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Jacob Abadi is professor of history at the United States Air Force Academy.

Constraints and Adjustments in Greece’s

Policy toward Israel

Jacob Abadi

Greek-Israeli relations have been cordial over the years, for the most part.

However, it was not until 1990 that Greece decided to establish full diplo-

matic relations with Israel, making it the last country in the European Com-

munity (EC) to do so. Observers have offered several possible reasons for

this belated recognition of the Jewish state. They have suggested that Greece’s

concern about its ties with the Arab states, whose support it needed on the

Cyprus issue, was a major deterrent. In addition, they have argued that

Greece’s concern for the fate of its nationals in Arab countries and its depen-

dence on Arab oil and investment had dissuaded it from upgrading its rela-

tions with Israel. Valid as these factors were, they are only a few pieces of a

big jigsaw puzzle. So far, no systematic attempt has been made by analysts

to explore all the reasons for this anomaly.

Why Athens thwarted all attempts by the Israeli Foreign Ministry to

upgrade bilateral ties is the question that I attempt to answer in this essay.

The main argument presented here is that Greek policy makers were con-

strained by a unique combination of domestic and external pressures, which

prevented them from responding favorably to Israel’s overtures. I also arguethat Greek policy toward Israel was far less hostile than the media in the

West, in Israel, and in the Arab states portrayed it.

Greek policy began to change in the mid-1980s, when the enormous pres-

sure exerted by the Greek opponents of rapprochement decreased consider-

ably and the tension in the Arab-Israeli conflict began to subside. Moreover,

the changing global environment, which resulted from the collapse of the



Abadi: Constraints and Adjustments in Greece’s Policy 41

Soviet Union and the rise of the United States as the only great power, had a

salutary effect on Greek-Israeli relations. Only by examining these changes

can one understand why Greece refrained from upgrading its relations with

Israel for so long.

The Early Years

Despite the short distance separating the two countries, Greece and Israel

historically have had little in common. For the most part, Greeks have

seemed indifferent toward Jews and Israel. Such indifference was apparent

even during the Nazi Holocaust, when the news about the mass extermina-

tion of Jews became known in Greece. Commenting on the Greek media’sresponse to the plight of the Jews during that period, one writer who

explored the topic says,

Jewry in Salonika, which accounted for one-fifth of the total prewar popu-

lation, had been utterly wiped out. During this time—and there were no

excuses for libel against the Jews—we observe an almost tangible

silence in the daily and periodical press. The illegal newspaper of the

Greek communist resistance movement [EAM], Eleftheria, printed only

brief news announcements on its fourth page. Generally speaking, the

genocide of the Jews does not appear to have moved Salonican writers to

literary composition.1

However, despite the general attitude of indifference, there were many

Greeks who risked their lives to prevent the extermination of the Jews by the

Nazis. The Greek government endeavored to save Jews whenever possible,

although largely due to British pressure, it prohibited the use of Greek ves-

sels to transport refugees to Palestine during the Second World War.2

Greece was among the countries that voted against the 1947 Partition

1. Fragiski Abatzopoulou, “The Image of the Jew in the Literature of Salonica,” in Ourselves and

Others: The Development of a Greek Macedonian Cultural Identity since 1912, ed. Peter Mackridge

and Eleni Yannakakis (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 222–3. Editor’s note: For the duration of the occupation,

the Greek press was censored by the Nazi military command.

2. David Sitton, Jewish Communities in Our Time (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Ahva, 1982), 234; Dalia

Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel 1939–44 (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1990), 47.



42 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2000

Plan for Palestine. However, Greek attitude in this matter was determined by

national interest and was by no means a byproduct of anti-Semitism. The

Greek government was concerned about the fate of its citizens in the Arab

world, in Egypt in particular. In addition, it had to protect the status of theGreek Orthodox Church and its patriarchs in Alexandria, Aleppo, and

Jerusalem. This factor weighed so heavily on Greek policy toward the Mid-

dle East that when U.S. president Harry Truman’s assistant, David K. Niles,

attempted to convince the Greek government to vote for the resolution, his

arguments fell on deaf ears. In vain did he appeal to his wealthy Greek

friends, Tom Pappas and Spyros Skouras, to use their influence in order to

change the Greek vote.3

In 1949, the Greek government decided to recognize Israel de facto butrefused to consider de jure recognition. For the most part, however, Greek

officials refrained from commenting on the Arab-Israeli conflict. They occa-

sionally mentioned the need to solve the Palestinian refugee problem, as a

way of demonstrating solidarity with the Arab states. A brief moment of ten-

sion in the bilateral relations ensued in January 1950, when the Greek gov-

ernment held two Spitfire planes that were on their way from Czechoslovakia

to Israel. The decision to hold the planes was a result of pressure by the

British Air Ministry, whose aim was to strengthen the Royal Hellenic AirForce and to deny Israel reinforcement. However, the planes were released

as soon as the United Nations embargo was lifted and the British Air Min-

istry left the matter to the discretion of the Greek government.4

Israel and Greece established consular relations in 1952. The Greek con-

sul general in Jerusalem, who since the Mandatory period (when the British

controlled Palestine following the First World War) was also in charge of

East Jerusalem, obtained the title of diplomatic representative. However,

Israel had no more than an honorary consul in Greece. Continued Israeli

requests to upgrade his status to that of a regular ambassador were ignored

in Athens. Nevertheless, commercial and cultural relations continued with-

out interruption.

3. Abram L. Sacher, The Redemption of the Unwanted: From the Liberation of the Death Camps to the

Founding of Israel (New York: St. Martin’s/Marek, 1983), 222.

4. Wardman to Jackson, Public Records Office (PRO), FO371, 82577, ER1223/1, London, 9 January

1950.




A close examination of Greek interests in the Middle East demonstrates

that Athens had valid reasons for remaining reluctant to upgrade its ties with

Israel. The Greek diaspora in the Arab world was a powerful factor dissuad-

ing the Greek government from establishing full diplomatic relations withIsrael. At the time it numbered more than two hundred thousand, most of

whom lived in Egypt. The Greek shipping industry, which constituted the

bulk of the country’s revenues, depended on constant Arab cooperation, and

free passage through the Suez Canal was deemed essential to the country’s

prosperity. Moreover, Greek dependence on Arab oil did not allow much

flexibility in foreign policy. Probably the most decisive factor was the need

to enlist Arab support in the UN on the Cyprus issue. This was an interest

which no political party in Greece was willing to jeopardize.Although the Greek government had good reasons to be disenchanted

with the Egyptian government for the restrictions it imposed on the Greek

expatriate community on the sale and purchase of its property following the

Egyptian coup d’état in 1952, and for its decision to confiscate their prop-

erty, Greek politicians were careful not to tamper with their country’s rela-

tions with the Arab world. Consequently, the Israelis concluded that Greece

was hopelessly committed to the Arab cause and for a while abandoned their

attempts to mend fences with its government. Yet despite their refusal toconsider de jure recognition, Greek officials continued to refrain from

demonstrating open hostility toward Israel. For the most part, Greece voted

with the Arabs in the UN but abstained when the resolutions were rabidly

anti-Israeli.

Witnessing the deterioration in Greek-Arab relations, Foreign Ministry

officials in Jerusalem hoped to capitalize on Greek grievances. Indeed, there

were signs of serious trouble in Greek-Egyptian relations. The fact that the

Egyptian government compelled the 120,000 Greeks of Egypt to leave with-

out indemnity intensified anti-Arab sentiments in Greece. Moreover, the

coexistence of Christians and Muslims in Cyprus led to indifference toward

the Arabs, and some Greek officials became convinced that Arab support

was no longer needed. In addition, the diminishing power of the Greek

Orthodox Church in Arab countries caused concern in Greece, and when the

Syrian government decided that the head of the Orthodox Church in Syria

must be Syrian and not Greek, there was much resentment among the Greek




clergy. Yet the Greek government refrained from taking any steps that could

be interpreted as inimical to Arab interests. Consequently, all appeals from

Israeli Foreign Ministry officials to upgrade ties continued to fall on deaf

ears in Athens.According to a 1952 report by the British consulate general in Jerusalem,

Greece was negotiating a treaty to protect its Greek subjects in Egypt and

therefore did not consider the time appropriate for granting Israel de jure

recognition. However, as a sop to the Israelis, it considered the possibility of

nominating a diplomatic representative. When the Greek government sus-

pended the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and civil aviation with Israel,

as a result of intense Arab pressure, the Israelis asked the British to assist in

the negotiations. Officials at the Greek Foreign Ministry responded favorablyto British mediation in this matter. They reassured the Israelis that the treaty

of commerce would be signed at the appropriate time.5 However, they made

it clear that Greece would not grant de jure recognition to Israel before the

issue pertaining to the Greek colony in Egypt was resolved.

In a letter to the Foreign Office, the British ambassador explained that

Israel was keenly interested in upgrading bilateral relations with Greece

because it sought to cultivate relations with all Mediterranean countries that

were susceptible to Arab pressure. Besides, Israel was interested in thefuture defense of the region and in minimizing the effect of the Arab Boycott.6

Aware of Israel’s efforts to upgrade its ties with Greece, the Arab states

embarked on a strategy aimed at preventing such a possibility. A summer

1956 invitation from Damascus to the king of Greece to visit Syria was part

of a deliberate attempt to keep Greece and Israel apart.7 Arab diplomats,

speaking to their Greek counterparts in the UN, made it clear that any

Greek attempt to upgrade ties with Israel would not be well received by

their governments. Although Arab diplomats had always argued that Greek-

Arab relations were anchored in tradition and common heritage, British

diplomats who became involved in Middle East affairs were hardly con-

5. Gallsworthy to Wardrop, PRO FO/371, 98796, R10319/3, 20 March 1952.

6. Judd to Sheringham, PRO FO/371, 82516, ER1023/13, 11 July 1950; Wadrop to Foreign Office,

PRO FO/371, 98796, ER10319, 22 February 1952; Chadwick to Foreign Office, PRO FO/371, 98796,

ER10319/2, 17 March 1952.

7. Gardner to Foreign Office, PRO FO371, 123859, Ra10389/1, 4 June 1956.




vinced about such outlandish assertions. In a 1956 letter to Foreign Secre-

tary Selwyn Lloyd, Anthony Lambert wrote from Athens: “They [the Greeks]

remain firmly Western and anti-Communist in outlook. . . . Greek ties of

friendship with the Arab world consist only of the presence of a large Greekcolony in Egypt, and a coincidence of views on ‘colonialism.’ In almost all

other respects their interests are diametrically opposed.”8

Greek-Egyptian relations underwent a serious crisis in early 1957 when

Egypt’s president Gamal Abdal Nasser approved legislation for the “Egyp-

tianization” of Greek enterprises. The Greek ambassador protested the Egyp-

tian government’s decision to confiscate Greek property. There was much

talk about a massive emigration of Greeks from Egypt, and the Greek press

reported that the days of the Greek community there were numbered. Seek-ing to avoid confrontation with Egypt, Greece refused to attend the first Suez

conference, which convened in London in February 1957 to discuss the con-

sequences of Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal.9

Explaining why Greece continued to maintain cordial relations with

Egypt despite the confiscation of Greek property, a British journalist said,

“Not unnaturally, the presence of this large Greek community and concern

for its welfare have steadily prejudiced Greek foreign policy in favor of

Egypt. This prejudice is now strengthened by Greece’s need for Arab sup-port for her annual appeals on Cyprus in the UN.” In addition, Egypt had a

debt of £4 million to Greece. And what complicated matters even further was

the fact that Egypt had rejected a Greek proposal that the sum should be

used in offsetting Greek payments of canal tolls. Egypt’s decision to restrict

imports of luxury goods from Greece had aggravated tensions even more.10

When Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis and Foreign Minister

Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas of the National Radical Union, which dominated

Greek politics from 1955 to 1963, visited Cairo in August 1957, both coun-

tries reaffirmed their desire to strengthen bilateral ties. However, when the

two ministers inquired about the fate of the Greek community in Egypt,

Nasser disappointed them by saying that the Egyptian government had yet

to decide what to do about foreigners.

8. Lambert to Selwyn Lloyd, PRO FO/371, 123850, Ra1021/1, 29 August 1956.

9. British Embassy in Athens to Selwyn Lloyd, PRO FO/371, 130018, RG10316, 8 February 1957.

10. Times (London), 17 August 1957.




That Nasser did little to promote better ties with Greece was in large mea-

sure due to his conviction that Greece’s role in Middle East affairs was rather

insignificant. Such was also the perception of many other observers. A

British official had once remarked:

The Greeks have got a rather vague and exaggerated idea of their own

political usefulness in the Middle East. Greek public opinion has little

real knowledge about the Middle East, and not much interest beyond the

immediate concerns of the Greek communities there. The Greek govern-

ment . . . may really have aspirations to play some sort of a mediatory role

between the West and the Arab countries; but I cannot myself see Greece

getting very deeply involved. For instance, I should be extremely sur-

prised if [Greek ambassador Seferiades] Averoff’s recent remarks either

to the Secretary of State or to me imply that Greece would in any circum-

stances contemplate becoming a member of the Baghdad Pact, in the

unlikely event that she were invited to do so. Nor can I see her contribut-

ing much of value to an eventual settlement with Nasser, if that ever takes

place, because in the last resort she will always be too frightened about

her community in Egypt.

Another British official remarked that while “the Turks regard themselves ashaving a special position in the Middle East by reason of their historical

connections with the area and their geographical position, Greek claims to

influence in the Middle East hardly rest on such a firm basis.”11

It was largely as a result of Ambassador Averoff’s efforts that Nasser was

invited to visit Greece in 1959, despite opposition from the Greek monarchy,

particularly the queen, who threatened to be out of the country if Nasser

came to visit. A Foreign Ministry official found it necessary to justify the

visit by saying that it would be beneficial to the Greek community in

Alexandria and that it could help strengthen Nasser’s links with the West.12

Such an attitude on the part of Greek Foreign Ministry officials both pre-

vented a crisis in Greek-Egyptian relations and kept Israel at a distance.

11. Allen to Foreign Office, PRO FO/371, 130018, RG10316/5, 29 August 1957; Allen to Addis,

PRO FO/371, 144523, RG1022/1, 9 January 1959; C. T. Brant, Minutes on Greece in the Middle

East, PRO FO/371, 144523, 19 January 1959.

12. Symon to Addis, PRO FO/371, 144523, RG1022/7, 31 December 1959.




Athens’s unwillingness to harm its ties with the Arabs had often resulted in

steps that were harmful to Israel. For example, when Israel concluded a deal

for the purchase of the first Super-Mystère aircraft from France in March

1960, Greece did not allow their passage through its air space. Shimon Peres,who was Israel’s deputy defense minister and very involved in the purchase,

recalled in his diary how the pilot of one aircraft, which was detained by the

Greeks, lost his bearings and almost fell into Egyptian hands.13

In a meeting with Greek diplomats in 1962, Israel’s minister of education

and culture, Abba Eban, who spoke on behalf of Foreign Minister Golda

Meir, raised the issue of diplomatic relations with Greece. In those meet-

ings, the Greeks argued that three factors stood in the way of normalization:

the existence of twenty thousand to thirty thousand Greek nationals inEgypt; the need to persuade the Egyptian government to compensate those

who had lost their property; and the need to enlist Arab support on the

Cyprus issue.

Despite intense efforts on the part of Israeli officials, Greek policy did not

change during the early 1960s. The rise of pan-Arabism and Nasser’s popular-

ity in the Arab world made it difficult for the Greek government to contemplate

better relations with Israel. Such steps would alienate not only Egypt but all

pro-Nasser elements in the Arab world. So susceptible were the Greeks topressure from the Arabs at that time that they agreed to Arab demands to

lower the diplomatic rank of the Israeli representative in Athens.14

When the Greeks invited Israel’s president Zalman Shazar to participate

in the marriage ceremony of the king in February 1966, the Arabs protested,

saying that there was no justification for a formal invitation since Greece rec-

ognized Israel only de facto. Yet despite its desire to pacify the Arab states,

the Greek government preferred to avoid a confrontation with Israel, particu-

larly in matters affecting its national security. When Israel planned to fly a

helicopter from France to Israel in spring 1966, the Greeks allowed it free

passage over the demilitarized zone in the Dodecanese Islands.

13. Matti Golan, Shimon Peres: A Biography (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982), 98 –9.

14. The Arabs insisted that the Israeli representative be placed under the chargé d’affaires ad interim

rather than under the chargé d’affaires en pied. Sykes to Dodson, PRO FO/371, 180852, ER103119/1,

1 February 1965.




Other events had demonstrated that there were further limits to Greek

compliance with Arab pressure. When the Arabs, who supported Greece on

the Cyprus issue, pressured the Greeks to remove Israel’s name from the list

of the diplomatic corps in Athens and asked that the Israeli representativenot be called “diplomatic,” the Greek Foreign Ministry flatly refused. Greek-

Egyptian relations underwent another period of coolness in summer 1966,

when the Greek government asked for compensation much larger than the

Egyptians were willing to pay to those whose property was confiscated.15

What made it so difficult to decide on rapprochement with Israel was the

fact that there was no agreement among Greek politicians regarding the pol-

icy that their government should adopt. For example, Andreas Papandreou

accused Foreign Minister Stavros Costopoulos of trying, without the primeminister’s knowledge, to pass a decree in the parliament allowing Israel to

appoint an ambassador in Athens. As it turned out, Costopoulos’s orders had

come from the palace. Papandreou was against upgrading relations with

Israel. He attacked the government and the leaders of the Radical Party for

putting Greek-Arab relations in jeopardy. Moreover, he argued that Arab

support on the Cyprus issue was crucial and managed to revoke the decree.16

A thorough perusal of the documents available in the Israel State Archive

reveals that Israeli Foreign Ministry officials attached great importance torelations with Greece. The centrality of Greek-Israeli relations becomes very

clear from the comments made by Israeli Foreign Ministry official Nahum

Eshkol, who firmly believed that Israel should not give up the struggle to win

Athens’s good will.17 In one of his letters to the Israeli ambassador in Athens

he wrote the following:

It is true that the issue of full recognition of Israel and the level of repre-

sentations are currently subjects of contest between the government andthe opposition, but we should not underestimate the importance of the

15. Shai to Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archive (ISA), 4029/24, 8 February 1966; Gilad to Foreign

Ministry, ISA 4029/24, 8 April 1966; Shai to Foreign Ministry, ISA 4029/32, 27 May and 24 June

1966.

16. Andreas Papandreou was the son of Prime Minister George Papandreou. Costopoulos was the for-

eign minister in George Papandreou’s government and later became defense minister. Shai to Foreign

Ministry, ISA 4029/24, 21 July 1966.

17. Nahum Eshkol, interview with the author, Jerusalem, 14 June 1995.




fact that the level of the relations with Israel was chosen as the subject of

this contest. . . . We are not suffering from excessive optimism, especially

since the Cyprus problem and that of the Greek property were not yet

solved and Greece does not enjoy a stable government, but the issue of our diplomatic relations with Greece must be at the center of our interest

and we must take advantage of every incident in that subject.

Eshkol recommended the Israeli ambassador remind the Greek public

that Cyprus, in whose interest Papandreou decided to speak in his cam-

paign, maintained full diplomatic relations with Israel without adverse effect

on its ties with Egypt or any other Arab state.

Despite the fact that the Greek government turned down the Israeli over-

tures, officials in Athens tended to be sensitive to Israeli concerns and

avoided conflict whenever possible. This became obvious in summer 1966,

when the Greeks decided to build an office for foreign airlines. When the

Egyptians demanded the area allocated to the Israeli airline El Al, Israel

protested and the Greeks decided in El Al’s favor. However, the Israelis were

still dissatisfied about the state of bilateral relations. In autumn 1966,

Eshkol indicated his dissatisfaction with the fact that the Greek consulate in

Israel was in charge of both Israeli and Jordanian affairs, saying that this didnot allow the Greek representative to fulfill his task properly.18

What made it particularly difficult for the Greek government to decide on

a well-defined foreign policy was the fact that not all parties in Greece

approved of good relations with Arab states. Some parties called for better

relations with Israel, while others dissuaded the government from doing so.

In autumn 1966, the Time correspondent in Rome quoted the leader of the

Greek Progressive Party as saying, “The future of Greece depends on coop-

eration with Israel. Only when we understand this would we be able, incooperation with Israel, to turn into a major factor in the Middle East and

the Mediterranean.” The correspondent also mentioned the corrosive impact

that Arab pressure had on Greek-Israeli relations. He quoted the Greek for-

eign minister as saying,

18. Eshkol to Ambassador in Athens, ISA 4029/24, 5 August 1966; Shai to Foreign Ministry, ISA

4029/24, 23 August 1966; Eshkol to Foreign Ministry, ISA 4029/24, 27 September 1966.




Excuse me for the delay, but the Egyptian ambassador that was here came

to harass me about arranging an official visit for the King of Greece to

Egypt. The King of Greece plans to visit the Sinai peninsula in the near

future, and Nasser would like to turn this into an official visit. I told theambassador that this is out of the question. After their treatment of the

Greek subjects and property in Egypt, we would not send our king for an

official visit.19

Bilateral Relations under the Military Regime

In April 1967, a new junta government under Constantine Kolias came to

power in Greece. Following the settlement of payments due to Greeks whoseproperty in Egypt had been confiscated, the Israelis hoped that the junta

would agree to upgrade ties. Israel’s ambassador in Paris, Walter Eytan,

wrote to the Israeli Foreign Ministry that the junta’s declared intention to

establish relations “with all countries without exception” was a sign that

Athens would not hesitate to upgrade its ties with Israel. He called on the

Foreign Ministry to intensify its diplomatic efforts in order to convince the

junta to agree to full diplomatic relations.

Aware of the pro-American proclivity of the military regime, the Israelisdecided to embark on another diplomatic initiative. The Israeli ambassador

told Foreign Minister Paul Iconomou Gouras that the junta’s stability made it

immune from criticism, and therefore there was no need to fear the implica-

tions of establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel.20 When the Greek

government did not move toward upgrading bilateral relations as expected,

the Israelis criticized it for being hopelessly pro-Arab. Responding to argu-

ments made by Greek officials regarding the need to obtain Arab support on

the Cyprus issue, Eshkol dismissed them as a pretext. He reminded the offi-

cials that full diplomatic relations with Israel had no adverse effect on

Cyprus’s relations with the Arab states. However, the argument made by

Greek government officials that Arab pressure prevented rapprochement

with Israel was not without foundation.

19. See Dinitz to Foreign Ministry, ISA 4029/32, 5 October 1966.

20. Eytan to Foreign Ministry, ISA 4029/24, 27 April 1967; Shai to Foreign Ministry, ISA 4029/24,

19 January 1967.




Given its dependence on Arab oil and on free passage through the Suez

Canal, the Greek government was in no position to ignore the fact that the

Arab media had occasionally portrayed Greece as collaborating with what it

described as the Zionist enemy. Just prior to the Six Day War of 1967, theGreek media carried denials of reports from Cairo that American planes car-

rying American soldiers to Israel took off from Greek airports.

Following the Six Day War, the junta’s position was that Israel should not

demand face-to-face negotiations with the Arabs as a precondition for its

withdrawal from the occupied territories.21 At the UN, Greece supported a

radical resolution sponsored by Yugoslavia, which demanded unconditional

Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. Greek officials explained

that they were unwilling to appear as opponents of the Arab states, becauseGreece had vital interests to protect. The Greek representative reiterated

that his country had to be sensitive due to several factors: the existence of

thirty thousand Greeks in Egypt, the existence of Egyptian debt, and the

need for Egyptian support on the Cyprus question. At the same time, how-

ever, he was pleased to mention that Israel had cordial relations with the

Greek Orthodox patriarchate and that he saw prospects for closer coopera-

tion between the two countries in the future.

The annexation of Jerusalem by Israel following the Six Day War createda unique situation for the Greek Orthodox Church. This was the reason

Israel saw the need to accelerate the normalization process with Greece. The

Israeli representative in Nicosia reported on his intention to embark on a

campaign to form a Greek Orthodox position against the internationalization

of Jerusalem. Following the Six Day War, the Greeks refrained from sponsor-

ing anti-Israeli resolutions. However, they tended to support such resolutions

when sponsored by others.22 During this time, Greece continued to experi-

ence difficulties not only with Egypt but also with other Arab states. In sum-

mer 1967, the Algerian government arrested twelve Greek seamen, and

21. Eshkol to Consul General in Philadelphia, ISA 4029/24, 28 April 1967; Embassy in Athens to

Foreign Ministry, ISA 4082/13, May 1967 (no exact date given); Israeli Embassy in New York to For-

eign Ministry, ISA 4082/13, 21 June 1967.

22. Foreign Ministry to Embassy in Athens, ISA 4082/13, 27 May, 9 July, and 13 July 1967; Arazi to

Foreign Ministry, ISA 4082/13, 15 July 1967; Embassy to Foreign Ministry. ISA 4082/13, 18 July

1967.




interrogated and humiliated them before they were released.23 Consequently,

the Greek attitude toward Israel became friendlier. Greek officials were quite

genuine when they argued that despite the absence of full diplomatic rela-

tions they were far from being hostile to Israel. Not only did they allow theU.S. Sixth Fleet to use Crete during the Six Day War to assist Israel, they

also allowed Israeli helicopters to land on the island of Rhodes.

Aware of the junta’s pro-U.S. orientation, the Israelis asked American offi-

cials to act on their behalf in Athens. At the same time, however, Greek offi-

cials made an attempt to appear as honest brokers in the Arab-Israeli con-

flict and were still reluctant to take a step that might be regarded as inimical

to the Arab cause. Greek foreign minister Panayotis Pipinelis told the Israeli

ambassador that in his opinion Israel could safely withdraw from the Araboccupied territories and rely on guarantees by the Great Powers. At the same

time, sources in the Greek embassy in Bonn argued that the Greek govern-

ment was compelled to maintain a pro-Arab policy. This was due not only to

its concern for the Greek communities in the Arab world but to the need to

use Nasser’s influence in Afro-Asian countries in order to obtain their sup-

port on the Cyprus issue. Therefore, these sources said that Israel could not

expect a change in Greek policy in the foreseeable future. Moreover, they

indicated that Greece would continue to vote against Israel in the UN,despite the fact that the Greek people identified with Israel.

Shortly after the Six Day War, Greece became vulnerable to terrorist

activities carried out by Palestinian commandos, which made it quite impos-

sible for the junta to remain indifferent to the Arab-Israeli conflict. When

Palestinian terrorists carried out an attack against an El Al airliner in

Athens in December 1968, the Greek prime minister and minister of the

interior, Stylianos Pattakos, was presented with a major dilemma. While the

Israelis expected an explicit condemnation of the attack, the Palestinians

expected a statement of sympathy to their cause. In a meeting with an Israeli

envoy, Pattakos said that he regretted the death of the Israeli passenger.

However, while condemning the attack, the junta instructed the press to

avoid portraying the Palestinian commandos as terrorists. Nevertheless, the

23. L’Algérie détient des marins grecs, ISA 4029/32, 28 July 1967; Yaish to Foreign Ministry, ISA

4029/24, 31 October 1967; Vered to Arnon, ISA 4029/24, 31 October 1967; Shai to Foreign Ministry,

ISA 4029/24, 28 November 1967; Ben Yaacov to Foreign Ministry, ISA 4029/32, 5 December 1967.




Greek press remained generally sympathetic to Israel, and when Israel was

condemned for its invasion of Lebanon, some newspapers implied that the

Greek government had criticized the Israeli invasion while avoiding con-

demnation of the Palestinian attack.It was largely as a result of its desire to mend fences with the United

States that the junta eventually decided to move somewhat closer to Israel.

In 1969, diplomatic representatives were appointed in both countries. Both

had the rank and the role of ambassador. However, the de facto recognition

remained in force. This was largely because Pipinelis remained influential

when Papadopoulos came to power in 1967. Greek Middle East policy was

constrained by American officials who pressured Greece to move closer to

Israel. At the same time, however, the Arab states expected the junta to showsympathy to the Palestinian cause. Despite strict control by the Greek gov-

ernment on the activities of Palestinian commandos, the terrorist attacks on

Greek soil continued and thus caused the junta embarrassment.

The junta continued to maintain the image of neutrality in the Arab-

Israeli conflict by allowing the Greek Red Cross to ship relief supplies to

Jordan, Syria, and Israel. The junta found itself in a great dilemma in Sep-

tember 1970 when U.S. officials asked it to grant facilities for refueling

airplanes sent to evacuate American citizens from Jordan and to allowreconnaissance plans to fly to the region. The junta vacillated and thus antag-

onized the Arabs while failing to substantially improve its relations with

Israel. What kept the junta from granting de jure recognition to Israel was

not only the fear of possible Arab reaction but also the anti-Semitic tenden-

cies of Greek reactionary media, such as the newspaper Estia and especially

the overtly fascist magazine Fourth of August , which often published virulent

anti-Semitic material.24

Although many Israelis and Greeks were friends at the personal level, the

junta continued to resist pressure to grant Israel de jure recognition. For-

mally, diplomatic representatives Yehuda Gaulan in Athens and Dimitris

Petrou in Jerusalem were ambassadors in rank but not in title. When

approached by their Israeli counterparts, Greek officials continued to claim

24. Maariv (Tel Aviv), 27 December 1968; New York Times, 31 December 1968; A. G. Xydis, “The

Military Regime’s Foreign Policy,” in Greece under Military Rule, ed. Richard Clogg and George

Yannopoulos (New York: Basic, 1972), 204, 205, 207, 209.




that they did not wish to offend the Arabs out of their concern for the Greek

community in Egypt. From Israel’s point of view, the lack of de jure recogni-

tion had diplomatic significance but no adverse effect on its national secu-

rity. In December 1972, U.S. Senator Frank Church submitted a report to theSenate Foreign Relations Committee quoting the Israeli military command

as saying that Israel no longer needed use of American bases in Greece.

This contradicted President Richard Nixon’s assertion that there was linkage

between American military aid to Greece and Israel’s security.25

Tension in bilateral relations increased considerably on 5 August 1973

when another terrorist attack took place in Athens. This one was launched

by the Palestinian organization known as Black September and took place

on a TWA airplane bound for Tel Aviv. Four passengers were killed duringthe attack and fifty-three were wounded. Israeli Labor Party leader Peres

angered Greek officials by implying that the Arab terrorist assault at Athens

airport was a result of Greek leniency toward terrorism.

Anxious to obtain U.S. support for its foreign policy objectives, the Greek

junta took Peres’s criticism seriously and began moderating its attitude toward

Israel. The junta members were aware of the powerful influence that Jewish

leaders had in Washington. Besides, Israel’s swift victory over the combined

armed forces of all Arab states was greatly admired in Greece and may haveincreased Greek sympathy toward the Jewish state. Nevertheless, the junta

had to be extremely cautious. Consequently, it refused to provide bases and

facilities to the American airlift of weapons to Israel during the Yom Kippur

War of October 1973. Since the Jewish community in Greece, which num-

bered no more than seven thousand at that time, did not interfere in politics,

there was little domestic pressure on the government to alter its Middle East

policy. Virtually the only Greeks who criticized the government’s policy were

Jewish army colonels who had quit out of disgust with the junta.26

Anxious to improve its image in the eyes of the American public, the junta

was compelled to appear more conciliatory to Israel. When he took office as

25. David Krivine, “More Drive Is Needed in Trade with the Greeks,” Jerusalem Post, 13 November

1972; “Washington Post Reports: Israel Says It Does Not Need U.S. Bases in Greece,” Jerusalem Post,

18 December 1972.

26. “Peres Implies Greece Partly at Fault,” Jerusalem Post, 7 August 1973; Nikolaos A. Stavrou, ed.,

Greece under Socialism: A NATO Ally Adrift (New York: A. Caratzas, 1988), 57–9; “Greece and

Israel: The Public Mood Has Changed since Six Day War,” Jerusalem Post, 3 December 1973.




prime minister in October 1973, Spyros Markezinis said that “many ties

connect us with Arab countries, but nothing divides us from the state of

Israel, which has also the right to have a place under the sun.”27 Moreover,

Greece offered its territory for Arab-Israeli peace talks following the YomKippur War. According to a Greek political exile, Elias P. Demetracopoulos,

the United States did nothing to prevent the ousting of George Papadopoulos

due to the Greek government’s refusal to allow U.S. aircraft to use Greek air-

space in order to deliver weapons to Israel.28

Following the Yom Kippur War, the Palestinian issue assumed greater

importance in the Arab-Israeli conflict and complicated matters even fur-

ther. It was nearly impossible for the Greek government to demonstrate sym-

pathy toward the Palestinians without alienating Israel. The Greek govern-ment’s decision of May 1974 to free two Arab terrorists was not well received

in Jerusalem and caused further friction in bilateral relations.

The New Democratic Party and the Bilateral

Relations with Israel

In 1962 Greece was given associate status with the EC. Afterward, its for-

eign policy became increasingly pro-Western. Nevertheless, the New Demo-cratic Party (ND), which came to power in 1974, was reluctant to reverse the

junta’s policy toward Israel. Despite past grievances, the new government

expressed sympathy with Egypt, and its criticism of Israel intensified. The

Greek press did not approve of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s

shuttle diplomacy, and some newspapers claimed that his Jewish origin

stood in the way of a fair settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition,

editorials compared the plight of the Palestinian refugees with Greek Cypriots

driven from their homes by the Turks.29 However, the ND proved more prag-

matic than its official statements suggested, and after a while it toned down

its criticism and increased its cooperation with Israel. In January 1977,

27. “Israel’s Place under the Sun,” Jerusalem Post, 9 October 1973.

28. “France Seeks Key Role in Peace Talks,” Jerusalem Post , 23 October 1973; “Exiled Greek Politi-

cian Says: U.S. Didn’t Help Papadopoulos because of His Mid-East Stand,” Jerusalem Post, 29

November 1973.

29. “Greece Frees Terrorists,” Jerusalem Post, 4 May 1974; “Israel Is the ‘Main Culprit’ Greek Hos-

tility to U.S. Focuses On,” Jerusalem Post, 12 December 1974.




Greek defense minister Averoff-Tositsas revealed to the press that Greece

had made limited purchases of American-made electronic equipment from

Israel. In addition, the two countries signed a cultural agreement facilitat-

ing exchange of academics and scientists.30

However, the ND did not givemuch publicity to its contacts with Israel, and its official statements sounded

as pro-Arab as ever. In a joint communiqué by Prime Minister Karamanlis

and President Anwar Sadat of January 1978, both sides called for Israeli

withdrawal from the occupied territories and the restoration of Palestinian

rights.31

According to a report of January 1978 by the London-based Institute of

Jewish Affairs and the World Jewish Congress, Arab influence in Greece

continued to stand in the way of better understanding between Greece andIsrael. This was due to an effective propaganda campaign and the influence

of pro-Arab elements within the Greek Orthodox Church. According to this

report, the center of pro-Arab agitation was the Panhellenic Socialist Party

(PASOK), led by Papandreou, who regarded himself a champion of the

Palestinian cause. According to this report, Greek trade with the Arabs had

increased considerably. In 1974, the Greeks exported to Arab states goods

and services worth £42 million, and by the following year the figure had

doubled. In addition, the report noted that in the UN “Greece has been elo-quent in its expressions of affinity with the Arab world.”32

The Greek government’s effort to cultivate ties with the Arab states was

part of an overall attempt to obtain the support of Third World countries. By

summer 1978, Turkey’s attempt to obtain the nonaligned countries’ support

on the Cyprus issue had failed miserably.33 Encouraged by this state of

affairs, the Greek government was in no mood to antagonize those countries

by rapprochement with Israel.

Menachem Begin’s right-wing Likud coalition, which came to power in

1977 after nearly thirty years of Labor Party rule, had embarked on yet

another diplomatic initiative aimed at improving Israel’s ties with Greece

and Spain by involving them in economic agreements. In December 1980,

30. “U.S., Israel Discussing Arms Exports,” Jerusalem Post, 7 January 1977; “Israel, Greece Sign

Cultural Agreement,” Jerusalem Post, 17 May 1977.

31. “Egypt, Greece Call for Israel’s Withdrawal,” Jerusalem Post, 25 January 1978.

32. “New Members May Tilt EEC to Arabs,” Jerusalem Post, 24 January 1978.

33. Martin Woollacott, “Turkey Eyes the Third World Again,” Guardian, 18 August 1978.




Likud prime minister Yitzhak Shamir called on EC members to urge Greece

to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel.34 This initiative had a salu-

tary effect on bilateral relations with Greece. After a meeting between Israeli

Foreign Ministry director General David Kimche and Greek officials, bothsides decided to take steps to upgrade bilateral ties. However, Greek offi-

cials decided that bilateral relations would remain at the level of diplomatic

representatives and turned down the request to nominate a full ambassador

to Israel. This still implied less than full de jure recognition. The Greek offi-

cials did not indicate what steps they would take to upgrade the bilateral

relations, but they told their Israeli host that they would be more attentive to

Israel’s views and reassured him that Greek ties with the Arab states would

have no adverse effect on Israeli interests.Progress in strengthening bilateral relations was made possible not only

due to the efforts by Israeli officials but also thanks to the European Parlia-

ment, whose members urged the Greek government to recognize Israel.35

However, when the Arabs expressed concern about the growing closeness

between Israel and Greece, Foreign Minister Constantine Mitsotakis assured

their ambassadors that Greece would not establish full diplomatic relations

with Israel.

Bilateral Relations under PASOK

When PASOK came to power in 1981, Papandreou unleashed an extraordi-

nary vilification campaign against Israel and invited PLO leader Yasser

Arafat to discuss the possibility of upgrading his organization’s diplomatic

representation in Athens. The Israeli Foreign Ministry expressed strong dis-

appointment and asked the Greeks to reconsider that decision. Nevertheless,

Arafat arrived in Athens in December 1981, and Papandreou granted the

PLO diplomatic status at the same de facto level that Israel had.36

The pro-PLO stand adopted by PASOK intensified anti-Israel sentiments

34. “Shamir Meets Thorn in Luxembourg Today,” Jerusalem Post, 7 October 1980; “Shamir Urges

Full Ties with Greece,” Jerusalem Post, 12 December 1980.

35. “Israel and Greece Agree on Steps to Improve Ties,” Jerusalem Post, 12 January 1981; “Euro-

pean Parliament Urges Greece to Recognize Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 14 January 1981.

36. “Greece Not to Upgrade Ties with Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 29 March 1981; “Greek Invitation to

Arafat ‘Pains’ Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 25 October 1981; “Greece to Grant PLO Diplomatic Status,”

Jerusalem Post, 17 December 1981.




in Greece. And despite intense criticism, both in Israel and the United

States, PASOK expanded its ties with the Arab world. In his first policy

speech to parliament in November 1981, Papandreou said that PASOK’s

intention was to “broaden relations with the Arab nation, which constitutes adynamic factor in the world’s course.” Not only did he upgrade the PLO

information bureau to diplomatic status, but he also paid visits to several

Arab countries. Moreover, he insisted that American military bases could

not remain in Greece if they were used to attack friendly nations.

PASOK’s anti-Israel campaign reached its climax in summer 1982, when

Papandreou denounced Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, calling it a “crime

against humanity.”37 Moreover, he spoke of the need to impose sanctions on

Israel and branded it an “aggressor” and a “murderer.” The invasion causeda wave of protest and anti-Israel outbursts in Greece. Thousands of protes-

tors demonstrated at the Israeli diplomatic mission. Greek organizations and

trade unions expressed solidarity with the Palestinians and sent medical aid

to Beirut. Not only did the Greek government denounce Israel, it provided

four ships to evacuate Arafat and his men from Lebanon and demanded that

the Great Powers guarantee their protection.38

By the early 1980s, the Greek economy was in dire need of petrodollars.

In addition, the need to obtain Arab support over the Cyprus issue andGreek territorial rights in the Aegean Sea was as important as ever. When

PASOK intensified its criticism, Israel raised strong objections to Greek par-

ticipation in the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon.39 Angry at

Israel’s reaction, Papandreou repeated his denunciation of the Israeli inva-

sion at an EC Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels on 17 June 1983,

describing it as “Nazi” and “Fascist.”40 His harsh rhetoric stood in sharp

contrast to the mild reaction of previous Greek politicians, who despite their

disapproval of Israel’s policy had seldom used such harsh terms to describe

its actions.

37. “Agony in Athens,” Jerusalem Post, 16 July 1982; Benny Morris, “Angry at Israel,” Jerusalem

Post, 29 June 1982.

38. “Sources in Jerusalem: ‘No Guarantees for Arafat,’” Jerusalem Post, 11 December 1983.

39. “Petrodollars Fuel Greek Tilt toward the Arabs,” Jerusalem Post, 30 August 1982; “Greece Says

Israel Kept It Out of the MNF in Lebanon,” Jerusalem Post, 20 February 1983.

40. Howard M. Sacher, Israel and Europe: An Appraisal in History (New York: Knopf, 1999), 306.




This wave of anti-Israeli sentiments in Greek government circles cannot

be explained without taking into consideration the political dynamics inside

PASOK. Upon their rise to power, PASOK’s leaders came under the influ-

ence of a powerful faction within the party, which pressured it to pursue non-alignment in foreign policy. This was referred to as tritokosmiko, or “Third-

worldism,” and it became an article of faith during PASOK’s first term in

office. Warming up to the Arabs was an essential part of this trend. In addi-

tion, the Greek Communist Party pressured PASOK to sever Greece’s rela-

tions with Israel. Even the media was affected by this trend, and some news-

papers tended to be overtly anti-Israel. One report on the Greek press

claimed that the progovernment daily Ethnos was financed and operated in

cooperation with the Soviet KGB, accounting for its anti-Israel bias.41

Like previous regimes, PASOK competed with Turkey in its attempt to

find favor in the eyes of the Arab states, whose support on the Cyprus and

Aegean issues it deemed essential. In addition, PASOK’s leaders hoped that

Arab investments in Greece would increase substantially. This was the rea-

son why they sought to cultivate relations not only with the PLO but also

with radical states such as Libya and Algeria. This was also the reason why

Papandreou went to the extent of denouncing Israel’s invasion to Lebanon in

such harsh terms.Papandreou continued to denounce Israel on every possible occasion and

rejected the pressure exerted by the EC to normalize relations with it. When

approached by EC officials, who asked him to call on his government to

establish diplomatic relations with Israel, a Greek government official avoided

the topic by saying, “The only competent body that could make decisions on

foreign policy is the Greek government.”42 Nevertheless, PASOK was not as

anti-Israeli as its official pronouncements might suggest. Athens’s contacts

with the Arab world had increased considerably already when the ND was

in power, although it is true that this trend intensified when PASOK came to

power. Both Greek parties condemned Israel’s occupation of Arab land after

the Six Day War. However, when PASOK was faced with resolutions that con-

tained more than a general denunciation of Israel, it voted in favor of the

41. “Russia Suggests That Arabs Consider Using Oil Weapon,” Jerusalem Post, 18 July 1982; “KGB

Finances Largest Greek Daily,” Jerusalem Post, 23 June 1983.

42. “Greece Refuses EC Call for Relations with Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 22 May 1983.




resolutions but either abstained or voted against it in separate votes on con-

troversial clauses. When it came to resolutions regarding self-determination

and independence for the Palestinians, both parties voted in favor. The only

exception was their attitude toward the UN General Assembly’s resolution tocondemn the Camp David agreements between Israel and Egypt. The ND

abstained but PASOK voted in favor of the resolution. Nevertheless, PASOK’s

refusal to endorse the EC’s acceptance of the Camp David agreements was

not necessarily inconsistent with the policy pursued by the ND. What gave

observers the impression that PASOK’s policy was more anti-Israeli was its

tendency to loudly voice its disagreement with the EC’s view regarding the

Arab-Israeli conflict.43 And what strengthened that impression even further

was Papandreou’s friendly gestures toward Arafat and Libya’s leader Muam-mar Qaddafi. In fact, it was during PASOK’s incumbency (1981– 87) that

Greece and Israel began moving toward normalization. There were mutual

visits at the ministerial level, and a tourism agreement was concluded.

Even Papandreou, who seemed so hostile to Israel, was not as recalcitrant

as he was often portrayed by the media. In December 1983, he clearly

seemed willing to change his attitude toward Israel. He told Jewish leaders

from five European countries that “we intend to improve relations between

Greece and Israel.” He also said that his government supported “Israel’sright to exist within safe and recognized boundaries” and that the Palestini-

ans were entitled to a state of their own. Moreover, he reminded his listeners

that his government had taken all necessary measures to protect the Jews

during the Holocaust.44

In March 1984, Foreign Ministry officials in Jerusalem reported a chang-

ing attitude in Greece. PASOK began moving closer to Israel by signing

commercial and cultural agreements with it. Such a low-key policy was

meant to silence opposition from the pro-Palestinian elements within

PASOK, the Greek Communist Party, and the Arab states. This change in

policy was a consequence of soul searching within PASOK. As it turned out,

Greek courtship of the Arabs had not paid Athens handsome dividends.

43. Susannah Verney, “From the ‘Special Relationship’ to Europeanism: PASOK and the European

Community, 1981– 89,” in Greece, 1981–1989: The Populist Decade, ed. Richard Clogg (New York:

St. Martin’s, 1993), 142– 3.

44. “Papandreou Says He Wants to Improve Ties with Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 18 December 1983.




PASOK’s leaders witnessed how American Jewry did not rush to support the

Greek lobby’s attempts in Congress to curtail aid to Turkey after the 1974

Turkish intervention in Cyprus. In addition, the EC had consistently called

on Greece to normalize relations with Israel. These were the imperatives thatmade it necessary for Athens to mend fences with Israel. However, at the

same time, Greek officials were apprehensive that full rapprochement with

Israel would alienate the Arabs. A government spokesman said: “We do

want to improve our relations with Israel . . . but that doesn’t mean we will

accept Israel’s policy or change ours. . . . [W]hile Israel follows its present

policy, it would be difficult for any Greek administration, conservative or

Socialist, to openly improve ties.”45 PASOK insisted that de jure recognition

could not come before Israel recognized the Palestinians’ right to self-determination.

In his meeting with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in March 1984,

President Karamanlis stated that the Palestinian issue was the core of the

Arab-Israeli conflict and that the PLO was the sole representative of the

Palestinian people. At the same time, PASOK continued to cultivate better

relations with Israel without fanfare. The dedication of the Hellenic House

at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in March 1984 gave the Israelis a

strong signal that Athens was willing to reassess its policy.46 Asked to com-ment on the nature of bilateral relations, Athens newspaper editor Heleni

Vlachou said that they were never bad. She explained Papandreou’s motives

and his disappointment with the Arabs by saying, “Papandreou is just doing

acrobatics—trying to court the Left and the Arab world. . . . The govern-

ment thought the Arabs would be useful for something, but they haven’t

come through.”47

In April 1984, Nikos Katopodis, director general for political affairs in the

Greek Foreign Ministry, arrived in Israel for talks about the state of bilateral

relations. When asked to comment about upgrading them he said, “There

has been no change to justify any upgrading of the relations between the two

countries. If the situation in the area should change and there was an

45. “Greece to Mend Its Ties with Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 14 March 1984.

46. “Karamanlis: PLO Is Sole Representative,” Jerusalem Post, 14 March 1984; “Opening of Hellenic

House Hints at Thaw in Greek Stand,” Jerusalem Post, 15 March 1984.

47. “The Greek Connection,” Jerusalem Post, 25 March 1984.




improvement in the relations between Israel and the Arab countries, then of

course my government could decide otherwise.”48

What made it so difficult for PASOK to upgrade diplomatic ties at that

juncture was the fact that this issue became a topic of major controversyamong Greek political parties. Mitsotakis, the newly elected leader of the

conservative opposition ND, used the Israeli card in order to promote his

party’s cause. He challenged PASOK by saying that if elected he would

extend full diplomatic recognition to Israel. But even he had to proceed with

caution, saying that this did not mean that Greece would neglect its Arab

friends.49

Aware of the recent Greek tendency to move closer to Israel, Arab diplo-

mats who met PASOK’s leaders expressed their disappointment. Papandreoutried to allay their fears by announcing that at the next European summit in

Dublin he would support the position of both Syria and Jordan. Naturally,

the response from the Israeli Foreign Ministry was that Greek policy was

biased.

The Israelis continued to regard Papandreou as pro-Palestinian, and

many blamed him for encouraging Palestinian terrorism. One journalist

remarked, “Under Papandreou’s rule, Arab terrorism has gained its prime

foothold in Europe.”50 The Greek response to the Israeli attack on the PLOheadquarters in Tunis on 1 October 1985 seemed to confirm that view.

PASOK condemned the attack as “an act of state terrorism which is a

hideous form of war.”51 Yet at the same time, bilateral contacts continued in

many areas.

By the end of May 1986, the Greek tourism minister announced that

Papandreou was interested in meeting Prime Minister Peres. Shortly after-

ward, a Greek official spoke at a press conference in response to a report that

appeared in the daily Akropolis, which stated that Athens was rehabilitating

its relations with Israel and that Peres was due to visit Athens soon. But fear

48. “Greek Official Here,” Jerusalem Post, April 1984.

49. “Lee Stockes, Greek Opposition Leader, Says He’d Recognize Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 23 Sep-

tember 1984.

50. “Haven for Terror,” Jerusalem Post, 27 June 1984.

51. “Widespread Condemnation: Gulf States Blast U.S. for Involvement in Raid,” Jerusalem Post,

3 October 1985.




of Arab reaction continued to prevail, and the government’s spokesman was

instructed to deny the veracity of this report.

Nevertheless, PASOK’s tendency to become friendlier toward Israel

became obvious to Greeks, Israelis, and Arabs. Officials in Athens becameincreasingly disillusioned by the less than enthusiastic support that the

Arab states gave Greece on the Cyprus issue. Moreover, Islamic fundamen-

talism threatened the security of Greek residents in Muslim states. This was

an opportune time for the Israelis to benefit from the coolness in Greek-Arab

relations, which had been manifesting itself since the mid-1980s. However,

accustomed to so many years of pro-Arab pronouncements, PASOK found it

difficult to embark on such a radical volte-face in foreign policy.

Toward Meaningful Rapprochement

Realizing that trying to deal with PASOK officials might not yield positive

results, Israel’s representative Moshe Gilboa arrived in Greece in 1986 and

began approaching ND leaders. In the summer of that year, Gilboa orga-

nized a celebration in honor of Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben

Gurion. He persuaded former president Constantine Tsatsos and Athens’s

mayor Miltiadis Evert, both of whom were pro-Israel and sympathetic to theJewish cause, to serve on the centennial committee. Among the leading

guests were Mitsotakis and the archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church.

This event helped clear the atmosphere for better relations. However, Gilboa

realized that in order to obtain more substantial results he had to contact

PASOK’s leaders, as well, and he began approaching them in earnest in the

coming months.

In response to critics who argued that Greece had constantly pursued a

pro-Arab policy with disregard to Israeli interests, some observers argued

that Greek policy was vindicated by recent developments in the region. They

argued that Athens’s support for Arafat and the attempt to promote Syria’s

role in the Lebanese crisis were steps which Western countries had later

adopted themselves. Moreover, they insisted that Greek-Israeli relations did

not suffer as a result of Athens’s pro-Arab tendencies. Witnessing the twists

and turns of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, one cannot escape the conclu-

sion that the arguments presented by the critics had some validity.




Despite the harsh pronouncements uttered by Papandreou, Greece’s vot-

ing record in the UN under PASOK does not show that its policy toward

Israel was much more hostile than previous governments. In the long run,

PASOK could not resist pressure by the ND to adopt a friendlier attitudetoward Israel. After Spain’s formal recognition of Israel in January 1986,

Greece was the only country in the EC without full diplomatic relations with

the Jewish state. The absence of full diplomatic relations with Israel exposed

the Greek government to criticism not only from Israeli officials but also

from the leaders of the powerful Jewish community and congressmen in

Washington. The Reagan administration’s disapproval of PASOK’s practice

of “Thirdworldism” and its friendly overtures to Qaddafi and Arafat was a

factor that Papandreou could no longer afford to ignore. He was forced toadjust his policy without antagonizing his Arab allies. There was little won-

der, therefore, that while he expressed his government’s decision to consider

full diplomatic relations with Israel, he made it clear that he would continue

to adhere to the principle of self-determination for the Palestinian people in

the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.52

Future events were to show how sensitive Papandreou’s regime was to its

image in the United States. When New York City mayor Edward Koch com-

mented in 1986 that Papandreou’s government was anti-Jewish, his remarkstriggered a critical response from Greek officials who were concerned about

the future of American-Greek relations.53 Mayor Koch had criticized not

only the anti-Jewish attitude of Papandreou’s regime but its authoritarian

nature as well.54 Irritated by such comments, PASOK began seriously

thinking about measures designed to improve its reputation in Washington’s

eyes.

On 23 February 1987, Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias stated that

Greece was seriously contemplating de jure recognition of Israel. He

expressed his government’s desire to cooperate in a joint Greek-EC initiative

52. “Shulamit Aloni Due in Athens: Israel Encouraged by Greek Statement,” Jerusalem Post, 20 July

1986; Christos P. Ioannides, “Greece, Turkey, the United States, and the Politics of Middle Eastern

Terrorism,” in Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK, 1974–86, ed. Speros

Vryonis Jr. (New York: A. Caratzas, 1991), 148.

53. Robert J. Pranger, “U.S.-Greek Relations under PASOK,” in Greece under Socialism, 275.

54. Peter Schwab, ed., Greece under the Junta (New York: Facts on File, 1973), 103.




aimed at resolving the Middle East conflict.55 Therefore, Gilboa had little

difficulty persuading Papoulias to visit Israel in November 1987. In addi-

tion, Gilboa managed to establish connections with top Greek businessmen,

who agreed to establish the Greek-Israeli Chamber of Commerce. LeadingGreeks from Pantion University arrived in Israel for the occasion.

When Greece became a full member of the EC on 1 January 1987, Israel

feared the economic consequence. It asked to keep its tariff walls against

Greek agricultural products or to be compensated in some way by the EC.

Nevertheless, bilateral contacts continued. Mitsotakis and some ND mem-

bers visited Israel in May 1988. He promised that if elected he would estab-

lish diplomatic relations with Israel.

More tension was to follow before the Greek government agreed to upgradethe bilateral relations. In February 1989, the Israeli minister of agriculture

decided to protest against the pro-Palestinian stand of the Greek govern-

ment by suspending his ministry’s ties with it. At that time, a national unity

government (NUG) was in power in Israel. In an effort to defuse the tension,

the Israeli ambassador in Athens apologized to the Greek government for the

rash decision but could not promise that his government would be willing to

reverse it due to the dissension within the NUG.56 Nevertheless, the bilateral

relations continued to improve thanks to Gilboa’s efforts. Mitsotakis came topower in spring 1990, after his party narrowly won the elections. He soon

raised the issue of recognizing Israel de jure and obtained the parliament’s

approval on 21 May. Gilboa became Israel’s first ambassador to Greece. Yet

despite the rapprochement between the two countries, Greek views about

the Arab-Israeli conflict changed little. Ever since its entry to the EC,

Greece had been active in pressuring its members to address the issue of

Palestinian rights. Greek perception of the Palestine issue continued to be

highly influenced by the similarities between the occupation of Cyprus and

the occupation of Palestine.57

55. For more on Greece’s support of cooperation with the EC, see Dimitri C. Constas, “Greek Foreign

Policy Objectives: 1974–1986,” in Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK,

1974–86, ed. Speros Vryonis (New York: A. Caratzas, 1991), 51–2.

56. Aaron S. Klieman, Israel and the World after Forty Years (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s,

1990), 125.

57. Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Pales-

tinian Cause (New York: St. Martin’s, 1986), 95, 99.




The Greek government continued to be concerned about its image in the

United States. This explains its willingness to support the coalition against

Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. Greece helped Israel indirectly by sending a

frigate to join the blockade against Iraq, despite opposition from socialistsand communists who were concerned that Greek aid would end up helping

Turkey.58 In July 1993, Israeli deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin was the

first official visitor to Greece since the two countries established diplomatic

relations in 1990. Accompanying Beilin were senior officials from the min-

istries of agriculture, tourism, energy, and infrastructure. Even more impor-

tant visits were to follow. In December 1994, Defense Minister Yitzhak

Rabin of Israel and Defense Minister Gerasimos D. Arsenis of Greece, who

was on a visit to Israel, signed a defense cooperation agreement, whichincluded exchange of information, mutual visits, and a general framework

for arms procurement.59 The agreement was followed by mutual visits of

defense personnel. Both countries had an interest in the deployment of

Russian-made S-300 missiles on Cyprus and therefore agreed to exchange

relevant information.

Responding to Rabin’s assassination on 4 November 1995, the Greek gov-

ernment expressed its condolences to Israel. During the following years,

Greece began seeking Israeli cooperation in areas relating to defense andarms procurement, and in January 1997 Israel agreed to refurbish forty

American-built F-4 Phantons owned by Greece. Greece agreed to Israel’s

request to supply it with natural gas.60 In February 1997, the Greeks and

the Israelis agreed to broaden their cultural ties significantly, especially in

the realm of arts and exhibitions. This agreement came after a visit by Edu-

cation Minister Zevulun Hammer to Greece.

The last stumbling block that stood in the way to normalization was

58. Trevor C. Salman, “Europeans, the EC, and the Gulf,” in Iraq, the Gulf Conflict, and the World

Community, ed. James Gow (London: Brassey’s, 1993), 96.

59. Jerusalem Qol Yisrael Radio Broadcast in Hebrew, 22 July 1993, in Foreign Broadcast Informa-

tion Service, Daily Report: Near East, 22 July 1993; “Israel, Greece Sign Defense Cooperation Pact,”

Jerusalem Post, 17 December 1994, international edition.

60. “Malaysia, Indonesia, and Greece Denounced the Assassination and Expressed Hope That the

Peace Process Continues,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 7 November 1995; “IAF Seeks Greek F-4 Contract,”

Jerusalem Post, 10 January 1997; David Harris, “Five Nations Vie to Supply Israel Natural Gas,”

Jerusalem Post, 14 January 1998.




Israel’s defense pact with Turkey. Reacting to the pact, Foreign Minister

Pangalos said, “We don’t want this military cooperation between them to

cast a shadow on the relations among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. And we

are not interested in Ankara using its military cooperation with Israel to cre-ate this sort of impression.”61

Reacting to the defense pact between Greece and Egypt, which was

designed to counter the Israeli-Turkish defense pact, Israel suggested that

Greece participate in joint naval exercises with the Israeli navy. Greek offi-

cials responded favorably but hesitated. Alternate Foreign Minister George

Papandreou said to the Jerusalem Post, “It is true that the exercises were

delayed because of Arab opposition. . . . But we hope to have the exercises.”

Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Yannos Kranidiotis explained why theGreek government was hesitant to participate in joint exercises with Israel,

saying, “We are very careful because we don’t want to play the game of

being one-sided in the area.” An Israeli diplomatic source explained that

Greece was interested in increased defense ties with Israel but said that

the government was being hampered by “entrenched elements in Greece’s

military and diplomatic bureaucracy.” According to Greek officials, Athens

was interested in Israeli involvement in its procurement program, but Israel

has shied away from this out of concern that the Turks might be upset.Kranidiotis admitted, however, that the cooperation between his country and

Israel was increasing. This cooperation included the exchange of intelli-

gence information. He said that Greece was interested in Israeli weapons

but that the price was high.62

The Israelis were pleased that after fifty-two years the Greek government

approved the establishment of a monument to the fifty thousand Jews of

Salonika who had died during the German occupation of 1941–45.63 While

continuing military cooperation with Israel, Greece found it prudent not only

to continue courting the Arab states but also to appear interested in the fate

of the Palestinian people. Therefore, by the end of 1997, it agreed to host a

meeting between Israelis and Palestinians.

61. “News in Brief,” Jerusalem Post, 4 February 1997; see also Arieh O’Sullivan, “Turkish Navy

Ships to Visit Haifa for First Time,” Jerusalem Post, 23 May 1997.

62. Steve Rodan, “Greece: Arab Pressure Has Delayed Exercise with Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 26 Sep-

tember 1997.

63. Patrick Quinn, “Greek Jews Finally Get Memorial,” Jerusalem Post, 23 November 1997.




The Israelis were enthusiastic about military cooperation with Greece,

but they had to be careful not to antagonize the Turkish government. When

the Greek Defense Ministry extended an invitation to Israel’s defense minis-

ter Yitzhak Mordechai to visit Greece, sources in the Defense Ministrystated that the situation required extreme caution due to the traditional

friendship that Greece maintained with the Arab states and so that the visit

would not impact the next Israel-Turkey pact. The Greeks did not conceal

their concern about the Israeli-Turkish rapprochement. Therefore, when

Mordechai was planning his visit to Greece, officials in the Defense Ministry

tried to find a Jewish event that could provide a good excuse for the visit.

Mordechai chose to visit Greece during the Hanukah holiday, which com-

memorates the Jewish victory over the ancient Greeks.64

Greek-Israeli relations underwent another period of tension in the late

1990s, when the Greek Cypriots expressed concern over reports that Israel

was spying in Cyprus on Turkey’s behalf. According to Mordechai, the

Greeks became suddenly interested in implementing the strategic alliance

signed by Rabin in 1994.65 The commander of the Greek air force, Lieu-

tenant General Giorgos Antonezis, visited Israel in December 1998 in an

effort to conclude an agreement regarding strategic cooperation.

Israel’s defense ties with Turkey left the Greeks suspicious.66 In his meet-ing with journalists in Cairo, Pangalos said, “This is an alliance of wrong-

doers that brings us to the Cold War situation.”67 Israel issued a formal

protest against Pangalos’s remarks, saying that its cooperation with Turkey

was not directed against any third party and that such comments were not

constructive.68 However, anxious not to harm bilateral relations with Greece,

64. “Smashing Plates for Peace,” Jerusalem Post, 26 December 1997; “Mordechai Is Searching for aConvenient Timing for a Trip to Greece in Order Not to Anger Turkey,” Haaretz, 16 September 1998;

“Greek Air Force Chief to Fly Israeli Fighter Jet,” Jerusalem Post, 2 December 1998; Arieh O’Sulli-

van, “Mordechai to Visit Greece Next Month,” Jerusalem Post, 27 November 1998; “Greece to Invite

Mordechai to Visit,” Jerusalem Post, 15 September 1998.

65. Arieh O’Sullivan, “Somebody in Cyprus Wants to Make It Difficult for Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 9

November 1998.

66. Andrew Borowiec, “Greece Nurtures Ties with Israel,” Washington Post, 7 December 1998;

Thomas O’Dwyer, “Dangerous Liaisons,” Jerusalem Post, 19 February 1999.

67. “News in Brief,” Jerusalem Post, 24 February 1998.

68. Jay Bushinski, “Israel Protests Greek Assault on Jlem-Ankara Links,” Jerusalem Post, 26 Febru-

ary 1998.




the Israelis reassured the Greeks that their defense ties with Turkey would

not be detrimental to Greek interests. An Israeli delegation led by the alter-

nate secretary-general for Western European affairs, Colette Avital, arrived

in Athens at the end of March 1998 and met with Deputy Foreign MinisterKranidiotis. And when Turkey’s prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz, visited Israel

in late summer 1998, Mordechai denied reports that Turkey was seeking

Israeli support in case of a conflict with Greece over the stationing of mis-

siles in Cyprus.69

By 2000 there was little doubt that Greece was interested in close ties

with Israel, despite its disapproval of the Turkish-Israeli defense pact. The

Greek government became increasingly interested in playing a mediating

role in the Middle East process. Encouraged by the fact that Israel’s primeminister Ehud Barak had demonstrated willingness to move the peace

process forward, the Greek government felt that rapprochement with Israel

was less risky than it had ever been. Moreover, the fact that Israel has

become Greece’s primary market provided further incentive to the bilateral

rapprochement.70

Summary

This essay has surveyed the course of Greek-Israeli relations from the estab-

lishment of the state of Israel in 1948 until 1990, when the Greek govern-

ment decided to establish full diplomatic relations with the Jewish state, and

has considered briefly more recent developments. The main reason for the

Greek government’s reluctance to elevate the status of its diplomatic rela-

tions with Israel was the need to obtain Arab support in the Greek-Turkish

conflict over Cyprus. Other factors, such as Greece’s concern for its nationals

in Arab countries, its dependence on Arab oil, and its ability to have unre-

stricted passage through the Suez Canal were also factors that constrained

its Middle Eastern policy. Just as important, however, was the rarely men-

tioned impact of domestic groups and political parties in Greece, whose view

of the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be ignored.

69. “Israel Reassures Cyprus, Greece over Turkey Ties,” Reuters, 7 September 1998.

70. The annual value of Greek exports to Israel was estimated at $140 million in 1999. Ralph Nurn-

berger, “Greeks Bearing Gifts: New Middle East Initiatives,” Washington Times, 8 November 1999.




The essay has also dealt with the attitudes of the different parties that

dominated Greek politics throughout that period and has challenged the

commonly held view that the Greek government’s attitude had changed dras-

tically whenever a new party came to power. Rather, the rapprochementbetween Greece and the Arab states occurred while the ND was in power

and, despite its rabid anti-Israeli pronouncements, PASOK followed a mod-

erate trend that had long been in existence. It was the loud tone of PASOK’s

reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict that led many observers to conclude

that its pronouncements were rabidly anti-Israel.

In addition, the essay has explored the reasons that made it imperative for

Greece to upgrade its relations with Israel. Among these were the onset of

the peace process; the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left the UnitedStates as the only global power; and Greek disillusionment with the Arabs.

These constraints had little to do with the political platforms of any particu-

lar ruling party. It is difficult to predict the future of the bilateral relations.

However, given the fact that the major constraints on Greek Middle East pol-

icy have been removed, it is likely that bilateral ties will remain cordial in

the foreseeable future.

Documents

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