G.R. No. 101387, G.R. No. 153691, G.R. No. 125375

7/29/2019 G.R. No. 101387, G.R. No. 153691, G.R. No. 125375

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[G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998] D E C I S I O N SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDALABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs. LANDREGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J :

In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrabletitle, may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it hasevidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree?

The Case

These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for mandamusi[1] under Rule65 which asks this Court to direct the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the correspondingdecree of registration in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022.ii[2]

The Facts

Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372,

located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court,rendered its decision disposing thus: iii[3]

“WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants, SpousesMarciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.

As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of legal age, married, with residence and postaladdress at No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila.”

After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order iv[4] datedMarch 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRArefused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for mandamus.v[5]

Attached to the LRA’s comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G.Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which explained public respondent’s refusal toissue the said decree:vi[6]

“In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through counsel, dated August 27,1991 relative to the above-noted case/record, the following comments are respectfully submitted:

On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivisionplan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San FelipeNeri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;

After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found thatit might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699,875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said subdivision planis Annex ‘A’ hereof;

The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos.240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;

On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, acopy is Annex ‘B’ hereof, requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355,issued in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;

On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received bythis Authority, a copy is Annex ‘C’ hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, MetroManila, a copy is Annex ‘D’ hereof;

After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex ‘E’ hereof, requesting for acertified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificateof title with complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, noreply to our letter has as yet been received by this Authority;

After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was foundthat Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda.de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex ‘F’ hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are [sic] incomplete.

For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant tothe Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplicationof titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrensregistration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon.Eutropio Migriño, et al.,); x x x.”

In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for beingpremature.

After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4,1995,vii[7] for an early resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution,dated October 23, 1995, which ordered:viii[8]

“x x x Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04 September 1995 filed bypetitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to theCourt in detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete and specific steps,if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993 (the date of respondent’s Memorandum) toactually verify whether the lot subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a portion of the parcelsof land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.”

On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, towhich was attached a letter dated November 27, 1997 of Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinaryand Cadastral Decree Division, which states:ix[9]

“With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is a copy of our letter dated29 April 1992 addressed to Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of thesubdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which wastransfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per verification of the records on file in theRegister of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision planPsd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is incomplete.

It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration soughtby the petitioners pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991,would result in the duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policyand purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et. al.).

Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the sameparcel of land.”

Issue Petitioners submit this lone issue:“Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority canbe compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial Courtof Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).”

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The Court’s Ruling The petition is not meritorious.

Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?

Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA “unlawfully neglect[ed] theperformance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office x x x.” Theycite four reasons why the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a “clear legalright to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform” because, as landregistration is an in rem proceeding, the “jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should becomplied with.”x[11] Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this proceeding, itcannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to “take thecudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No.6595.” Rather, it is the “sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute in aseparate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of petitioners’application for registration.” Third, petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuanceof their title, because of “the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595” notwithstanding the lack of oppositionfrom the holders of said titles.xi[12] Fourth, the State “consented to its being sued” in this case[;] thus,the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case “as final and make

provision for its satisfaction.”xii[13]

On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the trialcourt is not valid, considering that “[the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again theregistration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree for thesame land is null and void.”xiii[14] On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled to issue adecree of registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez xiv[15] which held:xv[16]

“Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below,these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, asin this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would becompelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled inthe name of another.

It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of thePayatas Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816,however, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, ‘(t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if thesame land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration.’ The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateralattack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529.” (Underscoring supplied.)

We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for threereasons.

First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory

Contrary to the petitioners’ allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yetexecutory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does notbecome executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration.We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals:xvi[17]

“It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitionersvigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed,much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property RegistrationDecree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwithissue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registrationand certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent

Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners’ contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastralor land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after theexpiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in severaldecisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land RegistrationCommission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of suchdecree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to beunder the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.”

Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible

That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA’s reaction is reasonable, evenimperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuancemay contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.

In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,xvii[18] this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any

doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In thisrespect, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is theact of the court. They are specifically called upon to “extend assistance to courts in ordinary andcadastral land registration proceedings.”

True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding uponand conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to saidapplication. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides:

“SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in hisapplication or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shallbe entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to theexceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, includingthe Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,notice, or citation, or included in the general description ‘To all whom it may concern.’ Such decreeshall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affectedthereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, tothe right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registrationobtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon theexpiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with thissection shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be

opened, but shall remain in full force and e ffect forever, subject only to the right of appeal herein beforeprovided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to theappeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case maypursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud inprocuring the decree. Whenever the phrase ‘innocent purchaser for value’ or an equivalent phraseoccurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. ( As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).”

However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29,1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the recordssubmitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 -- is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over whichTCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCTNo. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA’s refusal to issue a decree of registrationis based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the trial court void.

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It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land alreadydecreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same landwould be null and void,xviii[19] since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.xix[20] Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register hasalready been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will runcounter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia:xx[21]

“As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomesindefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertainproceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of therespondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, etal., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:

‘As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, whileperhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not availin the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot alreadypreviously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.

‘In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration caseand a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by acourt of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding onthe whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding(not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered owner in theRegistration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name.Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by atitle so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat thevery purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee itsindefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of theregistration law.”

Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act

The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mereministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: xxi[22]

“Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain manythings to be done before the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans andamended descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation

therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Courtin the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:

‘Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land.This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of landincluded in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughlyindicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimesadditional surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be doneby the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land RegistrationOffice with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).’

Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General LandRegistration Office, the administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considereda ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as anadministrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial

function and not an administrative one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). x x x” (Underscoringsupplied.)

Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it isa judicial act involving the exercise of discretion.xxii[23] Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awardedonly when the petitioners’ legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to becompelled is clear and complete.xxiii[24] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a rightwhich is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case ismeritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded.xxiv[25] But where the rightsought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.

A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision,but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties.xxv[26] As stated earlier, a judicial actis not compellable by mandamus.xxvi[27] The court has to decide a question according to its own judgment and understanding of the law.xxvii[28]

In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration.However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate todirect the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property

described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) daysfrom receipt of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed according to thefacts and the law, as herein discussed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin inPasig City. The Land Registration Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court aquo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No.6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn,is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA mayissue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.

[G.R. No. 153691. July 19, 2006] DR. EDUARDO RELLIN versus MIGUEL C. BELARMINO

RESOLUTION

This is an appeal from the Decision[1]cralaw dated October 17, 2001 and the Resolution[2]cralaw datedMay 20, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55923. The appellate court had affirmed theDecision dated October 25, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan City, Cotabato, Branch17.[3]cralaw

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:[4]cralaw

On March 10, 1947, one Florita Sembria executed a Transfer of Homestead Rights in favor of hereinrespondent, Miguel Belarmino. The property subject of the transfer was Lot No. 51, Block 23, Pls-59 inthe Kidapawan Subdivision.

On August 16, 1952, the same property was the subject of a Deed of Mortgage between MiguelBelarmino as mortgagor and petitioner, Dr. Eduardo Rellin, as mortgagee. The deed mortgaged onlythe improvements introduced and at that time existing on the property. The consideration for themortgage was eight thousand pesos (P8,000), payable within two (2) years from the date of executionof the deed, or until May 16, 1954.

Petitioner Rellin alleges, however, that what transpired was a sale of the subject parcel of land enteredinto by him and Ananias Belarmino, father of respondent Miguel Belarmino.

On April 14, 1955, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. V-9163 was issued in favor of MiguelBelarmino. This was recorded in the Registration Book for the province of Cotabato on June 6, 1956.The OCT covered the property mentioned in the Deed of Mortgage. [5]cralaw

On July 29, 1974, respondent, through counsel, sent a demand letter to petitioner for the return of theproperty as well as the title thereto. The respondent waited more than a year for a reply which did notcome. On February 4, 1976, the respondent filed a complaint[6]cralaw with the then Court of First

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Instance, Third Branch of Kidapawan, North Cotabato (now Branch 17, Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato) for recovery of property and possession with accounting and damages againstpetitioner. After trial, the lower court rendered the assailed decision against the defendant, now hereinpetitioner. It held as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Ordering the defendant Dr. Eduardo Rellin to vacate the premises and peacefully turn over theproperty to the plaintiff;

b) Ordering defendant to return the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. V-9163 to the plaintiff;

c) Ordering the defendant to account for the produce of the land from 1952 until he vacates thepremises;

d) Ordering defendant to pay [a]ttorney's fees in the sum of P7,000.00;

e) And to pay the costs of the suit.

It is so ordered.[7]

Petitioner's appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trialcourt.[8]cralaw It also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Now, petitioner submits to us the following issues for resolution:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE ACTIONWAS BARRED BY ACQUISITIVE OR EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION AS WELL AS LACHES;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THEPROPERTY WAS VALIDLY SOLD;

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE GOODFAITH OF THE PETITIONER IS IMMATERIAL; [9]cralaw

On the first issue: Has prescription set in? Petitioner contends that prescription had set in consideringthat he had been in possession of the subject property since 1952.[10]cralaw Respondent counters thatprescription was inapplicable since his land is covered by the Torrens system under Original Certificateof Title No. V-9163 in his name. [11]cralaw

We agree with respondent. Prescription could not arise in the instant case.[12]cralaw Respondent has inhis favor the law that protects holders of title under the Torrens System of land registration.[13]cralawOnce a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.[14]cralaw InVencilao,[15]cralaw a case with analogous facts, the Court held:

In awarding the disputed land to petitioners, the trial court erroneously found that petitioners had beenin possession and enjoyment of the property for more than thirty (30) years. It should be noted that theland in dispute is a registered land placed under the operation of the Torrens system way back in 1959,or more than thirty (30) years before petitioners instituted the present action in the court a quo, and for which Original Certificate of Title No. 400 was issued. The rule is well-settled that prescription does notrun against registered land. Thus, under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, it is specifically provided that "no title to registered land in derogation of that of theregistered owner shall be acquired by p rescription or adverse possession." A title, once registered,cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. The certificate of title issued isan absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose nameappears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. All persons must take notice and noone can plead ignorance of the registration.

Has laches set in? We observe that the petitioner did not exercise his alleged rights of ownership of theproperty when he did not foreclose the mortgage, despite having all the opportunity to do so from thetime the right to foreclose arose. He could not now claim that respondent is barred by time to recover

the property. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with uncleanhands.[16]cralaw Also, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and notthose who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt .[17]cralaw

Moreover, a collateral attack on the title of Miguel Belarmino is out of the question. The issue of thevalidity of title, i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expresslyinstituted for that purpose.[18]cralaw In Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court ,[19]cralaw we haveemphatically ruled:

It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to privaterespondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery of possessionfiled by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a defense partakes of thenature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the operation of the Torrenssystem of registration pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D.1259 (sic). The case law on the matter does not allow collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of titleon the ground of actual fraud. The rule now finds expression in Section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwiseknown as the Property Registration Decree.

Another case, Bolisay v. Alcid ,[20]cralaw cited in the recent case of Pacioles, Jr. v. Chuatoco-Ching ,[21]cralaw held:

. . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by TorrensTitle is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in theabsence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered asthe owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriateordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is inthe persons named in the title . . .

Corollarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateralattack against Torrens Title, hence:

Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

In the present petition, petitioner seeks from respondent the recovery of the subject property. It isevident that the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of respondent to the property in question,which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is in reality acollateral attack, which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. It is wellsettled that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title can only beraised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right

to claim ownership of the land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding.[22]cralaw

Was there a valid sale to petitioner? Petitioner avers that there was transfer of title by sale.[23]cralaw Ananias Belarmino, the father of the respondent, allegedly executed a document entitled Confirmationof Sale acknowledging and confirming the sale of property to the petitioner.[24]cralaw Respondentreplies that such sale was void, having been made during the prohibited five (5) year period and noconfirmation of sale made by Ananias Belarmino even after the lapse of the five-year period can ratifythe sale.[25]cralaw

Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,provides:

Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constitutedbanking corporation, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject toencumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the application and for a term of five years fromand after the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall become liable to the satisfaction of any

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debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may bemortgaged or pledged to qualified associations, or corporations.

Conformably with the foregoing provision, the alleged sale of the disputed land did not produce anyeffect because such is prohibited. That sale is void, inexistent and could not be ratified and a merelapse of time cannot give efficacy to it. [26]cralaw In Saltiga de Romero v. Court of Appeals,[27]cralaw theCourt held:

As for the alleged sale of three portions of the lot for a consideration of P3,000.00 each evidenced bythe three affidavits of sale executed by LUTERO in favor of GLORIOSA, PRESENTACION andLUCITA, the Court of Appeals correctly declared the three conveyances void. CA 141 prohibits thealienation of a homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent and grant under Section118, which states:

Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquiredunder free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from thedate of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent and grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to theexpiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to

qualified persons, associations, or corporations.No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five yearsafter the issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture andCommerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.

The conveyance of a homestead before the expiration of the five-year prohibitory period following theissuance of the homestead patent is null and void and cannot be enforced, for 'it is not within thecompetence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve. (Ortega v. Tan,181 SCRA 350 at p. 356 [1990]). In the present case, since the sales were made on January 17, 1969or less than two years after the issuance of LUTERO's title to the homestead on April 7, 1967, the salesare clearly void.

Furthermore, Ananias Belarmino cannot claim ownership of the land in question nor could he validlytransfer ownership of said lot to the petitioner since he is not the registered owner. As correctly pointedout by the Court of Appeals, it is only the respondent, Miguel Belarmino, who could validly dispose of or alienate his property.

On the third issue, petitioner states that he cannot be ordered to account for the fruits that he derivedfrom the subject land.[28]cralaw Respondent answers that there was bad faith on the part of petitioner,when the latter insisted on using the land. [29]cralaw

Indeed, we find bad faith on the part of the petitioner, when he refused to return the land to therespondent, despite several demands made by Miguel Belarmino for its return. As such, he is notentitled to the benefits the law bestows on individuals acting in good faith.

Moreover, the issue of good faith on the part of the petitioner has not been raised by him before theCourt of Appeals. Issues not raised or ventilated in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time onappeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.[30]cralaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 17, 2001 of theCourt of Appeals and its Resolution dated May 20, 2002 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

[G.R. No. 125375. June 17, 2004] D E C I S I O N SPOUSES ELPIDIO APOSTOL and AMELIAAPOSTOL, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES EMMANUEL CHUA and EDNA L.CHUA, respondents .

CALLEJO, SR., J .:

This is a petition for review of the Decisionxxviii[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38333reversing the Decision,xxix[2] on appeal, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, in CivilCase No. Q-94-21698.

The Antecedents

On September 3, 1993, the respondents, Spouses Emmanuel and Edna Chua, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, Spouses Elpidio and Amelia Apostol, in the Metropolitan TrialCourt (MeTC) of Metro Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 7660. The respondents alleged, inter alia,that they had contracted with the Spouses Paulo and Georgina Pascua for the purchase of a parcel of land. The petitioners, who were present during the negotiations, verbally assured the respondents thatthey would vacate the property within ten (10) days from the execution of the sale. The petitioners thenacknowledged that their stay in the property was only upon the tolerance of its former owners. On June7, 1993, the Spouses Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and theimprovements thereon in favor of the respondents for P1,000,000. On the basis of the said deed, therespondents were issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 87610 over the property on June 8,1993. Despite demands, however, the petitioners refused to vacate the property.

The respondents prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after asummary hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, asfollows:

1.Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to immediately vacate the above-mentioned parcel of land;

2.Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 per month from the filing of thecomplaint until they finally vacate and turn over completely the above-mentioned parcel of landrepresenting the reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the above-mentioned parcelof land;

3.Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, plusthe sum of P1,000.00 appearance fee for every court attendance of plaintiffs’ counsel; and

4.Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the costs of suit.

PLAINTIFFS further pray for such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just and equitable inthe premises.xxx[3]

In their answer with special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaim, the respondentsalleged, inter alia, that Luz B. Pascua was the owner of the parcel of land located in Quezon Citycovered by TCT No. 198936 with an area of 315 square meters. She sold a portion of the property, anarea of 285.32 square meters, to the respondents on July 8, 1976 for P45,548 of which P15,548 waspaid. On the same day, the parties executed a memorandum agreement covering the property, inwhich the respondents agreed that the balance of the purchase price would be paid in installments.Thereafter, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of the respondents over an unsegregatedportion of the property, with an area of 29.68 square meters, for P7,350 and, later, a deed of confirmation of deed of absolute sale with waiver over the said property. On June 20, 1979, therespondents executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the property, stating, inter alia, that they couldnot cause the registration of the said deeds because the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 198936 was inthe possession of Teresita B. Jimenez, a former co-owner of the property. The respondents further alleged that Luz Pascua, in her letter to the Register of Deeds dated August 6, 1979, confirmed thatshe failed to turn over the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 198936 because the same was in thepossession of Jimenez, who, in turn, gave it to Jose J. Burgos. Thereafter, on May 15, 1980, LuzPascua filed a Complaint against the petitioners in the RTC of Quezon City for rescission and damagesdocketed as Civil Case No. 29895 but the same was dismissed on December 19, 1983 for lack of interest to prosecute. Paulo Pascua filed a similar complaint against the petitioners in the RTC,docketed as Civil Case No. 88-523, but the same was, likewise, dismissed. Finally, the petitioners

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alleged that the Spouses Pascua’s possession of the property after the sale thereof to the respondentswas by mere tolerance.

In the meantime, the petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents, the Spouses Chua, theSpouses Pascua, and the Register of Deeds in the RTC of Quezon City, for annulment of deed of saleand TCT No. 86338, and for reconveyance with damages. The petitioners alleged, inter alia, that theyhad been in possession of the property since 1973; their adverse claim over the property wasannotated on June 20, 1979 as Entry No. PE 8812; Luz Pascua died on December 2, 1984 but PauloPascua did not inherit the property from her because the same had already been sold to therespondents; Paulo Pascua executed a falsified affidavit for self-adjudication over the property on thebasis of which he was able to secure, on May 20, 1993, TCT No. 86338.

The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered as follows:

1. Nullifying the deed of sale executed by Paulo Pascua in favor of Edna Chua, marked as Annex “G” hereof and TCT No. 87610 (Annex “H”) in the name of Edna L. Chua; including TCT No.86338 RT-432 (Annex “F”) in the name of Paulo Pascua; and in the alternative to reconvey theaforesaid property to herein plaintiffs;

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT Nos. 87610 and 86338;

3. Sentencing defendants to pay plaint if fs:

a) P100,000 as actual and consequential damages;

b) P50,000 as moral damages;

c) Exemplary damages, P50,000;

d) P15,000 as attorney’s fee;

e) Cost; and,

f) Praying for other reliefs and remedies, equitable and just under the premises.xxxi[4]

On February 17, 1994, the MeTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 7660 defining the issues, thus:

1.Whether or not the complaint is for Forcible Entry or Unlawful Detainer;

2.Who is entitled to the lawful possession of the subject property;

3.Whether this case has to be suspended in view of the filing of an action for Annulment of Title in theRTC of Quezon City; and

4.Whether the plaintiffs can lawfully eject the defendants from the premises.xxxii[5]

The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents on August 11, 1994. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of plaintiffs andagainst defendants by ordering as follows:

1) Defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises denominated as No.39, Visayas Ave., Project 6, Diliman, Quezon City, and to surrender the peaceful possession thereof toplaintiffs;

2) Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 per month representing the reasonablecompensation for the use and occupancy of the premises from the time of formal demand until thepossession of the premises shall have been fully restored to plaintiffs;

3) Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

4) Defendants to pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.xxxiii[6]

The MeTC ruled that having acquired the property from the Spouses Pascua, and being the registeredowners of the property, the respondents are entitled to the possession thereof:

The Court holds that plaintiffs are the ones entitled to the material or physical possession of the subjectproperty. This is so because they have sufficiently established their title over the premises in question.They have shown that they are the registered owners of the subject premises located at No. 39 Visayas Avenue, Project 6, Diliman, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 87610 issuedin their name by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, which property they acquired from its former registered owners, the Sps. Paulo and Georgiana (sic ) Pascua. Hence, as an incident to their ownership over said property, plaintiffs are entitled to its possession.xxxiv[7]

The court also ruled that the proceedings were not suspended by the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-94-19352.

The respondents appealed the decision to the RTC, which rendered judgment on April 15, 1996 in their favor, reversing the decision of the MeTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint. The RTC

anchored its decision on the following findings:

It is the contention of the plaintiff that as registered owners of the subject lot, they have the right to takepossession thereof and eject defendants from the premises. On the other hand, it is the contention of the defendants that they are the rightful owners of the land and have been in possession thereon fromthe time they acquired the land from the real owner Luz B. Pascua.

In ejectment cases, the only issue to be determined by the Court is the fact of prior physical andmaterial possession over the subject property. Under Article 538 of the New Civil Code (NCC), it isprovided that:

“Article 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalitiesexcept in cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, thepresent possessor shall be preferred, if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if thedates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions areequal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownershipthrough proper proceedings.”

In this case, defendants were able to establish the fact that they have been in physical and materialpossession of the subject premises from the time they purchased the same from Luz B. Pascua on July8, 1976. Defendants, therefore, are in possession of the property in the concept of an owner, andunder the law, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that hepossesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it (Art. 541, NCC).

Moreover, it is important to note that defendants purchased the subject premises from Luz B. Pascuaon July 8, 1976 while plaintiffs purchased the same from Paulo Pascua only on June 4, 1993, a muchlater date. This is shown by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Luz B. Pascua in favor of defendants on July 8, 1976 (Annex 1); Deed of Absolute Sale of Unsegregated Portion of Landexecuted by Luz B. Pascua and Paulo Pascua in favor of the defendants on July 14, 1977 (Annex 2)and a Deed of Confirmation of Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land with Waiver dated July 14,1977 executed by Paulo Pascua (Annex 3). These documents put in doubtful validity the subsequentsale of the same land by Paulo Pascua in favor of the plaintiffs. Paulo Pascua had no right, therefore,to transfer ownership of the subject land to plaintiffs because, Luz B. Pascua, the original owner, hadalready sold the same land to defendants during her lifetime. And upon the death of Luz B. Pascua,Paulo Pascua had no right to adjudicate the subject lot to himself because he even confirmed such saleand waived any rights, interest and participation over the subject residential house and lot in a Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale with Waiver dated July 14, 1977 (Annex 3). It bears emphasis, however,that the validity of the respective titles of the parties is now the subject of controversy in Civil Case No.Q-94-19352 pending before the Regional Trial Court o f Quezon City, Branch 102.

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From the foregoing, it is clear that defendants have priority of right and possession over the subjectproperty and have, therefore, the right to be respected in their present possession thereon.xxxv[8]

The petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which later rendered judgmentreversing the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA held that in rulingagainst the petitioners, who were the registered owners of the property, the RTC thereby violated theprescription against the collateral attack of a torrens title.

The Present Petition

In the present recourse, the petitioners, the Spouses Apostol, assert the following: (a) their possessionof the property since 1976 preceded the sale of the property to the private respondents; (b) therespondents were purchasers of the property in bad faith; and, (c) in declaring that the petitioners hadpriority of possession of the property on the sale thereof by Luz Pascua and Paulo Pascua way back in1976 and 1977, the RTC did not thereby collaterally attack the title of the respondents over theproperty. According to the petitioners, an inflexible adherence to the proscription against a collateralattack of a torrens title may result to g ross injustice.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents assert that contrary to the petitioners’ claim, thepetition raises questions of facts. The respondents also aver that the CA did not commit any error in its

decision.

The petitioners contend that the respondents themselves admitted in their complaint before the MeTCthat they knew that the petitioners were in actual possession of the property even before theypurchased the same. Hence, the petitioners argue, the respondents were purchasers in bad faith.

The petitioners also point out that since they purchased the property before the respondents, theycannot be ejected therefrom. Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code which, according to Justice Jose C.Vitug, is “self-operating,” the sale of the property to them prevails over the sale in favor of therespondents. Thus, the sale in favor of the respondents is null and void; consequently, TCT No. 87610issued in favor of the respondents is, likewise, null and void. Finally, the petitioners aver that they mayvery well have become the owners of the property by prescription under Article 1134 of the New CivilCode.

For its part, the CA held as follows:

The respondent court erred in dismissing the action for unlawful detainer on the sole ground that theprivate respondents are possessors in the concept of an owner of the subject premises and cannot,thus, be dispossessed of the same. The subject property is registered under the Torrens System in thenames of the petitioners whose title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterallyattacked, much less in an action for unlawful detainer. No title to registered land in derogation of thetitle of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Caina vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 256; Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 615; Calang vs. Register of Deedsof Quezon City, 231 SCRA 257). The presumption of ownership granted by law to a possessor in the

concept of an owner under Article 541 is only prima facie and cannot prevail over a valid title registeredunder the Torrens System.xxxvi[9]

The Ruling of the Court

We agree with the Court of Appeals. In Pangilinan v. Aguilar ,xxxvii[10] we held that it is an accepted rulethat a person who has a torrens title over the property, such as the respondents, is entitled to thepossession thereof. We reiterated our ruling in the Pangilinan Case in Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,xxxviii

[11] and declared that the registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property covered bythe said title from the time such title was issued in their favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondentswere never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment, as prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases.

The petitioners claim that, as alleged in their answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer, therespondents’ title over the property is a nullity; hence, the complaint for unlawful detainer against thepetitioners should be dismissed for lack of merit. Such allegation does not help their present recourse.

Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateralattack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose inaccordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in anaction expressly instituted for that purpose.xxxix[12] Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claimownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.xl[13]

The following issues are now the subject of Civil Case No. Q-94-19352 before the RTC of Quezon City:(1) whether the respondents were buyers in bad faith; (2) the validity of the deed of absolute sale over the property executed by the Spouses Pascua in favor of the respondents; and (3) the validity of thetitle issued to and in the names of the respondents. Hence, the Court shall no longer delve into suchissues.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38333 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/..%5C..%5C1996%5Cdec1996%5C124292.htm




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Documents

G.R. No. 101387, G.R. No. 153691, G.R. No. 125375