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GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032 CAPT Curt Dubay U.S. Coast Guard

GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032 CAPT Curt

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Page 1: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

GPS Vulnerability Assessment

CGSIC

International Sub-Committee Meeting

Melbourne, Australia

February 10, 20032

CAPT Curt Dubay

U.S. Coast Guard

Page 2: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

2ILA, 28 Oct 02

Overview

• Background

• Action Plan

• Radionavigation Systems Task Force

• The Way Ahead

Page 3: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

3ILA, 28 Oct 02

Background• PDD-63 tasked DOT to assess vulnerability of

transportation infrastructure relying on GPS• Analyze civil aviation, maritime, and surface use to

assess the ways each is impacted by GPS outage• Steps to minimize impacts of GPS outages

• Safety, operational, environmental, and economic

• Overall Finding• GPS key element of nation’s transportation infrastructure• GPS is vulnerable to interference/disruption• Independent backup systems/procedures needed in critical applications

Study released the day before Sep 11th

Page 4: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

4ILA, 28 Oct 02

Background (cont’d)

• 16 specific recommendations to mitigate the impact on transportation systems• Continue GPS modernization to include GPS III

• More civil signals/higher broadcast power

• Implement appropriate mitigation strategies• For each individual mode, maintain appropriate backup

systems or procedures

• Reflect impact of interference in application designs

• Monitor/report/locate sources of interference

• Applicability of military anti-jam technology

• DOT develop Navigation Infrastructure Roadmap for the future

Page 5: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

5ILA, 28 Oct 02

Background (cont’d)

• Dec 01 - DOT Pos/Nav Exec Committee• Operating Administrations concurred with report recommendations• Endorsed proposed mitigation action plan

• March 02 - Secretary approved plan • Department currently implementing • DOT Positioning and Navigation Executive

Committee overseeing implementation• Task Force conducting Radionavigation

Capabilities Assessment

Page 6: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

6ILA, 28 Oct 02

Overview

• Background

• Action Plan

• Radionavigation Systems Task Force

• The Way Ahead

Page 7: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

7ILA, 28 Oct 02

Action Plan Goals

• Ensure that GPS fulfills its potential as a key element of the nation’s transportation infrastructure

• Ensure that the vulnerabilities identified in the report do not affect the safety and security of our transportation system

• Contains 12 elements

Page 8: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

8ILA, 28 Oct 02

Action Plan ElementsVulnerability Mitigation

• Ensure adequate backup systems/procedures

• Continue GPS modernization• Continue spectrum protection• Enhance interference location

capabilities

Risk Awareness • Emphasize education programs• Conduct periodic public

outreach• Send letters to industry,

state/local DOTs• Work with GPS Industry

Council

GPS Receiver Enhancement• Facilitate transfer of DoD AJ

technology• Certify safety-critical GPS

receivers• Develop GPS receiver standards

Future Direction• Intermodal radionavigation

capabilities assessment• Make decision on the future of

LORAN-C by end of CY02• Develop Roadmap for 2003 Federal

Radionavigation Plan

Page 9: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

9ILA, 28 Oct 02

Overview

• Background

• Action Plan

• Radionavigation Systems Task Force

• The Way Ahead

Page 10: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

10ILA, 28 Oct 02

Radionavigation Systems Task Force

• Chartered to conduct a multi-modal capability assessment of radionavigation systems

• Complete assessment of the future mix of systems to meet all requirements of the U.S. Transportation infrastructure• From both a capability and cost perspective• Consider requirements of non-transportation users

of Federal Radionavigation Systems

• Forward recommendation to Secretary to support a decision in early 2003

Page 11: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

11ILA, 28 Oct 02

Technical Approach• Identify requirements of transportation modes • Define capabilities of different systems• Conduct technical assessment of systems

• Capabilities vs. Requirements

• Develop alternatives of system mixes• Reduce to 4-6 alternatives

• Criteria for evaluation of remaining alternatives • Cost, performance, backup• Political, impact to others

• Provide recommendation on best alternative• To satisfy national need for positioning and timing

services for at least the next 10 years

Page 12: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

12ILA, 28 Oct 02

Assumptions

• 2001 Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP)• Baseline for radionavigation systems

• Include GPS capabilities only through GPS modernized Block IIF (i.e., 2 new civil signals)• GPS III will be evaluated once system is defined

• Augmentations to GPS are not backup radionavigation systems for GPS • WAAS, LAAS, and NDGPS (includes MDGPS)• All depend on receiving basic GPS position• If GPS position lost, value of augmentation lost

Page 13: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

13ILA, 28 Oct 02

Evaluation• Produced detailed matrices of requirements

• 2001 Federal Radionavigation Plan

• GPS Operational Requirements Document (Feb 2000)

• Other validated requirements

• Produced detailed matrices of systems capabilities

• Evaluated Capabilities vs Requirements • Integrity, availability, coverage, accuracy, and continuity

Page 14: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

14ILA, 28 Oct 02

Alternatives

• Developed 12 alternatives from the baseline• Based on assumptions and capabilities vs requirements

assessment• Guidance from the POS/NAV EC on several issues

• FAA Navigation and Landing Transition Strategy• Forwarded to the DOT on Aug 21, 2002• Results integrated into Task Force evaluation

• Reduced to 4 for further evaluation• Pros & cons for each alternative

Page 15: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

15ILA, 28 Oct 02

IssuesShould radionavigation systems in R&D be

considered in current alternative mixes?• LAAS Cat II/III (FAA); High Accuracy NDGPS (FHWA); enhanced

Loran (FAA, Coast Guard); GPS III (DoD/AF); and Galileo (EU)

Decision: Do not include R&D systems until completion of R&D• Performance and lifecycle costs for systems are unknown at this

time• Modes continue investments in R&D systems• Each R&D effort should assess feasibility to meet other mode

performance requirements

Page 16: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

16ILA, 28 Oct 02

Issues Can a single augmentation system (i.e. WAAS or DGPS) meet cross-modal transportation requirements?

• 1994 National Augmentation Study • Field both the NDGPS and WAAS systems to meet individual mode requirements• Coordinate all Federal augmented GPS systems

• Ensure optimal use of resources by maximizing commonality of system components

• Task Force validated 1994 Study

Decision: Continue both WAAS and NDGPS• FAA/CG examine co-location of future WAAS and NDGPS monitor stations

Page 17: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

17ILA, 28 Oct 02

Issues What is decision path for Loran-C in 2002?

• Transportation requirements not met by Loran-C• The POS/NAV EC examined three options

• Option 1: Terminate Loran-C• Option 2: Complete enhanced Loran evaluation• Option 3: Fully endorse enhanced Loran now

• Evaluation of enhanced Loran required to:

• Determine performance for non precision approach for aviation and harbor approach for maritime• Will take until March 2004 and ~$10M to complete

• Based on current spending levels• Does not include recapitalization costs thru 2008

• Working toward decision in early 2003

Page 18: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

18ILA, 28 Oct 02

Radionavigation Alternative Mixes

• Baseline Mix • Satisfies user requirements for primary and backup systems• May be viewed as failure to reduce proliferation of systems

• Mix 1 – Baseline w/Loran-C terminated• Cost savings to Government w/termination of Loran-C• Negative user and political impact• May be viewed as not satisfying Volpe Report

Page 19: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

19ILA, 28 Oct 02

Radionavigation Alternative Mixes (cont’d)

• Mix 2 – Baseline w/ optimizing future systems convergence, Loran-C terminated

• Some cost savings with termination of Loran-C• Negative user and political impact• May be viewed as not satisfying Volpe Report

• Mix 3 – Baseline w/ optimizing future systems convergence to include Loran

• Meets requirements for primary and backup systems• Requires completion of enhanced Loran evaluation

Page 20: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

20ILA, 28 Oct 02

Overview

• Background

• Action Plan

• Radionavigation Systems Task Force

• The Way Ahead

Page 21: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

21ILA, 28 Oct 02

The Way Ahead• Developing Decision Memorandum for Secretary on

Loran-C• Coordinating with Modal Administrators

• Evaluating remaining 4 mix options pending decision on Loran

• Forward recommendation to Secretary in early 2003 • Establish foundation for development of 2003

Federal Radionavigation Plan

Page 22: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

22ILA, 28 Oct 02

Summary• Department concurs with all recommendations of the Volpe

Study• Critical infrastructure protection a continuing issue

• Department is implementing Action Plan• Completing assessment of future radionavigation mix to maintain

adequate backups in the future• Working toward Loran decision in early 2003

• Safety-critical transportation applications that use GPS currently have adequate backups in case of GPS disruptions• Ensure maintained in future

Page 23: GPS Vulnerability Assessment CGSIC International Sub-Committee Meeting Melbourne, Australia February 10, 20032   CAPT Curt

GPS Vulnerability Assessment

CGSIC

International Sub-Committee Meeting

Melbourne, Australia

February 10, 20032

Michael Shaw

U.S. Department of Transportation