re-organization and strengthening of the Achaean army, which led in 207 to the great Achaean victory over Sparta at Mantineia, see Errington, Philopoemen (above, n. 33), 62-67; cf. A. M. Eckstein, Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1995): 163-64.


Polybius (11.4-6). The latter passage demonstrates that Polybius covered the mediation of 207 in great detail. But his main narrative is no longer extant, and Livy - whom one could normally depend upon in this period to give at least Polybius' main points - chose not to preserve Polybius here, probably because Livy found the Romans militarily inactive in Greece in both 207 and 206 (see Livy 29. 12.1).54

App. Mac. 3 is unfortunately our only connected narrative of the diplomacy of 207. But clearly it must be used with caution. The early chapters of the Macedonica are rife with factual errors.55 And there is at least one major error in Mac. 3 itself: the claim that strong Roman reinforcements arrived in northwest Greece and carried out important operations with the Aetolians (namely, the capture of the strategic city of Ambracia) before the League concluded a separate peace with Philip in 206. The story of the operations at "Ambracia" is not a problem in itself. Perhaps it reflects an action by P. Sempronius Tudita- nus' actual expedition of 205; perhaps it is a mistake for the (hypothetical) capture by P. Sempronius Tuditanus of the lesser-known town of Ambracus in 205.56 Far more worrisome is the illogic of major Roman reinforcements

54 Were the Romans militarily inactive in Greece in 207 and 206? Rich (above, n. 3), intent on arguing that Rome always prosecuted the war in Greece with vigor, proposes (I136-43) that the expedition of P. Sempronius Tuditanus to northwest Greece, which eventually led to peace with Macedon and is placed by Livy 29.12 in 205, actually belongs in 206; cf. also now Kas6eev (above, n. 1), 430. This should not be accepted. First, we have Livy's statement at 29.12.1, at the beginning of the res Graeciae for 205, that negleciae eo biennio res in Graecia erant (the obvious years being 207 and 206) - a passage which Rich himself rightly argues derives from Polybius (137). Second, there is Livy 29.1 1.1 1, which has P. Sempronius Tuditanus being elected consul in 204 in absentia while in command in Greece, and which obviously derives from a Roman annalist. This places Sempronius in Greece in late 205 - and there is certainly not enough campaigning reported in Livy 29.12 to fill up two seasons (Livy indeed implies that Sempronius was in Greece only for one). Thus both the Polybian and the annalistic traditions appear to put Sempronius' expedition to northwest Greece in 205. And when our very skimpy sources for this period agree on something, it is dangerous methodology to substitute something else. Rich's thesis is rejected without argument (though it deserves one) by Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 409 n. 1. See also below, n. 56.

55 For instance, App. Mac. 4 has Philip conquering Chios during his Aegean campaign of 201 - which did not happen.

56 So Rich (above, n. 3), 143-44 (but dating these events to 206: see above, n. 54). Ham- mond, on the other hand, believes that App. Mac. 3 represents an actual, major Roman expedition to northwest Greece in 207 (Hammond-Walbank III [above, n. 3]: 406-7). This is hard to accept, given Livy's repeated statements that the Aetolians were abandoned by Rome during this period (29.12.1; 32.21.17; cf. 36.31.1 1 - all from Polybius); the similarity between the alleged "expedition of 207" and P. Sempronius Tuditanus' actual expedition of 205 (10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry each: App. Mac. 3; Livy 29.12.2); and the fact that Hammond has to make the alleged expedition of 207 return immediately to Italy following only a few forays on the Illyrian coast - an extremely


arriving in northwest Greece while the Aetolians then go on to make a separate peace anyway. Since Livy's version of events is that the Aetolians eventually made a separate peace with Philip because the Romans had abandoned them (29.12.1; 32.21.17; cf. 36.31.11), - a version which is evidently based on Polybius, which makes logical sense, and which (since it reflects badly on Roman fides) Livy would not have put forth unless he had strong evidence to believe it - it seems clear that if Appian's tale of major Roman help to Aetolia before the Aetolians' separate peace is not just sheer confusion, then it derives from a deceptive Roman annalist intent (precisely) on defending Rome from the charge of having abandoned Aetolia in 207-206. This does not raise our confidence in the general narrative of 207 in App. Mac. 3.57 Yet it is not easy to dismiss Appian entirely either, because part of his account of the diplomatic mediation of 207 sounds very like Polyb. 11.4-6 and provides a plausible historical context of this latter passage - as a whole range of scholars have pointed out.58

The story in App. Mac. 3 is that a delegation from certain non-belligerent states - the Ptolemies, Chios, Mytilene, and Amynander of Athamania - tried twice, at the Panaetolian Assemblies first of spring and then of autumn 207, to bring about a negotiated peace.59 This time we are explicitly told that the aim of the mediators was at the beginning a comprehensive peace including the Ro- mans: ?ti &takkayji 'Pogaiwv icai. APrwXcv KCCtV (Dtkin1oU.60 But Appian says that P. Sulpicius Galba, the current Roman commander in the Greek theater, sabotaged the peace effort: claiming publicly that he himself did not have the legal power to commit Rome to peace, he simultaneously wrote secretly to the Senate that it was to Rome's advantage that Aetolia should continue the war against Philip. The Senate was convinced by Sulpicius' letter, and wrote to Greece forbidding the putative treaty. There follows the tale of the large forces sent to help the Aetolians, and the joint Roman-Aetolian capture of "Ambracia" - all for naught, we are also told, for the Roman reinforcements immediately

inefficient use of manpower in the crisis year of 207, and an extremely cumbersome way of dealing with the fact that obviously no permanent help was sent by Rome to its Greek allies during these years.

57 Cf. Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 245 and n. 2; Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20), 99 and n. 9; Rich (above, n. 3), 144.

58 See Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 38 and n. 1; Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 207-8; Rich (above, n. 3), 144.

59 This is explicit in Appian: 6i;, 6vOa J?p oi Aitokoi Tai; nrxt; ctKaECIoggva; EKd- Xotv.

60 For what it is worth, Dio reports that it was Philip, on the advice of envoys from Ptolemy IV, who took an important initiative in including the Romans in these negotiations: frg. 57.58, cf. Zon. 9.1 1. (It is clear both from the placement of this Dio fragment within Dio's general narrative of the Hannibalic War, and from the sequence of events which it records, that the reference here parallels the negotiations in App. Mac. 3.)


returned to Italy, and Philip re-captured Ambracia. At a second meeting concerning peace, the neutral envoys then spoke directly against the Romans, questioning Roman motives and claiming that the conflict between Aetolia and Philip was allowing Rome to form the habit of intervening in the affairs of the Greeks, to the detriment of Greek freedom. When P. Sulpicius Galba rose to reply, he was shouted down by the audience - so strong had anti-Roman feelings become. Nevertheless, Appian appears to indicate that the second meeting, too, failed to bring about a negotiated peace, and the war thus continued for a while.61

Given the obvious problems in App. Mac. 3, it would be incautious to press the details here. What is striking, however, is the tradition in Appian that P. Sulpicius Galba was opposed to any mediated peace, believing it to be in Rome's interest that the war should continue. That Rome was to be included directly in the mediation of 207, i.e., that it was an intended "comprehensive peace," did not matter.62 It is difficult to see why a tradition of Galba's general opposition to peace would have developed out of whole cloth; and indeed, we do not possess so far any evidence of Roman encouragement for any of the mediators' several interventions. This leads to a (cautious) suggestion: Galba was the Roman commander in Greece in 209 and 208 as well as in 207; perhaps he was as fundamentally opposed to the mediations of 209 and 208 as he was to that of 207; and he would thus have viewed the actions of the mediating states in those years as contrary to Rome's interest, whether Rome was included in the putative peace efforts or not (although obviously even more so in the latter case) - just as he did in 207. Moreover, in the tradition as we have it, Galba's view of Rome's strategic interests in Greece was not that of a single headstrong individual, for his reasoning allegedly convinced the Senate to sabotage the peace effort of 207. This tradition, too, makes sense - given Rome's strategic need to keep Philip distracted in Greece, combined with the desire to punish him with war for his treaty with Hannibal.63

The account in App. Mac. 3 also gives us a plausible historical context for the important Polybian fragment 11.4-6. This is a speech by an ambassador,

61 The gap in time between the second mediation of 207 and the actual separate peace between the Aetolians and Philip may be implied by the use of the term tXko; at App. Mac. 3.2 init.: see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 208-9; Berthold (above, n. 3), 105 and n. 8. This means that App. Mac. 3-4 can be interpreted as conforming to the sequence of events indicated in Livy 36.31.1 1, where an important intervening development (namely, a destructive Macedonian invasion of Aetolia) is said to have led to the final Aetolian decision to engage in a separate peace (Schmitt, 209; cf. Berthold, 105).

62 Galba's opinion, according to Appian: 'Pwiaiot; cugo?pep noXqisiv Airoxob; 0txin- tw. Holleaux is therefore fundamentally correct about the basic clash of interests between Galba and the Greek mediators: Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 36 n. 3 (despite the criticisms of Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos [above, n. 31, 209).

63 On Roman goals in the war with Philip, see further above.


which Polybius decided to recount at length; the speech argues for peace between the Aetolians and Philip, and simultaneously it is hostile to Rome. The speech belongs to Polybius' res Graeciae for 207, since it is preceded in the Constantinian excerpta antiqua by the description of Hasdrubal's defeat at the Metaurus (11.1-3: June 207).64 What needs emphasis is that the speaker of this anti-Roman speech is a representative of one of the mediating Greek states: this is explicit at 11.4.1-2. The fragment as we have it does not give the speaker's name, but a gloss on one of the Polybian manuscripts identifies him as one Thrasycrates. And there is a fair argument for identifying Thrasycrates as a Rhodian, for Rhodes seems singled out in the list of persistent mediators mentioned at the beginning of the speech (second after Ptolemy IV, and called formally i] tiv'Poiowv n6kt;, as compared to the simple ethnicity names given the other mediators).65 And actually more can be said, for the speaker has to come from a state which not only has participated prominently in mediation efforts since the beginning of the war (Polyb. 11.4.2), but from a state in the Aegean or Asia Minor (see 1 1.4.6). That limits our choices even more obviously to the speaker being a Rhodian.66

The anti-Roman tone of Thrasycrates' speech in Polyb. 11.4-6 is not congruent with any attempt by the mediators to construct a "comprehensive peace" including the Romans (i.e., the "comprehensive peace" of Appian's first mediation of 207). It does, of course, fit very well with the anti-Roman tone of the speeches which Appian says the neutral ambassadors gave at the second mediation attempt. It therefore seems reasonable to ascribe the speech in Polyb. 11.4-6 to that occasion. That will be the assumption made here.67

Thrasycrates' speech is addressed directly to the Aetolians (Polyb. 1 1.4. 1: XO av8pE; Ai-rXoi). He speaks for all the mediating states (King Ptolemy, the

64 On the placement of Polyb. 11.4-6 in 207 B.C., see rightly Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 201; Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 6 and 274.

65 See Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 199; Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 275.

66 The Byzantine and Mytilenean envoys (Polyb. 11.4.1) are from the Aegean, but we have no record of the previous participation of these states in the mediations (unless one wants to take 11.4.2-4 itself as referring to them). A Chian might just fit, since we have evidence independent of 11.4.2-4 that there was Chian participation in the mediation effort of 209 (Livy 27.30.4), and perhaps the Chians participated in the mediation effort of 208 (based only on Polyb. 11.4.2-4 itself: see above, n. 44). But this thesis is difficult to accept, given the minor place the Chians receive in the speaker Thrasycrates' list of mediators at 1 1.4.1. The Rhodians, on the other hand, are from the Aegean, are mentioned specially by Thrasycrates, and were prominent participants in the mediations both of 209 and 208; no other state fits so well.

67 So Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 204-10; Ferro (above, n. 3), 7 n. 6 and 139- 40; G. A. Lehmann, Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwurdigkeit des Polybios (Munster, 1967): 138; Rich (above, n. 3), 144 45.


Rhodians, the Byzantines, the Chians, and the Mytilenaeans).68 Thrasycrates begins by saying that this is not the first or even the second time that the neutral states have made proposals to the Aetolians concerning peace - for they seriously seek the Aetolians' ending of hostilities (1 1.4.1-2). Indeed, the non- belligerents have sought this goal from the moment the war began, seeing the ruin the war was bringing upon both Aetolians and Macedonians, and the damage it might inflict upon other Greek states as far away as Asia (4.2-6). The reference here is clearly to the attempted mediations of 209 and 208.69 And thus Thrasycrates' opening statement would suggest in itself, even if we did not have additional evidence (which of course we do), that the primary goal of the non-belligerent mediators had always been the reconciliation of Aetolia and Macedon: that the neutrals had been strenuously trying all along to reconcile Aetolia and Macedon is precisely Thrasycrates' point (and note that the Ro- mans are totally absent from Thrasycrates' concerns about "ruin").

This point takes on additional force because it is followed by Thrasycrates' extraordinarily hostile depiction of Rome. The Aetolians, he says, are engaged in a war which is not only destructive and self-destructive (as all wars are), but also totally dishonorable. The Aetolians claim that they are fighting for the freedom of the Greeks against Philip, but in fact they are compromising Greek freedom in regard to Rome: "You are fighting for the enslavement and destruction of Greece" ( 11.5. 1). The terms of the Aetolians' treaty of alliance with the Romans, Thrasycrates says, are disgraceful (tiiv aioyXv1lv {itv ?7t,?4?pe: 11.5.3) - for the treaty tums over free Greeks "to the shameful violence and lawlessness of barbarians" (6e&Kawr -roit 3pf3pOt; Ei; T'a; aOXiOata; U"Pppt; ical napavogia;: 5.7).70 And beyond this, the war will result in a general disaster to all the Greeks, for once the Romans have finished the war in Italy against Hannibal (which they will soon do), they will turn with all their strength against Greece, on the pretext of helping the Aetolians against Philip, but really with the intention of subjugating Greece to themselves (I 1.6.1-2). The Aetolians should have foreseen all these consequences of their alliance with the Romans from the beginning (6.5). But they certainly have no excuse now - after Roman atrocities such as those committed at Oreus and Aegina - not to open their eyes to what is occurring and what will occur (6.0-8).71

68 Note that this list of mediators is quite close to the list in App. Mac. 3, though Appian omits the Rhodians (!) and adds Amynander of Athamania. Amynander had been a mediator in 209 (Livy 27.30.4); see above, pp. 274-275, and below, n. 86.

69 See Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 175. 70 Thrasycrates refers here to the fact that under the Roman-Aetolian treaty of alliance, the

Romans were to receive all the movable loot - including the enslavement of the free population - in any town in Greece which the allies conquered (the Aetolians receiving the territory and physical town itself). For discussion, see Schmitt, Staatsvertrage III (above, n. 9): 263-64.

71 Thrasycrates refers here to Oreus on Euboea, which had been seized and plundered by Roman forces under Galba in 208 (see esp. Livy 28.8.13), and to the great island of


Schmitt, intent on defending the thesis that informal Roman-Rhodian friend- ship existed from ca. 306 B.C. - i.e., from fully 100 years before Thrasycrates' speech -, minimizes the anti-Roman elements in this speech, and minimizes the importance of the speech for our general understanding of the attitude of Rhodes and the other neutral mediators towards the Romans; and other scholars have followed him in this.72 But I do not see how this can be an acceptable interpretation of Polyb. 11.4-6. It is reasonable to suppose that even if Polybius has reworked Thrasycrates' speech in his own vocabulary, it still reflects the fundamental tone of the original.73 And the language Polybius ascribes to Thrasycrates in this speech is as violent as Polybian language gets: the deep shame (aiaX'vvq) of associating with the Romans and their actions in Greece is constantly reiterated (11.4.8; 5.2; 5.7); the Romans are condemned as ppa- pot, and their actions as piaplkaptx&v ( 5.6; 5.7); the ascription of iapavojia to them (5.7) is especially damning, for Polybius uses this word only of the actions of the worst categories of people (criminals, Celts, the unruly mob).74

Aegina in the Saronic Gulf, which had been seized by Galba in 209. Galba's refusal to allow the ransoming of Aeginetan prisoners being sold into slavery became famous as a Roman atrocity (though in fact he soon relented: see Polyb. 9.42.5-8). He eventually turned over the island to the Aetolians themselves (as per the treaty of 211), who in turn sold it to Attalus of Pergamum: see Polyb. 22.8.9-10, cf. 11.5.8.

72 Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 199-204; cf. Berthold (above, n. 3), 106 and n. 12. 73 On the basic historicity of the speech as we have it in Polyb. 11.4-6, see Walbank,

Commentary II (above, n. 3): 275, against Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 202-3 (and compare Rom und Rhodos, 56, where Schmitt himself is much more willing to accept the basic historicity of the speech).

74 Berthold (above, n. 3), 106, seeks to minimize the importance of Thrasycrates' speech for our understanding of Rhodian policy towards Rome, on grounds that this is just an instance of "unkind words." But the sheer violence of Thrasycrates' total attack on Roman motives, methods and goals makes this unconvincing. On the fiercely anti-Roman tone of the speech, see Holleaux, Rome, la Grece, 37. On Polybius' reserving of the accusation of 1apavoisia solely for the worst categories of people, see Eckstein, Moral Vision (above, n. 53), 122 and n. 15; 127 and n. 32; 137; 154. The terms 3(pf3apot and Iaplcpuc6v in Thrasycrates' oration speak for themselves; for the Romans as barbaroi see also Polyb. 9.37.6 and 38.5, a speech (to be sure) by Lyciscus of Acarnania, a state allied with Macedon - which makes the re-appearance of this terminology in the speech of a neutral ambassador all the more remarkable. Polybius is clearly willing to employ the pejorative term barbaroi to describe the Romans in the mouths of Greek historical figures whom he places prominently in the Histories - which is an interesting finding; and Walbank's rule that Polybius nevertheless does not ever speak of the Romans as barbaroi in his own voice (Commentary II [above, n. 3]: 176) turns out not to be quite true: see Polyb. 12.4b.1-c.1, now with C. Champion, "Romans as Bdpokapot: Three Polybian Speeches and the Politics of Cultural Indetermina- cy," CPh 95 (2000): 431-32. For the "deep shame" involved in allying oneself with Roman barbaroi, see also Polyb. 9.38.6 and 39.1-5 (again, this comes in an oration by an ally of Macedon - but the re-appearance of this harsh theme in a prominent speech by one of the neutral mediators of 207 is therefore once more very striking).


In contrast to Schmitt, Rich does admit that it is politically significant that the Romans are mentioned in Thrasycrates' speech only to be villified.75 But he goes on to ascribe the violent tone of the speech merely to the bitterness of the neutral states over the Roman sabotaging of the first mediation of 207; this, he argues, caused the neutrals to change their previous policy, in which they had consistently urged a comprehensive peace including Rome.76 But if one accepts the import of part of Thrasycrates' speech as it appears in Polybius (namely, its virulently anti-Roman tone), then one should also accept the import of the rest of the speech - which is that the mediators from the beginning had focused primarily and persistently on a reconciliation between Aetolia and Macedon (11.4.1-2). Perhaps there is an element of propaganda in that assertion, con- structed for the specific political situation of autumn 207, when the rift between the Aetolians and Rome was obviusly widening - but as we have said, good propaganda needs to have at least a partial basis in fact. In fact, the statement of the mediator at Polyb. 11.4.1-2, and the tone of 1 1.4-6 taken as a whole, fit remarkably well with the anti-Roman tone that the mediators had acquiesced in as far back as the peace talks of 209: see the speech preserved in Polyb. 10.25 (discussed above).

Polybius says that Thrasycrates' oration had a large impact upon the Aeto- lians (11.6.9). Envoys from King Philip followed: they said they would post- pone discussion of the details of a peace settlement for the moment, and only say that if the Aetolians chose peace, the king readily consented, but if not, the Aetolians - not Philip - should be held responsible for what might then happen to the Greeks (11.6.9-10). The speech of the Macedonian envoys in Polybius thus parallels the position Philip had consistently maintained in previous negotiations: that this war was not of his making.77 And in this passage the context is explicitly negotiations for peace solely between Philip and the Aetolians - which is the only context where such statements make sense.78

The efforts of the Greek mediating states ultimately failed in 207, as they had in 209 and 208. We do not know the reasons why the peace talks broke down: Polyb. 11.4-6 ends with the speech of the Macedonians; App. Mac. 3 is too summary; Dio/Zonaras is vague. But the failure of the talks is clear enough from the placement of the fragment Polyb. 11.7.2-3, which describes a major Macedonian invasion of Aetolia following this failure. This invasion (or perhaps a second one, several months later) broke the will of the Aetolians to

75 Rich (above, n. 3), 144. 76 Ibid., 146. 77 On the connection between the Macedonian statement in Polyb. 11.8.9-10 and similar

statements at earlier peace talks by representatives of Macedon, see rightly Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 201; Rich (above, n. 3), 145 and n. 188.

78 See further above.


continue the war.79 Sometime in 206 (exactly when is uncertain), the Aetolians were therefore driven by Realpolitik to come to a negotiated peace with Philip by themselves, separate from Rome.80 Roman policy must have opposed this peace: thus we find the Romans dispatching a large force to northwest Greece in spring 205, ending two years of neglect (Livy [PI 29.12.1), in the expectation or hope that Aetolia was either still in the war or could be persuaded to rejoin it (29.12.2-6). Livy in fact says that P. Sempronius Tuditanus, the new Roman commander in Greece, was angry when he learned that the Aetolians had made a separate peace with Philip - for it was a violation of their treaty of alliance with Rome (29.12.4).

Given this political background, it is striking that we have a tradition where at least one of the mediators of 209, 208 and 207 played a part in bringing about the separate Aetolian peace with Macedon in 206. The state involved was Rhodes: App. Mac. 4 highlights the Rhodian role in that peace (tau.aKTA1pwv oi yeyov6tovw ... ). Most scholars in fact accept the idea that the Greek mediators of 209-207 were probably involved in helping create the peace of 206.81 We are

79 The question is whether the invasion of Aetolia in Polyb. 11.7.2-3 is the same as the one (seemingly different in detail) described retrospectively at Livy (P) 36.31.11. Niese 11 (above, n. 26): 495 and 500, followed by Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 405-6, suggests two separate successful invasions by Philip, one in spring 207 and a second one in summer 206; Hammond additionally proposes that the first invasion called forth a Roman expedition to northwest Greece in summer 207, to encourage the Aetolians (but see above, n. 56). Rich (above, n. 3), 147-48, opts for only one invasion, in autumn 207, after the failure of the two mediation efforts of App. Mac. 3. Walbank, on the basis of the placement of Polyb. 11.7.2-3 within the Polybian ms., opts for one invasion in the summer of 207 (Commentary II [above, n. 3]: 278; cf. Philip V [above, n. 20], 399); but this seems too early a date for the decisive stroke that drove Aetolia from the war (see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos [above, n. 31, 211 n. I - who therefore opts for two invasions).

80 Some scholars place the peace in early 206: so Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 211 n. 1; Rich (above, n. 3), 148. But in Rich's case this chronology is dictated by the hypothesis that P. Sempronius Tuditanus' expedition to northwest Greece should be dated to 206 rather than in 205 (for criticism, see n. 54 above). Other scholars suggest the Panaetolian Assembly of autumn 206 for the swearing of peace with Philip, because this makes Livy's remark that Tuditanus arrived in Illyria vixdum pace facta (29.12.3 - assuming this is the spring of 205) only a slight exaggeration: so G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani III:2 (Turin, 1916): 430 n. 87, and 444; Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 253 n. 4; Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 278; Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 408-9; Errington, CAH (above, n. 3): 101.

81 Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 26 and 254-55; Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20), 99 and n. 9; Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 206 n. 1; Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 405; Errington, CAH (above, n. 3): 103; Ager (above, n. 3), 16-17. But Holleaux, Walbank, Hammond and Errington, while implicitly accepting the idea that the mediators of 209-207 also helped engineer the separate Aetolian peace of 206, all base their reconstructions on the assumption that the second


dependent, of course, on Appian here - whose reliability is subject to question. Yet Appian's reference to the mediating role of the Rhodians in the Aetolian- Macedonian peace of 206 is not in contradiction to Livy 29.12. 1, according to which Philip by this point was able to impose upon the Aetolians pretty much whatever conditions he wished.82 If the tradition in App. Mac. 4 is correct, then it confirms the other evidence that the neutral states were all along focused primarily on ending the conflict between Aetolia and Macedon - with or without Rome. Now they had finally succeeded.

The current scholarly consensus on the end of the fighting between Rome and Macedon the next year (205), which has occasionally been challenged,83 is nevertheless accepted here. That is: in the spring of 205 P. Sempronius Tuditanus arrived in northwest Greece, bringing for the first time in two years a large Roman force into the Greek theater of operations; after some fighting between Sempron- ius and Philip, the neutral Epirotes (into whose territory the conflict was threatening to spread) took the initiative in mediating a peace. The result was successful peace negotiations at the Epirote capital of Phoenice in summer/autumn 205.84

Polybius evidently described the Phoenice talks in detail - as he evidently described all the attempted mediations of the war in detail. Thus we know the names of the three Epirote mediators, - Aeropus, Derdas and Philip - and even the order in which people spoke (Livy [P] 29.12.12). The talks went relatively smoothly, because both sides had now decided that peace was in their interest (29.12.7, 10 and 16): Philip had given up hope in the Carthaginians (whom he now abandoned, contrary to the terms of his treaty with Hannibal), while the Romans - themselves abandoned by the Aetolians - had no powerful allies left

mediation of App. Mac. 3 refers itself to this separate peace of 206. But if we follow Schmitt and Rich in positing that the second mediation of App. Mac. 3 actually belongs in 207 (= Polyb. 1 1.4-6) -, as I think we should -, then the position of these prominent scholars in support of neutral involvement in the separate peace of 206 loses much of its force. It seems better to follow Schmitt in employing here not App. Mac. 3 but the (retrospective) reference to Rhodian mediation in App. Mac. 4 - and since Appian is a summary, it may well be that the other usual mediating states were involved in this peace also.

82 See esp. the reconstruction offered by Ager (above, n. 3), 16-17. 83 See Rich (above, n. 3), 136-43. 84 Rich wishes to date the Peace of Phoenice to summer 206 (but see n. 54, above). By

contrast, Walbank argues that the peace negotiations might actually have continued into the spring of 204, since P. Sempronius Tuditanus in late 205 was elected consul for 204 in absentia while in Greece (Livy 29.11.10: see Philip V, 205). But the negotiations as described by Livy went quickly (29.12.12-13). Moreover, even if the preliminary peace was concluded in summer/autumn 205, Sempronius and his forces would obviously have had to remain on station in Illyria until it was actually formally ratified in Rome (cf. Livy 29.12.16); and even after that, there could have been much administrative work to do (e.g., delicate diplomacy with the Parthini and the other polities newly released from Macedonian control: cf. 29.12.13). All of this could easily account for Sempronius' election as consul for 204 in absentia.


in Greece, and did not wish to devote large resources to fighting Philip when their invasion of Africa was looming.85 In the negotiations Philip therefore conceded some of his Illyrian conquests of 213-212 back to Rome, while the Romans conceded to Philip some of those conquests. A compromise peace was concluded, later formally ratified at Rome (Livy 29.12.13-16). No doubt the results of the war actually left both sides disappointed.86

For our purpo

Documents

Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War