Globalizing Resistance: The New Politics of Social Movements in Latin America || New Social Movements with Old Party Politics: The MTL Piqueteros and the Communist Party in Argentina

New Social Movements with Old Party Politics: The MTL Piqueteros and the Communist Partyin ArgentinaAuthor(s): Isabella Alcañiz and Melissa ScheierSource: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2, Globalizing Resistance: The New Politicsof Social Movements in Latin America (Mar., 2007), pp. 157-171Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27648016 .

Accessed: 16/06/2014 10:05

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Latin AmericanPerspectives.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.40 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 10:05:29 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage

http://www.jstor.org/stable/27648016?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


New Social Movements with Old Party Politics

The MTL Piqueteros and the Communist Party in Argentina

by Isabella Alca?iz and Melissa Scheier

The Movimiento Territorial de Liberaci?n (MTL) is a radical piquetero (picketer) group formed by unemployed workers and activists from the Communist party in

Argentina. The autonomous and radical nature of the MTL is primarily attributable to

prior linkages of the Communist party to urban and skilled workers outside Peronist clientelistic networks and party access to project financing independent of state spend ing. The relationship is beneficial to both the movement and the party.

Keywords: Social networks, Social movements, Piqueteros, Unemployment, Clientelism

The Movimiento Territorial de Liberaci?n (Territorial Liberation

Movement?MTL), a radical piquetero (picketer) group formed by unem

ployed workers and activists from the Communist party (PC) in Argentina,

emerged rapidly in Argentina in the mid-1990s. By analyzing the origin and

evolution of the MTL, we hope to provide new insights into the ways in which new social movements interact with established political parties and why they choose more pragmatic or more radical political strategies.

Piqueteros began protesting the economic reforms of the Menem govern ment (1989-1999) by blocking country roads and city streets and subsequently negotiating their withdrawal with political authorities. The movement has

evolved into three broad factions based on their relationship with the state:

(1) groups or organizations more likely to enter into agreements with the state are associated with the Federaci?n de Tierra y Vivienda (the Federation of

Land and Housing?FTV) and the labor confederation Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (Argentine Workers' Central?CTA), (2) the intermediate Corriente Clasista y Combativa (the Class and Combatant Current?CCC), and (3) more radical1 organizations such as the MTL, which have joined the

Bloque Piquetero Nacional (National Piquetero Bloc) (Burdman, 2002). These

broad coalitions differ in size and state-sponsored resources. The FTV-CTA

Isabella Alca?iz is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Houston. Her

current research is on transnational policy networks in Latin America. Melissa Scheier is an

assistant professor of political science at Georgetown College. Her primary area of research is

law and repression in the developing world. The authors acknowledge the contributions of

Silvia Bleichmar, Ernesto Calvo, Charles Munnell, and their fellow panelists and discussants at

the annual conventions of the Midwest Political Science Association in 2005, the Latin American

Studies Association in 2006 (with particular appreciation to Deborah Yashar for her invaluable

insights), and the International Studies Association in 2006. They thank the editor and review

ers of Latin American Perspectives, Katherine Barillas, and the Mr. Earl Goode Fund at

Georgetown College.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 153, Vol. 34 No. 2, March 2007 157-171 DOI: 10.1177/0094582X06298749 ? 2007 Latin American Perspectives

157



158 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

has the most affiliates and government subsidies, and even though the Bloque Piquetero Nacional has a larger membership than the CCC it manages the fewest subsidies. Like other piquetero organizations in the Bloque, the MTL is based on an odd alliance of unemployed workers, members of emerging social movements characterized by episodic and spontaneous social protests and horizontal ties, and political activists from one of the most rigid and hier archical political parties of the Argentine left.2

Drawing upon social-movement theory (Auyero, 2003; Goodwin and

Jasper, 2004; McAdams, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Yashar, 2005) and our field research in Argentina, we find that while a sharp increase in unemployment and a decentralized Argentine welfare system prompted the political organi zation of unemployed workers, preexisting partisan networks linking unem

ployed workers to institutionalized political forces determined the specific development of piquetero coalitions.3 These coalitions, in turn, limited the

range of strategies available and determined the capacity of piquetero organi zations to persist over time.

We show that access to an autonomous source of political financing,4 the PC's Instituto Movilizador de Fondos Cooperativos (Institute for the Mobilization of Cooperative Funds?IMFC), and prior linkages to urban and skilled worker organizations independent of Peronist clientelistic5 networks

explain the self-directed and radical nature of the MTL. By using the knowl

edge and expertise of the IMFC to obtain government-subsidized loans for its

cooperative enterprises, the MTL is able to pursue a more radical strategy than other piquetero groups.

In examining the structural mechanisms that triggered the emergence of the

piquetero movement, this article concurs with prior scholarship in the view that it was the decentralization of social policy initiated by President Carlos

Menem that established the conditions for the emergence of new patron-client exchange networks (Delamata, 2004; Lodola, 2003; Svampa and Pereyra, 2003). However, it challenges the preconception that there is a necessary link

between state subsidies and clientelistic networks (and, by association, between piqueteros and clientelism) (Burdman, 2002; Escud?, 2005). While

previous research on Argentina has highlighted the importance of clientelism in connecting city mayors, party brokers, and labor unions (Auyero, 2001;

Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes, 2004; Calvo and Murillo, 2005; Levitsky, 2003; Stokes 2005), we show that other mechanisms of political organization can

replace the need for such links, leading to significantly different growth and

mobilization strategies. This article is organized as follows: First, we provide a brief overview of the

piquetero movement. Second, we outline the theoretical framework in which we will explain the emergence of new social movements in terms of preexist

ing political networks. Third, we explore the political and economic factors that led to the emergence of the piquetero movement. Fourth, we examine the

financial and political networks that granted the MTL autonomy from the

patronage networks in which other piquetero organizations were involved and show how radical mobilization is partially sustained by the human and

capital resources of the IMFC. We conclude by discussing the general impli cations of our research for the future of the piquetero movement in Argentina.



Alca?iz and Scheier / NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS WITH OLD PARTY POLITICS 159

THE PIQUETEROS ARE COMING

The official emergence of the piquetero movement can be traced to the pri vatization of major state-owned oil industries in the southern cities of Cutral Co and Plaza Huincul, Neuqu?n. Created as outposts for the extraction of oil in the early 1930s, these cities were for decades the oil extraction and refining center of the state-owned company Yacimientos Petrol?feros Fiscales (YPF). These cities witnessed the development of a combative labor movement of petroleum workers in a southern region with a rich history of social and

political organization. YPF had its headquarters in Cutral Co, a prosperous

working-class city with comparatively high wages and a skilled blue-collar

population. After its privatization, however, massive layoffs and a drastic

decline of the median income dramatically changed the economic makeup of the region. Without alternative sources of employment, in response to the news that the governor of Neuqu?n had canceled a contract to build a fertil izer plant in Cutral Co recently laid-off YPF workers, union members and

neighbors mobilized on June 21, 1996, to block a vital interstate road. Unable to block the entrance to the now-closed plant, the picket line moved to the

highway, bringing national attention to the conflict. The piqueteros were for

mally born as a new social movement led by a political actor previously unknown in Argentina: the unemployed.6

New picket lines on different roads of the province finally forced the gov ernor to meet the piqueteros' demands, including calling for new bids for the construction of the fertilizer plant, restoring water and electricity to hundreds of families who had lost service because of lack of payment, and initiating new

unemployment subsidies (Kohan, 2002; and Young, Guagnini, and Amato,

2002). The Cutralcazo, as it was known, succeeded in putting the growing number of unemployed at the center of the national political scene (see

Auyero, 2003). Moreover, in a show of political strength the new movement was able to gain significant concessions at a time when increasing unemploy ment made trade unions particularly vulnerable.

A second wave of picketing emerged in 2001. In contrast to the first wave, it was independent of and vocally rejected the lead of the Peronist unions.

When the Alianza government collapsed in December 2001 under the pres sure of violent and somewhat spontaneous street protests, piquetero move

ments were significantly transformed.7 First, the general resentment of conventional political leadership expressed in the popular motto ?Que se vayan todos! (Get them all out!) allowed leftist political parties in urban areas to gain a footing among political actors previously controlled by Peronist bosses and union leaders. Second, radical piqueteros saw December 2001 as "the vindica tion of all the resistance struggles and all the acts of rebellion" (Congreso, n.d.) and considered themselves "the heirs of 2001 . . . historic subjects in the con

struction of people power and counterhegemony" (Carlos Huerta, interview, Buenos Aires, August 6, 2004). The perception that the events of December 2001 constituted the beginning of a social revolutionary uprising allowed the radicalization of segments of the piquetero movement (Burdman, 2002).

Different from the Cutral Co piqueteros of 1996, the new piquetero con

stituency was composed of younger unemployed workers many of whom had




never held steady jobs or enjoyed worker benefits. The new leadership had

deeper roots in political activism, and, while many of the early piqueteros had prior experience as labor organizers, the new mostly non-Peronist

piqueteros were more closely connected to local organizations and leftist politi cal parties. Moreover, within these left-leaning piquetero organizations, even

those with prior union experience rejected the vertical organization of tradi tional Argentine labor institutions. The relationship between the piquetero base and its leadership therefore diverged significantly from the traditional one. The

piquetero movement was characterized by horizontal and voluntary ties, with formalized mechanisms to foster collective decision making. Times and loca tions of roadblocks, for example, were typically chosen in general assemblies.

Similarly, negotiations with public officials to lift the picket line after demands were granted were often carried out under the direct supervision of the rank and file. Further, these organizations were partially self-financed, with members

contributing a low monthly fee (Young, Guagnini, and Amato, 2002). The piqueteros' ability to make their demands heard rested on their form of

protest: blocking heavily traveled roads (typically vital commercial arteries in the

countryside and around the city of Buenos Aires) until provincial and/or national authorities were forced to give in. Since the first picketing, the immedi ate objectives of this tactic have been to secure new jobs, access new government subsidies, or increase existing ones. As piquetero organizations grew to an esti

mated 300,000 total membership, so did the number of cash transfers to the

unemployed (Savoia, Calvo, and Amato, 2004: 30-31). During the Menem administration approximately 100,000 government subsidies (planes trabajar) were distributed to key (electoral) areas of the counties (Ministerio de Econom?a,

n.d.). Beginning with the Duhalde administration (2002-2003) these subsidies increased to 2,000,000, covering close to 15 percent of the economically active

population. The Peronist administration of Nestor Kirchner (elected in 2003) cur

rently distributes approximately 1,700,000 (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2004).

OLD PARTISAN NETWORKS AND NEW COALITIONS

In order to avoid "conflating opportunities with mobilization/' we analyze piquetero coalitions as the result of both contextual and actor-centered variables

(Meyer, 2002:15). The political organization of unemployed workers is explained as a response to the social costs of the Menem administration's market alter

ations, which became "background conditions ... ripe for a large-scale protest"

(Auyero, 2003: 39). The nature of the particular political coalitions, however, is

explained by preexisting social networks that shaped the way the unemployed understood the political context and developed political strategies.

Coalitions are important because they reveal not just how individuals are

organized into a social movement but also how political interpretations and

strategies evolve and determine the likelihood of success (Goodwin and

Jasper, 2004: 167). The study of prior partisan network linkages allows us to

"understand the process of putting together movements by looking at the coalitions that animate, negotiate, cooperate, and compete within a social

movement" (Meyer, 2002: 15). These networks explain how coalitions and




social movements can go beyond "episodes of contention" to sustained col lective action (McAdams, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: 49).

The link between coalition formation and identity is critical for explaining how new social movements overcome problems of collective action, prevent

ing not just the emergence of free-riders but also co-optation, disintegration, and bureaucratization. Interpretation of the political context that cements

these new groups is central to the formation of collective identities

(McAdams, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett, 2003; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). The ideological dimension of collective identity formation is crucial in that ideology provides continuity to social movements

that have very immediate needs and relatively parochial goals. In the case of the MTL, identity was built upon programmatic strategies informed by an

interpretation of the political context linked to the Communist party. The cen

tral tenets of the MTL piquetero identity were rejection of neoliberal capital ism, belief in the possibility of an alternative model for labor organization (trabajo genuino), distrust of the traditional institutions of interest aggregation (state, party, and union politics) dominated by Peronism, and a revolutionary interpretation of the events of December 2001.8

Yet, to a great extent, the whole piquetero movement shares this ideology. Collective identity cannot explain particular piquetero coalitions. In consider

ing the ideological dimension of the movement we see that the number of pos sible allies for the piqueteros is limited. The collective identity of the

movement precludes the two dominant political parties (the Peronist Partido

Justicialista [Justice party?PJ] and the Uni?n C?vica Radical/Alianza [Radical Civic Party/Alliance?UCR]) and the (mostly Peronist) unions from joining the piqueteros, who see them as either directly responsible for or complicit in

the retrenchment of the state. One of the early piquetero leaders explained why she joined the first picketing in 1996 in Cutral Co as follows: "I was not

going to the place full of politicians.. . . My reality: unemployment, poverty,

injustice" (quoted in Auyero, 2003: 34). Therefore, collective identity, espe

cially its ideological dimension, is necessary but not sufficient to explain the MTL coalition.

To explain the emergence of particular coalitions we must look at the move

ment's preexisting ties: "On the whole, shared prior knowledge, connections

among key individuals, and on-the-spot direction guide the flow of collective action" (McAdams, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: 49). The social-network approach has highlighted this connection (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004) and provides strong evidence that "the pattern of sustained networks working on several issues over time is recurrent in social movements" (Meyer, 2002: 11). Yashar

(2005: 73) argues that existing networks provide social movements with the

capacity to organize and "the basis for generating new ones." They allow the

exchange of social resources necessary to sustain collective action. Networks are less formal and consequently less visible than institutions.

Because they are actor-centered, they bridge institutions and social groups. By

focusing on the political ties that underlie political parties and unions in

Argentina, we can explain coalitions involving seemingly disparate institu tions and groups. Further, new social movements based on existing ties tend to reinforce the fundamental attributes of the network. Thus, existing net

works can be of different types and define the direction of the movement.




Networks outside the clientelistic iron triangle of Argentine social politics (mayors, party brokers or punteros, and unions) will have difficulty gaining access to state resources. In order to sustain political mobilization without this

access, the coalition will need to secure resources for its membership from some other source.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PIQUETERO MOVEMENT

The emergence of the piquetero movement can be understood only against the backdrop of the failing Argentine economy. In 2001, the breakdown of the

Convertibility Plan9 and the crisis of the traditional political parties10 triggered massive mobilizations and social protests against the government of President

Fernando De la Rua (1999-2001) that led to the collapse of the economic, polit ical, and social order in December of that year. Even the traditionally lethargic

Argentine urban middle class took to the streets, banging pots and pans to

protest the government's financial policies. Neighbors organized local assem

blies to denounce the ineffectiveness and corruption of city government. Pensioners and retiree associations, some of the first social actors to protest the

restructuring of pensions carried out earlier by President Menem and his min

ister of economy, Domingo Cavallo, increased their political activism. The eco

nomic crisis proved fertile ground for an increasing piquetero role in the

political process. In a society in which political legitimacy was lacking, the

capacity to mobilize people became an extremely powerful resource.

Social disintegration generates social protest, but the necessary conditions for the emergence of the piquetero movement were the sharp rise in unem

ployment in the absence of comprehensive unemployment policies and the

decentralization of social protections. Both conditions resulted from the

decade of structural transformation that led to the demise of the 50-year-old

corporatist welfare state.

Rising unemployment or "hyperunemployment" with no comprehensive unemployment policy had a profound effect on the Argentine labor force

(Auyero, 2003:44). The lack of an unemployment policy was the result of 50 years of relative stability in a labor market characterized by full employment. Until the

hyperinflationary crisis of 1989/1990 Argentina had never experienced an annual

unemployment rate higher than 6 percent (Ministerio de Econom?a, n.d.). As a

result of the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the shrinkage of the

public sector under the Menem administration, the 1997 economic recession

quickly grew into a full-scale depression. The country went from a national aver

age of 7 percent unemployment in 1990 to 15.6 percent in 1999. The election of De

la Rua that year did little to improve the situation. In 2000 the national unem

ployment rate was 16 percent and in 2002 (after De la Rua's resignation) it reached an alarming 22 percent. Not surprisingly, the official poverty rate, which oscillated at the beginning of the Menem administration between 17 percent and 20 percent, reached 33 percent in 2001 and over 50 percent in 2002 (Ministerio de Econom?a,

n.d.). Prior to the 1990s, full-employment policies were firmly embedded in both

the public sector and the Peronist labor unions. The downsizing of the public sec

tor and the weakening of labor organizations left vast numbers of unemployed workers with no safety net to turn to, prompting them to protest and organize.




The second structural factor that facilitated the growth of the piquetero movement was the decentralization of social policy aggressively implemented by the Menem administration beginning in the early 1990s. By "decentraliza tion" we mean a "process of state reform composed by a set of public policies that transfer responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower lev els of government in the context of a specific type of state" (Falleti, 2005:

327-346). Decentralization under Menem's administration allowed local polit ical bosses to control the growth and distribution of antipoverty and unem

ployment programs. As a result of this decentralization, the national social emergency plans

implemented by the administrations of presidents Menem, Duhalde

(2002-2003), and Kirchner gave local governments and nonstate actors a say in the administration and distribution of the subsidies. In 1996, the Menem

administration launched the Plan Trabajar (Work Plan), cosponsored by the

World Bank. It provided a monthly wage of approximately 150 pesos (US$150 at the time) for unemployed workers in exchange for service in public-works

projects. The top-down distribution of these funds involved all levels of gov ernment (central, provincial, and municipal) but gave mayors a great deal of discretion in determining beneficiaries. Furthermore, the Plan Trabajar also

allowed, in some cases, the participation of nongovernmental actors (such as

NGOs), which could propose social infrastructure projects that could be

accomplished by public works (Lodola, 2003: 9). In April 2002 President Eduardo Duhalde instituted a new social program,

Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (Unemployed Heads of Households

Plan?PJJH), by which unemployed workers with children would receive a

monthly cash transfer of 150 pesos (approximately US$ 45 after the 2001 devalu ation of the peso). This cash transfer fell between the poverty line (231 pesos or

US$70 a month) and the level of income considered destitution or extreme

poverty (105 pesos or US$31 a month) (http://www.indec.mecon.gov.ar). In con

trast to the Plan Trabajar, the PJJH did not require the beneficiary to work. Rather, the requirement was that recipients participate in job training or community service (CELS, 2003). PJJH funds were to be distributed and monitored by local administrative councils made up of political authorities and representatives of

churches, NGOs, and even labor confederations such as the CTA (Vales, 2002). The current Kirchner administration continues to distribute the PJJH subsidies in

much the same way as Duhalde did, although President Kirchner's first minis ter of social policy attempted to grant a greater role to NGOs in order to curb the

power of mayors and party brokers.

The decentralization of social subsidies beginning with the Menem admin istration had two effects. On the one hand, it prompted the organization of

unemployed workers, who could directly manage subsidies by formally orga

nizing as NGOs.11 On the other, it encouraged the expansion of clientelistic networks among municipal leaders, party brokers (especially the majority Peronists), and potential beneficiaries (Auyero, 2001; Calvo and Murillo, 2005;

Delamata, 2004; Lodola, 2003). As a result, there have been numerous claims made by PJJH subsidy recipients of the misuse of subsidies for clientelistic

purposes (CELS, 2003: 41; Dinatale, 2005). Thus, piquetero organizations have been forced to compete for funds and

to develop the management skills needed to administer both Plan Trabajar




and PJJH subsidies. Piquetero groups with ties to either organized labor or the

government, such as the FTV and the CCC, manage the greatest number of subsidies. For example, the FTV-CTA, led by Luis D'Elia (called the "official

piquetero" because of his job in the administration), with 120,000 members, is said to control approximately 75,000 subsidies (Savoia, Calvo, and Amato, 2004; Epstein, 2006). Barrios de Pie, a close piquetero ally of the FTV, with

60,000 members, is reported to manage 11,000 PJJH subsidies (Savoia, Calvo, and Amato, 2004). The CCC, with 80,000 piqueteros, controls 40,000 subsidies.

Indeed, as one observer notes, "the piqueteros have functioned as one great parallel social agency" (Burdman, 2002). In contrast, the Bloque Piquetero Nacional, which includes the Polo Obrero and the MTL, has an approximate membership of over 90,000 piqueteros but manages only 10,000 subsidies

(Savoia, Calvo, and Amato, 2004). Of the 5,000 MTL piqueteros in the city of Buenos Aires, only 130 receive subsidies (Carlos Huerta, interview, Buenos

Aires, August 6, 2004). Nationwide, the MTL receives 4,000 PJJH subsidies

(Epstein, 2006).

Growing unemployment rates and the significant decentralization of social

policy allowed piquetero organizations to distribute coveted government sub sidies to organize the unemployed. At the same time, the institutionalization of the piquetero movement gave new organizational spaces to opposition par ties that could not penetrate the tightly controlled Peronist unions. Piquetero organizations belonging to the Bloque Piquetero Nacional and closely related to leftist parties such as the PC, the PO, and the MST also grew by deploying other types of organizational and financial incentives.

PIQUETERO COOPERATIVES AND THE RISE OF THE MTL

The rapid increase in unemployment and the decentralization of social wel fare facilitated the organization of the unemployed and the rise of the

piquetero movement, but among the piqueteros we find organizations with different levels of dependence on state resources and, consequently, varying levels of autonomy vis-?-vis the government.

After being perceived for decades as a mostly petty-bourgeois party with few links with workers, the PC returned to union politics in 1996 by taking part in the creation of the non-Peronist labor confederation CTA through the Communist Movimiento Pol?tico Sindical "Liberaci?n" (Liberation Political Labor Movement?MPSL).12 This new labor confederation was founded by center-left political forces in response to the privatization of state-owned

enterprises by the Menem administration and the rigid bureaucracy of the Peronist Confederaci?n General del Trabajo (General Confederation of

Labor?CGT). The CTA has a strong urban white-collar component made evi dent by the centrality of the state employees' union, the Asociaci?n de

Trabajadores del Estado (ATE).13 It was through its ties with the CTA that the PC first moved toward orga

nizing the unemployed. In 1997, D'Elia, the head of the FTV, endorsed the CTA during the high-profile nationwide protest of public school teachers

(Pacheco, 2004: 17). D'Elia had been affiliated with the Frente para un Pa?s




Solidario (Front for a Country in Solidarity?FREPASO), a dissident Peronist and progressive political party, and he had held several elected municipal positions in the southern districts of Greater Buenos Aires (Pacheco, 2004:

17).That same year the former Communist leader and founding member of the MTL, Beto Ibarra, became a member of the FTV national committee

(Ibarra, 2002). In 1998, the FTV formally joined the CTA (Pacheco, 2004: 17). The alliance between PC activists and the FTV did not last long. In 2000,

because of fundamental "political, methodological, and sociopolitical differ ences" created by the FTV's soft-line approach to dealing with the new

Alianza government, the PC abandoned D'Elia (Ibarra, 2002). PC activists led

by Beto Ibarra, now with ties to mobilized unemployed workers in southern Greater Buenos Aires, joined PC activists in the city of Buenos Aires, working with the growing number of poor who were being evicted from their homes

(Carlos Huerta, interview, Buenos Aires, August 6, 2004), to create the MTL in

June 2001 in a popular assembly in Lomas de Zamora, a district in southern Greater Buenos Aires. The location is telling; Lomas de Zamora was the elec toral district of future president Duhalde and the center of his formidable

patronage apparatus.14 A founding member, Carlos "Chile" Huerta (interview, Buenos Aires, August 6, 2004), recounted the creation of the MTL as follows:

The MTL does not appear spontaneously; rather it results from a political deci sion. In 2001 50 compa?eros came together. We had been doing territorial work, but we did not have a common identity. It was well-known that Peronism was

widespread in the province of Buenos Aires. At the time Duhalde was there with the manzaneras, women in charge of social control. The idea was, let's challenge their territory, let's break the dams of containment they have built. We did well; the development of the movement was fast. We started out in Buenos Aires and now have 19 provinces.

In 2001 the new MTL broke away from the CTA, now characterized by the PC as "representing the centralist hegemony" (Central, 2004), and partici pated in the first National Assembly of Piqueteros on July 24. Shortly there after it joined the radical Bloque Piquetero Nacional (Pacheco, 2004: 17). In

2004, rejecting the possibility of compromise for the sake of receiving more

subsidies, the membership expelled Ibarra for taking too conciliatory an

approach toward the Kirchner administration (Carlos Huerta, interview, Buenos Aires, August 6, 2004). The expulsion of Ibarra, a central actor in the PC network, highlighted the fact that "the existence of prior networks does not equal the formation of new ones" (Yashar, 2005: 73). It also underlined the

intransigence of the MTL regarding its autonomy from the state despite the fact that most of its base depended on social assistance to survive.

The issue of autonomy is a central concern of the MTL movement, even

with regard to its relationship with the PC. The relationship between the PC and the MTL, albeit unofficial, is close. The leader of MTL-Buenos Aires, Carlos Huerta, noted that while it was not part of the PC, several of its

members (including him) were affiliated with the PC (interview, Buenos Aires,

August 6, 2004):

There are compa?eros with different thinking, who endorse socialism, and while

effectively some members of the leadership are from the Communist culture and




several of us are affiliated with the PC, that doesn't mean that the movement is an

appendix or satellite of the PC. The movement is autonomous?within the

framework of a central political project but with a great degree of autonomy. I

personally am not autonomous, but the movement is.

The MTL has grappled with its relationship to the PC. At the August 2003

meeting of its Central Committee it issued the following statement (MTL, n.d.):

One of the debates that emerged with great force was the issue of autonomy as an attribute of the movement for the construction of popular power and the role of the [Communist] party in relation to the movement, a party that does not

impose itself on the MTL but one that does not dissolve itself in the movement either. For this, we believe the establishment of autonomy in different areas is fundamental: financial autonomy, autonomy from political parties, employers, and the state, and also autonomy in the sense of building consciousness and crit

ical thought that enables each activist to become a leader.

How can the MTL remain autonomous, sustain radical mobilization, and

support its deprived membership with little government assistance? How did an underdeveloped network limited mostly to the city of Buenos Aires and its southern suburbs grow into an organization with 30,000 members? The answer is that through the IMFC the PC leadership of the MTL secured self

generated employment and financial autonomy for its membership, thus min

imizing its dependence on government subsidies. The IMFC constituted a

buffer between the PC and the MTL, allowing the MTL to determine its own

political and economic agenda. The IMFC, the institutional backbone of the cooperative movement in

Argentina, was created by the PC in 1958 and grew to form a series of multi service cooperative banks (at one point dominating over 12 percent of the

Argentine financial market) (Heller, n.d.). Many MTL members credit the IMFC with making their co-op projects viable and sustainable. The IMFC lends its know-how and technical staff to help unemployed workers create and operate cooperatives. Its role in imparting the ideological position of the

party to the MTL is key. The cooperative projects that it sponsors require piqueteros to be not only political but also ideological activists. It holds regu lar workshops and meetings in which piqueteros and cartoneros (cardboard

scavengers) discuss the ideological goals of their movement.

Cooperative organization is a historic staple of the PC, and Argentine com

munists "equate [it] with socialism" (Mario Esman, interview, Buenos Aires,

August 2004). However, the Argentine left has had an ambivalent attitude toward cooperatives. Even the MTL was at first wary of the PC cooperative strategy (Carlos Huerta, interview, Buenos Aires, August 6, 2004). The IMFC has advised and assisted the MTL in all of its cooperative enterprises. The two

largest projects, the purchase of a mineral processing plant in the northern

province of Jujuy and the construction of a workers' housing complex in the

city of Buenos Aires, are very revealing of the importance of this relationship. The Jujuy project, by the local PC, the MTL, and the IMFC, involved

the reactivation of La Brava, a mineral processing plant in Tumbaya, Jujuy. The plant had been abandoned by its owners and declared bankrupt in the late 1990s. The area had a long history of PC activity (Miguel, 2005): "During




the dictatorship [1976-1983], this town of 300 inhabitants had close to 35 activists from the party, of whom 6 are desaparecidos [missing]. The organiza tion of the piquetero movement expanded on this base" (Miguel, 2005). La Brava was a processing plant for ulexite, from which boron is derived for use

in such household and industrial products as Pyrex and porcelain. The reacti vation of the plant "would not have been possible without the support of the

IMFC," which provided legal and financial assistance (Liliana "Jujuy" Ponce, interview, Buenos Aires, August 2004). After La Brava was registered as a min

ing co-op in November 2004, the MTL secured a subsidy of 365,000 pesos

(approximately US$12,200) from the Ministry of Social Development for the

purchase of new equipment and the repair of old machinery (Miguel, 2005). The MTL co-op already owned some mining machinery, because when the

plant declared bankruptcy in 1998, unpaid workers led by the plant manager and PC activist Daniel Carreras (now the president of La Brava Co-op) "some how collected as severance payment the machinery that remained in the

plant."15 With the support of the Ministry of Social Development and several local

politicians, the MTL attempted to have the Jujuy legislature expropriate the

processing plant and turn it over to the new cooperative, but in December 2004 provincial legislators voted against it (Diario Digital Jujuy al D?a, December 19, 2004). When the expropriation scheme failed, the MTL co-op decided to purchase the abandoned processing plant and, with money bor rowed from NGOs and sympathetic social movements, managed to do so in

May 2005. Simultaneously, it signed a concession agreement with the provin cial authorities to mine ulexite in a nearby borax salt bed. The processing plant

was reopened by the MTL and the PC in October 2005 and touted by Carlos Huerta as a major step forward.

The other large-scale MTL project, a workers' housing complex in the city of Buenos Aires, was totally financed by a loan from the city government.

While the IMFC was instrumental in assisting the MTL in the creation of a con

struction cooperative and the subsequent management of the city funds, the award of the loan was facilitated by the political network and human resources of the PC. The MTL construction co-op Emetele obtained a 30-year loan for 13,600,000 pesos (approximately US$4,540,000) from the city's

Housing Institute, some of whose officials had former ties to the PC (Carlos Huerta, interview, Buenos Aires, August 6, 2004). The Emetele cooperative nonetheless had to conform to the prerequisites of the city's Program for Self Generated Housing in order to get what is the largest mortgage loan to date. This included the hiring of a technical team of engineers, architects, lawyers, accountants, and social workers to assist in the project (Limiroski, 2004). The

MTL hired some of the most prestigious professionals to participate in the

construction, among them the architectural firm Pfeifer and Zurdo, which has

designed some of the signature landmarks of Buenos Aires (Limiroski, 2004). Carlos Huerta explained: "Basically the Institute [IMFC] is always next to us,

always willing to assist us, but as we began to explore the world, the human resources were there. There is a great deal of technical expertise, a lot of expe rience, excluded from the labor market. The only thing that was missing was

the political decision of managing a construction company and having these men contribute their experience."




The 18,000-square-meter lot, which was purchased by the co-op for

1,400,000 pesos, will include 334 family apartments, 10 commercial shops, a

community center, a day-care center, and a small clinic. The city and the MTL

consider this housing venture a pilot project for similar undertakings in which

popular organizations administer state resources. The symbolic importance of the project is also noted by those involved; the property on which the Barrio

Piquetero is being built used to be a paint factory belonging to the Argentine Bunge & Born Corporation, a close business ally of the Menem administra tion. During the 1990s, Bunge & Born tore down the paint factory and used the

premises to operate a "dry port" where they stored containers of imported goods. When the housing project is completed, the MTL will reopen a street

that had been closed off by Bunge & Born with a massive warehouse

(Newspaper Acci?n, June 2004). In order for the Emetele cooperative to continue receiving the city's dis

bursements, the approximately 300 construction workers employed in the

complex must be Buenos Aires residents, must have received no past city loans, and may not be on any type of government assistance (Limiroski, 2004).

A future MTL assembly will decide the financial-need qualifications that will

permit 334 MTL families to become homeowners who will repay the city loan as mortgage payments, up to a maximum of 42,000 pesos (approximately US$14,000) per family (for the larger, three-bedroom apartments) (Limiroski, 2004). With approximately 30,000 MTL members nationwide, this particular venture will not have a dramatic impact on the living standards of unem

ployed piqueteros, but the MTL leadership believes that its success could lead to more cooperatives' being administered by the movement and financed by the state.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We began this analysis with two main questions: How did the coalition between the MTL and the PC emerge? And how is the MTL's radical mobi lization sustained? We argue here that the MTL's association with the PC offered an alternative

to traditional patterns of government-labor relations. The MTL's ability to draw upon the PC's autonomy and institutional strength allowed it to adopt more radical methods by avoiding compromise and dependence on govern ment. For social movements, autonomy from government is crucial to avoid

co-optation. This would seem to be an odd coalition, given the radically different struc

tures of these two groups?on the one hand a horizontally organized social

movement, on the other a hierarchically structured political party. Our research reveals that the coalition was the result of preexisting ties between the PC, the CTA, and unemployed workers, coupled with conditions of eco

nomic collapse and policy decentralization. Further, the portrayal by the PC of the CTA as a conciliatory organization created an opportunity for the MTL to

move away from the centrist position of larger piquetero blocs. Under these

conditions, the coalition became attractive to both PC activists and unem

ployed workers. It served the MTL because the PC was willing to grant it

organizational autonomy and provide financial support for its employment




projects through the IMFC. The PC's agenda calls for creating, organizing, and

financing cooperative projects. The coalition may, however, prove more bene

ficial for the MTL than for the PC. When asked if the MTL members would vote PC, Victor Kot, the PC's undersecretary said (interview, Buenos Aires,

August 2004), "Of course not. They vote Peronist." The electability of the PC

(and other leftist parties) remains as limited as ever.

NOTES

1. The MTL is radical in that it rejects traditional forms of interest aggregation when negotiat

ing with government. Other piquetero groups rely on cash transfers from the government and

therefore must conform to formal and informal agreements concerning when and how to mobilize.

2. Other leftist parties, members of the Bloque Piquetero Nacional, include the Partido

Obrero (Workers' party?PO) and the Movimiento Socialista de Trabajadores (Socialist Workers7

Movement?MST). The PO is associated with the piquetero organizations Polo Obrero and

Futrade, while the MST backs the Movimiento Sin Trabajo Teresa Vive (Burdman, 2002). 3. Our field research consisted mainly of interviews with MTL and PC leaders and atten

dance at the 2004 MTL plenary assembly and other MTL events.

4. The funding from the IMFC comes with fewer restrictions than do cash transfers from the

government. In exchange for the latter, groups will offer not to strike or "picket" for a given amount of time or in a given area.

5. "Political clientelism, in short, may be viewed as more or less personalized, affective, and

reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and

involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immedi

ate sphere of dyadic relationships" (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972: 151-152). 6. Unemployment in Argentina was for most of the twentieth century well below 5 percent

of the economically active population. Therefore, unions became the central vehicle for the mobi

lization of workers (Ministerio de Econom?a, n.d.). 7. On December 19, 2001, the De la Rua government collapsed under the weight of violent

social unrest that was triggered, in part, by restrictive financial measures (e.g., the policy com

monly known as the "Corralito," which froze bank accounts). Two major consequences of the

financial and political crises that ensued were the devaluation of the peso and the turnover of

four presidents in a month.

8. Most social protest groups understood the collapse of political and financial institutions

as establishing the objective conditions for revolutionary change. 9. "Convertibility" was the name of the monetary program introduced by Minister of

Economy Domingo Cavallo in 1991, which pegged the Argentine peso to the dollar. This

program led to a significant appreciation of the currency, creating a trade-balance deficit and, by the end of the decade, a major run against the peso. It was abandoned in December 2001.

10. In the congressional elections of 2001, incumbent support for Alianza completely dis

solved. Amid social protests against the "political class," close to 40 percent of the electorate cast

null or blank votes (Calvo and Escolar, 2005). 11. Because NGOs could manage subsidies and were not held politically accountable, it

became easier to fuel clientelism with government subsidies (see Delamata, 2004; Lodola, 2003). 12. Comit? Central del Partido Comunista, http://www.pca.org.ar Also see http://www.po

.org.ar/edm/edm23/las.htm. 13. The emergence of the CTA clearly signaled the end of the Peronist CGT monopoly on

labor politics. It was created as an alternative to the old bureaucratic union guard with greater

accountability. 14. Duhalde, head of the Peronist party in the province of Buenos Aires, developed

an exten

sive clientelistic network through his wife, Chiche Duhalde, and the manzaneras, women in

charge of delivering social services to the impoverished families in the southwestern districts of

the Greater Buenos Aires (Szwarcberg, n.d.). 15. Daniel Carreras, quoted on the web site of the MTL Mining Cooperative "La Brava,"

http: / / www.coopmineralabrava.org/historia.htm 16. http://www.coopmineralabrava.org/historia.htm.




REFERENCES

Auyero, Javier 2001 Poor People's Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita. Durham: Duke

University Press.

2003 Contentious Lives: Two Argentine Women, Two Protests, and the Quest for Recognition. Durham: Duke University Press.

Brusco, Valeria, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan Stokes

2004 "Vote buying in Argentina/' Latin American Research Review 39 (2): 66-88.

Burdman, Julio 2002 "Origen y evoluci?n de los piqueteros/' La Prensa Digital, April 3. http://www

.laprensa.com.ar/secciones/nota.asp?ed=596&tp=ll&no=20245. Calvo, Ernesto and Marcelo Escolar

2005 La nueva pol?tica de partidos en la Argentina: Crisis pol?tica, realineamientos partidarios y

reforma electoral. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.

Calvo, Ernesto F. and Maria Victoria Murillo

2005 "Who delivers? Partisan clientelism in the Argentine electoral market." American Journal

of Political Science 48: 742-757.

CELS (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales) 2003 Reporte sobre Plan Jefe y Jefas: Derecho social o beneficio sin derechos. Buenos Aires.

Delamata, Gabriela

2004 The Organization of Unemployed Workers in Greater Buenos Aires. Center for Latin

American Studies, University of California, Berkeley Working Paper 8.

Dinatale, Martin

2005 "Persisten los mecanismos de clientelismo pol?tico en el pa?s." La Naci?n, August 8.

Congreso del Partido Comunista

n.d. "Documento de convocatoria." MS.

Central del Partido Comunista

2004 "Documento pol?tico aprobado por el Comit?." http://www.pca.org.ar.

Epstein, Edward C.

2006 "The piquetero movement in Greater Buenos Aires: political protests by the unemployed

poor during the crisis," in Edward C. Epstein and David Pion-Berlin (eds.), Broken Promises?

The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Escud?, Carlos

2005 Los piqueteros: Prebenda y extorsi?n de los estratos marginales de un estado parasitario. Universidad del CEMA Serie de Documentos de Trabajo 287.

Falleti, Tulia G.

2005 "A sequential theory of decentralization: Latin American cases in comparative perspec tive." American Political Science Review 99: 327-346.

Goodwin, Jeff and James M. Jasper 2004 The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts. Cornwall: Blackwell.

Heller, Carlos

n.d. "Formaci?n de bancos cooperativos a partir de la fusi?n de cooperativas de ahorro y cr?dito: el caso de la Argentina." MS, IMFC.

Ibarra, Alberto "Beto"

2002 "Hablan las organizaciones sociales: Movimiento Territorial de Liberaci?n." Segundo

Enfoque, http://www.segundoenfoque.com.ar/horg_mtliberacion.htm. Kohan, An?bal

?A las calles! Una historia de los movimientos piqueteros y caceroleros de los '90 al 2002. Buenos

Aires: Ediciones Colihue.

Lemarchand, Rene and Keith Legg 1972 "Political clientelism and development: a preliminary analysis." Comparative Politics 4:

149-178.

Levitsky, Steven

2003 Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative

Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.




Limiroski, Sergio 2004 "Como ser? el Barrio Piquetero." La Prensa Digital, January 26. http://www.laprensa

.com.ar/secciones/nota.asp?ed=1258&tp=ll&no=41420. Lodola, German

2003 "Popular mobilization and geographic distributive paths: the case of Argentine Plan

Trabajar." Paper delivered at the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association

Political Economy Group, Cartagena de las Indias, Colombia.

McAdams, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly 2001 Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meyer, David

2002 "Opportunities and identities: bridge-building in the study of social movements," in

David Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (eds.), Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meyer, David, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (eds.) 2002 Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miguel, Sebasti?n

2005 "Proyectos de producci?n alternatives." Revista Digital 4 Semanas. October, http://

www.4semanas.com.ar/22052006/mineriacooperativa.htm. Ministerio de Econom?a Argentina

n. d. "Serie hist?rica." http://www.indec.mecon.gov.ar. Ministerio de Trabajo

2004 "Planes de Jefas y Jefes de Hogares." Buenos Aires.

MTL (Movimiento Territorial de Liberaci?n) n.d. "Nuestra propuesta." MS.

Pacheco, Mariano

2004 "Del piquete al movimiento. Pt. 1. De los or?genes al 20 de diciembre de 2001." Cuadernos

de la Fundaci?n de Investigaciones Sociales y Pol?ticas 11 (January): 17.

Savoia, Claudio, Pablo Calvo, and Alberto Amato

2004 "Jaque a los piqueteros: el desaf?o de la convivencia social." Clar?n, August 8.

Stokes, Susan

2004 "Vote buying in Argentina." Latin American Research Review 39(2): 66-88.

2005 "Perverse accountability." American Political Science Review 99: 315-325.

Svampa, Maristella and Sebasti?n Pereyra 2003 Entre la ruta y el barrio: La experiencia de las organizaciones piqueteros. Buenos Aires: Biblos.

Szwarcberg, Mariela L.

n.d. "Feeding loyalties: an analysis of clientelism, the case of the manzaneras." MS.

Vales, Laura

2002 "Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar: Pro y contra de un seguro." Pagina 12 Web May 12.

2005 "Los piqueteros comparon una mina y la reactivaron." Pagina 12 Web, October 12.

Yashar, Deborah

2005 Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal

Challenge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, Gerardo, Lucas Guagnini, and Alberto Amato

2002 "Piqueteros: la cara oculta del fen?meno que naci? y crece con el desempleo." Clar?n, September 26.



Documents

Globalizing Resistance: The New Politics of Social Movements in Latin America || New Social Movements with Old Party Politics: The MTL Piqueteros and the Communist Party in Argentina