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Global Positioning of France, Germany and Greece from
1998 until 2007
Nikitas-Spiros Koutsoukis, Assistant Professor, Democritus University of Thrace,
Department of International Economic Relations & Development.
Spyros Roukanas,1
Visiting Lecturer, Democritus University of Thrace, Department of International
Economic Relations & Development.
Pantelis Sklias,
Assosiate Professor, University of Peloponnese, Department of Political Science &
International Relations.
1 Contact author: Roukanas Spyros, University Campus, Komotini, P.C: 69100.
Tel. 25310 39819, Fax. 25310 39830, Email: [email protected]
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Abstract
Contemporary relations between nation-states are shifting the emphasis from
geopolitical sovereignty and across-the-border relations to a novel domain of relative
(as opposed to adjacent) positioning. That is, nation-states find themselves interacting
in a fast-evolving, dynamic setting like the one being shaped by the multitude of
forces interacting in the globalization area. This shift poses important challenges to
the otherwise linear and slow-response decision making mechanisms and decision
makers at the state administration level(s) to adopt new reflexes that will enable them
to lead their constituencies successfully in the highly dynamic increasingly complex
global arena. In this paper we identify some key attributes of relative positioning in
the multinational EU setting. We draw upon empirical data for France, Germany and
Greece to perform a comparative analysis and make some interesting observations in
the context of relative positioning.
Keywords:
globalization, nation-state relations, international relations, international political
economy, analytic framework.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we are using an analytical framework to assess the relative
positioning of France, Germany and Greece within a broader, ‘globalised’ context.
We use the term(s) “relative,” “global,” or “relative global” positioning to refer to
similarities or differences between nation states in an International Political Economy
(IPE) context. In this notion of global positioning, we maintain the view that
contemporary nation states are progressively redefining their role, from mostly
guarding national sovereignty to mostly leading and administering interaction with
other nations and states in multiple contexts, including Economic, Political, Social,
Technological interactions (Stiglitz 2003; Sarooshi 2004). From this perspective
contemporary nation states act less as geopolitical guardians and more as market
regulators and international liaise points for their constituencies; i.e. as facilitators for
the interaction of their state with other states (Moreau 2004). Of course, geopolitical
characteristics are still important attributes, and play a key role in a nation-state’s
overall characteristics; however, the geopolitical role is profoundly diminishing due to
international and more and more globalised markets, international and global
institutions, technology reach, and cultural influence interchanges. This evolving role
of the state is to be anticipated given that continuous development cannot be self
sustained within a(ny) single state (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006).
In order to capture this interaction we are developing an analytical framework that
will progressively allow us to identify the relative global positioning of different
states and to pinpoint with sufficient accuracy key interactions that take place in the
globalised arena between a given nation state and its (internal or external)
environment, including other states. Thus far, we are using the framework to capture
snapshots of state-level indicators which, we believe, portray important state-level
characteristics that affect this ‘relative’ positioning in two different dimensions: The
State-Market dimension and the National-International dimension. In the first
dimension, the State extreme represents the inherent relation between politics and
economics, whereby state-level decision making solely defines market operation and
thus all aspects of nation-wide prosperity and development, whereas the Market
extreme represents a completely self-regulated market economy which dynamically
drives national prosperity and economic growth. It follows that, in practice, any given 734
4
Nation-State balances at some level between the two extremes of state and market.
Similarly, in the National-International dimension, the National extreme represents a
completely self-contained economy without international interaction, or a “closed”
economy, and the International extreme represents a completely international or
“open” economy in macroeconomic terms (e.g. Mankiw 1997). Again, for all
practical purposes, any given nation will be balancing somewhere between the two
extremes, of national and international.
In this paper we take into consideration a paradigm array of such state-level
indicators and look at consecutive snapshots for three European Union (EU) states:
France, Germany and Greece, between 1998 and 2007 and draw a comparative
analysis on the basis of our framework. The rest of this paper is organized in the
following way: In Section 2 we present briefly the main constructs and reasoning of
the analytical framework. In Section 3 we consider a set of indicators and their
interaction/relationships in the context of the framework, applied to three countries:
France, Germany and Greece. In Section 4 we discuss these preliminary findings and
outline future directions for this research.
2 An Analytical Framework for capturing relative
positioning.
Along the State-Market and National-International dimensions we consider two
main tendencies or directions or forces, which affect State-level decision making and
through it, the relative global positioning of a state through time. “Introversion” is the
tendency of a state to be more closed to interacting with other states; “Extroversion”
is the tendency of a state to be more open in interacting with other states. These two
forces are influenced by a number of factors, internal and external to the state,
originating in all aspects of social, economic, political and technological activity.
Thus, although an aggregate introversion and extroversion tendency may be identified
for a given State, the ‘character’ of this introversion and extroversion equilibrium may
be radically different, once the aggregate tendency is drilled down to its various
constructs, until a practical limit is reached for the type of analysis being performed,
of course.
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From our perspective, a State’s balance along these (or other) ‘globalised’
indicators or dimensions indicates the outcomes of dynamic decision-making taking
place at the state level. Further, we consider state-level decision-making outputs to be
due to the influence of a multitude of factors, internal and external to the state. Or, to
reverse our point, we support the view that global integration can be the result of
deliberate policy making and supervised policy implementation. A systemic view of
the framework is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Systemic view of the Analytical framework
Taking into consideration the two dimensions of the analytical framework, and the
tendencies of introversion and extroversion, it is easy to realize that a given state
boundary is constantly repositioned via the outcomes of State-level decision making
(or the lack of). Further, a state may exhibit different levels of introversion or
extroversion along different sets of activities. China, for instance, appears extrovert in
its role as an industrial production state (i.e. “made in china”), but introvert in its
international economics agenda and national politics (e.g. China’s position against the
External environmentOther states, International events, Political, Economic, Social, Cultural, Technological, other events and factors
Internal environmentPolitical Pressure Groups, Nationally-contained events, Political, Economic, other events and factors
State-Boundary
State-level Decision Making
(External) Influence inside the state
Influence outside the state
Influence on the state boundary
Influence on the state boundary
Without influence on the State or State boundary
Without influence on the State boundary or outside the state
Extroversion Introversion
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US dollar and censorship in Google and other search engines)2. Collectively,
however, the complete set of introversion and extroversion tendencies for a set of
multiple interactions (i.e. political, economical, social, and others) portrays the state
boundary with sufficient accuracy to portray the ‘true’ status of a state’s global
positioning, and even comparatively to other states. An illustration of this type of
analysis is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Illustration of State Introversion and Extroversion equilibria
In Figure 2 the “perfect” circles represent ‘romantic’ views of a globalised state,
that is, a state that is well balanced, though introvert or extrovert, in all of its activities
within the international/global domain(s). The polygonal shape, on the other hand,
represents a pragmatist’s view, where a state’s introversion and extroversion is
unequally balanced throughout its activities in the global setting. It is easily seen that
more complex shapes are to be expected as the level of detail in the analysis increases,
and more factors or indicators are taken into account. Also, a state’s positioning will
2 For instance China see Andrew Watson’s commentary in “China takes aim at dollar,” The Wall Street
Journal, March 24, 2009 (Online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123780272456212885.html), and
Jeannie Nuss’s report in “Web site tracks world online censorship reports” August 6, 2009 reporting on
behalf of the Associated Press (Online: http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_id=68224 )
among many other similar news headlines and analyses.
Self-sustained, Market Dominated
Internationally-based Market Dominated
Internationally-based State DominatedSelf-sustained
State DominatedState
Market
InternationalNational
An ideally-balanced state with ‘healthy’ interaction between State, Market, National and International activities
A balanced state favouring Market-oriented and International activities
A state leaning towards self-sustained and State dominated activities but also with a strong international tendency
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most likely shift, change shape, or both, with the passing of time, due to external or
internal (to the state boundary) influences. The shifts and shape changes may be sharp
or smooth depending on the time scale considered (e.g. months, quarters, years,
cabinet shuffles) or the occurrence of significant events that stimulate such changes
(e.g. EU’s Lisbon Strategy is an initiation point for a ‘slow’ change in EU member
states, whereas the current economic crisis is an initiation point for a fast-paced
response and change throughout most of the world). This type of analysis can form
the basis for capturing state-level decision making performance in a variety of
contexts, and subsequently supporting these decision-making activities by adopting
and applying strategy tools like the Balanced Scorecard or other planning and
decision making tools found, for example, in the Operational Research arsenal for
decision support.
We are aware that this is an ambitious research agenda and we are still in the
process of developing this framework. For the time being, our efforts are focused on
identifying the set(s) of indicators that will allow us to capture snapshots of state-level
making outputs or performance, which indicate the relative positioning of different
states according to our framework. We anticipate that eventually we will be in a
position to relate these outputs with a cause and effect relationship to specific
decisions at the state-level. We discuss some of the main challenges and difficulties of
developing the framework in the concluding section, later in this paper, and proceed
to illustrate how we are initializing the application of the framework thus far.
3 Illustrative framework instantiation and
implementation
While pertaining to our goal of capturing state-level decision-making, our
framework unavoidably bears a number of similarities with the constituent elements
of the two globalization indices considered above, namely the dimensions of
capturing global positioning and a some of the individual indicators used by KOF and
CSGR (KOF 2009; Drehel et al. 2008; CSGR 2009; Lockwood and Redoano 2005).
However, we are pursuing an altogether different agenda: (1) We seek to capture state
level output(s) that are directly influenced by state-level decision making. (2) Through
the use of the IPE-inspired dimensions mentioned previously, we adopt a 738
8
decomposition approach, whereby introversion or extroversion indicate qualitative as
well as quantitative characteristics of the level of Global integration achieved,
according to different criteria and as a result of state level decision-making. (3) The
dimensions are considered mostly as generic (dis-)aggregation paths for monitoring a
wide range of macro or micro activities, instead of an aggregate Globalisation score.
Overall, we believe that, this decomposed view will prove itself useful mostly for
decision support purposes at the state-level planning and policy making echelons.
For the purposes of this paper we have identified a number of global
positioning indicators which can be used in the context of the framework. We have
grouped these indicators in the following way: First, we identified the indicators
which show a tendency towards one of the four extremes but grouped in pairs of
functional equivalents (or ‘opposites’). That is indicators which identify the
corresponding competing tendencies towards the extremes along either dimension, but
not in both. Second, we are performing the same analysis with an indicator which
naturally fits the two dimensions and shows the competing tendencies towards all four
extremes. For each indicator comparison we discuss our main observations and
findings each time.
3.1 Bidirectional indicator pairs
The functional bidirectional indicator pairs combine indicators which show opposing
tendencies towards the dimension extremes. Effort was put in pinpointing directly
comparable indicators; however some functional pairs include indicators that are not
directly comparable because they represent different state characteristics. In both
cases, however, we are looking at apparent long-term trends or shifts in the values of
these indicators due to state-level decision-making and its internal or external
influences.
3.1.1 State-Market dimension
The bi-directional indicators in the State-Market dimension are outlined in
functional pairs in Table 1.
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Table 1. Indicator pairs in the State-Market dimension
Towards the Market extreme Towards the State extreme
Indicator Units/Scale Comment Indicator Units/Scale Comment
Index of Economic
Freedom
(IFE)
Score (%) Measures the freedom of individuals to produce,
work, invest and consume. This freedom must
be protected by the state and at the same time
must be unconstrained by the state (Miller and
Holmes, 2009). The direction of this indicator under the prism of the framework is towards the
market extreme
Political
pressure groups
and leaders
(PPG)
Count Refers to social, political, religious or labor
organizations of a country that are involved in
politics, or that exert political pressure. The leaders
of these groups do not stand for legislative election
(CIA Fact book, 2009b). PPGL indicates a state orientation
% of individuals
using Internet for
interaction with
public authorities
(IIPA)
% of
population
The interaction of individuals with public
authorities constitutes reduction of cost both for
individuals and public authorities (Eurostat,
2009b). This term has a profound market
orientation.
Corruption
Perceptions
Index (CPI)
Score (0-10) corruption is defined as the abuse of public office
for private gain and focuses in the public sector,
showing a state orientation (Transparency
International, 2009). A higher score shows less
perceived corruption.
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For each of these pairs we have obtained the data for the years 1998-2007.
For brevity purposes we have isolated the indicators in three-year intervals, i.e. for the
years 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007.
In Table 2 we list the data obtained for the indicator pair: Index of Economic
Freedom (IFE) and Political Pressure Groups and Leaders (PPG).
Table 2. IFE vs PPG
Indicator Year France Germany Greece
1998 58.9 64.3 60.6
2001 58 69.5 63.4
2004 60.9 69.5 63.4
IFE
2007 62.1 70.8 58.7
1998 5 None reported 3
2001 5 None reported 3
2004 5 None reported 3
PPG
2008 5 None reported 3
In France, the large number of PPGs appears to also have an influence on
economic freedom, which results to a higher degree of introversion than in the other
countries. A similar effect can be observed in Greece where the PPG is steady through
time, and economic freedom is higher but almost on par with France. On the other
hand Germany has no reported PPGs according to our data source which seems to be
functioning positively towards economic freedom. Thus, the data points to an
introversion tendency for France and Greece, but not so for Germany.
In Table 3 we list the data obtained for the indicator pair: Individuals using
Internet for interaction with public authorities (IIPA) and Corruption Perception Index
(CPI).
Table 3. IIPA vs CPI
Indicator Year France Germany Greece
1998 No data No data No data
2001 No data No data No data
2004 No data 31% 7%
IIPA
2007 37% 39% 9%
CPI 1998 6.7 7.9 4.9 741
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2001 6.7 7.4 4.2
2004 7.1 8.2 4.3
2008 7.3 7.8 4.6
Despite the lack of data for most of the time periods, it is easily seen that
France and Germany have a high percentage of people using the internet for their
transactions with public authorities, and a better CPI score. Greece on the other hand
has a high CPI score which also coincides with a low level of using the internet with
public authorities. Between the three nation-states Greece appears to be more
introvert, since it lacks the level of transparency to the other two countries and implies
that personal interaction with the public authorities is a more prominent of state-
market interaction.
3.1.2 National-International dimension
The bi-directional indicators in the National-International dimension are
outlined in functional pairs in Table 4.
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Table 4. Indicator pairs in the National-International dimension
Towards the Market extreme Towards the State extreme
Indicator Units/Scale Comment Indicator Units/Scale Comment
Law, order and
defense expenditure
(LODE)
% of GDP,
national
accounts
Shows sources allocated for the intelligence
services, police forces, the judicial system,
prisons and other correctional facilities, and
ministries of internal affairs. Influences the
internal and external stability of a state and
hence has a national orientation (OECD Fact
book, 2009a).
Peacekeeping
Financial
Contributions
% of GDP An instrument that helps countries to torn by
conflict and also creates the conditions for lasting
peace. This instrument has been developed by
United Nations (United Nations, 2009a). The
indicator has an international direction as it is
contributes to international peace.
Outgoing Students
(OS)
Count
(1000s)
Increasing numbers show limited or insufficient
state-level education quality or infrastructure
(Eurostat 2009c).
Incoming
Foreign Students
Count
(1000s)
Increasing numbers show state-level education
infrastructure with international recognition
(Eurostat 2009c).
Net migration rate %/1000 inhabitants
A negative rate shows that more people leave the state, and hence a national direction (OECD,
2009b).
Net migration rate
%/1000 inhabitants
A positive rate shows that more people enter the state, and hence an international direction (OECD,
2009b)
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Like in the State-Market dimension, for each of these pairs we have obtained
the data for the years 1998-2007. For brevity purposes we have isolated the indicators
in three-year intervals, i.e. for the years 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007.
In Table 5 we list the data obtained for the indicator pair: Law, order and
defense expenditure (LODE) and Peacekeeping Financial Contributions (PFC).
Table 5. LODE vs PFC
Indicator Year France Germany Greece
1998 3.5 2.9 2.9
2001 3.3 2.7 4.5
2004 3.3 2.7 4.0
LODE
2007 3.0 2.6 No data
1998 0.00489 .00402 .00206
2001 0.01866 .01592 .01353
2004 0.01703 .01505 .01225
PFC
2008 No data No data No data
Between the three countries, Greece is again more introvert, since it spends
more on LODE and less on PFC. Although the higher LODE expenditure can be
justified partly by the location of Greece and its relations with its immediate
neighbouring countries, the introversion indication remains.
In Table 6 we list the data obtained for the indicator pair: Outgoing Students
(OS) and Incoming Foreign Students (IFS).
Table 6. OS vs IFS
Indicator Year France Germany Greece
1998 25.1 31.0 59.9
2001 35.5 35.8 58.4
2004 38.5 40.8 45.6
OS
2007 48.6 65.4 35.8
1998 35.6 93.6 No data
2001 38.1 105.9 No data
2004 46.4 125.4 12
IFS
2008 46.0 115.7 13.3
France and Germany appear to be the most extrovert between the three
countries with a relatively good balance of outgoing and incoming students. Once
again Greece nodes towards and introvert tendency since the number of outgoing 744
14
students is significantly higher than the number of incoming students, implying that
the related institutions are not really geared towards international students, for one
reason or another.
In Table 7 we list the data obtained for the indicator Net Migration Rate
(NMR):
Table 7 NMR data
Indicator Year France Germany Greece
1998 0,8 0,6 5.1
2001 1,4 3,3 3.5
2004 1,7 1 3.7
NMR
2007 1,1 0,5 No data
Between the three countries Greece appears to be more extrovert, since the
migration rate is significantly higher than in France and Germany. However, much of
the difference can be explained due to the Geographic location of Greece, which is
closer to the Balkans, Africa and Middle East, where many of the immigrants
originate from, especially since the events following the fall of the Soviet Union, and
the wars in the Middle East (Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan).
3.2 Quad directional indicator: Expenditure on Research and
Development.
Expenditure on Research and Development (ERD) is a Eurostat indicator
that is measured as “Gross domestic expenditure on R&D [GERD].” However,
Eurostat measures GERD % contribution along three distinct fund sources: Industry,
Government, and Abroad. If we consider GERD (Domestic) = GERD (Industry) +
GERD (Government)3, then the GERD indicator naturally fits the four quadrants for
the two dimensional framework (Eurostat, 2009a).
For this particular indicator there was data for Greece was available only
biannually starting from 1997. Hence the resulting data set used was for the periods
3 We note that the calculation [GERD Domestic] + [GERD Abroad] does not add up to 100%, but the
total it is very close to 100% in all cases, implying that the discrepancies are due to measurement errors
and deviations in the member states, rather than the logic of our calculation. 745
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1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005. The resulting data for the three countries and the
respective periods is summarised in Table 8.
Table 8 ERD four quadrant data
ERD Country 1999 2001 2003 2005
Germany 32,1 31,4 31,2 28,4
Greece 48,9 46,6 46,4 46,8Government(%) France 36,9 36,9 39 38,6
Germany 65,4 65,7 66,3 67,6
Greece 24,2 33 28,2 31,1Industry(%) France 54,1 54,2 50,8 51,9
Germany 2,1 2,5 2,3 3,7
Greece 24,5 18,4 21,6 19Abroad(%) France 7 7,2 8,4 7,5
Germany 97,5 97,1 97,5 96
Greece 73,1 79,6 74,6 77,9Domestic(%) France 91 91,1 89,8 90,5
As we said the ERD indicator naturally fits the four quadrants of our model. The
resulting graph for the complete dataset is shown in Figure 3.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1001-Government
2-Abroad
3-Industry
4-Domestic
France - 1999France - 2001France - 2003France - 2005Germany - 1999Germany - 2001Germany - 2003Germany - 2005Greece - 1999Greece - 2001Greece - 2003Greece - 2005
Figure 3. The ERD indicator in the four quadrants
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In Figure 3 the structural differences between the three countries are easily
seen through the clustering of the diamond shapes. The smaller diamonds clustered
towards the government and abroad directions are the ‘Greek’ diamonds, while the
‘German’ diamonds are clustered towards domestic and industrial directions. The
‘French’ diamonds are clustered in between the other two. An initial observation is
that Greece relies much more on ERD from abroad and government, whereas France
and Germany rely mostly on Industrial and Government ERD and far less on ERD
from Abroad. Between France and Germany, the latter appears to have far less ERD
from abroad.
In Figure 4 we look only at the Greek ERD shifts for the periods in question.
Throughout the years Government ERD is relatively steady but there are large
variations in ERD from abroad, implying that the conditions for such investment were
also shifting through time.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1001-Government
2-Abroad
3-Industry
4-Domestic
Greece - 1999Greece - 2001Greece - 2003Greece - 2005
Figure 4. Greek ERD shifts
The ERD from abroad is largest in 1999, and lowest in 2001. Similar
magnitude and directional shifts can be observed for the industry ERD, implying that
Greece’s relevant policies are inconsistent in the periods concerned.
In Figure 5 we consider only the German ERD shifts for the periods in
question. 747
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1001-Government
2-Abroad
3-Industry
4-Domestic
Germany - 1999Germany - 2001Germany - 2003Germany - 2005
Figure 5. Germany’s ERD shifts
As is easily seen Germany’s ERD shifts are not significant throughout the
different time periods. The most significant shift can be observed in the allocation
between Government ERD which has been progressively lowered and the Industrial
and foreign ERD which have been progressively increased. Therefore, we find that
Germany is increasing its extrovert characteristics.
In Figure 6 we take a look at France’s ERD shifts.
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1001-Government
2-Abroad
3-Industry
4-Domestic
France - 1999France - 2001France - 2003France - 2005
Figure 6. France's ERD shifts
As it is easily seen in Figure 6, France is the more stable between the three
countries, and any shifts are barely noticeable, and overall point to a relatively steady
balance of introvert and extrovert tendencies, at least as far as ERD is concerned in
the four quadrants.
3.3 General remarks on using the framework
Overall, the complete analysis shows us that between France, Germany and Greece,
the introversion and extroversion tendencies remain relatively steady and have small
but important shifts throughout time. Between the three nation-states, Greece appears
to be, on average, the more introvert state, and Germany the more extrovert. While
this could be anticipated if one looks at each nation-state on its own, it also shows
three EU member states, and Euro-zone participants with substantially different
profiles in terms of their relative global positioning. Although this analysis is not
conclusive in any way, it is indicative for us that we are looking in the right direction.
4 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we are considering and analytic framework for capturing and
analyzing the relative global positioning of nation-states within an IPE context. By
using a carefully selected set of indicators which are influenced directly from state-749
19
level decision making we suggest that the relative global positioning is influenced
through state-level decision-making. The role, then, of the state-level decision makers
is to balance between introversion, or the tendency to promote a state-centered
sustainable development, and extroversion, or the tendency to pursue a collaborative
(with other states) sustainable development. To illustrate our point and the use of the
framework, we have used data for three EU nation-states, France, Germany and
Greece, and have highlighted some of the introversion-extroversion balancing points,
or their relative positioning in a globalised context.
While we are continuing to develop the analytical framework we have been able to
identify a number challenges and difficulties in doing so. Perhaps the greatest
challenge is to identify state-level indicators which can be naturally measured in the
two bidirectional dimensions, so that the relative positioning becomes more intuitive.
Although we have carefully isolated a number of functional pairs that can be used in
either (single) dimension, we are aware that there is still work to be done in terms of
data scaling, unit consistency, and in better matching the qualitative characteristics of
these indicators (e.g. between IIPA and CPI), and ideally to be able to scale them
consistently across both dimensions. We are confident that, eventually, we will be
able to iron out most of these discrepancies and to proceed in identifying cause-and-
effect relationships between indicator value changes and state-level decision making.
Given the relatively small data set and extend of the analysis required for the purposes
of presenting this paper, we believe that we are on the right track, and we will
continue to improve the framework as necessary in order to go to the next level.
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