Glock WS2012

What are Concepts?

Hans-Johann Glock

Summary: The article argues that a reasonably unied

account of the established use of `concept' and its cogna-

tes can be provided by a cognitivist approach. Such an

approach starts out from the role the ascription of con-

cepts plays in characterizing certain cognitive operations

and abilities, yet without treating concepts as symbolic

representations or particulars in the minds of individu-

als. In particular, it explores the idea that concepts are

rules or principles of classication and inference. At the

end I argue that a cognitivist account can deal not just

with the role of concepts in cognition, but also with the

idea that they are components of propositions.

This article aims to elucidate the established use or uses of the

term `concept', and those of its equivalents and cognates. This

established use includes everyday uses: like some related terms

with a philosophical provenance notably `idea' but unlike

others notably `universal' `concept' is widely employed in

everyday parlance.

1

But it also comprises the established uses

of these terms in special disciplines like the history of ideas,

psychology, logic and philosophy.

Within these disciplines, one encounters numerous theoretical

judgements or prejudices about concepts, for instance that they

contrast with intuitions (Kant), are tied to language (rationalist

tradition), are unsaturated entities (Frege), are compositional

1

Quotidian contexts are particularly signicant for the German Be-

gri, since the humdrum verb begreifen covers all types of compre-

hension. In a lecture, the late Michael Dummett once illustrated the

pervasiveness of Begri by relating how struck he was on his rst

visit to Germany when reading a sign at a railway station mentio-

ning `Gepckstcke, die unter den Begri Koer fallen' that is,

pieces of luggage which fall under the concept suitcase.

8 Hans-Johann Glock

(Fodor), must be amenable to naturalization (most philosophers

and cognitive scientists in the USA), are socially constituted

(most other North-American academics in the humanities), etc.

However, my account seeks to respect not such specic theories

about concepts, but rather fruitful uses of `concept' and its

cognates. It is salutatory to remember that even in specialised

disciplines the use of `concept' is rarely entirely stipulative or

unconnected to the everyday use, since these disciplines purport

to explain cognitive and semantic phenomena describable in

terms of concepts in ordinary discourse.

Philosophers and logicians talk of comparative (x is heavier

than y), quantitative (x weighs 20kg), individual (the author

of Atemschaukel), logical (negation, implication), spatial and

temporal concepts, including the concepts of space and of time.

My initial focus here will be on those concepts that have tended

to occupy centre stage, namely predicative concepts. These are

concepts that correspond to general terms of a particular kind,

namely to the verbs, adjectives or count-nouns that feature in

one-place predicates like `x runs', `x is radioactive' and `x is a

tool'. But I shall also consider the question whether suggested

denitions of concepts capture other types of concepts.

It is relatively uncontroversial that predicative concepts are

involved when rational creatures entertain thoughts like

(1) Dogs bark.

The nature of this involvement remains controversial, ho-

wever. In the history of philosophy, one can distinguish three

fundamental approaches to concepts. According to subjectivist

conceptions, concepts are mental phenomena, particular entities

or goings-on in the mind or in the head of individuals. According

to objectivist conceptions, concepts exist independently of human

minds, as self-subsistent abstract entities. Finally, there is an

intermediate position, which may be termed cognitivist. It agrees

with objectivism in denying that concepts are mental particulars,

while at the same time maintaining, with subjectivism, that

What are Concepts? 9

they have an ineliminable mental or cognitive dimension. One

version of cognitivism is intersubjectivism. It holds that concepts

exist independently of individual rational subjects, but insists

that they are constituted by intersubjective linguistic practices.

Another version brackets the question of existence, yet holds

that what concepts are their essence, if you wish can be

explained only by reference to the operations and capacities of

rational subjects.

This article investigates whether the concept of a concept can

be given a fairly uniform explanation through a `cognitivist'

account of this second, less committal kind, one that accepts

that concepts may exist independently of individual subjects

or even linguistic communities, yet nonetheless invokes mental

achievements and capacities. I shall argue that (many) of

the established ways of using `concept' can be explained by

looking at the relationship between the concept of a concept

and cognitive notions like ability, way of thinking and rule. In

particular, I shall present a case for holding that a cognitivist

explanation can account not just for the connection between

concepts and human thinking and speaking but also for the idea

that they are components of thoughts (propositions). If we are

to situate concepts within the subjective/objective spectrum, it

is useful to distinguish at least ve philosophical questions that

can be raised about them:

Denition question: What are concepts?

Individuation question: How are concepts individuated?

Possession question: What is it to have a concept?

Function question: What is the role of concepts in cognition?

Once we keep apart these four questions, one further question

arises: Priority Question: Which of these questions denition,

individuation, possession or function is the most fundamental?

I have criticized prominent objectivist denitions of concepts el-

sewhere (2010b: 312-5), and shall take their failure for granted

here. Instead, I shall start by arguing against subjectivist ans-

10 Hans-Johann Glock

wers to the denition question. These arguments point in the

direction of a cognitivist approach. Yet the most straightforward

cognitivist denition, which identies concepts and abilities, will

also be found wanting. On the other hand it will transpire that

the cognitivist tradition gives the right response to the possession

question, and that this response does not entail untenable ans-

wers to the individuation question. This result will also suggest

that cognitivism is right in according priority to the possession

question.

1 Concepts and general terms

In many everyday contexts, `concept' means roughly: general

term with a meaning.

2

This denition also ts the role of `con-

cept' in logic in so far as concepts have an extension and are

components of sentences (see below). Yet it does not capture

crucial uses in philosophy, logic and psychology. In psychology, in

particular, concepts are invoked to account for cognitive processes

that are not verbalised. And this chimes with common sense. We

do not express all of our thoughts in words- and thank goodness

for that. Equally, we sometimes say that p when we think that q.

A lingualist might reply that in such cases we talk to ourselves

in foro interno, and that thinking is a kind of internal monologue

(as Plato had suggested in Thaetetus: 189e). But Wittgenstein

and Ryle ought to have taught us that speaking to oneself in the

2

This is more felicitous than predicates with a meaning, since the

latter are supposed to involve the copula or its equivalents. The

concept of a dog corresponds to the general term `dog' rather than

the predicate `x is a dog'. A moot question which I shall not take up

here is whether the latter is more closely aligned to the concept or

property of being a dog. The addition `with a meaning' is superuous

if a term is understood as a symbol, part of an established language;

but it is required if a general term is understood as mere sign which

has been accorded a syntactic role but no specic meaning (some-

thing represented by a predicate-letter in an uninterpreted formal

language).


imagination is no more sucient or necessary for thinking than

having mental images (see Glock 1997).

Now, one might grant this point, yet insist that genuinely concep-

tual thought must issue in `judgements', something in which the

subject consciously and explicitly applies a general term, whether

it be in overt or inner speech. This gambit would imply, however,

that human cognition involves much less conceptual thought than

commonly assumed; and it is not forced on us by the meaning of

concept in psychology or ordinary parlance (see Prior 1953: ch.

XI). Furthermore, the retreat to silent predication rules out ab

initio the possibility of concept-possession by non-linguistic crea-

tures, which is at least contentious (see Glock 2010a).

Even if these qualms could be waived, moreover, silent predica-

tion would not solve another problem. Talking to oneself in the

imagination is a process involving specic languages. By contrast,

in philosophy, logic and psychology concepts are standardly sup-

posed to cut across dierent languages, whether they be natural

languages or interpreted formal calculi. According to psycholo-

gists, it is the concept of a dog rather than general terms like

`dog' or `chien' that is involved in thinking (1). And a logical

concept like that of negation is expressed equally by logical par-

ticles from dierent languages: `not', `nicht', `ne pas', `~', etc. In

such contexts, `concept' is more closely aligned with `idea' than

with `word' or `term', which signify lexical items from specic

languages.

Now, there is a venerable tradition which would allow us to ex-

tend the denition of concepts as general terms to non-verbalised

cognitive processes and cognitive processes of non-linguistic crea-

tures, and which also lifts the restriction to particular languages.

This tradition postulates a mental language that is shared by

all creatures capable of conceptual thought, a universal mental

symbolism that underlies all specic languages. Concepts, the

story goes, are nothing other than the words of this language of

thought, a language that is thought by individuals rather than

spoken by linguistic communities. This is a version of subjecti-

vism. It goes back at least to Occam, and it ts Kant's claim


that a concept is a `predicate of a possible judgement' (Critique

of Pure Reason: A 69/B 94). Its most explicit and prominent ver-

sion, however, is Fodor's `representational theory of mind'. This

position will now be criticized.

2 Are concepts mental particulars or mental

representations?

According to Fodor, so-called propositional attitudes like belief

and desire are mental states, and they àre constituted by rela-

tions to mental representations', namely `thoughts' (Fodor 2003:

141, 10). Concepts are `the constituents of thoughts' (Fodor 1998:

25). They constitute a kind of `mental representation' and hence

a `kind of mental particular'. As mental particulars, they are òb-

jects in the mind' or ìn the head' of individuals; they are `concre-

te' rather than abstract; and they have causes and eects in the

physical world (Fodor 1998: 3, 7-8, 22; Fodor 2003: 13 and note).

As mental representations, they have `representational content'.

They contribute to the content of our propositional attitudes, to

what we believe, desire, etc. They do so by determining the con-

ditions under which our beliefs are true and our desires satised.

Any form of subjectivism faces a Fregean objection: concepts can-

not be phenomena in the minds or heads of individuals, since they

can be shared between dierent subjects. Now, `sharing' and its

cognates are used in a variety of ways. One paradigm is that of

dividing an object into parts, which themselves are not shared,

as in sharing a banana. But there is another, equally basic, para-

digm which does not imply division and extends well beyond ma-

terial objects. Dierent people can share bicycles, predilections,

insurance companies, heads of states, the credit for an invention,

beliefs, etc. It is in this sense that concepts are shareable. Two

individuals A and B can both have the same concept F, which

means that it is possible that both A and B have mastered and

employ F.

Shareability is a feature of the concept of a concept in both every-

day life and in disciplines like psychology and the history of ideas.


One central use we make of `concept' and terms that are equiva-

lent in the relevant contexts (like `conception', `idea' or `notion')

is in claims about dierent individuals or even groups of indivi-

duals either sharing a concept, or failing to do so. For instance,

dierent political and religious traditions may or may not share

the same concept of freedom or of guilt. Such claims are equally

central to intellectual history, e.g. when it comes to comparing

the Greek concept of eudaimonia with our concept of happiness.

Fodor accepts shareability as a `non-negotiable condition', that

concepts are `the sorts of things that lots of people can, and do,

share' (Fodor 1998: 28). The obvious diculty is that mental

particulars contrast with concepts in that they are modes of in-

dividual minds or heads, and hence private to their owners. Fodor

thinks, however, that he can easily overcome this diculty by in-

troducing a distinction between type and token. Fodor's `language

of thought hypothesis' treats mental representations as symbols

of a `language of thought' or `Mentalese'. Thoughts, the larger

wholes formed by concepts, are the sentences of Mentalese, phy-

sical tokens of computational types. When we engage in concep-

tual thought, Mother Nature inscribes the words of a computer

programme into our brains. And concepts are nothing other than

the token-words of Mentalese, i.e. computationally identied pat-

terns of neural rings.

Consider the scenario in which Anne and Sarah both believe that

dogs bark and (improbably) utter `Dogs bark' in close succes-

sion. In that case we have two tokens of a single type-sentence

`Dogs bark', and two tokens of a single type-word `bark'. Similar-

ly, according to Fodor, in Anne's brain there occurs one neural

token-sentence, and in Sarah's brain there occurs another neural

token-sentence. Yet Anne and Sarah both believe the same thing,

namely that dogs bark, since both tokens instantiate the same

Mentalese type-sentence DOGS BARK. Finally, they share the

concept DOG, because both have tokens of one and the same

Mentalese type-word.

This position can account for shareability. It does so at a pri-

ce, however. The type/token distinction implies abandoning the


claim that concepts themselves are particulars. After all, Anne

and Sarah do not have a Mentalese token-word in common, what

they have in common is that their distinct token-words are of

the same type. What can be shared between dierent individuals

are representation-types; and these types, as Fodor duly acknow-

ledges, are `abstracta' rather than mental particulars (see 1998:

20-1, 28). To be more precise, types are repeatable universals and

hence abstract. Conversely, what can qualify as mental particu-

lars are representation-tokens; and these tokens are conned to

each individual rather than shareable. This leaves Fodor's positi-

on in tatters. On the one hand, the non-negotiable constraint on

concepts, namely that they be shareable, is satised only by the

abstract types which are neither particulars (mental, physical or

otherwise) nor concrete. On the other hand, his central claim, na-

mely that concepts are concrete particulars, applies only to the

tokens which are not shareable. If one persistently keeps apart

types and tokens, one is forced to abandon the subjectivist credo

that concepts are mental particulars that can enter into causal

relations. Concepts themselves the things that can be shared

by dierent individuals are not particulars.

As far as shareability is concerned, concepts might yet be mental

representations, namely of the type- rather than token-variety.

This is in line with Fodor's contention that `concepts are [Menta-

lese] symbols' (Fodor 1998: 28). But at the same time he is driven

to the claim that concepts are something that `mental representa-

tions . . . express', namely `word meanings' (Fodor 1998: 2; Fodor

2003: 13). Accordingly, he is committed to the inconsistent claim

that concepts are both mental words and the meanings of those

very same words. This inconsistency is no coincidence. Instead,

it is connected to a fundamental aw in the language of thought

hypothesis and a general problem with the idea that concepts or

thoughts are representations.

Following Peirce's theory of signs (1933), one can distinguish bet-

ween dierent types of representation:

Icons resemble what they represent

Symbols are related to what they represent by convention


Indices are connected to what they `represent' by causal de-

pendencies or by other natural relations such as spatial or

temporal proximity.

Thus realist paintings are icons of what they represent. Linguistic

expressions, with the possible exception of onomatopoetic ones,

are symbols of what they represent. The word `dog', for example,

is connected to the animals not through any kind of resemblance,

but through an arbitrary convention. Smoke, nally, is an index

of re, because it is a causal result of re.

Given this distinction, one might deliver the following brief ver-

dict on the idea of a neurophysiological language of thought:

a) Patterns of neural rings are indices of external phenomena,

but only for suitably informed with neurophysiological mea-

suring equipment, not for ordinary subjects of thought;

b) they might be icons (but in fact not);

c) they cannot be symbols.

That neural rings are causal results of external events and cau-

sal preconditions of perception is agreed on all sides. The extent

to which there is, for example, a spatial resemblance between the

objects of perception and the neural activities that underlie per-

ception, is a matter for empirical investigation. For the most part,

no such iconic relation has been observed. Although experiments

like those of Hubel and Wiesel show that particular neurons are

involved in seeing lines of a particular orientation, there is no ico-

nic similarity between the lines and the pattern of ring neurons.

Finally, neural rings cannot be symbols because there is no one

who uses them to represent somehing in a conventional way (a

point to which I shall return). Accordingly, there can be no men-

tal symbols and hence no language of thought.

What about the more general idea that concepts are representati-

ons? According to an orthodoxy shared by Fodor, concepts must

be shareable because they are components of what people belie-

ve, of shareable thoughts or `propositional contents'. But as their

components, concepts can no more be representations or signs

than propositions themselves they are what is represented, the


content of thinking, not what represents, i.e. what expresses these

contents (Glock 2009 elaborates these objectioins to Fodor).

This lesson is in line with the common sense view that concepts

are expressed by signs such as predicates or logical operators. It

also follows from a more basic feature of the notion of represen-

tation.

Bona de representations, at least of an iconic or symbolic kind,

require a medium. That is to say, they have representational pro-

perties by virtue of having non-representational properties. For

instance, Rembrandt's self-portrait in the National Gallery of

Scotland represents a particular individual on account of more

basic properties, roughly the way in which it arranges colours

and shapes (see Hyman 2006). Similarly, the sign-token `Rem-

brandt Harmenszoon van Rijn' signies that same individual on

account of its typographic properties, which are subject to the

kind of conventions characteristic of symbols.

The idea that thoughts and concepts are (mental, computatio-

nal or neural) representations is incompatible with this dening

feature of representations. With apologies to Marshall McLuhan,

thoughts and by implication concepts are all message and no

medium! Or, with rather fewer apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein,

thought is not a linguistic symbol requiring interpretation; it is

itself `the last interpretation' (1958: 34).

But couldn't one respond that concepts and propositions qua

sign-types of Mentalese do occur in a medium, namely a medium

of neural rings? The latter represent propositional or conceptu-

al contents on account of their non-representational physiological

or physical properties. According to Fodor, for instance, these

representations have certain syntactic properties properties de-

termining the way they are processed on account of their phy-

siological qualities, and they have certain semantic properties,

properties determining what they represent, on account of their

causal relations to the environment.

At this juncture, the epistemic or cognitive dimension of repre-

sentations comes into play. The non-representational properties

of representations must be accessible to the subject of representa-


tion. After all, a representation R is not just a sign of something

an object O, but a sign for someone a subject of representati-

on S someone to whom X is represented through R (again, the

point was epitomized by Peirce, in his famous semiotic triangle).

Yet neural tokens of computational types are entirely and in prin-

ciple inaccessible to the subject; they are `deeply unconscious', to

use Searle's (1997) critical label. By the same token, they cannot

be used by S intentionally or, a fortiori, with the specic intent

to represent something. Nor can the subject employ them accor-

ding to rules, as required for symbolic representation.

A possible response: neural signs are used by sub-personal sub-

jects, e.g. by the brain, its parts, or functionally dened modu-

les.

3

But this invites the charge of a `homunculus' or `mereological

fallacy' (Kenny 1984: ch. 9; Bennett/Hacker 2003). This is the

fallacy of explaining mental attributes of an animal or subject

in our case the capacity for conceptual thought by postulating

sub-personal subjects homunculi with the same or similar

mental capacities in this case the capacity for the intentional

employment of signs. The explanation is fallacious because these

capacities can only be attributed to the animal or subject S as

a whole, and not save metaphorically to its parts, whether

they be organs like S 's brain or capacities like S 's mind. Further-

more, even if it made sense to credit sub-personal instances with

symbolic understanding, this would only push back the problem.

One then needs to explain the representational capacities of these

postulated homunculi, which engenders a regress.

Yet surely, to anyone except die-hard behaviourists the very exis-

tence of cognitive phenomena shows that there are mental repre-

sentations! Doesn't thought require some kind of representation?

The answer is yes, but only if `representation' is divested from

the standard connection with a medium and understood in a mi-

3

Fodor himself does not fall back on this response. He grants that

`nobody ever interprets mental representations' (2008: 16). Yet this

concession removes any license for holding that these representations

are symbolic, and hence for speaking about a language of thought.


nimalist sense. On that understanding, our thoughts are repre-

sentations, simply because they have what are nowadays called

semantic properties:

a proposition that p is true or false

a singular representation a refers or fails to refer to an object x

a concept F applies or doesn't apply to an object x

However, representations in this minimalist sense cannot explain

thought. For to represent (that p or x or F s or things being F )

in this sense simply is to think (to think that p, about x, about

F s, or about things being F ).

4

Representationalism is reduced to

uninformative claims like:

to think that a is F is to represent a as being F,

and to think of F s qua F s is to represent F s, etc.

A non-representationalist (`cognitivist') approach at least holds

the promise of a genuine explanation of what thought amounts

to: what it is to think that p or about F s as F s is spelled out in

terms of the possession of certain cognitive abilities.

4

Austere representationalists such as Husserl (1900), have disassocia-

ted the idea of representation from any specic connotations, nota-

bly from the link with a particular medium whether it be mental

images or words crossing one's mind, neural rings or computational

symbols. But such positions once more face the task of explaining

what having a representation amounts to. In Husserl's case, for ex-

ample, we seem to be left with the idea that it is `just like' mental

picturing, only without mental images. But that simply boils down

to saying that having a representation of (an) F is to think about

(an) F, which means that the explanation of thought has moved

in a circle. A logical relation, thinking about (an) F, has rst been

construed as a pictorial one, and has then been robbed of the picto-

rial aspects which alone can give it any substance (Tugendhat 1976:

62-3, 276-7).


3 Concepts and abilities

The most popular and straightforward cognitivist answer to the

denition question identies concepts with abilities. Thus, in re-

sponse to the question Àre concepts entities or are they dispo-

sitions?' Price states in no uncertain terms: à concept is not an

entity [. . . ] but a disposition or capacity' (1953: 320, 348). In the

same vein Geach pronounces that concepts àre capacities exer-

cised in acts of judgement' (1957: 7, see also 13; Saporiti 2010).

The idea that concepts are abilities is also espoused by Millikan

from a very dierent, naturalistic perspective (2000: ch. 4). This

proposal respects several features of established use.

First, properties are objective, something possessed by things of

all kinds. By contrast, concepts are something possessed by ra-

tional subjects capable of classifying things according to their

properties. This is simply a crucial aspect of the cognitive dimen-

sion of concepts stressed by cognitivism.

Secondly, the identication of concepts and capacities does not

fall foul of the constraint that concepts must be shareable. As Ge-

ach points out, it does not entail that ìt is improper to speak of

two people as having the same concept ', since dierent indivi-

duals can possess the same mental capacities (1957: 14). Thirdly,

concepts and abilities alike can be acquired, applied and lost, and

some of them may be innate.

Finally, to possess a concept is to possess a certain kind of mental

ability, capacity or disposition. In what follows, I refrain from de-

ciding which of these types of potentiality is the most appropriate

general category (see Glock 2010b: section 5). Barring that issue,

identifying concept-possession with an ability, capacity or dispo-

sition of some kind is inevitable. That concept-possession is an

ability of some kind is accepted, willy-nilly, even by Fodor, who

purports to contradict cognitivism (a.k.a. `pragmatism') on this

issue (2003: 19). The real bone of contention between representa-

tionalists like Fodor and those cognitivists that can properly be

called `concept pragmatists' in a wide sense e.g. Wittgenstein,

Ryle, Travis and concerns the question of whether concept-

possession is simply the ability to represent the property of being


F or F s as F s, or whether it should be explained as the ability to

classify things into those which are F s and those which aren't, or

to draw inferences from thoughts about F s. Concepts are involved

not just in occurrent thoughts or beliefs, but also in long-standing

or dispositional beliefs. Consequently, the possession of concepts

must be at least as stable as the possession of dispositional beliefs.

Put in Aristotelian terms, concept-possession must be a poten-

tiality of some kind, since it combines two features. On the one

hand, it is enduring rather than episodic. On the other hand, it

is something which manifests itself in certain episodes, notably of

overt or silent classication and inference.

In addition to respecting features of the established concept of

a concept, dening concepts as abilities has advantages when it

comes to explaining both the phylo- and the ontogenesis of con-

ceptual thought and of language. Of course, the denition itself

does not provide such a genetic explanation. But it claries how

we might be able to give a genetic account that avoids vicious

regress and circularity and thereby the paradoxical denial that

an explanation is impossible in principle. In particular, the abili-

ty approach is congenial to the following claims that facilitate a

genetic explanation of conceptual thought:

i. there are preconceptual forms of cognition, conation and in-

tentional action;

ii. these dier from the conceptual forms through the absence

of certain advanced cognitive abilities.

iii. abilities can be possessed in varying degrees, and they can be

acquired through a gradual process.

4 The individuation of concepts and abilities

Its attractions notwithstanding, the identication of concepts

with abilities faces the objection that it implies an untenable ans-

wer to the individuation question. Thus Fodor has alleged that

concepts are more nely individuated than abilities. For instance,

`creature with a kidney' and `creature with a heart' apply to all

and only the same things, but they express dierent concepts.


Furthermore, èquilateral triangle' and èquiangular triangle' ap-

ply necessarily to the same things, yet they still express dierent

concepts. In current jargon, concepts are not just ìntensional'

but `hyperintensional'.

Now, an ability is individuated by reference to its exercise. But,

Fodor maintains, the same sorting and inferential performances

can manifest the possession of dierent concepts. Conning our-

selves to the ability to sort or discriminate, sorting equilateral tri-

angles from all other gures is also sorting equiangular triangles

from all other gures (Glock 2003: 256, 1436). It seems to fol-

low that concepts cannot be individuated by the exercise of an

ability, and hence that they cannot be individuated by reference

to abilities. In eect, Fodor's objection runs as follows:

P1 Abilities are individuated by their exercise (ability to =ability to i ing = ing).P2 In all possible situations, one and the same sorting activity

can manifest dierent concepts.

C: Concepts cannot be individuated through the abilities which

constitute their possession.

The argument is valid. Yet P2 is false: sorting triangles according

to lengths is not the same activity as sorting triangles according

to angles, even though the results are the same. The dierence in

the two activities can be displayed by linguistic creatures, who can

justify their sorting along dierent lines. It can even be manifes-

ted in non-linguistic behaviour. A creature that sorts on account

of comparing or measuring lengths applies equilateral triangle, a

creature that sorts on account of measuring angles applies equian-

gular triangle. These are dierent activities, manifesting dierent

abilities and thereby the possession of dierent concepts. And it

is obvious that one can have one of these abilities or concepts

without having the other. Indeed, most children actually learn

how to measure lengths before learning how to measure angles.

But individuation also poses another challenge to identifying con-

cepts with abilities. Many cognitivists grant that there is no pre-

cise way of individuating abilities. Thus Travis (2000) grants that


linking concepts to abilities may not be much help in individua-

ting concepts, since it is not clear how abilities are to be counted.

That concession needs to be put in perspective, however. Like

Travis, Geach (1957: 15) accepts that it is absurd to ask how

many abilities are exercised in a judgement. Yet he also insists,

rightly, that we can still distinguish between such abilities. More

generally, one must distinguish between the possibility of enume-

rating and the possibility individuating entities of a particular

kind (see Strawson 1997: ch. 1; Glock 2003: 4752). And this ge-

neral lesson applies equally to abilities.

Still a problem remains. It is prima facie plausible to hold that

we are able not only to distinguish the concept of a dog from that

of barking, but also to specify that precisely two concepts are in-

volved in judging that dogs bark. So concepts and abilities seem

to come apart on the issue of enumerability. This verdict can be

contested, however, on the grounds that it does not compare like

with like. The claim that the number of concepts involved in (1)

is determinate is only even remotely plausible if we conne oursel-

ves to predicative concepts (otherwise we have to add at least one

quantitative concept that corresponds to the plural in English; al-

ternatively, if we analyse (1) with the help of Fregean logic, we

need to add the logical concepts of universal quantication and

of material implication). But the very same consideration applies

to abilities. It is just as plausible to insist that precisely two pre-

dicative abilities are involved in judging that (1) namely that of

thinking about dogs and that of thinking about things that bark

as it is to maintain that precisely two predicative concepts are

involved in (1).

5 Dierences between concepts and abilities

The stumbling block for identifying concepts with abilities is not

individuation. It is rather that there are other respects in which

the established use of `concept' diers from that of `ability', not

least as regards the role or function of concepts.

First, one thing we do with concepts is to dene or explain them.


But to dene or explain a concept is not to dene or explain a

capacity. Normally, to explain an ability is to explain its causal

preconditions (causal explanation), whereas to explain a concept

is to explain its content (semantic explanation). Furthermore,

even when we dene an ability (i.e. explain its content), we

specify what it is an ability to do; as just mentioned, abilities

are individuated through their exercise. By contrast, to explain

a predicative concept is to specify the conditions that an object

must satisfy to fall under it.

Secondly, and relatedly, concepts can be instantiated or satised

by things; conversely, things instantiate, satisfy or fall under

concepts. These things cannot be said of abilities, or at least not

in the same sense.

Thirdly, and once more relatedly, concepts have an extension

(the set of objects which fall under them) and an intension

(the features which qualify objects for falling under them); yet

this cannot be said of abilities. Insofar as the ability linked to

possessing the concept F has an extension, it is not the range of

things that are F, but either the range of subjects that possess

F, or the range of situations in which these possessors can apply

or withhold F.

Fourthly, a concept can occur in a proposition or statement, but

an ability cannot. Of course, abilities can occur in propositions

in the sense of being mentioned in them, as in

(2) The ability to lie convincingly is a great asset in ban-

king.

But it seems that concepts occur in propositions in yet

another and more pervasive way, not just as topics or referents,

something the proposition is about, but as components. The

concept of being sweet occurs in the proposition that

(3) Sugar is sweet

even though no ability occurs in it.


6 Tools

At this point it behoves us to return to the issue of concept

possession, since it provides the strongest argument in favour of

the identication. It starts out from

(I) to possess a concept is to possess a certain mental ability.

Next, it glosses (I) as

(I') to possess a concept = to possess a certain mental ability

It then invokes the additional premise

(II) to possess x = to possess y x = y

in order to reach the conclusion that

(III) a concept = a certain mental ability.

But this reasoning is problematic. First, it is unclear whe-

ther (I) is indeed an identity statement, as the paraphrase (I')

assumes. Often statements of the form `to is to ' merelyexpress a generality statement of the form `For all x, if x F s then

x Gs)'. The latter need not even be reversible (as in `to be a

Cretan is to be a liar'). Next, to be reversible, (I) and (I') would

have to specify a particular mental ability which is equivalent

to concept possession. This is far from trivial, as we shall see.

And even if this feat has been achieved, it will be insucient

to establish an identity. It will only mean that everyone who

possesses a concept also possesses this specic mental ability,

and vice versa.

Furthermore, it remains an open question whether (I) should

not instead be glossed as:

I* S has the concept F S has the ability of operating with F.


To be sure, someone who identies concepts with abilities will

resist that paraphrase and insist that the ability with which pos-

sessing the concept F is to be identied must be explained with-

out mentioning the concept F, an entity with which the subject

operates. But it is an alternative that her arguments do not rule

out. That alternative is based on the following line of thought. If

having a concept is an ability, it is an ability to operate with con-

cepts. In that case, however, the concept itself cannot be identical

with the ability. Rather, it is something employed in the exercise

of that ability.

A cognitivist conception which picks up this cue is the popular

idea that concepts are a kind of cognitive or linguistic tool. Con-

cepts are things employed in the exercise of conceptual abilities,

just as tools are things employed in the exercise of manual (tech-

nical) abilities.

Unfortunately, it is far from clear what kind of tool concepts

might be. Worse still, the analogy is misleading to begin with.

The idea that concepts are akin to tools in that they are objects

(concrete, mental or abstract) with which we operate in conceptu-

al thought amounts to a reication. There is a dierence between

the possession of a tool and the possession of the ability to em-

ploy the tool as I keep discovering to my cost when trying to

operate our electric drill. This distinction cannot be drawn in the

case of concepts. To possess a concept is ipso facto to possess the

ability to use the concept.

5

I now turn to two proposals that avoid the pitfall of treating

objects as if they were bona de objects.

7 Ways of thinking

First, the Neo-Fregean proposal that concepts are senses or `mo-

des of presentation' (Peacocke 1992; Knne 2005). Unfortunately,

the latter is merely a catch-phrase, and one Frege himself never

explained adequately, least of all with respect to concepts, which

5

In this respect, concepts resemble skills. To possess a skill is ipso

facto to possess the ability to apply the skill.


he regarded as referents rather than senses of predicates. But we

can put some esh on it by treating concepts as ways of thin-

king about objects, though not in the adverbial sense of thinking

about them hard or longingly. More specically, concepts are ways

of thinking about or conceiving of objects as possessing certain

properties, without themselves being properties. To render that

suggestion viable, we need to avoid literal interpretations of the

Fregean idea that a sense is a `mode of presenting a referent'.

Strictly speaking, there can be no way of presenting a referent

unless there is a referent or extension. In the case of concepts,

this would rule out uninstantiated concepts, which is absurd. On

my construal, therefore, ways of thinking about objects are direc-

ted not just at those objects which possess the relevant properties,

but at all objects of which the relevant properties can be predi-

cated either truly or falsely. To put it dierently, a concept is a

way of thinking of objects from a suitable range as possessing or

lacking certain properties. This reintroduces the idea of classica-

tion. Finally, we can operationalize the idea of ways of thinking,

thereby further spelling out its cognitive dimension. The concept

expressed by a predicate is determined by the features to which

the subject refers in deciding whether a given object falls under

the concept, or would decide, if the question arose.

6

Neo-Fregeanism does justice to the cognitive dimension in several

respects. First, its answer to the possession question runs:

A subject S possesses the concept F i S is capable of

thinking of an object as being an F.

Secondly, the Neo-Fregean answer to the denition question has

it that concepts are `representational abstract entities' (Knne

2007: 346-7). Qua modes of presentation they are not linguistic

symbols predicates of a language of thought but things ex-

pressed by symbols. Yet they in turn are ways of thinking about

objects or of objects as having properties. Concepts are at the

same time representanda of the predicates of public languages

and representantia of properties. And they are subjective not in

6

For a more elaborate discussion of Neo-Fregeanism, see Glock 2011.


the sense of being inside the minds or brains of individuals, but

only in a sense related to the function question: it is essential to

concepts that they play a role in cognitive acts and operations.

Hurdles remain nonetheless when it comes to expatiating upon

the idea of thinking of an object as possessing certain properties.

For one thing, to accommodate even all employments of predica-

tive concepts Neo-Fregeans are driven to statements like

one thinks of something as F if one judges, that it is F,

when one hopes that it is F, when one wonders, whether it

is F, etc. for all propositional attitudes and acts. (Knne

2007: 343)

Alas, when I wonder whether Susan is well, I do not, normally,

think of her as being well. Accordingly, `thinking of something as

F ' cannot have its normal sense here, and hence cannot be used

to explain the Neo-Fregean notion of `way of thinking'. One might

respond that `thinking of something as F ' has a technical sense

here; it is something one does when one judges that x is F, hopes

that x is F, wonders whether it is F, etc. But this would once more

take us back to square one, namely the cognitive phenomena that

concepts were supposed to explain.

For another, `thinking of objects as possessing certain properties'

does not t all types of concept or conceptual thought. It directly

captures predicative concepts and classication. And perhaps the

idea can be extended to comparative, quantitative, spatial and

temporal concepts, and to individual concepts, provided that the

latter are welcomed as bona de concepts in the rst place. But

it does not capture logical concepts and inference. To possess

the concept of negation is not a `mode of presenting' or a `way of

thinking' about a putative logical object negation, or the property

of being negated, or even of negated propositions or a proposition

as negated. Instead, it is a way of operating with negation, e.g.

in negating propositions and drawing inferences.


8 Techniques and rules

A nal cognitivist approach promises both more specicity and

greater generality. It also has the advantage of acknowledging

that a concept is something employed in conceptual thought

without reifying it. A concept is not an object, properly speaking,

the story goes, but a technique. Thus Wittgenstein maintained

that `a concept is a technique of using a word', or `the technique

of our use of an expression: as it were, the railway network that

we have built for it' (1988: 50 and 2000: MS 163: 56v). To master

or possess a technique is to master or possess an ability. Yet

techniques are not themselves abilities, but something which the

possessor of an ability uses in exercising the ability. There is a

dierence, for instance, between the ability to skin a rabbit and

the various techniques one might employ to this end.

Wittgenstein regarded concepts as linguistic techniques. But

his idea can be given a Kantian twist, in order to avoid the

potentially problematic implication that concepts are the

prerogative of linguistic creatures. One can tie concepts instead

to thought or understanding rather than language. Concepts are

techniques not just for using words, but for mental operations or

mental acts which may or may not be expressed in language. The

capacity for such mental operations may presuppose possession

of language, yet it can denitely be exercised by a subject that

does not engage in either overt or silent speech at the time (see

also section 1 above).

But what kind of mental operation? Here we face the question of

what function or functions concepts are supposed to full. The

most popular candidate, and the one that has preoccupied us so

far, is classication. Often classication is in turn spelled out as

an operation of discrimination, of sorting things into those that

do and those that do not fall under the concept. This elaboration

invites an objection, however. There is at least one concept that

cannot be used to discriminate between those things that fall

under it and those that do not, namely the concept of identity

(Knne 2007: 344). It makes no sense to sort things into those

that are and those that are not identical with themselves. One


way of avoiding this problem is to gloss classication not as

sorting, but as recognizing. In so far as identity is a bona de

relation at all, it makes sense to recognize that it is one in which

each thing stands to itself.

A second response is to cast our net more widely. There is

a second basic function standardly and plausibly ascribed to

concepts, namely inference. This obviously accommodates the

concept of identity, which has a distinctive role in inference.

In any event, acknowledging inference as a basic function of

concepts in addition to classication is imperative in order to

account for logical concepts. As we have seen, these defy the

labels `mode of presentation' or `way of thinking about', and by

the same token they should not be lumbered articially with the

function of classifying things. At the same time logical concepts

are obviously at least as amenable to being treated as cognitive

techniques as predicative concepts.

Accordingly, the proposal currently under consideration is this:

a concept is not identical with the capacity to classify or infer,

but only with the technique employed by someone who exercises

the ability to classify or infer. Next, the term `technique' needs

to be made more specic. What matters as far as concepts are

concerned whether they be predicative or logical are the

rules or principles that guide conceptual thought. Concepts, the

proposal now runs, are rules or principles of classication and/or

inference.

Even this modied proposal is threatened by category mismat-

ches. It does not seem that to dene a concept is to dene a

principle or rule. Rather, the principle or rule features in the

denition. On the other hand, perhaps this is just a vagary

of the current use of `denition' in English, without further

conceptual import. There is no linguistic infelicity in maintaining

that to explain a concept is to explain a principle or rule for

performing certain mental or linguistic operations.

7

At the same

7

One might further remonstrate that, strictly speaking, it is terms

rather than concepts that are dened. After all, concepts are suppo-

sed to be located at the level of meaning rather than that of symbols.


time one would at the very least feel queasy about violating or

acting in accordance with a concept. But note that one can do

violence to a concept, by misapplying it or stretching it beyond

breaking-point. Finally, while rules apply to subjects or agents

under their `jurisdiction', concepts apply to objects that satisfy

their dening criteria.

Another qualm would be that principles can be true or false,

whereas concepts cannot. Prima facie, at least, rules escape

this diculty. Even if they are expressed by sentences in the

indicative mood, it is arguable that their `truth' amounts to

nothing other than a particular prescription being actually in

force.

The question remains, however, what form these principles

or rules should take. Here we seem to be facing a dilemma.

One apparent option is that these rules are standards for the

employment of concepts. They might, for instance, take the

form of the rules Bennett extracts from Kant (Bennett 1966: 145):

(IV) You may apply concept F to x i x is . . .

But on this proposal, the concept F itself would not be

identical with the rule after all. It would rather be a predicate

the use of which is governed by the rule.

A second option is that the rule species another activity, e.g.

(V) You may treat x in way W i x is . . . .

In that case the danger is that we are stuck with two un-

palatable options. One is that W is a place-holder for practical

activities which may presuppose concept-possession, but which

someone who has mastered the concept need not be able to

But the matter is not straightforward. While one cannot dene the

meaning of an expression, one can certainly explain it. The crucial

point is that in all three cases terms, concepts, meanings one

ultimately species and demonstrates rules or principles for certain

cognitive or linguistic operations.


engage in; the other is that W is a place-holder for conceptuali-

zation, which would render the account unexplanatory.

Fortunately, this dilemma is more apparent than real. The

second horn can be avoided by noting that the form which

a conceptual rule takes depends on the kind of concept or

conceptual operation at issue. It is at least plausible to hold

that those cognitive operations which are genuinely conceptual

revolve around classication on the one hand, inference on the

other. If one is hard up for a generic label, one can say that

conceptual capacities are those involved in judgement (see also

Glock 2010a). Thirdly, the operations governed by rules of

classication and inference are clearly cognitive rather than

practical in nature, which avoids the rst horn of the dilemma.

This leaves one nal question: is there a substantive common

denominator between classication and inference, one that goes

beyond both being advanced cognitive operations? The answer

may well be negative. It is not even clear that classication and

inference always go together. Admittedly, even formal inference

depending on logical concepts presuppose judgements involving

predicative concepts and hence classication. But it is less clear

that classication requires inference of either the formal or the

material kind. There is at least a case to be made that the

behavioural capacities of some non-linguistic creatures amount

to classication rather than mere discrimination of stimuli, yet

without crossing the threshold of inference (see Newen and

Bartels 2007; Carey 2009; Glock 2010a).

9 The proposition problem

We now need to attend to a problem facing all cognitivist ac-

counts. Concepts are treated as the components from which pro-

positions are built, especially in logic and philosophy. At least

prima facie, however, neither abilities, nor ways of thinking, nor

rules of classication and inference occur in normal propositions;

at best, they occur in those propositions which are, respectively,

about abilities, ways of thinking or rules, i.e. explicitly mention


or refer to them.

There are two ways of responding to this `proposition problem'.

I shall argue that in combination, these responses promise to re-

solve this diculty, which would otherwise seem intractable.

If Strawson (1959: Part II) is to be trusted, a universal such as a

property can enter a proposition not just in the direct sense that

the sentence expressing the proposition contains a word or phrase

referring to the property of being F, but also in the less direct

sense that the sentence contains a word or phrase signifying it. By

a similar token, such a sentence would contain a general term ex-

pressing the concept F, even though it does not refer to it. What

is more, one can extend this courtesy to any otherwise plausible

explanans of `concept'. Sticking to the rule proposal, this would

mean that the predicate in (3) expresses a rule for classiying

substances into those that possess the property of being sweet

and those that don't.

Crucial to this construal is that standard propositions, and by

implication our common or garden thoughts, are not about con-

cepts. That insight goes back at least as far as Aquinas. Ideas

(species) are `not what is thought of (id quod intelligitur) but

that by which thinking takes place (id quo intelligitur)' (Kenny

1980: 71). It is also accepted by Price, who identies concepts

with capacities:

The concept is not before the mind as an object of in-

spection. It is at work in the mind, but not as one in-

spectable content among others . . . It shows itself not as

a detectable item of mental furniture, but rather as a gui-

ding force, determining the direction which the series of

presented particulars [mental images or words] takes . . . '

(Price 1953: 342).

Finally, it is congenial to the Neo-Fregeanism propounded by

Knne. In the spirit of Strawson, Knne distinguishes between

application, connotes and expression: the general term `dog' ap-

plies to all and only dogs, connotes the property of being a dog,

and expresses the concept of being a dog (2005: 254 and fn. 31,


263; see also his 2003: 4).

Some such distinction is prerequisite for capturing the dierent

semantic properties or dimensions of general terms. Nonetheless

the StrawsonKnne solution to the proposition problem imme-

diately faces two challenges.

First, can't the courtesy of being allowed to enter into a proposi-

tion indirectly be extended from ways of thinking to all otherwise

plausible candidates for being concepts, notably abilities or ru-

les? Secondly, why should one accept that any of these candidates

feature in all propositions, however indirectly?

The answer to the rst question is straightforward in so far as we

stick to the relationship between concepts and general terms. It is

perfectly commonplace to speak of words as expressing concepts.

And there is no violent infelicity in speaking of general terms as

expressing ways of thinking. The same goes for rules of classi-

cation and/or inference. Perhaps one of these notions `ways of

thinking' or `rule' comes closer to capturing the ordinary mea-

ning of `concept', yet it is not on account of the possibility of being

expressed by general terms. By contrast, it is at best misleading

to speak of general terms as expressing an ability. Conceptual

abilities are possessed by cognitive subjects, and they are expres-

sed by in the sense of being manifested in the mental activities

notably the judgements and inferences of such subjects. And

we might say that those activities manifest concepts indirectly,

keeping this relation apart from the expression of concepts by

general terms. The notion of a conceptual ability points to the

subject of conceptual thought and to the activity (in a suitably

loose sense of the term) of conceptual thinking. By contrast, it is

out of place when it comes to the content of conceptual thought,

which is precisely what the idea of concepts as components of

propositions points to. What we still need is a way of reconciling

the mental or cognitive dimension of concepts with the objective

dimension suggested by their occurrence in propositions.


10 Propositions and concepts as logical

constructions

This takes us straight to the second challenge. The Strawson

Knne response at best removes an obstacle to claiming that

concepts can be ways of thinking and yet appear in propositions.

But what positive reasons do we have for accepting that ways of

thinking appear in propositions, let alone as components of pro-

positions? The answer, I submit, is that both propositions and

their components are logical constructions out of the practices

and abilities of concept-exercising creatures.

Elsewhere (2010b; 2011) I have tried to substantiate this answer.

In the present context I conne myself to indicating some of the

critical steps that need to be taken. They involve attacking an

orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind and language epitomized by

the ubiquitous label `propositional attitude'. According to this or-

thodoxy, intentional verbs like `believe', `know', `desire', `intend'

signify relations between a subject and a proposition, which is

in turn composed of concepts. More specically, this orthodoxy

involves three distinct elements:

a relational model: an intentional state is a relation bet-

ween a subject and a content, something the intentional

state is directed at;

propositionalism: these contents are propositions

a building-block model: propositions are (abstract) who-

les which have (abstract) parts concepts.

All three elements must be rejected. First, propositionalism is

ab initio unsuitable for intentional states like craving x or inten-

ding to (Glock 2010a: 13-4). Next, even `thatish' intentionalverbs like `believe/know/desire that p' are not standardly direc-

ted at propositions (see White 1972). Thirdly, the relational mo-

del which treats believing or desiring that p as a relation to a

bona de object amounts to a reication. Finally, and related-

ly, the building block model, according to which propositions are

complex abstract entities composed of concepts as their proper


parts, is misguided. It transposes the part/whole relation from

the spatial and temporal sphere to a sphere that of abstract

entities to which, ex hypothesis, neither spatial nor temporal

notions apply. What seems to give sense to talk of parts and

wholes in the case of propositions or thoughts is the fact that

the linguistic expressions of thoughts namely sentences have

components namely words (see Kenny 1989: 1267). What is

said or thought has genuine components to the extent to which

its linguistic expression has components (which may, for instance,

be explained when A is called upon to state and explain what she

believes).

My approach is top-down in one respect and bottom-up in an-

other (for the distinction see Dretske 2000: 80-83). On the one

hand, in the spirit of a moderate contextualism, it regards the

components of sentences and intentional contents as abstractions

from entire sentences or `propositions'. On the other hand, this

semantic top-down approach is favoured, among other things, by

a bottom-up perspective on the nature and genesis of thought and

language. To describe more primitive capacities and communica-

tive practices, we do not need to identify conceptual components

but can start, in a holophrastic or holodoxastic mode with whole

sentences or beliefs, respectively. The imperative for parsing ari-

ses only when we reach a more complex phenomena, in particular

those which need to be described in terms of classication and

inference. Even if these phenomena are not conned to creatures

with language, in describing them we employ the apparatus of

fully articulated sentences and their components.

Although propositions are not themselves linguistic entities, they

are akin to what Prior (1971: ch. 2) called logical constructi-

ons from linguistic phenomena, namely from the that-clauses by

which we report and refer to what subjects say or think. The cri-

teria of identity for propositions make essential reference to lin-

guistic acts (sayings or utterances). There are propositions no one

has ever uttered or thought of. But what distinguishes two such

propositions is evident from the declarative sentences which ex-

press them. Although our criteria of identity for propositions are


not the same as our criteria of identity for sentences, we can only

identify the former because we can identify the latter. Although

there are dierent linguistic expressions for the most important

truth discovered by Newton and the most important truth disco-

vered by Einstein, what distinguishes these two truths is evident

from their expressions `F = ma' and `E = mc

2'.

If the relational model, propositionalism and the building-block

model are jettisoned, cognitivism can oer a satisfactory soluti-

on to the proposition problem. In what sense, then, can rules of

classication and inference occur in propositions? The answer is,

very roughly: in the sense that S can only think that a is F in a

fully conceptual sense if S has the capacity to classify or recognize

objects as being F and draw inferences from this fact. Propositi-

ons are what is or can be said or thought. Concepts are rules or

principles that enable a subject to say or think such things, ways

in which subjects do or could conceive of properties.

To talk of propositions and concepts is not just a faon de parler,

and propositions and concepts are not just `make-believe entities'

(to use what is indeed a currently fashionable faon de parler).

Rather, they are logical constructions in a non-reductive sense. It

may prove impossible to paraphrase concepts away. We may need

to refer to them in order to describe the highly evolved cognitive

and/or linguistic abilities of certain creatures. At the same time,

the nature, individuation and function of concepts ceases to be

mysterious once we attend to the abilities that enable and neces-

sitate the ascription of concepts to a subject. In that respect, at

least, the possession question does indeed enjoy priority over the

others (see Glock 2010c: 315-9).

It is only possible to state what propositions and concepts are in

terms which implicitly refer to what subjects can say or do; and

we identify propositions and concepts by grouping or classifying

actual or potential token-expressions according to what they say

or mean. On this basis we may at least hope to reconcile two

apparently incompatible features of the established use of `con-


cept', the cognitive dimension of concepts and their appearance

in propositions.

8

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Chair of Theoretical Philosophy II

Institute of Philosophy

University of Zurich

Zrichbergstrasse 43

CH-8044 Zrich

Switzerland

[email protected]

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