CRITICAL STUDYMEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS:

AERTSENS CHARACTERIZATION OF MEDIEVALTHOUGHT AND THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS

Aertsens recent book on the transcendentals in the thought ofThomas Aquinas and his immediate predecessors is a splendid pieceof research that should prove useful for years to come to those inter-ested in the history of medieval philosophy1. The significance of thebook derives mainly from three factors: its exploration of a centraltopic in medieval philosophy which, unfortunately, has been largelyneglected; its extraordinary erudition; and the detailed and enlight-ening analyses found throughout the book. Aertsen discusses everyrelevant text and has taken into account most of the significant sec-ondary sources. The breadth and depth of the book make it requiredreading of all those interested in the thought of the Middle Ages.

The centerpiece of the study is the discussion of the transcenden-tals in Thomas thought, but Aertsen has also provided us with thefirst overall discussion of the history of the transcendentals in theearly thirteenth century. In Chapter One, where Aertsen takes upthat history, he discusses Philip the Chancellor, the Summa theologiaeattributed to Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Greats early works.The discussion of Thomas views begins with a general analysis inChapter Two. Chapter Three takes up the relation of Thomas con-ception of metaphysics and the transcendentals, and the next fivechapters are devoted to particular transcendentals: being, one, true,good, and beauty (sic). The last chapter before the chapter whichsummarizes the conclusions of the work is devoted to the relation ofthe transcendentals to God. The book, moreover, is preceded by anIntroduction in which Aertsen proposes a new and provocative inter-

1. Jan A. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of ThomasAquinas (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 52), Leiden-New York-Kln 1996.

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pretation of medieval thought. The bibliography is thorough, andthe indexes are helpful.

Significant and novel theses are found in practically every chapter.Indeed, even to list these, let alone to remark on their relative value,would take up substantially more space than I have at my disposal,and so will have to be left for others to consider. Here I would like toturn my attention to two of the theses Aertsen defends which are atthe core of the book and which, in my opinion, are both controversialand provocative. They go against a long-established, interpretative tra-dition and touch the heart of medieval and Thomistic thought. Thesetheses are closely connected, but they are presented in two differentchapters. The first is formulated in the Introduction and concerns thecharacter of all medieval thought; it serves as the capstone for all sub-sequent discussion. The second, made explicit in Chapter Three, isconcerned with Thomas conception of metaphysics.

The more general of the two theses is presented at the very begin-ning and repeated at the closing of the book. In the Introduction,Aertsen tells us: We want to show that philosophy in the MiddleAges expresses itself as a way of thought which can be called tran-scendental (p. 1). And in the concluding chapter, he adds:medieval philosophy can be understood as a transcendental way ofthought (p. 419). He echoes this view throughout the book, some-times enlarging upon it, as when he says that the doctrine of thetranscendentals is the core of medieval metaphysics (p. 21). Thepoint is clear: the proper way to characterize medieval philosophy asa whole, and medieval metaphysics in particular, is as transcendental.By this Aertsen means not only that medieval philosophy is primar-ily concerned with the transcendentals, but that it also uses anapproach which can be characterized as transcendental.

I should add at this point that this claim has some antecedents.One of the first scholars to note the importance of the transcen-dentals in medieval philosophy was Allan Wolter in his pioneeringstudy of this subject in Duns Scotus2. And Ludger Honnefelder haswritten a series of studies in which he argues that the conception ofmetaphysics as the study of the transcendentals initiated in the Mid-

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2. Allan B. WOLTER, The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics ofDuns Scotus, St. Bonaventure, New York 1946, p. 184.

dle Ages constitutes both a major shift in the conception of the dis-cipline and one that had lasting and substantial impact in early mod-ern philosophy3. Still, Aertsens claim is more encompassing thaneither of these antecedents, since it applies to medieval philosophy asa whole.

The more specific of the two theses concerns Thomas in particu-lar, but goes hand in hand with the overall thesis concerningmedieval philosophy. According to Aertsen, Thomas does not adoptthe theological conception of metaphysics [common before him].His understanding of first philosophy is transcendental (p. 127);indeed, for him the very understanding of metaphysics has itselfbecome transcendental (p. 155). And shortly after, Aertsen adds:The first and most fundamental aspect [of Thomas thought] is hisview of the subject of metaphysics [because it involves] a shiftfrom the theological conception of metaphysics, based on transmate-riality, to an ontological conception, based on commonness. Thesubject of first philosophy is not the first being, that is transcendent,but being in general and that which is consequent upon being [sothat with Thomas] [t]he conception of metaphysics itself becametranscendental (p. 157).

In short, Aertsen claims that Thomas conception of metaphysics,in line with the thesis he maintains concerning medieval philosophyin general and medieval metaphysics in particular, is transcendental,and it is so primarily because the subject of the discipline is identi-fied with the transcendentals, namely, being qua being and its attrib-utes. Moreover, elsewhere he also applies his general claim about atranscendental approach in medieval philosophy to Thomistic meta-physics (p. 157).

As with the more general thesis, there are also antecedents of Aert-sens claim concerning the metaphysics of Thomas. Cornelio Fabro

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3. Ludger HONNEFELDER, Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen,Anstze und Folgen der Wiederbegrndung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert, in:J.P. BECKMANN et al. (edd.), Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradig-men, Hamburg 1987, pp. 165-186; ID., Ens in quantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden alssolchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, Mnster1979 et 21989; ID., Metaphysik und Transzendenz. berlegungen zu Johannes DunsScotus im Blick auf Thomas von Aquin und Anselm von Canterbury, in: L. HONNE-FELDER et W. SCHBLER (edd.), Transzendenz. Zu einem Grundwort der klassischen meta-physik, Paderborn 1992, pp. 137-161.

had already claimed in the sixties that the transcendentals are theproper focus of Thomas metaphysics4. But again, Aertsen goes wellbeyond this antecedent because he claims that metaphysics itself hasbecome transcendental and that it has become so in Thomas notonly because of what it studies but also because of the way it does it.

The argument on which the less general thesis is in part defendedis based on the subject of metaphysics. It could be formulated likethis:

1. Metaphysics is a science.2. The aim of every science is to study its subject and the properties of that

subject.3. The subject of metaphysics is being qua being.4. Being qua being and the properties of being qua being are the same as the

transcendentals.5. Therefore, the aim of metaphysics is to study the transcendentals.

The argument used to support the conception of medieval meta-physics as the study of the transcendentals is similar to this, but theargument used to support the claim that all medieval philosophyinvolves a transcendental way of thought is of a different sort. Forthis thesis maintains that not just in subject, but in approach as well,medieval philosophy involves a kind of transcendentalism. I have notenough space to examine in detail this second claim made by Aertsenor the arguments he uses to support it, but I will say a few wordsabout the particular claim concerning the subject of metaphysics inThomas and the general claim that medieval philosophy is primarilyconcerned with the transcendentals.

First concerning Thomas: Historians of philosophy should main-tain a clear distinction between what the authors they study hold andthe implications of what those authors hold, for surely authors areaware of what they hold but they are not always aware of the impli-cations of what they hold. Indeed, it is a matter of common experi-ence that we are frequently, and sometimes painfully, made aware ofthe implications of our views. The failure to keep this distinction inmind has unfortunate consequences for historical interpretation,resulting in the attribution of views to authors who did not, and

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4. Cornelio FABRO, The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of Metaphy-sics, in: International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1966), p. 392.

sometimes could not, have held such views5. Now, it seems to methat Aertsens claims about Thomas conception of metaphysics failto take into account this distinction and, therefore, lead to unneces-sary confusion concerning his views. In saying that Thomas under-standing of metaphysics is transcendental, does Aertsen mean thatThomas was aware that it was so, or is he merely claiming that, givenwhat Thomas says about metaphysics, his conception of the disci-pline implies it is transcendental, regardless of what he consciouslythought about it? More specifically: Did Thomas claim, and was heaware of the fact, that metaphysics is the study of the transcenden-tals, or is this conception of metaphysics an implication of his views,but one of which he was not aware?

There is no clear evidence of the first, for nowhere does Thomasexplicitly say that for him the subject of metaphysics is the tran-scendentals. Indeed, Aertsen does not quote a single text of Thomasto that effect. Thomas does say explicitly that the subject of meta-physics is ens commune and ens in quantum ens (Expositio super librumBoethii De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6 and 7), and he also says that,because of this, metaphysics also considers the attributes of being (InMetaphysicam, Promium). But he does not say that the subject ofmetaphysics is being qua being and its attributes. This is differentfrom what Aertsen claims in two important senses: First, the subjectof metaphysics is not being qua being and its attributes, but ratheronly being qua being. The attributes of being are not part of the sub-ject of metaphysics; they are studied only because metaphysics stud-ies being. This is important because it suggests that the concern ofThomas was not with the transcendentals as such, but with being.Second, what Thomas says is different from what Aertsen claimsbecause it does not suggest that metaphysics deals with what is tran-scendental qua transcendental, but with being qua being. Of course,being qua being is being-in-general, that is common being, and inthis sense it is transcendental. But to say this is not to say that it isthe commonality, i.e., the transcendentality, that is the pertinent fac-tor here. Indeed, if that had been the case, Thomas could have hardlyavoided saying what Aertsen claims he holds, namely, that the subject

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5. For more on this, see my Philosophy and Its History: Issues in Philosophical Histo-riography, Albany, New York 1992, pp. 295-304.

of metaphysics is being qua being and its attributes. Thomas doesnot say this. His concern is not with transcendentality as such, butwith one of the transcendentals.

It is quite significant that Thomas never says that the subject ofmetaphysics is the transcendentals. Indeed, if as Aertsen claims, heheld such a view, why did he fail to say so? And indeed, if such aview is an implication of Thomas view of metaphysics, why didThomas fail to draw out the implication? Certainly there is plenty ofevidence that he strived to draw out the important implications ofhis views, in particular when those implications were in conflict oragreed with well-established and authoritative views. In the case ofmetaphysics the maximum authority was Aristotle, but Aristotlenever unambiguously stated that metaphysics is concerned exclu-sively, or even primarily, with the transcendentals, although he doessay that there is a science which investigates being qua being andthe attributes which belong to it in virtue of its own nature andthat the philosopher investigates the truth about the propertiespeculiar to being qua being (Metaphysics IV, 1 and 2; 1003b17 and1004b15).

From this one or more of the following can be inferred: (1)Thomas was not aware of the conception of metaphysics as the studyof the transcendentals; (2) he was aware of it but did not hold sucha view; (3) he was aware of it but did not believe that it was an impli-cation of his views. (2) and (3) do not seem appropriate, for it wouldmake no sense to say that he was aware of it but did not think it wasimportant enough to be mentioned.

In short, from all that has been said it follows that Aertsens judg-ment is questionable if he intends it to mean that Thomas was awarethat metaphysics is properly the study of the transcendentals. More-over, it also becomes questionable if it means only that Thomas con-ception of metaphysics does in fact imply, regardless of what he mayhave consciously thought, that it is the study of the transcendentals.Note that I am not trying to prove that Aertsen is wrong in his judg-ment in this matter, but only that there are legitimate questions thatmust be answered before one can agree with it and which he has notanswered in his book.

Second, I turn to the more general thesis concerning the characterof medieval philosophy. First of all, one could raise a question con-

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cerning whether in fact it is accurate to say that medieval philosophyis transcendental because it is concerned primarily with the transcen-dentals. Let us suppose this claim is taken to refer to medieval phi-losophy understood in the general sense, used during the MiddleAges, of the cumulative aggregate of all other disciplines. Then, theclaim would be clearly false, for how are we to fit such disciplines ascanon law, grammar, rhetoric, medicine, and alchemy within a tran-scendental conception? A more modest claim might have more suc-cess. For example, if one were to claim that it is only medieval phi-losophy understood as a more restricted enterprise that is to beconsidered as the study of the transcendentals. But under closerscrutiny this claim does not fare better, for much medieval philoso-phy has little to do with being qua being and its attributes. Considerwhat we call today the philosophy of language and logic. Of course,one could argue that these are not parts of philosophy properlyspeaking and in fact that the medievals did not think they were and therefore they cannot serve as counter examples to the thesiswe are examining. Well, perhaps not, but if they are not part of phi-losophy, where are they to be fitted? And, even if they are excluded,what would we make of the philosophy of mind, for example? For,indeed, the mind was a most important subject of study by philoso-phers and theologians in the Middle Ages.

Here again, I find myself thinking that Aertsen, in his enthusiasmfor the neglected medieval doctrine of the transcendentals, has him-self forgotten important historiographical principles. Because he seesthe transcendentals operating throughout medieval philosophy, heconcludes that the transcendentals must be central to it. But this isfar from being the case. A notion can be functionally operative in aphilosophy and yet be of merely marginal importance in the overallconceptual perspective of the author. For a notion to be central it isrequired that it become a subject of discussion not subordinated tothe discussion of other philosophical notions. Textually, this entailsthat we should find separate treatises, books, articles, and mono-graphs devoted to it. At this point the notion begins to play a keyrole in the development of other notions6. Centrality is a stage of

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6. See my Philosophy and Its History (supra, n. 5), pp. 301-302.

development with respect to a philosophical idea that goes evenbeyond that of textual independence, where a clearly delineated partof a text is devoted to it. But where are the summae ontologiae, sum-mae metaphysicae, or summae transcendentiae, in the Middle Ages?The transcendentals, considered as such, do not become central inphilosophy until the silver age of scholasticism, with authors likeSurez.

A still less radical and more promising way of interpreting Aert-sens claim would be to restrict it to metaphysics. But even here ques-tions can be raised. For one thing, apart from a rather unclear text ofAlbert the Great7, there is no evidence that anyone before Duns Sco-tus explicitly claimed that metaphysics concerns the transcendentals.And this is not all. More important, perhaps, is that the center of allphilosophical, theological, and metaphysical speculation in themedieval period, from the beginning to the end of the age, is with-out a doubt, God. And it is not always God considered as Being, forthere were medieval thinkers who did not think of God primarily inthat way. The queen of the medieval sciences is not ontology but the-ology. True, God transcends the world, and in that sense one can saythat metaphysics is a transcendental enterprise. But that is not whatAertsen claims. His claim is that metaphysics becomes transcenden-tal because it is about the transcendentals, namely, being qua beingand its attributes, rather than about God or immaterial being. God isa being, or perhaps the being, or even the model of all beings, or thesource and/or cause of all being, but certainly not being qua being,whether strictly or even analogically speaking. Indeed, perhaps thegreatest controversy of the times concerning metaphysics was pre-cisely whether God was properly studied in the discipline. It is God,then, that is at the center. Of course, this does not mean that a newconception of metaphysics as the study of the transcendentals doesnot begin to take shape in the thirteenth century. But to go fromthis, as Aertsen does, to the claim that the proper characterization ofmedieval philosophy, or even medieval metaphysics, is as the study ofthe transcendentals is to go beyond what the historical evidence, eventhat offered by Aertsen himself, supports.

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7. ALBERT THE GREAT, Metaphysica 1, 1, 2, Opera omnia 16 (ed. B. GEYER), Mn-ster 1960, p. 4.

Let me finish by emphasizing, again, the value of Aertsens contri-bution to the understanding of the history of the medieval doctrineof the transcendentals and the role it played in Thomas thought.Aertsens book is a model of erudition and subtlety. The questions Ihave raised concerning his characterization of medieval philosophyand Thomas metaphysics should not obscure this fact8.

State University of New York Jorge J.E. GRACIABuffalo

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8. I would like to thank Robert Delfino for several useful suggestions.