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Global Environmental Politics and Competition between Nation-States: On the Regulation ofBiological DiversityAuthor(s): Christoph Grg and Ulrich BrandReviewed work(s):Source: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 371-398Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4177350 .

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Review of InternationalPolitical Economy7:3 Autumn 2000: 371-398

Global environmental politics andcompetition between nation-states:on the regulation of biologicaldiversityChristoph Gorg and Ulrich Brand

University of Frankfurt

ABSTRACTGlobal environmentalpolitics is often seen as an areawhere cooperationamong nation-statescan be improvedand common andtrans-borderssuescan be regulated. The article criticizes this view which tends to ignorethe complex crisis of the relationships between societies and ongoingeconomic competition among nation-states. Therefore, the differencebetween intentionalpolitical control and the unintended stabilizationofsocial contradictions (regulation,n the usage of the French regulationschool) is shown, and used to analyse the broader context of the regula-tion of societal relationshipswith nature. For an adequateunderstandingof such a network of internationalregulation, however, one must carefullyanalyse the transformation of the nation-state within the process ofcapitalist globalizationand its role in this network which goes beyondenvironmental regimes. Global biodiversity politics is an interestingexampleof such a network: t can be seen that capitalinterests in the useof geneticresources for the 'life science industry'is a driving forcein thisarea of contention. National regulations,in the sense of intentional poli-tics,constituteanecessaryaspectof theprocessof creating table conditionsfor the commodificationand valorizationof genetic resources.At the sametime, environmentalpolitics becomes part of global capitalistcompetitionand regionaland nationalcompetition.

KEYWORDSRegulation theory; international regulation; environmentalpolicy; statetheory;societalrelationshipwith nature;biodiversity.

Environmental problems are considered to be among the factors whichcan explain the emergence of forms of international cooperation andglobal regulation. They do not necessarily affect all the players to an

Review of InternationalPolitical EconomyISSN 0969-2290print/ISSN 1466-4526online ? 2000 Taylor& FrancisLtdhttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journals


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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICALECONOMYequal extent, but under certain conditions they make cooperative problemsolving appear more rational than the egoistic pursuit by the morepowerful players of their individual interests. This is at least the viewof the theory of international regimes which, in its 'liberal' form,addresses the question of which conditions and constellations of playersfavour, or could favour, such cooperation (Haas et al., 1993;Young, 1994).But at the same time it has become clear that global environmental policyis embedded in other political forms and subject matter (Conca, 1993)and that environmental regimes tend to reflect the international distri-bution of power rather than redefine it (Buttel, 1995). Finally, in theprocess of globalization ecological questions appear to be moving everfurther into the background behind issues concerning competitivenessbetween states and regions. In order to examine the connection betweensocial and ecological problems in the process of capitalist globalization,it is not enough simply to investigate official statements in favour ofthe ecological reorganization of national societies or of 'world society',such as those that are made within the framework of the discussion onsustainable development. Often much more important than a specificallyenvironmental policy are decisions in quite another field and theirimplicit effects on the transformation of societal relationships with nature.

These misgivings are formulated in this article, first of all from atheoretical point of view with regard to the difference between politicalregulation or directed control on the one hand and societal regulation onthe other hand.' While directed control is essential for the treatmentof environmental problems, it is only one element of the (societal)regulation of societal relations with nature. That is to say, societal regu-lation also includes - in addition to directed control - the contingentstabilization of social relations, which can be the result both of antago-nistic power-based strategies and of the interplay of different systemicprocesses. A comprehensive examination of this regulation must there-fore give greater prominence not only to questions of dominationbut also to the fact that for the stabilization of social development it isnot necessarily essential to find a 'solution' - of whatever nature - toproblems, but the contradictions of social development simply have tobe institutionally secured (and not necessarily removed). What this meansin detail will be demonstrated more precisely using the example of theregulation of biological diversity. While in the public domain the predom-inant opinion is that this issue is about measures which can stop orslow down the loss of biological diversity, the international agreementsregulating this field must be regarded rather as establishing a regimeto regulate the rights of access to, and more or less exclusive rightsof disposition of, biological diversity. Nevertheless, this new form of bio-politics (Flitner et al., 1998) also includes the societal regulation of theseforms of appropriation and their inherent contradictions.

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYIn the analysis of the principal features of this (highly asymmetric)

network of international regulation, particular attention will be paid tothe role of nation-states in relation to other players and as a field ofregulation of their own. While it is disputed that nation-states have thedecisive ability to solve environmental problems, and alternatives aretherefore sought (Lipschutz and Conca, 1993), they remain at the sametime an important terrain in the condensation (Verdichtung) of classrelations and as a structural element of international competition, a rolewhich is indeed changing within the framework of the new forms ofcapitalist globalization but which is generally becoming stronger (Hirsch,1997). Biological diversity is a good example of the fact that the estab-lishment and recognition of sovereign rights of disposition within theframework of nation-states is an important step towards (partially new)forms of 'valorization' (Inwertsetzung) of genetic resources and thus,rather than precluding the process of capital valorization, is a precon-dition for it. In this process, new forms of achieving compromises indealing with conflicts and problems are developed, which reflect insti-tutionally both opposing interests and mutual dependencies. The basicpattern of this interplay of competition and cooperation and the roleof the participating players will be presented and analysed in thefollowing, taking the example of the negotiations on the Convention onBiological Diversity (CBD) and on some of the connected agreementsand initiatives.

I 'REGULATING' AND 'REGULATION' IN THE CRISISOF SOCIETAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATUREOne of the most common subjects of dispute with regard to our under-standing of globalization is the importance of institutional arrangements:are we dealing with a process brought about by market forces andcompetition alone (Ohmae, 1994) - independently of whether this isevoked in a neoliberal fashion or regulated by appropriate institutionsaccording to social democratic ideas2 - or is the development of aglobalized capitalism accompanied and secured by institutional formsfrom the very beginning (Porter, 1990; Reich, 1991)? Further questionsarise based on this fundamental question, which is older and furtherreaching than the present globalization discussion. At what level areinstitutional regulations appropriate to the democratic requirements andthe problems of present-day societies - at the level of the nation-state,at the regional or international level, or at a geographically smaller orfederal level and within a local framework (cf. Gorg and Hirsch, 1998)?What room for manoeuvre exists for the regulation of the different layersof social problems and the transformation of the welfare state, but alsofor socio-ecological reforms?

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYOn the basis of regulation theory the fundamental question can,first of all, be transcended: as an institutional theory, it turns the basic

political-economic theme of the embedding of market processes in thesupporting political, economic and cultural framework into an exami-nation of the historical phases of capitalism (cf. Amin, 1994a; Elam, 1994;Alnasseri et al., 2001). Regulation theory, or at least those versions ofit which are still based on Marx (cf. Jessop, 1990), continues to assumethe existence of an imperative of accumulation, a compulsion to expandand to subsume spheres of life under the capital relation which lies inthe structures of capitalist societalization, although the entire meaningof socio-cultural processes in themselves is not lost because of thissubsumption (cf. Esser et al., 1994). This dual front involves quite anumber of problems which regulation theory until now has been unableto solve and which possibly cannot be dealt with on this basis (Gbrg,1995). The term 'regulation' gives a name to the stabilization of a funda-mentally contradictory and conflictual process without removing thecontradictions. Regulation or control by the state is only a part of thisprocess. Moreover, the political form of the state must be analysed moreprecisely. The power relations and the fundamental class relations of asociety are condensed in the state (Poulantzas, 1978). Its actual or poten-tial regulating functions are thus superimposed by its character ofdomination, i.e. by its function within the framework of the fundamentalsocial antagonisms. At the same time capitalism developed from thebeginning as a world system (Wallerstein, 1986), although this did notexclude - and still does not exclude - competition between differentstates and groups of states and the expansive trend of this system ofcompeting individual states (Hirsch, 1995). The basic ideas brieflyoutlined here allow us to formulate a somewhat different starting pointfor the examination of globalization and the ecological crisis.Against this background the global ecological crisis must be regardedprimarily as an institutionalcrisis of the appropriation of nature by society.Questions of environmental policy were and are a part of the crisis ofFordism, but they are not its cause (for example Hein, 1997: 110).The connection between the crisis of Fordism and the crisis of societalrelationships with nature is, rather, to a considerable degree both polit-ically and culturally mediated. Socio-ecological problems were firstplaced on the agenda in certain countries and internationally in the 1970sby new social movements and epistemic communities. Although thematerial aspects of the ecological crisis - the consumption of materialsand energy and the resulting pollution, as well as the risks involved incertain key technologies - are induced by the Fordist growth constel-lation and its consumption patterns, they have not necessarily led to thecrisis being regarded as an environmental crisis. As well as takingthe political and socio-cultural mediation processes into account (Jahn

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYand Wehling, 1998), this approach also leads to the examination ofruptures and continuities in the post-Fordist development model, thebare outlines of which are at best beginning to emerge (and the successof which, as a 'stable formation', is not at all certain; cf. Alnasseri et al.,2000).One central aspect is changing in quite a contradictory manner: accessto natural resources in the age of 'globalization'. As the imperative ofinternational competitiveness set out by powerful interests becomesever stronger, access to nature as a resource, i.e. its valorization, isincreasingly subjected to the profitability considerations of capital. Thisvalorization aims at the constitution of a resource as an element of capi-talist production and reproduction. This is a complex process comprisingseveral phases. Altvater (1991: 321) defines four phases:3 the identifica-tion of usable resources, for example by prospecting; their isolation fromthe surrounding ecological system, for example the rainforest; followedby their commodification; nd finally monetarization.Each of these stages,however, requires the fulfilment of a number of preconditions: in orderfor identification as a resource to be possible, discursive-symbolic con-stitutive processes must have taken place which make certain naturalobjects interesting to humanity as resources - such as the tropical rain-forest now being regarded as a 'forest pharmacy' or 'database'. Closelyconnected with this discursive process of constitution are new techno-logical methods (e.g. within the framework of 'bioprospecting', cf. Reidet al., 1993), which enable the practical isolation of a usable resource, forexample in the form of 'genetic information' (on this and on the differentphases of the constitution of biological resources, see Heins and Flitner,1998). For commodification in the narrower sense of the term, legaland political conditions such as specific property rights must also bemet, and first of all be enforced politically (for agro-biodiversity, seeKloppenburg, 1988). In addition, monetarization depends on the marketopportunities of the participating players and therefore on their economicand political power as well as on forms of political regulation.Although the private appropriation and exploitation of naturalresources has long been a central component of capitalist societalization(Crosby, 1972; Brockway, 1988), this exploitation has now taken on anew quality due to new technological methods and new patterns of pro-duction. The new biological and gene technologies require and in partmake possible this other access and turn elements of both non-humanand human nature into 'strategic resources' (Cecena and Barreda, 1995)and the new 'life industry' (Baumann et al., 1996). This view of thestrategic intentions of central and powerful players does not, however,suffice for the comprehension of the crisis of societal relationships withnature. The complex interplay of economic, political, legal, socio-culturaland symbolic aspects must be taken into account. What this means in

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYdetail will be demonstrated below with regard to developments in thefield of genetic resources, in which economic and technical strategies,and political and legal regulations, but also socio-cultural evaluations,must be taken into consideration.The crisis of societal relationships with nature is by no means 'solved';on the contrary, its very existence is controversial and subject to varyinginterpretations. What is happening, rather, is the highly selectiveintegration of socio-ecological questions into new forms of societaliza-tion (Becker and Brand, 1996). One disputed path to modernization,which is followed under the vague model of sustainable development,has achieved considerable importance in those countries and regions inwhich socio-ecological questions are in fact on society's political agenda.But even there, the prevailing interpretation of sustainability is extremelyselective, reducing socio-ecological questions to technical solution strate-gies under the dominant pattern of ecological modernization (cf. Keilet al., 1998; Brand and Gorg, 1998a; for biodiversity, see McAfee, 1999).The more effective management of flows of materials is often all thatremains here; the manifold forms of the appropriation of nature andtheir effects are not extensively considered or reshaped. In countriesand regions in which socio-ecological questions are of no - or onlyvery minor - importance, the transformation of societal relationshipswith nature is carried out even more functionally in the direction ofvalorization, i.e. under the perspective of its contribution to 'nationalcompetitiveness'. The disputed restructuring of societal relationshipswith nature must thus be regarded as an inherent part of the process ofglobalization. The politically 'resonant', i.e. publicly discussed, ecologi-cal crisis does not in any way define the path to be taken by restructuring.In other words, the requirements for change discussed in connectionwith the ecological crisis are not at all the same as the actual transfor-mation of societal relationships with nature. This transformation takesplace within the framework of social 'search processes' in which varying,not always clearly defined, strategies by very different social playersmeet. They contribute to the fact that capitalist societalization, whichtakes place largely 'hinter dem Rucken der Akteure', 'behind the players'back' (Marx) - to the extent that they also define the forms of the appro-priation of 'nature' - could once again take place in a stable institutionalframework (which always involves a widespread and brutal exclusionof various interests).According to the basic assumptions of regulation theory, however, itis not surprising that within the framework of capitalist globalizationboth increased international competition and attempts at regulating theproblems arising can be observed. With regard to the 'environment' andresources there are therefore both strategies for an accelerating valoriza-tion in line with the interests of certain players, particularly transnational

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYconcerns (TNCs), and an interest in cooperation.There are very differentreasons for cooperation. First, there are cooperative trategies or the valori-zation of nature,especially where governments and TNCs have a commoninterest in enabling access to certain resources. Above all, however, it isa question of protection against crises and their after-effects, both on thematerial level (where the overexploitation and destruction of naturecould be counterproductive) and on the socio-economic level (if socialtensions threaten to get out of hand). In addition, other political (mili-tary) and cultural (normative) aspects also play a role, for exampleif international crises are feared as a result of a shortage of water or ifecological degradation could reach an extent where it violated cultur-ally anchored aesthetic norms, and so on. Internationally binding rulesare necessary for the organization of this cooperation. Cooperation breaksdown, however, due not only to the different competitive situations butalso to the unequal distribution of power within the system of states, inwhich powerful constellations of interests - articulated as 'national inter-ests' - still tend to win the day. (It therefore only appears to be a paradoxthat the same players cooperate in certain areas and compete in others.)In view of the readiness to cooperate expressed by all parties it is neces-sary to examine more precisely the interests involved, their unequallydistributed capacities to assert themselves, and institutional structures.In the case of the many aspects of global environmental destruction thetreatment of which is not being pushed by any dominant interests, itis a well-known fact that cooperation is much more sluggish than, forexample, in the 'urgent' question of the establishment of global freetrade.

Thus, in the international attempts to set up rules new problems andwidely varying interests are articulated, which find their way intocompromises. Because of the pattern of conflict, these compromises reflectthe influence of the players involved and are therefore highly asym-metrical. In spite of ample room for manoeuvre here, a contentiousrestructuring of societal relationships with nature is taking place in linewith the fact that certain strategies for the use of resources are global-ized and have to adjust to international competition or are part ofit. But this also means that these strategies cannot assert themselves bythe logic of capital. The fact that international compromises are soughtshows - with all the asymmetry of the power relations involved in thecompromises - that there is no such thing as homogeneous interest onthe part of capital, and the strategies of powerful concerns and alliedgovernments cannot assert themselves unilaterally. It is the task of thesocial sciences, among other things, to identify the general and specific- according to the policy field - conditions of competition and cooper-ation, i.e. to elaborate how to deal with conflicts in such a way asto achieve compromises. We assume that, against this background, an

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYinternational mode of regulation in the form of a network of not yetcompletely integrated institutions is establishing itself in a rudimentaryform. We therefore speak of a(n asymmetric) network of internationalregulation.

II THE CONFLICT OVER BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITYThe fact that the loss of biological diversity is one of the most impor-tant global environmental problems can be substantiated with impressivefigures.4 In the 1996 'red list of endangered species', the IUCN pointsout that worldwide 5,205 species are endangered. These represent 11percent of all species of birds, 25 percent of all mammals, 34 percent ofthe fish species examined, 20 percent of the reptiles and 25 percentof the amphibians (IUCN, 1996: 24). But no matter how accurate thesefigures are, they in fact say very little about the actual extent of theproblem. To begin with, all estimates involve a high degree of uncer-tainty, since all the figures are inexact and only preliminary estimates.It is no accident that the comprehensively researched and 'famous'mammals, birds, fishes, reptiles and amphibians form the core of theIUCN's 'red lists', as much less is known about other species and specificinformation can scarcely be presented (ibid.). Of greater significance,however, is the fact that this method of procedure only covers one aspectof biological diversity, namely the diversity of species. The definition ofbiological diversity includes not only the diversity of species, however,but also genetic diversity and the diversity of habitats and ecosystems(cf. WCMC, 1992;UNEP, 1995; on the partly contradictory forms of scien-tific discussion, see Gorg et al. (eds) 1999).If genetic diversity is examined, at first glance a similar problem canbe observed, namely the loss of diversity. However, the players and theinterests involved change rapidly and new insights into the structureof the problem arise. While in the case of the loss of diversity ofspecies we are dealing with the destruction of apparently largely virginhabitats such as the tropical rainforest or coral reefs (cf. for exampleWilson, 1992), genetic diversity is important primarily in the field ofplant varieties which humans have been cultivating and breedingfor their own purposes for hundreds and thousands of years. Geneticvulnerability and genetic erosion are, accordingly, attributed in part toquite different factors (FAO, 1996: 19ff.; Flitner, 1995). In the fieldof biological diversity widely varying concepts of nature thus meet(depending on the preferred viewpoints on ecosystems, species orgenetic resources; from untouched nature or the 'natural wealth ofthe tropics' to the utility of genetic resources), but also widely varyingpractical societal relationships with nature (above all diverging formsof use).

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYIn these and other major areas of conflict, the present discussion onthe 'loss of biological diversity' must be seen in connection with morerecent developments in (bio- and genetic) technology for the appro-

priation of genetic resources, with the establishment of a new form ofbiopolicy aimed at the control and appropriation of these resources.Nevertheless, even this new form of biopolicy has its historical fore-runners. From the very beginning, the appropriation of genetic resourceswas closely tied to the colonial expansion of Europe and the rise ofcapitalism. In addition to the search for gold, the exploitation of newbiological resources and the strategic securing of those resources formeda central driving force of that expansion (Crosby, 1972; Brockway, 1988).Since the beginning of the twentieth century, with the adventof new scientific methods of breeding (according to Mendel's rules ofheredity) and the discovery of the areas of origin of present-day culti-vated plants by the Soviet geneticist Vavilov in the 1930s, systematicefforts at collecting have been made in order to recover the traditionalvarieties which are needed for scientific breeding (Flitner, 1995; on thedifferent periods, Heins and Flitner, 1998).As a result, some of the basic characteristics of the present patternsof conflicts gradually began to appear in the 1960s. On the one hand,in the context of the so-called Green Revolution in agriculture aware-ness of the fact increased that genetic diversity in this area was rapidlydisappearing. On the other hand, it became clear that this diversity wasextremely unevenly distributed and that the countries of origin, themajority of which were to be found in the geographical and politicalsouth, were no longer prepared to accept without resistance the gratu-itous appropriation of their genetic resources. Resistance intensified inthe 1980s, when the question of the use of genetic resources becamean open conflict within the UN Food and Agricultural Organization(FAO) (Kloppenburg and Kleinman, 1988). These international conflictsfound their preliminary 'solution' in 1983 with the establishmentof a Commission on Plant Genetic Resources (CPGR, now CGRFA -Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture) and theInternational Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IU-PGR),a systemof treaties within the framework of the FAO not binding in internationallaw (FAO, 1989). Admittedly, 'solution' here certainly cannot be takento mean the definitive clarification of the issues broached, but ratherthe existence of an institutional framework in which conflicts can besettled. It therefore makes more sense to speak not of a solution but of(institutionalized) forms of dealing with conflicts.At the same time, however, the expansion of and change in the subjectmatter in question must be noted. That which applied initially to thesphere of cultivated plants has been expanded in recent years to include'wild' biodiversity, and this has involved considerable shifts in emphasis.

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYNot only is a different line of negotiation on the establishment of acomprehensive agreement on the protection of species (which goes backto the World Conservation Strategy of 1980; cf. IUCN et al., 1980) mani-fested here, but also a different symbolic meaning of the subject matter,particularly the tropical rainforest (Hecht, 1998), new technical methodsfor the industrial use of the resources to be found there (bioprospecting,i.e. the screening of genetic characteristics; cf. Reid et al., 1993) and theresulting claims of participation and property (with regard to intellec-tual property, from patent protection to consideration of the rights ofthe indigenous population). Finally, within the issue of biodiversity tradi-tional efforts at environmental protection are combined with newer onesunder the concept of sustainable use (Gorg, 1997) and with the questionof the use of resources and connected questions such as those of rightsof access and of exclusive use, benefit sharing and patents.It was in this complex and difficult situation for negotiations that theCDB (on the negotiation process, see Sanchez and Juma, 1993; on theprovisions of the Convention, Glowka et al., 1994) was developed in therun-up to the UN Conference on the Environment and Development(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The importance of this Conventionis estimated very differently, depending on the point of view of theobserver. For observers from the tradition of the conflicts over plantgenetic resources, the 'environmentalization' of the conflicts meant thethreat of depoliticization and the neglect of distributional aspects.5 Forenvironmental and nature conservationists, in contrast, the CBD paid,and pays, too much attention to use and far too little heed of the inter-ests of species protection. Underlying these diverging assessments whichhave accompanied the conflicts within the framework of the CBD andthe International Undertaking negotiations until the present (cf. Brandand G6rg, 1998b), however, are widely varying views as to what thepolitical regulation of biological diversity should in fact include.

III THE MARKET AND POLITICS:MODELLING AND ITS CONSEQUENCESAt one extreme, at least according to the models, is the view of themarket radicals that the problems connected with the loss of diversityare caused by imperfect or politically distorted price formation (Moranand Pearce, 1994). According to the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960), thecomplete distribution of titles to property, in this case the complete priva-tization and commercialization of biological diversity, would ensure itspreservation even without regulatory state intervention - of course, onlyif there is complete information on all goods and markets and no trans-action costs arise. This condition can hardly be met, however, not onlyfor objective reasons (von Prittwitz and Wolf, 1993); thus with regard

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYto biodiversity this model can only be described as an unrealisticintellectual exercise. Most importantly, the model is based on twoextremely problematical assumptions: first, the assumption that biodi-versity in fact does not belong to anybody;and second, the allegation thatit is being destroyed becauseit does not belong to anybody.The first assumption is an abstraction from every traditional form ofuse and the claims resulting from them; in its major assumptions andtheir consequences this model thus de facto represents an expropriation.The consequences can be shown in two different directions. Within theframework of the FAO, following lengthy negotiations in 1989 there wasa recognition of the rights of the farmers over the genetic diversity theyused and produced through their activities in the area of cultivated plants(farmers' rights; FAO, 1989).6 This at least rhetorical recognition, whichis not binding in international law, refers to the fact that genetic diver-sity exists in this area in the form of plant varieties which have beencultivated and preserved by the farming population over the centuries.A somewhat different, but nevertheless comparable, situation existsrelating to the 'wild' biodiversity of the tropical rainforest. Interest hereis directed primarily at substances which are of significance for phar-maceutical purposes. These substances have often been known for a longtime for traditional healing methods, however, and their exploitationwith the aid of ethnobotany is therefore a lucrative business (Heins,1996). Just as we cannot speak here of unowned nature (even if the formsof ownership vary in detail; see Brush, 1993; Agrawal 1996, 1998), so theassumption that the tropical rainforest (just like other areas of land) iscompletely virgin nature in which no use has taken place (Hecht, 1998)is also untrue. The assumption that biological diversity is untouchednature and therefore possessed by no one thus comes into conflict inboth directions with complicated use, possession and even partiallyrecognized property relations (even if, as in the case of farmers' rights,this recognition is not legally binding, it at least serves the players inthis field as a major guideline in case of conflict).The second assumption, namely that of the overexploitation ofbiological diversity due to lack of property entitlements, is a highlyproblematical construction from another point of view. It employs -following Garrett Hardin (1968) - the theoretical model of the destructionof theglobalcommons,of global common property (see for example Lipietz,1995). This model is problematical even where it is not radicalized inthe direction of the distribution of property titles but on the contrary isexpanded into a model for the management of the global commons.Independent of the reasoning and strategy chosen here in the individualcase (cf. Goldmann, 1997), this model is based on the assumptionthat biodiversity is being lost because it is not adequately protected as acommon good. In contrast to the market model, however, this protection

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYis expected from political regulation, i.e. from management at the politicallevel and particularly at the intemational political level. This is why thisassumption is at the centre of the arguments about international protec-tion agreements on the political regulation of biodiversity.But what is really at stake here can be seen in the political effortsto establish markets. Recently, the UN Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD) brought the so-called Biotrade Initiative intobeing, to coordinate and strengthen efforts in this direction; the aim ofthe Initiative is 'promoting international markets for biological resourcesthat will provide conservation incentives and sustainable developmentopportunities' (UNCTAD, 1997: Executive Summary). In contrast to theradical market strategy, it is precisely the market asymmetrieswhich areused here to legitimate the programme: 'most developing countries lackthe technical and entrepreneurial resources to exploit the full potentialof their biological resources' (ibid.). This lack of capacities for the appro-priate valorization cannot be remedied by the distribution of propertytitles and the privatization of biological diversity alone, but requiressupporting political and organizational measures. The Biotrade Initiativeis to develop these measures and place them at the disposal of theappropriate countries.

The publication of this initiative was followed by massive attackson it on the Internet, which concentrated primarily on the question offair and just participation in the negotiations concerning the use of bio-logical resources and on the exclusion of, and disregard for, indigenousgroups and local communities.7 These challenges to the initiative artic-ulate the character of domination of the global regulation of geneticresources and give an indication of what the establishment of a systemof international regulation and the commodification of biological diver-sity really means. The concept of global commonsplays a central role here.The Biotrade Initiative assumes that via the CBD a regime of free accessto 'the common good, biodiversity' has been removed and replaced bygraduated rules on property and access. Many players seem to be agreedon the point that the 'enclosureof theglobalcommons' s necessary, whetherby privatization through the distribution of property titles, whether -because the assumptions of the Coase Theorem are unrealistic - by theirdesignation as protectedareas: The present global ecological crises, whichare crises of global commons, may imply some "global enclosure" aspart of the solution' (Lipietz, 1995: 121; see also Wilson, 1988).The parallels drawn by Alain Lipietz between the enclosure of thecommons in early modern times and the present day can be instructive,although in a different sense from that intended by Lipietz. For him thepast 'enclosures' were an answer to the economic, social and ecologicalcrisis of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries (ibid.). Karl Marx (1962:741ff.) offers a somewhat different interpretation of those events. For

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYhim, the fencing in of the common land which took place at that timewas first of all not a 'solution' to an ecological crisis but a part of the'primitiveaccumulation', of the forceful establishment of a new mode ofproduction on the path towards the enforcement of central structuralprinciples of capitalist socialization (separation of the means of produc-tion from the producers and the transformation of those means intocapital). In order to achieve this it was in many cases necessary to removeearlier forms of property and rules for the use of common propertymore or less violently.8 Far from being the solution to an ecological ordemographic crisis from a functionalistic point of view, this processcreated and secured the socio-structural foundation for the specificcapitalist societalization of the former common goods.The drawing of parallels, if it is understood as an analogous compar-ison, is therefore helpful. As has already been outlined, what weare apparently dealing with at present within the framework of theecological crisis is, among other things, theexpansionof thestructuralchar-acteristicsof capitalistsocietalizationto resources which until now have inpart been subject to other forms of property and use. This also explainswhy particular interest is paid to those regions, technologies and playerswhich have been marginalized by the Fordist model of growth but whichhave also until now been spared by it. The 'valorization' of biologicaldiversity therefore not only means that it is becoming the object ofcommodified exchange. In the majority of the regions trade and pricesetting even of rare medicinal herbs is by no means unknown, althoughthis is usually limited to the regional market (Hayden, 1998). But withthe new regulations, a worldwide valid system of property rights forthe economically attractive areas of diversity is being developed and thecorresponding socio-structural positions established. This means animprovement of the possibilities for calculating investment decisionsand thus for the estimation of profits on the regional and the globalmarket.The appears to be at the centre of the present discussions on the globalcommons, which are based on the discursive construction of commongoods which apparently belong to no one and on global protectionefforts (Zerner, 1996; Flitner, 1997). And this is the basis for the actualselectivity of the Biotrade Initiative: indigenous peoples and localcommunities will in future be able to make their interests heard only incertain forms and will be put more or less under pressure to give upother resources and their forms of use to certain institutionalforms. Acentral role is played in this, first, by the economic value of a resource,expressed in monetary units, and second, by legal and politicalforms ofregulation,expressed in property forms and in the state's decision-makingstructure (on the problem of indigenous knowledge and changes in it,cf. Agrawal, 1996).

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYWith the concentration of political efforts to regulate the global envi-ronmental problem of 'loss of biodiversity' on the management of the

global commons, traditional forms of use and claims are ignored or evenaccused of contributing to the erosion of diversity. With this interpre-tation the process of regulation itself is also obscured, with regardboth to its actual consequences and to the immanent contradictionsof this form of regulation. If the assumption can be proved true thatwithout increased economic and technical interest in the use of biolog-ical diversity there would be no CBD, i.e. no actual global environmentalproblem in this form, then the connection between protection effortsand interest in use or exploitation will have to be handled particularlycarefully. It is, namely, not the case that inversely the valorization alonewould determine the forms and institutions of regulation. Not onlyis this process, like the establishment of a mode of regulation in general,full of contradictions and conflicts, but in these conflicts a role isalso played by dependencies which are connected with the realmaterial characteristics of the object to be regulated, that is with its'natural side'. We shall attempt to demonstrate this using one strand ofthe international negotiations, namely that on the issue of agriculturalbiological diversity. With the CBD a treaty has been agreed upon, thecontents of which in the field of agrobiodiversity overlapped withthe IU of the FAO from the very beginning, but in certain aspectscontained contradictory rules.9There was therefore a need for the harmo-nization of the two agreements which, however, developed a dynamicof its own, allowing insights into the regulation of biological diversityand its contradictions.

IV ON THE CONTRADICTIONS OFINTERNATIONAL REGULATION

There are three particular areas of conflict where the CBD formulatedclearly differing regulations causing adjustment problems: the questionof access, the principle of benefit sharing in the use of biodiversity, andthe relationship of the legal regulations of the two agreements both toeach other and to other systems of treaties such as the reformulatedGATT (or the International Agreement on the Protection of PlantBreeding; UPOV). All three are extremely complex in themselves andbring to light the problematical nature of international societal regula-tion. It should not be forgotten that in view of the existing (and quitedifferently rated) problems we are dealing mostly with relatively recentinternational attempts at political regulations.10 The powerful and moreor less successful process of shaping these regulations can so far onlybe assessed with caution. Nevertheless, quite a number of central prob-lems can already be illustrated.

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYThe question of access to genetic resources and the concomitant

search for compromises revolves between the two extremes of free accessand rigid restriction of access. For one thing, this has an internationallegal dimension: with the CBD the system of free access to geneticresources, which was long regarded by international law as the so-calledcommon heritage of humankind,has been replaced by a system of regu-lated access. The central lever of change was the recognition of thenational sovereignty of states over the natural resources in their territory;this does not give them the right to destroy these resources at will,but does give them the right to prescribe political regulations foraccess to them - a precondition for the 'enclosure of the global commons'.This strengthening of national sovereignty presents a remarkablecontrast to the thesis of the diminishing sovereignty of nation-states,although it does not diametrically contradict it. Rather, it reveals thatvery differing processes come together at this point. With the recogni-tion of national sovereignty the states gain the right to pass regulationsgoverning access to the genetic resources in their territory. This wasdemanded by the southern states in the CBD negotiations, reflectingtheir interest in the use of 'their' resources, and must be seen in thecontext of the agreements between large corporations and individualcountries on bioprospecting (the best known is the agreement betweenthe pharmaceutical company Merck and the National BiodiversityInstitute INBio in Costa Rica; see Reid et al., 1993; Rompzyk andGettkant, 1996). The CBD takes these developments into considerationand is responsible for seeing that genetic resources are in fact definedand protected as commodifiable items. The recognition of nationalsover-eignty (in the sense of legal regulatory competence) is thus a necessarypreconditionfor the valorization of biodiversity even in periods of thesupposed loss of competence on the part of nation-states. From theviewpoint of the conservation of nature this recognition of nationalsovereignty is not necessarily helpful, however, as it endows consider-able decision-making competence on a type of player which in theenvironmental field does not exactly enjoy increasing esteem: the nation-state.The contradictory relationship between more political-economicand more environmental and nature-conservationist problems can beobserved in the negotiations on the adjustment of the IU to the CBD. Itis expressed there in the complex association of factual questions withparticular interests and questions of power. The factual subjects of thenegotiations are very closely connected with environmental problems inthe broader sense, for they concern primarily the question of depen-dence in agriculture and in the industrial (or pharmaceutical) use ofthe existence and character of genetic diversity in various fields: anexistence which appears to be threatened by the erosion of diversity.

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REVIEWOF INTERNATIONAL POLITICALECONOMYThis dependence is itself, however, geographically11 and politicallyshaped and varies considerably in the different forms of use, dependingespecially on the technical options which are available or are being devel-oped in each individual case.In the sphere of agriculture it can be assumed that there is a'competition-cooperation-paradox' (Busch et al., 1995) in the use ofgenetic resources: economically induced competition over the disposaland exploitation of genetic resources in modem, intensive farming high-lights the vulnerability of this form of use, which requires coordinatedmeasures for preservation.12 The interests in use and preservation arecontradictory elements of one constellation and must be seen in directrelationship with one another. This complex situation meant that thenegotiations were long interpreted by observers as 'pre-negotiations'.13As long as the effects on the individual countries could not be foreseen,there was little inclination to enter into definitive commitments and regu-lations. It was a study by the IPGRI(International Plant Genetic ResourcesInstitute; see IPGRI, 1996) which laid the foundation at a meeting inDecember 1996 for progress to be made, at least in the sphere of 'scopeand access', i.e. in the range of resources concerned14 and the rules ofaccess individually in force, and for the FAO Commission on GeneticResources for Food and Agriculture (CGRFA) to adopt a 'MultilateralSystem of Exchange' (MUSE) for plant genetic resources in May 1997.This system represents a compromise between a purely bilateralagreement, such as the paradigmatical accord between Merck and INBio,and a comprehensive multilateral system which is based simply oninformal agreements and - at its core - on the idea of free access (whichdoes not necessarily mean without paying). While the first variation issuitable only for a few plants with a high market valueand one-sidedly supports the commodification of genetic diversity, thesecond variation is judged to be unclear and awkward with regard torights arising from use and commitments to preservation (IPGRI, 1996).According to its founder, a MUSE system combines the advantages ofboth systems and provides a flexible framework for the exchange ofgenetic material on the basis of mutually agreed rules. In other words,it allows the commodification of genetic diversity, also in bilateral agree-ments, and at the same time guarantees minimum standards to whichthe participating parties must adhere.Here, the second disputed or unclear rule which is discussed in theCBD and also within the FAO gains in importance: benefitsharing. Thisis because the minimum standards of the MUSE system affect not onlyefforts aimed at the conservation of genetic diversity, but also the distri-bution of benefits from its use. Here again, however, reality collidedwith the splendid plan. Although the negotiating parties succeeded incoming to an agreement on a MUSE model in May 1997, they did so by

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYleaving out the articles dealing with the distribution of the benefits fromthe system. These rules, with their core - farmers' rights - continue tobe disputed. At the centre of the dispute is the question of whetherfarmers' rights represent actual legal entitlements or are a legallynon-binding 'concept' (ENB, Earth Negotiation Bulletin (68) (26 May1997)). Within the CBD the discussion on a just distribution of profitshas until now played a very minor role, which is why the interestedparties are hoping at least for a politicization of the discussion withinthe framework of the adoption of farmers' rights by the FAO.The situation concerning 'wild' biodiversity looks rather different fromthat of agrobiological diversity. Biotechnological use is here not directedat the physical use of the resource, but at the socially exclusive useof certain characteristics (Flitner, 1997). Nor are rare species being madethe basis of production processes on a large scale, which would involvetoo great an economic risk. It is primarily a question of the attempt toobtain 'genetic codes' which can then be integrated into other produc-tion processes (Heins, 1996). Nor is the entire diversity per se the objectto be utilized: for example, in the case of bioprospecting only potentiallyvaluable characteristics are sought, of which only a very small share,depending on the technological possibilities and the specific marketsituation, are turned into products. Economic interest is not in any wayidentical here with an ecological interest in the conservation of diver-sity, whatever is continually claimed in public.15 Even if interested partiesemphasize that economic valorization offers ways to sustain biodiver-sity, they usually say nothing about the fact that only a small part reallymeets an economic demand, due among other things to the extremelysmall number of potential users, i.e. firms which in fact have the tech-nical and financial means to apply the genetic information to production.Here, the question arises of how economic and ecological interests canreally be combined, i.e. how economic interests and 'ecological sustain-ability' are connected.The interesting aspect of these negotiations is the following: the main-tenance of genetic diversity, although it is formulated on the surface asan ecological problem, is inseparably bound to economic and politicalquestions concerning capital valorization and the legal conditions underwhich it takes place. Nevertheless, there exist mutual dependenciesas faras the substantial, material aspect of this is concerned, which can beregarded as the core of environmental problems and which induce therestructuring of societal relationships with nature. Which characteristicsof individual species of plants are of importance in which form to whichcommercial and non-commercial users? The problem in dispute is notthe use of 'nature'as such,but the usefor which orm of production, nderwhichsocial andecological onditions nd with which (ecological nd social)consequences.

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYThe close connection between environmental problems and the

political and economic situation in which resources are used gives riseto the scientific-technical problem of the assessability of the social andnatural effects of certain political regulations. This assessability involvesconsiderableuncertainty in both dimensions: the attempts to anticipatethe unintended results of certain forms of valorization in the naturesphere (which certainly give ground for controversy) have effects in thesocial sphere with regard primarily to the market opportunities ofthe participating players. What does it mean, for example, if foodstuffsare included in patent regulations or if they are left out? What does thismean for certain states? What consequences does it have for particularsections of the population concerned? What consequences does it havefor foodstuffs or seed multinationals? What are the conclusions to bedrawn by the governments of the countries in which the multinationals(still) have their headquarters or which they are at least threatening toleave? Moreover, questions arising from the new form of 'biopolicy' havea lot of gender implications in feminist terms (Shiva, 1993; Shiva andMoser, 1996; Agarwal, 1998).

Due to the complexity of these connections, we cannot speak here ofthe determination of interests on the basis of simple characteristics. It isa case, rather, of a conflict of distribution under a high degree of uncer-tainty (Lipschutz, 1998). Neither northern nor southern countries havebehaved in a concerted manner in the negotiations, but have formedalliances, in part according to extremely complex factors in which, inaddition to basic political positions, at least technical competence andflexibility in formulating positions play a role, and sometimes personalaspects too.16 This behaviour may be partially dependent on the struc-tural position of the country involved when, for example, in nearly allthe negotiations the US delegation makes alliances aimed at strength-ening intellectual property rights and weakening farmers' rights while,in contrast, the EU and several other European countries work to someextent with countries from the south.

Nevertheless, the essential characteristics of the pattern of compro-mises which led to the establishment of the CBD, the IU and other formsof the regulation of biodiversity can be explained by the correspondencebetween the aspects of conservation and technical use. In principle,possession of technology and natural resources is in inverse proportionto the interest in both these spheres in both north and south (Sainchezand Juma, 1994). It must be borne in mind, however, that the situationis considerably more complex than this simple model suggests. Neithernorth nor south is a homogeneous bloc or corresponds in any way tothe geographical facts, but rather to socio-economic ones, if at all. Bothin agriculture and in the issue of 'wild' biodiversity, conflicts of interestpermeate the individual states and state groups. Different forms of

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYagricultural use and the resulting dependencies are in conflict with oneanother, as are different uses of areas rich in biodiversity such as thetropical rainforest.

In agriculture, we can speak of a one-sided interest on the part ofmodem breeding and intensive agriculture in genetic resources, whichin contrast are sustained primarily by traditional extensive forms of agri-culture ('on farm'). Here, too, the interpretation of conflicts as basedpurely on north-south relationships is too simplified. As Flitner (1995:202ff.) has shown with regard to Kloppenburg's theory of internationaldependencies, neither geographical nor political areas (states) are thecentral units here, but economic strategies concerning the use of resourcesin a traditional or an industrial form. That the principle of nation-statesovereignty has established itself here, following de facto the suggestionby Kloppenburg and Kleinman (1988), was not factually (correspondingto the substantial-material dependencies) but politically determined: itis due to the primacy of the political form of the nation-state within thecontext of capitalist societalization.When in the CBD the principle of national sovereignty over biologi-cal resources is laid down as mandatory, this shows that a decisive levelof regulation continues to exist at the national level. The diverse interestblocs at this level have to develop a unified strategy based on theirrelative power potentials, which can then, via negotiations between thestates, be transformed into institutional (legal and political) conditionsfor capitalist valorization. Thus, it continues to be the case that the systemof political egulationtill centralizesheconflictingnterests t thelevelof thenation-state,ven thoughthepossibilityof comingto a consistent national'strategywhich is equallybinding or all playershas diminished.Altogether,therefore,hisis a highlycontradictoryrocess.On the one hand, in connec-tion with the new round of capitalist globalization the preconditions forthe establishment of structural principles of capitalist societalizationcontinue to be created at the political and legal level of the nation-state.On the other hand, their manifestation has changed greatly, and preciselybecause of this an increasingly repressiveabsorption of the contradictionsis to be expected.The third type of adjustment problems will only be touched on brieflyhere: the relationship of the international regulation of certain questionswithin the framework of the CBD and FAO to other international insti-tutions. If we turn our attention to 'implicit environmental politics' (KenConca, 1993) or to the 'transformation of the societal relationships withnature', then it becomes clear that other international regulations areimportant in the field of agrobiological diversity, perhaps even moreimportant. For one thing, there is the role of the World Bank, which devel-oped the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) before the signing andratification of the CBD. Officially this is an interim mechanism for the

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYinternational financing of biodiversity projects, which nevertheless hasbeen extended again and again in spite of criticism by some southerncountries and NGOs and which until now has had no alternative. Foranother thing, the World Bank - and to an even greater extent the IMF -are the expression of an international neo-liberal policy, which is sus-pected of making a major contribution to the aggravation of the globalenvironmental crisis. The CBD and the IU can certainly be interpreted as'weak' mechanisms of international regulation, which does not mean thatthey are without importance. The situation is similar for the UNCTADBiotrade Initiative, for this institution certainly belongs to those withinthe 'UN family' which have lost much of their importance in recent years.The relationship between different regulation mechanisms can also beseen clearly at another point, however: there is no doubt that the conceptof farmers' rights, which is basically accepted by the FAO and is increas-ingly noticed by the CBD, is being implemented in tension with anotherrecent agreement, namely that on trade-related intellectual propertyrights (TRIPs) within the reformulated GATT. The TRIPs agreement,which is managed by the WTO and is to be renegotiated in the nearfuture (GRAIN, 1998; Seiler, 1998), is intended to strengthen the effec-tiveness of patents, copyrights and plant breeders' rights, and representsa major restriction for the negotiations on farmers' rights within theframework of the FAO and the CBD since western patent law does notleave much room for other non-commercial economic forms such as, forexample, that of non-industrial agriculture. Art. 27.3. (b) of the TRIPsagreement requires 'the protection of plant varieties either by patents orby an effective sui generis system or by a combination thereof'.17 Thisbuilds on the major regulation regarding patents in Art. 27.1., namelythat patenting must be possible for 'any new inventions, whether prod-ucts or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application'.18 Astatement made by a number of NGOs to the plenum of the thirdConference of the Parties (COP) of the CBD (November 1996 in BuenosAires) pointed out contradictions between the different regulationprocesses, but these were not further discussed.19 Despite the negativedevelopments to be expected for many periphery countries, we canhardly speak of a 'new consensus in the South' (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997: 355) in the rejection of the currently enforced internationalregulations. The Committee on Trade and Environment, which until nowhas had little influence within the WTO, developed a number of friendlyrecommendations for a 'constructive relationship between trade and theenvironment' in the run-up to the first WTO ministerial conference inDecember 1996 in Singapore (WTO Focus 13 (November 1996)). Thesebrief remarks should serve the purpose of indicating that not only aredifferent international attempts at regulation complex in themselves and

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYin their design, but that there are contradictions between differentinstitutions which already exist or are in the process of coming intoexistence, which have to be dealt with in the course of the politicalprocess. The 'power' of institutions such as the WTO/TRIPs, theCBD and the FAO, which is closely connected to the correspondingproblems and the interests lying behind them, is an essential aspect ofthe meaning and dynamic processes of international political regulation.

V CONCLUSION:INTERDEPENDENCY AND RULING POWERThe commodification of biodiversity as an element of globalization isnot simply an economic process induced by market forces, but is some-thing which is established politically. This means that ecological aspectsbecome a factor in international competition, a strategical element oftrade policy. Questions concerning the use of resources, access to andrights over resources and the resulting consequences and negative effectsare mixed here with questions of benefits and benefit sharing from thisuse, above all (but not only) in north-south relations. Although ecologi-cal problems are not at all global in themselves, they must increasinglybe regarded in a global setting because of their socio-ecological 'embed-dedness' (which is greatly underestimated in the dominant debate onsustainable development with its strong orientation towards nation-statesand opportunities of changes).This is where questions of the international rule setting on the use ofbiological diversity come into the field. On the one hand, the differentforms of (attempts at) regulation must be related to one another, andon the other hand forms of non-rule setting or the non-observance ofagreed rules must be kept in mind. Contrary to 'optimistic' interpreta-tions it should have become clear that global environmental problemsdo not necessarily engender greater cooperation in problem solving; theexisting forms of cooperation to a large extent represent compromiseswhich both secure capitalist valorization and constitute environmentalpolicy as a part of national interest policy.The role of nation-states has changed in this context, but this doesnot mean we can assume that globalization and ecological crisis couldsignal the end of political processes and institutions at the nation-statelevel. Special attention must be paid to the empirically varying formsdeveloping in different fields and the 'natural' dependencies which theseexpress. Critical social scientists studying these problems should onno account devote themselves exclusively to problems of directedcontrol, in particular to the so-called management of the global commons,neglecting questions of domination and power. 'Global ecological inter-dependence' (Lipschutz and Conca, 1993) does not annul the processes

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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYtaking place both in and between nation-stateswhich form and repro-duce existingpatternsof domination,but bases itself upon thosepatterns.

NOTES1 This distinction is based on regulation theory, the German version of whichprovides the framework for this article (see in particular Hirsch and Roth,1986; Hirsch, 1990; Esser et al., 1994) and which has influenced the perspec-tive developed in it. For the German term Regulierung, we use politicalregulation or directed control, and Regulationis translated as societalregulation.The article is a thoroughly revised version of the contribution published inHein and Fuchs (1999). We wish to thank Wolfgang Hein, Joachim Hirschand the anonymous RIPE referees for valuable comments. We are especially

thankful to Irene Wilson for the translation.2 It is therefore no coincidence that many social democratic political viewsshow a structural affinity to those of neoliberals: the existence of an inde-pendent world market with an inherent competitive mechanism has alwaysbeen taken for granted by both.3 Unfortunately, the English edition of The Futureof theMarket(Altvater, 1993)does not contain this part.4 Edward 0. Wilson points out in his classic work, The Diversity of Life, thatthe majority of the species which have ever existed in the history of the earthare already extinct and that, in spite of this, biological diversity today isgreater than it has ever been (Wilson, 1992: 216). The problem is of courseanthropogenically caused loss of biological diversity. The Global BiodiversityAssessment by UNEP (1995) refers to 1.75 million identified species andstates that the plausible maximum number of species existing today isbetween 13 and 14 million.5 Cf. Buttel (1992). Within the framework of the CBD two of the problemswhich had been at the centre of the conflicts in the FAO in the 1980s werebasically excluded: the ex situ collections of genetic resources which hadbeen established over the decades in genetic databases in the north and ininternational agricultural research centres; and the farmers' rights, alreadymentioned, acquired via the cultivation of traditional plants. These questionscould not simply be excluded from the further negotiations on the IU,however, at least partly thanks to the work of NGOs such as the RuralAdvancement Foundation International (RAFI) and the Genetic ResourcesAction International (GRAIN), which followed the negotiation process veryclosely and attempted to intervene with far-reaching conceptual proposals(cf. Brand and Gorg, 1998b). But there were also structural reasons. The factthat the questions of ex situ collections and genetic databases remained onthe agenda also had something to do with the extremely complex situationwith regard to interests in this field, and here again with the combinationof distributional questions and environmental questions (in a broader sense).It was therefore not at all simple for the participating governments, due tothe complex problems and the complicated negotiation structure, to formu-late their individual 'national interests' and articulate them in thenegotiations, whereby in addition to the mixture of factual issues and ques-tions of power an additional component, demagogy, has to be taken intoaccount (Heins, 1996).6 Farmers' rights means rights arising from the past, present and future contri-butions of farmers to conserving, improving and making available plant

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GORG AND BRAND: THE REGULATION OF BIODIVERSITYgenetic resources, particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity. Theserights are vested in the international community, as trustee for present andfuture generations of farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full benefits tofarmers, and supporting the continuation of their contributions, as well asthe attainment of the overall purposes of the International Undertaking(Resolution 5/89 in Appendix II of the 35th FAO Conference, November1989). On the complex problems involved, see Guha and Martinez-Alier(1997).7 At the centre of the debate was a contribution by Alexander Cockburn inthe US journal The Nation of 30 June 1997 ('Wolfensohn, Indian killer'), whichis taken as evidence that the World Bank (in the person of its president,James Wolfensohn) violates its own political goals and in particular doesnot recognize the entitlements of indigenous peoples to control over theirown biological resources.

8 On the conflicts relating to the establishment of global commons, see thecontributions in Goldmann (1997).9 The need for the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resourcesand of a sustainable agriculture is also pointed out in Agenda 21, Chapter14. We concentrate, however, in the questions which interest us here, on theconsiderably more important and legally binding CBD.10 Barben (1997: 398f.) speaks in an examination of the complex 'battlefield' ofbiotechnology of the fact that in the sphere of biodiversity few results ofregulation are foreseeable due to the many novel unsolved problems.11 Thus, periphery countries are affected more strongly in the sphere of basicfoodstuffs, but also in resources for export, while the industrial countriesare also involved with regard to the interests of the seed and chemical indus-tries and as importers of biological resources.12 The establishment of modern forms of intensified farming (monocultures,high-yielding varieties, intensive irrigation, etc.) is recognized as one of themain causes of the erosion of biological diversity, not only in agriculture(FAO, 1996). This leads to an upgrading of supposed or actual alternatives,particularly traditional and indigenous forms of cultivation, but also to agreater acceptance of participative approaches to the use of resources(Eyzaguirre and Iwanaga, 1996; Bunders et al., 1996).

13 On this, see the monitoring of the EarthNegotiation Bulletin (ENB), publishedby the International Institute for Sustainable Development on the variousnegotiation rounds: http:/ /www.iisd.org14 At issue here is a list of plants to which the individual regulations apply, alist which includes food plants, possibly even basic foodstuffs; but also indus-trially utilizable plants. The sphere of forests as a 'hidden harvest' is alsodisputed.15 For example, the Colombian embassy, together with the University ofBonn, organized an ambitiously planned conference in November 1997 withthe title 'Biodiversity of Colombia - a Call for German-ColombianCooperation' (documented in Kraemer and Barthlott, 1998), which was setup as a 'sales meeting' for the biological diversity of Colombia. The enor-mous wealth of species in Colombia was emphasized, using a ranking scale,and the promising opportunities for cooperation and lucrative economicpossibilities were extolled. It remains to be proved that impulses for theconservation of biodiversity also emanated from this event. What becameclear, however, was that the countries with a high level of biodiversityfind themselves in a certain sense competing with regard to supply, in orderto convince international concerns with technological and other know-how

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REVIEWOF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMYand capital of the usefulness of the valorization of their 'own' biologicaldiversity.16 See especially on the policies of the NGOs at these conferences Brand andGorg (1998b). We have extensively studied the role of NGOs in general ininternational political processes and in particular in international biodiver-sity policy (Gorg and Hirsch, 1998; Brand and Gorg 1998a, 1998b; Brand2000). The studies showed that NGOs do not act homogeneously but them-selves represent manifold and in part contradictory interests. In the field ofinternational environmental policy their essential function is that of providingexpertise, and sometimes also the legitimation of certain forms of politics.They are much less important for the implementation of specific policies.For the field of agrobiological diversity we have classified four types of NGO(Brand and Gorg, 1998b; Brand, 2000): indigenous NGOs, developmentNGOs, so-called seeds NGOs and conservationist NGOs. In addition, thereare private consultancies and so-called industrial NGOs, which represent theinterests of firms.17 A sui generis system is a possible alternative to patents for plant geneticresources in that it allows existing systems of rights to continue if they are'effective' in the sense of TRIPs. Some experts fear that this could strengthenthe existing rights of commercial breeders (Kothari and Anuradha, 1996).Whether or not a sui generis system paves the way legally and politically foralternative forms of property rights (see, for example, Posey, 1996: 14ff.;GRAIN, 1996: 28ff.) must remain unanswered here.18 The exceptions to this regulation are defined in Art. 27.2. and are applicablewhen public order or morality is endangered, 'including to protect human,animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environ-ment'. That these regulations will be the subject of hard and unequal disputesgoes almost without saying.19 GATT is likely to promote inexorably the commercialization of agricul-ture for exports, spreading industrial agriculture with serious negativeconsequences for biodiversity.... The Committee on Trade andEnvironment [of the WTO] has so far failed to address these contradic-tions and is not likely to address them in the future. For that reason, wecall for full accountability of the World Trade Organization towards boththe UN system and legally binding Conventions such as the Conventionon Biological Diversity.The Conference of the Parties should establish a mechanism by which therelevant CBD regulations are integrated into the relevant GATT and WTOchapters (Statement, 1996).

REFERENCESAgarwal, Bina (1998) 'The gender and environment debate', in Roger Keil et al.

(eds) Political Ecology.GlobalEcology, London and New York: Routledge, pp.193-219.Agrawal, Arun (1996) 'Dismantling the divide between indigenous and scien-tific knowledge', Developmentand Change 26: 413-39.Alnasseri, Sabah, Brand, Ulrich, Sablowski, Thomas and Winter, Jens (2000)'Space, regulation and the periodisation of capitalism', in Robert Albritton,Makoto Itoh, Richard Westra and Alan Zuege (eds) Phases of CapitalistDevelopment. Booms, Crisis and Globalization, London: Macmillan, (forth-coming).394


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