Go It Alone the Effect of International Institutions on Economic Sanction Regimes

8/6/2019 Go It Alone the Effect of International Institutions on Economic Sanction Regimes

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GO IT ALONE?

THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON

ECONOMIC SANCTION REGIMESA thesis

submitted to the Graduate School of Arts & Sciences

at Georgetown University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of Master of Public Policy

in the Georgetown Public Policy Institute

ByJacqueline Roth Geis, M.P.P.

Washington, D.C.April 14, 2007


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my thanks to my advisor, Robert Bednarzik, and my GPPI

colleagues who have provided me with invaluable support and guidance throughout this

process.


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INTRODUCTION

The relevance and utility of international organizations is cyclically, if not

continually, called into question in the United States. Recent discussions on international

organizations -- including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International

Monetary Fund -- have centered on issues of reform, corruption, and effectiveness

(Helms, 1996; Keohane, 1998). In these discussions on reform, particular attention has

been paid to the weaknesses and defects of international organizations; little attention,

however, has been paid to the added value and strengths of these organizations.

The United States and other nations continue to seek the approval of international

organizations despite reservations about the effectiveness and necessity of their role in

the international system. As a look to the recent crises in Iran and North Korea suggests,

international organizations have a prominent role in enforcing international norms and

standards. One of the methods of enforcement employed by these organizations is

sanctioning.1

Despite the general ambivalence surrounding the effectiveness of economic

sanctions, their use and the threat of their use continue to be part of the international

policy repertory. In fact, for the United Nations and other international institutions,

sanctions are among the strongest possible enforcement measures. Sanctions, however,

continue to be imposed not only by these institutions, but also by individual states or

coalitions of states.

1 In this paper, the word sanction and its derivatives will mean economic sanction unless otherwise stated.


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This paper will look at the use of economic sanctions in international affairs and

analyze whether sanctions implemented with the strong backing and commitment of

international organizations are more effective than sanctions imposed either unilaterally

by a national government or multilaterally by an informal coalition of national

governments. In addition, this paper will determine whether certain types of international

organizations are more effective sanctioners. Both the threat and the imposition of

sanctions will be included in the analysis.


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LITERATURE REVIEW

International Organizations

The struggle between state sovereignty and the developing international

governance system is ongoing. It is important to note that international organizations

have few, if any, independent powers. Unlike national governments, they do not have

treasuries or standing militaries. International organizations are dependent on member

states to provide them with financial, human, and military resources to accomplish tasks

set before them. Their ability to secure these resources depends heavily on two

interdependent factors: effectiveness and legitimacy.

International organizations serve, among other functions, a convening function.

They provide structured opportunities for their members to discuss events and goals.

Given that these organizations often have charters or mandates that provide moral

authority, they are more likely to be seen as working in the interest of the global order or

good rather than national self-interest. States seek this moral authority when they request

that international organizations take action when they have reason to believe that another

member state is disrupting this order. Even when states are determined to act on their

own against renegade states, they often seek approval from international organizations in

order to validate their claims and their actions in other words, to supply legitimacy to

their causes.

Keohane (1998) argues that institutions whose members have shared values tend

to be more effective. The nature of the institutional mandate is also a determining factor

in its perceived effectiveness. Less controversial mandates, such as setting measurement


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standards, tend to be more effective than mandates whose definitions are not well defined

and touch at controversial or central value, such as human rights. Effective organizations

with wide-reaching, controversial mandates are rare.

Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions are most often defined as restrictions or limitations on

intergovernmental trade intended to alter the political behavior of a given state. They are

economic measures directed to political objectives and can be imposed by a single state

or a group of states (Barber, 1979). The effectiveness and effects of sanctions have been

the subject of extensive scholarly literature. The verdict has been almost uniformly

negative. Sanctions were determined to be ineffective and, moreover, often had effects

that were detrimental not to the sanction target, but to the general population of the

sanctioned country. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) and UN

sanctions against Haiti from 1991 to 1994 were characterized by a large majority of

countries as porous and ineffective; with respect to putting pressure on the Haitian

government; however, these sanctions did have a negative economic impact on the

country, particularly the rural poor (Gibbons and Garfield, 1999).

The idea, and eventual use, of smart sanctions was developed in response to

episodes such as the 1991-1994 Haiti sanctions. Smart sanctions seek to maximize the

economic degradation of the regime being targeted by the sanctions while minimizing the

amount of suffering that the sanctions impose on the countrys population (Cortright and

Lopez, 2002). In essence, these sanctions try to hit the intended target through methods


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such as freezing financial assets, arms embargoes, and restrictions on commercial trade.

The sanctions recently implemented by the UN Security Council against North Korea and

those implemented by the US against Taliban financial assets are examples of smart

sanction activity. While this amended form of sanction addresses one of the concerns

raised unintended suffering of the countrys population, Drezner argues that smart

sanctions are not any more effective than those previously implemented (Drezner, 2003).

The question remains the same. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policymakers

continue to use them? Recent literature claims that the perceived ineffectiveness of

sanctions that scholars have quantifiably found to be the case may be the partially caused

by selection bias. That is, studies conducted prior to the late 1990s only included data

from events where the sanctions had been implemented. T. Clifton Morgan (2003) has

argued that these data must be augmented with data from events where sanctions were

threatened, but not actually imposed. He argues that the exclusion of the data from

threatened sanction events introduces bias into the results. In other words, implemented

sanctions and threatened sanctions may have different impacts.

Multilateral vs. Unilateral Sanctions

Within the discussion about the forms that sanctions should take, there has also

been debate about whether multilateral or unilateral sanctions are more effective.

Unilateral action does provide the sanctioning state (or sender) with the ability to

sanction a target state (or target) quickly and to deploy the type and breadth of sanctions

that the state considers appropriate given the targets actions. Working unilaterally,


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however, also subjects the sender to all of the costs, both economically and politically, of

taking action against the target (Mansfield, 1995; Drezner, 2000). Furthermore, very few

states have economies large enough to impose effective sanctions regimes against their

targets (Drezner, 2000).

Even for states that can impose effective sanctions regimes unilaterally, however,

there are benefits of seeking multilateral action, including the sharing of both economic

and political costs. The economic cost burden is spread across the governments and

citizens of sender countries, which limits the impact of the sanction on the populations of

the sanctioning countries. Moreover, the larger the multilateral coalition, the greater the

economic cost to the target. The political cost burden is also shared, creating greater

legitimacy and moral authority for the effort and thereby protecting senders from

removing sanctions due to domestic political pressures (Mansfield, 1995; Drezner, 2000;

Thompson 2006). There is a greater economic cost to the target the larger the multilateral

coalition.

While there are benefits, there are also costs to multilateral sanctions. Drezner

breaks the costs down into three categories: bargaining between the sender and the target,

bargaining between the initial (or primary) sender and subsequent senders, and

enforcement. He argues that sender often seeks multilateral support for the most

sensitive cases: when the stakes are high and there is a real possibility of long-term

deadlock. In other words, multilateral action is often sought when unilateral action is not

an option. Bargaining between potential senders in the international arena also tends to

imply costs to the initial sender since the sender often has to compromise or offer


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concessions in order to gain consensus. As the number of senders increases, enforcement

also becomes more difficult. An increase in the number of senders leads to an increase in

the number of possible defectors (Drezner, 2000; Thompson 2006).

Even though policymakers continue to push for coalitions, the early quantitative

evidence in the literature has shown that the benefits of multilateral action are not worth

the costs. There has been substantial evidence that unilateral action is more effective

than multilateral (Martin, 1993). At the beginning of the decade, however, other scholars

began to look at the role of international organizations in multilateral sanctions efforts

and making distinctions between ad hoc multilateral sanctions regimes and those

structured under an international organization. Using this distinction, Drezner (2000)

shows (1) that multilateral sanctions with an international organization as the sender are

more likely to be effective than unilateral sanctions and (2) that multilateral sanctions

without an international organization as the sender are less likely to be effective than

unilateral sanctions. Mansfield (1995) argues that international institutions each have

distinct characters and that some may implement more effective sanctions than others.

There is a gap in the literature between Mansfields assertion and Drezners

results that this paper seeks to address. There are various types of international

organizations that implement sanctions regimes and the effectiveness of these

organizations has not been studied. Furthermore, neither Drezner nor Mansfield included

the effectiveness of the threat of sanctions into their analysis. This paper will seek to

expand upon Drezners results of the importance of international organizations in light of


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the new data and to test Mansfields assertion that distinguishing between international

organizations is important.


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HYPOTHESIS, DATA SOURCE, & METHODOLOGY

This paper will examine whether sanctions threatened or implemented with the

strong backing and commitment of international organizations are more effective than

sanctions threatened or imposed either unilaterally by a national government or

multilaterally by an informal coalition of national governments. It will further analyze

whether certain types of international organizations are more effective in threatening or

implementing sanctions.

Five hypotheses will be tested:

H1: Unilateral sanctions are more effective than multilateral

sanctions.

H2: Multilateral sanctions with international organization (IO)

involvement are more effective than unilateral sanctions and

multilateral sanctions without IO involvement.

H3: Sanctions with the backing of a regional IO are more effective

than those with the support of a global IO.

H4: Sanctions with the support of a UN agency are more effective

than sanctions with the support of another IO.

H5: Economic international organizations implement more effective

sanctions and sanction threats than political international

organizations.

The same dependent variable (FINALOUTCOME) will be used in each of the

hypothesis test. It is defined as the success of the sanction case. The dependent variable


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will be constructed by synthesizing the 10 possible final outcomes in the TIES database

into four categories: (1) successful, (2) partially successful, (3) stalemate, and (4)

unsuccessful. Regime success is defined by total acquiescence by the target or successful

negotiations in either the threat or imposition stage. Partial success is when the target

only agrees to some of the senders demands. A stalemate is when the sanction regime

has not been lifted but neither side wants to back down. Failure, or an unsuccessful

sanction regime, is defined as the removal of sanctions without gaining any concessions

from the target. This categorization will allow for greater comparison across sanction

cases.

While it is usual when the dependent variable is an ordered measure of

effectiveness (successful, partially successful, stalemate, and unsuccessful) to use an

ordered probit regression model, in this instance running both the ordered probit model

and the OLS regression model showed similar results. For ease of interpretation, the

OLS results are used. The ordered probit results are appended in Appendix I. The model

is based on completed studies by Drury (1998), Drezner (2000) and Whang (2006) and

seeks to determine the success of sanction regimes. Data from the Threat and

Implementation of Sanctions (TIES) database will be used in this study. The TIES

database was released by Morgan, Krustev, and Bapat in October 2006. The database


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EXHIBIT 1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

Variable Name Definition Source

Final outcome

The outcome of the sanction event:

1 = successful2 = partially successful

3 = stalemate

4= unsuccessful

Threat and

Implementation ofSanctions (TIES)

Database

Target cost

The anticipated costs to the target; higher

costs to the target would increase the

incentive to acquiesce; variable =1 when

costs are moderate or high; =0 if costs arelow

TIES

Sender cost

The anticipated costs to the sender;

variable =1 when costs are moderate or

high; =0 if costs are low

TIES

Issue

If the issue at hand is of large consequence,

political regime change for instance, then

this variable = 1; variable = 0 if the issue is

limited in scope.

TIES

ThreatIf the sanction event was resolved in the

threat stage (no sanctions implemented) =1TIES

USAWhether the USA is the sender; variable

=1 when USA is senderTIES

VARIABLES OF INTEREST

Regional IO If regional IOs are involved, variable =1 TIES

Global IO If global IOs are involved, variable =1 TIES

MultiIf multiple countries are involved, but nointernational organizations, variable =1

TIES

UnilateralIf only one country and no international

organizations are involved, variable =1TIES

UN

Whether a UN organization was involved

in the sanction event; constructed dummyvariable; UN involvement = 1

TIES

Political IOIf an IO serves a mainly political function,i.e. UN or Arab League involvement = 1

TIES

Economic IOIf an IO serve a mainly economic function,

i.e. WTO or OPEC involvement, =1TIES

includes 888 sanction cases from 1971 to 2000. A sanction case is defined as a single

sanction episode or a merged group of sanction episodes, regardless of whether the

episode ended with a sanction threat or implementation. Sanction cases form the base

unit of the data (Morgan et al, 2006).


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Key factors in sanction regimes as determine by previous studies and theory are

presented in Exhibit 1. The expected effects of each variable are summarized in Exhibit

2. The model is presented in Exhibit 3.

EXHIBIT 2: HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS AND BACKGROUND OF SANCTION VARIABLES

Variable Name Description Prediction Rationale

X1 Target cost Dummy PositiveDrury (1998), Drezner

(2000)

X2 Sender cost Dummy NegativeDrury (1998), Drezner

(2000)

X3 Issue Dummy NegativeDrury (1998), Drezner(2000); Whang (2006)

X4 USA Dummy PositiveDrury (1998), Drezner

(2000)

X5 Threat Dummy PositiveDrury (1998), Drezner

(2000)

X6 Regional IO Dummy PositiveVariable of interest,Mansfield (1995)

X7 Global IO Dummy PositiveVariable of interest,

Mansfield (1995)

X8 Multi Dummy NegativeVariable of interest,Mansfield (1995)

X9 Unilateral Dummy NegativeVariable of interest,

Mansfield (1995)

X10 UN Dummy Positive

Variable of interest,

Mansfield (1995)

X11 Political IO Dummy NegativeVariable of interest,

Mansfield (1995)

X12 Economic IO Dummy PositiveVariable of interest,

Mansfield (1995)

EXHIBIT 3: MAIN REGRESSION MODEL

OUTCOME= 1Targetcost + 2Sendercost + 3Issue + 4Threat +5U SA + 6RegionalIO+ 7GlobalIO +8Multi

The TARGETCOSTvariable serves as a proxy for the strength of the proposed or

implemented sanction. As the strength of the sanction increases, the costs to the target


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are also likely to increase. Increased target costs will most likely increase the likelihood

of the sanctions success.

SENDERCOSTis a proxy variable to determine the level of commitment of the

sender. Its effect on sanctions success could be either positive or negative. Senders

willing to incur high costs to sanction targets are more likely to have strong resolve to

solve the conflict successfully, increasing the likelihood of sanction success. On the

other hand, increased costs could raise political pressures to end the conflict sooner,

potentially decreasing the likelihood of sanction success.

TheISSUEvariable is predicted to have a negative effect on sanction success.

The larger or more complex the issue or set of issues that the senders have with the target,

the more difficult it is for the target to agree to the demands or to negotiate with the

senders (Whang, 2006). These larger, more complex issues, such as regime change, are

often not in the best interests of the targeted states current rulers and, therefore, they

have decreased incentives to back down from their current policies. As such, seminal

issues, like regime change, lead to the decreased effectiveness of sanctions.

The THREATvariable illustrates the effectiveness of sanction threats as opposed

to sanction implementation. Threats provide warnings and that conflicts resolved in the

threat stage show the initiative of both the sender and target to come to a solution prior to

sanction implementation. It is predicted that threatening sanctions increases the

likelihood of that sanction regimes success.

The USA variable is included in the regressions where unilateral sanctions (UNI)

are the reference regime category. Earlier studies separated out the effect of unilateral


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United States sanctions to isolate the effect that being a superpower has on sanctions

success. The United States, as a hegemonic power, may have sway over targets that other

states and potential senders do not have. U.S. involvement is expected to increase the

effectiveness and success of sanction regimes.

Sanction regime variables are included to determine the effects of multilateral and

international organization (IO) involvement in sanction cases. The international

organization variables are broken down into various categories to determine whether

certain international organizations are more successful with sanctions policies than

others. There are three sets of dummy indicator variables used (1)REGIONAL IO,

GLOBAL IO, MULTI, UNI; (2) POLITICAL IO, ECONOMIC IO, MULTI, UNIand (3)

UN, OTHER IO, MULTI, UNI. Each of these dummy indicator variables was created

from raw descriptive data on country and organization involvement found in the TIES

database.

To compare the likely success of sanctions with regional organization

involvement, sanctions with global organization involvement, multilateral sanctions

without organization involvement, and unilateral sanctions, the first set of variables

(REGIONAL IO, GLOBAL IO, MULTI, UNI) is used in the regression. To identify

whether international organizations with a primarily political mandate, like the UN and

the Arab League, are more or less likely than economic institutions, like the WTO and

OPEC, to increase the success of sanctions, a second set of variables was created

(POLITICAL IO, ECONOMIC IO, MULTI, UNI). Another set of variables will be used

to determine whether the UN is more effective than other international organizations


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(UN, OTHER IO, MULTI, UNI). In each regression, one category in the set serves as a

reference group to which the three remaining groups are compared.

The international organizational variables are predicted to increase the likelihood

of success for the sanction regime. The tests intend to show that different types of

institutions increase the likelihood of success to varying degrees. Using Keohanes

(1998) logic that larger, more complex institutions are less effective, global institutions

should show to be less effective at sanction implementation than regional institutions. As

for political and economic organizations, economic institutions have more ready tools at

their disposal (trade sanctions, embargoes, etc.) than political organizations and should

show to be more effective than their political counterparts. The third set takes the UN

system as a separate dummy variable. Given the UNs size and complexity, it should

show to be less effective than other international institutions as a sanctioner.


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LIMITATIONS

This model has limitations. Sanction events are partially formed by a set of

strategic decisions. The sender and target respond to the others last move. A regression

does not capture the effects of this decision-making on sanction outcomes. The

regression allows a focus on the impact that international organizations may have in

determining the success of a sanction case (Whang, 2006).

There are many other factors that can impact a sanction case or cause a state to

seek a multilateral sanctions approach. For example, the time that it takes to achieve

consensus within an international organization is not measured in these data, but is

included in the effects of having an international institution as a sender.

Limitations also arise from the data collection. The TIES database was created

from normative sources2

and asked its coders to use judgment when entering the data.

There is no way to determine the personal biases of each of these coders. It is not

feasible to think that each viewed every sanction case in the same light and it may very

well be the case that sanction success was determined differently by coders on the

margins.

2 The TIES Database collected material from many sources includingLexis-Nexis,Facts on File, Keesings

Record of Contemporary Events, and the indices ofThe New York Times andLondon Times (Morgan et al,

2006).


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ANALYSIS

The data show that the majority of sanction cases are implemented unilaterally.

In fact, in the TIES dataset, approximately 71 percent or 627 cases are unilateral sanction

cases. Frequency of the use of a particular type of sanction, however, does not imply the

greater effectiveness of that type. What frequency does imply, however, is that unilateral

sanctions were the implementation method of choice for sanctions during the period of

1971-2000.

The general question that this study hopes to answer is whether this preferred

method of implementing sanctions is the one that yields the largest likelihood of success.

Previous studies (Drezner, 2000) have shown that there are other types of sanctions that

have a greater likelihood for success than unilateral sanctions, namely multilateral

sanctions with the involvement of international organizations. As depicted in Chart 1, the

data analyzed for this study has 259 non-unilateral sanction cases (approximately 29

percent of the sample). Of these 259 cases, the overwhelming majority (232) included

the involvement of an international institution. As Chart 2 illustrates, without accounting

for other factors, the TIES data seem to support Drezners theory that multilateral

sanctions with international organization involvement have the highest success rate and

call the relative effectiveness of unilateral sanctions into question. Nearly half of the

successes or partial successes involved an international organization. This higher success

rate for IO sanctions is particularly notable since states are more likely to seek

international organizations assistance when facing tougher, more complex situations

(Drezner, 2000; Thompson 2006).


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CHART 1: THE FREQUENCY OF UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS (1971-2000)

70.6%

(627)

26.1%(232)

2.0%

(18)1.2%

(11)

Unilateral Multilateral w/ IO Other Multilateral Missing

Data Source: Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Database; N=888.

States are more likely to turn to some international organizations than others.

Chart 3 provides an overview of the international organizations represented in the data.

A cursory look at the chart illustrates that when an international institution is involved in

a sanction regime, it is more likely to be a regional (or selected membership)3

organization than a global organization. In fact, 77.6 percent of the 232 observations that

cited involvement of an international organization cited the involvement of a regional

organization such as the European Union or the Arab League.

3 For ease of reference, the phrase regional international organization will be used to represent all select

membership organizations, even when selection is determined based on characteristics other than

geography. OPEC would be an example.


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CHART 2: OUTCOMES OF UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS, 1971-2000

20.1%

8.5%7.5%

20.3%

15.1%

3.4%

10.8%

37.5%

22.2%

27.8%

16.7%16.7%

Successful Partially Successful Stalemate Unsucessful

Unilateral Multilateral w/IO Other Multilateral

Data Source: Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Database; N=888

Here again, the frequency of regional organizational involvement does not

provide sufficient information about the success of the sanction. In this instance, the

preliminary data do not illuminate any patterns either. It does illustrate that sanctions

threatened or implemented with the assistance of UN organizations can be expected to be

less successful than those implemented by other international organizations. Nearly 40

percent of sanctions involving UN organizations ended in failure or a stalemate.


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CHART 3: THE DISTRIBUTION OF SANCTIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONALINVOLVEMENT , 1971-2000

UN Organizations

15.9%

WTO/GATT

4.3%

EEC

30.2%

OPEC

5.2%

Arab League

9.5% Other

8.6%

EU

26.3%

Organization Key: UN = Any organization in the United Nations System; WTO/GATT = World TradeOrganization/General Agreement on Tariffs and Taxes; EEC = European Economic Community; OPEC = Organizationof Petroleum Exporting Countries; EU = European Union

Data Source: Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Database; N=232

This preliminary outcome poses a question regarding the tradeoffs of working

with an international organization. Is there an organizational size, or character, or

composition at which the benefits of working with a international organization

minimized costs, fewer political and economic risks are outweighed by the political

costs and time needed to reach consensus, causing international organization-endorsed

sanctions to lose their effectiveness edge over unilateral sanctions? The preliminary data

are inconclusive on this point.


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CHART 4: OUTCOMES OF SANCTIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT,1971-2000

40.0%

26.0%

16.0%

6.0%

36.1%

11.7%

2.8%

10.0%

35.1%

29.7%

8.1%

13.5%

Successful Partially Successful Stalemate Unsucessful

Global IOs Regional IOs UN

Data Source: Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Database; N=232.

Regression Analysis

Regression analysis provides more conclusive answers to this question. From the

base regression outlined in Exhibit 3, five regressions are run to test the five hypotheses.4

4 The TIES data set does not include effectiveness data for 356 of its observed sanction threats andsanction events. The vast majority of these 356 observations are for unilateral sanction threats or events.

The reason for this low rate of unilateral effectiveness rates could be that news services may have lost

interest in long-running sanction threats or events and did not report the results. Given that the data for the356 missing effective observations may skew the results toward underreporting the effectiveness ofunilateral sanctions, the results reported in this paper include only the 532 observations that have

effectiveness data. Ramsey RESET test shows model misspecification when using all 888 of the TIES

observations, while it showed no model misspecification when using the 532 observations that had outcome

data.


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Each of the regressions utilizes one of the three sets of sanction regime variables

described in the Hypothesis, Data Source, & Methodology section. A note detailing

which sanction regime set is used included with each model. The first, bolded variable

marks the regime reference group for the model.

In addition to the five analyses displayed in this section, regressions were run to

determine whether uniqueness of the European Union as a multinational regional actor

did not skew the results. To determine this, several regressions were run with the EU as a

unilateral actor and as a regional actor. In all instances, the results were similar and since

the EU is still a group of national governments, the entity is characterized as a regional

organization for the purposes of this paper.

Hypothesis 1: Unilateral sanctions are more effective than multilateral sanctions.

Model 1 does not support the hypothesis that unilateral sanctions are more

effective than multilateral sanctions. In fact, the model shows that multilateral sanctions

that include international organization involvement are more likely to be successful than

unilateral sanctions. The model does not support any findings on the likelihood for

success of multilateral sanctions without organization involvement.

The two international organization sanction variables were both significant and

positive, providing evidence that sanction threats and sanctions backed by international

organizations are more likely to be effective than those implemented unilaterally. This

model leads to the conclusion that including either regional or global international

organizations in sanction events increases the likelihood that the sanction events will be


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MODEL 1: MAIN REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)SANCTION REGIME SET: Unilateral, Global IO, Region IO, Multilateral

Coefficients (Standard Error)

Target Cost -.004 (.003)

Sender Cost -.002 (.003)Issue .101 (.205)USA .244 (.117)***Global IO .519 (.196)***Region IO .780 (.140)***Multi .118 (.290)Threat .748 (.258)***

Number of Observations 532F (Prob >F) 5.94 (0.0000)Adjusted R2 0.07Ramsey RESET Test F(3,520) =0.53

PROB>F = 0.66*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level

effective. This conclusion will be dissected further in other models to see if it can be

determined what type of international organizations are the most effective to include in

sanction situations.

The other two predictors that were significant in Model 1 were U.S. involvement

and whether the sanction was resolved in the threat stage. Other factors were not found

to be statistically significant at any level. Both of these predictors were positively related

to sanction outcomes. Given the size of its economy and its political power, this result

reflects the common perception that the U.S. is more likely than other nations to be

successful at implementing unilateral sanctions. The results also show that situations in

which sanctions are resolved in the threat stage are more likely to be effective than those

events in which sanctions need to be implemented. This bolsters two points in the

previous literature: (1) sanction events than are resolved in the threat stage are more


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likely to be effective than those multilateral sanctions that do not have international

organization involvement.

Both international organization variables are significant in this model and

correspond positively with the success of sanction regimes. Here again, the inclusion of a

regional or global institution increases the chances of the sanction regimes success. The

results also provide further basis for the claim that sanction events ending in the threat

stage are more likely to be effective than those involving the implementation of

sanctions. Indeed, all of the models in this paper bolster this theory.

Hypothesis 3: Sanctions with the backing of a regional IO are more effective than

those with the support of a global IO.

MODEL 3: REGIONAL VS. GLOBAL IOS: OLS REGRESSION

(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)SANCTION REGIME SET: Global IO, Unilateral, Region IO, Multilateral

Coefficients (Standard Error) Coefficients (Standard Error)Target Cost -.004 (.003) -.004 (.003)Sender Cost

-.002 (.003) -.002 (.003)Issue .179 (.204) .150 (.215)Unilateral -.111 (.163) -.048 (.222)Region IO .488 (.182)*** .551 (236)**Multi -.142 (.316) -.084 (.346)Threat .752 (.260)*** .757 (.260)UN NA .126 (.302)

Number of

Observations532 532

F (Prob >F) 5.57 (0.0000) 4.89Adjusted R2 0.06 0.06

Ramsey RESET Test F(3,521) =0.44PROB>F = 0.72

F(3, 520) = 0.57PROB>F = 0.63

*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level


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The results for Model 3 depict that hypothesis 3 was supported. That is, it is more

likely for a sanction episode involving a regional international organization to be

effective that one involving a global international organization. This relationship remains

the same even when the UN is pulled out from the general global IO grouping. The

results appear to be marking a line, albeit not a very clear one, where the chaos of

multiple players begins to outweigh the economic and political benefits of multiple

senders. Regional organizations tend to form around a similar ideal or a joint concern,

meaning there is greater consensus from the beginning an easier environment in which

to deliberate and determine a course of action in a sanction event. Global organizations

are formed to instill a sense of order, which makes for a more difficult starting ground

upon which to build consensus.

Hypothesis 4: Sanctions with the support of a UN agency are more effective than

sanctions with the support of another IO.

MODEL 4: UN EFFECTIVENESS REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)SANCTION REGIME SET: Other IO, UN, Unilateral, Multilateral

Coefficients (Standard Error)Target Cost -.003 (.003)Sender Cost -.002 (.003)Issue .161 (.216)UN -.324 (.164)Unilateral -.497 (.112)***Multilateral -.495 (.299)*Threat .738 (.261)***

Number of Observations 532F (Prob >F) 4.77 (0.0000)Adjusted R2 0.04Ramsey RESET Test F(3,521) =0.77

PROB>F = 0.51`*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level


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Model 4 does not show support for the hypothesis that UN agencies are more

effective than other agencies at sanctions. The results show that UN involvement does

not necessarily lead to a sanctions episode success. The results show a negative

correlation between unilateral and multilateral involvement and successful sanctions

outcomes. This implies that IO support boosts effectiveness, further supporting the

findings of Model 1. The results also provide further evidence for the effectiveness of

threats.

Hypothesis 5: Economic international organizations implement more effective

sanctions and sanction threats than political international organizations

Model 5 provides the test results for whether the involvement of economic IOs

increases the likelihood of effectiveness of sanction regimes as compared to political IOs.

MODEL 5: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OLS REGRESSION

(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)SANCTION REGIME SET: Political IO, Unilateral, Economic IO, Multilateral

Coefficients (Standard Error)Target Cost -.003 (.003)Sender Cost -.003 (.003)Issue .055 (.198)Unilateral -.380 (.120)***Economic Organizations .223 (.191)Multilateral -.372 (.303)Threat .764 (.261)***

Number of Observations 532F (Prob >F) 4.68 (0.0000)Adjusted R

20.05

Ramsey RESET Test F(3,521) =1.17PROB>F = 0.32

`*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level


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This hypothesis is not supported. However, the results continue to illustrate the likely

ineffectiveness of unilateral sanction regimes as compared to regimes with the

involvement of a political international institution and the effectiveness of threats.


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POLICY IMPLICATIONS

State governments have options when it comes to threatening or imposing

sanctions. It is in the interest of each sender to maximize the sanctions likelihood of

success while minimizing its economic and political risk. Like many things in politics,

sanction regimes are about striking the right balance.

Given that there is risk associated with threatening or implementing a sanction

regime, potential senders should use caution when deciding their course of action.

Preliminary evidence from cross-tabs reveals that states should collaborate and involve

international organizations in their proposed sanction regimes. In particular, cross-tabs

indicate that regional IO involvement in sanction regimes decreases the likelihood of

failure most significantly, while maintaining a high success rate. The regression results

support these findings, inclusion of an international organization in a sanction regime

increases that regimes likelihood for effectiveness.

These results provide a strong case that it is in the self-interest of the potential

sender state to seek the consensus of a regional body and seek to jointly threaten or

impose sanctions. The governments of potential senders would then be able to not only

lessen their political and economic risk, but limit the amount of sanction management

that would need to be done by the states bureaucrats. This could lead in a shift in the

prevailing policies in sanctions.

There are mitigating factors to this shift. The time that it takes to build consensus

varies by international organization and, in some instances, this time lag may prevent the

potential sender state from seeking consensus. By attempting to quantify which types of


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international organizations are most effective at threatening and imposing sanctions,

potential senders can better determine which organizations to engage in various

circumstances.

The results form Model 3 may illustrate the trade off between effectiveness and

timeliness. These results show that regional organizations are more likely to be effective

sanctioners than global organizations. Members of regional organizations as

organizations formed around a specific collective interest tend to have more common

interests than members of global organizations, making their decisions more prompt and,

as the data show, effective. However, the results for the hypotheses about the

effectiveness of political and economic organizations and the UN did not provide

additional support for determining certain types of international organization sanctioners.

The RAND Cooperation recently published a report on the success of UN and

U.S. peacekeeping missions since World War II showing that the UN had a comparative

advantage over the U.S. in peacekeeping (Dobbins et al, 2005 and 2003). The

comparison is particularly relevant since international peacekeeping missions face similar

time lag problems in consensus-building as sanctions do. In the past decade, there has

been a remarkable increase in the number of UN peacekeeping missions deployed

(Dobbins et al, 2005). A similar shift should happen in the realm of sanctions, since

international organizations are shown to have a comparative advantage in threatening and

imposing sanctions.

Determining that international organizations, particularly regional organizations,

have a comparative advantage over unilateral orad hoc multilateral efforts provides new


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relevance to the international governance regime. Qualitative and quantitative

assessments illustrating the successes of international organizations should give

opponents of international organizations pause and cause them to rethink the overarching

negativity they associate with these institutions.

Continuing to decipher where international organizations work better than

individual states will begin to mitigate the tension between the international governance

regime and states about sovereignty. Once international organizations are seen as

partners and not as rivals to states, consensus may be easier to achieve. Moreover, the

comparative advantages of using international organizations as part of a states foreign

policy toolkit may also increase. Most importantly, however, determining where

international organizations are most useful to states will only help in securing their future

and preventing their demise.


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CONCLUSION

The presented analysis is not intended to answer the question whether sanctions

are a good policy decision. The analysis starts from the point that sanctions continue to

be a primary element of foreign policy and, as such, the most effective way to implement

sanctions should be determined. The data provide strong support for seeking

international institution support for sanction regimes as opposed to pushing sanctions

unilaterally or with an ad hoc group. There is also support for using regional institutions

instead of global institutions to strengthen sanction effectiveness, when such a policy is

politically feasible. The strong coalitions that make up international organizations

provide steady administrative and political support for sanctions.

Sanctions remain an imperfect foreign policy instrument. However, by seeking

the participation of international organizations, and especially regional organizations,

these imperfections can be softened and the likelihood for success increased.


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APPENDIX I

ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)

Unsuccessful Stalemate PartiallySuccessful

Successful Sign of ProbitCoefficient

Targetcost -.185

(.034)

-.023

(.006)

.091

(.020)

.117

(.022)-

Sendercost .168

(.053)

.021

(.008)

-.082

(.028)

-.106

(.034)-

Issue -.033

(.076)

-.005

(.012)

.015

(.033)

.022

(.055)+

USA -.080

(.043)

-.010

(.006)

.038

(.021)

.052

(.029)+

UN .296

(.152)

-.001

(.018)

-.180

(.101)

-.115

(.036)-

GlobalIO -.246(.061)

-.065(.028)

.028(.043)

.283(.125)

+**

RegionIO -.210(.393)

-.041(.012)

.068(.014)

.184(.047)

+**

Multi .014

(.106)

.001

(.011)

-.007

(.054)

-.008

(.063)+

Threat .042

(.038)

.005

(.005)

-.020

(.019)

-.026

(.024)-**

SenderComm -.0003

(.0004)

-.00004

(.00006)

.0001

(.0002)

.0003

(.0003)+

Reported values are the dy/dx values provided by the ordered probit regression

* = significant at the 10% level; ** = significant at 1% level

LINKTEST RESULTS

COEFFICIENT SE Z P >|Z|

_hat 1.10 .313 3.53 0.000

_hatsq -.142 .374 -0.38 0.704

The link test shows that the ordered probit model is correctly specified.


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OLS REGRESSION (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: OUTCOME)

Coefficients (SE)Targetcost -.004 (.003)Sendercost -.003 (.003)

Issue .197 (.214)USA .237 (.117)**UN -.553 (.375)GlobalIO .858 (.324)***RegionIO .750 (.142)***Multi -.001 (.290)Threat -.917 (.306)***SenderComm .001 (.001)

Number of Observations 532F (Prob >F) 5.11 (0.0000)Adjusted R2 0.07

` *** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level

The OLS results are comparable to the ordered probit results, which led to the use of the

OLS results in analyzing the hypotheses in the paper.


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CHART 8: SCATTERPLOT OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE (OUTCOME) RESIDUALS

-2

-1

0

1

2

Residuals

2 2.5 3 3.5Fitted values

The scatter plot shows that within the four outcome possibilities (see page 11), the resultswithin each category are distributed randomly.


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36

SIMPLECORRELATIONS

outcome

multi

glob

alIO

regionIO

UN

USA

issue

threat

outcom

e

1.00000

0.04023

0.2311

0.15

055


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Go It Alone the Effect of International Institutions on Economic Sanction Regimes