Global Governance Under Pressure: Trends and … · Since the last edition of Global Trends was published three years ago, ... such as the "Next 11" ... Global Governance Under Pressure:

9

Introduction

Global Governance Under Pressure: Trends and Outlook

Tobias Debiel / Michèle Roth / Cornelia Ulbert

Since the last edition of Global Trends waspublished three years ago, the demands beingmade of global governance institutions haveincreased to such an extent that the system ofinternational relations appears to be perma-nently under pressure. A series of globalshocks – the world financial crisis and thefood crisis being two examples – have thrownthe gaps in global governance and the re-peated failures of the climate process intosharp relief. These crises are in no small partthe – albeit unintended – consequence ofyears of deregulation policy, coupled withgovernment and market failures and environmental change, which is itself largelythe outcome of a growth-fixated developmentmodel.

At global level, a climate of distrustof the United Nations (UN), fuelled overmany decades, and the erosion of its problem-solving capacities through the systematic useof blocking tactics have done much to under-mine institutionalised multilateralism. Issuesof vital relevance to the future, such as thereduction of greenhouse gas emissions andthe conversion of the global energy system torenewable energies, thus remain unresolved.The time when a hegemonic power providedpublic goods "benevolently" – as in the era ofthe Bretton Woods system – is long gone.Instead, attempts are being made to alleviatethe pressure in the system through a movetowards sectoral – in other words, thematical-ly specialised – forums and a multitude of

alternative forms of global governance out-side the established multilateral institutions.

The resulting fragmentation of globalpolicy-making, combined with a proliferationof international and transnational forums, iscreating new complexities in internationalrelations and is tending to reinforce theinequalities between actors, as only the morepowerful among them – including a growinggroup of emerging countries – are attuned tothese complexities. At the same time, theincreasing multipolarity in the system offersopportunities to forge new alliances which no longer (have to) abide by the rules of conventional power politics.

In this scenario, the state's roleappears to be undergoing a process of long-term change, reflected also in an alteredunderstanding of what sovereignty means,both internally and externally. Social protestmovements are increasingly objecting to thelack of provision of national and global public goods by governments and their failure to control dominant market forces.The burgeoning middle classes in manydeveloping countries are a major force to bereckoned with here. Technological advancessuch as the Internet offer new opportunitiesfor political participation, transnational net-working and public access. At the same time,the threats posed by the new technologies areconfronting states' governance capacitieswith an entirely new set of challenges (cyber-security).

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The major global governance gaps mentionedat the start clearly show that the Western eco-nomic model and concept of progress cannotprovide a frame of reference for the widerworld – and that it is the major industrialisednations, first and foremost, which need tochange course. The finite nature of our natu-ral resources, and the limited and in somecases almost exhausted carrying capacity ofthe Earth's ecosystems, including the atmosphere, mean that a "business as usual"approach is not an option. As a result, a broaddebate has begun at the national and the inter-national level about how prosperity and welfare should be defined, also in light of theinterests of future generations. Among themultitude of proposals and models, thereappears to be one certainty: that gross national income (GNI) has outlived its use-fulness as the sole indicator of wealth andprogress. But what kind of sustainable devel-opment goals do we need? That is still a con-tentious issue. Far-sighted policy-makingmust also consider possible future crisis sce-narios and take precautionary measures toprevent these scenarios from becoming reali-ty, or to mitigate their foreseeable impacts.

The authors of this new edition ofGlobal Trends have undertaken in-depthanalyses of these developments, briefly outlined here, and present their findings,underpinned by statistical data and factualinformation. In this introduction, we turn thespotlight on some of the major multisectoraltrends. We also consider the wider issue ofthe future goals of global governance. Andfinally, we examine the prospects for globalproblem-solving against the backdrop ofpolitical and cultural differentiation.

Global trends in the structures ofgovernance

The fragmentation of global governance

and its consequences

Multipolarity, a polycentric, sectoral worldorder and forms of informal governance characterise the present structure of globalgovernance. Increasingly, global problemsare being addressed on a sectoral basis byshifting coalitions whose members includenot only states and international organisa-tions but also networks, businesses, privatefoundations and non-state actors. Thisupsurge in informal governance has anumber of causes. Firstly, institutionalisedmultilateralism is deadlocked in a numberof policy fields. The climate process and thedelayed reaction to the global financial crisisare merely the most striking examples. Thissituation is caused by a multitude of factors.In some cases, it is simply the large numberof participants which makes consensus-build-ing so difficult. At a time when not onlyBrazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa(BRICS) but other emerging economies too –such as the "Next 11" (N-11) countries – aremaking their voices heard and are no longerfalling into line with hegemonic demands atthe global and regional levels, this is resultingin overly complex bargaining processes inwhich potential veto players tend to gain theupper hand and can derail even the mostadvanced negotiating outcomes.

A second factor also comes into play:The existing multilateral formats are notyet sufficiently well-adapted for the emerg-ing countries in particular to have ade-quate opportunities for participation. Inorder, nonetheless, to alleviate the


11

Introduction

ment, clubs generally have a good trackrecord. It is debatable, however, whetherthe effectiveness of their cooperation genuinely benefits global problem-solving,or whether it is more about consensus-based safeguarding of particularistic inter-ests.

The fragmentation of global gover-nance can offer fresh opportunities: Theimpetus for a more effective InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) during the financialcrisis since 2007/2008 has largely come fromthe G20. Conversely, the MillenniumDeclaration adopted by the UN GeneralAssembly spurred private foundations, non-governmental organisations, states and multi-lateral organisations to engage in new typesof public-private partnership in order toaddress the urgent challenges of povertyreduction. At the same time, however, a"global governance à la carte" is fraughtwith risks. First of all, the frequent shifts offormat and the parallel debates about thesame issues in different settings generate sub-stantial transaction and communication costs.The blurring of mandates and functions ofinstitutions and clubs in some cases makesspecialisation based on a division of labourand a coordinated multisectoral approachmore difficult to achieve. Secondly, this type of configuration encourages "forumshopping", with actors invariably seeking outthose institutions which they believe willoffer them the most favourable solution. Itgoes without saying that this can lead to suboptimal solutions for public goods, sub-stantial time delays, or issues simply being"debated to death".

If global organisations and gover-nance regimes – but also horizontal networks– fail on core issues relating to humankind'sfuture security, the alternative is a risky situation with the prospect of a return to

ever-increasing pressure caused by burgeoning problems, state and non-stateactors alike are experimenting withdiverse forms of global policy-makingwhich tend to be notable for their ex-clusivity or new configurations of actorsand which are resulting in ever greaterfragmentation of global governance. Clubmodels in particular have gained in significance [see Informalisation of WorldPolitics?]. These exclusive coalitions ofstates, some of which are established for alimited period with a single goal while othersare "built to last", are notable for their infor-mality and flexibility. They can build onexisting structures such as the G7/8 and nowalso the G20, which have a "firm core" of par-ticipants, but they can also offer flexible par-ticipation according to the given situation.Their informality may or may not be perma-nent. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,Tuberculosis and Malaria and the ExtractiveIndustries Transparency Initiative (EITI)evolved from the G8 setting, for example.

Will these developments ultimatelylead to more effective problem-solving? Thatis a contentious issue. It is undisputed, how-ever, that the UN system has forfeited itscoordination and steering role in manyareas, and that there are many policy fields– notably global health – where it is nolonger central to the mobilisation and distribution of resources. A higher level oflegitimacy tends to be ascribed to individualunits within the UN system due to their par-ticipatory mechanisms and procedural rules.Of course, these aspects could be balancedout by notable successes (output) achieved bysmaller models with a club-type format. Sofar, however, these models have only beenable to acquire a veneer of output legitimacyon a selective basis, making the situationeven more complex. In terms of goal attain-


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classic "power-and-influence" politics. Thisis precisely the scenario which can beobserved in the context of energy security.The trend towards maritime rearmament, too,shows that when it comes to core issues ofsurvival, states are ultimately not prepared torely on norms being agreed and implemented,and infringements sanctioned, at the multi-lateral level. The consequences of a lack ofmultilateral commitment could also be dra-matic in a field which has long been a crucialissue for the survival of the planet: the use offossil energies as a key driver of globalwarming.

Over the course of the comingdecade, it is quite possible that in the key areaof energy supply and use, the competition foraccess to fossil fuels and other raw materialswill intensify, perhaps with military backing,while efforts to reduce climate-damagingemissions grind to a standstill. Here, cooper-ation can only be successful if a reliableframework is in place. Informal forums caninitiate debate and prepare the ground fordecision-making. Ultimately, however, coreissues of global survival can surely only beaddressed effectively through institution-alised structures and within the frame-work of inclusive multilateralism.

The resurgence of the state – but a

changed understanding of sovereignty

The crises which have occurred over recentyears have shown that those who proclaimedthe demise of the state so vociferously in the1980s and again, in a more muted manner,since the end of the 1990s were misled.Complex crisis management in particularneeds a functioning state as a core unitwith the capacity to meet the stringentdemands of globalised policy-making.

International organisations, policy networks,clubs and sector-specific coalitions all have arole to play in coordination, norm-settingand, if appropriate, legal regulation.However, if policy- and decision-makers areunable to cooperate, make appropriate contri-butions to the debates and implement agree-ments at the national level, global governanceruns on empty. And while non-state and pri-vate actors have played an increasingly significant role in the delivery of national andglobal goods and as international develop-ment donors in recent years, it should beborne in mind that the state – through its fiscal sovereignty – is still the key actor inmobilising the resources needed for the discharge of public functions.

This resurgence of the state shouldnot be confused with a return to tradition-al concepts of statehood. In fact, the con-cept of statehood has changed empiricallyand now has a new normative classifica-tion. States today have far more permeableexternal borders – not only in relation to tradeor transboundary environmental pollution,but also, and particularly, in relation to peopleand ideas. States are involved in many different arrangements which require somesharing of sovereignty. In many policy areas,it is no longer about states' own rule-making,but how they can contribute to global regu-latory processes, with implementation then taking place at the national level. As a result,governance nowadays is far more reliant onpartnerships. And while authority is still significant, the capacity to learn and theorganisation of cooperative problem-solvingare becoming more important. However, thisis something of a balancing act for states.Contributing to collective forms of interna-tional governance which to some extent –especially in the context of European integra-tion – have resulted in the transfer of ele-


13

Introduction

ments of sovereignty can lead to a loss oflegitimacy at the domestic level, due to a perceived disconnect between national politi-cal representation, on the one hand, and theloci of collective and binding decision-making, on the other.

Not least, states today have an evengreater obligation than before towards theircitizens, with the result that the "firewall"provided by the non-intervention principlehas become porous. This is particularlyapparent in relation to the "responsibility toprotect" (R2P), which applies to grave humanrights violations and no longer sees sover-eignty solely as the state's right to defenditself but primarily as an obligation towardsits own citizens. With technological advancessuch as the Internet, the ability to disseminateinformation very rapidly, the correspondingdemands for transparency and the global callsfor more democracy also show that stateswhich currently base their legitimacy mainlyon output must utilise this period in order tomanage the negative growth and welfarecycles that are predicted to lie ahead. Withphases of stagnation and crisis clearly inprospect and likely also to impact on theemerging economies, legitimacy can only beguaranteed if more participation and reliablerule-of-law processes are established.

New drivers of democracy – but no

guarantee of success

The number of democratically constitutedstates has steadily increased over the lasttwo decades. Following the waves of demo-cratisation in Latin America in the 1980s andin Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s,opposition movements also emerged in theCaucasus, Asia and latterly in the Arab world,demanding democratic reforms in their

countries. Since then, elections have alreadytaken place in some North African countries,such as Tunisia and Egypt, following regimechange. In the context of the Arab Spring in particu-lar, a lively debate has emerged about the roleof the new social media and the middle classes as catalysts and drivers of democracy.In many cases, there is a clear connectionbetween economic discontent among themiddle classes and the desire for politicalreforms. If well-educated sections of thepopulation lack adequate employmentprospects which offer them livelihood securi-ty, they are more likely to be willing toengage for regime change and democracy,which appear to hold out the promise of morerights of political participation and better economic opportunities.

The significance of digital media inpolitical mobilisation, on the other hand, is ahighly contentious issue [see Revolution2.0?]. After initial euphoria about the"Facebook revolutions" in Tunisia andEgypt, critical voices can increasingly beheard, pointing out that the role of the newsocial media and the Internet in bringingabout political change has been overstatedand that much of the impetus for changecomes from conventional mainstreammedia such as television and the news-papers. In reality, there is an increasing over-lap between new and traditional media in thedissemination of information. At the sametime, however, repressive regimes are alsoseizing on the opportunities afforded to themby the Internet or new social media, or areattempting to control and suppress them.

The long-term success of the various transformation processes is not guaranteed, however. Even if democraticstructures and corresponding procedures areestablished, it is by no means certain that


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political elites will abide by democratic rules.Recent developments in Ukraine and, indeed,in Russia show that simply because a countryholds elections, this does not mean that it hasa functioning parliamentary or presidentialsystem with compliance with the separationof powers, the rule of law, and guaranteedbasic political and civil rights. Unless demo-cratic rules are embedded as a core socialvalue, there is a risk that the transformationwill produce nothing more than a pale imita-tion of democratic institutions and pro-cedures.

The external support provided by theinternational community in order to promotedemocracy has a mixed track record at best.The success or failure of democracy-buildingprocesses generally depends on a number ofinternal and external factors, which measuresadopted in isolation by external actors canonly influence to a very limited extent. Akey determinant of long-term democratic stability is whether the positive effects whichbroad sections of the population and govern-ment elites hope to achieve from a demo-cratic system of government actually becomereality.

It is noteworthy, in this context, thatthe goals of the democracy movements in theArab world are mainly economic and socialin nature. In other words, democracy is associated with a desire for basic materialsecurity and the dismantling of inequalities.Both of these are core outputs of democraticsystems – and they are areas where the established Western democracies have shownsubstantial deficits in recent years.

A new set of goals for global governance

Towards global development goals

Poverty, avoidable deaths from essentiallytreatable diseases, environmental change, climate change, disruptions in the globalfinancial system – the list of challengeswhich the international community has toaddress is a long one. There is a growingawareness that new ways of thinking aboutsocial progress from a global perspectivewill increasingly be required in future. Foralthough the number of people living inpoverty has been reduced in variousregions of the world, albeit to varyingextents, the inequalities within and be-tween societies have widened in recentdecades. This is due firstly to changedemployment and social structures in theindustrialised countries, where the financialcrisis and sovereign debt crisis of recent yearshave left deep scars in some cases. Secondly,as a result of economic growth in the emerging countries, which have now joinedthe ranks of middle-income countries, a burgeoning middle class is forming, while atthe same time, large sections of the popu-lation – and China is an outstanding exampleof this phenomenon – are still living in poverty.

Furthermore, although 40 yearshave passed since the first United NationsConference on the Human Environment inStockholm and the publication of the Clubof Rome's Limits to Growth (Meadows etal. 1972), humankind has still not managedto decouple economic growth from risingCO2 emissions [see Transforming the GlobalEnergy System]. Furthermore, with a growing world population and changing


15

Introduction

dietary habits, emissions of other greenhousegases such as methane are rising due to anincrease in rice cultivation and livestockfarming. This is associated with land-usechange and a shift towards more intensivecultivation of energy crops and the expansionof livestock husbandry, with many, often negative, effects – not only for affected com-munities but also for the environment andfood security [see Food Security – A GlobalChallenge]. This clearly shows that theWestern fossil-fuelled economic systemand its associated lifestyles cannot serve asa global model and that a change of courseis required, particularly also in ourincreasingly agro-industrial farming systems. Human-induced environmentalchanges since the start of industrialisationhave resulted in certain biophysical thresh-olds in the Earth system having alreadybeen overstepped (Rockström et al. 2009). Twenty years after the United NationsConference on Environment and Develop-ment (UNCED), the issues of sustainabilityand development – which in the meantimehave become separate strands of the politicaldebate – must be merged again. Global sustainable development is the key benchmark for measuring policies whichaim to safeguard the future. It is debatable,at present, whether the outcomes of theUnited Nations Conference on SustainableDevelopment (Rio+20) can make an adequatecontribution here. Nonetheless, the con-ference in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012 marksthe start of a change of mindset, as the socialdebates conducted in advance of the con-ference have already shown (Martens 2012,p. 8f.).The shift towards a green economy – a low-carbon, resource-efficient, socially equitableeconomic model – as promoted by the UnitedNations Environment Programme (UNEP)

and the Organisation for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD)(UNEP 2011; OECD 2011), can only be onebuilding block here. Although resource-efficient production has been promoted inmany sectors over recent decades, more efficient resource use is often cancelled outby larger unit quantities in production andincreased consumption as a result of popula-tion growth. With regard to CO2 emissions inparticular, only an "energy turnaround", awayfrom fossil fuels towards renewable energies,can put us on track towards sustainable devel-opment [see Transforming the Global EnergySystem]. Germany's future energy policycourse is therefore likely to be the subject ofintensive scrutiny in the wake of itsannounced nuclear phase-out and its commit-ment to promoting renewables more vigorously worldwide.

However, even a green economy isbased on the concept of economic growth asa means of creating new jobs and thus reducing poverty and narrowing socialinequalities. This conflicts with the observa-tion – already mentioned – that in countrieswith high economic growth rates in particu-lar, the gap between rich and poor haswidened further in recent years. Furthermore,there are increasingly vocal calls for socialprogress and prosperity to be measuredagainst benchmarks other than gross nationalincome (GNI). There is still a goal conflictbetween economic growth, ecological sus-tainability and universal social welfare. Aglobal debate has therefore started aboutnew indicators for measuring prosperitywhich include subjective assessments anddownplay the notion that "more" materialprosperity always creates "more well-being" (see Martens 2012, p. 33ff.). At present, however, there is no sign of anyemerging consensus on what could replace


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GNI. Nonetheless, the mere fact that a dis-cussion process has been initiated at bothnational and international level should beviewed as a positive sign that serious consid-eration is being given to new indicators ofprogress and related development goals.

This debate is also about the commoninterests and responsibilities which all statesshare, which implies a shift away from thepresent dichotomy between developing countries on the one hand and industrialisednations on the other – the "developed North"and the "underdeveloped South". This conforms with the real-world situation inwhich "the South" is no longer a monolithicbloc – if, indeed, it ever was. The interests ofthe emerging economies are not congruentwith those of the least developed countries(LDCs). Without the emerging economies, itwill be impossible to implement effectivesolutions to numerous problems, especiallythe problem of greenhouse gas emissions. Atthe same time, climate change in particular –which from a historic perspective was causedprimarily by the industrialised countries –demonstrates yet again the North's responsi-bility for the framework conditions underwhich the Global South is developing. These"new realities" are the starting point for therecommendations on sustainable develop-ment goals (SDGs) presented in the reportResilient People, Resilient Planet, publishedin January 2012 by the High-level Panel onGlobal Sustainability set up by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The High-level Paneldoes not provide a list of specific goals, how-ever, but proposes a set of principles as thebasic framework for the development of thesegoals (High-level Panel on GlobalSustainability 2012, p. 72f.). This also reflects the awareness that "development"must be considered against the backdrop ofpolitical and cultural differences.

Development challenges facing the indus-trialised countries and their socio-economicsystems, whose development models cannotprovide a frame of reference for the widerworld, must be given just as much considera-tion as the socio-economic problems facingthe emerging and developing countries.

Crisis prevention: importance recognised,

but implementation still in its infancy

A further key topic, reflected in the title of the High-level Panel's report, is human andenvironmental "resilience": in other words,the ability to cope with the many stresses to which human communities and the environment are exposed. 2011 was the yearwith the highest level of material damagecaused by natural disasters, although thenumber of deaths was lower – despite theearthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan– than the high casualty figures recorded for2010 as a result of the extremely large number of disasters that year. Due to theirextensive and technically sophisticated infrastructures, the industrialised countriestend to sustain higher levels of material dam-age than developing countries, whereas disasters in developing countries generallyclaim more lives. Any economic damagewhich they sustain, however, is generallymuch more difficult for these countries tocope with on account of their low economicoutput. This is due to a lack of coping andadaptive capacities, which makes populationsin poorer countries more vulnerable thanthose in more affluent countries. The effectsof the food crisis in 2007/2008 also showedthat populations in the least developed coun-tries (LDCs) in particular, which additionallysuffer from poorly functioning markets, lowagricultural productivity, unmitigated


17

Introduction

impacts of environmental degradation, debt and poor governance, are particularlyaffected by crises [see Food Security - AGlobal Challenge].

The large number of crises over thepast decade shows just how many areas of ourmodern "globalised" lives are characterisedby ever greater linkages, growing interdepen-dencies and increasing complexity. In thecase of natural disasters or, indeed, in criseswhich are the consequence of human actionsuch as the financial crisis, the functionalityof key systems such as finance or transport,information and telecommunications systemsor the health sector may be at risk.Prevention and adaptation measures mustbe adopted against these types of risk,which are described as "systemic", inorder to safeguard the wellbeing and, overthe long term – at least as regards the possible impacts of climate change – thesurvival of humankind. Natural disastersand crises cannot be avoided entirely, so it isimportant to identify particularly vulnerablesocieties or sections of society, such as marginalised groups, in order to improvetheir resilience and adaptive capacities on atargeted basis.

There is a gradual recognition atthe international level too that forward-looking policies must be guided by the precautionary principle and crisis prevention. However, the practical obstacles remain high. The success of a disaster prevention policy is almost impossi-ble to quantify. Furthermore, integratedstrategies are required, which must not onlyunite various fields of action under one specific goal, as is the case with the conceptof global sustainability. Linkage betweenthe different levels of action – global,national and local – is also needed, not only to improve stakeholders' opportu-

nities to participate in policy formulationbut also to utilise capacities and resourcesat the various levels more effectively, basedon a division of labour. The risk that "diffusion of responsibility" will occur acrossthese various levels of action is extremelyhigh. The only possible response is to impose specific forms of accountability on all actors– state and non-state alike – at the variouslevels (Hesselmann 2011).

Outlook: Global problem-solvingagainst the backdrop of political andcultural differentiation

Power relations in the global economy andpolitics have undergone a permanent shiftsince the end of the "short TwentiethCentury" (Hobsbawm 1998), with thedominance of the Western countries nowdwindling. The fact that these shifts havehad dramatic effects on the internationalsystem, global regimes, and the perform-ance capacities and legitimacy of globalgovernance is now impossible to ignore.But which regulatory models and politicalcultures will characterise global society inthe 21st century? That is still an open question. The observation that new powerssuch as China, India and Brazil are in-creasingly making their mark on globalisa-tion processes is now bordering on cliché. Aless obvious trend, but perhaps with a compa-rable effect over the long term, is that otherstates of significant size are positioning them-selves in the world economy and politics;these countries with mainly regional sig-nificance at present are often described as theN-11 countries: Egypt, Bangladesh,Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico,


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Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey andVietnam. Compiling an accurate list of thesecountries is less important than the fact thatthey can be regarded as potential "agenda-set-ting powers" which have no intention of sub-ordinating themselves to a "Concert of GreatPowers" agreed between a small number ofcountries. World politics in future is likelyto be about "managing diversity" in acomplex balancing act between highlydiverse economic and security policy inter-ests, and with different normative conceptsand views on global governance accordingto culture and region.

Will this diversity have a positive ornegative effect on global problem-solving?This is almost impossible to predict at pres-ent. One possible effect may be the fragmen-tation of world politics, described at the start.At the same time, it is remarkable that onissues of sovereignty and the protection ofhuman rights, despite all the controversies onpoints of detail, a fundamental normativeconsensus has emerged on the "responsibilityto protect" (R2P). In the field of developmentcooperation, too – always a defining elementof North-South relations – the internationalcommunity has been able to achieve joint tar-gets based on the Millennium DevelopmentGoals and also to mobilise more resourcesand focus greater attention on this policyarea. In these fields of action, the UN system– whether in the form of the Security Councilor the General Assembly – remains a centralframe of reference for authoritative actionand resource mobilisation.

This much is certain: In addressingwhat are essentially global problems, anew dimension of global cooperation mustbe achieved in order to avoid considerablefrictions in the international order (Debielet al. 2009). It is clear that established sector-based international regimes (Breitmeier et al.

2009) are no longer enough. Models or,indeed, blueprints from the past are alsounlikely to help us progress towards a systemof governance that is both effective and le-gitimate. There is little sign, at present, of areturn to hegemonic structures. It is morelikely that the web of hierarchical and horizontal governance forms will continue todiversify. It could be helpful, in this context,to view club models à la G20, forums for private self-regulation, but also the "classic"negotiating arenas in institutionalised orselectively practised multilateralism not onlywithin the narrow confines of direct cost-benefit calculations but also as transculturalsocialisation and learning communities,where norms, world visions and regulatoryconcepts with different provenances can circulate, ideas are aired and shared, andregional policy and regulatory debates relating to specific regime formats can converge. Diplomacy in particular – which isincreasingly "packaged" for the media-demonstrates the great importance of these"soft factors" for problem-solving and goalattainment.

The extent to which political traditions influence national foreign policyhas often been underestimated. Formative state-building events often influence the predispositions of decision-making elites fordecades and even centuries afterwards(Johnston 1995). The USA's strong inter-national engagement, e.g. in the field ofhumanitarian intervention, is motivated notonly by national interests but can also be seenas an expression of its sense of mission,which is deeply rooted in its history and hasoften been translated very successfully intopractical action. China's stance is quite differ-ent: it has its own painful experience of exter-nal intervention and is also shaped by philosophical, ideological and regulatory


19

Introduction

models which culminate, at least initially, in a desire to establish a strong position in the region. These political cultures have a bearing on fundamental normative questionsof global governance – and are constantlybeing redefined. In the process, they mustprove their worth to a world public heavilyinfluenced by the Internet and selected electronic mainstream media. This has a feed-back effect on national public and politicalprocesses, not only in democratically consti-tuted states but also in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, which (must) now openup to the outside world in a way scarcelyimaginable in the 20th century.

All this has an impact on the questionof how global governance for global problem-solving can be organised today, against thebackground of political and cultural differen-tiation. First of all, a rational review of thevarious forms of global governance isundoubtedly required, with a focus ontheir effectiveness and legitimacy. How-ever, for a proper understanding of thediversity – regional, political and cultural –which exists in the international arena, itwill become increasingly necessary to seeinternational forums as learning communi-ties and to take account of their feedbackeffects on rapidly changing strategic andpolitical cultures. As this happens, the worldis likely to become less ordered and morechaotic than in the era of bipolarity, hegemo-ny or "concerts of powers". The static conceptof architectures can only be of limited assis-tance. Much will be decided in communica-tive and decentralised opinion-formingprocesses which obey their own internallogic. But this new diversity also creates newopportunities. The real challenge is to utilisethese processes in such a way that theyreduce, rather than exacerbate, the existinginequalities in the world. Only then will there

be a genuine prospect of sustainable andpeaceful development worldwide.


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References

Breitmeier, Helmut/Michèle Roth/Dieter Senghaas 2009: Sektorale Weltordnungspolitik: Effektiv, gerecht und demokratisch? (ONE World series of the Development and Peace Foundation, Vol. 22), Baden-Baden.

Debiel, Tobias/Michèle Roth/Cornelia Ulbert 2009: Global Trends in the Shadow of the World Financial Crisis: Challenges, Power Shifts and Options for Global Governance, in: Tobias Debiel/Dirk Messner/Franz Nuscheler/Michèle Roth/Cornelia Ulbert (eds.), GlobalTrends 2010. Peace - Development - Environment, Frankfurt/Main, p. 11-21.

Hesselmann, Elena 2011: The Limits of Control: The Accountability of Foundations and Partnerships in Global Health, in: Simon Rushton/Owain David Williams (eds.), Partnerships and Foundations in Global Health Governance, Basingstoke, p. 228-252.

High-level Panel on Global Sustainability 2012: Resilient People, Resilient Planet: A Future Worth Choosing, New York, NY.

Hobsbawm, Eric 1998: The Age of Extremes, New York, NY.Johnston, Alastair I. 1995: Thinking about Strategic Culture, in: International Security, Volume 19, Number 4, p. 32-64.

Martens, Jens 2012: Rio+20 - Die UN-Konferenz für nachhaltige Entwicklung 2012: Hintergründe - Konflikte - Perspektiven, Bonn/Osnabrück.

Meadows, Dennis H./Donella L. Meadows/Jørgen Randers/Williams W. Behrens 1972: The Limits to Growth, New York, NY.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 2011: Towards Green Growth, Paris.

Rockström, Johan et al. 2009: A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, in: Nature 461, p. 472-475.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) 2011: Towards a Green Economy. Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication, Nairobi.


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Global Governance Under Pressure: Trends and … · Since the last edition of Global Trends was published three years ago, ... such as the "Next 11" ... Global Governance Under Pressure: