Ching and Po Wing vs. Rodriguez DigestG.R. No. 192828

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, v. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.

REYES, J.:FACTS:

The respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and Stroghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon).

The Complaint was captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction." In the complaint, the respondents alleged that (1) they are the heirs of Antonio Ching and that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonios son when he was, in fact, adopted and his birth certificated merely simulated; (2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime suspect and prior to the conclusion of the investigations, Ramon made an inventory of the formers estate and illegally transferred to his name the titles to Antonios properties; (3) Ramon sweet-talked respondent Mercedes into surrendering to him aCertificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio and the TCTs of two condo units registered under Ramons name; (4) Ramon illegally transferred to his own name through a forged document 40,000 shares in Po Wing Corporation; (5)Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents; and (6) Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price.

The respondents thus prayed for the (1) issuance of a TRO to restrain Ramon or his representatives from disposing or selling any property that belongs to the estate of Antonio; (2) that Ramon be declared as disqualified from inheriting from Antonio Ching; and (3) declaring null the unauthorized transfers made by Ramon.

The RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss with regard to the issues which could only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action

HELD:

No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss was proper.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, the case filed does not partake of the nature of a specialproceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of the civil case could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. The civil case was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, iftheir intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

FERNANDEZ V. MARAVILLA 10 SCRA 589

FACTS: Maravillasoughttheprobateofhislatewife’swill.Thesiblingssoughtdenialof probate on the ground that it wasn't signed on each and every page by thedecedent.Theylikewiseprayedfortheappointmentoftheirbrotherasspecial administratorinlieuofthehusbandtoprotecttheirinterestandalsoduetothe failuretofileaninventory.Theprobateofthewillinthemeantimewasdenied andtothis,thehusbandappealed.Consequently,thebrotherwasappointedas administrator. The husband fileda petition for certiorari and for preliminary injunction,prayingthereintheannulmentofthebrotherasco‐administratorand the prohibition of the probate court from proceeding in his removal as administrator.ThepetitionersmovedforthecertificationofthesametotheSCas theamountinvolvedexceedsthejurisdictionoftheCA.Nevertheless,theCA decidedinfavorofthehusband.

HELD: UnderSection2,Rule75,oftheRulesofCourt,thepropertytobeadministered andliquidatedintestateorintestateproceedingsofthedeceasedspouseis,not onlythatpartoftheconjugalestatepertainingtothedeceasedspouse,butthe entireconjugalestate.ThisCourthasalreadyheldthatevenifthedeceasedhad leftnodebts,uponthedissolutionofthemarriagebythedeathofthehusbandor wife,thecommunitypropertyshallbeinventoried,administered,andliquidatedin thetestateorintestateproceedingsofthedeceasedspouse.Inanumberofcases whereappealwastakenfromanorderofaprobatecourtdisallowingawill,this Court,ineffect,recognizedthattheamountorvalueinvolvedorincontroversy thereinisthatoftheentireestate.Nothavingappellatejurisdictionoverthe proceedings in probate (CA‐G.R. No. 27478‐R), considering that the amount involvedthereinismorethanP200,000.00,theCourtofAppealscannotalsohave originaljurisdictiontograntthewritsofcertiorariandprohibitionprayedforby respondentintheinstantcase,whicharemerelyincidentalthereto.

Notealsothatthepresentproceedingsunderreviewwerefortheannulmentof theappointmentofEliezarLopezasspecialco‐administratorandtorestrainthe probatecourtfromremovingrespondentasspecialadministrator.Itistherefore,a contestfortheadministrationoftheestateand,consequently,theamountor valueoftheassetsofthewholeestateisthevalueincontroversy(4C.J.S.204).It appearingthatthevalueoftheestateindisputeismuchmorethanP200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.

Case Digest on Rufina Lim vs. CA, Auto Truck, TBA Corp, et. al.

Rufina Lim vs CA, Auto Truck, TBA Corporation, Sspeed Distributing Inc., Active Distributors, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Action Company, Inc. (January 24, 2000)Tests to Pierce the Veil of Corporate Fiction

Facts: Rufina Lim is the surviving spouse of Pastor Lim whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings. The private respondents are corporations formed,

organized and existing under Philippine Laws and which own real properties. Pastor Lim died June 1994, Rufina Lim filed for the administration of the estate. The properties which were owned by the corporations were included in the inventory of the estate. They filed for the exclusion of the properties from said estate and the cancellation of the annotation of lis pendens in the TCTs of said properties.The RTC granted the motions. However Rufina Lim filed an amended petition which averred that such corporations were owned by Pastor Lim, that such were dummies of Pastor Lim, that those listed as incorporators are there only for the purpose of registration with the SEC, and that the real properties, although registered in the name of the corporations, were actually acquired by Pastor Lim during his marriage with Rufina Lim. The RTC acting on such motion set aside its order and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate the lis pendens. The respondent filed for certiorari with the CA which granted its prayer. Rufina Lim disputes such decision and urges that not only are the properties of the corporations part of the estate but also the corporations themselves. She cites that Pastor Lim during his lifetime organized and wholly owned the 5 corporations.

Issue: Whether or not a corporation in its universality be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?

Held: The real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. A corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it. But “when the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as avehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from…will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals.” FirstPhilippine International Bank vs CA (252 SCRA 259)The test in determining the applicability of piercing the veil of corporation fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control but complete domination not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as of this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own. 2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiff’s legal right. 3) The control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury. The absence of these elements prevent the piercing. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence that would justify such piercing. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by a corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock is not sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.

San Luis vs. San Luis

Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on this.

Facts

FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:

VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963

MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973

FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang residence

-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati

-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:

Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death)

No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)

---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of the ff:

Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper venue

Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue

RTC Makati: Dismissed petition

CA: reversed and set aside

Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was properly filed

Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine law

WON Venue properly laid? YES

-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.

-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES

As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which were in Ma'am's book)

-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again

---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was notsufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC

Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both statingthat she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void.

Roberts v. Leonidas (April 27, 1984)Ramon Aquino, J .:N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.PROBLEM: A will already probated in Utah was filed before Manila CFI Branch 38 while intestate proceedings for the same estate were ongoing in Manila CFI Branch 20.HELD: The two proceedings must be consolidated and the testate proceeding should be continued. It would be anomalous to undergo intestate proceedings when the deceased died with two wills.FACTS:

EDWARD Grimm, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, was married twice.

o FIRST MARRIAGE (divorced) = Juanita Kegley Grimm (MRS. GRIMM). Children: JUANITA Grimm Morris and ETHEL Grimm Morris.

o SECOND MARRIAGE = MAXINE Tate Grimm. Children: Edward Miller Grimm II (PETE) and LINDA Grimm.

Jan. 23, 1959 – Edward executed 2 wills, one for his Philippine properties (PH WILL) and one for his properties abroad (FOREIGN WILL).

o Edward described his Philippine properties as conjugal property of his second marriage.

o In the PH will, Juanita and Ethel were given their legitimes.o They were not given anything in the foreign will, because according to

Edward he had already given them their legitimes in the PH will.o The rest of the 2 wills favored Maxine and her children

Nov. 27, 1977 – Edward died in the Makati Medical Center. Jan. 9, 1978 – Ethel instituted intestate proceedings for Edward’s estate

before Manila CFI Branch 20.o Ethel was named special administratrix.o Maxine admitted that she was notified of the proceedings

March 7, 1978 – Maxine presented the 2 wills for probate before the 3rd Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah, USA.

o Juanita and Ethel were notified of the proceeding March 11, 1978 – Maxine, through ACCRA, moved to dismiss the intestate

proceeding on the ground that Edward’s wills were being probated in Utah. April 10, 1978 – Utah court admitted the 2 wills to probate. April 25, 1978 – COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO

CAMPSo made in Utah with knowledge of the intestate proceedings before the

Manila CFIo signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the

parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita and Mrs. Grimm

o STIPULATIONS Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as administrators of

Edward's Philippine estate Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be

reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plusthe homes in Utah and Sta. Mesa, Manila.

Computation of the "net distributable estate"

Recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the ACCRA law firm

Pete, Linda, Ethel and Juanita "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate"

Ethel and Juanita should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share.

Included a supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 May 23 and June 2, 1978 – Pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, CFI

Branch 20 (intestate court) allowed Maxine to withdraw her opposition. Maxine, Pete and Ethel were appointed administrators of the estate. The court ignored the will already found in the record (I think it was there becauseit was submitted together with the compromise).

March 21, 1979 – Maxine, Pete and Ethel, acting as administrators, sold one of Edward’s businesses (Palawan Pearl Project) for P75,000, to a company named Makiling Management Co. [whose incorporators were Ethel, her husband Rex Roberts and Maxine’s former lawyer William Limqueco]

o The admins also sold 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation to Joseph Server and others for P1,546,136.

July 27, 1979 – Branch 20 Judge Molina adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the Edward's Philippine estate and one-eight (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2%. No mention at all was made of the will in that order. (anlabo mo judge)

August 9, 1979 – Maxine, through a new lawyer, moved to defer approval of the partition (as per the Utah agreement ata). Court considered it moot because the shares had already been adjudicated in the July 27 order.

April 18, 1980 – Juanita moved for accounting of the estate’s properties filed a motion for accounting to facilitate partition and close the present intestate estate.

June 10, 1980 – ACCRA filed appearance as collaborating counsel for Maxine Sep. 8, 1980 – Maxine, through Rogelio Vinluan of ACCRA, filed the

assailed petition for probate of the 2 wills already probated in Utah. The case was heard before Manila CFI Branch 38

o ALLEGATIONS Maxine and her children were defrauded due to the

machinations of the Roberts spouses 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal the intestate proceeding is void because Edward died testate the partition was contrary to Edward's wills

o Petition also asked that: the 1979 partition approved by Br. 20 be set aside and the

letters of administration be revoked Maxine be appointed executrix Ethel and Juanita be ordered to account for the properties

received by them and to return the same to Maxine Ethel moved to dismiss, Judge Leonidas denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition

o RELIEFS SOUGHT: Dismissal of the testate proceeding, OR

Consolidation of the two proceedings in Branch 20 That the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise

agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate ISSUE (HELD): Can a petition for allowance of wills and annulment of partition - approved in an intestate proceeding by one branch of the CFI - be entertained by another branch (after a probate in the Utah district court)? (YES)RATIO:

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Edward died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is provedand allowed" (NCC 838; ROC 75, Sec. 1).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara and Baluyot vs. Paño).

It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settledin an intestate proceeding.

The intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the twocases.

Ethel may file her answer to the petition anyway.DISPOSITION: Petition denied, CFI affirmed.

URIARTE V. CFI 33 SCRA 252

FACTS: UponthedeathofDonJuanUriarte,hisallegednaturalsonfiledforintestate proceedingsintheNegrosCourt.Thiswasopposedtobyoneofthenephews, allegingthatawillwasindeedexecutedinSpainandaskedforthesubmissionof thesaidwill.Meanwhile,oneofthenephews,whowasinpossessionofthe allegedwill,institutedintheManilaCopurtpetitionforprobateofthewill.Healso soughttointerveneintheinstestateproceedingsinNegrosCourt.

HELD:

Itcannotbedeniedthataspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionof theestateofadeceasedperson,whetherinaccordancewiththelawonintestate successionorinaccordancewithhiswill,isa"probatematter"oraproceedingfor thesettlementofhisestate.Itisequallytrue,however,thatinaccordancewith settledjurisprudenceinthisjurisdiction,testateproceedings,forthesettlementof theestateofadeceasedpersontakeprecedenceoverintestateproceedingsfor the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestateproceedingspendingbeforeacourtoffirstinstanceitisfoundithatthe decedenthadleftalastwill,proceedingsfortheprobateofthelattershould replacetheintestateproceedingsevenifatthatstageanadministratorhadalready beenappointed,thelatterbeingrequiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnoverthe estateinhispossessiontotheexecutorsubsequentlyappointed.This,however,is understoodtobewithoutprejudicethatshouldtheallegedlastwillberejectedor isdisapproved,theproceedingshallcontinueasanintestacy.Asalreadyadverted to,thisisa

clearindicationthatproceedingsfortheprobateofawillenjoypriority overintestateproceedings.

Zamaconashouldhavesubmittedforprobatethewillhehasonhandwiththe Negroscourt.

In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensiveadministrationofjusticetounnecessarilymultiplylitigation,especially ifseveralcourtswouldbeinvolved.This,ineffect,wastheresultofthesubmission ofthewillaforesaidtotheManilaCourt.Inthesecondplace,whenrespondent HiginioUriartefiledanoppositiontoVicenteUriarte'spetitionfortheissuanceof letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceasedJuanUriarteyGoitehadleftawillinSpain,ofwhichacopyhadbeen requestedforsubmissiontosaidcourt;andwhentheotherrespondent,Juan UriarteZamacona,filedhismotiontodismissSpecialProceedingNo.6344,hehad submittedtotheNegrosCourtacopyoftheallegedwillofthedecedent,from whichfactitmaybeinferredthat,likeHiginioUriarte,heknewbeforefilingthe petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceedingpendingintheNegrosCourtforthesettlementoftheestateofthe samedeceasedperson.AsfarasHiginioUriarteisconcerned,itseemsquiteclear thatinhisoppositiontopetitioner'spetitioninSpecialProceedingNo.6344,he hadexpresslypromisedtosubmitsaidwillforprobatetotheNegrosCourt.

Butthefactisthatinsteadoftheaforesaidwillbeingpresentedforprobatetothe NegrosCourt,JuanUriarteZamaconafiledthepetitionforthepurposewiththe ManilaCourt.Wecannotacceptpetitioner'scontentioninthisregardthatthe lattercourthadnojurisdictiontoconsidersaidpetition,albeitwesaythatitwas notthepropervenuetherefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable proceduraldefect,and,inthelightofthecircumstancesobtainingintheinstant case,weareoftheopinion,andsohold,thatpetitionerhaswaivedtherightto raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to considerinthisconnectionthatpetitionerknewoftheexistenceofawillexecuted byJuanUriarteyGoitesinceDecember19,1961whenHiginioUriartefiledhis opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the allegedlastwillinthePhilippinesandofthefilingofthepetitionforitsprobate withtheManilaCourtsinceAugust28,1962whenJuanUriarteZamaconafileda motionforthedismissalofSpecialProceedingNo.6344.Allthesenotwithstanding, itwas only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special ProceedingNo.51396anOmnibusmotionaskingforleavetointerveneandforthe dismissalandannulmentofalltheproceedingshadthereinuptothatdate;thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexedbutalsotoadmitsaidwilltoprobatemorethanfivemonthsearlier,or morespecifically,onOctober31,1962.Toallowhimnowtoassailtheexerciseof jurisdictionovertheprobateofthewillbytheManilaCourtandthevalidityofall theproceedingshadinSpecialProceedingNo.51396wouldputapremiumonhis negligence.

CUENCO V. COURT OF APPEALS 53 SCRA 360

FACTS: UponthedeathofSenatorCuenco,leavinghiswidowand2minorchildren,letters foradministrationoftheestatewasfiledbyrespondentinCebuCity,alleging thereinthatthedeceaseddiedintestateandthathislastknownresidencewasin CebuCity.Inthemeantime,thewidowfiledinQuezonCity,whereinthedeceased has died, petition to admit into probate the last will and testament of the decedent. Upon learning of thepending petition in Cebu City, she filed her oppositionandmotiontodismissthepetitionbyrespondent.

HELD: TheJudiciaryActconcededlyconfersoriginaljurisdictionuponallCourtsofFirst Instanceover"allmatterofprobate,bothoftestateandintestateestates."Onthe otherhand,Rule73,sectionoftheRulesofCourtlaysdowntheruleofvenue,as theverycaptionoftheRuleindicates,andinordertopreventconflictamongthe differentcourtswhichotherwisemayproperlyassumejurisdictionfromdoingso, theRulespecifiesthat"thecourtfirsttakingcognizanceofthesettlementofthe estateofadecedent,shallexercisejurisdictiontotheexclusionofallothercourts."

ItshouldbenotedthattheRuleonvenuedoesnotstatethatthecourtwithwhom theestateorintestatepetitionisfirstfiledacquiresexclusivejurisdiction.

TheRulepreciselyanddeliberatelyprovidesthat"thecourtfirsttakingcognizance ofthesettlementoftheestateofadecedent,shallexercisejurisdictiontothe exclusionofallothercourts."

AfairreadingoftheRulesinceitdealswithvenueandcomitybetweencourtsof equal and co‐ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petitionisfirstfiled,mustalsofirsttakecognizanceofthesettlementoftheestate inordertoexercisejurisdictionoverittotheexclusionofallothercourts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviouslyhadhisconjugaldomicileandresidedwithhissurvivingwidowandtheir minorchildren,andthattheallegationoftheintestatepetitionbeforeitstating that the decedentdied intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizanceofthepetitionandholdthepetitionbeforeitinabeyance,andinstead defertothesecondcourtwhichhasbeforeitthepetitionforprobateofthe decedent'sallegedlastwill.

This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner‐widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyanceitsactiononthedismissalmotionanddeferredtotheQuezonCitycourt, awaitingitsactiononthepetitionforprobatebeforethatcourt.Implicitinthe Cebucourt'sorderwasthatifthewillwasdulyadmittedtoprobate,bytheQuezon Citycourt,thenitwoulddefinitelydeclinetotakecognizanceofLourdes'intestate petitionwhichwouldtherebybeshowntobefalseandimproper,andleavethe exerciseofjurisdictiontotheQuezonCitycourt,totheexclusionofallothercourts. Likewisebyitsactofdeference,theCebucourtleftittotheQuezonCitycourtto resolvethequestionbetweenthepartieswhetherthedecedent'sresidenceatthe timeofhisdeathwasinQuezonCitywherehehadhisconjugaldomicilerather thaninCebuCityasclaimedbyrespondents.TheCebucourtthusindicatedthatit woulddeclinetotake

cognizanceoftheintestatepetitionbeforeitandinstead defertotheQuezonCitycourt,unlessthelatterwouldmakeanegativefindingas totheprobatepetitionandtheresidenceofthedecedentwithinitsterritoryand venue.

Itcannotbedeniedthataspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionof theestateofadeceasedperson,whetherinaccordancewiththelawonintestate successionorinaccordancewithhiswill,isa"probatematter"oraproceedingfor thesettlementofhisestate.Itisequallytrue,however,thatinaccordancewith settledjurisprudenceinthisjurisdiction,testateproceedingsforthesettlementof theestateofadeceasedpersontakeprecedenceoverintestateproceedingsfor the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestateproceedingspendingbeforeacourtoffirstinstanceitisfoundthatthe decedenthadleftalastwill,proceedingsfortheprobateofthelattershould replacetheintestateproceedingsevenifatthatstateanadministratorhadalready beenappointed,thelatterbeingrequiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnoverthe estateinhispossessiontotheexecutorsubsequentlyappointed.Thishowever,is understoodtobewithoutprejudicethatshouldtheallegedlastwillberejectedor isdisapproved,theproceedingshallcontinueasanintestacy.Asalreadyadverted to,thisisaclearindicationthatproceedingsfortheprobateofawillenjoypriority overintestateproceedings.

SOLIVIO V. CA 182 SCRA 119

FACTS: ThiscaseisregardstheestateofthelateauthorEstebanJavellanaJr.Whenhe died,hewassurvivedbyonlyhismaternalaunt,petitionerSolivioandpaternal aunt,respondentVillanueva.Wishingtofulfillthedecedent’swishtoplacehis propertiesintoafoundation,Soliviofiledapetitionforthelettersofadministration of the estate be issued to her and consequently be appointed as a special administrator.Thepetitionwaslateramendedtodeclareherassoleheirofthe decedent.ThecourtruledinSolivio’sfavorandsheexplainedthatshedidthisto facilitatetheformationofthefoundationamongotherreasons.Subsequently, Villanuevabelatedlysoughtthereconsiderationoftheorderofthecourt,averring thatSoliviowasn’ttheonlyheirofthedecedentbuttothis,shewasoverruled. Shethenfiledacaseforreconveyanceandpossessionofproperty,whichthetrialcourtdecidedinherfavor.

HELD:

Afteracarefulreviewoftherecords,wefindmeritinthepetitioner'scontention that the RTClacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partitionandrecoveryofhershareoftheestateofEstebanJavellana,Jr.whilethe probateproceedingsforthesettlementofsaidestatearestillpendinginBranch23 ofthesamecourt,therebeingasyetnoordersforthesubmissionandapprovalof theadministratix'sinventoryandaccounting,distributingtheresidueoftheestate totheheir,andterminatingtheproceedings.

Itistheorderofdistributiondirectingthedeliveryoftheresidueoftheestateto thepersonsentitledtheretothatbringstoaclosetheintestateproceedings,puts anendtothe

administrationandthusfarrelievestheadministratorfromhis duties.TheassailedorderdeclaringCeledoniaasthesoleheiroftheestateof EstebanJavellana,Jr.didnottolltheendoftheproceedings.Asamatteroffact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlementoftheestate."

UTULO V. VDA. DE GARCIA 66 Phil 302 (1938)

FACTS: JuanGarciadiedintestateleavinghischildren,oneofwhomisLuzGarcia,andhis wifeasheirs.Duringthependencyoftheintestateproceedings,Luzdiedandshe leftnolegitimatedescendants.Heronlyheirswerehermotherandhusband.Her husbandthenappliedforjudicialadministrationoftheproperty,absentanywill fromhislatewife.Thiswasopposedtobythemotherhowevershewasoverruled andthecourtdecidedinthehusband’sfavor.

HELD: As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure providinginpartthat"ifnoexecutorisnamedinthewill,orifapersondies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the generalrulethatwhenapersondieslivingpropertyinthePhilippineIslands,his propertyshouldbejudiciallyadministeredandthecompetentcourtshouldappoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the deceasedleftnowill,orincasehehadleftoneshouldhefailtonameanexecutor therein.Thisrule,however,issubjecttotheexceptionsestablishedbysections596 and597ofthesameCode,asfinallyamended.Accordingtothefirst,whenallthe heirsareoflawfulageandtherearenodebtsduefromtheestate,theymayagree inwritingtopartitionthepropertywithoutinstitutingthejudicialadministrationor applyingfortheappointmentofanadministrator.Accordingtothesecond,ifthepropertyleftdoesnotexceedsixthousandpesos,theheirsmayapplytothe competentcourt,aftertherequiredpublications,toproceedwiththesummary partitionand,afterpayingalltheknownobligations,topartitionalltheproperty constitutingtheinheritanceamongthemselvespursuanttolaw,withoutinstituting thejudicialadministrationandtheappointmentofanadministrator.

Construingthescopeofsection596,thiscourtrepeatedlyheldthatwhenaperson dieswithoutleavingpendingobligationstobepaid,hisheirs,whetherofageor not,arenotboundtosubmitthepropertytoajudicialadministrationandthe appointmentofanadministratoraresuperfluousandunnecessaryproceedings.

Vda. De Reyes v. CA, 169 SCRA 524 (1989)Short Facts: Beatriz, (not sure if illegit or legit child) opposes the correction of judgment and the re-opening of the probate proceedings to correct a alleged typographical error in the sqm of the Antipolo land in question, claiming that there

was no typographical error and the parties intended to share only that area of land.Decedent: Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr. Pilar Ibanez de Susuarregui: surviving spouse of decedent-administratix of the estateIllegit children: Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.Enrique de ZuzuarreguiJose de Zuzuarregui*Beatriz de Zuzuarregui vda. Re reyes: daughter of Antonio Sr. by another mother Pacita Javier: niece of administratix-mother of the three illegit children Project of partition:Pilar: 12/16, inclusive of 1/2 of the assets (share of conjugal partnership)Beatriz: 1/16Antonio, Jr.: 1/16Enrique: 1/16Jose: 1/16 Antipolo, Rizal property: mentioned 4x in document-adjudicated to Pilar (12/15), Antonio Jr. (1/15), Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15)-Pacita relinquished her right "in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property" -administratix and other three distributees filed a MOTION TO REOPEN SPECIAL PROCEEDIGNS for the purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the parcel of land (correct land area: 803,781.51, not 83,781sqm)-opposition to motionTC: (1) opened for purpose of correcting clerical error in description of land(2) correct land area to conform with description of land area in TCT(3) correction be made in the project of partition-CA: Affirm Pacita's allegation: no clerical area. The area in the project of partition is correct. She would not have relinquished her share in the Antipolo land if she new nothing would remain from the land. It was even repeated 4x in the project of partition WON there was a clerical error, which is an exemption to correcting or supplying a final judgment already entered? NONE.On correction of clerical errors:It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered. The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction may be made by the

court in its judgment once the latter had become final. The court may make this amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision. -TC already found that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by inadvertence in the project of partition -probate proceeding, nature: That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the ENTIRE estate of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares. -It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in factit is, a full and complete adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate, necessarily including the entire area of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus as perceptively posed by the queries of the respondents, if theintention of the heirs was to make only a partial adjudication and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did not make any further disposition of theremaining balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound reason would the heirs have in holding in suspense the distribution of the difference of 720,000 square meters? -if they cannot see eye to eye, why share properties as co-owners?-weird that the parties came up with 83,781, just omitting the zeroes. So only logicalreason is that they just forgot to put zero. -according to her own computation, she already received her 1/16 share in the estate. There would not be a substantial difference in value in their shares...

Vda. De Reyes v. CA ( Gr. 92436)

FACTS: The ascendant of the petitioner owned a parcel of land, which was transferred to the petitioners; the petitioners partitioned the said property amongst themselves albeit not deduced into writing.

One of the heirs sold his share of the property to the private respondent, the petitioners now claim that since the same was never validly partitioned and was extrajudicial settled the said sale was allegedly void.

ISSUE: WON the sale was valid.

HELD: Yes, since although not reduced into writing the said partition was valid;

The requirement that a partition should be deduced into writing and be made into a public document was merely for the constructive notice to others, thus does not affect it`s validity.

And for argument that said property was never partitioned the same may still be sold as an undivided claim/interest/share to the property.

Also discussed by the court is that an extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir. Since it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property.

And since at the present case the said property was sold the petitioner never had a right to speak of in the first place.

BENNY SAMPILO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-10474. February 28, 1958

FACTS:

Teodoro Tolete, died leaving his wife and nephews and nieces who are children of hisdeceased brothers and sisters. His wife executed an affidavit of self adjudicatingsaying that Teodoro had no children or or dependents, neither ascendants oracknowledged natural children, neither brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces.Then,his wife sold the properties to Sampilo, then the latter sold it to Salacup.

Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for letters of administration. Shealleged that Teodor’s wife, has no right to execute the affidavit of self-adjudicationfor there others heirs aside from her.

The trial court ruled in favor of Sinopera. In their appeal, the petitioners argue thatSinopera’s cause of action has already prescribed because according to the rules ofcourt, person’s deprived of their rights due to the partition or self adjudication forthere are other heirs aside from her. The CA modified the ruling stating that theaffidavit of Teodoro’s wife is null and void, but the subsequent sales are valid insofaras it is not above her share from Teodoro’s estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the casue of action has already prescribed.

RULING:

No. The rule applies only to persons who participated in the said specialproceedings and does not prejudice those who did not have the chance toparticipate.

There are two significant provisions in section 1, and 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules ofCourt. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all ofthem should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is mademore imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of theclause "and not otherwise". By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate"are indicated as the persons to answer for rights violated by extrajudicialsettlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is madeexpressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not takepart therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt thatthose who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are boundthereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any mannerdeprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement,they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and boththe distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest.Evidently, they are the persons who, in accordance with the provision, may seek toremedy the prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. But as to those whodid not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent orof the settlement, there is no direct or express provision, and it is unreasonable andunjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of twoyears. To extend the effect of the settlement of them, to those who did not take partor had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect,would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law.

Cua v. Vargas, 506 SCRA 374SHort Summary: Cua bought property from some of the co-heirs who were also signatories to the 2 documents they executed, excluding some of the other heirs who were not notified before the alleged partition, though there was a publication ofthe partition after the partition was done.Mom/Decedent: Paulina VargasHeirs:EsterVisitacionJuanZenaidaRosario<> AndresGloria AntoninaFlorentino Those who signed the notarized EJ Settlement:EsterVisitacion

JuanZenaidaRosario-the said EJ Settlement was published in Catanduanes Tribune for 3 consecutive weeks-they were also the ones who executed an EJ Settlement Among Heirs with Sale withCua*the latter 4 never signed any document*all documents executed and published in 1994 -one of the heirs (Gloria Vargas, widow of Santiago Vargas) claimed that she only knew of the EJ Settlement + Sale when the original house was demolished sometime in 1995; claimed she was unaware of said settlement-tried to redeem the property from Cua but Cua refused their offer-amicable settlement not reached in barangay level-ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF EJ SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL REDEMPTION OF LOT, MTC: 30-d period ff a written notice by vendors to co-owners not sent to them so theEJ Settlement and Sale were null and void and had no legal effect on themMTC: DISMISS-transaction occurred after partition so the co-owners could validly dispose of their shares-written notice of sale under A1088, though not sent, was cured by the ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF SALE (which was more than 30d before filing of complaint)-no bad faith on part of Cua RTC, appeal: affirm MTCCA: Reversed RTC and MTC-pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same. -MR Denied WON PUBLICATION of the EJ Partition was binding on the non-signatory heirs because it constitutes due notice and therefore, the non-signatory co-heirs were already estopped from assailing the partition and sale

NO. Publication was made AFTER THE PARTITION WAS MADE, NOT BEFORE WHICH WAS REQUIRED IN R74.1-The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has alreadybeen executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the firstdeed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs. -The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the

heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned. WON THE RESPONDENTS NON-SIGNATORY CO-HEIRS HAD RIGHT TO REDEEM?YES. -sale of pro indiviso shares allowed, subject to right of redemption of other co-heirs. This right was never lost because the non-signatory co-heirs were never notified in writing of the actual sale. NOTIFICATION IN WRITING OF THE SALE BY THE VENDOR is required to start the period of redemption (w/n 1 month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale); even if the co-heirs have actual knowledge of sale, the notification in writing is still required. As there was no such notice here, the rightto redeem the shares is still with the non-signatory co-heirs.-method of notification remains exclusive, no alternative provided by law-purpose of A1088: keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership WON Cua was a builder in GF-not in GF because he was very much aware that NOT ALL THE HEIRS PARTICIPATED IN THE EJ SETTLEMENT + SALE, as evident from the face of the document itself-since no valid partition yet, no sale could occur. Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of the respondents, he still constructed improvements on the property WON MTC does not have jurisdiction, this being incapable of pecuniary estimationCua estopped thru active participation in the MTC WON it should still be dismissed for non-joinder of indispensable partiesNO. -indispensable party: party-in-interest, without whom there can be no final determination of an action and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or defendant.-here: prayer of complaint was that they be allowed to redeem shares in property sold. The other co-heirs already relinquished their right over their shares to Cua withthe alleged sale. As a result, the other co-heirs who sold him the property are not anymore needed. On improper verification and CNFSRule may be relaxed. And since the respondent share a common interest with the other respondent, her sole signature complies with the rules.

G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner, vs.GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents .

FACTS:A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.3

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale4 was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.

Respondents argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement cannot bind them for it was executed without their consent and participation.

ISSUE:WON said Settlement would bind the respondents who did not give their consent?

HELD:No. It would not bind them. The Supreme Court gave the following reason.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreedupon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has alreadybeen executed19 as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIROsubstituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia andGorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO andROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents, vs.HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by theirattorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.

FACTS:On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition4 for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "Inthe Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).

In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate.

Subsequently, the respondents questioned the said Compromise Agreement for they did not give their consent and participation.

The petitioners claimed that they were constructively notified through publication.

ISSUE:WON the said agreement is binding to the heirs who did not consent to the Agreement?

HELD:No. Said agreement is not binding upon those heirs who did not give their consent to said agreement. The Supreme Court held as follows:

We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite

the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.

PEDROSA, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001

FACTS

Miguel Rodriguez died intestate survived by his wife Rosalina and their legallyadopted daughter Maria Pedrosa, the petitioner. Rosalina and Maria entered into anextra judicial settlement of his estate. The other Private respondents, theRodriguezes, however filed an action an action to annul Maria’s adoption which theCFI upheld. It was also appealed to the Court of Appeals which also upheld theadoption as legal.

In the meantime, Pilar, the sister of Miguel also passed away with no otherheirs but her brothers and sisters, the private respondents. Who then entered intoan extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estateof Miguel and of his sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs ofMiguel Rodriguez. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition coveredfourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. Theseproperties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs ofMiguel, represented solely by Rosalina. Armed with the Deed of ExtrajudicialSettlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new TransferCertificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the otherrespondents herein.

Petitioner Maria tried to claim their share of the properties and after beingunable to do so, filed a complaint to annul the partition. Her complaint wasdismissed by the RTC and on appeal was also dismissed by the CA.

ISSUES

(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the “Deed of ExtrajudicialSettlement and Partition” had already prescribed;

(2) whether or not said deed is valid;

(3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which hadalready been transferred to the respondent buyers.

RULING

1. No. The complaint for the annulment has not prescribed

Section 4, Rule 74] provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons whohave participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and inaddition (2) when the provisions of Section 1of Rule 74 have been strictly compliedwith, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in theextrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicialpartition. So the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. Theapplicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. DeGuzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of “extrajudicial settlement” upon the ground offraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Suchdiscovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with theRegister of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name ofrespondents exclusively.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in questionwhich was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule coversonly valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because itexcluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitionedproperty. Under the rule, “no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon anyperson who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.” As the partitionwas a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for thetrial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after twoyears from its execution in 1941

2. No. The deed of partition is not valid.

No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has notparticipated therein or had no notice thereof.

Under Rule 74, without the participation of all persons involved in theproceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. Therule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed ofSettlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested partiesto participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition,not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in thesaid partition, the settlement is not binding on her.

The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed ofextrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of

extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had noknowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is anheir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lonedescendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel fromparticipating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code

3. The court ruled that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue.

The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registeredunder the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a TorrensTitle cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised inan action expressly instituted for such purpose.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFADELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE LA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN

FACTS:

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado and Lucio Campo,both of whom were never married. Five other children were born to the couple whoare full-blood siblings of Josefa and natural children of Felisa. Felisa also had anotherson with another man (Ramon Osorio) named Luis Delgado. Josefa Delgado died onSeptember 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and somecollateral relatives.

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa but whether a marriagein fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually livedtogether as husband and wife but were never married. Petitioners point out that norecord of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismalcertificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as anunmarried woman. They never had any children but took into their homeGuillermina and Nanie. They were never legally adopted but was known in the localdialect as ampun-ampunan. Guillermina was alleged to be the illegitimate child ofGuillermo with another woman.

Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate didnot mean that no marriage transpired and that Guillermina was never dulyacknowledged as an illegitimate child and such right had prescribed upon the deathof Guillermo. They maintain that Guillermo and Josefa were married on June 3, 1919and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa.During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among theirrelatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, theypresented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity dated December 1, 1944 issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia;2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947; 3.Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation filed with the VeteransAdministration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr.Guillermo J. Rustia himself swore to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3June 1919; 4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated thathe was married to Josefa Delgado.

Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the originalpetition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses JosefaDelgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila. This petition was opposed bythe following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’slate brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. Theopposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and theother claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimatehalf-blood relative Josefa Delgado. Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene inthe proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line ofGuillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors, the motion was granted.

The RTC ruled that petitioner and her co-claimants are entitled to the estate of thelate Josefa Delgado and declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado.Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and onlysurviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estateof the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.As the estates of both decedents have not as yet been settled, a singleadministrator was appointed in the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa.LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION were issued to CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LAROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of P500,000.00.

Upon appeal in the CA said court reversed the decision.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and JosefaDelgado; 2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and JosefaDelgado are; 3. who should be issued letters of administration.

First issue: The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory ifuncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife haveentered into a lawful contract of marriage;

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a validmarriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitationof more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to bemarried. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the originalpetition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975referred to them as "spouses." These arguments are very persuasive.

Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, itsabsence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once thepresumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in supportthereof. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. GuillermoRustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath ofno less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles tothe properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," morethan adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documentswhich are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincingevidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals thereinwas presented by petitioners. This is the usual order of things in society and, if theparties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living inconstant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumiturpro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.

Second Issue: The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

Since Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the childrenborn to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonioand the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.

The SC ruled that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothersand sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition onreciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not applyto the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference incategory between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such differencewhen all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begottenwith different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just likelegitimate children of half-blood relation. The court ruled that the rules regardingsuccession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them.

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Intervenor Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, shemay be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission orrecognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledgedillegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition iscompulsory in any of the following cases:

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the allegedfather (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will,a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsoryrecognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of anillegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing. Therewas apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child fromher birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this didnot constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could havecompelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any judicial action forcompulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and thelifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsoryrecognition can no longer be filed. Therefore the right to claim compulsoryacknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia.

Third Issue: Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestateestate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an orderof preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor isnamed in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, orfail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, inthe discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, ornext of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or theperson selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow ornext of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply foradministration or to request that the administration be granted to some otherperson, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competentand willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted tosuch other person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in

the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out theappointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equitydemand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of theestates, a situation which obtains here.

The SC found it fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgadovda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia.They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and GuillermoRustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appealsis AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of GuillermoRustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to anominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upontheir qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may bedetermined by the trial court.

G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998

RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F. MARQUEZ, respondents.

During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr., (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio.

Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more particularly described in TCT No. 47572, 1wherein the constructed their conjugal home.

In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property

Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" 3 covering the land described in TCT No. 33350, as well as the house constructed thereon to three of this children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael, Jr.;(2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children

From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land. However, when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572, they immediately demanded that since they are also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., theyare entitled to their respective shares over the land in question.

In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr.,filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" alleging that the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him execute the said documents, thus making the other documents fraudulently made.

Petitioners, in contending that the action had not yet prescribed, assert that by virtue of the fraudulent "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation" wherein they were allegedly deprived of their just share over the parcel of land, a constructive trust was created. 9 Forthwith, they maintain that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years.

In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of limitations since the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.

RTC: in favor of petitioners (not yet prescribed)

CA: reversed, in favor of respondents (prescribed already)

ISSUE: Whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed.

RULING:

It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established.

In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the isuance of the Torrens title over the property. 13 For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred theaction.

Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's share, validly donate this portion to the respondents? Obviously, he cannot, as expressly providedin Art. 736 of the Civil Code, thus:Art. 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong tohim.

Whether this donation was inofficious or not is another matter which is not within the province of this Court to determine inasmuch as it necessitates the production of evidence not before it.

Finally, while we rule in favor of petitioners, we cannot grant their plea for moral damages and attorney's fees 20since they have not satisfactorily shown that they have suffered "mental anguish" as provided in Article 2219 and Article 2290 of the Civil Code.

IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN GERONA, petitioners,vs.CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN respondents

FACTS: , Petitioners herein, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, which are now the respondents, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on September11, 1945;

On May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that such fraudwas discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case.

Petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refusedto heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners.

Respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discoveryof the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action was commenced on November 4, 1958.

ISSUE:WON an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe?

HELD: Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.

When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud.

G.R. No. 160530 November 20, 2007CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner, vs. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary toherein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. After hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will. Later, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the issuanceof letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a certification against forum-shopping. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not certificate of non-forum shopping is required? (2) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case? (2) Whether or not petitioner was denied due process? HELD: (1) Revised Circular No. 28-918 and Administrative Circular No. 04-949 of the Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure to include a certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is nota ground for outright dismissal of the said petition. (2) Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate. … (Emphasis supplied.)In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time and again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher

correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila,the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary torespondent. (3) Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. – …If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs. In this case, petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis. Petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will is conclusive only as to its due execution.11 The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.12 Thus, petitioner’s claim of title to the properties forming part of her husband’s estate should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts.

June 19, 1982G.R. No. L-57848RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS: Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the CFI-Quezon City for the probate ofthe holographic will of Clemencia Aseneta who instituted her and her husband as heirs. Later on, Bernardo Aseneta (herein private respondent), claiming to be the adopted child of the deceased and her sole heir instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI-Rizal. The two cases were consolidated with the latter court. Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will was null and void because he, being the only compulsory heir, was preterited; thus, intestacy should ensue. In her opposition, Soledad averred that the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. The motion was

granted. The motion for reconsideration by Soledad Maninang was denied for lack ofmerit. In the same order, the court appointed Bernardo Aseneta as administrator considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be unfit to perform the trust.Soledad Maninang filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It was denied. Hence, this petition was filed. ISSUE: whether or not the dismissal of the court a quo of the testate case proper? HELD: No, it was not proper. Probate of a will is mandatory as required by law and public policy. Ordinarily, the probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic validity; but on the extrinsic validity which includes the capacity of the testator to make a will and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.However, when practical considerations demand, the intrinsic validity of the will may be passed upon like when on its face there is really preterition or invalid disinheritance making the will void. The probate might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Such would shorten the proceedings if the issues are decided as early as during the probate proceedings.In the instant case, there is still doubt to the alleged preterition or disinheritance of the private respondent cannot be clearly seen on the face of the will and needs further determination which can only be made if the will is allowed to be probated.

. Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs. Zenaido ALUAD, respondentG.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raisedby the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter, she executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that such will become effective upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land. Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising four (4) of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death. Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido, alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have

been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review has been filed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed is valid?HELD: The donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) is one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; andThat the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee. The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s mother during the former’s lifetime. Further the statement, “anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated,” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For theright to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. The phrase, “anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor. The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right to petitioner’s mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.

36. RALLA v. UNTALAN, ( G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989)

FACTS: The late Rosendo Ralla filed a petition for the probate of his own will in thethen CFI of Albay, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 564. In his will heleft his entire estate to his son, Pablo (the petitioner herein), leaving nothing to hisother son, Pedro. In that same year, Pedro Ralla filed an action for the partition ofthe estate of their mother, Paz Escarella.

Petitioner’s Brother-in- law filed a petition, docketed as Special ProceedingsNo. 1106, for the probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the ground that thedecedent owed him P5,000.00. Pablo then filed a manifestation stating that he hadno objections to the probate; thereafter, he filed a "Motion to Intervene as Petitionerfor the Probate of the Will." This motion was heard ex parte and granted despite thewritten opposition of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. Likewise, the petition for probate wasgranted; Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed specialadministrator, over and above the objection of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. However, intaking possession of the properties belonging to the estate of Rosendo Ralla,Teodorico Almine also took possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered bythe project of partition mentioned earlier. Consequently, the heirs of Pedro Ralla (theprivate respondents herein) moved to exclude from the estate of Rosendo Ralla theaforesaid parcels of land. Private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew ForConsideration Of The Court The Exclusion Of the 67 Parcels of Land Subject Of TheProject Of Partition. However, Judge Untalan ruled that the partition should berespected and upheld. Hence the 63 parcels should be excluded from the probateproceedings, and likewise the administration of Amine, Jr.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the Will had been probated

HELD: The rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after thewill has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to bepartitioned are the same properties embraced in the win. Thus the rule invoked isinapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No.2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of awill), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and RosendoRalla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.

37. FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA ( October 12, 1967)

FACTS: Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instancea petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes,executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted thepetitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. Fernandez et. al., allsurenamed Reyes, claiming to be the heirs intestate filed oppositions to the probateasked. The lower court found that the will was genuine and properly executed; butdeferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such timewhen we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or whenthe question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or newtrial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered andresolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponentwas in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties theright to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time." The appellateCourt held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, hadbecome final for lack of opportune appeal

ISSUE: Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will toprobate had become final for lack of appeal

HELD: It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles allquestions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution andwitnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions arevalid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs.Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probateorder is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions ofSection 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person mayappeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order orjudgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."

Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolutionon the other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise therewould be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is withoutweight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six different instanceswhen appeal may be taken in special proceedings.

There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below wasnot appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, theappellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence uponwhich it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree wascorrectly dismissed.

38. REMEDIOS NUGUID v. SALONGA PAZ NUGUID (L- 23445, June 23, 1966)

FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid,and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal aholographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probateand that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. Felix andPaz Nuguid entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter

alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of thedeceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the directascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution isvoid. The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is acomplete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceasedRosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may rule on the validity of the Will.

HELD: The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.

If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appearsin the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability existsthat the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

39. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

FACTS: On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted for allowance of decedent's(Annie sand) holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she wasof sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress,fraud or undue influence, andwas in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.This was opposed on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor thesignature therein was indecedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not dulysigned by decedent;and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undueinfluence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested thedisposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, asshe was not its sole owner.

The trial court having found that the holographic will in question was writtenentirely, dated and signed inthe handwriting of the testatrix with three (3) witnesses to have explicitly andcategorically identified thehandwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be thegenuine handwriting andsignature of the testatrix admitted the probate, however on appeal with CA this wasreversed and thepetition for probate was dismissed on the ground that it fails to meet therequirements for its validity by not complying articles 813 and 814 of the NCC whichread, as follows:

Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signedwithout being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such datevalidates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.

Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will,the testator mustauthenticate the same by his full signature.It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated,or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations andcancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA was correct in disallowing the probate of the willbased on the provisions of Art Art 813 and Art 814?

HELD: No.The Court said it is erroneous for the CA to say that the holographic willof Anne Sand was notexecuted in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law and held that Articles813 and 814 of the New Civil Code were not complied with, hence, it disallowed theprobate of said will.

The Court cited: Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall bedisallowed inany of the following cases:

(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at thetime of its execution;(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part ofthe beneficiary, or ofsome other person for his benefit;(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did notintend that the instrumentshould be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto. In the same vein, Article839 of the New Civil Code reads:

Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, atthe time of its execution;(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, orthreats;(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part ofthe beneficiary or ofsome other person;(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signedshould be his will at thetime of affixing his signature thereto.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in apetition to admit aholographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether theinstrument submitted is,indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed inaccordance with theformalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessarytestamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether theexecution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.

In the case of holographic wills what assures authenticity is the requirement thatthey be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as providedunder Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, andsigned by the hand ofthe testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of thePhilippines, and neednot be witnessed. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in thedisallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by thetestator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects thevalidity of thedispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator failsto sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositionscannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testamentvoid.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with theprovisions of Article 814. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, andinterlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been notedunder his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at mostonly as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Thus, unlessthe unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the dateof the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not

invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowanceof such changes.

Only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found inArticles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of aholographic will.

Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SETASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire houseand lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Courtadmitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is herebyREINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. Nocosts.

40. JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R. INFANTE, MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE, TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE CAMPBELL, petitioners, vs.THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRAN CH NO. 166, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE, respondents.

G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988

FACTS: On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees.

On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearingon 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era”, newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three(3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared thus, moved to 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court issued an order admitting private respondents evidence ex-parte, allowed the latter to place Arturi Arceo as one of the testamentary witnesses, and appointed private respondent as executor.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will. Probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner’s contention: Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will and that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, said requirement of the law is mandatory and its omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion.

Court of Appeals’ contention: The requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a matter of procedural convenience to better satisfy in some instances the requirements of due process,

ISSUE: Whether or not personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.

HELD: Yes. We grant the petition.

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testatorresident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited inthe post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personalservice of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement ofthe law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

Tan vs Gedorio

Facts: Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents RogeloLim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as special administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of the respondents can be appointed since they are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does not have the same competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of kin, being the legitmate children, is preferred in the choice of administrator (claiming that the respondent were illegitmate children). However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of the estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection of a special administrator.

Ruling: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference , they should pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. Comment: The court was correct in granting the appointment of Romualdo as special administrator since it was shown that Vilma was in remiss afterfailing to follow the series of directives and extension given to her to account for theestate.

pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. on the issue of personal service, as in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally “might have been superfluous" because the distance from the petitioner's residence and the respondent court is very far. Petition granted. Comment: Yes, in this case the court was too blinded with its sense of duty to follow to the rules to the letters. The court should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, in the interest of substantial justice. Because in the end, it would be the estate that would benefit upon being given notice of a money claim against it so it can be inspected and verified.