Global Islam: Between Fundamentalism and …cmiesi.ma/acmiesi/file/notes/jocelyne-cesari_1.pdfGlobal Islam: Between Fundamentalism and Cosmopolitanism 50 There are of course alternative

Global Islam: Between Fundamentalism and Cosmopolitanism

JOCELYNE CESARI

Islam and Cultural Globalization There is no need to discover that Islam is global. In its own conception,

Islam has always been a global religion through the concept of the Ummah, or Community of Believers. Even the nation-states born out of the decolonization process have not completely dissolved the Ummah’s power as a locus of identification; nor has the division between Sunni and Shi’a Islam—not to mention other sects—fully managed to eradicate the powerful idea of the Ummah. Unlike Protestantism, in which the diversification of interpretations of religious belief led to the founding of separate communities and the proliferation of sects, the unity of the Ummah as an imagined and constantly renewed community based on an understanding of a shared fate remains strong. Today, conditions for communication and the free movement of people and ideas have made the Ummah all the more effective, not to mention the fact that national ideologies—which had, during the past quarter of a century, taken away some of Islam’s allure within the Muslim world—have declined. Our era is thus one of paradox: Islam is increasingly exposed to westernization, while at the same time benefiting from the positive circumstances which allow for its beliefs to be spread transnationally.

The different manifestations of this global Islam are rarely or even not at all studied. By and large, the treatment of religion in the age of globalization is an extremely reductive one. Most studies of religion in relation to globalization focus on the phenomenon of fundamentalism. The trend is to consider fundamentalism as the foremost religious reaction to globalization, caused by the ‘moral relativism’ that is said to derive from it. As Bauman has put it, ‘With the market induced agony of solitude and choice as its only alternative, fundamentalism, religious or otherwise, can count on an ever-growing constituency (1997: 185). As a result, however, most contemporary approaches to religion ‘reduce religious activism to an anti-modern artifact of corrigible secular errors, a dangerous and ignorant revolt against nonetheless profane injustice, suffering and objectification’ (Rudy, 2004: 40).


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There are of course alternative arguments, such as those of Bryan Turner (1994). However, the focus is always on anomic modes of behavior and the deregulations spawned by such an upheaval of our social and geographic space. In other words, fundamentalism has thus far been seen as the response of discontented groups to the processes of secularization, urbanization and de-tradionalization that we group under the broad umbrella of ‘modernization’ (Turner, 2001: 138). Islam is often cited as the example par excellence of such religious fundamentalism: in terms of its conservative or reactionary interpretation of the Islamic religious message, or, in extreme cases, its sectarian usage and recourse to violence. The Islamic quest for authenticity is thus said to signal the definitive decline of the western Enlightenment. The anti-consumerist ethics of contemporary Islamic ideology would thus be a reaction to the postmodernist pressure to consume, leading to the temptation for certain fringes of the Muslim world towards a self-isolation which takes the form of a strict fundamentalism informing all aspects of private, social, and political life.

The question we must ask, then, is whether or not cultural globalization leaves open any possibilities for religion besides fundamentalism. The condition of Muslims in various contexts shows that this unilateral approach fails to note the emergence of a hybrid Islamic culture produced by the interaction between Islamic belief and various cultures (Cesari, 2004).

Thus, the new spatio-temporal context of global culture need not be synonymous only with alienation; it can also spell emancipation. Globalized culture is not bound to a particular place or era, but rather to an ill-matched mixture of components whose origins are both everywhere and nowhere. As Arjun Appadurai emphasizes (1996), this means that the imagination gains a certain amount of power, and that the spectrum of possible lives expands accordingly. The social power exerted by the imagination manifests itself in two ways. The first of these, obvious and highly visible, is the resistance to a globalization which is considered a synonym of westernization, even among the Muslim world’s secularized elite.1

However, the social power of the imagination also makes itself known in another, less visible and less examined way. Phenomena such as the globalization of mysticism and Islam’s hybridization with various cultures point to alternative forms of encounter with modernity. Rather than 1 One of the most disconcerting aspects of the discourse on globalization coming from the Muslim world is that it generally takes a completely hostile view of globalization, perceiving it as a kind of westernization and an imperialist agenda that would be the contemporary equivalent of European colonialism. This idea is shared by almost all Muslim intellectuals, both Islamist and secular. See for example the comparable anti-globalization positions of the secular Lebanese journalist and intellectual Abbas Beydoun and the Islamist Egyptian academic Hassan Hanafi: see <www.quantara.de >.


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considering the various forms of contemporary Islam as a mere reaction to globalization, then, these forms should be treated as an integral part of cultural globalization itself, including in their reactionary or fundamentalist manifestations. That is, cultural globalization also includes forms of discourse and practice that have cultural references outside western language and society. Instead, these forms, which Stuart Hall calls ‘vernacular modernities’ (Hall, 1999: 15), borrow the language, the outlook, and the mythology of particular groups. These groups or cultures may well be undergoing a process of modernization, but this process does not make use of the standard western narrative or ‘ideological landscape’ (Appadurai, 1996), exemplified by such concepts as democracy, progress, or human rights.

From this standpoint, neither religion in general nor Islam in particular can be considered merely as the causes of international conflict, nor as reactions to modernity. In this article, we would like to present certain overlooked forms that exist in the globalization of the Islamic message, specifically: diasporic, pan-Islamist, and cosmopolitan Islam. The differences between these three forms are to be found in their relationships to the Islamic tradition, as well as to the variety of political and cultural contexts in which they may find themselves. Diasporic Islam maintains a localized relationship to Islamic tradition, usually a form of tradition issuing from one of the various countries of the Muslim world. Pan-Islamist Islam is distinguished by an emphasis on the revealed Text, sometimes to the point of literalist interpretations of scripture. In contrast, cosmopolitan Islam is characterized by an acceptance of cultural differences and a tendency to syncretic religious practices. In the following pages, we will outline the pan-Islamist and cosmopolitan forms of global Islam.1

The resurgence of pan-Islamism Pan-Islamism is a term referring to those religious or political

transnational movements that emphasize the unity of the Community of Believers Ummah over specific cultural, national, or ethnic loyalties. The idea of the Ummah was an important element of Islamic thought, particularly during the decline of the Ottoman Empire before World War I, and was closely associated with the preservation of the caliphate. Today, as stated above, the conditions for communication and the circulation of people and ideas make the Ummah all the more effective as a concept, especially

1 For the study of Muslim Diasporas, see Jenkins (1999), Menger (1999), and Cesari (2002).


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considering the fact that nationalist ideologies have been on the wane. The Imagined Ummah takes a variety of forms. The most influential of these forms are fundamentalist in the sense that they place an emphasis on the revealed Text and a Muslim unity which transcends national and cultural diversity. It is for this reason that we have insisted on the term “pan-Islamism” to describe these groups, and the restoration of the Caliphate is indeed no longer a major element of these movements.1 We further call attention to the fact that these pan-Islamist movements should not be taken as unanimously reactionary or defensive. To avoid this generalization, a distinction must be drawn between on the one hand, the Wahhabi/Salafi and Tablighi movements, and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other.

Wahhabism as a specific interpretation of the Islamic tradition emerged in the eighteenth century in the Arabian peninsula with the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdel Wahab (1703-1792) whose literalist interpretations of the Qu’ran became the official doctrine of the Saudi Kingdom upon its creation in 1924. Wahhabism is characterized by an extreme hostility to any kind of intellectualized criticism of tradition. Mystical approaches and historical interpretations alike are held in contempt. Orthodox practice can be defined as a direct relation to the revealed Text, with no recourse to the historical contributions of the various juridical schools (madhab). In the literalist interpretation of Islam, nothing must come between the believer and the Text. Customs, culture, Sufism, etc. must all be done away with.

The modern heirs of this rigorist and puritanical line of thought in the Arabian Peninsula (as well as in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt) are known as Salafi. The only significant difference between contemporary Salafi Islam and the original Wahhabi period, therefore, is a difference in audience: what this means, however, is that Salafi decisions and interpretations are no longer limited to the Saudi kingdom, but are now followed by Muslims allover the world. Salaf refers to the devout elders who served as companions to the Prophet Mohammed.2 The irony, however, is that salafiyya was initially a

1 The Hizb at-Tahir party is one of the most important contemporary pan-Islamist movements among those who argue for the restoration of the Caliphate. Founded in Jerusalem in 1953, it claims branches in the Muslim world as well as Europe and the United States. In Great Britain, the party is known under the name Muhajirrun, and has been active in the public sphere, particularly before September 11th (Farouki, 1996). 2 In contemporary Salafism, the salaf are the first three generations of Muslims, comprising the companions of the Prophet (Sahabah), their immediate successors (Tabiun), and the generation after these. The term ‘Salaf’ is also used to refer to those sages who guarded the spirit and the letter of this original Islam: including, among others, the founders of the four juridical schools, as well as Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1368). Taymiyya was a jurist of the Hanbalite whose interpretation of jihad forms the basis for the contemporary radical idea of the term, as used by groups such as Al Qaeda.


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modernist movement created in the nineteenth century. Although the early Salafi leaders, such as Mohammed Abduh, Al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida, certainly promoted a return to the revealed Text and the Sunna, (the words and deeds of the Prophet Mohammed), they were not by any means anti-intellectual, and were in their time even considered modernists.1 By the end of the 1970s, however, the Saudi government had fully co-opted the term Salafiyya, and from that moment on the term became a synonym for Wahhabi doctrine. The fatwas of Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baaz, Grand Mufti of the Saudi Kingdom, who died in 1999, and of Sheikh Al-Albani are the shared points of reference for their disciples in Europe and the United States, and more generally throughout the Muslim world. The movement has succeeded in imposing their beliefs not as one interpretation among many, but as the global orthodox doctrine of Sunni Islam. The considerable financial resources of the Saudi government have certainly also helped in creating this situation of religious monopoly.

In the past two decades, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, and Iran over control of the Muslim world has rapidly intensified. Within this atmosphere of competition, Europe and the United States have become crucial battlegrounds, as evidenced by the massive rise in the sum of petrodollars distributed in this part of the world. The proliferation of brochures, free Qu’rans, and the building of new Islamic centers in Malaga, Madrid, Milan, Mantes-la-Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb, Washington, Chicago, and Toronto; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; the increase in the number of Internet sites: all these elements serve to facilitate access to Wahhabi teachings and to promote Wahhabism as the sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought.

It is extremely difficult to gauge the precise influence exerted by Wahhabism on Muslim religious practice. In the case of European and American Muslims, the influence cannot simply be measured by statistics. In a minority culture—which lacks both institutions for religious education and the means by which to produce new forms of knowledge—the easy access to theology that Salafism offers is one of the main reasons for its popularity. The widespread diffusion of Salafi teachings means that even non-Salafi Muslims evaluate their Islamic practice by Wahhabite standards. In other words, even if most Muslims do not follow Wahhabite dress codes—white tunic, headcovering, beard for men, nikab2 for women—the orthodox Salafi nonetheless often becomes the standard image of what a good Muslim ought

1 For example, the position taken by Mohamed Abduh, Grand Mufti of Egypt, who toward the end of the nineteenth century came out against polygamy and for equality between the husband and the wife in divorce proceedings. 2 Cloth covering the face according to Wahhabi law.


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to be. Another group that takes a traditionalist and legalistic approach to Islam

is the Tabligh, sometimes referred to as the ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses of Islam.’ The Tabligh is usually described as a pietist and apolitical movement whose primary aim is to promote Islamic education (Masud, 2000). A subsect within the larger Deobandi movement, the Tabligh movement was founded in 1927 by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, who lived in New Delhi and died in 1944. The essential principle of Tabligh is that every Muslim is responsible for spreading the values and practices of Islam.1 This obligation takes the form of an energetic proselytizing, which varies according to the degree of Islamic education of the individual missionary. The mission can take place in the city of the missionary, in his country, or in more distant destinations as far as India and Pakistan. The annual gathering of Tabligh in Lahore brings together the largest amount of Muslims at any one time, second only to the pilgrimage to Mecca. Today, competition rages in the West between Tablighis and Salafis, and anathemas rain down on both sides.2

What all of these movements indicate is the emergence of fundamentalism as a global phenomenon. Global fundamentalism is defined, above all, by an exclusive and hierarchical vision of the world, as well as by a taxonomy of religions that places Islam at the top. The expanded use of the term ‘kafir’ (infidel, heretic), for example, is very common among Wahhabis (more than among Tablighis). In the classical Islamic tradition, this term is used only for polytheists, not for members of competing monotheistic faiths. In globalized fundamentalist groups, however, it has been extended to include Jews, Christians, and sometimes even non-practicing Muslims (see Cesari, 2004).

Thus the world is divided into Muslims and infidels, and the image of the West, automatically associated with moral depravity, is always a negative one. Also common to these movements is a worldview that separates the various aspects of life —family, work, leisure—and classifies everything according to the opposition between haram (forbidden) and halal (permitted). Everything that did not already exist or happen during the time

1 The six principles governing Tabligh missionary work (dawah) are: (1) dawah is not just for Islamic scholars or specialists, but for all Muslims; (2) the Muslim must seek contact with others; (3) missionary work and preaching is conducted by itinerant and self-funded groups; (4) these groups must be made up of Muslims from all class backgrounds; (5) the most important goal of these groups is to deepen the faith of those who are already Muslims; and (6) unity is the most important virtue and has priority over any theological and political controversies. 2 In particular, one fatwa from Sheikh Ibn Baaz (issued in 1997) named the Tabligh, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, as one of the 72 heretical sects of Islam.Fatwa issued in 1997. For the complete English text of this fatwa, see <www.allaahuakbar.net/ tableegi_jamaat/>.


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of the Prophet is an innovation, thus haram. Khaled Abou El Fadl has called this particular spectrum of interpretation ‘The Culture of “Mamnu” (“What is forbidden”) (Abou El Fadl, 2001a:125).Islam as it existed during the time of the Prophet, especially during his stay in Medina, is idealized and essentialized, functioning as an ‘epic past’ (Bakhtin, 1981) and gold standard for life in the present. The smallest aspect of this period serves as the basis for the present day, for ‘In this era, everything is good, and all the good things have already come to pass.’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 15).

Another characteristic common to both Tablighis and Salafis is their extreme inflexibility regarding the status of women. The rules determining proper dress for women—namely hijab, a long loose garment covering the entire body—are presented as absolute and may never be questioned. Salafis are more extreme than Tablighis in their imposition of dress code; for Salafis, a woman must cover not only her hair, but also her face and hands. The nikab, gloves, and long tunic fashionable in Saudi Arabia are what distinguish the Salafi woman from the Tablighi woman. The latter also wears a long tunic, but in a neutral color (not necessarily black), and covers her hair with the hijab only.

This puritanical interpretation of women’s behavior regulates not only dress, but also women’s roles as a wife, as a mother and daughter, and as a participant (or nonparticipant) in the community. Mixed-gender interaction is forbidden in both public spaces and schools, and male superiority is constantly reaffirmed, along with the Qu’ranic legitimacy of corporal punishment for women (4:34). This question of women’s status—both within the family and in society—functions as a kind of litmus test, according to which the various interpretations of Islam may be classified from the most reactionary to the most liberal.1 Yet another criterion is the respective opinions of the various movements on political participation and citizenship, in both western and non-western societies. Fundamentalist movements, in particular the Salafis, reject political participation, holding that the believer must maintain a separatist stance in relation to public institutions. A concrete example of this position is the fatwa, issued in 1996 by an American Salafi group, approving the actions of Abdul Rauf, a black Muslim basketball player who refused to rise for the singing of the national

1 A distinction must be introduced here regarding the status of women in the Tabligh. Because married women are allowed to do missionary work, they get an intense Islamic education and can be taken away from the family circle and their conjugal duties. A dissonance is thus created between the theoretical vision of the ideal woman and the reality of women within Tabligh. In other words, one consequence of women’s participation in Tabligh is to modernize, in a certain fashion, the condition of women and to make women more autonomous—in spite of the extremely conservative discourse on the role of the Muslim woman which dominates Tabligh (Sikand, 1999).


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anthem (El Fadl, 2001b). Today, the burning question is whether these versions of Islam, based on

the anachronistic and anhistorical reading of scripture, have a necessary correlation with the unleashing of violence and the development of jihadi movements, particularly among young Muslims in the West. These versions do contain similarities with jihadi discourse, using the same vocabulary (especially when talking about the West) and often even the same religious terminology. This fact may explain the connection many young people may feel exists between Wahhabism and jihadism. One must not therefore assume, however, that all Wahhabis eventually become jihadis. Other factors, such as the level of political socialization and education of these youths, are also decisive in this respect (Cesari, 2004). We should note that the majority of jihadis—such as Hamas in Palestine, GIA in Algeria, or Jamaat Islamiyya in Egypt—are not pan-Islamists. The obvious exception here is Al Qaeda, which has brought jihad to the global level. Thus we have deliberately omitted Al Qaeda in our study, in that it is not a religious movement, but rather a political one. In other words, its main motivating issues—anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism—are secular issues dressed up in theological rhetoric. For this reason, it is more appropriate to compare it with other political groups, rather than with religious ones.

The inclusive approach of some branches of the Muslim brotherhood In contrast to groups like the Wahhabis and Salafis, there is also a kind

of fundamentalism that does not require a rejection of certain cultures. This stance is exemplified, for example, by some of the Muslim Brotherhood. Like the Salafists of today, followers of the Muslim Brothers consider the Salaf—the first generations of Muslims and companions of the Prophet—as their point of reference, and refuse to follow a particular school of jurisprudence. Contrary to Wahhabi-inspired Salafists, however, followers of the Muslim Brothers rely on ijtihad (the power to interpret the revealed text) as a way to construct a form of jurisprudence adapted to the circumstances of modernity.

From its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has been a part of the pan-Islamic movement. Its teachings emphasize a return to the revealed Text, the legitimacy of ijtihad (interpretation), and political and social engagement. The movement’s political vision has been in a continual process of evolution. From socio-educative or health-related charity work to political candidacy, and passing through a period of underground activity (against political repression under Gamal Abdel Nassar), the Muslim Brotherhood


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has covered a vast spectrum of modes of action, which have been adopted at one point or another, if only temporarily, by almost all other Islamist movements from Egypt, the Middle East, and the Maghreb. Political radicalization and the recourse to tactics of violence are by no means the fate of all Muslim Brothers. In fact, the movement has become divided over the question of violence as a means for political ends. Jihadist groups, i.e., those that legitimate the political use of violence (such as the Egyptian-based Jamaat Islamiyya), developed and became radicalized in the confrontation with the authoritarian regimes of the Arab-Muslim world. We should further note that the global mobilization of certain jihadi groups, such as Al Qaeda, is a direct consequence of these struggles between nation-states and their jihadi opponents.

Europe and the United States, however, have become the preferred terrain for the redeployment of this movement’s pacifist faction. In Europe and in the United States, there are a number of different organizations who derive their inspiration from the Muslim Brothers or the Pakistani branch of Jamaat Islamiyya. In Europe, the most important of these are: the UOIF (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France), the UOIE (Union des Organisations Islamiques d’Europe or Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe), the Zentralrat in Germany, the Muslim Council of Britain, and the Islamic Foundation, also in Great Britain. In the United States, the MSA (Muslim Student Association) and its satellite organizations, of which the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) is perhaps the most important, are inspired by the Muslim Brothers’ vision. The leaders of all these organizations display a remarkable social and intellectual homogeneity. The first generation of leaders, all from the urban educated middle class of the Middle East or Southeast Asia, received their training in opposition movements within Muslim countries. This leadership includes individuals such as Dr. Nadeem Elyas, the Syrian-born president of the Zentralrat, and the first president of the UOIF, Ahmed Jaballah, who was a member of the Islamist opposition in Tunisia. In the past decade, however, a new, European-born generation, from among the educated middle-classes, has achieved prominence in organizations such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).

Both generations of leaders are involved in the struggle for official representation of Islam by the respective countries in which they live. The secretary general of the UOIF, Fouad Allaoui, is also one of the two vice presidents of the French Council on Islamic Religion, the new representative body of Islam (for which the elections took place in April 2003 under the auspices of the French state). In 2002, Dr. Elyas drew up a charter in which he demonstrated the compatibility between Islamic principles and German


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democracy. Since the Rushdie Affair, and even more so after September 11, the MCB has become one of the main negotiating partners with the British government on issues relating to Islam.

In response to their new democratic and pluralistic context, the Muslim Brotherhood has reconnected with its historical origins as an activist movement with a devoutly religious outlook. Its code of behavior is based on respect for the institutional and political environment of the host country, together with the preservation of its religious and ethical heritage. This ‘re-evaluative’ approach manifests itself, in part, in the organization of various educational, charitable, athletic, and cultural activities. Their success can be measured in the emergence of prominent religious figures in European and American societies, many of whom are inspired by the example of the Muslim Brotherhood.

This pan-Islamist elite should be distinguished from ‘parochial’ leaders, whose sphere of influence is limited to the neighborhood or the town. Parochial leaders usually use cultural models taken from their Islamic home country: in other words, they tend to reproduce the traditions of the Muslim countries they come from. The pan-Islamist elite also differs from the bureaucratic leaders sent to Europe by certain Muslim countries, to uphold the ‘doxa’ of their country of origin (e.g., Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, and Tunisia).

This elite can best be described as a class of independent entrepreneurs acting in pursuit of salvation (to use Weber’s terminology). Usually having received a (secular) university education, knowledge of Islam among the Muslim elite is either learned at home, acquired through personal study, or gained in educational contexts outside the traditional clerical one. Neither should the Muslim elite be confused with Islamic legal scholars (fuqaha) or religious scholars (ulama), who derive their authority from their specific learning and their ability to interpret sacred text.

The differences between the parochial bureaucratic, and pan-Islamist leader are exemplified in a number of individuals currently living in Europe: for example, Bachir Dahmani, president of the Islamic Federation of Marseille, a first-generation Muslim immigrant, is a typical parish leader (as well as any local leader from the Deoabandi order, as described for example by Pnina Werbner 2001] or Phillip Lewis [1994]); Dalil Boubakeur, the current rector of the Paris Mosque and president of a the French Council of Islam, is a bureaucratic leader (as well as any leader of DITIB, the Turkish-sponsored German organization); and Tariq Ramadan, grandson of Hassan El Banna and professor at the University of Fribourg is an example of a pan-Islamist leader.

Sheikh Qaradawi is the most prominent figure of this branch of the


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Muslim Brotherhood. He serves as a model for young educated Muslims throughout the Western world, who want to reconcile the demands of Islam and secular life, without losing their soul in the process. The author of more than 50 works, including Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism (1984), Sheikh Qaradawi became famous for his participation in debates televised on Al Jazeera. Born in Egypt in 1926, his entire education was focused on Islamic Studies: he received his doctorate in jurisprudence from Al Azhar University in 1973. Along with Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi of Lebanon, he was one of the first to become interested in the minority condition of Muslims living in the West in the early 1980s. He is currently the president of the European Council for Fatwa and Research. Created in London in 1997 on the initiative of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE). The European Council for Fatwa and Research encompasses one of the privileged spheres of action of the Muslim Brothers: theological reflection, based on the principles of ijtihad. The European Council for Fatwa and Research is composed of 35 members representing the majority of Western European countries. Their fatwas are responses to questions asked by Muslims throughout Europe. The Muslim Brothers distinguish themselves from Salafis or Tablighis by their efforts to situate the interpretation of fiqh within a Western context. However, they can by no means be called a liberal or progressive movement. Their philosophy is most accurately described as one of enlightened conservatism. They actively practice ijtihad, with the primary aim of allowing Muslims to live devout lives within the European environment. Their rulings attempt to reconcile the requirements of Islamic practice with secular life. The result is a certain religious conformity combined with civil and political engagement. For example, on the one hand, certain fatwas issued by the Council have forbidden the sale of alcohol in Muslim-owned restaurants, or have discouraged Muslims from working in business which sell pork or which make stock or financial investments for profit. On the other hand, the Council issued a fatwa in October 1998 advocating Muslim political participation in the democratic process (European Council for Fatwa and Research, 2002: 186). The Fiqh Council of North America, presided over by Sheikh Taha Al-Alwani, takes a similar position. Dr. Al-Alwani is one of the foremost thinkers on fiqh as it relates to minority issues—a subject that elicits a great deal of debate, even among those who subscribe to the Muslim Brothers philosophy. A September 2001 fatwa of the Fiqh Council, for example, over which much ink was spilled, declared that it was legitimate for American Muslims to fight in the U.S. Army against Afghanistan.1

1 The fatwa elicited a good deal of discussion among Muslim decision-makers, not only in the United States but also in the Muslim world. According to an October 30, 2001 editorial in the


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Central to this transnational trend is a concern for preserving Islamic religion within a pluralistic European or American context—especially in terms of what some Muslims consider Islam’s core moral values on women and the family—and at the same time to allow Islam to exist alongside other religious and philosophical systems. Towards this end, the primary strategies appear to be the recognition of existing political institutions, a decision not to challenge the governments in power, and a search for religious interpretations to help Muslims understand their life within a secularized society.

Cosmopolitan Islam There are also forms of global Islam that are not fundamentalist at all:

which are, rather, characterized by inclusiveness and hybridization with cultures in different contexts. This outlook characterizes Sufi groups and certain members of the intellectual elite, as well as numerous individual lay Muslims, and may be identified with the term ‘cosmopolitan.’

In the growing body of literature devoted to the subject, cosmopolitanism is defined in one of six ways. It may be viewed as: 1) a socio-economic condition; 2) a philosophy or world view; 3) a political project towards building transnational institutions; 4) a political project for recognizing multiple identities; 5) an attitudinal or dispositional orientation; or 6) a mode of practice and competence (Vertovec and Cohen, 2003: 9). Our own position is that cosmopolitanism does not refer to a social class or a lifestyle, but rather: a) an attitude; or b) a competence in terms of a belonging to several supposedly incompatible worlds and cultures. It is synonymous neither with globalization nor with transnationalism. That is to say, non-cosmopolitan individuals are those who develop a transnational outlook based on physical mobility and the possibility of experiencing different contexts and cultures, but who at the same time preserve their own cultural and religious identity. The cosmopolitan, on the other hand, is one who interacts easily with other cultures, and out of that interaction develops the capacity to cross intellectual points of reference as well as social relations (Werbner and Modood, 1997; Hannerz 1992).

Bryan Turner rightly points out that cosmopolitanism as a specifically modern problem of relativism and otherness has its roots in Michel de

newspaper Al-Sharq Al Awsat, certain religious authorities in the Muslim world that had first given their sanction to the fatwa later rescinded it. See also ‘US Army Chaplain questions duty, Captain gets mixed signals from foreign Islamic leaders.’ <http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID25230>.


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Montaigne’s philosophy (Turner, 2002: 51). Combining the theories of Montaigne and Elias, Turner defines cosmopolitanism as the praise of values of peacefulness, care for others, and the protection of others’ rights. In the age of globalization, cosmopolitanism may be characterized on the individual level by the attributes of irony and reflexivity. The purpose of irony, as both a cultural method and a contemporary mindset, is that of achieving emotional distance. Reflexivity, on the other hand, is defined as the capacity to contextualize one’s own beliefs in order to make room for the values of the other (Turner, 2001: 150).

For the individual, then, a cosmopolitan stance implies the relativization of one’s own system of beliefs, as well as a dialogic approach to other cultures. Although a cosmopolitan approach to global Islam is also present in the Muslim world (through particular individuals or groups), it is increasingly visible in the West and constitutes a significant part of the secularization of Islamic thinking and practice.1 ‘Secularization’ here means a growing emphasis on individual choice in religious practice and the acceptance of religious pluralism. As we have described above, however, this sort of individualization of religious choice also be found among the adepts of fundamentalist groups. All of the current transnational forms of Islam, including fundamentalist ones, emphasize the idea of religious choice as an individual matter, the search for authenticity, and an emotional identification with the Islamic tradition. In short, individualization is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of cosmopolitanism.

Thus, to meet the criteria of cosmopolitanism, this individualization must be combined with an acceptance, or even an appreciation, of religious and cultural pluralism. Some Muslims have not merely adjusted to postmodernity, urbanity and globalization; they have also accepted a ‘culture of separateness’ (Myrdal, 2000: 35-47). A ‘culture of separateness’ is one that presupposes autonomy and independence, even in the religious realm. To these aspects pointed out by Myrdal, we would add the recognition of and respect for others, be they religious, secular, or atheist.

The trend of individualism can also be seen in the emergence and development of certain syncretic practices, most notably among Sufi groups. Muslim mysticism is primarily the search for a transcendental union with God. In the Muslim world, mystic practice usually means group initiation through the transmission of specific knowledge or practices. This transmission is carried out within the privileged relationship between a master (sheikh) and his disciple (murid). Syncretism and tolerance of difference is an integral part of Sufism’s history (Gilsenan, 1973 and

1 The reason of the difference in visibility lies in the political conditions that are less favorable to this kind of Islam in the Muslim world.


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Werbner, 2003). Thus Islamization of Southeast Asia and Africa went hand in hand with the development of Sufism, which incorporated certain local magic or medical practices in its diffusion.

Indeed, Sufism has always been characterized by a disregard for national borders. Its brotherhoods developed according to a deterritorialization of religious references, insofar as the common denominator of every group is its obedience to a master, and order or tariqa. Sufis break free of geographical constraints to recreate a symbolic territory delimited by the teaching of a particular sheikh, and by the imagination and subjective experience of the group’s adepts. The relationship created between the individual, the body, and the physical space is a decisive element of any sheikh’s charismatic leadership (Werbner, 2003: 13). Most existing Sufi groups place an emphasis on the universality of humankind, Sufism’s proximity to other faiths and traditions, and a praise of syncretism in terms of rituals and philosophies. Sufism thus provides an example of how cosmopolitanism may represent successful synthesis and/or hybridization among otherwise disparate cultures.

In the West, this syncretism and inclusive spirit of Sufi movements gains an even greater force. Many groups are based on a teaching that draws from several traditions and once. For some groups, it is not even necessary to be Muslim in order to become a member. Particularly in American society, syncretic Sufism attracts a considerable number of middle-class and educated individuals from cities like New York, Los Angeles, and Boston. Whatever form the practice takes, they all share the idea that humans need to find a way to live in harmony with a higher power that provides meaning and direction in (Hermansen, 1997: 155-178). One of the most influential of this kind of Sufi group is the Sufi Order of Vilayat Khan. According to this group, the divine revelation transcends that of the Prophet Muhammad and includes other traditions such as Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and Christian esoteric traditions, especially as described in the writings of Henry Corbin. Some Sufi groups also acknowledge certain exigencies of the non-Muslim world through the idea of an initiate’s gradual progression in the faith.

The cosmopolitan Muslim elite

Cosmopolitanism is also characteristic of a significant segment of the

Muslim elite in the West. This elite is cosmopolitan not only because it is transnational, but also and especially because it combines cultural references of various registers that are more often described as antagonistic, namely those of the Muslim world and those of Western societies. This elite is


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currently creating a space for exchange in which ideas, controversies, and slogans can circulate—at least in their English-language versions, and it is this function of dissemination and transmission that is perhaps the Muslim elite’s most important role.

Cosmopolitan leaders are more commonly drawn from the intellectual sphere—students, academics and other intellectuals, as well as activists and converts to Islam—rather than in the world of religious associations or mosque leadership. One sign cosmopolitan Islam’s growth is the reformist trend in Islamic thought currently beginning to emerge in the West. It is certainly still very much a fringe movement, and western Muslims remain, by and large, more conservative and more conformist than one might even suspect. But it is nevertheless a significant effort to break the vicious circle of the apologist mindset, which continues to dominate contemporary Islamic thought. The trend is particularly visible in the United States, largely due to the concentration there of Muslim elites from a variety of countries and cultures. The leading figures in the United States are Abdulahhi An-Naim, Amina Wadud or Khaled Abou El Fadl.

These new cosmopolitans are characterized by a twofold critical attitude: that is, a critique of both Islamic tradition and of western modernity and its limits. They distinguish their beliefs from those expressed in the growing body of apologetic/defensive literature by Muslim intellectuals (in both the Muslim world and the West) on two main issues: specifically, human rights and gender relations.

Regarding human rights issues, this cosmopolitan elite is engaged in an attempt to conciliate Islamic tradition and Western values. In other words, they acknowledge the presence of certain tensions between the teachings of the Islamic tradition and the precepts of human rights, and consequently see the need for cross-cultural dialogue. In this respect, they acknowledge that some interpretations of Islam may not always agree with the specific ways in which western thought conceives human rights law, particularly in its insistence on universal equality.

Thus reconciliation between theology and human rights law may sometimes entail the re-interpretation of certain religious precepts. What is particularly at stake is a self-critical re-evaluation of certain aspects of Shari’a and its underlying principles (Abdullah An Naim, 1990; Al-Ashmawwi, 1989; Mahmasani, 1982), especially those regarding women, non-Muslims, and apostates. One noteable example of the current critique of Shari’a and its political application in the Muslim world is Tariq Ramadan’s declaration of March 30, 2005—which appeared in over 60 countries—calling for a moratorium on the death penalty and corporal punishment in Muslim countries.


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It is also a fact worthy of notice that some of the major voices in Europe in the debate on Islam and human rights are transnational Muslim intellectuals from outside Europe speaking to different audiences (both Muslim and non-Muslim). The 2004 Nobel Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, who is from Iran, is just one example of the impact of Muslims abroad who have become involved in European debates about Islam and modernity. Another example is Jamal al Banna, brother of Hassan al Banna, the Egyptian founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Born in 1920, Jamal al Banna is a prolific writer who distinguishes himself from the majority of Islamic scholars in Egypt by his modernist positions. Well-known in Europe among Arabic-speakers, Jamal al Banna has for a number of years been one of the few mainstream Muslim scholars to argue that the Muslim headscarf, or hijab, is not an Islamic obligation (See The Methodology of Islam in the Affirmation of Human Rights (1999), Diversity in a Muslim Society (2001) and The Hijab (2003).

As noted above, it is the discourse on women that serves as yardstick for the various interpretations of Islam, from the most reactionary or apologist to the most modern. The overwhelming majority of Islamic literature on the subject of women available in the West either defends Islam against attacks by westerners, or acknowledges that certain practices are problematic, but simply considers them as non-Islamic.

Increasingly, however, women Muslims are offering interpretations to counter this dominant model. In this respect, Amina Wadud offers one of the most original approaches to the question of gender in the Qu’ran. An African American convert to Islam and professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Virginia, her career is a kind of case study of Western influence on Islamic thought. While many analyses of women’s status in Islam, including that of Fatima Mernissi (1983), deal with interpretations of sacred text, taking issue with the patriarchal aspects of religions tradition, Wadud chooses to interpret the Qu’ran directly. Using the technique elaborated by Fazlur Rahman, she has developed a hermaneutics of the Qu’ran (Wadud, 1999). She identifies two levels of text in the Qu’ran—the historical and the universal or megatext—and claims the right to disagree with the text, even as a practicing and believing Muslim, particularly in her discussion of the Qu’ranic verse that allows a husband to beat his wife.1 She also claims the right to wear hijab only from time to time, and advocates ‘gender jihad’: that

1 The verse in question is sura 4:34, according to which a husband is allowed to punish his wife if she disobeys him. For commentary and analysis of the sura, see Amina Wadud, 74–75. In particular, she points out that this verse is tied to the historical circumstances of the Qu’ranic revelation, and that it in fact contradicts the essence and universal mission of the Qu’ran and the real message of the Prophet Mohammed.


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is, the struggle for equality between the sexes, in the name of God.1 This struggle recently led to a decisive symbolic milestone, when, on Friday, March 18, 2005, Wadud presided as imam over a mixed congregation of men and women in a New York mosque.

While Europe and America have long been the promised land for the westernized Muslim intellectual, they have also, surprisingly, become a haven for the creativity and inventiveness of Muslim intellectuals. The fact of living next to Muslims from all cultures and civilizations, and being in regular contact with members of other religious traditions, can give Islamic intellectuals a cosmopolitan outlook and a sensitivity to differences not possible in their countries of origin.

As Humphrey writes: ‘The Western frontiers actually represented an opening which might engender skepticism about the authority of tradition; the possibility of challenging the World through the engagement of traditions in new spaces constructed by relations outside their control’ (Humphrey, 1982: 18). It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the emblematic figures of reformism nowadays live in Europe and America, where they are taking on the task of reconciling Islam and the West. Their presence alone constitutes a challenge to dominant historical narratives that continue to submit Muslims to the oppression of Western imperialism.

The duties and conditions of citizenship, inter-faith dialogue, the redefinition of what is negotiable and what is non-negotiable in the Islamic tradition: these are the main themes and pathways for a renewed approach to Islamic tradition. The democratization of Islam now no longer means merely the individualization of Islamic culture and practice. It also means reflection on how to adapt to the Other, even when this means tolerating atheism.

Conclusion

The variety of forms taken by global Islam demonstrates that the

opposition between fundamentalism and universalism is insufficient to account for the complex relationship to religion generated by cultural globalization. Nonetheless, the process of cultural globalization can promote defensive reactions in the name of Islam, or what Homi Bhabha has called forms of ‘contra-modernity’ (1991). It is not difficult to understand how and why Islam can be called upon as a resource for combating a West that has been essentialized as a destructive and oppressive entity. It is in such a context that the more conservative interpretations of the Islamic message 1 Amina Wadud, ‘Muslim women in the West’ conference, Harvard University, 17 December 2002.


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(Wahhabism and rigid forms of Salafism) have gained so many followers in all parts of the Muslim world.

At the same time, however, cultural globalization accelerates a process of the crossbreeding or hybridization of the Islamic message with different national and political contexts, including those of Europe and America, by generating a heretofore unseen reflection on the necessary conditions for tolerance and respect of the Other. Thus Islamic thought, long focused primarily on Islamic governance, is acquiring a new dimension. This recent development emphasizes coexistence between different religions within a shared national collectivity, and between believers and non-believers within a shared tradition. One of the unexpected consequences of September 11th has been the way in which this trend has also come to the fore in Muslim countries, highlighting an opposition between Muslims in a minority context and Muslims in the so-called Muslim world. A further opposition may be added to this one, i.e., that between fundamentalists and radicals: insofar as a return to the fundamental texts of Islam, or fundamentalism, need not be a synonym for religious extremism, defined as the shutting off of one’s thoughts and the rejection en masse of other belief systems. It is important, however, not to make the hasty deduction that the trend of universalism is restricted to the Western world alone. Such universalism is also present in many sectors of Muslim society, even if the Western world functions as a kind of sounding board for ideas that are elsewhere silenced by authoritarian regimes. Indeed, a transnational community of thinkers—including both western and non-western Muslims—is currently taking shape: one which ranges from Rached Ghannouchi to Abdolkarim Soroush, and includes within it such figures as Fatima Mernissi and Hassan Hanafi.1

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Documents

Global Islam: Between Fundamentalism and …cmiesi.ma/acmiesi/file/notes/jocelyne-cesari_1.pdfGlobal Islam: Between Fundamentalism and Cosmopolitanism 50 There are of course alternative