Governance Networks and Meta Governance

Public Administration Vol. 87, No. 2, 2009 (234–258)© 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01753.x

MAKING GOVERNANCE NETWORKS EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC THROUGH METAGOVERNANCE

EVA SØRENSEN AND JACOB TORFING

In response to the growing discrepancy between the steadily rising steering ambitions and the increasing fragmentation of social and political life, governance networks are mushrooming. Gov-ernance through the formation of networks composed of public and private actors might help solve wicked problems and enhance democratic participation in public policy-making, but it may also create confl icts and deadlocks and make public governance less transparent and accountable. In order to ensure that governance networks contribute to an effective and democratic governing of society, careful metagovernance by politicians, public managers and other relevant actors is neces-sary. In this paper, we discuss how to assess the effective performance and democratic quality of governance networks. We also describe how different metagovernance tools can be used in the pursuit of effective and democratic network governance. Finally, we argue that public metagover-nors must develop their strategic and collaborative competences in order to become able to meta-govern governance networks.

INTRODUCTION

When it comes to enhancing the legitimacy of the regulatory standards issued by the eu-ropean union (EU), resolving confl icts over national social policy reforms, securing a well-informed regional planning process, or mobilizing the relevant stakeholders in the local effort to combat problems such as obesity, political decision makers increasingly turn to network-based forms of governance, building on horizontal interaction between public and private policy actors. Consequently, governance networks appear to prolifer-ate at all levels and within and across most policy areas. The fi rst generation of gover-nance network theorists were primarily interested in describing different kinds of networks and showing how they function as mechanisms of governance (see Marin and Mayntz 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Schneider and Kenis 1996; Marsh 1998; Schneider 1998 ). The second generation of governance network theorists aim to assess the normative and political impact of governance networks and to improve their performance (see Benz and Papadopoulos 2006; Leach 2006; Klijn and Skelcher 2007 ; Sørensen and Torfi ng 2007) . The attempt to assess and improve the impact and performance of governance networks may invoke an entire range of normative criteria in terms of equity, democracy, goal-attainment, productivity, stability, confl ict resolution, learning capacity, and so on. The question of how to choose an appropriate criterion for assessing network performance has been dealt with elsewhere (Kenis and Provan 2008). We shall focus here on the impact of governance networks on what we broadly defi ne as effective and democratic gover-nance. The impact on effectivity is important since the reliance on governance networks is often justifi ed with reference to the need for enhancing the effectivity of public gover-nance. The impact on democracy is crucial, since democratic problems in terms of the lack of accountability and the privileging of strong and resourceful elites is an ever-present danger in a networked polity.

Eva Sørensen is Professor of Public Administration and Democracy and Jacob Torfi ng is Professor of Politics and Institutions at Roskilde University.

METAGOVERNING NETWORKS 235

Public Administration Vol. 87, No. 2, 2009 (234–258)© 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

We do not believe that governance networks are inherently effective; nor that they are inherently undemocratic. Network performance depends on the societal context, the institutional design and the political struggles that determine their form and function-ing. However, since governance networks are here to stay, we must be able to assess their performance in order to maximize the merits and minimize the problems via a re-fl exive and strategic metagovernance that combines hands-off and hands-on interven-tion. There has been increasing focus on how politicians and public managers can improve the overall functioning of governance networks through metagovernance (see Kickert et al. 1997; Rhodes 1997; Kooiman 2003; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004; Kelly 2006 ). However, the question of how public authorities can enhance effective and democratic network governance through different forms of metagovernance has received scant at-tention. In order to compensate for this neglect, we aim to provide a systematic account of the tools deployed by public metagovernors in the pursuit of effective and democratic network governance.

Our argument builds on the assertion that both politicians and public managers at different levels of government have a special responsibility for unleashing the poten-tials of governance networks. As knowledgeable and resourceful actors, they have a capacity for strategic leadership; they are, in addition, charged with defending public interests. Of course, there is no guarantee that politicians and public managers will assume this responsibility; they are also engaged in political confl icts and power strug-gles and may seek to exploit their privileged position to pursue particularistic interests. However, democracy forces them to justify their rule and legitimize the overall system of governance in the face of hegemonic norms prescribing that public governance should be both effective and democratic. Such norms are intrinsic to the discourse of liberal democracy, and they may be further accentuated and institutionalized in the years to come as a result of the growing emphasis on performance measurement, the persistent calls for combating the democratic defi cit within the EU by developing new forms of stakeholder democracy, and the global promulgation of the discourse on ‘ Good Governance ’ .

In this paper, the argument about how to assess and improve the performance and impact of governance networks proceeds as follows. We begin with a defi nition and brief account of the recent surge in governance networks. We proceed with a discussion of how to assess the contribution of governance networks to an effective and democratic governing of our increasingly complex, fragmented and multi-layered societies. This dis-cussion is followed by an attempt to defi ne the concept of metagovernance and to create an inventory of the range of metagovernance tools available to politicians and public managers working to enhance the effective and democratic performance of governance networks. Combining the central insights from the previous discussions renders it possi-ble to provide a systematic overview of how these different metagovernance tools can be used to enhance effective and democratic network governance. Finally, after a brief ex-ploration of the dilemmas confronting politicians and public managers in their exercise of metagovernance, we highlight the strategic and collaborative competences required for metagoverning governance networks before outlining an agenda for further research on metagovernance.

THE SURGE OF GOVERNANCE NETWORKS

In today ’ s world, governance networks have proliferated to an astonishing extent within different countries, policy areas and levels of governance ( Heffen et al. 2000; Agranoff

236 EVA SØRENSEN AND JACOB TORFING


and McGuire 2003; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Marcussen and Torfi ng 2007) . Although traditional forms of top-down government remain in place, public governance increas-ingly proceeds in and through pluricentric negotiations among relevant and affected ac-tors interacting on the basis of interdependency, trust, and jointly developed rules, norms and discourses. The surge in governance networks is prompted by the persistent critique of the traditional forms of governance in terms of hierarchies and markets for being, re-spectively, excessively rigid and reactive. Hence, important trend-setting organizations such as the World Bank, the EU, multinational corporations, private think tanks and na-tional governments, tend to recommend the formation and use of strategic alliances, partnerships and interorganizational networks since these are perceived as the key to a more fl exible and proactive governance.

This somewhat euphoric celebration of the merits of governance networks tends to neglect their problems and limitations: that they are often unstable, diffuse and opaque. Nevertheless, governance networks clearly deserve scholarly attention because they add considerably to the current transformation of the form and functioning of government and because they create new spaces of governance by breaking down the traditional di-chotomies of state and society; public and private; local and global. As such, governance networks blur the boundary between state and society by facilitating co-governance and negotiated coordination ( Kooiman 1993 ). They bring together public and private actors in processes of collaborative governance, and they cut across the distinctions between global, national and local levels of governance in the creation of tangled, multi-level net-works ( Bache and Flinders 2004 ).

Drawing on the extensive literature, we can defi ne governance networks as:

A stable articulation of mutually dependent, but operationally autonomous actors from state, market and civil society, who interact through confl ict-ridden negotiations that take place within an institutionalized framework of rules, norms, shared knowl-edge and social imaginaries; facilitate self-regulated policy making in the shadow of hierarchy; and contribute to the production of ‘ public value ’ in a broad sense of prob-lem defi nitions, visions, ideas, plans and concrete regulations that are deemed relevant to broad sections of the population.

This generic defi nition of governance networks makes no claim to originality; rather, it aims at capturing the main features commonly ascribed to governance networks ( Mayntz 1993a; Rhodes 1997; Jessop 2002 ). It highlights the interdependency of the public and pri-vate actors who retain their operational autonomy in the sense that they are not com-manded by superiors. The network actors interact through negotiations that possibly combine hard-nosed bargaining with consensus-seeking deliberation. When a governance network is fi rst formed, ‘ there are no agreed upon norms, procedures, or “ constitution ” to predetermine where and how a legitimate decision is to be taken ’ ( Hajer and Versteeg 2005 , p. 341). However, the ongoing interaction of the network actors will eventually lead to the formulation of a framework of rules, norms, values and ideas that is both precarious and incomplete. The institutionalized interaction facilitates a self-regulated policy-making process that always proceeds in the ‘ shadow of hierarchy ’ cast by public and/or private metagovernors, and who are capable of regulating and reducing the autonomy of the network ( Scharpf 1994 ). The relatively self-regulated policy-making results not only in concrete policy decisions and policy regulation; it may also change the entire policy dis-course, including the identity of the actors, their mutual perceptions of each other, and the norms and values upon which concrete policy decisions and policy regulations build.



Governance networks may assume different empirical forms in different countries, at different levels of governance, and within different policy areas. As such, they might be:

● self-grown from below or mandated and designed from above; ● formal or informal; ● intra- or inter-organizational; ● open or closed; ● tightly knit or loosely coupled; ● short- or long-lived; ● sector-specifi c or society-wide; ● preoccupied either with policy formulation or policy implementation.

The plurality in the forms of governance networks attests to the broad relevance of the concept for describing and analysing contemporary forms of governance. In addition, the different characteristics of governance networks are important for explaining their impact on public policy-making. For example, it is often asserted that strongly integrated policy communities are capable of blocking new policy initiatives, whereas loosely integrated issue networks might facilitate consensus building ( Thatcher 1998 ).

Governance networks may also carry different labels ( Kenis and Schneider 1991 ). Schol-ars previously used labels such as neo-corporatism, policy communities, private interest government and advocacy coalitions when talking about governance networks. Today, governance networks are referred to as informal governance arrangements, partnerships, joined-up government, co-governance mechanisms, strategic alliances, deliberative fo-rums, advisory boards or policy task forces. The litmus test enabling us to see whether the different labels conceal a governance network is to check whether we can identify a network of interdependent yet autonomous actors engaged in institutionalized processes of public governance based on negotiated interactions and joint decision making.

Finally, there are often different rationales behind the formation of governance networks that tend to shape their form and functioning (see Bogason and Zølner 2007; Marcussen and Torfi ng 2007) . In some countries and policy areas, governance networks are formed in order to overcome fragmentation within the public sector and mainly take the form of joined-up goverment. In other cases, governance networks are created in order to facilitate the coordination between quasi-autonomous public agencies and private con-tractors. Finally, the formation of governance networks is sometimes motivated by an interest in enhancing the input and output legitimacy of public governance processes ( Scharpf 1999 ). Input legitimacy is advanced through the participation of civil society actors (for example, the social partners), while output legitimacy is enhanced through an expansion of the knowledge basis of public policy-making and the creation of programme responsibility.

The differences in the forms, labelling and functions of governance networks is best explained by the presence of different administrative discourses, institutional traditions and political cultures ( Rhodes 2007 ), which also contributes to explaining the uneven spread of governance networks in different countries and policy sectors. There is no com-monly accepted theory of the impact of political and cultural contexts on the form and function of governance networks. What we have is a rather general picture of Europe as divided in three broad traditions: (1) a Northern and Western European tradition for the corporatist involvement of the social partners (currently developing into a broader stake-holder dialogue); (2) a Southern European tradition, whereby networks are negatively



associated with lobbyism, corruption and criminal activities; and civil society participa-tion in public governance is associated with the devolution of power to local and regional authorities; and (3) a Central and Eastern European tradition, where networks are nega-tively associated with the rule of old or new cliques, but a large effort being made to de-velop a legal framework for public-private co-governance ( Banthien et al. 2003 , pp. 47 – 8). A further contextualization of the deployment of governance networks in public policy-making is needed. This will require the development of more specifi c notions of network-based policy-making based on stylized descriptions of the institutionalized patterns of interaction and the supporting governance narratives.

The scholarly literature includes competing explanations of the recent surge of gover-nance networks (see Sørensen and Torfi ng 2007) . Governability theories advanced by Jan Kooiman (1993) and Renate Mayntz (1993b) tend to perceive governance networks as a functional response to the need for horizontal coordination in our increasingly complex, differentiated and dynamic societies. The interdependence theories advanced by Rod Rhodes (1997) and Walter Kickert, Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan (1997) tend to view governance networks as the strategic response of rational, self-interested policy ac-tors to the need for the exchange of material and immaterial resources within a public sector fragmented by New Public Management-inspired reforms. Finally, sociological organization theorists such as James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1995) tend to perceive governance networks as a normative response to the over-socialization of the individual by the state and the under-socialization of the individual by the market. The functionalist, rationalist and normative biases of these theories are overcome by the poststructuralist governmentality theory advanced by Michel Foucault (1991) and Nikolas Rose (1999) . These writers claim that governance networks are deployed as part of an advanced liberal governmentality urging the state to ‘ govern at a distance ’ by means of mobilizing a plu-rality of self-regulating actors and networks within an institutional framework ensuring a certain degree of conformity with broadly defi ned objectives. Despite the structuralist undertones of this explanation, it aims to bring political power to the fore, as the new hegemonic governmentality is seen as a result of political struggles aiming to respond to the problematization of both the statist and neoliberal conceptions of the art of govern-ment. Hence, the surge in governance networks is perceived neither to be an outcome of structural imperatives, strategic actions of self-interested policy actors, nor the normative ambitions of advancing the Good Society. Rather, it constitutes a political response to the persistent critique of both welfare statism and neoliberalism. While the welfare state has been accused of being excessively authoritarian and costly, the neoliberal marketization strategy has failed to alleviate the burden of the state since the creation of well- functioning quasi-markets requires a time-consuming and resource-demanding regulation ( Dean 1999 ). By contrast, governance networks aim to mobilize the knowledge, resources and energies of free and responsible citizens, civil society organizations, local public agencies and private fi rms aiming to govern themselves on the basis of narratives, objectives, standards and benchmarks articulated by performance technologies that are intrinsic to the new governmentality.

EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC NETWORK GOVERNANCE?

New governance arrangements such as governance networks take part in the authorita-tive allocation of values for a society ( Easton 1965 ). In evaluating their performance, we must therefore ask whether they contribute to fulfi l the key ambition of modern gover-nance: producing and delivering public policy in a manner that is both effective and



democratic. Effective governance has been a major concern in the public management literature for quite some time ( Lane 1995 ), and the question is whether governance net-works enhance or reduce effective governance. However, it is not enough to consider whether governance networks are effective. Given their informal character and the infl u-ence of private actors, there is an urgent need to consider the democratic performance of governance networks ( Skelcher 2007 ). The assessment of the contribution of governance networks to effective and democratic governance, however, poses a massive analytical challenge. As we shall see, we cannot blindly apply the traditional concepts of effectivity and democracy in evaluating the performance of the new interactive governance arrange-ments. Rather, we must carefully reconsider how to defi ne and measure effective and democratic governance in relation to networks.

Effective network governance As Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire rightly state, ‘ the issue of collaborative effec-tiveness is fundamental yet has been incompletely addressed ’ ( Agranoff and McGuire 2003 , p. 191). Governance networks are often praised for their contribution to making public governance more effective in policy settings characterized by a multiplicity of so-cial and political actors, vague and incomplete problem defi nitions, the need for special-ized knowledge, confl icting policy objectives, and a high risk of political antagonism ( Klijn and Koppenjan 2004 ). However, we lack a clear and adequate understanding of what ‘ effective ’ means in relation to governance networks. The few public administration researchers who have addressed the question of the effectivity of governance networks have been more interested in explaining the differences in effectivity across networks than in scrutinizing the notion of effectivity and developing a systematic framework for as-sessing the effectivity of governance networks ( Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Riccio et al. 2000; Provan and Kenis 2005 ). A major exception is Provan and Milward (2001) who provide an elaborate set of criteria for measuring the effectivity of community-based networks in terms of their costs and benefi ts for the community, the network and the participating organizations. Although the criteria proposed by Provan and Milward are biased towards measuring the effectiveness of service delivery networks in the healthcare sector, they certainly provide an important source of inspiration for our account of the effectivity of governance networks per se .

It is commonly asserted that governance networks provide a distinct mechanism for governance that is based on pluricentric negotiations rather than unicentric command or multicentric competition ( Kersbergen and Waarden 2004 ). This means that we cannot defi ne or measure the effectiveness of governance networks in the same way that we de-fi ne and measure the effectiveness of hierarchies and markets ( Jessop 2002 , p. 236).

Hierarchical forms of government are normally evaluated in terms of either the cost effi ciency of public policy programmes, defi ned as the total costs of producing a certain policy output, or the operational effectiveness of such programmes, defi ned as their abil-ity to attain some predefi ned goals through the operative mobilization and deployment of particular resources ( Etzioni 1964 , pp. 8 – 9; Lane 1995 , pp. 242 – 3). In public bureaucra-cies, there is an ever-present tension between cost effi ciency and operational effectiveness. Whereas the former requires focus, discipline and control, the latter is predicated upon experimentation, loose discipline and relaxed control ( March 1995 , p. 5). According to Nancy Roberts (2000 , p. 228), however, the move towards collaborative forms of gover-nance through networks may permit public managers to achieve both effi ciency and ef-fectiveness. Networking with stakeholders in the identifi cation and use of common means



will tend to increase effi ciency, and networking with stakeholders in the pursuit of com-mon ends will tend to enhance effectiveness.

Nevertheless, we do not fi nd the standard notions of effi ciency and effectiveness ap-propriate for evaluating the performance of governance networks. First, there are serious problems with measuring the cost effi ciency of networked policy processes. The output of governance networks can be extremely diffi cult to quantify, since it often includes in-tangible results such as joint problem understandings, common values, future visions, enhanced coordination, cooperative processes, and so on. Moreover, it is exceedingly troublesome to measure the total costs of networked policy outputs since the governance networks in question are seldom in control of the production of the tangible and intan-gible policy outputs. These outputs are often partly the responsibility of the network ac-tors and partly the responsibility of a broad range of government agencies. Even if we somehow managed to quantify the outputs and estimate the costs, it would be of no great interest to measure whether governance networks produce and deliver policies in a cost effi cient manner. Despite Nancy Roberts ’ optimistic assertions about the effectiveness of governance networks, we should not expect governance networks to be highly cost effi -cient, since there is nothing particularly effi cient about making decisions jointly ( Agranoff and McGuire 2003 , p. 191). Collaboration with stakeholders might help mobilize addi-tional resources, and negotiated coordination might help make better use of the available resources; however, we should not forget that the transaction costs of networking are often high and networks might fall into the joint decision trap ( Scharpf 1988 ).

The attempt to evaluate the operational effectiveness of governance networks does not fare any better. The assessment of policy outcomes, and thus goal achievement, is com-plicated by the fact that the defi nition of the policy goals is subject to ongoing confl icts as well as to negotiations among the network actors, both of which lead to unclear and competing goals. The presence of diffuse and multiple objectives is a standard problem in the assessment of goal attainment in public programmes ( Etzioni 1964 , pp. 14 – 16; Riccio et al. 2000 , p. 167). There is an additional problem in the case of the provision of networked policy solutions, however, since the policy objectives are constantly changing due to mutual learning and shifting power relations. Indeed, the need to adjust policy objectives to changing preferences and circumstances is often one of the primary reasons why governance networks are formed. The occasional and momentary presence of rela-tively clear, stable and coherent objectives might facilitate the assessment of a governance network ’ s capacity for goal attainment, but since governance networks often share the operational responsibility for reaching the specifi ed goals with a host of government agencies, it would be wrong to hold the networks accountable for the failure to achieve particular goals. Moreover, while the problem-solving capacity of governance networks is certainly important, the real strength of governance networks will often lie in defi ning a complex set of objectives that refl ects the complexity of the policy problems rather than in delivering the outputs that produce the desired outcomes ( Kooiman 1993; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004 ). This seriously challenges the appropriateness of the notion of opera-tional effectiveness for evaluating the effective performance of governance networks.

The evaluation of the kind of ‘ quasi-markets ’ introduced as part of New Public Man-agement reforms is normally carried out in terms of cost effi ciency ( Cutler and Waine 1997 ). However, in those cases in which public regulation and service delivery rely on the construction and operation of allegedly ‘ pure markets ’ , effectivity is assessed in terms of allocative effi ciency, defi ned as a Pareto-optimal allocation of costs and benefi ts that ensures that the marginal utility equals the marginal costs for all actors ( Downs and Larkey



1986 , p. 7). Compared to the notion of operational effectiveness, the Pareto criterion has the advantage of permitting an individual assessment of costs and benefi ts rather than assuming the presence of a collective utility function. However, the production of a Pa-reto-optimal solution does not provide an appropriate yardstick for measuring the effec-tivity of governance networks either. In governance networks, the economic competition among an infi nite number of independent market actors is replaced by confl ictual nego-tiations among a small number of interdependent stakeholders, and political struggles are unlikely to result in a Pareto-optimal solution. Although win-win situations do occur, the existence of asymmetrical power relations will tend to produce both winners and losers. Without the presence of an external coercive power, ANY compensation of the losers is unlikely.

In the search for an appropriate means of measuring the effectivity of governance net-works, we must move beyond the traditional notions of cost effi ciency, operational ef-fectiveness and allocative effi ciency. We need an alternative way of assessing the effectivity of governance networks that refl ects their distinctive structure, function and contribution to the governing of society.

A simple and frequently chosen solution to the problem of evaluating network perfor-mance is measuring the perceived effectiveness of governance networks through a survey of the ex post satisfaction with networked policy solutions ( Klijn and Koppenjan 2004 ). The target of such ex post surveys can either be the different groups of citizens affected by the networked policy solutions (Hasnain-Wynia 2003) or the stakeholder organizations participating in the networks ( Teisman 1992 ). The respondents are asked whether they believe the governance network has been effective in producing particular outputs and whether they are satisfi ed with the content and impact of these outputs. In order to test the comparative advantage of governance networks, the respondents may also be asked whether they think that collaborative network governance is ‘ better ’ in the sense of pro-ducing solutions and results that otherwise would not have occurred ( Agranoff and McGuire 2003 , p. 191). Such a counter-factual assessment helps reveal whether relevant citizens and stakeholders prefer the networked solution to solutions provided either by hierarchical government or competitive markets. However, the problem with this ap-proach is that the respondents are not likely to provide particularly reliable answers, since citizens are usually ignorant of how and by whom particular solutions and services are produced. In addition, stakeholders may be strongly inclined to provide affi rmative answers imbued with ex post rationalization and these may have no bearing on the actual performance of the network. Another problem is that the individual assessments of the effectiveness of the network will primarily refl ect the relative gains of the respondents rather than the effectiveness of the governance network as a whole. Last but not least, the evaluation of ex post satisfaction will not tell us anything about why citizens and stakeholders are more or less content with networked policy solutions. There might be a thousand reasons for preferring a networked policy solution to other solutions. Thus we need a systematic understanding of these reasons in order to provide an adequate mea-sure of the effectivity of governance networks.

The norms invoked by citizens and stakeholders in their evaluation of the effectiveness of particular governance networks can be studied through a qualitative, bottom-up analy-sis based on interviews and document studies. This has been attempted by Denise van Raaij and Patrick Kenis (2005), who explore the explicit and implicit norms of effective network governance that are articulated in four Dutch healthcare networks. Although such an inductive approach improves our understanding of the underlying reasons for



being satisfi ed or dissatisfi ed with the performance of particular governance networks, it does not provide a systematic and comprehensive account of what effectivity means in relation to governance networks.

In order to provide an appropriate measure of whether governance networks are ef-fective or not, we propose that governance networks be assessed in terms of whether they actually deliver what they are supposed to deliver, according to the vast literature on governance networks (for an overview, see Sørensen and Torfi ng 2007) . The assessment criteria listed below aim to capture the particular merits in terms of effective governance that are usually ascribed to well-functioning governance networks. These criteria include substantive as well as procedural aspects of network-based governance. In order to avoid confusing the effective performance of governance networks with the underlying condi-tions for this performance, the effectivity criteria are formulated in terms of a set of norms specifying the desired outputs and outcomes of networked policy processes, which to-gether measure the effectivity of governance networks. Like Keith Provan and Brinton Milward (2001, p. 416), we pay attention to the quality of network-based policies; the ac-tual ability of governance networks to solve relevant problems; the costs of the networked solutions and their distribution; and the enhancement of democratic legitimacy. However, instead of devising different sets of criteria for different stakeholder groups, our criteria for measuring the effectivity of governance networks relate to the different phases in the policy process. This refl ects our basic interest in how governance networks contribute to an effective formulation, implementation and revision of public policy through an ongo-ing process of trust-based interaction. Hence, effective network governance is not merely a question of how ‘ scarce public funding can be allocated to service-delivery mechanisms that are using resources effi ciently while adequately serving public needs ’ ( Provan and Milward 2001 , p. 415). Effective network governance begins with the identifi cation of relevant policy problems and ends with the building of capacities for future cooperation. Following this line of argument, we make the suggestion that the effectivity of governance networks can be measured in terms of their capacity to accomplish the following:

1. Produce a clear and well-informed understanding of the often complex and cross-cutting policy problems and policy opportunities at hand;

2. Generate innovative, proactive and yet feasible policy options that match the joint perception of the problems and challenges facing the network actors;

3. Reach joint policy decisions that go beyond the least common denominator while avoiding excessive costs and unwarranted cost shifting;

4. Ensure a relatively smooth policy implementation based on a continuous coordina-tion and a high degree of legitimacy and programme responsibility among all the relevant and affected actors, including target groups, client advocacy groups, stake-holder organizations, public administrators and politicians;

5. Provide a fl exible adjustment of policy solutions and public services in the face of changing demands, conditions and preferences;

6. Create favourable conditions for future cooperation through cognitive, strategic and institutional learning that construct common frameworks, spur the development of interdependency and build mutual trust.

The compilation of this list of effectivity criteria is inspired by several authors ( Jessop 2002 , pp. 228 – 30; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004 , pp. 122 – 29; and Scharpf 1988, 1994, 1999 ). The assessment of the effectivity of governance networks according to the six criteria



provides a broad and comprehensive picture of the capacity of governance networks to provide effective and comparatively better policy solutions through negotiated interac-tion. However, not all governance networks can be expected to deliver on all these dimen-sions. Hence, governance networks that are mainly preoccupied with policy formulation will fail to deliver on criteria 4 – 6. Likewise, governance networks primarily preoccupied with policy implementation and service delivery will fail to deliver on criteria 1 – 3.

At a more fundamental level, the problem is that governance networks – just like hier-archies and markets – are prone to failure. Governance networks rely on precarious social and political processes that are easily disturbed by external or internal events. The socio-political context might be unstable and subject to profound changes, and the centrifugal forces within the network emanating from confl icts and power struggles might be stron-ger than the centripetal forces rooted in mutual dependency and institutionalized norms and identities. Attempts at increasing the effectiveness of public governance through reli-ance on governance networks are thus conditional upon the form and functioning of these networks. In order to be effective, governance networks must be able to adjust to changes in their environment ( March and Olsen 1995 ) and provide a relatively institutionalized framework for robust and sustained negotiations that can facilitate the alignment of goals, values and cultures and produce a stable coordination of actions in the face of diverging interests ( Goldsmith and Eggers 2004 ). Ensuring the conditions for effective network governance requires a careful and deliberate governance of the self-regulated governance networks. In other words, governance networks must be metagoverned in order to con-tribute to the effective governing of society ( Kickert et al. 1997; Jessop 2002; Provan and Kenis 2005 ).

Democratic network governance Governance networks are often developing by default. Other hierarchical or market-based mechanisms of governance have failed, and the central decision makers now turn to more network-based types of governance. In those cases where governance networks are formed as part of a deliberate political strategy, the primary motive is often to enhance the effectivity of public governance. As such, the democratic potentials of network gov-ernance are seldom envisaged. This might be because the central decision makers fi nd it diffi cult to see how governance networks can enhance democracy. This is perfectly understandable, since when judged on the basis of the traditional liberal norms of repre-sentative democracy, governance networks appear to be rather undemocratic. There is no equal participation of the citizens within a given territory, since only the relevant and affected groups have access to a particular governance network. There is no free and open competition among different political elites to represent the relevant and affected citizens, as the participating stakeholder organizations often possess a monopoly in representing particular functionally defi ned groups of people. Finally, democratic control and account-ability is weak due to the fact that the network participants are not elected, but rather (self-)appointed. A shift in the theoretical perspective from aggregative theories of repre-sentative democracy to integrative, talk-centred theories of democracy does not necessar-ily lead to a more positive evaluation of the democratic prospects of network-based governance. Hence, communitarian theories of deliberative democracy tend to be scepti-cal regarding the democratic potentials of governance networks, because they blur the boundary between state and civil society and thereby threaten to subject the reasoned debate in civil society to the power games and instrumental logics associated with the state ( Sørensen and Torfi ng 2007 , p. 234).



This is not the end of the story of democratic network governance, however, since a number of relatively recently developed theories of democracy appear to offer crucial insights concerning the democratic potentials of governance networks (see Sørensen and Torfi ng 2005a ). In an elite-democratic perspective, governance networks can hence be seen as a means of establishing an intermediate level of sub-elites capable of challenging the dominant elites and increase vertical elite competition ( Etzioni-Halevy 1993 ). By con-trast, critical communitarian democrats might view governance networks as a way of forging horizontal links between fragmented social and political communities and identi-ties ( Sandel 1996 ). From the perspective of associational democracy, governance networks can be seen as a means to establish organizational links between top-down representative democracy and self-governing democracy in civil society ( Hirst 1994 ). The advocates of empowered participatory governance tend to see governance networks as a means of enhancing democratic legitimacy by facilitating political participation and infl uence on the output side of the political system ( Fung and Wright 2003 ). According to the theories of discursive democracy, governance networks might help widen the scope for inter-discursive contestation and deliberation ( Dryzek 2000 ). Finally, governance network theo-rists claim that governance networks provide a supplement to representative democracy that grants an extra channel of infl uence to those who are intensely affected by certain decisions ( Jessop 2000; Rhodes 2000 ). In fact, this echoes ideas presented by Robert A. Dahl (1956) half a century ago, when he discussed the possibility of allowing a minority with intense preferences to prevail over an apathetic majority.

However, the positive contribution of governance networks to the democratic function-ing of society can only be fully appreciated if governance networks are themselves demo-cratic. We have suggested elsewhere that governance networks are not democratic per se , but that their democratic performance can be assessed through an evaluation of their democratic anchorage ( Sørensen and Torfi ng 2005b ). In a nutshell, the argument is that governance networks are democratic in so far as they are democratically anchored in representative democracy, organizational democracy, a democratic public, and a set of democratic norms and rules regulating the interaction among the participants in the net-work. As such, we claim that a governance network is democratically anchored to the extent that it:

1. Is monitored by elected politicians capable of infl uencing the relatively self-regulated policy processes proceeding within the network;

2. Comprises private business and civil society actors whose performance in the net-work is critically assessed by the members of the organizations and groups they claim to represent;

3. Is accountable to the citizens affected by the decisions of the network and who are capable of scrutinizing and contesting publicly available accounts of how the net-work has handled different policy issues;

4. Re-enacts a series of commonly accepted democratic rules and norms ensuring the broad inclusion of relevant and affected actors, procedural fairness and agonistic respect among actors perceiving one another as legitimate adversaries rather than enemies.

The four anchorage points above can help us assess the democratic performance of governance networks. However, the assessment of the democratic anchorage of parti-cular governance networks will always be a matter of degree and often result in a mixed



judgement that identifi es different strengths and weaknesses. Here we should remember that, as a general rule, a high score on any of the four dimensions cannot serve to justify, or compensate for, a low score on another dimension ( Dryzek 2007 , p. 270). However, the particular form, functioning and context of a governance network will have an impact on how we assess a low score on one of the four dimensions. Hence, in a deprived area in the inner city, we might be willing to accept a low degree of political monitoring and control (the fi rst anchorage point) in the case of self-grown networks that are formed in order to facilitate self-organized activities. On the other hand, if the governance network is publicly funded or has substantial infl uence on highly politicized policy issues, political monitoring and control will be strictly required.

There are no guarantees that the democratic potentials of governance networks are real-ized. Nor is there any guarantee that governance networks are democratically anchored. The democratic impact and quality of governance networks depends on their particular form and functioning. This in turn depends on how these are designed and managed. The conclusion is that effective and democratic network governance depends on how the relatively self-regulating governance networks are metagoverned by public authorities or other legitimate and resourceful agents or networks ( Sørensen and Torfi ng 2005b ).

THE EXERCISE OF METAGOVERNANCE

In order to show how public authorities can metagovern governance networks in order to enhance their effectivity and democratic performance, we must fi rst clarify what meta-governance means. Metagovernance refers to higher-order governance transcending the concrete forms of governance through which social and economic life is shaped, regulated and transformed. Hence, if governance is defi ned as a both formal and informal process through which a plurality of actors regulates a multiplicity of social, political and eco-nomic practices in accordance with some predefi ned goals, metagovernance can be de-fi ned broadly as ‘ the governance of governance ’ . As such, metagovernance is a refl exive and responsive process through which a range of legitimate and resourceful actors aim to combine, facilitate, shape and direct particular forms of governance in accordance with specifi c rules, procedures and standards embodying the hegemonic conception of what constitutes ‘ Good Governance ’ .

In the emerging scholarly debate on metagovernance, there are three central contri-butions that should be mentioned here. Jan Kooiman (2003) approaches the question of metagovernance from a systems theoretical perspective. He claims that systems of governance are imbedded in higher order systems, and he defi nes metagovernance as a third-order governance invoking normative ideals in the governing of institutional systems of governance (second order), which in turn govern the way concrete policy problems and policy opportunities are governed (fi rst order). Bob Jessop (2002) pro-vides a state theoretical account of metagovernance that tends to view metagovernance as a possibility of the capitalist state to exercise power by choosing among different institutional forms of governance, tackling the dilemmas and potential failures associ-ated with different governance mechanisms, and determining the conditions for how they are functioning. Finally, Klijn and Koppenjan (2004) have a more managerial per-spective on metagovernance that is concerned with the question of how public manag-ers can manage complex networks in order to facilitate mutual learning and trust building.

There is a clear tension between Jessop ’ s macro-level conception of metagovernance as a tool for the exercise of state power and Klijn and Koppenjan ’ s micro-level concern for



how to improve the functioning of complex networks through the deployment of various management techniques. There are also tensions between Jessop ’ s emphasis on the exer-cise of power and Kooiman ’ s concern for the normative foundations of governance, as well as between Kooiman ’ s normative third-order governance perspective and Klijn and Koppenjan ’ s practical second-order governance perspective. Nevertheless, we believe that all three perspectives on metagovernance provide important insights: Kooiman em-phasizes the refl exive character of metagovernance and its foundation in normative stipu-lations about Good Governance; Jessop views metagovernance as a means of linking the governing capacities of the state with the new interactive forms of governance; and Klijn and Koppenjan show how public managers and other representatives of the state can in-fl uence and shape actual governance processes through different kinds of intervention. Combining these insights renders it possible to redefi ne metagovernance as a refl exive, higher order governance involving: (1) the production and dissemination of hegemonic norms and ideas about how to govern and be governed; (2) political, normative and context-dependent choices among different mechanisms of governance, or among differ-ent combinations of governance mechanisms; and (3) the strategic development of par-ticular institutional forms of governance in order to prevent dysfunctions and advance particular political goals. The special resources, formal authority and democratic legiti-macy of public authorities make them particularly suited for exercising metagovernance ( Klijn and Koppenjan 2000 ). However, metagovernance may also be exercised by a net-work of public and private actors, or by legitimate and resourceful private actors. In most cases, however, public authorities must authorize networks and private actors as meta-governors at the local, national or transnational levels.

The key challenge for public metagovernors is to avoid regulating governance net-works in ways that eliminate their capacity for self-regulation. Instead of steering net-work-based policy processes directly through the issuing and sanctioning of rules and commands, public authorities must devolve political competence and decision-making power to governance networks. Simultaneously, they must regulate these networks via a series of more or less subtle and indirect forms of governance, seeking to shape the free actions of the network actors in accordance with a number of general procedural stan-dards and substantial goals defi ned by the metagovernor. Hence, metagovernance in-volves the regulation of self-regulation through a combination of ‘ technologies of agency ’ , creating a plurality of free, empowered and responsible actors and ‘ technologies of per-formance ’ shaping the conditions for the exercise of free action within complex networks ( Dean 1999 , p. 167). Politicians and public managers who are already overburdened are likely to embrace this kind of metagovernance, since it permits them to ‘ let go of the reins without losing control ’ . Hence, metagovernance allows public authorities to mobilize the knowledge, resources and energies of a host of public and private actors while retaining their ability to infl uence the scope, process and outcomes of networked policy-making. As such, public authorities can exercise power while sharing the responsibility for public governance with other actors.

Elected politicians and public managers can employ different tools in their efforts to metagovern governance networks:

1. Network design that aims to infl uence the scope, character, composition and institu-tional procedures of the networks; 2. Network framing that seeks to determine the political goals, fi scal conditions, legal basis and discursive story-line of the networks;



3. Network management that attempts to reduce tensions, resolve confl icts, empower particular actors and lower the transaction costs in networks by providing different kinds of material and immaterial inputs and resources; 4. Network participation that endeavours to infl uence the policy agenda, the range of feasible options, the premises for decision making and the negotiated policy outputs.

While the fi rst and second forms of metagovernance are performed ‘ hands-off ’ , that is, at a distance from the self-regulating governance networks, the third and fourth forms are performed ‘ hands-on ’ , that is, through close interaction between the metagovernors and the individual governance networks. In contrast to the New Public Management doctrine, prescribing the use of hands-off metagovernance only, we believe that the metagovernance of governance networks is most successful when the metagovernors combine hands-off and hands-on metagovernance tools. Hands-off metagovernance must often be supplemented with hands-on metagovernance permitting the metagov-ernors to infl uence the governance network in a more direct and proactive manner. As such, network design and network framing might be adequate in the initial phase, where the network actors are recruited and empowered and the basic parameters for the net-worked policy interaction are defi ned. Later, when there are signs of failures in terms of confl icts, deadlocks or the exclusion of key actors from the policy deliberations, or when the networked policy output strays too far from what is deemed acceptable by the meta-governors, there will not only be a need for redesigning or re-framing the network, but also for a more hands-on metagovernance through network management and network participation.

The choice of public metagovernors between hands-on and hands-off metagovernance is also likely to vary from policy issue to policy issue. Hence, hands-on metagovernance will be more common in policy areas that are closely related to the core functions of the state, such as the preservation of law and order, the protection of public health, and the allocation of fi scal means. In these policy areas, where governance failure is likely to have fatal consequences, close interaction with network actors is required in order to facilitate a more fi ne-grained, day-to-day regulation of the governance network based on precise knowledge of the networked policy processes. For much the same reason, hands-on meta-governance will also be considerable in relation to governance networks operating within policy areas defi ned by the political decision makers as strategically important. Gover-nance networks established in response to mounting pressures from economic globaliza-tion offer a case in point (see Torfi ng 2007 ). However, a major exception to this rule is found in those cases in which the relative autonomy of the governance network is a key political goal ( Marcussen 2007 ).

The four different metagovernance tools outlined above can all be used to enhance ef-fective and democratic network governance. Politicians and public managers may want to avoid acting as metagovernors; and if they do, they may pursue less honourable goals than enhancing effective and democratic governance. Insofar as the institutional and po-litical pressures inherent to liberal democracy, and the contemporary discourses on gov-ernance, encourage them to metagovern governance networks in order to improve their effectiveness and democratic quality, however, they must know how this can be done. Table 1 aims to provide a number of stylized examples of how the four metagovernance tools can be employed to enhance effective and democratic network governance. The list is not exhaustive, but it provides an overview of the options available to public metagovernors.



The fi rst metagovernance tool, network design, is not only important in the initial phase where the governance network is formed, but also involves subsequent adjustments to the institutional design. Network design can help further effective governance in several ways. Firstly, a governance network should be formed around a number of clearly de-fi ned policy objectives. Focusing on policy goals rather than policy programmes imme-diately brings up the question of which actors can contribute to goal attainment ( Goldsmith and Eggers 2004 , pp. 56 – 60). Reliance on well-established connections with ‘ the usual suspects ’ is a common source of ineffective problem solving, since it tends to exclude crucial policy actors capable of making a signifi cant contribution to the governance net-work while including policy actors who might have little to offer in relation to the task at hand. To further stimulate effective interaction and decision-making processes in the network, the metagovernor might want to set, either unilaterally or through negotiation, a number of deadlines for the delivery of different kinds of policy outputs. Hence, a number of milestones can be defi ned in order to keep the network actors focused on the

TABLE 1 Metagovernance of effective and democratic network governance

Effectivity Democracy

Network design Keep a strict focus on objectives and innovative capacities when composing the network

Ensure publicity about the formation of the network and the policy outputs it produces

Defi ne or negotiate clear deadlines for different forms of policy output from the network

Ensure a broad inclusion of relevant and affected actors (avoid external exclusion)

Terminate superfl uous and unsuccessful networks

Create or support alternative and competing networks

Network framing Ensure coordination and goal alignment through political framing and storytelling

Communicate the political, fi scal, legal and discursive framework conditions to the network

Create strong interdependencies among the network actors in order to stimulate resource exchange

Monitor the performance of the network in relation to the framework conditions

Share effectiveness gains arising from network governance with the network and network actors

Decide whether non-compliance should lead to sanctions or adjustments to the framework

Network management Provide adequate resources that lower the transaction costs and empower the network actors

Empower the weak and marginal-ized network actors in order to pro-mote equality within the network

Reduce destructive tensions through agenda control, arbitration, joint fact-fi nding and cross-frame learning

Ensure transparency through the circulation of relevant information

Signal that a fl exible adjustment of ends and means is acceptable in order to encourage innovation

Probe whether the private stake-holders enjoy the support of their respective constituencies

Network participation Facilitate sustained cooperation by producing quick victories and creating joint ownership of them

Maintain a broad policy agenda supported by a vaguely defi ned story-line (avoid internal exclusion)

Show trust in order to gain and build trust

Insist on an open and responsive deliberation of alternative options

Institutionalize processes that work well and learn from those that do not

Ensure that the network evaluates its own performance in relation to common democratic standards



production of outputs in terms of reports, conferences, plans, policy proposals and direct interventions. Finally, the design of appropriate procedures for cooperation and nego-tiation will enhance effective governance since it helps lower the transaction costs of networking and may reduce the risk of damaging confl icts caused by uncertainty and lack of coordination. There is obviously a limit to how much the initial design of gover-nance networks will impact future effectiveness. It is therefore crucial that metagovernors are prepared to either terminate or sever the links to governance networks that, after careful network framing and network management, continue to prove to be superfl uous or unsuccessful. Terminating or banishing governance networks is troublesome, and might well be met by fi erce resistance from the network actors. However, cutting funding and replacing obsolete networks with new ones is in many cases a viable path to take.

Network design can also help improve the democratic performance of governance networks. Metagovernors can ensure general public awareness regarding the formation of the network so that the public will know that it has been established, what it is doing, who the participants are, and how they can be contacted. The design of the institutional procedures in the governance network can also help ensure publicity about relevant policy outputs in order to spur public debate and facilitate political contestation. Network design might also help ensure a broad inclusion of relevant and affected actors in a gover-nance network and thus avoid – or at least reduce – what Young (2000) defi nes as external exclusion. If it is impossible to include all of the relevant and affected actors, then the metagovernors can at least attempt to prevent systematic patterns of exclusion based on gender, ethnicity, economic resources or political opinions. If metagovernors prefer the formation of a small network, consisting of the most important and reliable policy actors who can deliver quick results, an elitist closure can be counteracted by the formation of alternative and competing networks with a broader composition in order to stimulate public debate and the scrutiny of the proposals produced by the elite network.

The second metagovernance tool is network framing; this is an ongoing process aimed at shaping the arena for network interaction through the use of indirect means such as the formation of the overall goals, the specifi cation of the fi scal and legal conditions, and discursive storytelling that defi nes the joint mission of the network. Effective governance can be enhanced by framing the policy objectives in ways that help align the goals of the network actors and convince them that there is an urgent need for coordination and joint action ( Termeer and Koppenjan 1997 ). Storytelling through the dissemination of ‘ best practices ’ can also be used to infl uence the means by which the network actors aim to reach particular goals. Metagovernors might also attempt to strengthen the interdepen-dencies among the network actors in order to stimulate resource exchange. This can be carried out either by clarifying or shaping the interests, roles and capacities of the par-ticipating actors, or by offering to fund activities and policy solutions that all of the net-work actors can agree upon (game theorists will know this as a ‘ split-a-dollar ’ game, see Gintis 2000 , p. 99). If, fi nally, goals are aligned, resources are exchanged, and effective policies are formulated and implemented, it becomes important that the effectivity gains arising from the networked policy process are shared with the network and the network actors in order to create an incentive for further cooperation and effectivity gains. The governance network can be rewarded by extending its remit and autonomy, enhancing its prestige and infl uence, and increasing its funding. The network actors may be re-warded by upgrading their political status, granting them access to other policy arenas, offering them better service, or compensating them for the time and energy invested in the governance network.



Network framing might also improve the democratic functioning of governance net-works by ensuring that the networked policy processes proceed within an overall politi-cal, economic and ideational framework endorsed by elected politicians and enforced by competent civil servants ( Goldsmith and Eggers 2004 , pp. 145 – 50). Hence, an indirect form of democratic control can be exercised through the negotiations and communica-tions of the political, fi scal, legal and discursive conditions for the network-based interac-tions so that the network actors obtain a clear idea of what the political system conceives as politically feasible and appropriate. The next step will be for the metagovernors to fi nd ways of monitoring the performance of the governance network in relation to the negoti-ated framework conditions and to refl ect on whether severe cases of confl ict and non-compliance ought to lead to soft sanctions (for example, in terms of ‘ naming and shaming ’ particular network actors or activities), or to a fl exible adjustment of the framework con-ditions (for example, in terms of a further differentiation of the overall policy goals or a relaxation of constraints in terms of the time frame or available resources) in order to ac-commodate new developments and facilitate future innovation.

The third metagovernance tool is network management , which involves interaction and dialogue with the network, though not direct participation in the negotiations in the network. Network management can boost effective governance by lowering the transac-tion costs of networking through the provision of adequate support and resources and by empowering the network actors through the funding of individual or collective learn-ing in terms of participation in courses, seminars and conferences, the invitation of guest speakers to network meetings, or the organization of future workshops with external moderators. Network management can also contribute to the reduction of destructive tensions through agenda setting, arbitration, the initiation of joint fact-fi nding, and the facilitation of cross-frame learning ( Klijn and Koppenjan 2004 , pp. 160 – 83). Finally, meta-governors must clearly signal that a fl exible adjustment of ends and means is acceptable if it is backed by sound arguments, results from a political compromise among the key actors, and does not involve heavy cost shifting. A stubborn insistence on predefi ned ends and old-fashioned means will tend to strait-jacket the governance network and prevent mutual learning and policy innovation.

Network management can also play a crucial role in democratizing governance net-works. The selective empowerment of weak and marginalized network actors – for ex-ample, by helping them to organize themselves, enhancing their knowledge and resources, and granting them some kind of veto power – can help promote equality in the process of deliberation and decision making. The network manager may also contribute to in-creasing the transparency within the network by ensuring that all relevant information is circulated to all of the network participants in a clear and accessible form. Finally, the network manager might be capable of probing whether the representatives of private stakeholders enjoy the support of their respective constituencies by communicating di-rectly with their hinterland. The network manager may also make it clear to the repre-sentatives that the infl uence of the governance network is not merely a function of its internal consensus, but also of the support the network actors enjoy from the social and political groups they claim to represent. This might help reinforce the democratic anchor-age of governance networks in the membership bases of the participating stakeholder organizations.

The fi nal metagovernance tool is network participation, which creates a complicated situation in which the metagovernor becomes one among many network participants but retains a refl exive gaze on the governance network in order to infl uence its operations



and promote effective and democratic governance. Effectivity can be furthered by facilitating sustained cooperation among the network actors. By participating actively in the network, the metagovernor can help produce the kind of quick victories obtain-able by picking the lowest hanging fruits and creating a sense of joint ownership for such victories through a repeated emphasis on the contribution of the participating actors. Quick victories with joint ownership demonstrate that networking matters, which in turn fosters further commitment and willingness to share resources and risks. The sustained cooperation among the network actors must build on some degree of trust in order to overcome the negotiator ’ s dilemma that consists of deciding whether to choose a cooperative or competitive strategy ( Scharpf 1994 ). The strategic behaviour of the individual network actors will often depend on the other network actors. Everybody waits to see which game is being played. In this situation, the public metagovernor will occasionally be able to gain and build trust among the network actors via a unilateral display of trust in the network and the different players. When fi rst one actor has opened up and displayed trust, other actors might follow suit, and the result might be the development of a generalized trust whereby everyone expects everybody else to abstain from exploiting an opening in the negotiation game to their own advantage. Sustained, trust-based interaction might produce successful public governance, but it might also lead to failures and policy disasters. Here, the role of metagovernors is to encourage the network to institutionalize the processes that worked well and learn from those that failed. Network governance is based on a good deal of trial and error, but it is crucial to ensure the codifi cation of the processes and procedures that appear to work well.

Metagovernance through network participation can also be used to enhance democracy. Metagovernors might struggle to maintain a broad and inclusive policy agenda that is supported by a vague and ambiguous story-line with multiple interpretations. On the one hand, the policy agenda should not be so broad that it prevents focused discussions and fi rm decisions. On the other hand, it should be broad enough to prevent what Iris Marion Young (2000) defi nes as the internal exclusion of the formally included network actors. As such, the policy agenda should make it possible for all network actors to participate in policy deliberations without feeling marginalized by the form and content of the policy discourse. The participating metagovernors may also make considerable effort to ensure an open and responsive deliberation of alternative options and problem definitions in order to prevent the premature closure of the debate on the basis of a particular set of hegemonic values and conceptions. The Habermasian ideal of a rational, consensus-seeking policy deliberation based on the ‘ forceless force of the better argument ’ ( Habermas 1987 ) might be incompatible with the confl ictual and antagonistic character of political negotiations. In a plural democracy, however, we must insist that antagonistic policy actors respect one another ’ s right to voice opinions and receive a proper political response based on agonistic respect ( Mouffe 2005 ). There are many other important democratic norms and values that ought to be brought to bear in the process of negotiated interactions within governance networks, and it is diffi cult for the metagovernor to insist on all of them in the heat of the moment. However, the metagovernor might be able to persuade the governance network to conduct a regular evaluation of its performance in relation to common democratic standards. Governance networks should not only evaluate and improve their effectivity, but also struggle to democratize themselves. Indeed, democratic improvement and innovation is a crucial democratic norm ( Dewey 1993 ).



METAGOVERNANCE DILEMMAS FOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

Metagovernance enables politicians and public managers to exercise state power in a decentred polity in which power is dispersed within complex networks bringing together public and private actors from different levels and policy areas. Public metagovernors might grant priority to short-term interests in advancing their own agendas and policy solutions through an instrumental co-optation of the stakeholders and a strategic manipulation of the networked policy process. However, their long-term interest in attempting to enhance the input and output legitimacy of public gover-nance within a ‘ differentiated polity ’ ( Rhodes 1997 ) might encourage them to consider how metagovernance can contribute to making governance networks more effective and democratic.

Metagovernance is by no means a simple task; it requires a carefully calibrated combi-nation of different metagovernance tools. Even the most well-intentioned, carefully planned and context-sensitive metagovernance might fail. Not only because the meta-governors, in respect for the self-regulating character of governance networks, must ab-stain from exercising direct control and be content with more or less explicit ‘ threats ’ of changing the composition of the network, narrowing its scope, limiting its public re-sources, or replacing it with either hierarchical command or the rule of the market forces; but also because the exercise of metagovernance is ridden with dilemmas that cannot be eliminated, but only handled more or less successfully through different coping strategies.

One of the key dilemmas facing public metagovernors concerns the question of how to ensure a high level of democratic legitimacy in a networked polity ( Hirst 2000 ). On the one hand, increased reliance on governance networks will tend to enhance democratic legitimacy by means of extending the functional representation of relevant and affected stakeholders in the policy process. On the other hand, the creation of a strong network-based stakeholder democracy will tend to weaken the democratic legitimacy derived from the democratic institutions based on territorial representation and its core principle of one-man, one-vote. Although metagovernance can be viewed as a means of linking traditional forms of representative democracy and new forms of stakeholder democracy, the transferral of decision-making power to governance networks tends to undermine legitimacy based on territorial representation, while the attempt to withdraw decision-making power from network types of governance will reduce the legitimacy gained from enhanced stakeholder participation.

Another dilemma is captured by the question of how to avoid excessive or insuffi cient metagoverning ( Kooiman 1993 ). If the exercise of metagovernance is too tight and straight-jackets the governance network, it will give rise to political confl icts, pacify the network actors, and reduce their willingness to participate and invest themselves in the joint problem solving. This will also reduce the benefi ts gained from the self-regulating char-acter of the network. If, on the other hand, the exercise of metagovernance is too loose and vague, it might lead to underperformance, stalemate and fragmentation, because the governance network is not provided with proper support in terms of discursive framing, funding and confl ict resolution.

A third dilemma concerns the relationship between the effective and democratic performance of governance networks ( Scharpf 1999 ). Governance networks might give rise to a plus-sum game between effectivity and democracy due to the simultaneous enhancement of, on the one hand, goal alignment and resource exchange, and, on the other



hand, the participation and influence of individual and organized citizens. However, trade-offs between effectivity and democracy are also likely to occur. Hence, the more inclusive participation of relevant stakeholders in a governance network might make it more democratic, while simultaneously reducing its ability to formulate clear and sustainable compromises based on negative and/or positive coordination ( Scharpf 1994 ). Likewise, a tightly knit network that only includes like-minded policy actors who know each other well might be highly effective in responding to emerging problems and opportunities, but will often lack democratic legitimacy. Hence, open and inclusive governance networks tend to enhance democracy to the detriment of effectivity, whereas closed, club-like governance networks might be effective, but ALSO rather undemocratic.

Finally, public metagovernors face a dilemma when choosing between hands-off and hands-on metagovernance ( Sørensen 2007 ). On the one hand, strong reliance on hands-off metagovernance aimed at maintaining or increasing the self-regulating capacity of the network might result in political confl icts between the governance network and the dem-ocratically elected government because the absence of close interaction between the net-work participants and public metagovernors hinders the construction of joint ownership to the outputs and outcomes produced by the governance network. On the other hand, strong reliance on hands-on metagovernance aimed at resolving internal confl icts and infl uencing the content of policy solutions tends to bind public metagovernors tightly to the policy output produced by the governance network, leaving little scope for subse-quent policy changes. The network participants will maintain that ‘ a deal is a deal ’ ; if the compromise obtained through negotiations with the public metagovernors is not re-spected by the government, then implementation resistance will rise and the prospect of continued network negotiations will be dim.

As such, metagovernance is an inherently imperfect strategic practice that calls for a skilful handling of a variety of dilemmas as well as the recognition of the risk of metagovernance failure ( Jessop 2002 ). However, two alternative strategies seem to be available to public metagovernors faced with the series of metagovernance dilemmas: they can either attempt to strike a balance between territorial and functional represen-tation; over-regulation and under-regulation; democracy and effectiveness; and hands-off and hands-of regulation, or they can try to calculate and counteract the consequences of being forced – by political or institutional circumstances – to fall on one of the two sides of the fence. In the long run, however, metagovernors must be prepared to ac-cept, and hopefully learn from, metagovernance failures. Metagovernance is not exer-cised in a realm of apodictive certainty; rather, it proceeds in the land of political contingency.

THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC AND COLLABORATIVE COMPETENCES

Metagovernance may fail in much the same way that governance networks fail. The metagovernance strategies of politicians and public managers are often met by fi erce re-sistance from network actors interested in protecting the ‘ bounded autonomy ’ of the governance network. Even in the absence of such resistance, public metagovernors may fail to provide the right kind of metagovernance at the right dosage and at the right time. Nevertheless, our optimistic message is that metagovernance can be used to make gov-ernance networks more effective and democratic. However, in order to realize the poten-tials of the public metagovernance of governance networks, the following three basic conditions must be met:



1. The relevant political authorities and public agencies must assign responsibility for the strategic governance of particular networks to the politicians and public manag-ers who are directly or indirectly involved in the networked governance processes and, therefore, have the required knowledge of the organizational and political land-scape to act as metagovernors.

2. The public metagovernors must have suffi cient understanding of how governance networks can contribute to effective and democratic governance, and they must know how their form and functioning can be infl uenced through a negotiated de-ployment of different metagovernance tools.

3. The public metagovernors must possess a range of strategic and collaborative com-petences in order to craft, execute and revise their metagovernance strategies in a context-sensitive manner.

The fi nal point is important, as it concerns the personal capacity to metagovern the net-worked polity that is gradually emerging at all levels of governance. Politicians and public managers are well versed in planning, budgeting and concrete decision making. As metagovernors, however, they will also require profi ciency in a host of other tasks, such as forming, activating, arranging, stabilizing, integrating and developing networks (Eggers and Goldsmith 2004, p. 157). To perform these important tasks, public metagov-ernors must possess a range of strategic and collaborative competences. The strategic competences include negotiated goal alignment, risk assessment, procedural and means-end fl exibility, project management, and the ability to tackle unconventional problems. The collaborative competences include communication skills, storytelling capacities and talents for coaching, cooperation and trust building. The lists of strategic and collabora-tive competences can be further expanded, and some of the competences are also relevant for carrying out tasks other than those narrowly related to networks. However, the im-portant thing to realize is that the metagovernance of governance networks brings some particular strategic and collaborative competences to the fore.

Although recent times have seen an increasing emphasis on strategic and collaborative competences among executive public managers, these competences are not generally found among lower level public managers who, according to the omnipresent New Public Management (NPM) doctrine ( Osborne and Gaebler 1992 ), are supposed to do the ‘ row-ing ’ rather than the ‘ steering ’ . As such, there is an urgent need for further and better training of public managers at the lower administrative levels. But even with the best training, some public managers will be unable or unwilling to change their role from rule-observing bureaucrats to strategic developers and from case and programme managers to network managers ( Sørensen 2007 ). Recruiting this new type of public manager, one with a background and temperament that enables them to mobilize and connect a plurality of actors, might help solve this problem (Eggers and Goldsmith 2004, pp. 169 – 70).

Many elected politicians continue to cling to the traditional image of themselves as sovereign rulers who hold all the power and, therefore, all the responsibility. These politi-cians will tend to see governance networks as messy, undemocratic and a threat to their political authority. Consequently, they will oppose the devolution of power to governance networks and refuse to act as metagovernors. In the last decade, however, the NPM doc-trine has managed to redefi ne the traditional self-image of elected politicians by portray-ing them as ‘ managing directors ’ in charge of formulating the strategic objectives of public policy and assessing the performance of policy programmes that are adjusted and implemented by a host of public and private actors. Although this opens the way for the



development of a new type of politician: those who tend to perceive themselves as meta-governors, the politicians still perceive themselves as being placed at a safe distance from the complex processes of network governance. Hence, the NPM doctrine ’ s insulation of the politicians from the production of public service prevents them from engaging in a continuous dialogue with sector-specifi c governance networks and from engaging in hands-on metagovernance through network management or network participation.

In the future, the isomorphic pressures to reshape public governance in accordance with the principles specifi ed by the advanced liberal governmentality will force politi-cians to rely on network-based policy processes and adjust to their new role as metagov-ernors, but they might not possess the strategic and collaborative competences required to metagovern governance networks, let alone to enhance their effectivity and democratic performance. In the face of the lack of formal training programmes, many politicians will have to learn the art of metagovernance through hard-earned experiences based on trial and error. In this process, close cooperation with executive public managers in small political-administrative teams might prove extremely valuable. Politicians will benefi t tre-mendously from sparring with the more experienced administrative leaders, and proper metagovernance will require coordinated effort from politicians and public managers.

In sum, the capacity of public authorities for metagovernance is not yet suffi ciently developed, but a combination of training, recruiting and experience-based and dialogue-oriented learning might help establish the competences necessary for making governance networks more effective and democratic through metagovernance.

CONCLUSION

Let us conclude by briefl y reiterating our propositions in reverse order. Public administra-tion researchers must pay more attention to the question of how to develop the strategic and collaborative competences of politicians and public managers. The acquisition of new skills and competences is absolutely required in order for politicians and public managers to be able to metagovern governance networks. The exercise of hands-off and hands-on metagovernance is necessary in order to reap the fruits of governance networks by turn-ing them into an asset for the improvement of effective and democratic governance. Attempts at ensuring effective and democratic network governance are important, not because the development of a networked polity is an inevitable destiny of our advanced capitalist societies, but because governance networks are conceived as the proper response to the need for mobilizing the knowledge, resource and energies of responsible and empowered citizens and stakeholders in the face of the persistent problems of ‘ overload ’ and ‘ ungovernability ’ ( Peters and Pierre 2004 ).

Public administration research dealing with metagovernance represents a new and in-teresting fi eld of study that can help us transcend the juxtaposition of government and governance. Metagovernance enables politicians, public managers and other relevant ac-tors to exploit the potentials of new governance arrangements such as governance net-works. Hence, it may serve as a tool for realizing cherished values such as effective and democratic governance. We have aimed to demonstrate how various metagovernance tools can be employed to promote effective and democratic network governance and emphasized the dilemmas and limits confronting public metagovernors. However, our propositions merely serve to clear the ground for a rethinking of effectivity and democ-racy in the light of pluricentric forms of governance in which decision making involves a plurality of actors, arenas and processes. Further research on this subject is needed. Departing from the argument presented above, we highlight here three crucial items on



the future research agenda. First, we must develop operational defi nitions of network effectivity and democratic anchorage that can be used in empirical case studies of gover-nance networks at multiple levels. Second, we need an entire series of empirical studies that can help us establish the possible trade-offs between effectivity and democracy in relation to different kinds of governance networks. Finally, we need in-depth studies of how politicians and public managers cope with their new role as metagovernors and the extent to which their concrete metagovernance strategies aim to promote different nor-mative ideals.

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Date received 8 June 2007. Date accepted 21 April 2008.

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Governance Networks and Meta Governance