109
Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

  • View
    225

  • Download
    1

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Goldman SachsBy:Amandeep GillGeoff ThomassonKatherine LypkieTej Sandhu

Page 2: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Agenda Goldman Overview Risk Management Environment

Market Risk Credit Risk Liquidity Risk Operational Risk Regulatory Risk

Recommendations

Hello

Page 3: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

GS - Overview

Overview

Page 4: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

History Founded in 1869 by Marcus Goldman in New York

Son in law, Samuel Sachs, joined in 1882 and adopted their current name in 1885

Early 20th century mainly IPO’s December 1928 launched Goldman Sachs

Trading Corporation, which failed during the 1929 stock market crash

1930’s focus shifted towards investment banking First international office in London 1970

Overview

Page 5: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

History Major events –

Sears IPO – 1906 Stock Market Crash 1929 – moved out of trading to

more investment banking Ford IPO – 1956 Penn Central Transportation Company bankruptcy left

GS with 80million in cp, this lead to credit ratings for cp issuers – 1970

Microsoft IPO – 1986 1990 introduced paperless trading to NYSE

IPO in 1999 only 12% held by public→ As of 2009, 67% of GS owned by shareholders

Overview

Page 6: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

History- Subprime Crisis Made $4 billion in profit due to shorting

the subprime mortgage backed securities September 21, 2008 following the

collapse of Lehman Brothers, Goldman along with Morgan Stanley became a bank holding company Now under the supervision of bank

regulators Easier access to capital

Overview

Page 7: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Current Situation Offices in over 30 countries with 35,700 staff

members 44% of revenue generated outside of the Americas CEO Lloyd Blankfein

Former trader at Goldman BA JD from Harvard

2010 revenues of 39.2 billion with net earnings of $8.4 billion

Total Assets of 910B as of 3Q Market Cap of 84.3B

Overview

Page 8: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Current SituationGlobal investment banking and securities

firm operating in three main financial services areas: Investment Banking Trading and Principle Investments Asset Management and Securities

Services

…mainly for institutional clients; however, some PCS.

Overview

Page 9: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Financial Highlights

Overview

Page 10: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Financial Highlights

Overview

Page 11: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Firm – Goals & Strategy “In many respects, our job is to match the

capital of our investing clients — who aim to grow the savings of millions of people — with the needs of our corporate and government clients — who rely on financing to generate growth, create jobs and deliver products and services.”

Goals – industry leading returns while continuing to grow book value and earnings per share

Overview

Page 12: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Firm – Business Principles 1. Our Clients’ interests always come first2. Our Assets are our people, capital and reputation3. Our goal is to provide superior returns to our

shareholders4. We take great pride in the professional quality of

our work5. We stress creativity and imagination in

everything we do 6. We make an unusual effort to identify and recruit

the very best person for every job

Overview

Page 13: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Firm – Business Principles 7. We offer our people the opportunity to move

ahead more rapidly than is possible at most other places

8. We stress teamwork in everything we do 9. The dedication of our people to the firm and

intense effort they give their jobs are greater than one finds in most other organizations

10. We consider our size and asset that we try hard to preserve

11. We constantly strive to anticipate the rapidly changing needs of our clients and to develop new services to meet those needs

Overview

Page 14: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Firm – Business Principles 12. We regularly receive confidential

information as part of our normal client relationship

13. Our business is highly competitive and we aggressively seek to expand our client relationship

14. Integrity and honesty are at the heart our our business

Overview

Page 15: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

What They Do Investment Banking

Financial Advisory Mergers and Acquisitions Divestitures, corporate defense Financial Restructuring

Underwriting Debt and Equity Underwriting Services Public offerings, private placements Underwrite a wide range of securities &

financial instruments

Overview

Page 16: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

M&A League Table

Overview

Page 17: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

What They Do Asset Management

Investment advisory services, financial planning and investment products across all major asset classes and exchanges

Management of merchant banking funds Securities Services

Prime Brokerage Financing Services Securities Lending

Overview

Page 18: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

What They Do Fixed Income, Currency & Commodities

Commodities & commodity derivatives Credit products, derivatives, investment-

grade, high-yield, and distressed debt among many others

Currencies & currency derivatives Interest rate derivatives Mortgage-related securities and loan

products and other asset backed instruments

Overview

Page 19: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

What They Do Equities

Equity securities and derivatives Equities and options exchange-based market-

making activities Securities, futures and options clearing

services Insurance Activities

Principal Investments In connection with merchant banking activities ICBC (come back to this)

Overview

Page 20: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Current Results Net Revenues

Investment Banking – $4.81B Investing & lending – $7.45B Institutional Client Services – $21.78B Investment Management – $5.01B

Pre Taxing Earnings – $12.89B

Overview

Page 21: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Revenue – Investment Banking

Overview

Page 22: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Revenue – Investing & Lending

Overview

Page 23: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Revenue – Client Services

Overview

Page 24: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Revenue – Investment Management

Overview

Page 25: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Operations by Segment

Overview

Page 26: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Major Risks – Overview “We believe that effective risk management is

of primary importance to the success of the firm. Accordingly, we have comprehensive risk management processes through which we monitor, evaluate and manage the risks we assume in conducting our activities. These include market, credit, liquidity, operational, legal, regulatory and reputational risk exposures. Our risk management framework is built around three core components: governance, processes and people.”

Major Risks

Page 27: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Major Industry Risks – Overview Market Risk Credit Risk Liquidity Risk Operational Risk Regulatory Risk

Major Risks

Page 28: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

GS – Market Risk

Market Risk

Page 29: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Market Risk Market risk is the potential for changes

in the market value of trading and investment positions

Primary exposures include interest rates, currencies, equities (and other asset prices), and commodities

Market Risk

Page 30: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Market Risk High sensitivity to the business

environments being operated in These depend on:

Global GDP growth Efficient capital markets Low inflation High business and investor confidence Geopolitical conditions Business earnings

Market Risk

Page 31: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Market Risk Market for M&A and underwriting is

limited by investor and CEO confidence in the economy

Clients are also highly dependent on liquid credit markets to finance major transactions

These large transactions are the major driver of Goldman’s M&A revenue

Market Risk

Page 32: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Market Risk Trading & Arbitrage opportunities

depend on market volatility A volatile market can therefore increase

trading revenues Conversely increased volatility increases

VaR as trading activity becomes more risky – this may force the firm to reduce trading activities to reduce VaR

Market Risk

Page 33: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Market Risk – Asset management Asset Management fees are directly

based on the value of client’s portfolios Uncertainty, volatility, adverse

economic conditions and lower asset values can reduce these values and ultimately lower revenues

Risk of inability to attract new clients or hold onto existing clients

Market Risk

Page 34: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

How Market Risk is Managed Diversify exposures Control Position Sizes Economic hedges in related securities or

derivatives E.g. hedging a portfolio of common stocks

by taking an offsetting position in an equity index

Market Risk

Page 35: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Tools for Managing Market Risk VaR; Value at Risk is a summary of

market risk exposure Sensitivity/scenario analyses, stress

tests, other analytical tools to measure effect of variables such as widening credit spreads, decline in equity markets, emerging market moves

Inventory position limits for selected business units

Market Risk

Page 36: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Value at Risk - VaR Potential loss in value of trading

positions due to adverse market movements

A one-day time horizon is used with a 95% confidence interval

Market Risk

Page 37: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Benefits of VaR Covers linear and nonlinear risk

exposures Responds to the change in the

composition of trading portfolios Estimates aggregate risk Reflects risk reduction due to

diversification

Market Risk

Page 38: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Drawbacks of VaR Past changes do not necessarily reflect

future performance Trading gains/losses due to market

movements may differ from the model

Market Risk

Page 39: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

VaR Components of Goldman’s VaR:

Interest rate risk arises primarily from exposure to changes in level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve; interest rate volatility, mortgage prepayment speeds, and credit spreads

Equity price risk arises from exposure to individual equity prices, baskets of equities, and equity indices

Market Risk

Page 40: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

VaR Components of Goldman’s VaR

Currency rate risks arise from changes in spot and forward prices and volatility of currency rates

Commodity price risk arises from changes in spot prices, forward prices, and volatilities of various commodities

Market Risk

Page 41: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Year End VaR – High/Low

Market Risk

Page 42: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Average Daily VaR at Year End

Market Risk

Page 43: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Daily VaR – Last Four Quarters

Market Risk

Page 44: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Analysis of VaR Overall in the time from December 2009

until December 2010 they have significantly reduced their average daily VaR from $218m to $134m

This change is mostly due to a change in their interest rate and equity measures in year end VaR

Market Risk

Page 45: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Market Risks – Not in VaR

Market Risk

VaR does not include the impact of changes in the credit spreads of derivative counter-parties or Goldman’s own credit spreads

A one basis point increase in these credit spreads would produce a $1M loss of net revenue and a one basis point decrease would produce an $8M gain for net revenue

Page 46: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Market Risks – Not in VaR

Market Risk

For inventory positions not included in VaR, sensitivity analysis is used, Goldman analyzes the effect on net revenues of a 10% decline in the underlying value of the positions

Page 47: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Market Risks – Not in VaR

Market Risk

Page 48: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

GS – Credit Risk

Credit Risk

Page 49: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

What is Credit Risk? Potential for loss due to the default or

deterioration in credit quality of a counterparty or an issuer of securities or other instruments

Credit Risk

Page 50: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Sources of Credit Risk OTC derivatives Loans and lending commitments Securities financing transactions (i.e., resale

and repurchase agreements and securities borrowing and lending activities)

Cash and cash equivalents receivables from:

brokers dealers clearing organizations

Credit Risk

Page 51: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Measuring Credit Risk Potential Exposure to credit risks

Estimate credit exposure within a given confidence level, during the life of the transaction and market movements

Changes in Credit Spread VAR

Scenario Analysis/ Stress tests Applying shocks to counterparty credit

ratings or credit risk factors

Credit Risk

Page 52: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Managing Credit Risk To Reduce credit exposures on derivatives

and securities financing transactions:

Enter into netting agreements with counterparties that allow to offset receivables and payables

Obtain collateral or contingent basis Ability to terminate transactions if

counterparty’s credit rating falls below a specified level

Credit Risk

Page 53: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Managing Credit Risk For loans and lending commitments

Obtain upfront or contingent collaterals Have 3rd party as guarantor for the counterparties’

obligations Transfer credit risk through hedging with available

derivatives Covenants/ Guarantees

For cash and cash equivalent All deposits with highly rated banks and central

banks

Credit Risk

Page 54: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Overall Credit Ratings

Credit Risk

Page 55: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Credit Exposure – By Industry

Credit Risk

Page 56: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Credit Exposure – By Region

Credit Risk

Page 57: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Credit Exposure – By Quality

Credit Risk

Page 58: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

GS – Liquidity Risk

Liquidity Risk

Page 59: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

What is Liquidity Risk ? Liquidity is defined as the ability of a

financial firm to meet its debt obligations without incurring unacceptably large losses Most of the recent failures of financial

institutions have occurred in large part due to insufficient liquidity

Liquidity Risk

Page 60: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Managing Liquidity Risk

Excess Liquidity Excess capital

Asset liability management (ALM)

Contingency Funding Plan

Liquidity Risk

Page 61: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Excess Liquidity Reserve Cash reserve kept in highly liquid securities

that allows same day conversion to cash Consists of:

Foreign Sovereign securities – ‘unencumbered’ bonds, overnight cash deposits Only Japan, French, German, UK

US Government and agency securities, also US Agency backed mortgage-backed security All can be used as collateral to borrow from

Federal Reserve

Liquidity Risk

Page 62: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Excess Liquidity Excess liquidity to prepare for:

Upcoming maturity of debts Long term debt, commercial paper,

promissory notes, term deposits, and other funding sources

Potential buyback of outstanding unsecured funding

Potential withdrawal of client deposits GS, as a bank holding company, will have to

worry about bank runs

Liquidity Risk

Page 63: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Excess Liquidity Excess liquidity to prepare for:

Adverse changes in the quality of underlying assets used for financing

Outflow of cash from OTC derivatives, when counterparty takes delivery

Collateral related issues Cash outflow from prime brokerage Tax payments to the government, and

other fines and expenses

Liquidity Risk

Page 64: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Asset-Liability Management (ALM) Goal is to have sufficient total capital toavoid reliance on asset sales

However, sales of assets may be necessary in a severe or persistent liquidity crisis

Approach: Actively managing and monitoring asset base,

with focus on: liquidity holding period ability to fund assets on a secured basis

Liquidity Risk

Page 65: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Asset Liability Management (ALM)

Approach: Raise secured and unsecured financing

with a sufficiently longer term than anticipated holding period of assets This reduces risk that liabilities will be due

in advance of ability to generate liquidity from sales of assets

Liquidity Risk

Page 66: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Funding Sources Where funding sources come from:

raised through all channels Issuance of corporate bonds in both the US and

internationally Short-term U.S. and non-U.S. Commercial

Paper sold mainly through own sales team which already

has a global reach Occasionally through other financial institutions

There is a limit as to how much debt a single owner may own

Liquidity Risk

Page 67: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Secured Funding GS tends to prefer to operate on secured

financing Less sensitive to credit ratings of company Substantial part of its liabilities are in the form of

long term secured financing Average life is 100 days

Recognize that overnight secured funding will evaporate as the economy plunges / loses confidence

All financing is done evenly among multiple sources, to reduce any counterparty risks

Liquidity Risk

Page 68: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Unsecured Funding: Subsidiary Funding

Goldman Sachs receives much of its unsecured funding from Group Inc.

Each subsidiary operates on their own budget and income Unless legally allowed, funding are not freely available Many subsidiaries are not allowed to give money back

to parent company until maturity of financing agreement

Significant amount of cash are invested in such subdiaries

Liquidity Risk

68

Page 69: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Contingency Funding Plan Sets out the plan of action to be used to

fund business activity in crisis

Outlines potential risk factors, key reports and metrics that are reviewed on an on going basis to assess the severity of a liquidity crisis

Liquidity Risk

Page 70: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Contingency Funding Plan Identifies key groups of individuals to

foster effective: coordination control distribution of information

Also details responsibilities of these groups/individuals including making and disseminating key decisions

Liquidity Risk

Page 71: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Credit RatingCredit Ratings play a huge role in

securing financing for the company Just being downgraded a notch by a rating

agency can have significant effects on the cost of borrowing Credit Ratings of GS as of December 2010

Liquidity Risk

Page 72: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Credit Rating Downgrade

Table presents the additional collateral or termination payments that could be called by counterparties in the event of a one and two-notch downgrade in Goldman Sachs credit ratings

Liquidity Risk

Page 73: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

GS – Operational Risk

Operational Risk

Page 74: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Operational Risk Causes of Operational Failure:

Termination or capacity constraints of any of the clearing agents, exchanges, clearing houses or other financial intermediaries

Increase in interconnectivity with clients increases risk of client systems

Operational Risk

Page 75: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Operational Risk Consolidation:

Recent years have shown a significant increase in consolidation among clearing agents, exchanges and clearing houses

Industry consolidation among market participants or financial intermediaries

Disparate complex systems are needed which can increase operational risk

Increase in the number of derivative transactions being cleared on exchanges

Operational Risk

Page 76: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Operational Risk Centrality and interconnectivity of

multiple financial institutions with central agents, exchanges and clearing houses Failure at one institution can cause industry-

wide failures

Operational Risk

Page 77: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Operational Risk Infrastructure

Disruption of electrical, internet, communications, transportation, and other third party services

These disruptions can be both regionally and globally

Operational Risk

Page 78: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Operational Risk Primary locations

New York metropolitan area, London, Bangalore, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Salt Lake City

Headquarters and the largest concentration of employees in the New York metropolitan area

Catastrophic events in these areas can negatively affect business

Operational Risk

Page 79: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Operational Risk Investment banks have a legal

separation between their investment banking and sales & trading businesses – known as a Chinese Firewall

Risk of operational failure and reputational harm when information is leaked between these two lines of business

Operational Risk

Page 80: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

GS – Regulatory Risk

Regulatory Risk

Page 81: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Regulatory Risk On January 14th, 2010, President Barack ObamaProposed a Financial Crises Responsibility Fee Purpose is to recoup every last penny for

American Taxpayers The proposed fee would include the following:

1. Require the financial sector to pay back for the extraordinary benefits received: taxpayer dollars used to support largest financial firms are reimbursed by financial sector to reduce deficit

Regulatory Risk

Page 82: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Regulatory Risk 2. Responsibility Fee will remain in place to

fully pay back TARP Fee would last for 10 years If costs were not recouped at end, fee would

remain in place Treasury Department would be asked to

report after five years on the effectiveness of the fee as well as its progress in repaying projected TARP losses

3. Raise up to $117B to repay projected cost of TARP

Regulatory Risk

Page 83: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Regulatory Risk 4. Provide plan for taxpayer repayment

Originally required by 2013; however, President Obama has already put forward a plan

Again, recoup TARP funds to ensure the burden does not add to the deficit or national debt

Regulatory Risk

Page 84: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Regulatory Risk 5. Apply to the largest and most highly

leveraged firms Firms with more than $50B in

consolidated assets Heaviest burden will fall on those firms

that have taken on the most debt Estimated over 60% of revenues will be

paid by the 10 largest financial institutions

Regulatory Risk

Page 85: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Graham-Leach-Bliley Act Enacted November 12th, 1999 Repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act,

allowing institutions to act as any combination of an investment bank, commercial bank, and insurance company

Goldman Sachs become bank holding company in September 2008 and a financial holding company in August 2009

Regulatory Risk

Page 86: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Regulatory Requirements As a bank holding company, Goldman Sachs

is subject to consolidated regulatory capital requirements administered by the Federal Reserve Board

Capital levels must meet specific requirements as calculated under regulatory reporting practices

Capital levels are subject to qualitative judgments by regulators regarding components, risk weightings and other factors

Regulatory Risk

Page 87: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Capital Requirements Currently Goldman Sachs is in accordance

with the minimum capital requirements outlined in the Basel I Accord Tier 1 Capital > 4% Total Capital > 8% To be considered a “well capitalized” bank

holding company: Tier 1 Capital > 6% Total Capital > 10%

Regulatory Risk

Page 88: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Capital Requirements Cont. For bank holding companies that have

received the highest supervisory rating under regulatory guidelines or implement Fed’s market risk measures: Tier 1 leverage ratio > 3%

Other bank holding companies must have a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 4%

Regulatory Risk

Page 89: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Goldman’s Capital Ratios

Regulatory Risk

Page 90: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Basel I to Basel II U.S. banking regulators have

incorporated the Basel II framework into the existing capital requirements by requiring internationally active banking organizations, of which Goldman Sachs is included, to transition to Basel II over several years

Regulatory Risk

Page 91: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Subsidiary Capital Requirements GS Bank USA is required to maintain

cash reserves with a Federal Reserve Bank

Currently, GS Bank USA holds excess reserves

GS Bank Europe is regulated by the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority and is in compliance with their respective capital requirements

Regulatory Risk

Page 92: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Subsidiary Capital Requirements GS & Co. and Goldman Sachs Execution &

Clearing are registered U.S. broker-dealers and futures commission merchants subject to regulation by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission

SEC and CFTC specify minimum capital requirements and require a significant part of the registrants; assets be kept in relatively liquid form

As of Dec 2009, GS & Co. and GSEC exceeded the minimum capital requirements by $11.81B and $1.86B respectively

Regulatory Risk

Page 93: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Subsidiary Capital & Dividends Regulatory requirements restrict Goldman

Sachs Group from withdrawing capital from subsidiaries

Instead, subsidiary assets are restricted as to the payments of dividends to GS Group

The Federal Reserve Board and FDIC have authority to prohibit or limit payment of dividends if they feel payment of a dividend would constitute an unsafe or unsound practise

Regulatory Risk

Page 94: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Basel III ChangesRecent Changes to the Basel Rules that have been formalized in Basel III include:

Increase in Tier 1 Capital from 4% to 6% Minimum requirement for common equity raised from

2% to 4.5% Capital conservation buffer set at 2.5% New liquidity requirements involving short-term

liquidity coverage ratio and long-term net stable funding ratio

In addition, financial instruments that qualify asTier 1 Capital may become stricter

Regulatory Risk

Page 95: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act The act is divided into 16 titles The aim of the legislation is:

“To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”

Regulatory Risk

Page 96: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform ActTitle I – Financial Stability Two agencies created: Financial Stability

Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research

FSOC has three main goals: Identify risks to the financial stability of the

U.S. Promote market discipline Respond to any threats to financial stability

Regulatory Risk

Page 97: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform ActTitle I Continued FSOC can force financial institutions

with assets exceeding $50B to submit reports regarding: The overall financial condition of the firm Firm’s current systems in place to monitor

and control risks The extent to which any of the company’s

activities could impact financial markets

Regulatory Risk

Page 98: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform ActTitle II – Orderly Liquidation Authority Purpose to assist in the orderly liquidation of

bank and financial institutions Orderly Liquidation Fund: FDIC run fund used

in the event of financial company’s liquidation that is not covered by the FDIC

Title III – Transfer of Powers Intended to streamline banking regulation and

reduce competition and overlaps between regulators

Regulatory Risk

Page 99: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform ActTitle IV – Regulation of Advisors to Hedge Fundsand Others Introduces significant regulation of hedge funds by

increasing reporting requirementsTitle VI – Improvements to Regulation (Volcker)Title VII – Wall Street Transparency andAccountability Focuses on increasing regulation of OTC swaps

markets (CDS & CDs) Encourages trading through exchanges or

clearinghouses

Regulatory Risk

Page 100: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform ActTitle IX – Investor Protections and

Improvementsto the Regulation of Securities Subtitle C: Involves expanding the

regulation of credit rating agencies Subtitle D: Improving the transparency

and securitization of asset-backed securities

Regulatory Risk

Page 101: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

The Volcker Proposal Proposal introduced by former Federal

Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker Chairman under Jimmy Carter and Ronald

Reagan Administration Graduate of Princeton, Harvard, & LSE

Mr. Volcker was appointed as the chair of the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board in February 2009

Board created to advise Obama Administration on economic recovery matters

Regulatory Risk

Page 102: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

The Volcker ProposalThe proposal will aim to do the following:

1. Limit the Scope – Ensure that no bank or financial institution that contains a bank will own, invest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity fund, or proprietary trading operation unrelated to serving customers for its own profit.

2. Limit the Size – Limit the consolidation of our financial sector and place broader limits on the excessive growth or the market share of liabilities at the largest financial firms.

Regulatory Risk

Page 103: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Regulatory Effect on Goldman Sachs Goldman is well known for having one of the

most aggressive and profitable proprietary trading outfits on Wall Street

Generates about 10% of total revenue for the firm

Dodd-Frank Act allows banks at least four years to comply with a potential extension of up to 3 years

Reports indicate that Goldman and other Wall Street firms are disbanding proprietary units early…

Regulatory Risk

Page 104: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Will it Work?Does Goldman really intend on ridding of such a profitable unit? Wall street insiders say they are merely

disguising activity Ex. JP Morgan Chief Investment Office

supposedly a hedging operation, but makes massive bets with JP Morgan’s capital

Loophole in the bill = definition of “principal”

Regulatory Risk

Page 105: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Goldman Sachs Capital Partners GSCP is the private equity arm of the

bank Currently holds $40B in assets If and when forced to disband:

Seller friendly economic climate Fire sale prices What sort of impact would this have on

revenue?

Regulatory Risk

Page 106: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Goldman Sachs Asset Management As of 2009, 9th largest Hedge Fund with

$20.59B assets under management What sort of impact would it have on

revenues?

Regulatory Risk

Page 107: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Use of Estimates Goldman admits the inherent difficulty in

predicting costs that may arise out of litigation and regulatory proceedings, but offers estimating techniques as follows: Precedent cases Estimate of probable losses after considering

the progress of each case Firm’s experience in similar proceedings Advice of legal counsel

Regulatory Risk

Page 108: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Recommendations Credit Risk

Supplementary evaluations of the firm’s current/potential credit exposure/losses from counterparty default

Increasing the use of credit risk mitigants, including collateral and hedging

Liquidity Risk maintain substantial excess liquidity to meet a broad

range of potential cash outflows Maintain contingency funding plan to provide a

framework for responding to a liquidity crisis situation Manage maturities and diversity of funding across

markets and counterparties; to maintain liabilities of appropriate tenor relative to asset

Recommendations

Page 109: Goldman Sachs By: Amandeep Gill Geoff Thomasson Katherine Lypkie Tej Sandhu

Questions??

The End…